Defence and Security of India - April15 by Armada International & Asian Military Review

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BELOW PAR ALLOCATIONS INDIA’S DEFENCE BUDGET

Defence Budget 2015 has not shown enough accretion in allocation that can be called significant I LAXMAN K. BEHERA

THE COASTAL CHALLENGE MARINE SECURITY

With the rise of non-traditional security, the maritime security paradigm has undergone a transformation I ANUP SINGH

SPECIAL FORCES IN INDIA:

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BLOATED BUT BEREFT SPECIAL FORCES IN INDIA HAVE HAD HUGE ACCRETION IN NUMBERS BUT HAVE REMAINED DEPRIVED IN TERMS OF AIRLIFT AND FIREPOWER I RAHUL BEDI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA VOLUME 7

ISSUE 2

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LETTER FROM THE

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editor

o, Indian Air Force (IAF) is going to have their Rafale medium, multirole aircraft after all. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tied up that deal on his recent visit to France in a government-to-government basis. But the deal might not have been what Dassault desired. For, the French giant had been negotiating an agreement to build 18 aircrafts on their own and provide licenced assistance to Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to make another 108. The deal was being estimated to be about $ 20 billion – a revised estimate over an original price of about $ 12 billion mentioned in response to the request for proposal (RFP), with a life cycle cost (LCC) estimate that was higher. But Modi’s move to seek to buy 36 aircrafts will cater for about two squadrons. Considering that the IAF has a three-tier force structure with Tejas light combat aircraft at the lowest tier, upgraded Mirage-2000s, Jaguars and Rafale at the medium tier and Su-30 MKI and the proposed fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) at the uppermost tier, whether the limited number of squadrons of Rafale will be sufficient is an issue. However, it has to be said that the smaller number of Rafales will not just meet the immediate need of the IAF – with its squadron strength depleting at a rate faster than it can add combat aircrafts – but they will open the option for procuring a different type of fighter aircrafts. Though, unless it is of the same family of the three tiers, it would create severe maintenance and overhaul problems for the air force with several types constituting their fighting arm. Having said that, the Modi deal should also be viewed as a budgetary solution for the moment when the accretion in the air force capital allocation is barely enough for all the other big ticket acquisitions the transport aircrafts and choppers that IAF had planned according to the perspective plan. Now that a smaller number of Rafales have been chosen, there is very little left barring the shout. It can now be said that the six-year-long process with Dassault, which had continued to animate the ministry of defence and the armed forces for so long, is all but buried to be reborn as a government-to-government sale. The experience gained in the process though, will remain as an institutional learning that can be applied later on the other negotiations in the future.

Pinaki Bhattacharya

Now that a smaller number of Rafales have been chosen, there is very little left barring the shout. It can now be said that the six-year-long process with Dassault, which had continued to animate the ministry of defence and the armed forces for so long, is all but buried to be reborn as a governmentto-government sale.

CONTENTS

COMBAT AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT: WHERE DOES INDIA STAND TODAY? AEROSPACE

Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s desire for a combat aircraft capability was hindered by technology denial regimes, time and cost over-runs

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PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS: ‘SMART BOMBS’ NEED ‘SMART DECISIONS’ PGMs

BLOATED BUT BEREFT

SPECIAL FORCES

Special Forces in India have had huge accretion in numbers but have remained deprived in terms of airlift and firepower

INDIA’S DEFENCE BUDGET: BELOW PAR ALLOCATIONS DEFENCE BUDGET

Defence Budget 2015 has not shown enough accretion in allocation that can be called significant and the capital account numbers are even more depressing

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MARITIME SECURITY: THE COASTAL CHALLENGE MARINE SECURITY

With the rise of non-traditional security, the maritime security paradigm has undergone a transformation with institutional arrangements being strengthened

PGMs changed the shape of battle in the late-20th century with the US virtually winning the war in Persian Gulf with just a few KIAs

REQUIREMENTS AND STRATEGY FOR GROWTH UAVs

Linked to India’s growth as regional power is the development of aeronautical sector. The significant numbers of SMEs and MSMEs that constitute the domestic aeronautical sector can be loci for growth

CONTRIBUTORS

LT GEN (RETD) ANIL CHAIT L t Gen (R e t d. ) An il C ha i t, PVSM, AVSM,VSM retired from service July 2014. His last appointment was that of the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Tri-Service Organisation). In his forty one years of military service, he has served as the Commanderin- Chief of a Field Army, HQ Central Command from 01 Mar 2012 to 30 Jun 2013. Also, he was the Commandant of Army War College, Mhow.

RAHUL BEDI R a h ul B e d i is the New Delhi correspondent for Janeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

DR LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

AIR MARSHAL(RETD) M MATHESWARAN

L a x m a n K um a r B ehe ra is Research Fellow at New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Behera has vertical specialisation on issue related to Arms Procurement, Offsets Defence Industry and Defence Cooperation. He was closely associated with two high-level Committees set up by indian MoD on Defence Acquisition and Defence Expenditure. Recently, he was the Consultant to theTask Force on Self-Reliance and Defence Modernisation Constituted by the NSCS, Government of India .

Ai r M a r sh a l M M a t he sw a ra n was the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff at Head Quarters IDS until his retirement in March 2014. He was responsible for Policy, Plans and Force Structure development of the Three Services, including budget analysis, Acquisition, procurement and technology management. He was responsible for formulating the long-term and short-term integrated defence plans. He was commissioned in 1975. He is an alumni of National Defence Academy. His academic achievements include Ph.D in Defence and Strategic Studies (University of Madras) and a Post Graduate Diploma in Financial Management.

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DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2015 VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) ANUP SINGH Anup S ingh, served the Indian Navy till October 2011 during which he commanded four Indian Naval warships. He was the Sailing Master of the fi rst ever squarerigged Sail TrainingVessel in India, named ‘Varuna’, during 198082. He also skippered the NavalYacht ‘Samudra’ for her Pacific crossing during the Tri Service round-theworld voyage in 1989. He has also served as Director of Naval Plans and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in his career. On his last sea going appointment he served as ‘Flag offi cer commanding Western Fleet’ where he led operation Sukoon, the evacuation of civilians from war-torn Lebanon inJuly 2006. He also served as Flag Offi cer, CommandinginChief, Eastern Naval Command in last two years of his career. He is a keen sportsman and an adventurer.

P S KRISHNAN PS Krishnan Distinguished Scientist (Retd) & Former Director, Aeronautical Development Establishment, Bengaluru; a premier Systems Establishment of DRDO, India. He is B.Tech (1972), M.Tech (1980) in Mechanical Engineering both from IIT, Madras. At the beginning of his career he worked at DRDL (now RIL)w RCI), Hyderabad on the development of Gimbaled Inertial Navigation System (1 nautical mile/hr class) which was tested successfully in Avro Aircraft. Such class of INSs guide today’s missiles produced in India. For 37 years, he worked at ADE in various positions on the development of Flight Control System for Unmanned AirVehicles and Quadruplex Digital Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System for Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. Superannuated from service as Director in 2013.

VOLUME 7, ISSUE 2

EDITOR Pinaki Bhattacharya GENERAL MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mediatransasia.com) MANAGER MARKETING Jakhongir Djalmetov (E-Mail: joha@mediatransasia.com) ASST.ART DIRECTOR Ajay Kumar ASSTT. MANAGER Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz, atul@mediatransasia.com) PRODUCTION Ritesh Roy MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED 323, UdyogVihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Benelux Cornelius W. Bontje Tel: (41) 79 635 2621 Email: cbontje@ymail.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: rem-media@sfr.fr Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/SouthAfrica Emanuela Castagnetti-Gillberg Tel: +46 31 799 9028 E-Mail:egillberg@glocalnet.net South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411 E-Mail: corres1@jesmedia.com East-Central Europe/Greece/Turkey Zena Coupé Tel: (44) 1923 852537 Email: zena@expomedia.biz USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmediainc@icloud.com Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, UdyogVihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Nutech Photolithographers B-240, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I,New Delhi-110020, India. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy. The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited. SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION DefenceandSecurity of India is obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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AEROSPACE

COMBAT AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT:

WHERE DOES INDIA STAND TODAY? India’s desire for a combat aircraft capability was hindered by technology denial regimes, time and cost over-runs

M MATHESWARAN

ver since the dawn of aviation in 1903, all major nations aspired to design and manufacture aircraft. In the early decades it was Europe that took the lead in the design and manufacture of aircraft as they saw the enormous potential of the third dimension on warfare. By 1914 Britain, France and Germany had fielded very large air forces. The Second World War catapulted aviation research into the forefront. Japan, USSR, and the USA joined the ranks during the war with bustling military aircraft industries. The last two went on to create massive military

industrial complexes (MIC) centred on the aviation industry. In the post Second World War scenario many nations aspired to make their own combat aircraft. These countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Israel the late entrants in the aircraft industry would soon find significant barriers to their development in the form of technology restrictions and denial regimes built by the leaders. The motive was, while professing the interests of disarmament and peace, clearly economic. The military industrial complex that emerged in the USA after the Second

World War became a major contributor to the national economy. The leading countries were in no mood to share their pie with emerging powers. Hence, as the late entrants soon realised the domain of combat aircraft development will always be an uphill task. Argentina, Brazil, and China were the earliest to start. First two benefitted from the spill over of the German expertise while China gained from its Communist ideological partnership with the USSR.

Origins of India’s Aircraft programme

India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal

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KEY POINTS

In the post-WW II situation, there have been some regional powers that have sought to build their own fighter aircraft India had an early experience of developing a fighter aircraft with the help of the British called HF 24 (Marut) The LCA is an experiment at developing a home-grown aircraft from ground-up with indigenously developed technology

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overhauling, and refurbishing (upgrade in today’s parlance) a large number of Liberator bombers for the fledgling Indian Air Force. This was followed by its first attempt at aircraft design, which was the basic trainer (HT-2) for the Indian Air force. The HT-2 entered IAF service in the late 1950s and went on to train IAF pilots for more than three decades. A few numbers were also exported. Combat aircraft manufacturing began when the de Havilland Vampire (it began the jet age in the IAF) was inducted into the IAF. Licence production of this aircraft and its engine was undertaken by HAL. This was followed by the development of the Gnat for India by Folland, UK. HAL began licence production of the Gnat and its Orpheus engine from 1956. The Indian Air Force also inducted through direct imports, from UK and France, a series of combat aircrafts such as the Toofani (French name “Ouragon”), Mystere IV, Hawker Hunter, and the Canberra. A large number of weapons and system integration activities on these fleets were undertaken by IAF’s AATU (Aircraft and Armament Testing Unit). By the mid-1950s India initiated the move to design and manufacture a combat aircraft within the country. The move was certainly audacious, given the expertise available within the country at that time.

Combat Aircraft Design, Development and Manufacture

Rafale C and Rafale B in flight © Dassault Aviation

Nehru, exhibited significant clarity in dealing with India’s strategic priorities. This was evident in the way Atomic Energy and Space departments were nurtured by his personal direction and involvement. He was also clear that India must make its own aircraft and to that extent he was personally involved. However, aeronautics did not get the same primacy in strategic importance like the other two sectors and this has had a serious negative impact on subsequent developments. The only aircraft industry in the country, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., began as a

private company in 1940 as Hindustan Aircraft Ltd. Its contribution to the allied war effort was immense in the numbers of aircraft and engines produced under licence, and a very large effort of maintenance and overhaul of allied aircraft and engines. However, after the War the British downsized HAL by retrenching 80% of its experienced workforce. The net result was that at the time of independence HAL had to start again virtually from scratch with a small core of left over expertise. Despite this handicap, HAL could still pool in its wartime experience in assembling,

India’s attempts at the design, development, and manufacture of fixed wing combat aircraft have been just two so far. The first was the HF-24 programme, which was initiated in the 1950s and was prematurely closed after just a decade and a half of operations; while the second is the LCA programme, which is, even after three decades of development, yet to fructify.

