DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA

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INDO-US TIES

Separation plan Can a strategic partnership between US and India grow I MANOHAR THYAGARAJ MARITIME SECURITY

Turning point Indian dockyards adopt global methods for shipbuilding I AJAI SHUKLA APRIL 2009

THANK YOU

INDIA FIFTY YEARS IN EXILE IS IT TIME TO DO MORE FOR TIBETANS Arun Shourie

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DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 1

ISSUE 5

Rs 250

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APRIL 2009

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

EDITOR Defence & Security of India

T

his month, it has been fifty years since the Tibetan community came to live in India. For this they have held processions and functions to show their gratitude to India. But DSI is exploring if India done enough to serve the cause of Tibet and to serve its own cause through the issue of Tibet. We examine how India’s security is inextricably linked with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion.

By giving the Dalai Lama asylum in India in 1959, India became a thorn in China’s political flesh, and perhaps it will serve India’s cause better to capitalise on that rather than pretend otherwise.

With China increasing control over Tibet by building railways, deploying its forces and even changing the demography of the region, experts believe the resolution of the Sino-Indian border is receding further away.

We have closely followed the fate of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and as the war in the island nation draws to a close, DSI is keeping a close watch on how the endgame will actually end. Will the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime’s ideology of majority rule, buttressed by military victory, actually translate into demonstrable political commitment to reach a settlement that will be acceptable to the Tamils?

DSI also continues to keep a watch on developments in Pakistan. Can Islamabad survive a deal with Taliban?

We at DSI are developing a core strength area in marking trends in the Indian defence industry. In this issue we look at the changing mindsets in the Indian naval industry, specifically in the area of warship building. The Indian navy is concentrating on building fleet capabilities rather than counting warship numbers but the change in thinking must translate into a real shift on the ground.

Merely creating state-of-the art infrastructure will not chart the course of future warship building, it will take effective decision-making.

As India’s relations with the United States grow, they become more complicated. We at DSI address the issue of difficulties in the defence partnership with Washington even as the strategic relationship remains on course.

Finally, to help us shape DSI into a periodical that meets your expectations, we continue to solicit the feedback of our readers. Write to us at dsieditor@gmail.com. In case you are wondering how you can subscribe, all you need to do is to send an email to dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will handle the rest.

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India’s security is inextricably linked with the existence of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival of Tibetan culture and religion

CONTENTS

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MARITIME SECURITY 06

TURNING POINT The Indian Navy is slowly moving towards becoming a more visible part of India’s military. With a growth in force structure, visibility and budget, the country’s naval force is increasing its fleet capabilities, both by acquiring and indigenously building warships.

WAR ZONE

36

INDIA-US RELATIONS

POST-WAR VS SEPARATION POST-CONFLICT PLAN The two-decade long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka seems to be coming to an end. But civilians are bearing the brunt of this catastrophe. While few have managed to escape, there are several others who are still in the clutches of the LTTE.

NEIGHBOURWATCH

COVER STORY

22

ROOF OF THE

WORLD It’s been 50 years since the Dalai Lama lost his home and sought refuge in India. Over the years, Indo-Tibet relations have seen many phases. But the big question now is should India play a more active role in helping Tibetans.

2

42

WARINESS IN PAKISTAN A young resident of the Swat Valley in Pakistan shares her grief at being in the middle of a province which seems to have lost its identity at the hands of the Taliban.

SPECIAL

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PAST VS FUTURE India has been privy to the Tibetan struggle for the past five decades. But is this past enough to create a better Indo-Tibetan relationship in the future?

3

14

Between 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with India has moved to a new sphere, motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia and the aftermath of 9/11.

CONTENTS

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APRIL 2009

DSI

MARITIME SECURITY 06

TURNING POINT The Indian Navy is slowly moving towards becoming a more visible part of India’s military. With a growth in force structure, visibility and budget, the country’s naval force is increasing its fleet capabilities, both by acquiring and indigenously building warships.

WAR ZONE

36

INDIA-US RELATIONS

POST-WAR VS SEPARATION POST-CONFLICT PLAN The two-decade long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka seems to be coming to an end. But civilians are bearing the brunt of this catastrophe. While few have managed to escape, there are several others who are still in the clutches of the LTTE.

NEIGHBOURWATCH

COVER STORY

22

ROOF OF THE

WORLD It’s been 50 years since the Dalai Lama lost his home and sought refuge in India. Over the years, Indo-Tibet relations have seen many phases. But the big question now is should India play a more active role in helping Tibetans.

2

42

WARINESS IN PAKISTAN A young resident of the Swat Valley in Pakistan shares her grief at being in the middle of a province which seems to have lost its identity at the hands of the Taliban.

SPECIAL

28

PAST VS FUTURE India has been privy to the Tibetan struggle for the past five decades. But is this past enough to create a better Indo-Tibetan relationship in the future?

3

14

Between 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with India has moved to a new sphere, motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia and the aftermath of 9/11.

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CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 5 EDITOR

AJAI SHUKLA

ARUN SHOURIE

CLAUDE ARPI

MANOHAR THYAGARAJ

PAIKIASOTHY SARAVANAMUTTU

SHUJA NAWAZ

Working in both the visual and the print medium, Ajai Shukla is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. He has been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

A member of parliament, Arun Shourie has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

French by birth, Claude Arpi has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is the author of several books on Tibet, India and China and Indo-French relations including Tibet the Lost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a dental surgeon from Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided to come to India. In December 1974, he joined Auroville, the international community founded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual collaborator.

An nternational relations expert whose work has appeared in USAF Air and Space Power Journal and ORBIS. Manohar Thyagaraj is also the founding editor of Engagel NDUS, a journal on US-India relations.

He is currently a Director of the US-India Business Alliance (USIBA), a trade association with offices in Washington and New Delhi, and consults with US and Indian defence companies.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) an independent and nonpartisan public policy institute focusing on issues of democratic governance and peace through programmes of research and advocacy.

Author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008) and the forthcoming FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS January 2009), Shuja Nawas is currently the first Director of the South Asia Center of The Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington DC.

Sonia Shukla ASSISTANT EDITOR

Rewati Rau ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar Parveen Kumar Subrata Jana BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

K-35, Green Park Main New Delhi 110016. India Ph: +91 11 26868775/26960926 Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi 110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40. For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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APRIL, 2009

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 5 EDITOR

AJAI SHUKLA

ARUN SHOURIE

CLAUDE ARPI

MANOHAR THYAGARAJ

PAIKIASOTHY SARAVANAMUTTU

SHUJA NAWAZ

Working in both the visual and the print medium, Ajai Shukla is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. He has been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

A member of parliament, Arun Shourie has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

French by birth, Claude Arpi has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is the author of several books on Tibet, India and China and Indo-French relations including Tibet the Lost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a dental surgeon from Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided to come to India. In December 1974, he joined Auroville, the international community founded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual collaborator.

An nternational relations expert whose work has appeared in USAF Air and Space Power Journal and ORBIS. Manohar Thyagaraj is also the founding editor of Engagel NDUS, a journal on US-India relations.

He is currently a Director of the US-India Business Alliance (USIBA), a trade association with offices in Washington and New Delhi, and consults with US and Indian defence companies.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) an independent and nonpartisan public policy institute focusing on issues of democratic governance and peace through programmes of research and advocacy.

Author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008) and the forthcoming FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS January 2009), Shuja Nawas is currently the first Director of the South Asia Center of The Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington DC.

Sonia Shukla ASSISTANT EDITOR

Rewati Rau ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar Parveen Kumar Subrata Jana BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

K-35, Green Park Main New Delhi 110016. India Ph: +91 11 26868775/26960926 Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi 110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40. For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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MARITIME SECURITY

DSI

TURNING

POINT Indian dockyards adopt global methods for shipbuilding

Ajai Shukla

F

OR the Indian Navy these are times of change. After decades as a nearly invisible part of India’s military, the growth in the Indian Navy’s force structure, visibility and budget are being carefully observed by every other power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Asia-Pacific.

A significant indicator of the navy’s shift into the mainstream of Indian strategic planning — even more so than the growing number of capital warships — is the growth in its command and administrative infrastructure. The deep-water Karwar naval base, located 34 nautical miles south of Goa, is nearing completion.

Aimed at decongesting Mumbai, Karwar will be home base for 42 ships including the aircraft carrier, Vikramaditya, when it is commissioned. Karwar’s upgraded facilities include a Synchronised Ship Lift cum Transfer System that can lift more than 10,000 displacement tons.

Nearing completion too is INS

Kadamba, an administrative support base, which was commissioned in 2005.

Another important addition to the navy’s capabilities is the new Naval Academy at Ezhimala, 280 kilometres north of Kochi, in Kerala. This year it is expected to reach its full capacity of 750 cadets a year.

The navy’s changing mindset is visible also in its approach to warships; it is now concentrating on fleet capabilities, rather than merely counting warship numbers.

India’s growing skill in integrating disparate sensors and weapons on indigenous warships gives them heavier punches than many others in the same weight class. For that reason, and because indigenous production costs just half to one-third the cost of procurement from any country other than Russia, the Indian Navy is increasingly looking to its three defence shipyards—Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL); Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) and the smaller Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL)—to manufacture India’s entire requirement of surface combatants.

Currently only four surface warships are on order in foreign shipyards: Russia is building the INS Vikramaditya, and three stealth frigates of the improved Krivak class. India also looks to foreign suppliers for auxiliary vessels like fleet tankers.

And in submarine production, India is

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The view of the armament from the deck of INS Shivalik

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MARITIME SECURITY

DSI

TURNING

POINT Indian dockyards adopt global methods for shipbuilding

Ajai Shukla

F

OR the Indian Navy these are times of change. After decades as a nearly invisible part of India’s military, the growth in the Indian Navy’s force structure, visibility and budget are being carefully observed by every other power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Asia-Pacific.

A significant indicator of the navy’s shift into the mainstream of Indian strategic planning — even more so than the growing number of capital warships — is the growth in its command and administrative infrastructure. The deep-water Karwar naval base, located 34 nautical miles south of Goa, is nearing completion.

Aimed at decongesting Mumbai, Karwar will be home base for 42 ships including the aircraft carrier, Vikramaditya, when it is commissioned. Karwar’s upgraded facilities include a Synchronised Ship Lift cum Transfer System that can lift more than 10,000 displacement tons.

Nearing completion too is INS

Kadamba, an administrative support base, which was commissioned in 2005.

Another important addition to the navy’s capabilities is the new Naval Academy at Ezhimala, 280 kilometres north of Kochi, in Kerala. This year it is expected to reach its full capacity of 750 cadets a year.

The navy’s changing mindset is visible also in its approach to warships; it is now concentrating on fleet capabilities, rather than merely counting warship numbers.

India’s growing skill in integrating disparate sensors and weapons on indigenous warships gives them heavier punches than many others in the same weight class. For that reason, and because indigenous production costs just half to one-third the cost of procurement from any country other than Russia, the Indian Navy is increasingly looking to its three defence shipyards—Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL); Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) and the smaller Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL)—to manufacture India’s entire requirement of surface combatants.

Currently only four surface warships are on order in foreign shipyards: Russia is building the INS Vikramaditya, and three stealth frigates of the improved Krivak class. India also looks to foreign suppliers for auxiliary vessels like fleet tankers.

And in submarine production, India is

6

The view of the armament from the deck of INS Shivalik

7

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learning to swim in the deep end: The second and tional methods. From mid-2011, all its first indigenously produced third vessels of frigates and destroyers will be designed and built using submarine will be the Advanced Project 15-A “modular shipbuilding” methods.

Technology Vessel (ATV), a Conventional shipbuilding was nuclear-powered attack submarine, currently under manufacture in Vishaka- relatively simple: first weld together a patnam, the headquarters of India’s East- steel hull, put it in the water, and then fit the engines, fitments, piping, electrical ern Navy Command. wiring, weaponry and electronics that make it a fighting platform. This was Indigenous production THE WINDS of change are blowing most a slow and difficult process, with strongly into the sails of India’s shipyard workers often having to programme for designing and construct- function in contorted positions in the ing surface warships. In March 2009, dark, cramped confines of tiny compartthe Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), ments deep in the bowels of the vessel the top acquisition body in India’s Ministry under construction.

Modular shipbuilding is far more of Defence (MoD), gave the green light for Project 15-B — the construction of complex in design, but simpler to execute. four destroyers of the improved Kolkata Like a giant Lego game, the warship is built class in MDL. These will be the last in 300-ton blocks, each block complete warships that MDL builds using conven- with all the piping, electrical wiring

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and fitments that form a part of the ship. Each of these blocks is constructed in a well-lit, spacious modular workshop.

Since the blocks are open at both ends, and provide the workers with access at different levels, they can work comfortably to fit the items that form a part of that block. Once the 300-ton blocks are ready, they are lifted out of the modular workshop by a giant crane, carried to the slipway and joined together with its neighbouring blocks. A series of such blocks is thus assembled into a complete warship.

But modular construction entails an entirely different set of design challenges. Each bulkhead wall, each pipe, each cable, and each electronic component in a 300-ton block must precisely connect with its counterpart in the neighbouring block. Each block is designed separately, but all of them must

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MARITIME SECURITY come together in perfect alignment.

Because of these design complexities the Indian warship-building community— - including the Ministry of Defence (MoD); the Directorate of Naval Design (DND); and the two largest defence shipyards, MDL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) —- agree that the switch to modular shipbuilding will require the expertise of a foreign design partner. Since Russian shipyards have never done modular shipbuilding, and the budding US-India defence relationship has still to generate a sufficient degree of mutual confidence, only the European shipyards are in the race to be India’s design partner for modular shipbuilding.

At pole position is French major DCNS, with a clever strategy that hinges on bidding as part of an Indian joint venture (JV). On 27th Feb 09, the DCNS board passed a resolution for DCNS to join a three-party design consultancy in partnership with GRSE and Indian IT engineering company, Infotech Enterprises. The board of Infotech Enterprises is expected to clear its participation by April, after which the JV will apply for registration in Kolkata.

The JV will carry out marine engineering tasks for clients anywhere, including back office work for DCNS, one of the world’s biggest warship builders.

But the first design job that the JV is eyeing is Project 17-A, India’s biggest-

The Indian shipyards say there is no need to build abroad.

Confident after building the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they need from a foreign partner is help with the design

”

ever naval purchase, a Rs 17,000 crore (US $3.4 billion) plan for the modular construction of seven stealth frigates, which will be successors to the Project 17 Shivalik Class that is nearing completion at MDL. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had earlier accorded sanction for these seven frigates but the order is pending because the Indian Navy and the shipyards disagree on a crucial issue: the navy is insisting that the first two Project 17-A frigates must be built abroad, with Indian dockyard workers observing and learning the process before undertaking manufacture in India. The Indian shipyards, however, say there is no need to build abroad. Confident after building the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they need from a foreign partner is help with the design.

Says Admiral HS Malhi, Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) of MDL, “We need to go abroad for the production drawings. But for actual modular construction, no technology is required to be transferred” But the Indian Navy is wary of chronic delays in warship building in India; it believes that if MDL and GRSE try to master modular shipbuilding while actually building the first Project 17-A frigates, the entire programme will be delayed unacceptably. The Director of Naval Design, Rear Admiral MK Badhwar, strongly argues that Indian shipyard workers must learn the ropes of modular shipbuilding, while the selected foreign design partner builds the first two frigates in his own shipyard.

This, points out the DND, “will also make the vendor demonstrate “buildability”. He must demonstrate that his design can be actually built into a warship, using modular construction, in four years. That will create a demonstrated benchmark for GRSE and MDL. Otherwise, if there are delays later, our shipyards could argue that the foreign yard too would have taken a long period to build each frigate.”

The final decision between these two viewpoints will have a significant effect on the cost of Project 17-A. Warship construction in India has proved to be far cheaper than building abroad, particularly in European shipyards. The cost of Project 17—for building three 4900-ton Shivalik Class stealth frigates in MDL—has come to about Rs 7000 crores (US $1.4 billion). The cost of Project 15-A—for building three

10

6800-ton destroyers in MDL, including long-term spares—is about Rs 12,000 crores (US $2.4 billion). In contrast Spanish shipyard, Navantia, has charged the Australian navy almost US $6 billion for three 3000-ton F100 frigates.

Whichever way the Indian MoD rules -- and South Block sources indicate that it is inclined to rule in favour of constructing at least six Project 17-A frigates in Indian yards — DCNS is well positioned to benefit. The DCNS-GRSE-Infotech JV will have the advantage of being registered as an Indian company. Furthermore, DCNS has a comfortThe bridge (left) able working relationand the stateship with both MDL of-the-art and GRSE; besides the Command ongoing Scorpene subCentre on INS marine programme in Shivalik (below) MDL, DCNS has worked with both shipyards on several other projects. And finally, the modular construction infrastructure coming up in MDL and GRSE is very similar to that in DCNS’s shipyards in France.