HF – 24 “Marut”

By all measures the HF-24 was a national programme. It was given the quickest burial for any national programme anywhere in the world. In hindsight one can see that the decision to go ahead with the HF-24 project against enormous challenges was strategically brave, its execution was equally brilliant, but its follow up and subsequent project management was shoddy and some poor national level decisions not only killed the

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British-made Jaguar on a bombing run in an IAF exercise

programme but its impact subsequently was disastrous. In the mid fifties the IAF looked for a multi-role combat aircraft. The national leadership decided that this should be designed and manufactured within the country, by HAL. Given the expertise prevalent in the country at that time, Nehru encouraged inducting foreign assistance. This was a farsighted and visionary approach. The need for inducting foreign design expertise, in areas where our capabilities had not fully developed, will be relevant at all times. It applies to every country irrespective of its development status. The ASR given out in 1955 called for an aircraft that was suitable for both high altitude interception and low altitude ground attack. Its top speed was to be in Mach 2.0, a service ceiling of 60,000 ft, top speed at low level of 640 knots, and a combat radius of action of 500 miles (805 km). The ASR further demanded that the aircraft be suitable for adaptation as an advanced operational trainer, all weather fighter, and a naval version for carrier operations. The task of meeting this was on HAL, and it was hardly equipped to undertake this task in 1955. It had only three senior Indian design engineers and its entire design department boasted strength of just 54. The prototype shop had a complement

of some 60 men, including supervisors, while 13 men constituted the entire strength of the production-engineering department. The entire infrastructure had to be built up from grassroots. In this scenario, HAL did the wisest act. It inducted Dr Kurt Tank, the German designer, to head the design team for the HF-24, while addressing the infrastructure development on a high priority. Dr Kurt Tank was one of the finest aircraft designers of the 20th century. Kurt Tank was an engineer, designer, and a Test Pilot. His Focke-Wulf Fe 190 (Wurger) Strike was the mainstay of the Luftwaffe from 1941 to 1945. He moved to Argentina in 1947 and designed the Argentinian fighter “Pulqui II” based on his end of the war design Ta 183. Argentina became the first country outside of the developed world to design a state-of-the-art jet fighter in 1948. While the prototypes flew, the project was scrapped in 1953 due to shortage of funds. Kurt Tank and his close design team moved to India. He became the director of MIT (Madras Institute of Technology) where he taught aeronautics. President Abdul Kalam was his student. He moved to Bangalore with his team when the HF-24 design task was entrusted to him. By all standards the HF-24 was a state of the art design, and was equal to the best in its contemporary era. It was hampered by

the non-availability of the right power plant. As a result, the IAF and HAL chose to power it with two Gnat engines – Orpheus 703. Though underpowered, the HF-24 could touch 600 knots at low level, a quality that was its strength in the 1971 war as the HF-24 veterans would vouch for. Its normal ferry speed was the fastest in IAF history, 0.9 Mach at 40,000 ft. The development programme of HF-24 was first established on a full-scale glider model. 83 developmental sorties were flown on this model. This perhaps, was the last aircraft on which a glider model was used in the world. The actual prototype flew in 1961, just four years from 1957 when the design work commenced. This was surely a fantastic achievement, considering the challenges that existed in India’s technological environment, as also the technology status and design and testing tools that were available in that era compared to that available today. The first two pre-production models were handed over to the IAF in 1964 to the AATU for operational evaluation. The first squadron was formed in 1967 (No 10 Sqn – Daggers), just 10 years after the commencement of the design. While the HF-24 acquitted itself well in the 1971 war (in ground attack role), its envisaged air defence role was non-existent due to its underpowered power plants.

AEROSPACE India’s own LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) Tejas displaying low-flying aerobatic skills at Yelahanka Air Base, Bangalore

Despite huge efforts the Indian government could not get the right engines. The government made a huge blunder when it rejected the offer of Bristol for a joint development of the engine that required less than Rs 5 Crore investment at that time. The finance wizards in the government rejected it on grounds of huge expense. This was a hugely lost opportunity. Rs 5 crores even in those times was not a big sum considering the fact that such a joint venture would have catapulted India to the select ranks of Engine designers and manufacturers. Four decades later India is still struggling to make an aero engine, the Kaveri engine programme has consumed thousands of crores and is nowhere near airworthiness. Dr Kurt Tank left India in 1967. But the HF-24 experience had strengthened HAL immensely. It now had great experience, a design department of 150 Indian engineers in addition to 18 German design engineers, a prototype shop of 592 workers with 59 supervisors, and a production-engineering department of over 100 engineers/ technicians. In 1967 this was certainly a very strong position. Logically the country, the user and the industry should have persisted with this successful design to bring about necessary improvements through successive derivatives of the same aircraft.

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Dr Kurt Tank was one of the finest aircraft designers of the 20th century. KurtTankwas an engineer, designer, and a Test Pilot. His Focke-Wulf Fe 190 (Wurger) Strike was the mainstay of the Luftwaffe from1941 to 1945. Hemoved toArgentina in 1947 and designed the Argentinian fighter “Pulqui II” based on end of the war design Ta 183

But what happened subsequently was a huge national tragedy. The Air Force lost interest due to the aircraft’s persistent problems of underpowered engines and phased out the fleet by 1984, a mere 17 years after the first induction. What was even more alarming was the fact that HAL

design department lost interest and its experienced work force began to move away to better prospects. In a nutshell the HF-24 became a massively wasted opportunity for the country. The final nail in its coffin was delivered when the IAF inducted the Jaguar as its premier strike fleet, and HAL was happy to produce it under licence. The decade of the 1970s could be called as the lost decade. By the time the LCA project came up in 1985, the country began from scratch all over again.

Light Combat Aircraft

The LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) requirement emerged in the late Seventies when the IAF, concerned with the high accident rate of the Gnat/Ajeet aircraft, asked HAL to develop a light, inexpensive aircraft as a quick replacement. Later, the replacement requirement included early series MiG-21s as well. A feasibility study was carried out by an integrated team headed by the then Director of NAL, Dr Valluri, under the auspices of HAL. Initial inputs of the IAF focused on its objective of a low-cost, lightweight and a simple replacement for the Gnat/Ajeet. When the need for incorporating contemporary technologies was emphasised the IAF modified the target to a state-of-the-art requirement. Feasibility studies were completed in 1983 with considerable

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inputs from design houses from UK, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The ASR was then finalised in 1985. The LCA envisaged a basic 5-ton empty weight (later revised to 6 ton) platform incorporating fly-by-wire and glass cockpit technologies, with a significant multi-role weapon capability and a performance requirement that aimed to match the F-16. The LCA concept was influenced by set of various events that had emerged in the world. The USA initiated the “Light Weight Fighter” programme after the dismal performance of its expensive fighters like the Phantom against the low cost light fighters like the MiG -15, MiG-19 and MiG21. The architect behind the LWF concept was Col John Boyd and his “Fighter mafia” who used the Energy-Manoeuvrability (EM) concept to drive the design process. The USAF defined the objectives clearly – a right balance of low cost, light weight and high performance. Low cost remained an overriding imperative. Aircraft and performance requirements were defined in broad terms, flexible and not fixed in great details. Quite naturally, technology was developed as a tool to achieve the right balance. It was the first aircraft to incorporate fly-by-wire controls, advanced aerodynamic concepts, and composites. The YF-16 concept demonstrator flew within two years of the project sanction, and the series production aircraft entered service in less than eight years. The LCA programme management failed to learn the above lessons. The Indian LCA boxed itself into

stringent weight and size limitations resulting in severe restrictions on its mission range. The influence of the Gnat on the concept of being “Light” and the desire to make it technologically advanced created contrasting requirements. The IAF’s original requirement was for a conventional aircraft but the desire to bridge technology gaps, including aeroengine, through this programme was projected by DRDO. Thus the programme became a vehicle for technology development rather than using appropriate technologies to hasten the induction of the aircraft. So, while many achievements have been made in terms of mastering various technologies, the final product ie the weapon platform is still in development even after three decades. Considering the development challenges of various technologies involved, and the fact that HAL’s design capability had seriously depleted after the lost decade since the HF-24 programme, the government approved the formation of ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency) to manage and steer the LCA programme. This agency, logically, should have been steered by the user as is done in other countries in order to keep the focus on operational objectives thus balancing cost, timeframe, and technology. But this was not to be. ADA ended up being managed entirely by the DRDO. The industry (HAL) played a subsidiary role with negative impact on cost, and more seriously the erosion of its own decisive design capabilities. The net result is that the LCA (designated LCA Mk I) falls short on

A Mig-21 being towed to the tarmac before a flight

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critical ASR performance requirements. In short, the LCA Mk I will fall in the MiG-21 Bison class but with advanced systems, sensors and weapons. The LCA Mk II is to be powered by a higher-powered engine, but if it has to become better than LCA Mk I, then it calls for a major aerodynamic redesign. Simply put, the LCA Mk II will have to adapt the platform design that the consultants initially recommended – a canard and delta wing combination. Otherwise the LCA Mk II may end having inferior performance to the Mk I.

Upgrade Programmes

For nearly three decades since the early 1950s, integration of weapons and upgrade of systems have been handled largely by AATU, and later ASTE of the Air Force. The first major large upgrade programme was done on the Jaguar fleet. This was the development of the digital nav attack system for the Jaguar fleet. The system called DARIN (Digital Attack, Ranging, and Inertial Navigation) was developed in the early 1980s and went on to be fitted in the entire fleet. The system was developed with SAGEM, France as the technology partner. An umbrella organisation called IIO (Inertial Integration Organisation) was created with active participation of HAL and ASTE. The entire programme was controlled by the IAF. The programme was approved in 1981and the DARIN system was operational by 1986. It brought an order of magnitude change in the weapon accuracies of the IAF. This experience proved very useful when the IAF entrusted

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MiG-27 Upgrade MiG-29K taking-off from a strip on a trial run for an aircraft carrier launch

HAL with the task of developing the next version of DARIN II based on ring laser gyro system.

Jaguar Upgrades

Ever since its induction in 1979, the Jaguar aircraft has continued to be the preferred vehicle for series of major modifications. The first upgrade began with over wing missile modification. Magic I air-to-air missile was integrated as an over wing missile in 1982. The entire upgrade programme was done by ASTE and HAL with the assistance of British Aerospace industries. An Electronic Warfare adaptation was done in 1985. This was followed by the development of the maritime attack aircraft version with the Agave radar and Sea-eagle missile. The Agave was subsequently replaced with Israeli radar. A series of upgrades have followed; LGB and Designator pod, autopilot, refuelling probe on the trainer, avionics and glass cockpit, and finally the re-engining project.

MiG-21 Bison

Concerned at the delay in the LCA programme, the IAF embarked on upgrading an optimal number of 125 MiG21 Bis aircraft in late 1990s. The upgraded aircraft, called Bison, was fitted with a new Russian multi-mode radar, a HUD (head-up display), and a digital inertial nav attack system. The development phase was a huge challenge as it involved integrating equipment and systems from Russia, France and Israel. Co-ordinating with three countries was a nightmare. Once

Based on the Bison experience HAL was now confident of upgrading the MiG-27 aircraft, which it had produced earlier under licence. DRDO’s experience and expertise from LCA and Su-30 projects ensured that the entire upgrade programme, unlike the Bison, was done in India. HAL, DARE (Defence Avionics Research Laboratory – a DRDO lab) and ASTE managed the entire upgrade process, including the mission computer development. This was a good indigenous upgrade programme. The upgraded MiG-27 was equipped with a HUD, modern nav attack system, self-protection suite, Multi Function Displays, and advanced electro optical targeting system.

MiG-29 & Mirage 2000 Upgrades

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development was completed series production was entrusted to HAL. The IAF accomplished this programme successfully and the new Bisons acquitted themselves well by jolting the overconfident USAF in the joint exercise in 2005.

Life extension and upgrade of these two fleets are being done by the OEMs in their facilities. HAL’s gain will be limited to series modification at its facilities using mod kits provided by the OEMs.