Admiral Malhi points out, “We already have a relationship with DCNS; we are building the Scorpene together. They have the same infrastructure as we have, which means that the drawings they make can be easily translated into warships in our yard.

But we will keep our options open by asking (Italian shipyard) Fincantieri to bid as well.”

GRSE and MDL are coordinating strategy for winning this high-stakes game.

They have joined forces, rather than competing for the order, arguing that the navy would get their seven warships quickly if both shipyards worked on them concurrently. If this were accepted, Project 17-A would be the first naval project to be split between two shipyards.

Admiral Mahli explains, “We have to ensure that the navy gets all these seven warships by 2021. That means GRSE and MDL might both work concurrently on Project 17 A. You might have four built in MDL and three in GRSE. There is enough work for both shipyards.”

The two shipyards are walking the talk.

In early 2009, Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence Production, inaugurated GRSE’s modernisation programme. And a visit to MDL reveals hectic work in progress on creating Rs 800 crores (US $160 million) worth of infrastructure for modular construction. MDL says these facilities will be completed by mid-2011, when

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manufacture of the Project 17-A frigates is expected to start.

Under construction at both MDL and GRSE are covered workshops large enough for constructing 300-ton modules inside; sliding roofs that allow for lifting out the completed modules; 300-ton Goliath cranes on rails that extend from the modular workshop, across two or three construction slipways. These convey the completed modules to whichever frigate they are meant for.

MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi, confirms progress is on schedule. “Italian company, Fagioli, in partnership with McNally Bharat Engineering (MBE), is building the 300-ton Goliath crane. With a span of 138 metres, it will be the longest in India, stretching across the two slipways and across the modular workshop.”

Expanding capabilities EVEN as this infrastructure upgrade continues, GRSE and MDL are grappling with a spate of ongoing programmes.

Besides six Scorpene submarines under construction, MDL is working on Project 17 (three Shivalik class frigates) and Project 15-A (three Kolkata class destroyers); four Project 15-A destroyers will soon be added onto MDL’s order book. Meanwhile GRSE is struggling to meet its delivery schedule for Project 28 (four anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, stealth corvettes, an order that could rise substantially). Simultaneously, GRSE is working on ten Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and two Landing Ships Tank Large (LSTLs).

Both shipyards, located in thriving commercial cities, have no space for additional construction slipways. Furthermore, this surge of naval orders comes at the end of a long process of downsizing shipyard workforces. MDL, for example, has reduced its workforce from 16,000 in 1987 to just 6000 today.

Outsourcing production bridges this gap, between the amount of work on order and the number of workers in the shipyard. For each warship series, targets are laid down in terms of percentage of work that must be outsourced. For Project 15-A, it was decided that 25% of the first ship (INS Kolkata) would be outsourced. This would be increased for subsequent vessels: for the third vessel, the target was 50%.

As he takes us around the yard, the Superintendent of Project-15A, Commander HC Dhamija, points out the work that is being subcontracted. Over a

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MARITIME SECURITY come together in perfect alignment.

Because of these design complexities the Indian warship-building community— - including the Ministry of Defence (MoD); the Directorate of Naval Design (DND); and the two largest defence shipyards, MDL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) —- agree that the switch to modular shipbuilding will require the expertise of a foreign design partner. Since Russian shipyards have never done modular shipbuilding, and the budding US-India defence relationship has still to generate a sufficient degree of mutual confidence, only the European shipyards are in the race to be India’s design partner for modular shipbuilding.

At pole position is French major DCNS, with a clever strategy that hinges on bidding as part of an Indian joint venture (JV). On 27th Feb 09, the DCNS board passed a resolution for DCNS to join a three-party design consultancy in partnership with GRSE and Indian IT engineering company, Infotech Enterprises. The board of Infotech Enterprises is expected to clear its participation by April, after which the JV will apply for registration in Kolkata.

The JV will carry out marine engineering tasks for clients anywhere, including back office work for DCNS, one of the world’s biggest warship builders.

But the first design job that the JV is eyeing is Project 17-A, India’s biggest-

The Indian shipyards say there is no need to build abroad.

Confident after building the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they need from a foreign partner is help with the design

”

ever naval purchase, a Rs 17,000 crore (US $3.4 billion) plan for the modular construction of seven stealth frigates, which will be successors to the Project 17 Shivalik Class that is nearing completion at MDL. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had earlier accorded sanction for these seven frigates but the order is pending because the Indian Navy and the shipyards disagree on a crucial issue: the navy is insisting that the first two Project 17-A frigates must be built abroad, with Indian dockyard workers observing and learning the process before undertaking manufacture in India. The Indian shipyards, however, say there is no need to build abroad. Confident after building the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they need from a foreign partner is help with the design.

Says Admiral HS Malhi, Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) of MDL, “We need to go abroad for the production drawings. But for actual modular construction, no technology is required to be transferred” But the Indian Navy is wary of chronic delays in warship building in India; it believes that if MDL and GRSE try to master modular shipbuilding while actually building the first Project 17-A frigates, the entire programme will be delayed unacceptably. The Director of Naval Design, Rear Admiral MK Badhwar, strongly argues that Indian shipyard workers must learn the ropes of modular shipbuilding, while the selected foreign design partner builds the first two frigates in his own shipyard.

This, points out the DND, “will also make the vendor demonstrate “buildability”. He must demonstrate that his design can be actually built into a warship, using modular construction, in four years. That will create a demonstrated benchmark for GRSE and MDL. Otherwise, if there are delays later, our shipyards could argue that the foreign yard too would have taken a long period to build each frigate.”

The final decision between these two viewpoints will have a significant effect on the cost of Project 17-A. Warship construction in India has proved to be far cheaper than building abroad, particularly in European shipyards. The cost of Project 17—for building three 4900-ton Shivalik Class stealth frigates in MDL—has come to about Rs 7000 crores (US $1.4 billion). The cost of Project 15-A—for building three

10

6800-ton destroyers in MDL, including long-term spares—is about Rs 12,000 crores (US $2.4 billion). In contrast Spanish shipyard, Navantia, has charged the Australian navy almost US $6 billion for three 3000-ton F100 frigates.

Whichever way the Indian MoD rules -- and South Block sources indicate that it is inclined to rule in favour of constructing at least six Project 17-A frigates in Indian yards — DCNS is well positioned to benefit. The DCNS-GRSE-Infotech JV will have the advantage of being registered as an Indian company. Furthermore, DCNS has a comfortThe bridge (left) able working relationand the stateship with both MDL of-the-art and GRSE; besides the Command ongoing Scorpene subCentre on INS marine programme in Shivalik (below) MDL, DCNS has worked with both shipyards on several other projects. And finally, the modular construction infrastructure coming up in MDL and GRSE is very similar to that in DCNS’s shipyards in France.

Admiral Malhi points out, “We already have a relationship with DCNS; we are building the Scorpene together. They have the same infrastructure as we have, which means that the drawings they make can be easily translated into warships in our yard.

But we will keep our options open by asking (Italian shipyard) Fincantieri to bid as well.”

GRSE and MDL are coordinating strategy for winning this high-stakes game.

They have joined forces, rather than competing for the order, arguing that the navy would get their seven warships quickly if both shipyards worked on them concurrently. If this were accepted, Project 17-A would be the first naval project to be split between two shipyards.

Admiral Mahli explains, “We have to ensure that the navy gets all these seven warships by 2021. That means GRSE and MDL might both work concurrently on Project 17 A. You might have four built in MDL and three in GRSE. There is enough work for both shipyards.”

The two shipyards are walking the talk.

In early 2009, Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence Production, inaugurated GRSE’s modernisation programme. And a visit to MDL reveals hectic work in progress on creating Rs 800 crores (US $160 million) worth of infrastructure for modular construction. MDL says these facilities will be completed by mid-2011, when

11

DSI

manufacture of the Project 17-A frigates is expected to start.

Under construction at both MDL and GRSE are covered workshops large enough for constructing 300-ton modules inside; sliding roofs that allow for lifting out the completed modules; 300-ton Goliath cranes on rails that extend from the modular workshop, across two or three construction slipways. These convey the completed modules to whichever frigate they are meant for.

MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi, confirms progress is on schedule. “Italian company, Fagioli, in partnership with McNally Bharat Engineering (MBE), is building the 300-ton Goliath crane. With a span of 138 metres, it will be the longest in India, stretching across the two slipways and across the modular workshop.”

Expanding capabilities EVEN as this infrastructure upgrade continues, GRSE and MDL are grappling with a spate of ongoing programmes.

Besides six Scorpene submarines under construction, MDL is working on Project 17 (three Shivalik class frigates) and Project 15-A (three Kolkata class destroyers); four Project 15-A destroyers will soon be added onto MDL’s order book. Meanwhile GRSE is struggling to meet its delivery schedule for Project 28 (four anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, stealth corvettes, an order that could rise substantially). Simultaneously, GRSE is working on ten Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and two Landing Ships Tank Large (LSTLs).

Both shipyards, located in thriving commercial cities, have no space for additional construction slipways. Furthermore, this surge of naval orders comes at the end of a long process of downsizing shipyard workforces. MDL, for example, has reduced its workforce from 16,000 in 1987 to just 6000 today.

Outsourcing production bridges this gap, between the amount of work on order and the number of workers in the shipyard. For each warship series, targets are laid down in terms of percentage of work that must be outsourced. For Project 15-A, it was decided that 25% of the first ship (INS Kolkata) would be outsourced. This would be increased for subsequent vessels: for the third vessel, the target was 50%.

As he takes us around the yard, the Superintendent of Project-15A, Commander HC Dhamija, points out the work that is being subcontracted. Over a

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hundred private contractors have developed important sub-systems of the Kolkata class destroyers. These include L&T (stabilizers and steering gear); Kirloskar Pneumatics (air-conditioning and refrigeration systems); and Godrej (watertight doors and hatches). In addition, some 30-40 private contractors work inside MDL, installing equipment, preparing the warship and doing housekeeping tasks. These include companies like Excel Coatings, which has been contracted work involving painting and blasting.

Commander Dhamija says that this not only increases the shipyard’s output, but allows the shipyard’s workers to focus on core, high-end skills: “Many activities can be outsourced because those skills are available out there in the market. So we are increasing our capacity to produce warships by outsourcing many kinds of

A significant indicator of the navy’s shift into the mainstream of Indian strategic planning —even more so than the growing number of capital warships —is the growth in its command and administrative infrastructure

12

work. This also allows us to focus on our core strengths like hull fabrication; welding; and propulsion and weapons systems related equipment.”

Outsourcing, however, will only pick up real momentum once private companies are convinced that substantial profits lie in doing business with shipyards and in putting money into developing the expensive, high-tech systems that INS Kolkata go onto warships. Priunder construction vate contractors complain that the MoD (top left); A orders warships in submarine batches of just three or under refit at four vessels, after Mazagon Dock which a new warship series is introduced. Usually, this means fresh expense for the contractors in developing upgraded systems for the new series.

Private contractors, as well as defence shipyards, suggest that a warship series be expanded to at least 7-10 vessels, so that a viable Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) is available to vendors. MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi holds up the example of the US Navy’s DDG-51 destroyer project, under which 62 destroyers have already been churned out with standardised hulls and propulsion systems. He points out, “If you have that kind of production line, the speed of building and the cost of building comes down dramatically.”

But change is in the air with Project 17-A. Admiral Malhi admits, “There has never been an order like this, where you have had seven ships of one class. It will give everyone downstream the chance to sort out their production plans… Once vendors know they are catering for a Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) of seven ships, they will invest in R&D and in upgrading production facilities. They will have the confidence of having orders for several years.”

This is why Project 17-A, and the way the MoD decides to distribute the order— between foreign and Indian yards on the one hand, and between MDL and GRSE on the other—could be crucial in charting the future of warship building in India.

Expect a decision soon.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. He has been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

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INDO-US TIES

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Dichotomy of the US-India security relationship: Can a strategic partnership grow without an avalanche of defence systems sales?

SEPARATION Manohar Thyagaraj

PLAN 14

ETWEEN 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with India clearly moved to a new plateau, motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia and the aftermath of 9/11.

The path to developing defence and security-related dialogue since 2001–a process which pre-dated the nuclear deal - forked along two distinct, but related arcs.

The first arc deals primarily with military-to-military contacts like Red Flag, Malabar, Cope India exercise series and Special Forces training (India has had a large International Military Exchange and Training–IMET– programme for years) as well as

B

between the US and India high-level exchange visits Indian Navy Chief Admiral in this decade. Less known such as those between Sureesh Mehta (far left), US is that the Indian Navy has Indian Navy Chief Admiral Chief of Naval Operations sent pilots to a US Navy Sureesh Mehta and US Admiral Gary Roughead training course in PenChief of Naval Operations (above) and Indo-US ships sacola, Florida. These pilots (CNO) Admiral Gary Roug- in a joint exercise will be flying the MiG-29Ks head that aimed to deepen personal relationships between top that the Indian Navy will deploy when it finally gets its hands on the serving officers in both countries.

This level of inter-force exchange is nec- ex-Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov. essary from both countries’ perspectives to Where military-to-military contacts create personal linkages and comfort are concerned, the two countries could not levels that are important for the perpetua- today be on firmer footing.

The second arc deals with the process tion of a security relationship. Decades of collaboration have created such a measure of defence technology procurement by of comfort between US and Pakistani India from the United States to fit its military modernisation plans. forces at an operational level.

The progress here has been steady, Cope India, Red Flag and Malabar are well known bilateral military exercises without being spectacular, starting

15

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Page 1

APRIL 2009

INDO-US TIES

DSI

Dichotomy of the US-India security relationship: Can a strategic partnership grow without an avalanche of defence systems sales?

SEPARATION Manohar Thyagaraj

PLAN 14

ETWEEN 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with India clearly moved to a new plateau, motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia and the aftermath of 9/11.

The path to developing defence and security-related dialogue since 2001–a process which pre-dated the nuclear deal - forked along two distinct, but related arcs.

The first arc deals primarily with military-to-military contacts like Red Flag, Malabar, Cope India exercise series and Special Forces training (India has had a large International Military Exchange and Training–IMET– programme for years) as well as

B

between the US and India high-level exchange visits Indian Navy Chief Admiral in this decade. Less known such as those between Sureesh Mehta (far left), US is that the Indian Navy has Indian Navy Chief Admiral Chief of Naval Operations sent pilots to a US Navy Sureesh Mehta and US Admiral Gary Roughead training course in PenChief of Naval Operations (above) and Indo-US ships sacola, Florida. These pilots (CNO) Admiral Gary Roug- in a joint exercise will be flying the MiG-29Ks head that aimed to deepen personal relationships between top that the Indian Navy will deploy when it finally gets its hands on the serving officers in both countries.

This level of inter-force exchange is nec- ex-Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov. essary from both countries’ perspectives to Where military-to-military contacts create personal linkages and comfort are concerned, the two countries could not levels that are important for the perpetua- today be on firmer footing.

The second arc deals with the process tion of a security relationship. Decades of collaboration have created such a measure of defence technology procurement by of comfort between US and Pakistani India from the United States to fit its military modernisation plans. forces at an operational level.

The progress here has been steady, Cope India, Red Flag and Malabar are well known bilateral military exercises without being spectacular, starting

15

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INDO-US TIES with the Indian Two F-15 Eagles Army’s purchase from Elmendorf of AN/TPQ-37 FireAir Force Base, finder radars in 2001.

Alaska, fly with In 2007, the Indian two Indian air Navy took possession force SU-30K of the USS Trenton, Flankers and two a Landing Platform Mirage 2000 Dock, which was reaircraft during named the INS Cope India’ 04 Jalashva.

In early 2008, the Indian Air Force signed a contract for C-130Js for Special Operations use. On 1st January 2009, the Indian Navy signed on the dotted line for the purchase of 8 P-8Is for maritime patrol purposes.

Yet - and this is a big yet - over the last few months of 2008, US industry decided to no-bid on several programme in India, including an Indian Army contract for 197 light helicopters, an Indian Army programme to procure 22 attack helicopters, and the Indian Army’s MediumRange Surface-to-Air Missile programme.

The reasons for each of these withdrawals or decisions not to compete were varied: from evaluation by companies of the financial implications of India’s offset policy to procedural delays on both sides.

US industry, unlike the relationship between some of their global competitors and their respective governments, cannot count on the US government for financial support in the process of international business development. As publicly listed companies, they ultimately answer to the stock market.

For each company’s financial handlers, the annualised number of collective US ‘successes’, when compared to the total number of projects in which US companies are involved or express interest in, is still considered small.

It is almost certain, transfers of equipment out of US military stock, such as the AN/TPQ-37s and the USS Trenton, would have limited commercial impact for US companies.

Further, the margin that companies make on defence projects in the US itself is fairly small (sources suggest 10-12% is common). International business development in any country, not just India, with the attendant market-entry obligations, will further affect the likely profit that US companies forecast.