Conclusion

Aircraft upgrade strategy has become a critical requirement for all major air forces in the world as the costs of developing a new aircraft are becoming prohibitively expensive. Upgrade strategy provides a very cost-effective solution due to exponential improvements in sensors, systems and weapons. Besides, upgrade strategy provides a good opportunity for industries to hone their design skills and also contribute to developing a large pool of highly skilled technical manpower in the country. Nevertheless, major powers will continue to develop new systems and aircraft in order to address their strategic autonomy and security. India’s fighter aircraft and engine development programmes have been hampered by discontinuity and compartmentalised approach. This is what killed HF-24 that was an extremely well designed platform. The LCA faces a similar danger due to its short fall in ASR compliance. If this is to be avoided, then a radical restructuring needs to be done with HAL and ADA. More active role by the user in programme management is absolutely necessary. If the LCA roles are reviewed and rationalised (for example as LIFT – Lead in Fighter Trainer) it could be a good aircraft to be produced in larger numbers with significant export potential.

SPECIAL FORCES IN INDIA:

SPECIAL FORCES

BLOATED BUT BEREFT

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Special Forces in India have had huge accretion in numbers but have remained deprived in terms of airlift and firepower

RAHUL BEDI

KEY POINTS

Elite Maroon Berets are deployed almost as replacements for infantry soldiers in Kashmir. Glamourised in mass media, the SFs have become icons of force projections. The Special Frontier Force is the sword arm of the external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing.

ndia’s manpower intensive Special Forces (SF), which continue to operate without a specific operational mandate, adequate gear, organisational support or dedicated funding, face an identity crisis. Senior military officers concede that the country’s under-equipped SF units are deployed routinely on tactical rather than broader,strategic and unconventional missions that were envisaged for them in a turbulent neighbourhood. Consequently the SF, whose numbers have proliferated recklessly 2001 onwards, have often ended up as substitutes for conventional forces in counter-insurgency operations (COIN) in the Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir, that could well have been undertaken by regular infantry. There are more maroon berets (of the SF) visible in Kashmir than necessary. For such an elite force with a seemingly diverse orientation to be employed on cordon-andsearch and long-range pathfinding tasks and execute attacks on terrorist hideouts is, simply, overkill. All such responsibilities can easily be effected by the infantry’s Ghatak commando platoons, trained and equipped for special operations. Experts argue that such employment only militates against fundamental SF ethos, their unconventional skills and proficiency, all of which are aimed at a precise and focussed response for high value gains. All militaries concur that by virtue of specialised and demanding training, exploitation of advanced weaponry and equipment, strategic mobility and tactical flexibility, most SFs are any country’s highoctane force multipliers. Capable of functioning in ambiguous and evolving scenarios and adapting swiftly to crisis situations, their primary aim is to maximise military, diplomatic and political outcomes for their respective governments. It is, after all, an accepted axiom in military

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and security circles, that much like the lone sniper, SF too are capable of altering, not only the course of battles, but even of politics and history. And like the sniper, their roles remain shrouded in secrecy. Accordingly all SF, glamourised by cinema and fiction, are deemed capable of conducting spectacular operations, in inverse proportion to their numbers employed in assorted conflict spectrums. The stunning US Navy SEAL Team Six raid on Abbotabad cantonment in northwestern Pakistan in May 2011, to assassinate Osama bin Laden, is one such recent example. In India, however, the absence of a centralised SF authority and doctrine, command-and-control structure and confusion over their allocation to joint or single service commanders, has resulted in lop-sided capability development and at times, even mission duplication. An SF doctrine issued by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2005, decades after the first battalion was raised in 1978, was more a generic document that failed in providing mission clarity or resolving innumerable operational anomalies. The lack of standarised training and equipping norms has further added to SF operational ambiguities creating, instead, a ‘stove pipe’ or silo-like structure of multiple elite forces operating in isolation, albeit to little strategic effect. Hence, Indian SF rarely, if at all, function as an effective politico-military tool. There is near unanimity amongst military and security officers that poorly trained and accoutred SF remain largely incapable of effectively implementing raids, ambushes, direct assaults or standoff attacks in hostile territory. Furthermore, they are ill suited to conducting strategic reconnaissance and unconventional warfare or executing a wide-range of critical challenges that have emerged in India’s neighbourhood in recent years, like locating and seizing weapons of mass destruction. “India’s SF are so only in name, not orientation because the country’s higher defence organisation lacks military professionals. Their ability to employ SF on politico-military missions at strategic levels is lacking” lamented Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch, a former SF officer. They (SF) continue to be employed tactically, he added. The bulk of India’s 18,000-20,000

SPECIAL FORCES An Indian Army paratrooper exits a CH47 Chinook helicopter during a partnered airborne training exercise with US Army paratroopers © US Army

strong SF, including support units,or some 7,000-8,000 personnel are from the Indian Army, which is in the process of raising its 10th Para (SF) battalion. These overall,proliferating numbers equal those of the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), even though the operational remit of Indian SF is severely circumscribed, confined to its immediate neighbourhood whilst that of the former is global. The remaining SF comprise the Indian Navy’s (IN’s) 1,000-1,200 Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) 1,200-odd Garud Commando Force. Additionally, there are 4,000-5,000 SF personnel from the 51 and 52 Special Action Group (SAG), drawn exclusively from the army, that constitute the principal strike arm of the National Security Guard (NSG), a Federal Contingency Deployment Force that operates under the Cabinet Secretariate. After the November 2008 Mumbai terror

Hence, IndianSF rarely, if at all, function as an effective politico-military tool.There is near unanimity amongst military and security officers that poorly trained and accoutred SF remain largely incapable of effectively implementing raids, ambushes, direct assaults or standoff attacks in hostile territory.

strikes, these SAG numbers are gradually being increased, following the decision to expand NSG deployment to Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Chennai, in anticipation of similar attacks elsewhere in the country. This wider NSG dispersal, presently underway, nearly seven years after the Mumbai siege, was also prompted by the forces five-hour delay on 26 November 2008 in deploying, from its headquarters at Manesar on New Delhi’s outskirts, against the 10 Pakistani terrorists besieging Mumbai. During operations, three Special Ranger Group (SRG) battalions-11,12 and 13- of around 900 personnel each, recruited from State and Central ParaMilitary Forces, provide logistic support to the SAG. However,years of depreciated operating procedures, under which SRG personnel have thoughtlessly been assigned to VIP security, has severely

APRIL 2015

An Indian Army paratrooper examines an M4 carbine prior to sighting in the weapon during field training exercises © US Army

blunted their combat edge. Furthermore are 1,200-1,500 SF from two shadowy Special Group (SG) battalions of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), raised after India’s disastrous 1962 border war

with China, and headquartered at Chakrata, near Dehra Dun. The SFF and its SG served as models for the NSG-SAG combine. The SFF-better known by its nom de guerre Establishment 22 is operationally

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employed by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for clandestine and sensitive missions. Interestingly, the SFF came to be known by this latter appellation due to its first Inspector General, the doughty Major Gen Sujjan Singh Uban, who commanded the 22nd Mountain Regiment during World War II,winning a Military Cross in the process. In its formative years, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIAs) paramilitary wing alongside the Indian Army, trained and armed the SFFs largely Tibetan Khampa recruits. It supplied them lightweight .30 calibre M1 semi-automatic carbines- and its M-2 and M-3 variants-and infiltrated its SG personnel into Chineseoccupied Tibet to gather intelligence and execute disruptive raids. Thereafter, with airlift facilities provided in the 1970s by the RAW’s secretive Aviation Research Centre (ARC), the SFF became a fully airborne jungle and mountain warfare unit. However, such force abundance spawns operational problems. For, other than operating individually, there is a tendency

SPECIAL FORCES amongst individual services to look upon each SF unit as their singular preserve, thereby compromising ‘jointness’ and integrated mission capability. This includes dedicated air support to ensure insertion and extraction of SF units, coordinated armed reconnaissance and close air support missions to depreciate vital enemy assets. The IAF, for instance, cited inadequate cooperation from the army in 2004 as its operational rationale for raising, at great expense, its own Garud counter-terrorism and anti-hijacking force. This needlessly duplicated the NSGs role as a counterterrorism force to tackle hijackings a decade earlier. In turn, the army, claiming insufficient support from the IAF, plans to create two special aviation squadrons for its SF, further duplicating scarce assets. Proposals to establish a unified SF command headed by the Indian Army alongside those for Space and Cyberspace led by the IAF and IN respectively – announced in early 2013, are nowhere near fruition. These followed the May 2012 recommendations of the 14-member Naresh Chandra National Security Review Committee, set up by the Congress Partyled federal coalition to evaluate the progress in defence reforms introduced after the

1999 Kargil conflict. The long overdue Commands- particularly the SF- were aimed at dispelling enduring inter-service and intra-service rivalries for funding and reducing asset duplication, particularly in communication and network-centric systems and aerial platforms like helicopters. Economising on over-extended resources, in order to free up moneys for long-deferred military modernisation, was the other aim behind this deferred restructuring but such force and resource rationalision is awaited. A rapid expansion - almost a 120 per cent increase - of the army’s SF units occurred in an ad hoc manner between 2001 and 2004, after the US deployed its SF in large numbers to Afghanistan, following the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon. At the time, two successive influential Colonels of the Parachute Regiment ironically, both non-SF officers erroneously prevailed upon the army’s higher defence management that an expanded SF, like the US’, was the ‘magic bullet’ for all future campaigns and conflicts in the sub-continent. Thereafter, three Parachute Regiment battalions were hastily converted to SF maroon beret units with their distinctive

US Army Osprey in operation at a war theatre

‘Balidan’ badge and special Rs 7,000 monthly allowance for the officers. “Operational efficiency was ignored as the jobs-for-the-boys policy was implemented” said Lt Gen V K Kapur. It was a totally unprofessional decision, he declared. Grievously, army headquarters had failed to comprehend the central principle behind these lethal fighting units that SF effectiveness lies not in numbers, but in cohesion amongst small numbers honed by intensive training and backed by superior equipment. Disregarding the dictum that SF cannot be mass-produced and the quality of its manpower is better than quantity, army headquarters arbitrarily pursued the SF exponential enlargement. Unthinkingly, a fourth assault team too was added to existing SF units, perpetuating the cult of elitehood but at the cost of operational capability. Army planners also disregarded a 2001 internal study on modernising the SF by consolidating existing numbers and training and arming them better. Instead, some senior officers went as far as to recommend that each of the army’s 13 Corps-lately 14, including the under-raising 17 Mountain Strike Corps-be assigned an SF battalion. This proposal, if pursued, would

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Infantry soldiers in operation on 26/11

necessitate converting three, if not four, more Parachute Regiment battalions to SF status. And, other than further depreciating SF fighting skills, it would also overwhelm the already overstretched SF headquarters at Nahan in the Himalayan foothills and it’s equally overloaded training centre at Belgaum in Karnataka, to structure and equip such a vast force. According to Gen Katoch the SFs rapid proliferation has adverse integral consequences. He said each time an additional SF unit is created, existing SF battalions are required to provide it a nucleus of officers, junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers and varied support staff. “This breaks the cohesion of existing units, as personnel continuity in a five-man assault team and two-man surveillance team, is central to the success of all missions” Gen Katoch said. Further compounding this crisis, was the officer shortage all SF battalions faced - up to a third of their authorised strength of 48 officers. This deficit further diluted SF combat output, tailored for precision strikes led by officer-led sub-units, he declared. In comparison, SF expansion by the Chinese and Pakistani militaries has been studied and strategically orientated. Numerically, the Peoples Liberation Army Special Operations Forces, for example, are estimated anywhere between 7,000 and 14,000 personnel, while Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) number around 5,000. The PLAs SF, established 1988 onwards,

”

According to Gen Katoch the SFs rapid proliferation has adverse integral consequences. He said each time an additional SF unit is created, existing SF battalions are required to provide it a nucleus of officers, junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers and varied support staff

specialise in rapid reaction combat in a limited regional war under hi-tech conditions, commando operations, counterterrorism and intelligence gathering. They are also trained in target designation, surveillance, airborne insertion, sabotage and offensive strike missions. Currently they are receiving instruction on the newly digitised army soldier system and on varied high-mobility land weapon platforms. Pakistan’s 10-battalion SSG, on the other hand, headquartered at Tarbela in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North West Frontier Province), was created in early 1956

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by converting the 19 Baloch infantry battalion. Its training, orientation and weaponry is based on that of the US SOCOM with whom it has exercised for decades and still does. The SSG specialises in desert, mountain and underwater warfare. Meanwhile, the Indian SF organisational woes were exacerbated by a persisting shortage of varied materiel and a lack of dedicated air support due to the consistent deficiency of helicopters that have been under acquisition for nearly two decades. Till late 2006, bureaucratic procedures had delayed the induction of some 3000 Israel Weapon Industries 5.56mm Tavor-21 assault rifles (TAR-21) with 40 mm underbarrel grenade launchers (UBGLs), four years after the USD 20 million contract for them was signed. These numbers,however, were inadequate to arm all SF units and the shortfall was made up by imported AK-47s. Some 20 types of specialised SF equipment promised by the US nearly a decade ago, like laser designators and night vision devices are still awaited. The SF sources said deficiencies, of not only 5.56mm training ammunition - of which there is an annual 50 per cent shortfall - but of carbines, sniper and underwater rifles, heavy and general purpose machine guns persevered. Also needed were 60mm mortars, disposable anti-tank rocket launchers and flamethrowers, amongst numerous other offensive assets that constitute the staple of all SF globally. Adequate communication equipment including satellite telephones, GPS systems and tactical computers, were awaited, as were combat free-fall parachute systems. The longawaited Battle Field Management System, which the SF could operationally exploit, was in the process of being fast tracked was unlikely to be operational for at least a decade, leaving a massive communication hiatus. Guided Para-foil Delivery Systems (two andfourtoncategory),underwaterpropulsion vehiclesandcameras,digitalcompasses,highresolution video and still cameras, radiocontrolledandremotedetonatortransmitters, high resolution and passive night vision binoculars, too were required. Even rucksacks provided to the SF were of poor quality, forcing soldiers to acquire them from the open market with their own money. “In most other armies SF units are the vanguard for most equipment testing” Gen Kapur said. In India they constitute the backend.

EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE, REASONABLE B

ROSOBORONEXPORT OFFERS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS FOR ARMORED EQUIPMENT WITH CONSIDERABLE IN-SERVICE TIME eing the major striking force of the Army in battle, tracked armored vehicles today are key elements in the Armed Forces of nearly every country all over the world. Their life cycle spans 20-30 years and even 40 year in some cases. It is paramount that they maintain their main combat qualities throughout these years to gain superiority over the enemy in conditions of modern combat and kill more modern armored equipment of opposing forces. But the fact is that even the most formidable vehicles of the past years tend to age and need modernization to make them capable of fighting not only current but also future threats. This is the most effective, reliable and cost-effective way of maintaining high combat readiness of armored equipment even that with considerable in-service time.

For example, the T-72 tank has become the most produced main battle tank in the world. Over 30 000 T-72s and their derivatives have been manufactured in the USSR and Russia. Dozens of countries received part of them to deploy in combat and peacekeeping operations where the tank earned its popularity as an effective and reliable asset. Its licensed production in India was launched as far back as 1982. Ever since about 500 T-72s have been produced in the country. February 2001 witnessed first efforts to set a licensed construction line for the T-90S at HVF in Avadi. Both Russian and Indian parts are used. Even before that Russian-produced T-90S tanks had been imported en masse. Thus T-72 and T-90S MBTs comprise the backbone of India’s armor.

India also purchased Soviet and Russian BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs and then was licensed to produce them with a considerable quantity of these vehicles still in service or stored. Thanks to its modernization potential, the latest achievements can be integrated into Russian armored equipment to make it powerful, reliable and effective core of India’s armor and army for yet a few more years. Rosoboronexport – Russia’s special exporter of military and dual-purpose equipment and related services – offers a range of modernization programs of old armored vehicles to its Indian partners. These include replacement of units and parts, as well as partial modernization, aimed at boosting specific characteristics and combat features to a desired level.

There are three ways a comprehensive modernization can be provided: – Firepower enhancement; – Protection enhancement; – Mobility improvement. Greater firepower requires more advanced weapons systems, fire control system, and modern ammunition, including guided projectiles. This is the most complicated modernization as it is weapons that comprise the most sophisticated and expensive parts of armored vehicles. Explosive reactive armor (ERA) packages, metal and non-metal armor materials (composite armor) will improve protection of IFVs. ERA can either be welded or detached to the vehicle. Though, it should be noted that each type of MBT and IFV requires individually designed ERA solutions. ERA will also enhance tank protection considerably. In this case packages are fitted to the hull and turret at a required

angle and turn. This can be combined with armor protection improvements. This modernization is rather simple as it does not require vehicle disassembling and can be carried out even outdoors provided adequate welding and lifting equipment, as well as hand-held metal cutting tools are available. Mobility improvements will involve chassis, engines, and transmission of Russian tanks and IFVs. Greater performance can be achieved by installing a more powerful power plant, upgrading transmission and drive arrangement. Improvements of chassis and its elements – suspension, road wheels, and tracks – are also an option. Unlike armor enhancements, mobility improvement operations are more complex and require mechanical facilities. Rosoboronexport informs that the type of modernization is determined based on desires of the Customer and his financial situation.

DSI Marketing Promotion

Regardless of the modernization type the main goal is to bring characteristics of tanks and IFVs in conformity with modern requirements. Upgrades can be carried out at Customer’s sites provided all necessary production facilities and equipment are available. Required technical and technological production centers can be deployed at the following installations: maintenance sites, workshops, overhaul depots, facilities, complexes, and plants. Rosoboronexport stresses that if the Customer provides facilities for upgrade operations it will cost him less money, make them work at full capacity, provide opportunities to train specialists, and result in greater number of jobs for skilled labor. It should also be taken into consideration that only Russian specialists are familiar with specific characteristics of Russian equipment, thus they are best qualified to provide and carry out effective and robust modernization.

INDIA’S DEFENCE BUDGET: DEFENCE BUDGET

Defence Budget 2015 has not shown enough accretion in allocation that can be called significant and the capital account numbers are even more depressing

LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

KEY POINTS

Eight per cent growth in Defence Budget this year is in the mode of inflation adjustment The squeeze is felt most in the Capital Acquisition Budget mostly nullifying all the demands for modernisation Budget fails even to incentivise domestic private sector in defence production

hile presenting the Modi government’s first full budget to the Parliament on 28 February 2015, the Finance Minister allocated Rs. 2,46,727 crore (US$ 40.4 billion) for defence. The defence allocation amounts to an increase of Rs. 17,727 crore or 7.7 per cent over the previous allocation. The new defence allocation comes in the wake of Modi government’s all-out push for ‘Make in India’ initiative, the ‘heart’ of which as noted by the prime minister himself at the Aero India 2015, is the defence industry. The budget also comes in the

wake of 14th Finance Commission which has made a number of recommendations having a bearing on central government’s budget, a significant portion of which is spent on defence.

Widening Deficiency in Resource

Requirement The eight per cent growth in the defence budget comes at a time when the armed forces are already battling a huge gap in resource requirement to sustain their modernisation efforts. Suffice to mention that the gap – between the projected requirement and the actual

allocation made in successive budgets – which was eight per cent (Rs. 12,453 crore) in 2009/10 has increased to a 26 per cent (Rs.79,363 crore) in 2014/15. It can be assumed with a reasonable degree of certainty that the mere eight percent growth in latest defence budget would further widen the gap, with all its consequences on defence preparedness.

Defence Budget: Estimates, Major Elements and Growth Drivers

It is to be noted that though the defence budget 2015/16 has grown by eight per cent

BELOW PAR ALLOCATIONS APRIL 2015

For the Rafale deal alone, the initial payment is estimated at Rs 5,000-6,000 crores

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TABLE I. BUDGET AND REVISED ESTIMATES FOR 2014/15 AND 2015/16 Revenue Expenditure (Rs. in crore)

Capital Expenditure (Rs. in Crore)

Total (Rs. in Crore)

134412 140405 152139

94588 81965 94588

229000 222370 246727

2014-15 (BE) 2014-15 (RE) 2015-16 (BE)

Note: BE: Budget Estimate; RE: Revised Estimate

TABLE II: ELEMENTS OF DEFENCE BUDGET: 2014/15 & 2015/16 2014/15 Defence Budget (Rs. In Crore)

2015/16

229000.0 246727.0

Growth of Defence Budget (%)

12.4

Revenue Expenditure (Rs. in Crore)

7.74

134412.05 152139.0

Growth of Revenue Expenditure (%)

14.9

13.2

Share of Revenue Expenditure in Defence Budget (%)

58.7

61.7

94587.95

94588.0

Capital Expenditure (Rs. in Crore) Growth of Capital Expenditure (%) Share of Capital Expenditure in Defence Budget (%) Capital Acquisition (Rs. in Crore)

9.0

0.0

41.3

38.3

75148.03

77704*

Growth of Capital Acquisition (%)

2.3

3.4*

Share of Defence Budget in GDP (%)

1.81

1.75

Share of Defence Budget in Central Government Expenditure (%)

12.8

13.9

Note: *: approximate figure. Rs. 1.0 crore = Rs. 10 million = US$ 163880 (as per the average exchange rate for the first 11 months of 2014-15)

over the preceding year’s budget allocation, the growth rate amounts to 11 per cent over the revised allocation for 2014/15. This means the original budget allocation of 2014/15 has been revised downward, to the extent of Rs. 6,630 crore, or three per cent. Downward revision is on account of capital expenditure which has been reduced by Rs. 12,623 crore (13 per cent). More significantly, nearly 72 per cent (Rs. 9,123 crore) of the total cut in capital expenditure is effected on capital acquisition budget. On the other hand, the revenue expenditure has been revised upward by Rs. 5,993

crore (four per cent) (Table I). The Table II summarises the key elements of the defence budgets of 2014/15 and 2015/16. Of note is the decline in the share of capital expenditure in total defence budget to below 40 per cent. The last time the decline was below 40 per cent was way back in 2009/10 when the hike in pay and allowances due to the implementation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission recommendations increased the share of revenue expenditure to over 60 per cent. In 2015/16 also, it is the same pay and allowances that have resulted in a

similar situation. It is to be noted that of the total increase of Rs. 17,727 crore in defence budget 2015/16, Rs. 8,855 crore (50 per cent) is on account of increase in pay and allowances of the three armed forces. Compared to this, the ‘Stores’ budget which is key to maintenance and hence preparedness, has contributed to only 17 per cent to the growth in defence budget. The capital expenditure, which is BMS new solutions now deployed key to acquiring capability, has not are hardware agnostic contributed anything to this growth as the © General Dynamics Itronix allocation remain virtually the same over these two years.