In short, an increasing view among the US industry and US government is that the market opportunities in India for US

DSI

US government and defence industry In short, an increasing in circles that unless some progress is made view among the US on EUM and CISMOA, US industry would be able to deliver sensitive technoloindustry and US not gies which fall under the purview of EUM. government is that the This includes technologies in which the armed forces have expressed great market opportunities in Indian interest, and which the US is fully willing to India for US technology release, provided an EUM agreement to support the US-India is in place. strategic and defence Separation of a strategic partnerrelationship may ship from defence sales to India be outweighed by IN 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the notion that India should market risks alluded seek to leverage its significant external

”

technology to support the US-India strategic and defence relationship may be outweighed by market risks.

The question that industry observers and strategic analysts must ask is: can the US-India strategic partnership be separated from the pipeline of defence technology transfer between the US and India? Could the two arcs continue to function as separate?

Difficulties in US-India defence procurement dialogue AS MAY be expected, the perspectives from both sides are different.

In part, the problems identified by US industry and policymakers stem from the procurement process in India itself, and from the requirements spawned by the new offset policy. When Bell Helicopter withdrew from the Light Helicopter programme, they cited the 50% offset

16

requirement as a chief reason, believing that they would not be able to satisfy it given the policy’s strictures and their perception of the capacity of the Indian aerospace industry.

In addition, several sources suggest that India has proven unwilling to sign Technical Assistance Agreements, which would limit how much pre-RFP information could be provided to India and also potentially limit the execution of offset projects. TAAs essentially function as Non-Disclosure Agreements that must be approved by the State Department.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that India has been reluctant to approve the use of FMS (Foreign Military Sales) cases, a key factor in one of the US industry withdrawals. In theory, there is no bar to an FMS case being used in a competitive, tendered programme. Many sensitive US military technologies can

only be sold to foreign governments under the FMS programme.

Indian decision-makers and industry frequently still cite US delays in processing license applications. Further, US industry themselves cite occasionally lukewarm support from certain US government agencies in processing cases related to India.

US technology transfer policy (grounded in law written by the US Congress) requires the Administration to have certain inter-governmental agreements signed between the US and recipient countries of US defence technology.

The most important of these are an End-Use Monitoring (EUM) agreement and a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) to ensure the security of US defencerelated equipment transferred overseas.

India, so far, has not agreed to an

umbrella EUM agreement with the US, despite signing case-by-case EUM texts for past contracts. The reasons for prolonging of assent on EUM text are many – political and procedural – but they are underpinned by an apprehension in India about allowing the US unfettered and at-will access for ‘inspection’.

US interlocutors frequently assert this is an unfounded apprehension as they are not insisting on unannounced inspections, but do need to satisfy reporting requirements as mandated by law. US law requires verification to this end, not inspections, which is a key difference in perception.

Although objections have been raised to EUM on grounds that it infringes on Indian national sovereignty, there is precedent for the US and India reaching such an agreement. The US and India exchanged diplomatic notes between Under Secretary of State James Webb and Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit on the 7th and 16th March 1951. In the note from Ambassador Pandit, concerning the terms and conditions that would be attached to sale of US defence items to India, including EUM, the government of India was clearly “in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed.”

Well into 2009, it is thus a common view

17

arms purchases for strategic advantage.

Certainly, the national treasure that any major importer of defence systems spends on the global market is a driver for exacting or cementing strategic gains. The global defence market is a driver for security dependencies: buyer states need to maximize their security; seller states need the additional economic security for their defence-industrial complexes, in order to provide for their own security.

To normalise this argument, the US as a country is not a defence exporter in the mould of states such as Israel or France, in that exports are not essential to sustain its domestic defence industry. The US domestic market is large enough that US industry could continue to provide adequately for US security without an avalanche of exports.

In states where defence-industrial complexes have limited domestic markets, companies need exports to survive, in order to be able to consistently provide for the home state’s own security.

The ‘security’ that defence exporter states seek, excluding the US, thus has both physical and economic dimensions.

On the other hand, defence exports for the US are primarily driven by calculations that focus on expanding its own physical security.

One hastens to add that the global economic meltdown has altered this dynamic to some degree for the US, but the argument still holds as a general pattern, and is reflected in the exhaustive export control process. Industry and government in the US do not necessarily have their playbooks synchronised on the subject.

It is important to note a general trend here: the US is used to providing defence equipment to allies and countries that are wholly dependent on the US for their

Indo-US Change 2nd time.qxd:KARGIL.qxd

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INDO-US TIES with the Indian Two F-15 Eagles Army’s purchase from Elmendorf of AN/TPQ-37 FireAir Force Base, finder radars in 2001.

Alaska, fly with In 2007, the Indian two Indian air Navy took possession force SU-30K of the USS Trenton, Flankers and two a Landing Platform Mirage 2000 Dock, which was reaircraft during named the INS Cope India’ 04 Jalashva.

In early 2008, the Indian Air Force signed a contract for C-130Js for Special Operations use. On 1st January 2009, the Indian Navy signed on the dotted line for the purchase of 8 P-8Is for maritime patrol purposes.

Yet - and this is a big yet - over the last few months of 2008, US industry decided to no-bid on several programme in India, including an Indian Army contract for 197 light helicopters, an Indian Army programme to procure 22 attack helicopters, and the Indian Army’s MediumRange Surface-to-Air Missile programme.

The reasons for each of these withdrawals or decisions not to compete were varied: from evaluation by companies of the financial implications of India’s offset policy to procedural delays on both sides.

US industry, unlike the relationship between some of their global competitors and their respective governments, cannot count on the US government for financial support in the process of international business development. As publicly listed companies, they ultimately answer to the stock market.

For each company’s financial handlers, the annualised number of collective US ‘successes’, when compared to the total number of projects in which US companies are involved or express interest in, is still considered small.

It is almost certain, transfers of equipment out of US military stock, such as the AN/TPQ-37s and the USS Trenton, would have limited commercial impact for US companies.

Further, the margin that companies make on defence projects in the US itself is fairly small (sources suggest 10-12% is common). International business development in any country, not just India, with the attendant market-entry obligations, will further affect the likely profit that US companies forecast.

In short, an increasing view among the US industry and US government is that the market opportunities in India for US

DSI

US government and defence industry In short, an increasing in circles that unless some progress is made view among the US on EUM and CISMOA, US industry would be able to deliver sensitive technoloindustry and US not gies which fall under the purview of EUM. government is that the This includes technologies in which the armed forces have expressed great market opportunities in Indian interest, and which the US is fully willing to India for US technology release, provided an EUM agreement to support the US-India is in place. strategic and defence Separation of a strategic partnerrelationship may ship from defence sales to India be outweighed by IN 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the notion that India should market risks alluded seek to leverage its significant external

”

technology to support the US-India strategic and defence relationship may be outweighed by market risks.

The question that industry observers and strategic analysts must ask is: can the US-India strategic partnership be separated from the pipeline of defence technology transfer between the US and India? Could the two arcs continue to function as separate?

Difficulties in US-India defence procurement dialogue AS MAY be expected, the perspectives from both sides are different.

In part, the problems identified by US industry and policymakers stem from the procurement process in India itself, and from the requirements spawned by the new offset policy. When Bell Helicopter withdrew from the Light Helicopter programme, they cited the 50% offset

16

requirement as a chief reason, believing that they would not be able to satisfy it given the policy’s strictures and their perception of the capacity of the Indian aerospace industry.

In addition, several sources suggest that India has proven unwilling to sign Technical Assistance Agreements, which would limit how much pre-RFP information could be provided to India and also potentially limit the execution of offset projects. TAAs essentially function as Non-Disclosure Agreements that must be approved by the State Department.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that India has been reluctant to approve the use of FMS (Foreign Military Sales) cases, a key factor in one of the US industry withdrawals. In theory, there is no bar to an FMS case being used in a competitive, tendered programme. Many sensitive US military technologies can

only be sold to foreign governments under the FMS programme.

Indian decision-makers and industry frequently still cite US delays in processing license applications. Further, US industry themselves cite occasionally lukewarm support from certain US government agencies in processing cases related to India.

US technology transfer policy (grounded in law written by the US Congress) requires the Administration to have certain inter-governmental agreements signed between the US and recipient countries of US defence technology.

The most important of these are an End-Use Monitoring (EUM) agreement and a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) to ensure the security of US defencerelated equipment transferred overseas.

India, so far, has not agreed to an

umbrella EUM agreement with the US, despite signing case-by-case EUM texts for past contracts. The reasons for prolonging of assent on EUM text are many – political and procedural – but they are underpinned by an apprehension in India about allowing the US unfettered and at-will access for ‘inspection’.

US interlocutors frequently assert this is an unfounded apprehension as they are not insisting on unannounced inspections, but do need to satisfy reporting requirements as mandated by law. US law requires verification to this end, not inspections, which is a key difference in perception.

Although objections have been raised to EUM on grounds that it infringes on Indian national sovereignty, there is precedent for the US and India reaching such an agreement. The US and India exchanged diplomatic notes between Under Secretary of State James Webb and Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit on the 7th and 16th March 1951. In the note from Ambassador Pandit, concerning the terms and conditions that would be attached to sale of US defence items to India, including EUM, the government of India was clearly “in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed.”

Well into 2009, it is thus a common view

17

arms purchases for strategic advantage.

Certainly, the national treasure that any major importer of defence systems spends on the global market is a driver for exacting or cementing strategic gains. The global defence market is a driver for security dependencies: buyer states need to maximize their security; seller states need the additional economic security for their defence-industrial complexes, in order to provide for their own security.

To normalise this argument, the US as a country is not a defence exporter in the mould of states such as Israel or France, in that exports are not essential to sustain its domestic defence industry. The US domestic market is large enough that US industry could continue to provide adequately for US security without an avalanche of exports.

In states where defence-industrial complexes have limited domestic markets, companies need exports to survive, in order to be able to consistently provide for the home state’s own security.

The ‘security’ that defence exporter states seek, excluding the US, thus has both physical and economic dimensions.

On the other hand, defence exports for the US are primarily driven by calculations that focus on expanding its own physical security.

One hastens to add that the global economic meltdown has altered this dynamic to some degree for the US, but the argument still holds as a general pattern, and is reflected in the exhaustive export control process. Industry and government in the US do not necessarily have their playbooks synchronised on the subject.

It is important to note a general trend here: the US is used to providing defence equipment to allies and countries that are wholly dependent on the US for their

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INDO-US TIES An argument could be made that the US will remain the world’s pre-eminent military power well into the 21st century, as no other state will be in a position or inclined to challenge it.

Annual US defence spending exceeds that of all other nations combined

security, including democracies and states that could be deemed authoritarian.

India is an outlier in this framework, as a country that is a democracy, but will never depend totally on the US for its physical security needs. Security ‘dependency’ is thus seen differently by India as compared to the US’ other strategic partners.

India will seek to maximize its strategic ‘autonomy’, meaning a broad-basing of defence imports as much as possible.

It is an article of faith in India’s foreign policy to maintain relationships with all major powers for the purposes of flexibility. History and current trends show this extends to defence procurement as well.

For India, this pattern could imply that the leveraging of arms purchases for strategic advantage equates to the development of new relationships rather than the simple extension of existing ones.

The obvious ‘new’ strategic relationship is with the US. But, one must keep in mind that a traditional perception of any strategic relationship of this kind in India would emphasize defence-economic levers, when these levers are not as important to the US as they are to India.

Thus, to decipher whether the USIndia strategic partnership can be sepa-

global commitments. rated from a defence Su-30MKI conducts What could suffer are relationship, several factors post-flight maintenance for large-ticket future prohave to be kept in mind: Red Flag 2008 (above); The curements such as Future First: is US power USS Trenton becomes INS waning? On the global Jalashva as the Indian flag is Combat Systems and the F-22. Despite this, the US stage, the US is no longer raised on the ship (right) defence industry is unthe pre-eminent power in all the domains that an international likely to see, or be allowed to see by the political economist would identify as US government, exports as an existential characterizing a hegemonic power. For need to the degree that other defenceinstance, the US no longer controls the industrial complexes do.

Second: in the context of major power lion’s share of global productivity.

However, the argument could be made re-alignment, what does this strategic that the US will remain the world’s partnership mean from the perspective of pre-eminent military power well into the either country?

An important point needs to be made: 21st century, as no other state will be in a position or inclined to challenge it. it is impossible to separate security (and Annual US defence spending exceeds that the tools of security co-operation) from the definition of a strategic partnership of all other nations combined.

The emphasis on EUM must thus be between any two countries.

Both countries inescapably have seen in this light as well. It’s likely that the US will take extra steps to safeguard its shared security interests such as: regional intellectual property (and minimize the stability; securing the Indian Ocean chance of leakage to potential adversaries) Region (IOR) for flow of goods, especially while the major powers jockey for energy; countering threats from radical alignment in the latter part of the century. Islamist non-state actors; interdiction of And, even while the US economy is WMD-related shipments and perhaps challenged by the global economic most pertinently the prevention of a single downturn, defence spending is likely to power from dominating Asia.

It is reasonable to assert that for India, remain high while the US has ongoing

18

”

the term ‘strategic partnership’ denotes a pathway to strategic autonomy more than operational congruence. While for the US, the term is used more regularly to denote a pathway to operational congruence with strategic partners.

This divergence in basic assumption goes still deeper. For India, the term ‘strategic partnership’ lacks uniform definition and is fungible based on the partner in question. This allows India flexibility in creating a multitude of such partnerships.

As evidenced by its moves toward the nuclear deal, the 2005 ‘New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship’, and subsequent actions, India clearly believes that engaging the US is a contributor to its goal of strategic autonomy.

If policymakers in both countries believe that ad hoc congruence of state interests can drive operational congruence, then any divergence in perception of this strategic partnership can be managed by making sure the Indian and US militaries have the option to operate together as situations require.

However, this line of thinking suggests a ‘strategic partnership’ in a new paradigm from those the US and India have been accustomed to working with. The

19

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INDO-US TIES An argument could be made that the US will remain the world’s pre-eminent military power well into the 21st century, as no other state will be in a position or inclined to challenge it.

Annual US defence spending exceeds that of all other nations combined

security, including democracies and states that could be deemed authoritarian.

India is an outlier in this framework, as a country that is a democracy, but will never depend totally on the US for its physical security needs. Security ‘dependency’ is thus seen differently by India as compared to the US’ other strategic partners.

India will seek to maximize its strategic ‘autonomy’, meaning a broad-basing of defence imports as much as possible.

It is an article of faith in India’s foreign policy to maintain relationships with all major powers for the purposes of flexibility. History and current trends show this extends to defence procurement as well.

For India, this pattern could imply that the leveraging of arms purchases for strategic advantage equates to the development of new relationships rather than the simple extension of existing ones.

The obvious ‘new’ strategic relationship is with the US. But, one must keep in mind that a traditional perception of any strategic relationship of this kind in India would emphasize defence-economic levers, when these levers are not as important to the US as they are to India.

Thus, to decipher whether the USIndia strategic partnership can be sepa-

global commitments. rated from a defence Su-30MKI conducts What could suffer are relationship, several factors post-flight maintenance for large-ticket future prohave to be kept in mind: Red Flag 2008 (above); The curements such as Future First: is US power USS Trenton becomes INS waning? On the global Jalashva as the Indian flag is Combat Systems and the F-22. Despite this, the US stage, the US is no longer raised on the ship (right) defence industry is unthe pre-eminent power in all the domains that an international likely to see, or be allowed to see by the political economist would identify as US government, exports as an existential characterizing a hegemonic power. For need to the degree that other defenceinstance, the US no longer controls the industrial complexes do.

Second: in the context of major power lion’s share of global productivity.

However, the argument could be made re-alignment, what does this strategic that the US will remain the world’s partnership mean from the perspective of pre-eminent military power well into the either country?

An important point needs to be made: 21st century, as no other state will be in a position or inclined to challenge it. it is impossible to separate security (and Annual US defence spending exceeds that the tools of security co-operation) from the definition of a strategic partnership of all other nations combined.

The emphasis on EUM must thus be between any two countries.

Both countries inescapably have seen in this light as well. It’s likely that the US will take extra steps to safeguard its shared security interests such as: regional intellectual property (and minimize the stability; securing the Indian Ocean chance of leakage to potential adversaries) Region (IOR) for flow of goods, especially while the major powers jockey for energy; countering threats from radical alignment in the latter part of the century. Islamist non-state actors; interdiction of And, even while the US economy is WMD-related shipments and perhaps challenged by the global economic most pertinently the prevention of a single downturn, defence spending is likely to power from dominating Asia.

It is reasonable to assert that for India, remain high while the US has ongoing

18

”

the term ‘strategic partnership’ denotes a pathway to strategic autonomy more than operational congruence. While for the US, the term is used more regularly to denote a pathway to operational congruence with strategic partners.

This divergence in basic assumption goes still deeper. For India, the term ‘strategic partnership’ lacks uniform definition and is fungible based on the partner in question. This allows India flexibility in creating a multitude of such partnerships.