DEFENCE BUDGET A Canadian M777 lifted by a CH-47 Chinook; BAE systems 155/39 ultralight howitzer was can also be airlifted the CH-53s used by the USMarine Corps. (Canadian Army)

TABLE III. PROJECTION FOR CAPITAL ACQUISITION, 2014/15

Army Navy Air Force Total

Committed Liabilities (Rs. in Cr)

New Schemes (Rs. in Cr)

18851 22001 29173 70026

9456 3054 12000 24509

Total Capital Share of Share of Acquisition Committed New (Rs. in Cr) Liabilities (%) Schemes (%) 28307 25055 41173 94535

67 88 71 74

33 12 29 26

TABLE IV. ALLOCATION FOR CAPITAL ACQUISITION, 2014/15

Army Navy Air Force Total

Committed Liabilities (Rs. in Cr)

New Schemes (Rs. in Cr)

18851 21721 29173 69746

2084 673 2645 5402

Total Capital Share of Share of Acquisition Committed New (Rs. in Cr) Liabilities (%) Schemes (%) 20935 22394 31818 75148

90 97 92 93

10 3 8 7

One area where the defence budget 2015/16 is likely to hurt the most is the capital acquisition allocation, which is already under acute pressure in recent years due both to shortage of funds and overwhelming share of the ‘committed liabilities’ in the total acquisition budget. It is to be noted that in 2014/15

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TABLE V. ARMY’S ACQUISITION BUDGET 2014/15 (BE) 2014/15 (RE) 2015/16 (BE) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) Aircraft & Aero-Engine H&MV Other Equipment Rolling Stock Rashtriya Rifles Total Acquisition Budget

2128 2692 15592 275 213 20900

2324 1784 12549 61 211 16927

% Increase in 2015/16 (BE) over 2014/15 (BE)

2365 1784 17335 364 91 21939

11 -34 11 32 -57 5

TABLE VI. NAVY’S ACQUISITION BUDGET 2014/15 (BE) 2014/15 (RE) 2015/16 (BE) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) Aircraft & Aero-Engine H&MV Other Equipment Joint Staff Naval Fleet Naval Dockyard Total Acquisition Budget

3331 34 4358 1029 12576 1613 22941

3311 8 3697 715 9398 661 17790

% Increase in 2015/16 (BE) over 2014/15 (BE)

3466 11 2559 922 16050 1275 24283

4 -68 -41 -10 28 -21 6

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capital acquisition, which is already under acute pressure in recent years due both to shortage of funds and overwhelming share of the ‘committed liabilities’ in the total acquisition budget. It is to be noted that in 2014/15, the allocation for capital acquisition was over 20 per cent below the projected requirement, with the shortfall in ‘new schemes’ being a whopping 78 per cent. (Tables III & IV). Given the already downward revision of 2014/15 capital acquisition budget, its moderate increase in 2015/16 budget is unlikely to generate the required amount to sign any major new contracts. Tables V to VII summarise the capital acquisition budget of the three forces. Among the three services, the Air Force’s capital acquisition budget is projected to decline. This comes at a time when it has lined up several mega deals which are one step short of contract signing. These include the tanker aircraft deal with Airbus, two helicopters contracts with Boeing and the Rafale fighter deal with Dassault Aviation. For the Rafale deal alone, the initial payment is estimated at Rs 5,000-6,000 crores. So the writing on the wall is very clear. Unless the acquisition budget, particularly that of the Air Force is substantially augmented in the course of 2015/16, there is a little chance of signing these big deals.

TABLE VII. AIR FORCE’S ACQUISITION BUDGET 2014/15 (BE) 2014/15 (RE) 2015/16 (BE) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) (Rs in Cr) Aircraft & Aero-Engine H&MV Other Equipment Total Acquisition Budget

Share of Services

16271 194 15352 31818

Like in the past, the 1.2 million strong Indian Army continues to be biggest stakeholder in the defence budget. With an allocation of Rs. 1,30,874 crore it accounts for 53 per cent of total defence budget 2015/16. The Air Force is at a distant second with an allocation of Rs. 56,658 crore (23 per cent), followed by Navy (Rs. 40,529 crore; 16 per cent), Defence Research and Development Organisation (Rs. 14,358 crore; 6 per cent) and

21461 67 10290 31818

% Increase in 2015/16 (BE) over 2014/15 (BE)

18866 233 12382 31482

16 20 -19 -1

Ordnance Factories (Rs. 3,644 crore; 2 per cent). It is however to be noted that the Army is the most revenue-intensive service. In 2015/16, 80 per cent of its budget is earmarked for revenue expenditure. The corresponding figures for the Navy and Air force are 38 and 41 per cent, respectively.

Impact on Capital Acquisition

One area where the defence budget 2015/16 is likely to hurt the most is the

Indian army infantry soldier on the radio

DEFENCE BUDGET TABLE VIII. CAPITAL ACQUISITION FROM FOREIGN SOURCES (Rs in Crore)

Air Force Navy Army Total

2011/12 15258 6701 506 22465

2012/13 19221 6100 992 26313

2013/14 20928 12654 1501 35082

Total 55407 25455 2999 83860

Source: Rajya Sabha, “Indigenous Manufacturing of Weapon System by DRDO”, Unstarred Question No.1331, Answered on 10 March 2015.

TABLE IX. COUNTRY-WISE CAPITAL ACQUISITION, 2011/12-2013/14 Country USA Russia France Israel Others Total

Rs in Crore 32615 25364 12047 3389 10445 83860

This Spanish Air Force Airbus C295M (serial 35-42) is shown employing Lapes (low altitude parachute extraction system), delivering a load precisely with a cushioned pallet, without landing. (Airbus Defence & Space)

‘Make in India’ for Defence In the run up to the defence budget, there was a huge expectation built around the government unleashing a series of reforms to reverse India’ huge arms dependency on external sources. Of note is that in three preceding years, India spent a whopping Rs 83,860 crore on foreign sources for capital acquisition, with the US accounting the largest share followed by Russia and France among other countries (Tables VIII & IX). To add to the expectation the PM had promised in the recently held Aero India show to bring in a host of reform measures for the domestic industry including the tax incentives for indigenous manufactures and ‘special

universities and skill development centres to cater to our defence industry.’ The budget, presented by the Finance Minister, does not however shed any light on these aspects. The only concrete defence-specific measure visible in the budget is allocation for ‘Make’ projects for which Rs. 144.21 crore has been allocated. Although the budget is opaque in details, the allocation, by far the biggest under the ‘Make’ head, would mostly be provided to two industry consortiums – one of TATA Power SED and L&T and the other of Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Rolta India Ltd– which have recently won a contract from the MoD to develop a prototype

under the Indian Army’s Battlefield Management System (BMS) programme.

Impact of 14th Finance Commission on Defence

The 14th Finance Commission (FC), which was constituted to give recommendations on certain aspects of centre-state fiscal relations for the period of five years (from April 2015 to March 2020), has made a number of recommendations having a far reaching implication on the central government’ budget making. The recommendations of the Commission have been ‘wholeheartedly’ accepted by the government in the spirit of ‘cooperative federalism’. Among other measures, the

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projected period), the revenue expenditure would also grow that much faster. The converse is also true. Given this, the defence ministry would now hope that the nominal GDP grows faster than 13.5 per cent in the remaining years of the projected period so that revenue expenditure remains in a healthy situation.

Conclusion

An Apache combat helicopter in operation

Commission has recommended a quantum jump of 10 percentage points to 42 per cent of States’ share in the central government’s tax revenues. The magnitude of the hike can be gauged from the fact that in the past when the finance commissions have recommended an increase in states’ share, such increase was in the range of one-two per cent. The quantum jump in devolution of tax revenues to the states would mean proportionately reduced fiscal space for the central government. To further squeeze the fiscal space available with the centre, the government has decided to discontinue only eight centrally sponsored schemes as against 32 schemes suggested by the Finance Commission. Given this, what boils down to hard reality is that defence has to compete with other sectors to maintain its share in what now remains a relatively reduced pie for distribution. Apart from the above the defence is also likely to be impacted by roadmap suggested for it by the 14th Finance Commission. It is however to be noted that unlike the 13th Finance Commission which had given a roadmap covering both revenue and capital expenditure, the 14th Finance Commission has limited its projection to defence revenue expenditure only, arguing that capital expenditure is “beyond the scope of our assessment.” As per the roadmap, the revenue expenditure is projected to grow by 13.5 per cent per year till 2019/20.

However, while projecting this growth rate, the Commission has kept the revenue expenditure-GDP ratio at constant 1.04 per cent, so as to allow the revenue expenditure to grow at the same rate as the nominal GDP. In other words, if the nominal GDP grows faster than 13.5 per cent (the growth rate assumed by the Commission for the

The 14th Finance Commission (FC) was constituted to give recommendations on certain aspects of centre-state fiscal relations for the period of five years (fromApril 2015 to March 2020), has made a number of recommendations having a far reaching implication on the central government budget making

The eight percent growth in defence budget 2015-16 is disappointing on several accounts. First, the modest increase would most likely enlarge the already huge gap existing between MoD’s resource requirement and the allocation made in successive budgets. Second, the stagnation of capital expenditure which is crucial for building new capability, would further delay the on-going modernisation process. Having said that, the latest defence allocation has to be seen the light of the new centre-state fiscal relations in which the fiscal space of the central government is left shrinking due to the implementation of the report of the 14th Finance Commission. From both short- and longterm perspective this is a major cause of concern for sectors like defence, which is completely dependent on the central government for its resource requirement. What is more significant is that if the fiscal space does not widen rapidly in future, defence will have very little for augmenting its capital assets. As evident, the entire increase of Rs. 17,727 crore in defence budget 2015/16 is consumed by the revenue expenditure with the manpower accounting nearly half of it. Given the new fiscal reality, the government has to now ponder seriously if such situation could be left to continue in future in which whatever extra fund is provided in budget, it does not add to capital expenditure. Third, the defence budget 2015/16 is also disappointing on account of lack of defence-specific ‘Make in India’ initiative. In particular, the budget does not speak of measures promised by Prime Minister in the recently held Aero India exhibition. Considering that the defence manufacturing, particularly by the private sector needs substantial investment on plant and machinery, technology and skill development, it is high time that the government incentivises the industry and implement the measures promised by the Prime Minister himself.

MARITIME SECURITY: THE COASTAL CHALLENGE

MARINE SECURITY

With the rise of non-traditional security, the maritime security paradigm has undergone a transformation with institutional arrangements being strengthened

ANUP SINGH

KEY POINTS

Though a ‘continental man’ is land focussed, it cannot be gain-said 90 per cent of global cargo move by oceans and seas Sea Lines of Communication are crucial for passage of cargo thus to be guarded by the navies of the world After 26/11, Indian government has strengthened coastal security by raising new institutional arrangements

ICG Sagar of the Indian Coast Guard participating in exercise at eastern region some where near to Chennai

o the common person, security in the maritime domain is of little relevance, and he would rather pay attention to something more “earthly,” commonplace, and interesting. This is because man is basically a continental creature, and tends to take only matters related to terra firma seriously. The “continental” man does not consider the oceans even though they constitute 71 per cent of planet earth; it does not matter even if most of the global economy were dependent on carriage of merchandise over

the medium of water. To man, the limits of life’s activities are defined by his own boundaries – unless he is venturing into the sea for economic or leisure activity (of which there are a minuscule few – including the seamen who man the 100,000 odd seagoing vessels of the world). But one must appreciate that 90 per cent of the world’s goods by volume and 75 per cent by value have no alternative but to take the sea route! This is because the sea connects the world without barriers of territory, terrain, or toll, and because ships offer the cheapest mode of

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transportation of bulk goods. This scenario being a ‘given’, all national and global economies are heavily (almost entirely) dependent on the sea. Any disruption or threat of disruption would entail heavy penalties to the economies of those nations (including the land-locked ones). Traditionally, there have been two types of threats from the sea. One, as explained above, is the threat to shipping or sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and two, the ageold threat to territorial integrity that takes the form of surreptitious or overt conquest. It is to keep these traditional threats at bay, that maritime nations have always had navies as defenders of vital maritime interests of nations. However, the situation at sea has undergone a huge change since the fall of the Berlin Wall. After the end of the Cold War, it was as if hitherto suppressed challenges were unleashed for assault through the sea route, or otherwise! These are now commonly known as nontraditional challenges, and are used by states as well as non-state actors as asymmetric tools of war. These include maritime terrorism, drug-running, gunrunning, human trafficking, piracy and armed robbery. Even man-made or natural disasters are threats of huge magnitude that keep maritime forces engaged in the task of maritime security. These non-traditional

threats were always ‘listed’ in the manuals and practiced in some regions – but on a very small scale, and were faced only as isolated cases earlier. Today, however, it is these non-traditional challenges that constitute majority of threats to peace and good order in the medium of the seas – the most important of the global commons.

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To the common person, security in the maritime domain is of little relevance, and he would rather pay attention to something more “earthly,” commonplace, and interesting.This is because man is basically a continental creature, and tends to take only matters related to terra firma seriously

Do 228 built by HAL is the mainstay of the Indian Coast Guard’s coatal surveillance fleet © AJB

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To appreciate the security environment of India’s maritime domain, one must first look at the geostrategic environment in which India exists.Within the symmetrical perimeter of the northern Indian Ocean, the Indian peninsula drives a wedge extending a thousand nautical miles into the sea, making all mercantile shipping hug the Indian coast – whether moving through the Cape of Good Hope/Gulf of Aden/ Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Strait/Northern Bay of Bengal, or while taking the same route on the way back. In other words, India is located at the natural junction of the most important and some of the most important SLOCs of the world. These international SLOCs account for about 100,000 vessels transit through a path close to India’s shores annually. That translates into a continuous stream of ships passing close toIndia’s shoreline, round the year. In addition, there are almost 200,000 fishing crafts registered in nine coastal states and four Union Territories of India, of which at least 20 per centof the boats must be in operation at any given time along the coasts (except during “banned” period for fishing). Altogether, these ships and boats clutter the entire offshore horizon along peninsular India, and to a lesser extent, the island territories. That makes the task of maritime forces of the state an unenviable charter – particularly in the aftermath of 26/11. Of all the non-traditional challenges,

MARINE SECURITY Combat Boat 90 used for coastal surveillance

the three that pose the most serious implications to India’s vital interests are, first, the asymmetric threat to shipping at sea. As India’s global economic engagement touches almost a trillion dollars,the primary task of its maritime forces – particularly the Navy and the Coast Guard – gets magnified. Any threat to ‘freedom of navigation’ in our territorial waters can have disastrous consequences. Second, any threat to any of the 13 major and 187 minor and intermediate ports of the country can be even more disastrous, as disruption through sabotage or terrorist action in one port can easily have a ‘domino’ effect(of slow progress due to tightened security) in all other ports. In fact, an immediate casualty of a disruption in any port under terrorist action, will be the diversion of almost all foreign flagged ships originally headed for that port. Even Indian flagged vessels are likely to weigh economic costs of commercial activity in terms of delay or diversion. And finally, the threat of terrorist assault from the sea, on land – as was witnessed during 26/11 – keeps the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Police Wing of coastal states on alert round the clock. If it was the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba as the

prominent force then, the spectre of a combination of Pakistan based and sponsored groups attempting more dramatic episodes, has not faded. Just to put things about vulnerabilities of a long and unmanned coastline in perspective, it is important to also look back at all the coastal intrusions of the past. The explosive ordnance that had wreaked havoc in the Mumbai blasts of 1993 had been ferried via the sea route before landing on the West coast.This revelation had led to heightened security along the coast, and launching of “Operation Swan” executed by the Indian Navy in concert with the Coast Guard and state police in Gujarat and Maharashtra. However, the boats used in this operation were hired trawlers – manned by security forces and the police – which did not have adequate infrastructure or hardware for laying an impenetrable barrier. Therefore, the incident of 26/11 provided impetus for infusion of funds, technology, and reorganisation for a seamless cordon along the coast. Amongst the various measures that have been sanctioned include the following: Mandatory Registration. Registration of all fishing craft with colour-coding to identify their parent coastal state has almost

been completed. This has made a tangible difference to the task of sifting wheat from the chaff by the security forces. Coastal Radar Stations. The process of setting a complete coastline string of radars – to keep track of vessels close to coast – was initiated after 26/11. Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), India’s premier PSU in Electronics (including for Defence Services) had supplied the first tranche of equipment. So far, 46 radar stations have been established on the coastline including some in the island territories. But for a maritime nation with a 7516 km long shore, these are obviously not sufficient. Therefore, Phase II of this scheme, which will involve erection of 38 more radars is on anvil. Once done, these 84 radars will enable a somewhat ‘seamless’ coverage along the coast. Though the first batch of radars is already providing valuable, real time inputs – of their coverage radii - the entire project will take some more time to complete as it entails creation of expensive and time-consuming infrastructure with wireless linkage to Operation Centres ashore. Most advanced maritime nations have such means of electronic surveillance that keep a watchful eye for safety of seagoing people, vessels, and security of national territory and assets.

One has to just imagine the paradigm shift that our maritime environment will have undergone once this infrastructure is in place, in its entirety. Not just security of the state, but the wellbeing of fishermen as well as the capability of identifying friend from foe will be put in place. Security of Ports. All ports in India have been brought under the ambit of security under ‘self-help’ and ‘state assistance’ in certain areas. In the aftermath of 9/11, and with the spectre of future assaults possibly through the sea route, the IMO, in 2002, promulgated a security protocol for ports, under what is called the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The new requirements form the international framework through which governments, ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts, which threaten security in the maritime transport sector. The risks to Indian ports are truly huge. Under the Code governments are required to assess the threats and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act in their ports. The ISPS Code provides a standardised, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between the shipping companies, port facilities, and ships. When a risk of attack is identified, the government is supposed to advise the ships concerned of the current security level; of

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The threat of terrorist assault from the sea, on land – as was witnessed during 26/11 – keeps the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Police Wing of coastal states on alert round the clock. If it was the Lashkar-eTayyeba as the prominent force then, the spectre of a combination of Pakistan based and sponsored groups attempting more dramatic episodes, has not faded

any security measures that should be put in place by it to protect themselves from attack; and of security measures that the country has decided to put in place.A security audit of all 13 major ports and 187 minor/

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intermediate ports in India was completed by 1 July 2004 (the date of the code’s entry into force, and ports have since been brought under its ambit. However, a lot more needs to be done in the Centre and state-controlled ports, in terms of plugging the physical gaps, and introduction of technology for ensuring foolproof security in ports.

Remote Identification of Fishing Crafts. In order to identify trawlers at sea, a remote interrogation system is also under consideration. When completed, it will enable the Navy/ Coast Guard/ Light Houses, and Operations Centres to determine credentials of the ‘interrogated’ vessel by remote means which would be a satellite-based system. High Speed Craft. One area that was a weak link with security forces all this time was the inadequacy of fast boats that can be used for intercepting suspicious vessels. It is this inadequacy over the years that had emboldened smugglers, poachers, and ultimately terrorists to go about their misdeeds with abandon. In the business of defence of the state at sea,visible “presence” and “speed”of the fast boats provide a credible deterrence! That void has finally begun to get filled. The Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Wing of state police forces have started to get equipped with fast interceptor boats, which are building confidence amongst stakeholders at sea, and making

India is planning to buy ShinMaywa amphibious aircraft ‘US-2’ fromJapan to strengthen its coastal security

MARINE SECURITY

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As will be seen from the above, in a country as ours–with almost 40,000 vessels at sea at any time – along and off the 7516 km long coastline – it is a serious disadvantage to have gaps in coverage by theAIS and LRIT combine. Both systems were made mandatory by IMO, only for vessels above 300 gross tonnes.This would have meant leaving almost two hundred thousand fishing vessels out of the screen

awareness and better dissemination to all stakeholders including the Navy and the Coast Guard.

Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT). LRIT provides

As on land and air, command and control capabilities are via data fusion, enhancing the effectiveness of hitherto unconnected sensors © DCNS

the shoreline more and more impregnable. What is more important is the fact that most of these highly specialised crafts are being produced indigenously.

Automatic Identification System (AIS). This is a system that was initially

introduced by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the year 2000, in the form of a VHF radio-based transponder, as an optional attachment on vessels above 300 gross tonnes and of 20 metres length. After the 9/11 episode, and after many meetings of the Maritime Security Committee of the IMO, its use has now become mandatory. In a very general sense, the AIS system is similar to the air traffic control system at airports, applied here to marine traffic. This mandatory regulation requires all vessels to

have an AIS transponder installed. Ships are aware of each other’s position and harbour control establishments can use AIS to increase transportation efficiency and safety, by identifying, tracking and supervising the movement of all vessels as they head into harbour, or navigate along in-land waterways or dangerous coastlines. AIS data is sent every few seconds over dedicated digital marine radio channels. In addition, now AIS signals are also picked up by satellites and relayed to ships and ground stations. After the 26/11 attacks, India launched a “National AIS” grid under the aegis of the Director General of Lighthouses and Lightships (DGLL), and this system has worked towards much improved domain

an enhanced level of Maritime Domain Awareness that is the first of its kind. It is a satellite-based, real-time reporting mechanism that allows unique visibility to position reports of vessels that would otherwise be invisible and potentially a threat to countries such as ours. The system provides for the global identification and tracking of ships. After seeing the benefits as well as lacunae in the AIS system, the IMO, in 2006, had made LRIT a mandatory requirement for all ships above 300 gross tonnes to be equipped with a system that uses the satellite communication set onboard, to transmit their position at least four times a day.The LRIT system consists of the ship borne LRIT information transmitting equipment, LRIT Data Centers in various countries, and the International LRIT Data Exchange system. The LRIT has a data exchange protocol between the IMO and all contracting states. It is designed to collect and disseminate vessel position information received from IMO member states’ ships. This data gets

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system of specific identification for all fishing boats as cited in (d) above. This is being enabled by a satellite-based transponder which has been developed by ISRO, and successfully tested on some 1000 boats in Gujarat. Now it will be put into production, for installation on the huge number of fishing vessels in India.

Information Management System.

Two Indian Coast Guard helicopters fly past as a Coast Guard officer works on the deck of a ship during a demonstration in the Bay Of Bengal

USVs such as Rafael's Protector are playing a growing role in securing ports and close to shore © Rafael

collated in Data Centres within contracting states. The advantage to India comes from the fact that being a mandatory requirement for all vessels above 300 gross tonnes, India will get advance information when a vessel is1000 nautical miles from its shores. Details with the ship’s report include its intended passage, destination, cargo etc. Any deviation from its course will alarm our authorities to track/monitor any ‘rogue’ vessel’s movements, and if required, to set up a chase/or interception to unravel the truth of such a vessel’sintent. Gaps in Coverage. As will be seen from the above, in a country as ours – with almost 40,000 vessels at sea at any time – along and off the 7516 km long coastline – it is a serious disadvantage to have gaps in

coverage by the AIS and LRIT combine. Both systems were made mandatory by IMO, only for vessels above 300 gross tonnes. This would have meant leaving almost two hundred thousand fishing vessels out of the screen! And it was a fishing trawler that became the carrier of Pakistani terrorists on 26/11. Therefore, the Director General of Shipping, India (DG Shipping), has made it mandatory for all vessels of length 20 metres or more (registered/ operating along the Indian coast), to have an AIS system onboard. Thus, while AIS covers vessels above 20 metres length, LRIT is mandatory for vessels above 300 tonnes. Remote Interrogation. The question still remains about vessels below 20 metres length (most fishing boats in India), as also a

Long before 26/11, the Navy had been working on a National Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) network, to obtain network centricity in its operations, and to enable real time information exchange for the sake of immediate maritime domain awareness. A huge achievement (as an offshoot of the NC3I initiative) has been the creation of the impressive Information Management Analysis Centre (IMAC), at Gurgaon, recently commissioned by the defence minister. This Centre now acts as the hub in the hub - and-spoke system of real time awareness of our immediate maritime environment. The spokes here, are the large number of Naval and Coast Guard monitoring stations along the coast. In other words, all elements and “messengers” cited above feed into the IMAC for integration, correlation, and dissemination of information in ‘intelligent’ form. In the business of security, the situation at sea is vastly different from any example on land. First, there is no terrain at sea. Therefore, building of barriers or fences is not possible. Brick and mortar infrastructure cannot be built, and manpower cannot be made to physically scour every kilometre of territorial border. Secondly, even electronic surveillance systems on the coast or on ships behave differently at sea due to weather patterns and propagation conditions, leaving voids in detection on some occasions. Thirdly, it is important to understand the sea frontier. Maritime zones are vast in depth, unlike narrow border strips for patrol, requiring large resources to scour and search. Generally such numbers are unaffordable for countries with long coastlines and scarce resources. In such a scenario, the answer lies in using technology (apart from essential numbers), to ‘beat the intruder’. Most of the infrastructure may be in place, but many elements have to be further strengthened with induction of more hardware and even manpower in some cases.