As evidenced by its moves toward the nuclear deal, the 2005 ‘New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship’, and subsequent actions, India clearly believes that engaging the US is a contributor to its goal of strategic autonomy.

If policymakers in both countries believe that ad hoc congruence of state interests can drive operational congruence, then any divergence in perception of this strategic partnership can be managed by making sure the Indian and US militaries have the option to operate together as situations require.

However, this line of thinking suggests a ‘strategic partnership’ in a new paradigm from those the US and India have been accustomed to working with. The

19

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result would be a learning curve for policymakers in both countries so that expectations can be managed.

Third: from a US perspective, for India to become as relevant as possible in a security sense, the best capability multipliers, and certainly the tools of globally relevant interoperability, will come from the US. Interoperability, or at least the ability to choose it when required, would be essential for India as many global militaries adopt US-led net-centric standards.

Interoperability, and the quest for it with states that have congruent interests, is one of the tools for the US to manage the maintenance of its strategic interests when

governmental issues, to some extent.

Fifth: the Indian offset policy aims to empower India’s previously languid defence industry and turn it into an exporter.

Empirical evidence suggests that US industry does a far better job of energizing local industry participation using offsets in any country they have been engaged in. In the case of the T-50 jet trainer development with South Korea, offsets were used as a key tool. Suppliers to US industry have been developed in several countries such as Israel using offsets.

Targeted US imports could thus be a gateway to India being able to become as large an exporter as the government of In-

KC-130 J Hercules aircraft

its own relational power is changing.

Fourth: Can procurements from the US include co-developments of technologies in strategic areas such as missile defence?

India is already exploring such co-developments with Israel and Russia and has previous experience with co-developing the Shakti engine with France (India owns 15%) and the Brahmos missile with Russia.

In the case of co-developments with these countries, the value-addition from Indian industry varies, but the core technologies are still sourced from the partner. This was certainly true in the case of the Shakti engine and is true in the case of the Brahmos. In fact, industry experts suggest that the Russians still do not part with some of the core propulsion technology. The PAK-FA 5th-generation fighter design was also frozen by the Russians.

Since US industry would be providing core technologies for co-development, US-India co-developments would still depend on settlement of current inter-

Can procurements from the US include co-developments of technologies in strategic areas such as missile defence? India is already exploring such co-developments with Israel and Russia

”

20

dia envisioned, since the market for the resulting exports from India would be larger.

But, if India chooses to broad-base its procurements, the impact of this variable in defence economics will be mitigated. At the same time, this broad-basing will likely increase US concerns about EUM. In summary, whether India views the development of the US-India strategic partnership on security through the prism of defence economics more than physical security or vice versa, the ‘funnel’ or path to consistent de jure congruence on physical security is not yet defined.

This is a ‘new’ strategic partnership, not just in name, but in form. The top-level driver for strategic congruence is obvious - the simple fact that both countries are large, multi-ethnic democracies with shared security interests.

In other ways, the lower-level drivers for this strategic congruence are not yet clear, and could be characterized as outof-sync in both capitals. The immediate future of this partnership depends on how quickly policymakers in either country can come to terms with its evolving definitions.

In the meantime, to answer the title question - since the contours of this ‘strategic partnership’ remain undefined, it is difficult to estimate whether it could exist outside of a rational defence technology relationship.

As the cascade of military-to-military contacts has shown, this strategic partnership has already expressed itself. But, if operational congruence isneeded at some point, it would undoubtedly be more the robust if India were to adopt and adapt some core US technologies toward its military modernization. Military-to-military contacts and exercises can only take a strategic partnership in security up to a point.

In bilateral actions on security, whether or not the two countries engage in ‘trivial tasks’ to keep the ‘silence at bay’, like the title characters in ‘Waiting for Godot’, will stem directly from the deepening of the defence sourcing relationship to mutual benefit.

Manohar Thyagaraj is an international relations expert whose work has appeared in USAF Air and Space Power Journal and ORBIS, and is the founding editor of Engagel NDUS, a journal on US-India relations. He is currently a director of the US-India Business Alliance (USIBA), a trade association with offices in Washington and New Delhi, and consults with US and Indian defence companies.

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COVER STORY

ROOF OF THE

WORLD The Tibetan Government in exile has completed fifty years in India, but what has India done for Tibet?

ARUN SHOURIE

T

HE Tibetan Government in Exile has just completed fifty years in India, its been fifty years since its greatest leader, the Dalai Lama, lost his home and state and sought asylum in India. In these fifty years, India’s policy towards Tibet has been through many avatars, but everyone seems to agree on five facts: Tibet’s cause is just; Tibetans have given no cause for offence China has already reduced Tibetans to a minority, even in Lhasa. It is systematically obliterating the Tibetan culture and the identity of the Tibetan people; It has not succeeded as yet, but nor has it loosened its grip; People across the world feel intensely about this injustice and oppression, but governments are silent.

India’s policy towards Tibet has to be assessed on the touchstone: how does it address the danger that these facts pose for India?

The policy has moved from: Viewing the Government of Tibet as the Government of an independent country; to Viewing Tibet as an autonomous country

or region under the overall “suzerainty” of China; to Viewing Tibet as an autonomous region under the “sovereignty” of China; to Viewing Tibet as a region that is an integral part of China and one in which China can do as it pleases – what happens to Tibet and Tibetans being an internal affair of China; To not merely viewing Tibet as such, but to accepting the Chinese definition of Tibet– as is well known, China has hacked off half the area of Tibet that encompasses half the population of Tibetans and submerged it in Han provinces.

From the time of Pandit Nehru, India’s policy has been to shut its eyes to what is happening in Tibet, to what the Chinese are doing in Tibet. In particular, to what they are doing to the culture and people of Tibet; and to the military buildup there.

This was evident in the way in which, under Pandit Nehru’s firm hand, the Indian Government shut its eyes to the roads and other infrastructure which were being built in Tibet.

Indeed, the “policy” was carried further.

The view was taken, and enforced, that we should not only not ourselves raise, but we should oppose efforts by others to raise their voice in fora like the United Nations on what was being done to Tibetans. This, Panditji laid down, is what would be in the best interests of the Tibetans themselves!

Along with this shutting of eyes to Chinese buildup has gone a shutting of eyes

22

to the fact that India’s security is inextricably intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion. One reason for this, of course, is that it is the representative of the Government of Tibet who signed the Simla Agreement in 1914 with the British Government of India and not the representative of the Government of China – though, it must be remembered, that the objection of the Chinese representative was not to the border between Tibet and India but to the border between Tibet and China. The second reason is that unless there is an area of peace between China and India, an area in which there is no great Chinese military presence, our northern borders are directly exposed. The ecology of India is just as closely interlinked with what happens across the Tibetan plateau. The deforestation of eastern Tibet that has already taken place; mining and other activities that China is pursuing with vigour across Tibet; the diversion of Tibetan waters to the north

by China engineering works for which have already begun – all these are bound to affect the entire plain of north and east India, as, indeed, they are bound to affect the countries all along the Mekong river delta.

In the case of China and Tibet, as the years have gone by, we have shut our eyes tighter and tighter. In the last few years, in particular up to 2007, the Chinese attitude towards Tibet has hardened; the buildup of infrastructure in Tibet – an infrastructure

Tibetan women shouting anti-Chinese slogans in front of the United Nations regional headquarters in New Delhi

23

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COVER STORY

ROOF OF THE

WORLD The Tibetan Government in exile has completed fifty years in India, but what has India done for Tibet?

ARUN SHOURIE

T

HE Tibetan Government in Exile has just completed fifty years in India, its been fifty years since its greatest leader, the Dalai Lama, lost his home and state and sought asylum in India. In these fifty years, India’s policy towards Tibet has been through many avatars, but everyone seems to agree on five facts: Tibet’s cause is just; Tibetans have given no cause for offence China has already reduced Tibetans to a minority, even in Lhasa. It is systematically obliterating the Tibetan culture and the identity of the Tibetan people; It has not succeeded as yet, but nor has it loosened its grip; People across the world feel intensely about this injustice and oppression, but governments are silent.

India’s policy towards Tibet has to be assessed on the touchstone: how does it address the danger that these facts pose for India?

The policy has moved from: Viewing the Government of Tibet as the Government of an independent country; to Viewing Tibet as an autonomous country

or region under the overall “suzerainty” of China; to Viewing Tibet as an autonomous region under the “sovereignty” of China; to Viewing Tibet as a region that is an integral part of China and one in which China can do as it pleases – what happens to Tibet and Tibetans being an internal affair of China; To not merely viewing Tibet as such, but to accepting the Chinese definition of Tibet– as is well known, China has hacked off half the area of Tibet that encompasses half the population of Tibetans and submerged it in Han provinces.

From the time of Pandit Nehru, India’s policy has been to shut its eyes to what is happening in Tibet, to what the Chinese are doing in Tibet. In particular, to what they are doing to the culture and people of Tibet; and to the military buildup there.

This was evident in the way in which, under Pandit Nehru’s firm hand, the Indian Government shut its eyes to the roads and other infrastructure which were being built in Tibet.

Indeed, the “policy” was carried further.

The view was taken, and enforced, that we should not only not ourselves raise, but we should oppose efforts by others to raise their voice in fora like the United Nations on what was being done to Tibetans. This, Panditji laid down, is what would be in the best interests of the Tibetans themselves!

Along with this shutting of eyes to Chinese buildup has gone a shutting of eyes

22

to the fact that India’s security is inextricably intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion. One reason for this, of course, is that it is the representative of the Government of Tibet who signed the Simla Agreement in 1914 with the British Government of India and not the representative of the Government of China – though, it must be remembered, that the objection of the Chinese representative was not to the border between Tibet and India but to the border between Tibet and China. The second reason is that unless there is an area of peace between China and India, an area in which there is no great Chinese military presence, our northern borders are directly exposed. The ecology of India is just as closely interlinked with what happens across the Tibetan plateau. The deforestation of eastern Tibet that has already taken place; mining and other activities that China is pursuing with vigour across Tibet; the diversion of Tibetan waters to the north

by China engineering works for which have already begun – all these are bound to affect the entire plain of north and east India, as, indeed, they are bound to affect the countries all along the Mekong river delta.

In the case of China and Tibet, as the years have gone by, we have shut our eyes tighter and tighter. In the last few years, in particular up to 2007, the Chinese attitude towards Tibet has hardened; the buildup of infrastructure in Tibet – an infrastructure

Tibetan women shouting anti-Chinese slogans in front of the United Nations regional headquarters in New Delhi

23

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COVER STORY

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We continue to shut our eyes to what the Chinese are doing in Tibet and to what they are doing towards India

”

that can be used for military purposes as much as for anything else – has become more intense; and the incursions and other hostile acts towards India have become much more frequent, and broader in range: to take just two examples, recall how China has striven to prevent closer relations between ASEAN and India; how it has striven to snuff out any chance that there might have been of India, along with countries like Japan joining the Security Council.

It was only during the buildup to the Olympic Games that China felt it necessary to show a benign face to the world, that these hostile acts were tempered.

Spiritual leader Dalai Lama answers But, the Olympics over, China has questions from resumed its oppresjournalists sion in Tibet just as in New Delhi it has resumed its hard stance towards India in general and on the border issue in particular.

In India, on the other hand, we continue to shut our eyes to both – what the Chinese are doing in Tibet and to what they are doing towards India.

The net result is that the Chinese, having already swallowed Tibet, are now making systematic inroads onto the southern slopes of the Himalayas. The pace at which they are extending their presence and influence in Nepal since the Maoist Government took over are to be seen to be believed – and yet to this also India continues to shut its eyes. Nor should any of it surprise us. After all, a China that is spreading its influence in Latin America, Central Asia, Africa is not going to overlook these countries along its southern rim.

The danger will not go away just because we refuse to see it.

24

A clue to the coming years lies in the contrasting attitudes of governments and legislatures in the West. This very month, both the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives have passed resolutions endorsing the cause of Tibet and its people. In this very month, governments of those very countries have bent backwards to assure China that they will not inconvenience it. For two reasons, at least, I fear things are going to get much worse in the coming months. On the one hand, China is now in a position where no Government is prepared to talk the truth about or to China: look at the turnaround in the policy of Australia; similarly, with the US now dependent on China for financing its bailout packages, the US will not take a stand on any issue that may offend China – look at the way China has silenced the new US Administration by reminding it of the extent to which China holds US Government paper, and what it can do to the dollar’s value and, even more so, to its status as an international reserve currency.

borders were successively The second factor concerns Tibetans in exile in advanced northwards and us in India. It is an apprehen- Delhi burn a Chinese sion, thus far mercifully just a flag as they take part eastwards by British surveyors in late 19th and early 20th possibility, but a possibility in a protest century. That the Chinese have nonetheless. Namely, that in the coming years, we may have in India similarly enlarged the entire concept of even weaker coalitions than we have had “China” is not mentioned at all: is it not a in the last few years, that leadership in India fact that the original China was only may pass into hands which will be even one-third of what China is today? I hear more preoccupied with its own petty cal- similar “objectivity” in regard to the culations and even less concerned with eastern border, in particular in regard to what is happening in Tibet as in other ar- Tawang. This cannot but dissipate national eas around India. The rationalization that resolve; it cannot but further expose became so convenient an alibi when China Tibetans to Chinese oppression; and it invaded Tibet will come in handy again: cannot but ultimately endanger India.

We must bear in mind that China has a “When the country most affected by developments in Tibet, namely India, is silent, clear view of what it wants to be – the domwhy should we get worked up about the inant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards India developments?”

This goes for the border between Tibet as a potential nuisance, a nuisance that and India. There is a unilateral objectivity, must be confined within South Asia. All its espousing which is taken as the hallmark policies, including its policy of conquering of “independent thinking” in India. Books and suppressing Tibet, its policy of militarizhave been put out showing how in regard ing Tibet and stationing air and nuclear to Aksai Chin, for instance, the Indian bases in Tibet, are part of this larger policy.

25

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COVER STORY

DSI

We continue to shut our eyes to what the Chinese are doing in Tibet and to what they are doing towards India

”

that can be used for military purposes as much as for anything else – has become more intense; and the incursions and other hostile acts towards India have become much more frequent, and broader in range: to take just two examples, recall how China has striven to prevent closer relations between ASEAN and India; how it has striven to snuff out any chance that there might have been of India, along with countries like Japan joining the Security Council.

It was only during the buildup to the Olympic Games that China felt it necessary to show a benign face to the world, that these hostile acts were tempered.

Spiritual leader Dalai Lama answers But, the Olympics over, China has questions from resumed its oppresjournalists sion in Tibet just as in New Delhi it has resumed its hard stance towards India in general and on the border issue in particular.

In India, on the other hand, we continue to shut our eyes to both – what the Chinese are doing in Tibet and to what they are doing towards India.

The net result is that the Chinese, having already swallowed Tibet, are now making systematic inroads onto the southern slopes of the Himalayas. The pace at which they are extending their presence and influence in Nepal since the Maoist Government took over are to be seen to be believed – and yet to this also India continues to shut its eyes. Nor should any of it surprise us. After all, a China that is spreading its influence in Latin America, Central Asia, Africa is not going to overlook these countries along its southern rim.

The danger will not go away just because we refuse to see it.

24

A clue to the coming years lies in the contrasting attitudes of governments and legislatures in the West. This very month, both the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives have passed resolutions endorsing the cause of Tibet and its people. In this very month, governments of those very countries have bent backwards to assure China that they will not inconvenience it. For two reasons, at least, I fear things are going to get much worse in the coming months. On the one hand, China is now in a position where no Government is prepared to talk the truth about or to China: look at the turnaround in the policy of Australia; similarly, with the US now dependent on China for financing its bailout packages, the US will not take a stand on any issue that may offend China – look at the way China has silenced the new US Administration by reminding it of the extent to which China holds US Government paper, and what it can do to the dollar’s value and, even more so, to its status as an international reserve currency.

borders were successively The second factor concerns Tibetans in exile in advanced northwards and us in India. It is an apprehen- Delhi burn a Chinese sion, thus far mercifully just a flag as they take part eastwards by British surveyors in late 19th and early 20th possibility, but a possibility in a protest century. That the Chinese have nonetheless. Namely, that in the coming years, we may have in India similarly enlarged the entire concept of even weaker coalitions than we have had “China” is not mentioned at all: is it not a in the last few years, that leadership in India fact that the original China was only may pass into hands which will be even one-third of what China is today? I hear more preoccupied with its own petty cal- similar “objectivity” in regard to the culations and even less concerned with eastern border, in particular in regard to what is happening in Tibet as in other ar- Tawang. This cannot but dissipate national eas around India. The rationalization that resolve; it cannot but further expose became so convenient an alibi when China Tibetans to Chinese oppression; and it invaded Tibet will come in handy again: cannot but ultimately endanger India.