PGMs

PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS:

‘SMART BOMBS’ NEED ‘SMART DECISIONS’ PGMs changed the shape of battle in the late-20th century with the US virtually winning the war in Persian Gulf with just a few KIAs

ANIL CHAIT

KEY POINTS

Germans expectedly led in PGM tech as well as they exhibited in 1943 at the Strait of Benfacio. The first recent use of precision guided munition was in 1991 during the Gulf War. Directed energy weapons that many nations are working on will be next generation development after PGMs.

mpact of technology on the battlefield has been dramatic. Air Marshal Anil Trikha wrote in an article on the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Precision Guided Munitions and reminded us recently, that while it took 108 B17 Bombers, crewed by 1,080 airmen, dropping 648 bombs to generate a 96 percent chance of getting two hits inside a 400x500ft German Power plant in World War II, a single strike aircraft with one or two crewmen dropping two bombs could achieve the same result in 1991 Gulf

War, with essentially a 100 percent expectation of hitting the target. It is not surprising therefore that technology is perceived to be the biggest game changer. It has changed the traditional thought process on military effectiveness and in the evolution of new war-fighting techniques and doctrines. Though it appears strange but it is true for majority of the nation today that technology drives the concepts to support its mission requirements instead of being a catalyst for

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destruction of war-waging potential not just to subdue the will of the enemy but also to delay, disrupt and defeat the adversary before his power could be applied on the antagonist. As the target list became large and spanned well into the rear and flanks, it became necessary to prioritise. Taking out the centre of gravity of the force therefore came to be associated with the priority in degradation tasking for breaking the organic cohesion of the force before defeating it in detail. Since it was defended in depth and often was not visible to the naked eye, the focus shifted on target acquisition and subsequently towards its engagement with accuracy, in the indirect engagement zone. What facilitated the successful outcome desired by the war-fighters was, the concurrent improvement that was occurring in tandem in the field of battlefield transparency, net enabled operations and in the field of command and control. The PGMs seek to combine into a single weapon, all four attributes of mobility, destructive force, range, and ability to engage a target with precision. Besides conserving ammunition, PGMs also reduce

US Marines fire an M982 Excalibur round from an M777 155 mm howitzer during a fire support mission at Fire Base Fiddlers Green, Helmand province, Afghanistan ÂŠ DoD

supporting the concept and doctrines. As we enter the information age, there is no doubt that information age technologies, precision fire technologies and a host of other technologies fused together, are going to transform the way we conduct warfare. As target acquisition range increased on the conventional battlefield on account of the ability to see, the desire to engage targets beyond visual range accurately, came to be desired increasingly, driven not only by the second and third generation mindset of

Trajan 155mm/52 calibre ordnance originally developed by Nexter for CAESAR with the mounting developed in conjunction with Larsen and Toubro in India ÂŠ Nexter

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the risk of unintended â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;collateral damage. Ammunition wastage during ranging and misses on account of dispersal of the ammunition is thus avoided as target, is attacked with accuracy. Engagement is swift and occurs without any warning, resulting in greater damage. Variables imposed by weather and gravity becomes meaningless. Most importantly PGMs enables moving targets to be engaged smartly, as the warfighter progressively graduates to the concept of shoot and scoot. The first instance of modern day engagement by PGMs is perhaps of the German attack on the Italian naval Ship Roma, in the Strait of Bonifacio in 1943. A German Luftwaffe Dornier used a radio controlled 1,400-kg Fritz X ammunition for the attack. The virtues of PGMs, in such an engagement, caught the attention of commanders and their development commenced with increasing capabilities and varying technologies.

Present day PGMs: Types and Technologies

Modern day PGMs are of varied types,

PGMs Integration software of the upgraded M20B1 UK launcher fires its first rocket at the White Sand Missile Range in New Mexico. GMLRS and M270B1 are now deployed in theatre in support of UK ground forces and complement their US counterparts © Lockheed Martin

operating on different technological platforms, grouped according to the guidance technology. Futuristic PGMs using advanced guidance concepts and guided small arms would soon join the array. Besides various guidance technologies, guidance can also be provided by inertial guidance systems supported by satellites having PNT (positioning, navigating and timing) capabilities like GPS. Infrared (IR) light is electromagnetic radiation with longer wavelengths than those of visible light and includes most of the

thermal radiation emitted by objects at near room temperature. Objects like people, vehicle engines and aircraft generate and retain heat, which is visible in the infrared wavelengths of light when compared to objects in the background. Emission of this IR is used to track a target, which is called IR tracking and is used for passive guidance of missiles. Such missiles are also called heatseeking missiles. Smaller missiles, especially man-portable air-defence systems normally use the IR homing guidance system, which has the advantage of being “fire-and-forget”.

The US Stinger and Maverick, the Russian SA-18 Igla, fall under this category. Laser guidance was first applied to aerial bombs to achieve greater accuracy as they were cheaper than employing a guided missile. Some of these utilise beam-riding guidance, but most operate on semi-active laser homing. In this technique, the target has to be illuminated with a laser, which then assists the bomb to accurately hit the target. The LAHAT (Laser Homing Attack or Laser Homing Anti-Tank) of Israel and the AGM-114 Hellfire of the U.S., fall under this category. BAE Systems’ Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) laser-guided rocket would be another example of use of laser guidance. Laser beam riding is generally used for short-range anti-tank and anti-air missiles like the British SAM Starstreak, Swedish SAM RBS 70, Brazilian anti-tank MSS-1.2 and Russian anti-tank 9M119 Svir. Beam riding was introduced along with low-cost portable laser designators and is generally used for short-range anti-tank and anti-air missiles.The third generation Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) lock-on the target before launch. Lockheed Martin’s AGM114 Hellfire, is an air-to-surface ATGM that uses millimeter radar as its seeker. Importantly, our own indigenous ATGM Nag may also be fitted with a millimeter wave radar seeker. Gulf War brought out the importance of PGMs but their employment was limited. Satellite-guided weapons, which employ GPS and thus could be called as all weather system showcased their potential. As the GPS are prone to jamming, these weapons have inertial navigation as back up. HOPE and HOSBO are a new family of precisionguided munitions used by the German Air Force that use GPS/INS and electro-optical video feedback for guidance. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kit has been developed by the US to convert unguided bombs into all-weather guided bombs. JDAM-equipped bombs are guided by INS guidance, coupled with a GPS. The AGM-154A joint standoff weapon is a fire and forget system, which employs a coupled GPS/ INS for terminal guidance.

PGMs for the Artillery

The M-712 Copperhead is a 155 mm caliber projectile, which is fin-stabilized and has laser guidance for terminal homing. It can be fired from M-114, M-109 and M-198

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howitzers and is very effective against tanks and artillery guns. It however requires the target to be laser designated to guide the projectile. The Copperhead was used during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit is a US Army programme, to develop a precision guidance kit (PGK) for 155 mm artillery shells. The PGK is screwed into the nose of the projectile similar to a fuse and provides GPS guidance and control surfaces to correct the flight of the shell. Its Circular Error Probability (CEP) is less than 30 to 50 m, far less than an unguided 155-mm round. XM395 Precision Guided Mortar Munition (PGMM) is a 120 mm guided mortar round, which is guided by Distributed Aperture Semi-Active Laser Seeker technology. The system consists of a GPS-guided kit, which includes a nose and tail sub-system for manoeuvring the bomb and has a CEP of one meter. Satelliteguided weapons are likely to be more effective in adverse conditions than any other PGM and have been found particularly effective in the mountains. Krasnopol is a Russian 152/155 mm projectile, which is fin-stabilised and has semi-automatic laser-guidance. The target has to be laser designated for the projectile to be guided. It is very effective against tanks, artillery guns or small hard targets. India possesses a sizeable stock of these, which were acquired post Kargil. M982 Excalibur is a 155 mm calibre PGM developed by Raytheon and BAE Systems with extended-range and GPS guidance for accurate, first round, fire-for-effect capability. It has a range of approximately 40 to 57 km depending on configuration with a CEP of around 5 m to 20 m. It is claimed that one round of the Excalibur can be equal to 10-50 rounds of conventional ammunition in effectiveness. An improved version of the Excalibur is being developed by Raytheon, which will provide even greater range, accuracy and less collateral damage. GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) developedby Lockheed Martin fires guided unitary MLRS over a range of more 70 km and is in service with many countries. The GMLRS XM30 rocket has a combination of GPS and inertial guidance system, with small canards on the rocket nose, to enhance accuracy. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile is perhaps the most effective example of

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BAE Systems is leading the Paladin Integrated Management upgrade following a $313 million award last year and which is due to complete in 2015 © US DoD

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The M-712 Copperhead is a 155 mm caliber projectile, which is fin-stabilized and has laser guidance for terminal homing. It can be fired from M-114, M-109 and M-198 howitzers and is very effective against tanks and artillery guns. It however requires the target to be laser designated

achieving accuracy “independent of range to the target”. This long-range cruise missile is as accurate against a target 1,000 nautical miles from its launch point, as is a laserguided bomb only a few miles away from an attacking aircraft. The difference is in their costing and survivability, on account of exposure, with the Tomahawk being

almost a hundred-fold more expensive.

Application

PGMs require detailed data on their intended targets or ‘aim-points’. They require “precision information on targets” to be militarily useful, as opposed to being wasteful. For engagements by submerged submarines, which have ability to manoeuvre while remaining deep underwater non-homing torpedoes aimed on constant azimuth and running at constant depths offer little chance of hitting the opponent. Guided torpedoes hence remain the only viable solution. Are PGMs useful in CI and CT Operations? This is a question that is often asked and the answer is yes; especially if the concept of jus in bello and desire to follow International Humanitarian Laws, remains predominant. Projectiles with higher destructive power on the contrary, which are not even accurate, increase possibility for collateral damage where victims may overwhelmingly be the friendly citizens.

Future Technologies and Trends

Extreme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance (EXACTO) seeks to improve sniper effectiveness by providing longer standoff range (both by day and night), better accuracy and reduced time of engagement. This is

PGMs

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JAGM’s design integrates our AGM-114R multi-purpose HELLFIRE II missile body (including the control actuation system, warhead and rocket motor) and capitalizes on missile program improvements that have migrated into the modern HELLFIRE II design © Lockheed Martin

probably to be achieved by developing the first ever-guided small-calibre manoeuvrable bullet, which is guided by a real-time guidance system to track, guide and achieve bull’s eye on the target. It is based on the 0.50 calibre Browning machine-gun. The CounterSniper Program (C-Sniper) does the exact opposite of EXACTO by detecting the sniper and neutralising him. Counter Rocket-Propelled Grenade and Shooter System with Highly Accurate Immediate Responses (CROSSHAIRS) is a modular, vehicle-mounted, threat detection and counter-measure system that locates and engages enemy shooters. It takes on bullets, rocket propelled grenades, ATGMs and mortars. The system will also be effective, while moving. Efforts are ongoing to develop precisionguided small arms ammunition using a laser designator to guide an electronically fired bullet, or using a laser range finder to detonate shells close to the target. Directed Energy Weapons will be the future of PGMs and development efforts in this field are on in many countries, including India.

formulation for storing ammunition, to joint capability building matrix for destruction of opponent. Axiomatically, numbers will offset the cost partially. India’s Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) lay’s the requirement of future PGMs. With no communications, no humans, and only a camera in the loop, it may take a little time. The capability as and when developed, will offer highly accurate precision fire. Missiles such as the Prithvi and Prahaar and long-range rockets like Smerch and Pinaka, have the capability to strike deep with accuracy and precision. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile

Rapidity and fluidity on the battlefield can occur, through rapid destruction of targets. Targets such as bunkers, tanks, ICVs and missile launchers, command and control centres, can be engaged with least number of shells and with minimal collateral damage amidst urbanisation on the western front. This is an imperative for the Indian defence forces if they are to dominate the battlefield, quickly, in a short duration war. This can be achieved by a limited number of PGMs far more effectively than through deployment of a very large number of ‘dumb,’ high explosive shells. In building this capability, forces will have to move away from War Wastage Reserve

with a velocity of Mach 2.5 to 2.8 is a versatile missile that can be launched very accurately, employing the above concept from mobile launchers as well from land, aircraft and ships. Modern artillery, firing 155 mm precision strike ammunition can be employed across the frontage and depth of the battlefield to cause extensive damage and destruction of the enemy’s forces. The Indian artillery must induct PGMs in large numbers to give effect to its emerging role of causing destruction rather than mere neutralisation. PGM holding must go up to 25 to 30 per cent of total ammunition. As technology develops, the day is not very far when tank guns will be firing precision ammunition to engage targets accurately in the intermediate zone (so far not visible), on predetermined coordinates with guns being laid with the help of full solution fire control system in a networked scenario. This will optimise the firepower and make the fighting vehicle platform capable not only to manoeuvre but also to shape the opposition while approaching it, before closing and destroying the target. Indian Air Force is believed to have acquired Crystal Maze Air-to-Surface missiles from the Israeli firm, Rafael. As reported in the newspapers, it is also wanting to acquire Paveway IILGBs. DRDO is also working on indigenous Laser Guidance Kit Sudarshan, while wanting to co-produce Crystal Maze for IAF.