We must bear in mind that China has a “When the country most affected by developments in Tibet, namely India, is silent, clear view of what it wants to be – the domwhy should we get worked up about the inant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards India developments?”

This goes for the border between Tibet as a potential nuisance, a nuisance that and India. There is a unilateral objectivity, must be confined within South Asia. All its espousing which is taken as the hallmark policies, including its policy of conquering of “independent thinking” in India. Books and suppressing Tibet, its policy of militarizhave been put out showing how in regard ing Tibet and stationing air and nuclear to Aksai Chin, for instance, the Indian bases in Tibet, are part of this larger policy.

25

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COVER STORY We must bear in mind that China has a clear view of what it wants to be —the dominant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards India as a potential nuisance that must be confined within South Asia

DSI

few Britishers took it upon themselves to hunt them down and excavate them.

Among the places in the world, where this great heritage of mankind, and the Buddha’s doctrine and practice, were preserved has been Tibet. The great Tibetan masters have been with us and amidst us now for 50 years. It is indeed true that Panditji helped set up institutions in which higher Tibetan learning and Tibetan arts and culture could be preserved and nourished. And there is no doubt that the Tibetans themselves feel that these institutions have been instrumental in helping save their culture and religion. But it is equally true that, as a people, we have not thought it necessary to learn from the Tibetan masters.

In this sense, the Tibetan monk policy of succesdelegates arrive at the sive governments closing session of the of India, the polChinese People's icy of shutting Political Consultative our eyes to what Conference (CPPCC) at the Great Hall of the is happening in Tibet and what People in Beijing China is doing around India is representative of the way we have shut our eyes to the presence of Tibetan masters in our midst.

As a people and as a country we will pay for this.

It is often said, “But we had no option in 1949/50.” Take that to be true for a moment.

The tragedy is that six long decades later, we remain a country without options.

It is weakness that lies at the root. The rest, accepting Chinese “suzerainty” one day, “sovereignty” the next; accepting Tibet as an autonomous region within China one day and as an internal affair of China the next – these are just successive steps to “operationalize” that weakness, so to say. Unless we acquire strength comparable to that of China; unless we build up an alliance system with other countries that are concerned about Chinese intentions and might, we will be left with hope as our only policy: the hope that “ultimately truth triumphs,” that “ultimately tyrannies dissolve,” the hope that like all else ultimately China too will evolve towards freedom and democracy.

”

We must also be clear that China is just not going to make any conciliatory move in regard to Tibet. In fact, one sure road for Chinese leadership to ascend has been through Tibet: the present President of China won his spurs by the systematic oppression of Tibet that he directed and over which he presided. China only goes through the pretence of talking to the Dalai Lama’s delegations from time to time – as it did, for instance, in the run-up to the Olympic Games. It is only waiting for the Dalai Lama to pass away, knowing that, with this centre of gravity gone, the Tibetans will be reduced to an even more helpless situation.

It is for this reason that we can expect that, in the coming months, China will put the kind of pressure on India which it has put recently on South Africa – pressure to either silence the Dalai Lama completely or to evict him from India. And, I’m afraid, there will be no shortage of rationalizers who will say, “Why should we let one man, howsoever eminent and pious, come in the way of improving relations between China and India, as improving those relations is required for India’s own security?”

There is another feature about India’s stance towards Tibet, a feature that reveals a lot about us as a people, a feature that goes beyond the attitude of successive Indian governments. As is well known, the Buddhist tradition was forgotten in India; in fact, the Buddha himself seems to have been forgotten and the Buddhist sites erased from our collective memory till a

Arun Shourie is a Member of Parliament.

He has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government. He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

26

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COVER STORY We must bear in mind that China has a clear view of what it wants to be —the dominant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards India as a potential nuisance that must be confined within South Asia

DSI

few Britishers took it upon themselves to hunt them down and excavate them.

Among the places in the world, where this great heritage of mankind, and the Buddha’s doctrine and practice, were preserved has been Tibet. The great Tibetan masters have been with us and amidst us now for 50 years. It is indeed true that Panditji helped set up institutions in which higher Tibetan learning and Tibetan arts and culture could be preserved and nourished. And there is no doubt that the Tibetans themselves feel that these institutions have been instrumental in helping save their culture and religion. But it is equally true that, as a people, we have not thought it necessary to learn from the Tibetan masters.

In this sense, the Tibetan monk policy of succesdelegates arrive at the sive governments closing session of the of India, the polChinese People's icy of shutting Political Consultative our eyes to what Conference (CPPCC) at the Great Hall of the is happening in Tibet and what People in Beijing China is doing around India is representative of the way we have shut our eyes to the presence of Tibetan masters in our midst.

As a people and as a country we will pay for this.

It is often said, “But we had no option in 1949/50.” Take that to be true for a moment.

The tragedy is that six long decades later, we remain a country without options.

It is weakness that lies at the root. The rest, accepting Chinese “suzerainty” one day, “sovereignty” the next; accepting Tibet as an autonomous region within China one day and as an internal affair of China the next – these are just successive steps to “operationalize” that weakness, so to say. Unless we acquire strength comparable to that of China; unless we build up an alliance system with other countries that are concerned about Chinese intentions and might, we will be left with hope as our only policy: the hope that “ultimately truth triumphs,” that “ultimately tyrannies dissolve,” the hope that like all else ultimately China too will evolve towards freedom and democracy.

”

We must also be clear that China is just not going to make any conciliatory move in regard to Tibet. In fact, one sure road for Chinese leadership to ascend has been through Tibet: the present President of China won his spurs by the systematic oppression of Tibet that he directed and over which he presided. China only goes through the pretence of talking to the Dalai Lama’s delegations from time to time – as it did, for instance, in the run-up to the Olympic Games. It is only waiting for the Dalai Lama to pass away, knowing that, with this centre of gravity gone, the Tibetans will be reduced to an even more helpless situation.

It is for this reason that we can expect that, in the coming months, China will put the kind of pressure on India which it has put recently on South Africa – pressure to either silence the Dalai Lama completely or to evict him from India. And, I’m afraid, there will be no shortage of rationalizers who will say, “Why should we let one man, howsoever eminent and pious, come in the way of improving relations between China and India, as improving those relations is required for India’s own security?”

There is another feature about India’s stance towards Tibet, a feature that reveals a lot about us as a people, a feature that goes beyond the attitude of successive Indian governments. As is well known, the Buddhist tradition was forgotten in India; in fact, the Buddha himself seems to have been forgotten and the Buddhist sites erased from our collective memory till a

Arun Shourie is a Member of Parliament.

He has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government. He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

26

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The Dalai Lama and his people have spent five decades in exile in India but will the past create a future for Tibet-India relations

A view of the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region

PAST VS

FUTURE

CLAUDE ARPI

F

OR centuries, India and Tibet have shared a common border and had a civilisational affinity. The Dalai Lama often calls Tibet a child of India. It probably started long before the 7th century AD, when the Roof of the World discovered Buddha’s teachings, this was a crucial turning point in the history of Tibet.

The following period saw a constant flow of Tibetan lamas, pandits and yogis visiting the great Indian universities of Nalanda, Odantapuri or Vikramasila. The disappearance of Buddhism from India around the 12th-13th century had grave consequences for the subcontinent and Central Asian politics. The Buddha dharma continued to flourish on the Roof of the World, but the interest of lamas in what they considered to be Aryabhumi rapidly declined.

Ironically, a new era for Indo-Tibetan relations began when the British took control of the Indian Peninsula. The IndoTibet relations which had primarily been spiritual became strategic and economic.

The British Crown’s officials saw the Land of Snows as an opportunity to open new markets and to create a convenient buffer zone between India and the Russian Empire. China was too weak to react meaningfully then but continued to pretend to be the suzerain of Tibet.

In July 1904, Francis Younghusband

28

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The Dalai Lama and his people have spent five decades in exile in India but will the past create a future for Tibet-India relations

A view of the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region

PAST VS

FUTURE

CLAUDE ARPI

F

OR centuries, India and Tibet have shared a common border and had a civilisational affinity. The Dalai Lama often calls Tibet a child of India. It probably started long before the 7th century AD, when the Roof of the World discovered Buddha’s teachings, this was a crucial turning point in the history of Tibet.

The following period saw a constant flow of Tibetan lamas, pandits and yogis visiting the great Indian universities of Nalanda, Odantapuri or Vikramasila. The disappearance of Buddhism from India around the 12th-13th century had grave consequences for the subcontinent and Central Asian politics. The Buddha dharma continued to flourish on the Roof of the World, but the interest of lamas in what they considered to be Aryabhumi rapidly declined.

Ironically, a new era for Indo-Tibetan relations began when the British took control of the Indian Peninsula. The IndoTibet relations which had primarily been spiritual became strategic and economic.

The British Crown’s officials saw the Land of Snows as an opportunity to open new markets and to create a convenient buffer zone between India and the Russian Empire. China was too weak to react meaningfully then but continued to pretend to be the suzerain of Tibet.

In July 1904, Francis Younghusband

28

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In July 1904, Francis Younghusband entered Lhasa, theTibetan capital. At the end of his stay, the young Captain signed an Agreement with the Tibetans on behalf of the British Empire

”

entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At the end of his stay, the young Captain signed an Agreement with the Tibetans on behalf of the British Empire. However political deals are never simple; Tibet’s western neighbour, China, was extremely unhappy to not be a party to the accord.

Ten years later, wanting to show fairness, London called for a tripartite conference in Simla to settle the issue: the three main protagonists sat together at a negotiation table for the first time. The result was not fully satisfactory for the Chinese who only initialled the main document and did not ratify it, though the British and Tibetans agreed on a common

border which they demarcated on a map: the famous McMahon Line was born. This treaty was still in force when India became independent in August 1947.

The ‘Liberation’ of Tibet In October 1950, an event changed the destiny of the Roof of World as well as the relations between India, Tibet and China: Mao’s troops marched into Tibet.

A month later, when Lhasa appealed to the United Nations against China’s invasion, India which had till then acknowledged Tibet’s de facto independence, began to vacillate; it did not stand up to defend its militarily-weak neighbour.

30

In May 1951, some of the Dalai Lama’s representatives signed a 17-point Agreement with Communist China. Lhasa had no choice but to accept to be a part of China, ‘their Motherland’.

Article 1 said: “The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland.” The declared objective of the Agreement was to ‘drive out imperialist aggressive force from Tibet’ and to ‘liberate’ the Roof of the World.

Who were these ‘imperialist aggressive forces’ at China’s door? Was it India who had a few hundred jawans posted in Gyantse? Delhi did not realize that it was indeed targeted.

Agreement put an end to Another article of the Dalai Lama talks to a Tibetan its existence as a 17-Point Agreement said: craftswoman at an arts and distinct nation. The Land “Tibetan troops shall be culture exhibition in New Delhi; of Snows became ‘Tibet’s reorganised step by step British explorer Francis Region of China’. The into the People’s Libera- Younghusband (far left) led the tion Army (PLA) and mission to Tibet which opened up circle was closed with incalculable consquences become a part of the this region to the Western World for India and Tibet. Ironinational defence forces of the People’s Republic of China.” It cally, the Tibetans themselves were not meant that the few-thousand strong informed of the negotiations.

Tibetan Army was to be disbanded The Exile: Implications for India and merged into the PLA. The incorporation of the Tibetan nation Five years later, on March 10, 1959, the popinto Beijing’s fold was not immediately ulation of the Tibetan capital revolted acknowledged by Delhi which continued against the Chinese Communist presence for a couple of years to maintain a full- on the Roof of the World. They fledged mission in the Tibetan capital and surrounded the Dalai Lama’s palace to have diplomatic relations with Lhasa. prevent him from attending a performance The signature of the Panchsheel Agree- in the Chinese camp. The stalemate continment between India and China in April ued for a few days and finally during the 1954 marked the tail-end of the events set in night of March 17, the young Tibetan leader motion by Younghusband’s entry into Ti- secretly fled his palace for India. bet. While the British expedition officially For the following days, the world accepted Tibet as a separate entity, the 1954 remained in the dark about his where-

31

abouts. On March 30, he crossed the Indian border in Kameng Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh. He was immediately granted asylum by the Nehru Government.

The arrival of the Tibetan leader in India (and the immediate grant of asylum to him and his 85,000 countrymen) triggered an increased tension between India and China and de facto, the opening of a second front for the already stretched Indian defence forces.

The Chinese authorities in Tibet were quick to move after the Dalai Lama’s escape, they decided to create a Military Area HQ on the Tibetan plateau: “Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries.”

‘Patriotic elements’ was an ominous term.

On March 28, Xinhua issued a communiqué from Beijing giving the Chinese

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SPECIAL

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In July 1904, Francis Younghusband entered Lhasa, theTibetan capital. At the end of his stay, the young Captain signed an Agreement with the Tibetans on behalf of the British Empire

”

entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At the end of his stay, the young Captain signed an Agreement with the Tibetans on behalf of the British Empire. However political deals are never simple; Tibet’s western neighbour, China, was extremely unhappy to not be a party to the accord.

Ten years later, wanting to show fairness, London called for a tripartite conference in Simla to settle the issue: the three main protagonists sat together at a negotiation table for the first time. The result was not fully satisfactory for the Chinese who only initialled the main document and did not ratify it, though the British and Tibetans agreed on a common

border which they demarcated on a map: the famous McMahon Line was born. This treaty was still in force when India became independent in August 1947.

The ‘Liberation’ of Tibet In October 1950, an event changed the destiny of the Roof of World as well as the relations between India, Tibet and China: Mao’s troops marched into Tibet.

A month later, when Lhasa appealed to the United Nations against China’s invasion, India which had till then acknowledged Tibet’s de facto independence, began to vacillate; it did not stand up to defend its militarily-weak neighbour.

30

In May 1951, some of the Dalai Lama’s representatives signed a 17-point Agreement with Communist China. Lhasa had no choice but to accept to be a part of China, ‘their Motherland’.

Article 1 said: “The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland.” The declared objective of the Agreement was to ‘drive out imperialist aggressive force from Tibet’ and to ‘liberate’ the Roof of the World.

Who were these ‘imperialist aggressive forces’ at China’s door? Was it India who had a few hundred jawans posted in Gyantse? Delhi did not realize that it was indeed targeted.

Agreement put an end to Another article of the Dalai Lama talks to a Tibetan its existence as a 17-Point Agreement said: craftswoman at an arts and distinct nation. The Land “Tibetan troops shall be culture exhibition in New Delhi; of Snows became ‘Tibet’s reorganised step by step British explorer Francis Region of China’. The into the People’s Libera- Younghusband (far left) led the tion Army (PLA) and mission to Tibet which opened up circle was closed with incalculable consquences become a part of the this region to the Western World for India and Tibet. Ironinational defence forces of the People’s Republic of China.” It cally, the Tibetans themselves were not meant that the few-thousand strong informed of the negotiations.

Tibetan Army was to be disbanded The Exile: Implications for India and merged into the PLA. The incorporation of the Tibetan nation Five years later, on March 10, 1959, the popinto Beijing’s fold was not immediately ulation of the Tibetan capital revolted acknowledged by Delhi which continued against the Chinese Communist presence for a couple of years to maintain a full- on the Roof of the World. They fledged mission in the Tibetan capital and surrounded the Dalai Lama’s palace to have diplomatic relations with Lhasa. prevent him from attending a performance The signature of the Panchsheel Agree- in the Chinese camp. The stalemate continment between India and China in April ued for a few days and finally during the 1954 marked the tail-end of the events set in night of March 17, the young Tibetan leader motion by Younghusband’s entry into Ti- secretly fled his palace for India. bet. While the British expedition officially For the following days, the world accepted Tibet as a separate entity, the 1954 remained in the dark about his where-

31

abouts. On March 30, he crossed the Indian border in Kameng Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh. He was immediately granted asylum by the Nehru Government.

The arrival of the Tibetan leader in India (and the immediate grant of asylum to him and his 85,000 countrymen) triggered an increased tension between India and China and de facto, the opening of a second front for the already stretched Indian defence forces.

The Chinese authorities in Tibet were quick to move after the Dalai Lama’s escape, they decided to create a Military Area HQ on the Tibetan plateau: “Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries.”

‘Patriotic elements’ was an ominous term.

On March 28, Xinhua issued a communiqué from Beijing giving the Chinese

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SPECIAL version of the uprising: “the Tibetan Local Government and the upper-strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism-assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against the PLA.” Xinhua added that the valiant units of the PLA stationed in Tibet had completely smashed the ‘rebellious bandits’. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply hurt by the tone used

by Beijing. During a debate in the Parliament, he said that the Xinhua statement was written in a 'cold-war language'.

The Nehru-Dalai Lama encounter On April 29 1959, the Indian Prime Minister visited the hill station of Mussoorie where the Dalai Lama had been given a temporary residence. During their four-hour long encounter, Nehru told the Dalai Lama that he would not politically help the Tibetan cause, but he would support the rehabilitation of the refugees who had started pouring into India; he also promised to educate the next generation of Tibetans.

For the past 50 years, the successive governments in Delhi have stuck to this policy. Recently during a five-day function held in Delhi, the Tibetans expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and people of India in rehabilitating more than 100,000 refugees as well as support to reestablishing several religious institutions such as some of the most important monasteries. On March 31, 2009, the Dalai Lama said: “We shall be very happy if we are able to contribute to restoring India's rich Buddhist heritage. In order to fulfill this dream, Pandit Nehru established the Sikkim Research Institute of Tibetology, Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, Leh, Ladakh, and the Central University of Tibetan Studies in Varanasi. In these places, initiatives have b een taken to translate important texts, whose originals once existed in Indian languages but have since been lost, from Tibetan back into Indian languages such as Sanskrit. This significant project has been both successful and satisfying.”

Politically, though Delhi has followed Nehru’s policy to not take an active role in solving the Tibetan issue, the mere presence of the Dalai Lama and his countrymen in India, is considered by Beijing to be a political statement in itself.

The Border Issue As early as September 1951, some 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic

points on the Tibetan Plateau. The first surveys to build a new road on the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh were conducted a year later; Xinjiang and Tibet provinces needed to be connected.

The departure of the Dalai Lama from the Roof of the World remains the watershed of Sino-Indian strategic relations. The consequences of the Dalai Lama’s departure did not take long to appear: the People’s Liberation Army took control of the entire Tibetan plateau and China’s aggressiveness towards India reached new heights.

On August 27, 1959, the PLA crossed the McMahon line and ventured onto Indian territory in an area called Longju in NEFA. As they had done several times in the Aksai Chin or the central sector, before Delhi could react, the Chinese accused the Indian troops of trespassing into Chinese territory.

The quibbling continued during the following years and despite the visit of

The incorporation of Tibet into Beijing’s fold was not immediately acknowledged by Delhi which continued for a couple of years to maintain a full-fledged mission in theTibetan capital and have diplomatic relations with Lhasa

”

During the followZhou Enlai, the Chi- Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, nese Premier to India the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama ing years, the bridges were practically cut in April 1960 — dur- receive Zhou Enlai in Delhi in 1957; ing which he pro- Tibetan monks stage a candlelight vigil between Delhi and Beijing. Despite fresh conposed to exchange as part of an anti-Chinese tacts in the early 1980s, NEFA against Askai demonstration in Kathmandu (right); the last years of the Chin — the situation continued to deteriorate. It culminated decade saw renewed tensions on in October 1962, when Chinese troops India’s north-eastern border in 1986-87.

Delhi, however, was not ready to entered India through the same Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA that the approach Beijing to solve the Tibetan Dalai Lama’s party had used to escape. issue which was intractably linked to the Was it a sign of Chinese bitterness at India border tangle between India and China.

As the Dalai Lama stated in a secret for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama?

32

DSI

memorandum to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on April 11, 1986: “In its continuing talks with the Chinese on the border, India's stand of accepting the legality of the McMahon Line without recognising the independent status of Tibet whose participation in the Simla Convention and whose acceptance of the McMahon Line gave the demarcation of this border its present international legitimacy is not only illogical but is also a source of the weakness of India's stand in the border talks with the Chinese.”

But Delhi was not ready to take the

jump to help the Tibetan leader. As a result, the Indian stand on the border remained vulnerable.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China Two years later, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing. It was the first time since Nehru visit in 1954 that an Indian Prime Minister traveled to China. The visit helped to release the tensions on the border, but no step was taken to sort out the Tibetan issue. After a meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping, a Joint Statement was issued. Tibet and the refugees in

33

India were mentioned: “The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the longstanding and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.”

The noted historian Parshotam Mehra commented: “An interesting facet of the joint communiqué is a reiteration by New Delhi of its earlier stance on Tibet: its status as an autonomous region of China coupled

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SPECIAL version of the uprising: “the Tibetan Local Government and the upper-strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism-assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against the PLA.” Xinhua added that the valiant units of the PLA stationed in Tibet had completely smashed the ‘rebellious bandits’. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply hurt by the tone used

by Beijing. During a debate in the Parliament, he said that the Xinhua statement was written in a 'cold-war language'.

The Nehru-Dalai Lama encounter On April 29 1959, the Indian Prime Minister visited the hill station of Mussoorie where the Dalai Lama had been given a temporary residence. During their four-hour long encounter, Nehru told the Dalai Lama that he would not politically help the Tibetan cause, but he would support the rehabilitation of the refugees who had started pouring into India; he also promised to educate the next generation of Tibetans.

For the past 50 years, the successive governments in Delhi have stuck to this policy. Recently during a five-day function held in Delhi, the Tibetans expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and people of India in rehabilitating more than 100,000 refugees as well as support to reestablishing several religious institutions such as some of the most important monasteries. On March 31, 2009, the Dalai Lama said: “We shall be very happy if we are able to contribute to restoring India's rich Buddhist heritage. In order to fulfill this dream, Pandit Nehru established the Sikkim Research Institute of Tibetology, Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, Leh, Ladakh, and the Central University of Tibetan Studies in Varanasi. In these places, initiatives have b een taken to translate important texts, whose originals once existed in Indian languages but have since been lost, from Tibetan back into Indian languages such as Sanskrit. This significant project has been both successful and satisfying.”

Politically, though Delhi has followed Nehru’s policy to not take an active role in solving the Tibetan issue, the mere presence of the Dalai Lama and his countrymen in India, is considered by Beijing to be a political statement in itself.

The Border Issue As early as September 1951, some 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic

points on the Tibetan Plateau. The first surveys to build a new road on the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh were conducted a year later; Xinjiang and Tibet provinces needed to be connected.

The departure of the Dalai Lama from the Roof of the World remains the watershed of Sino-Indian strategic relations. The consequences of the Dalai Lama’s departure did not take long to appear: the People’s Liberation Army took control of the entire Tibetan plateau and China’s aggressiveness towards India reached new heights.

On August 27, 1959, the PLA crossed the McMahon line and ventured onto Indian territory in an area called Longju in NEFA. As they had done several times in the Aksai Chin or the central sector, before Delhi could react, the Chinese accused the Indian troops of trespassing into Chinese territory.

The quibbling continued during the following years and despite the visit of

The incorporation of Tibet into Beijing’s fold was not immediately acknowledged by Delhi which continued for a couple of years to maintain a full-fledged mission in theTibetan capital and have diplomatic relations with Lhasa

”

During the followZhou Enlai, the Chi- Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, nese Premier to India the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama ing years, the bridges were practically cut in April 1960 — dur- receive Zhou Enlai in Delhi in 1957; ing which he pro- Tibetan monks stage a candlelight vigil between Delhi and Beijing. Despite fresh conposed to exchange as part of an anti-Chinese tacts in the early 1980s, NEFA against Askai demonstration in Kathmandu (right); the last years of the Chin — the situation continued to deteriorate. It culminated decade saw renewed tensions on in October 1962, when Chinese troops India’s north-eastern border in 1986-87.

Delhi, however, was not ready to entered India through the same Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA that the approach Beijing to solve the Tibetan Dalai Lama’s party had used to escape. issue which was intractably linked to the Was it a sign of Chinese bitterness at India border tangle between India and China.

As the Dalai Lama stated in a secret for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama?

32

DSI

memorandum to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on April 11, 1986: “In its continuing talks with the Chinese on the border, India's stand of accepting the legality of the McMahon Line without recognising the independent status of Tibet whose participation in the Simla Convention and whose acceptance of the McMahon Line gave the demarcation of this border its present international legitimacy is not only illogical but is also a source of the weakness of India's stand in the border talks with the Chinese.”

But Delhi was not ready to take the

jump to help the Tibetan leader. As a result, the Indian stand on the border remained vulnerable.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China Two years later, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing. It was the first time since Nehru visit in 1954 that an Indian Prime Minister traveled to China. The visit helped to release the tensions on the border, but no step was taken to sort out the Tibetan issue. After a meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping, a Joint Statement was issued. Tibet and the refugees in

33

India were mentioned: “The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the longstanding and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.”

The noted historian Parshotam Mehra commented: “An interesting facet of the joint communiqué is a reiteration by New Delhi of its earlier stance on Tibet: its status as an autonomous region of China coupled

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with a refusal to allow anti-Chinese 'political activities' on Indian soil. One is not so sure as to why it was deemed necessary to do so”.

Sumit Ganguly, an analyst working as an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Hunter College, The City University of New York remarked: “This amounted not only to a betrayal of the Tibetan cause, but also a failure to extract similar concessions from the Chinese on India's disputed territories. …Indian officials closely associated with the visit take a markedly different view, contending that the prime minister's statement was the mere reiteration of a long-standing Indian position that dates back to 1954 when India formally acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in Tibet.”

Since then, despite regular visits to India of Chinese heads of State/ Government and Indian leaders to China, a similar phraseology is used in Joint Statements.

Premier Li Peng (1991 and 2001), President

Jiang Zemin (1996), Premier Tibetans living in India the Tibet-India border.

For India, the strategic conZhu Rongji (2002), Premier distribute sweets to sequences of the 1959 events Wen Jaibao (2005) and Presi- the locals in Delhi as are incalculable, whether it is dent Hu Jintao (2006) visited they begin the 'Thank India while President R. You India' programme the change of demography in Tibet, the arrival of the railway Venkataraman (1992), Prime Ministers, P.V. Narasimha Rao (1993), A.B. line to Lhasa, Chinese control over the HiVajpayee (2003), Dr. Manmohan Singh malayan rivers or the stationing of nuclear missiles on the plateau. It is (2008) have been to China.

Fifty years later, though the Tibetan difficult to see a way out for the Tibetan i refugees are said to be amongst the most ssue, especially if Delhi continues to successful refugees in the world and under refuse to take a more active role in the the leadership of the Dalai Lama, their entangled situation. thousand-year old culture has been preserved to a great extent in India, the Claude Arpi, french by birth, has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is he author of Tibetan issue is far from being solved.

The latest proof is the virtual Martial several books on Tibet, India, China and Law clamped in different regions of the Indo-French relations, including Tibet the plateau on the occasion of the 50 years of Lost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a dental surgeon from 1959 uprising in Lhasa.

Not only are the Beijing-Dharamsala Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided to talks goingnowhere, but it is today come to India. In December 1974, he joined doubtful if any serious progress can Auroville, the international community be made on the Sino-Indian border, which founded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s let us not forget, had for centuries been spiritual collaborator.

34

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Supporters of the Tamil Tigers shout during a demonstration in Geneva demanding peace in Sri Lanka

PAIKIASOTHY SARAVANAMUTTU

The war in Sri Lanka is winding down but now the country stares at a humanitarian tragedy

T

HE conventional military phase of the two and half decades long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is into an end game with the Sri Lankan army succeeding in capturing all of the territory held by the Tamil Tigers except for a strip of some 20 odd sq kms. It is in this territory that the remnants of the LTTE are holed up.

Trapped with them are some 150,000-190,000 civilians according to the UN and international humanitarian agencies, or 70,000 according to the figures put out by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL). Some of them are there by choice, in that they have family whom they do not want to leave behind who in turn, have voluntarily joined the LTTE or been coerced into doing so, others who are forcibly kept inside by the LTTE and yet others who fear what awaits them once they cross into GOSL controlled territory. The fear in this case is largely attributed to the “screening” they have to undergo for security reasons and the reports of rights violations that mar this process.

Some 40,000-50,000 civilians, however, have been able to flee to government - controlled territory and are being located in camps. Consequently, the apparently unending end game in this conflict is one that could result in a horrific civilian catastrophe as there are serious questions with regard to the adequacy and frequency

of food and medical supplies to the trapped civilians, grave problems in respect of sanitation, credible reports of dozens being killed and injured on a daily basis including a statement by Navneetham Pillay UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, that actions of the GOSL and the Tigers could amount to war crimes. The High Commissioner, in particular, condemned the documented LTTE practice of killing and shooting civilians who are attempting to escape thereby confirming the charge that they are indeed using the civilians as a human shield. She also pointed out that the GOSL continues to fire into the “no fire” zone it has designated in 14 sq kms of this strip of territory causing civilian deaths and injuries as well as damage to the make shift medical facilities there. Given the numbers of civilians trapped there, any firing into the zone is by definition indiscriminate.

Sir John Holmes, the Head of UN OCHA and Chief Relief Coordinator, visited Sri Lanka in February and echoed the above concerns about the situation there in two unofficial briefings to the Security Council. These concerns have also been raised with the President of Sri Lanka and the GOSL by the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the US Secretary of State, the UN Secretary General and the European Union.

POST-WAR VS POST-CONFLICT 36

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Supporters of the Tamil Tigers shout during a demonstration in Geneva demanding peace in Sri Lanka

PAIKIASOTHY SARAVANAMUTTU

The war in Sri Lanka is winding down but now the country stares at a humanitarian tragedy

T

HE conventional military phase of the two and half decades long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is into an end game with the Sri Lankan army succeeding in capturing all of the territory held by the Tamil Tigers except for a strip of some 20 odd sq kms. It is in this territory that the remnants of the LTTE are holed up.

Trapped with them are some 150,000-190,000 civilians according to the UN and international humanitarian agencies, or 70,000 according to the figures put out by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL). Some of them are there by choice, in that they have family whom they do not want to leave behind who in turn, have voluntarily joined the LTTE or been coerced into doing so, others who are forcibly kept inside by the LTTE and yet others who fear what awaits them once they cross into GOSL controlled territory. The fear in this case is largely attributed to the “screening” they have to undergo for security reasons and the reports of rights violations that mar this process.

Some 40,000-50,000 civilians, however, have been able to flee to government - controlled territory and are being located in camps. Consequently, the apparently unending end game in this conflict is one that could result in a horrific civilian catastrophe as there are serious questions with regard to the adequacy and frequency

of food and medical supplies to the trapped civilians, grave problems in respect of sanitation, credible reports of dozens being killed and injured on a daily basis including a statement by Navneetham Pillay UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, that actions of the GOSL and the Tigers could amount to war crimes. The High Commissioner, in particular, condemned the documented LTTE practice of killing and shooting civilians who are attempting to escape thereby confirming the charge that they are indeed using the civilians as a human shield. She also pointed out that the GOSL continues to fire into the “no fire” zone it has designated in 14 sq kms of this strip of territory causing civilian deaths and injuries as well as damage to the make shift medical facilities there. Given the numbers of civilians trapped there, any firing into the zone is by definition indiscriminate.

Sir John Holmes, the Head of UN OCHA and Chief Relief Coordinator, visited Sri Lanka in February and echoed the above concerns about the situation there in two unofficial briefings to the Security Council. These concerns have also been raised with the President of Sri Lanka and the GOSL by the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the US Secretary of State, the UN Secretary General and the European Union.

POST-WAR VS POST-CONFLICT 36

37

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against the GOSL. It is clear The immediate, urgent President Mahinda that in conventional military and priority need is for a Rajapakse (above) terms the outcome of the pause in the fighting to allow handing over a sword to hostilities is the foregone for the evacuation of the his naval officer son, conclusion of an LTTE defeat. civilians by a third party – the sub- Lieutenant Yoshitha UN being the obvious and Rajapakse, at his passing Ironically, an organisation that has founded its reputaacceptable choice in this out parade tion on its military prowess instance. Explorating the feasibility for such an evacuation has come and terrorist repertoire, now appears to be up against the positional bargaining of depending on a political strategy of an inthe two protagonists and the LTTE’s ternational “bail-out” based on humanitarunwillingness to engage in discussions ian grounds, notwithstanding the horrenon it, clearly on account of their fear dous costs to the people it claims to that such an evacuation would deny them represent. That this will not happen, given their “human shield” and expose them to the LTTE’s record and current behaviour the full wrath of the GOSL forces and in respect of the civilians, does not deter them from risking a civilian catastrophe. certain defeat.

The GOSL on the other hand, is agreeThe LTTE insists on a ceasefire and unconditional negotiations. Unsurpris- able to a humanitarian pause to evacuate ingly, it is surmised that if the LTTE were the civilians but not to a ceasefire and to engage in discussions about a civilian unconditional talks. It maintains that the evacuation they might also insist on a LTTE must surrender and first lay down guarantee of safe passage for their leader- arms. Whilst disputing the figures of IDPs ship – a condition that may prove to be an put out by the international agencies and insuperable obstacle and totally unaccept- strenuously denying the charge of firing able to any potential third party. It appears into the “no-fire” zone causing civilian that the grim and despicable logic of the deaths and injuries, the GOSL has LTTE is to provoke an egregious civilian conceded through its representative at the massacre beyond the current daily death UN that there could be return fire by its toll, which they dearly wish, will turn forces resulting in civilian casualties. It international opinion in their favour and insists that there is no deliberate targeting

38

of civilians and points to the LTTE firing from the “no-fire” zone in the first place.

The dispute over the figures continues, including in relation to those put out by the UN on civilian casualties. The GOSL maintains that these figures are unverifiable - a claim it can make since it has severely restricted humanitarian access to the conflict zone and denied all access to the independent agencies.

The way in which the end game ends will have a decisive impact on the prospects for peace, unity and reconciliation as well as for the political interests of the key protagonists. Given the current dynamics, will a post war situation also be a post –conflict one?

Current Core Interests, Dilemmas and Challenges The Tamil Polity: The LTTE will probably revert to guerilla warfare and urban terrorism with the remnants of its cadres, to the extent possible. They could wreak considerable damage to the Sri Lankan economy and provide the justification to the Rajapakse regime to continue to maintain a security establishment on high alert and exercise considerable control over the civilian population. But the dilemma for the LTTE, however, will be that this may not be

in any way sufficient to ensure recognition of Tamil demands and aspirations within a new constitutional framework for Sri Lanka or result in any meaningful autonomy for the Tamils in the north and east of the island under LTTE hegemony. Nor will it necessarily advance the prospects for secession. The LTTE will have to transform in the wake of conventional military defeat and whilst the Sri Lankan state could turn out to be in no mood to accommodate Tamil grievances in a political settlement, this may not be a sufficient catalyst for a resurgence of LTTE military and political fortunes.

This dilemma extends throughout the Tamil polity and the available political representation. Anti-LTTE groups ranging from its erstwhile Eastern command now split into two parts at war with each other - one under Colonel Karuna forSri Lankan army mally part of the rulmarches along ing party and the the sea-front other is the political promenade during party, the TMVP, una rehearsal ahead der the recently of the island’s elected Chief Minisindependence day ter of the Eastern Province, Pillayan, to the EPDP of cabinet minister Douglas Devananda and to the lone voice of Anandasangaree of the TULF, lack the independence and credibility necessary to take the lead in a Tamil polity no longer dominated and overpowered by the LTTE. All of them have owed their existence to the Sri Lankan state and would in all likelihood be unable to enter into any meaningful negotiations with it on an accommodation of Tamil political aspirations.

This leaves the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the alliance of the traditional Tamil political parties, which has the largest Tamil representation in parliament.

Throughout the conflict the TNA has been the parliamentary political mouthpiece of the LTTE. Notwithstanding this, it is quite possible that the political constituencies of the parties that make up the alliance are still in tact and could serve as the basis for their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the wider Tamil polity in a post war context. This no doubt will be augmented if the TNA sets itself on course for acquiring broader appeal – in effect, whilst not downplaying its Tamil nationalism, demonstrating that it is no longer in the clutches and thrall of the LTTE. Ideological objections aside, many would aver that this is impractical since as

It appears that the grim and despicable logic of the LTTE is to provoke an egregious civilian massacre beyond the current daily death toll

39

”

DSI

long as there are even remnants of the LTTE around the risk of assassination is very high for anyone who dares to distance themselves from the LTTE, leave aside oppose them. This is a measure of the brutalisation of the Tamil polity wrought by the conflict and of the distance it will have to traverse in order to return to mainstream democratic politics. The acute dilemma and challenge confronting the Tamil polity remains and it will have to resolved in a context of probable triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state.

The latter is the crux of the challenge to peace, unity and reconciliation for Sri Lanka. Will it be that the conventional military victory against the LTTE was in defence of the constitutional and political

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against the GOSL. It is clear The immediate, urgent President Mahinda that in conventional military and priority need is for a Rajapakse (above) terms the outcome of the pause in the fighting to allow handing over a sword to hostilities is the foregone for the evacuation of the his naval officer son, conclusion of an LTTE defeat. civilians by a third party – the sub- Lieutenant Yoshitha UN being the obvious and Rajapakse, at his passing Ironically, an organisation that has founded its reputaacceptable choice in this out parade tion on its military prowess instance. Explorating the feasibility for such an evacuation has come and terrorist repertoire, now appears to be up against the positional bargaining of depending on a political strategy of an inthe two protagonists and the LTTE’s ternational “bail-out” based on humanitarunwillingness to engage in discussions ian grounds, notwithstanding the horrenon it, clearly on account of their fear dous costs to the people it claims to that such an evacuation would deny them represent. That this will not happen, given their “human shield” and expose them to the LTTE’s record and current behaviour the full wrath of the GOSL forces and in respect of the civilians, does not deter them from risking a civilian catastrophe. certain defeat.

The GOSL on the other hand, is agreeThe LTTE insists on a ceasefire and unconditional negotiations. Unsurpris- able to a humanitarian pause to evacuate ingly, it is surmised that if the LTTE were the civilians but not to a ceasefire and to engage in discussions about a civilian unconditional talks. It maintains that the evacuation they might also insist on a LTTE must surrender and first lay down guarantee of safe passage for their leader- arms. Whilst disputing the figures of IDPs ship – a condition that may prove to be an put out by the international agencies and insuperable obstacle and totally unaccept- strenuously denying the charge of firing able to any potential third party. It appears into the “no-fire” zone causing civilian that the grim and despicable logic of the deaths and injuries, the GOSL has LTTE is to provoke an egregious civilian conceded through its representative at the massacre beyond the current daily death UN that there could be return fire by its toll, which they dearly wish, will turn forces resulting in civilian casualties. It international opinion in their favour and insists that there is no deliberate targeting

38

of civilians and points to the LTTE firing from the “no-fire” zone in the first place.

The dispute over the figures continues, including in relation to those put out by the UN on civilian casualties. The GOSL maintains that these figures are unverifiable - a claim it can make since it has severely restricted humanitarian access to the conflict zone and denied all access to the independent agencies.

The way in which the end game ends will have a decisive impact on the prospects for peace, unity and reconciliation as well as for the political interests of the key protagonists. Given the current dynamics, will a post war situation also be a post –conflict one?

Current Core Interests, Dilemmas and Challenges The Tamil Polity: The LTTE will probably revert to guerilla warfare and urban terrorism with the remnants of its cadres, to the extent possible. They could wreak considerable damage to the Sri Lankan economy and provide the justification to the Rajapakse regime to continue to maintain a security establishment on high alert and exercise considerable control over the civilian population. But the dilemma for the LTTE, however, will be that this may not be

in any way sufficient to ensure recognition of Tamil demands and aspirations within a new constitutional framework for Sri Lanka or result in any meaningful autonomy for the Tamils in the north and east of the island under LTTE hegemony. Nor will it necessarily advance the prospects for secession. The LTTE will have to transform in the wake of conventional military defeat and whilst the Sri Lankan state could turn out to be in no mood to accommodate Tamil grievances in a political settlement, this may not be a sufficient catalyst for a resurgence of LTTE military and political fortunes.

This dilemma extends throughout the Tamil polity and the available political representation. Anti-LTTE groups ranging from its erstwhile Eastern command now split into two parts at war with each other - one under Colonel Karuna forSri Lankan army mally part of the rulmarches along ing party and the the sea-front other is the political promenade during party, the TMVP, una rehearsal ahead der the recently of the island’s elected Chief Minisindependence day ter of the Eastern Province, Pillayan, to the EPDP of cabinet minister Douglas Devananda and to the lone voice of Anandasangaree of the TULF, lack the independence and credibility necessary to take the lead in a Tamil polity no longer dominated and overpowered by the LTTE. All of them have owed their existence to the Sri Lankan state and would in all likelihood be unable to enter into any meaningful negotiations with it on an accommodation of Tamil political aspirations.

This leaves the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the alliance of the traditional Tamil political parties, which has the largest Tamil representation in parliament.

Throughout the conflict the TNA has been the parliamentary political mouthpiece of the LTTE. Notwithstanding this, it is quite possible that the political constituencies of the parties that make up the alliance are still in tact and could serve as the basis for their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the wider Tamil polity in a post war context. This no doubt will be augmented if the TNA sets itself on course for acquiring broader appeal – in effect, whilst not downplaying its Tamil nationalism, demonstrating that it is no longer in the clutches and thrall of the LTTE. Ideological objections aside, many would aver that this is impractical since as

It appears that the grim and despicable logic of the LTTE is to provoke an egregious civilian massacre beyond the current daily death toll

39

”

DSI

long as there are even remnants of the LTTE around the risk of assassination is very high for anyone who dares to distance themselves from the LTTE, leave aside oppose them. This is a measure of the brutalisation of the Tamil polity wrought by the conflict and of the distance it will have to traverse in order to return to mainstream democratic politics. The acute dilemma and challenge confronting the Tamil polity remains and it will have to resolved in a context of probable triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state.

The latter is the crux of the challenge to peace, unity and reconciliation for Sri Lanka. Will it be that the conventional military victory against the LTTE was in defence of the constitutional and political

Sri Lanka 2nd time 6.qxd

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status quo? Was this a war against terrorism and not a war in the context of an ethnic conflict with deep political roots that have to be addressed if peace is to be achieved?

The Rajapaksa Regime: The political orientation and direction of the Rajapaksa regime does not make for optimism as far as a political settlement is concerned. Capitalising on the Bush era War on Terrorism rhetoric and on a “We versus Them” patriot vs traitor discourse with its attendant human rights violations, culture of im-

Nadu has gained in salience punity and crack down on Sri Lankan devotees and forced Delhi to take on a dissent and the media, the a split second after a more proactive role on Sri Rajapaksa regime has yet to blast at a mosque at Lanka. The full extent of this, demonstrate its commit- Akuressa; (right) Indian the unfolding humanitarian ment to a political settle- Foreign Secretary Shiv catastrophe notwithstanding, ment, beyond the rhetoric Shankar Menon will have to await the outcome which many believe is for the sole purpose of placating the interna- of the Indian general election.

For over two and a half years, an All tional community and India in particular.

The latter, as the key international actor in Party Representatives Conference (APRC) the region, has gained in salience as convened by the Rajapaksa regime has agitation on the Sri Lanka issue in Tamil been in existence. Set up to come up with

40

consensual proposals for a political settlement of the conflict, the APRC has been at various times stymied by the ideological and political imperatives of the regime.

Proposals that it came up with, along federal lines on the recommendations of an expert panel, were jettisoned on presidential instruction and now the APRC is restricted to recommending fuller implementation of the provisions of the current constitution. This is a direct reference to the system of Provincial Councils that

DSI

were ushered in through the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in the wake of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

Two key areas of the system have yet to be implemented in full. They relate to police powers and powers over land. The expectation was that the APRC would recommend Thirteenth Amendment Plus, rather than fuller, leave aside full, implementation of a system of provincial devolution in which the balance of powers are weighted decisively in favour of the central government.

The current concern is that the ideolog-

ical orientation of majoritarianism of the Rajapaksa regime, buttressed by conventional military victory, will not translate into demonstrable commitment to arrive at a political settlement. There are concerns too, that political settlement aside, conventional military victory could strengthen the case for majoritarianism and its consolidation, even extending to “ethnic re-engineering” of the population in the north and east of Sri Lanka. These are fears that are expressed by stakeholders in the east, despite that province having been “liberated” from LTTE control in 2006. If

The acute dilemma and challenge confronting theTamil polity remains and it will have to be resolved in a context of probable triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state

the Sri Lankan state and its current standard bearers, the Rajapaksa regime, was to jettison the opportunity created by this conventional military victory for a new social contract for the country, which accommodates the aspirations of all of its peoples, the unity of Sri Lanka and its prospects for peace and prosperity will be further retarded. A lot is riding on how the end game ends and on the willingness and ability of all stakeholders to transform a post-war situation into a post-conflict one.

41

”

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) an independent and non-partisan public policy institute focusing on issues of democratic governance and peace through programmes of research and advocacy.

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status quo? Was this a war against terrorism and not a war in the context of an ethnic conflict with deep political roots that have to be addressed if peace is to be achieved?

The Rajapaksa Regime: The political orientation and direction of the Rajapaksa regime does not make for optimism as far as a political settlement is concerned. Capitalising on the Bush era War on Terrorism rhetoric and on a “We versus Them” patriot vs traitor discourse with its attendant human rights violations, culture of im-

Nadu has gained in salience punity and crack down on Sri Lankan devotees and forced Delhi to take on a dissent and the media, the a split second after a more proactive role on Sri Rajapaksa regime has yet to blast at a mosque at Lanka. The full extent of this, demonstrate its commit- Akuressa; (right) Indian the unfolding humanitarian ment to a political settle- Foreign Secretary Shiv catastrophe notwithstanding, ment, beyond the rhetoric Shankar Menon will have to await the outcome which many believe is for the sole purpose of placating the interna- of the Indian general election.

For over two and a half years, an All tional community and India in particular.

The latter, as the key international actor in Party Representatives Conference (APRC) the region, has gained in salience as convened by the Rajapaksa regime has agitation on the Sri Lanka issue in Tamil been in existence. Set up to come up with

40

consensual proposals for a political settlement of the conflict, the APRC has been at various times stymied by the ideological and political imperatives of the regime.

Proposals that it came up with, along federal lines on the recommendations of an expert panel, were jettisoned on presidential instruction and now the APRC is restricted to recommending fuller implementation of the provisions of the current constitution. This is a direct reference to the system of Provincial Councils that

DSI

were ushered in through the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in the wake of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

Two key areas of the system have yet to be implemented in full. They relate to police powers and powers over land. The expectation was that the APRC would recommend Thirteenth Amendment Plus, rather than fuller, leave aside full, implementation of a system of provincial devolution in which the balance of powers are weighted decisively in favour of the central government.

The current concern is that the ideolog-

ical orientation of majoritarianism of the Rajapaksa regime, buttressed by conventional military victory, will not translate into demonstrable commitment to arrive at a political settlement. There are concerns too, that political settlement aside, conventional military victory could strengthen the case for majoritarianism and its consolidation, even extending to “ethnic re-engineering” of the population in the north and east of Sri Lanka. These are fears that are expressed by stakeholders in the east, despite that province having been “liberated” from LTTE control in 2006. If

The acute dilemma and challenge confronting theTamil polity remains and it will have to be resolved in a context of probable triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state

the Sri Lankan state and its current standard bearers, the Rajapaksa regime, was to jettison the opportunity created by this conventional military victory for a new social contract for the country, which accommodates the aspirations of all of its peoples, the unity of Sri Lanka and its prospects for peace and prosperity will be further retarded. A lot is riding on how the end game ends and on the willingness and ability of all stakeholders to transform a post-war situation into a post-conflict one.

41

”

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) an independent and non-partisan public policy institute focusing on issues of democratic governance and peace through programmes of research and advocacy.

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Shuja Nawaz

P

ROVINCIAL authorities in the Swat Valley in northwestern Pakistan have struck a peace deal with local Taliban franchisees, and in it the government agreed to extend Islamic law in the area. Since then, commentators around the world have pretended to know what the agreement means.

Some suspect a “hidden hand”, whether it is the intelligence agencies or the United States. In a conspiracy-prone Pakistan, some even talk of an inside deal between the army and the militants - even as they ignore the hundreds of casualties that the army suffered in Swat. Never mind that facts may interfere with these pet theories.

In reality, only the locals know what the deal really means. I recently received the following account from a young woman from the area: “For months and months the military has been trying to quell the militants. Two days ago their failure was accepted when the provincial government of the North-West Frontier Province went into talks with Mullah Sufi Mohammad and accepted some things. We don't yet know what those things are but the first promise is peace. Peace on what grounds?

We don't know.

“Today the party of the Mullah announced that ‘democracy’ is un-Islamic.

It is too late. We have lost the battle against the militants. We have seen day by day how government and army have (been) weakened, how they have finally been reduced to talk and to deal. Nobody is accountable for the thousands killed, for the closure of schools, for the beheadings of men and women. Nobody. Someone said to me the other day – ‘Don't complain, because the one you complain to will be your enemy.’

“We no longer can turn (to anyone) here to complain. We now have to think about how to survive this. We now have to give up much of what many of us believe in - tolerance, peace, educated women, and freedom.”

She believes the North-West Frontier Province is lost. And she questioned whether President Obama understands the extremists. “He seems to think that these people can be contained within their land, or (any) land. He thinks there is a meeting point, a dialogue possibility.

Those who think that giving the militants their haven will contain them - well, the rest of the country and the world will see what this will lead to. This is not the end, it is only the beginning.”

I can see her point. We seem to be reviving a deal that fell apart last year, a deal that

Pakistan treads a perilous path after signing a deal with the Taliban, a deal which fell apart in days last year. This time, the Taliban are already on the prowl

WARINESS IN PAKISTAN 42

Jubiliant Pakistani police commandos chant slogans after overpowering masked gunmen who had besieged a police academy last month

43

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DSI

Shuja Nawaz

P

ROVINCIAL authorities in the Swat Valley in northwestern Pakistan have struck a peace deal with local Taliban franchisees, and in it the government agreed to extend Islamic law in the area. Since then, commentators around the world have pretended to know what the agreement means.

Some suspect a “hidden hand”, whether it is the intelligence agencies or the United States. In a conspiracy-prone Pakistan, some even talk of an inside deal between the army and the militants - even as they ignore the hundreds of casualties that the army suffered in Swat. Never mind that facts may interfere with these pet theories.

In reality, only the locals know what the deal really means. I recently received the following account from a young woman from the area: “For months and months the military has been trying to quell the militants. Two days ago their failure was accepted when the provincial government of the North-West Frontier Province went into talks with Mullah Sufi Mohammad and accepted some things. We don't yet know what those things are but the first promise is peace. Peace on what grounds?

We don't know.

“Today the party of the Mullah announced that ‘democracy’ is un-Islamic.

It is too late. We have lost the battle against the militants. We have seen day by day how government and army have (been) weakened, how they have finally been reduced to talk and to deal. Nobody is accountable for the thousands killed, for the closure of schools, for the beheadings of men and women. Nobody. Someone said to me the other day – ‘Don't complain, because the one you complain to will be your enemy.’

“We no longer can turn (to anyone) here to complain. We now have to think about how to survive this. We now have to give up much of what many of us believe in - tolerance, peace, educated women, and freedom.”

She believes the North-West Frontier Province is lost. And she questioned whether President Obama understands the extremists. “He seems to think that these people can be contained within their land, or (any) land. He thinks there is a meeting point, a dialogue possibility.

Those who think that giving the militants their haven will contain them - well, the rest of the country and the world will see what this will lead to. This is not the end, it is only the beginning.”

I can see her point. We seem to be reviving a deal that fell apart last year, a deal that

Pakistan treads a perilous path after signing a deal with the Taliban, a deal which fell apart in days last year. This time, the Taliban are already on the prowl

WARINESS IN PAKISTAN 42

Jubiliant Pakistani police commandos chant slogans after overpowering masked gunmen who had besieged a police academy last month

43

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Pakistani fire fighters extinguish a blaze at the NATO supply trucks’ terminal on the outskirts of Peshawar

the army opposed at that time. It fell apart in a matter of days, and the first army sortie resulted in some 18 dead soldiers. Will the army want to re-enter the fray if this deal falls apart? Who will claim responsibility for the inevitable failure?

Recall that in 1994 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government agreed with the same militant leader, Mullah Sufi Mohammad, to allow him to run some districts of Swat and Malakand according to his convoluted view of Islamic law. He thus got legitimacy and grew into a force that now has brought a new government to the table.

Pakistan's constitution already contains provisions protecting against un-Islamic laws. Why then does the country need an agreement with violent extremists to ensure Islamic laws? And who will pronounce on these laws? The militants?

And if the army is to remain in a reactive mode, as a government minister explained, will they stand by and watch

In a conspiracy prone Pakistan, some even talk of an inside deal between the army and the militants—even as they ignore the hundreds of casualities that the army suffered in Swat

”

44

Taliban justice being meted out to people?

Who will ensure that girls' schools will be rebuilt? Who will protect those who refuse to wear a beard or a burqa? Who will disarm the militants? Certainly not the Taliban.

The Swat deal gives territory in Pakistan proper to a militant minority, against the wishes of the majority of Muslims in what was once a valley of peace and quiet. If the militants gain this foothold, the stain of extremism will spread further into Pakistan.

My young correspondent may be right: This is not the end, it is only the beginning.

Shuja Nawas is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008) and the forthcoming FATA: A Most Dangerous Place (CSIS January 2009). Shuja is currently the first director of the South Asia Center of The Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington DC. This article first appeared in Boston Globe.

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defencetalk

An update on military policy

IAF plans for additional Hawks advanced jet trainers shelved Proposals (RFP) in Defence parlance — were issued about a month ago to six global aircraft manufacturers.

Surprisingly, United Kingdom-based Hawks manufacturer BAE Systems finds a place among the six companies which had received the fresh tenders. But it was being approached for an upgraded version of the AJTs, sources said.

Others trainers that the IAF has shown interest in and sent the tender papers to were Italy's Alenia for the M-346, Korean T-50s, the Chez L-159, Russian YAK-130 and MiG ATTrainer, sources said.

After a procurement process that lasted nearly 20 years, India finally entered a contract for the delivery of 66 Hawks trainers with BAE in 2004.The contract had an in-built provision for a follow-on order for 40 more aircraft.

But the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) had been finding it difficult to maintain the production lines for the aircraft at its facility due to considerable delays in spares supplies, sources said. The move of the IAF to go in for a new brand of trainer aircraft came as a surprise, as it had originally planned to have a single type of trainers in the fleet to train future fighter pilots.

SPARE PROBLEM Production line of the Hawk 132 at HAL, Bangalore. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is upset over the supply problems of British Advanced Trainer Jets

UPSET over problems relating to spares supply for British 'Hawks' Advanced JetTrainers (AJTs), India has shelved plans to place follow-on orders for the aircraft and instead floated new tenders to supplement its trainer fleet. Indian Air Force (IAF) sources said that the new tenders—Request for

PressTrust of India

Govt cancels tenders for 22 IAF attack helicopters TENDERS for purchase of 22 attack helicopters for the Indian Air Force (IAF), issued in May last, has been cancelled. Fresh tenders for the helicopters will be issued soon, the sources said.

“The Request for Proposals (RFP) for the 22 attack helicopters have been cancelled, as the three offers received from foreign defence companies did not meet the TECHNICAL SNAG Tenders to buy the 22 attack helicopters at a Staff Qualitative Requirements were cancelled by the cost of USD 25 million per platset by the government.We will is- Government as the offers did form, including weapons, to boost sue fresh RFP for the platform not meet the staff qualitative the IAF's surveillance and combat soon,” the sources said.With this, requirement capabilities. The RFP was sent to the IAF's plans to operationalise Agusta Westland, Boeing, Eurothe 22 attack helicopters beginning 2010 would copter, Kha- zan and Bell Helicopter. However, the be hit considerably and could be delayed beyond government received replies from only three com2012, they said. panies for the 2.5 tonne twin-engine helicopter.

TheTimes of India The Defence Ministry had issued an RFP

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ASIA 2009

Future Capabilities and Requirements of Asian Air Power Doctrine for the 21st Century

Main Conference: 13-14 May 2009 | Pre Conference Workshop: Venue: Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel, Singapore

DISTINGUISHED SPEAKERS: Air Commodore Garry Porter Assistant Director Transformation NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre Captain Mark Darrah F/A-18 and EA-18G Program Manager Naval Air Systems Command, US Navy Group Captain Stephen Richards Assistant Director of Flying Training Royal Air Force Colonel Mark DeLong US Pacific Air Forces Colonel John Geis II Director Center for Strategy and Technology Maxwell Air Force Base, US Air Force Lt. Col. (Dr.) Arvind Kumar Sinha Director – International Collaboration Australian Aerospace and Defence Innovations Dr. Joel Hayward Dean Royal Air Force College Cranwell & Head of Air Power Studies, King’s College London Dr. Douglas Beason Col (USAF Ret.), Associate Director Los Alamos National Laboratory Bill Sweetman Editor-in-Chief Aviation Week Dr. Bernard Loo Assistant Professor Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS Chris Chadwick President Boeing Military Aircraft Mike Henchey VP International Business Development Space & Airborne Systems, Raytheon Stephen O’Bryan Vice President, F-35 Business Development and Customer Engagement, Lockheed Martin Dr. Sanu Kainikara Air Power Strategist, Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre *pending final confirmation* Senior Representative, US Pacific Air Forces

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Air Marshal PV Naik will be the new Chief of Air Staff

India jettisons French jet from race for fighter deal FRENCH fighter Rafale has being knocked out of the race for the “mother of all defence deals”, the Rs 42,000-crore project to acquire 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for IAF, leaving five jets in the fray now.

Defence ministry sources said Rafale had “fallen short’’ on “several counts’’ listed in the GSQRs IN & OUT differences for the (general staff qualitative French fighter Rafale (top) has been upgrade of the 51 Mirequirements) drawn up by knocked out of the race for the acquisition rage-2000s in IAF’s IAF. “It did not pass in the of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft combat fleet despite technical evaluation of the (MMRCA); American F/A-18 Super Hornet being locked in nebids submitted by the six (above) is one of the five left in the fray gotiations for over contenders,” said a source. two years.

The move is sure to rile France, which like As for MMRCA battle, India will now invite other countries in the contention for what will only American F/A-18 ‘Super Hornet’ (Boeing) be the largest global defence contract had and F-16 ‘Falcon’ (Lockheed Martin), Russian mounted a high-voltage campaign for the $10.4 MiG-35 (United Aircraft Corporation), Swedish billion MMRCA contract.

Gripen (Saab) and EurofighterTyphoon (consor“We have no confirmation from the Indian tium of British, German, Spanish and Italian MoD...We are surprised as there was no techni- companies) for field trials likely to begin from cal lacuna in our bid,” said a French official. India July-August.

TheTimes of India and France are also yet to settle their bitter

48

THE GOVERNMENT has appointed Air Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik PVSMVSM ADC presently theVice Chief of Air Staff as the next Chief of Air Staff with effect from the afternoon of May 31, 2009. The present Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major PVSM AVSM SC VM ADC retires from service on May 31, 2009.

Born on July 22 1949, Air Marshal Naik was commissioned into the Air Force on 21 Jun 1969 as a Fighter Pilot. During his long distinguished service spanning nearly 40 years he has served in a variety of Command Staff and Instructional appointments. He has 3085 hrs of flying to his credit. The Air Officer also took part in 1971 war. Before taking over as VCAS, he was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Allahabad based Central Air Command.

Besides being a fellow of the National Defence College, New Delhi, College of Defence Management, Secundrabad and Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, he has attended a variety of courses like flying instructor Course, Jungle & Snow Survival, Junior Commanders Course.

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EADS plans to ride the LCA into Indian market ATTHE opening of the Aero India 09 defence exposition, Defence Minister AK Antony clearly enjoyed what must have seemed like a wild-west style shootout. One after another, four contenders for India's purchase of 126 medium fighters --- the EurofighterTyphoon, the F/A-18, the F-16 and the MiG-35 --- took to the skies in a fiesta of aerobatics clearly aimed at impressing the decision-makers who must decide which aircraft will win the $12 billion contract.

But the performance that evoked Mr Antony's praise was that of the Indian-built Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

Although more cautious than the all-out performances of the established fighters, the Tejas went far beyond anything it had ever displayed before, surprising the spectators with steep climbs, an inverted pass, high-gravity turns and loops.

Addressing the press, Mr Antony remarked, “I was very excited to see the LCA. After many years we could see the LCA doing manoeuvres… I was excited to see the Indian-made LCA in Indian skies.”

But even amidst success, theTejas LCA is struggling to overcome major development hurdles. Its maker, Bangalore-based Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has taken the crucial decision to bring in a design consultant, a global aerospace major

that would assist HAL to over- GROWING CONCERNS the contract for the EJ200 engine, come persistent design The Tejas Light Combat and producing it in India, glitches that dog the LCA, Aircraft (LCA) might would position it perfectly for including fuel distribution, have been applauded by the lucrative medium fighter uneven braking, flight controls, the Defence Minister AK contract; twin EJ200 engines environment controls and Antony at the Aero India’ power the Eurofighter. testing. And while US-based 09 defence exposition, While willing to part with the Boeing has declined to supply but the aircraft is still technology assistance needed to such know-how, German- struggling to overcome get the LCA over its hump, Spanish consortium, EADS, major developmental EADS worries about the possione of the makers of the Eu- glitches like fuel bility of eventually being held rofighter, has aggressively pur- distribution, flight responsible for a possible failure sued the consultancy as a way controls, environment in theTejas development. of flying into the Indian market. controls and testing “Let's be clear that we are not In multiple interviews with underwriting the LCA progsenior Indian and EADS officials who ramme”, says a senior European official rerequested anonymity, Business Standard has lated with the contract. Another likens EADS's pieced together the EADS strategy.The com- role to helping someone in a dark room turn on pany has decided to supply India with high the light switch. But EADS will do no more than technology for Indian products that are not indicate the direction of the switch. directly competing with an EADS product.

The German and Spanish governments The Tejas is not in the same category as the have already permitted EADS to part with the heavier Eurofighter. technology needed for the Tejas programme; Having established its presence in the the US government, in contrast, imposed Tejas programme, EADS is confident that it stringent restrictions on Boeing. Explains a would be well positioned to get its Eurojet senior EADS official, “If we don't supply techEJ200 engine accepted for the Tejas. India is nology, India will develop it anyway, perhaps currently deciding between the EJ200 and the with some delay. So it is better for us to estabGE-414 engine for powering future squadrons lish our presence here, partner India in theTeof theTejas. jas, and perhaps even market it together.”

Business Standard And EADS believes that winning

50

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Defence allocation up 35 per cent CONSIDERING the changed security scenario in view of the Mumbai terror attacks, the government has allocated Rs 1,41,703 crore (Rs 1,417.03 billion) for defence sector, almost a 35 per cent increase from the previous year's budget provisions. Last year's allocation for Defence stood at Rs 1,05,600 crore (Rs 1,056 billion) and the current increase amounted to Rs 36,103 crore (Rs 361.03 billion).

Presenting the Interim Budget for 200910 in the Lok Sabha, finance minister Pranab Mukherjee said the allocation has been increased because of the prevailing security environment, which has 'deteriorated considerably.'

Noting that the Mumbai attacks had amounted to the threshold being crossed on the security front, Mukherjee said, “We are going through tough times.The Mumbai terror attacks have given an entirely new dimension to cross-border terrorism.”

With the total revised expenditure for Defence last year standing at Rs 1,14,600 crore (Rs 1,146 billion), he said the

increased Plan expenditure for Defence this year would be Rs 86,879 crore (Rs 868.79 billion). Last year's Plan expenditure was only Rs 73,600 crore (Rs 736 billion), thereby providing an increase of Rs 13,279 crore (Rs 132.79 billion) this year.

The increased allocation this year would include Rs 54,824 crore (Rs 548.24 billion) focapital expenditure as against Rs 41,000 crore (Rs 410 billion) in the revised estimates for 2008-09, Mukherjee said. However, the government would TOUGH TIMES provide for any addiIn the wake of the tional requirement for current security the security of the nascenario, Finance tion, he added.

Minister Pranab The increased alloMukherjee has cation for defence announced an assumes significance increased as the government allocation of funds has decided to go on for the defence and fast track acquisition security of the of defence equipcountry ment. The armed forces have already prepared a long list of equipment, mainly for its special forces commandos, to be bought under the fast track process.

After the Mumbai attacks, the government has initiated a massive revamp of the security structure of the country, which includes creation of a Coastal Command.

Despite the nearly 35 per cent increase this year, India's defence spending is still at about 2 per cent of the GDP, compared to China's 7 per cent and Pakistan's 5 per cent.

Rediff.com

NSG learns from 26/11, to upgrade its firepower SECURITY LESSONS After the 60-hour gun battle on 26/11 in Mumbai, the National Security Guard is all set to upgrade its equipment and weapon profile

52

BrahMos Block-II version hits bulls eye ON 29th March 2009 the land attack version of BrahMos block-II was tested from a Mobile Autonomous Launcher at Pokhran test range by the Indian army officers. The missile took off successfully at 11.15 a.m. and hit the desired target at bull’s eye meeting all mission parameters.

The launch was witnessed by Lt. General A.S. Sekhon DGMO , Lt. Gen. K.R. Rao , Commandant School of Artillery & Maj. General V.K. Tiwari ADG Artillery along with other senior army officers . Dr. A. Sivathanu Pillai CEO & MD BrahMos along with Director DRDL Mr. P. Venugopalan , Project Director Mr.S. Som, Executive Director (Production) Rear Admiral (Retd.) S. Mohapatra and other senior scientists were present during the launch.

This is the third launch in the series for the Block-II version for the Indian Army. With this launch the requirement of army for the land attack version with Block-II advanced seeker software with target discriminating capabilities has been fully met and this version is ready for induction. This will provide an enhanced capability to the user for selection of a particular land target amongst group of targets. With this success BrahMos has become the only supersonic cruise missile possessing this advanced capability in the world, providing an edge to the user with precise hit.The Indian Army is the first army in the world to have a regiment of supersonic cruise missile with advanced capabilities.

LEARNING from its 60-hour gun battle during the 26/11 Mumbai Terror attacks, the National Security Guard (NSG) is all set to upgrade its equipment and weapon profile.

Having already moved on procuring bodyworn video and audio bugs, mini-remotely operated vehicles and real time x-ray viewing system almost immediately after the Mumbai attacks, this elite commando force is now in the process of procuring night-sight equipment for its SIG (SWAT) assault rifles, laser listening devices and light support weapons.

Sources said procurement of these equipments was at the top of the force's agenda following an in-depth analysis of the force's strengths and weaknesses during the "debriefing" following the Mumbai operations.

While NSG officials maintained that some of these equipments were already available with the force, they admitted that there was fresh impetus to plans to procure the best available, and in sufficient numbers.

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