Conclusion

PGMs in Indian Context

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PGMs are at the cutting edge of technology. While costs are a significant factor in seeking to rapidly enhance their procurement, the availability of technology is also a major grey area as advanced countries are unlikely to part with such advanced technical know how. While the DRDO has acquired and/or possesses technical knowhow to develop and produce PGMs to meet some of the requirements of our Armed Forces, it is still striving to perfect an active seeker – the ultimate in precision guidance. Over the six decades since their first use in operations, PGMs have evolved to attain formidable accuracy and reliability with their lethality. This has, been exponentially enhanced through integration with sensor and targeting networks. PGMs being integrated into battlefield decision-making systems will result in the use of ‘smart bombs’ through ‘smart decisions’.

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UAVS: BEST CHANCE FOR MAKE IN INDIA

AERIALVEHICLES

The unmanned aircraft development in the country has gone beyond the incipient stage but have still not reached the levels of a USA or an Israel

P S KRISHNAN

KEY POINTS

DRDO labs like ADE that work on UAV development have some areas of strengths, but also weaknesses. ADE has developed a private industry base within the country who can codevelop UAVs. The best bet for UCAVs in the country is to use an already productionised airframe like that of an LCA.

he unmanned aerial vehicles will play an important role in the way the future wars are going to be fought globally. It is evident already by its extensive use in the low intensity conflicts happening in the Afghanistan theatre. The situation and opportunities in India in this field are analysed in this article. It is an easy guess that there are huge projections made by the armed and para military services for these systems in the future. Numbers are sufficient to make the industry sufficiently interested.

Even though the indigenous design and development of the UAVs had started early enough through the fielding of Sparrow UAV in the army Exercise Brasstacks by the DRDO (Aeronautical Development Establishment, Bangalore) back in 1984 the early needs of the UAVs of the armed services are being met even today for the bulk of its needs by the import of UAVs from Israeli sources (Searcher and Heron UAVs). While Sparrow was not meeting the user requirement of launcher take off, Nishant

APRIL 2015

A US Air Force operated UAV Global Hawk operating in Afghanistan-Pakistan

was developed by DRDO and fielded in 2002 meeting this requirement and was ordered by Army in small numbers. The experience with these imported UAVs like all defence equipment, is negated by the difficulty in supply of spares and opportunity costs. A comparison of the performances of these two UAVs, made in india in the past, the imported ones score over indigenous systems in respect of endurance, but the data link security and range characteristics of the indigenous Nishant is definitely better. On a

user request, the Nishant has now been made to conform to the taxi take off. As a parallel development the ADE has been able to develop the Rustom 1 UAV having endurance and payload capabilities better than the Searcher UAV. Having done more than 30 flights this UAV gives a good option for the services to consider. Many other exciting versions of this UAV are also possible. On the anvil, is the development of Rustom 2 UAV by ADE having an endurance and payload capabilities higher than Searcher and Heron UAVs. It falls short of only the Global Hawk UAV of the US though this UAV is of a different classification. It is reported that the Rustom 2 UAV is undergoing taxi-trials and will have its first flight later this year, the project being behind schedule by one year. It is thus seen that in terms of capabilities the Indian designed and developed UAVs will have all the requisite figures sought by armed services, but then what is lacking, which prevents fielding them in large numbers by our Indian armed services? This article will attempt to give an insight into this aspect. Before we step into discussions on the gaps between needs and capabilities, a quick word about the status of development of micro and nano air vehicles and their need. By the definition of these air vehicles they have very limited scope in meeting the user needs of UAVs and a lot has been done in the country in its development by joint team of National Aerospace Laboratories, Bangalore and ADE. There are a number of configurations of these MAVs being flown and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has also started a development program of these UAVs. In addition this is the most interesting topic for the Indian engineering institutions that a lot of development is taking place though in the prototype stages. This is the low-end market need item of the UAVs for the armed services, price wise and its need can be met by the developers and manufacturing industry within India. The foreign nations are also ready to give the know-how for this product. An initiation work is going on in the country in respect of the nano air vehicles. The aspect of indigenisation of aerospace products has been handled in different ways for different products made by the aerospace product developers and industry. A well established DPSU HAL, which ironically started as a private industry in the pre-independence days is now a

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aeronautical monopoly. The HAL works largely (at least in its volume of trade done so far) on licenced production of foreign aircrafts. It has successfully produced variety of aircrafts in the past, under licence production and of late, is involved in abinitio development of helicopters and jet trainer (IJT, HTT). The HAL also suffers in meeting user aspirations of keeping 75 per cent aircraft serviced and flying, due to the dependence on OEMs for spares. The LCA development story is yet to see the user feedbacks in respect of squadron use and proportion of aircraft flying as needed by the user. It has however the advantage of less dependence on OEMs for maintenance and upgrades. The UAVs developed in the country have a different approach in its making, compared to licenced manufacture. Designs of Sparrow, Nishant, Rustom 2 are all indigenous done by ADE and other DRDO labs. This includes systems design, aerodynamics, structure, the flight control computers (hardware and software), the data link Line Replacement Units (LRUs), the flight control actuators, the engines (though there was an initial import and later indigenisation), the payload elements like the gimbals, its control, the video trackers, the electronic intelligence and communication intelligence payloads of Rustom 2, the synthetic aperture radar of Rustom 2 (though the programme began with a few imports), ground control station, ground data terminal and other ground support equipments. Rustom 1 uses a standard configuration of airframe which is indigenously manufactured in the country by a private industry. Rest of the onboard systems integration etc follow the route of other ADE UAVs. After the design, the manufacture, right from the prototypes stage, have been done by the Indian private industry Taneja Aerospace, Tata Power, Larsen and Toubro etc, and DPSUs chosen on a competitive basis. The integration and flight tests of these UAVs are done indigenously by DRDO. When we do either licenced manufacturer or follow any other equivalent mode of manufacture, the grass-root level technology does not get transferred and thus the industry is ever dependent on foreign OEMs, even after decades of doing so, and those who suffer are the users. In the case of the indigenous UAVs cited above, ADE has only done the design of the LRUs, established rigs to test these LRUs individually or as

AERIALVEHICLES integrated systems, obtained certification from concerned agencies, conducted development and user evaluation trials and handed over the units produced by the industry to the user. The manufacture of the LRUs right from the prototype stage is by private industries. There is no doubt a small amount of import and as an example it is 5 per cent or thereabouts, for the Nishant UAV by the cost. Nishant is an example. For many years, the Lakshya, though a pilotless target aircrafts, which is unmanned, has followed this route with HAL being the production agency and the armed service users have been using this indigenous target aircrafts for decades. Still, this has not answered the critical question of gaps between user needs and indigenous capability seen as a product in his hand, which has lower acquisition cost while meeting all the performance parametres and is maintained to the percentage of availability desired by him. At best the above goes to show the Indian capability to design and field such UAVs for

user trials but then where are the numbers in the user hands. Now comes the industry. At least for Lakshya HAL has been able to supply the units to users and the spares situation could be improved. Lakshya 2 needs to be watched. HAL is keen in producing and supplying Nishant and the dialogues with users including with the BSF is going on. The Rustom 2 is a big order and all the agencies involved such as HAL, if it is chosen as the production agency, ADE have first got to meet the user’s functional requirements through the developmental and user evaluation trials. It is worth noting here that the focal plane arrays used in making the payloads are the critical technology and efforts in bringing this technology through offsets etc are to be made. Above all, the indigenous development efforts gone on in this area must not go waste and the champions of ‘Make in India’ must come forward and bridge the gaps between the indigenous capabilities and user aspirations and demonstrate a stable product of quality in the hands of the user. This, to start with

Rustom II in advanced stages of operational development by the DRDO lab ADE

involves marketing of these indigenous UAVs to the Indian armed services in the ‘as is’ form or improved versions that meet user needs. A concentrated effort is required to plug this area of drain of precious foreign resources and thus become world sellers of these products owing to the lower cost of manufacturing involved in indigenous effort including that of very low technology acquisition cost from DRDO. Internationally, the area of UAVs has seen vast development in the area of payload sensors and algorithms used for data presentation and fusion being the critical technology of the aerospace vehicles in general, and UAVs in particular. These payloads of UAVs can be classified as electrooptic (EO) payloads and electronic payloads. The EO payloads consist of Medium Range EO or MREO and Long Range EO or LREO systems. MREO payloads carried by contemporary UAVs have CCD cameras, Forward Looking Infra red Sensor camera and Laser Designator mounted on their turrets. The electronic payloads consist of Maritime patrol radar, Synthetic Aperture

APRIL 2015

radar, Electronic intelligence payload, Communication intelligence payloads, IFF, video recorders etc. The criticality of MREO is the size vis a vis stabilisation accuracy, which has to be better than 30 µrads in order to recognize a 3.5m sized object at 8 km range. Such systems are available from ELBIT and CONTROP of Israel, L3 Western of Canada, and FLIR systems of the USA. The LREO payload having stabilisation accuracy of 5µrad is used to recognize man sized objects from 12 kms distance. Such LREOs are restricted in supply from the USA, IAI of Israel. Tamam division of IAI is trying to supply the same to India. The key issue of LREO is the stabilisation accuracies. Though the DRDO has made gimbaled payload assemblies having jitter isolation capabilities of 50µrad for the two payload sensors, efforts are on to make them for three payload sensors. Miniaturisation is another issue. The Indian efforts for the 5µrad class are still in the R&D stage. The electronic payloads are usually restricted by the sensitive nature of the frequency data unique to the user. Another type of SAR using electronic beam control is the most challenging of the electronic payloads. There are a number of Israeli, European and American companies offering these payloads at very attractive size configurations which challenges the Indian developments of these payloads done for the ground applications when suiting to airborne applications. On the whole as costs of these payloads consist of 50 per cent of the total cost of the UAV system, there is a lot of emphasis on its indigenisation. Another area of importance to all the types of UAVs or even for UCAVs is the ground control station while considering it as integrated with data link segment. The interoperability of the Geographic Coordinate System (GCS) with other UAVs is one important aspect as stressed by Raytheon of the US. The Indian users have the advantage of getting all the needed features incorporated in the Rustom 2 GCS as it is being co-developed with the users. The other technology areas such as diesel engine and the composites manufacture, though important, are within the reach of the Indian developers and manufacturers. Another type of the UAVs is the rotary UAV. IIT Kanpur has a smaller rotary UAV built largely with kits bought from suppliers to hobby flyers. This IIT has done extensive

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Indian Navy’s ‘Heron’ UAV of Israeli origin flies over the Porbandar airfield

An UAV built by DRDO ‘Nishant’ in the early stages of the UAV programme

Internationally, the area of UAVs has seen vast development in the area of payload sensors and algorithms used for data presentation and fusion being the critical technology of the aerospace vehicles in general, and UAVs in particular.

work in characterising its dynamics and generating control laws. A joint effort between HAL, ADE and IIT Kanpur has been initiated in this area of rotary UAVs with an aim to finally make a present manned helicopter, unmanned. The unmanned combat aircraft are going to be the main workhorse of tomorrow’s aerial battle and efforts are going on for the conceptualisation of such aircraft in the country. UCAVs are designed to carry out Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) and also in LICs for targetted operations. As they do not yet have the complex capabilities of manned fighter to evade other strike aircraft, they have increased stealth capabilities using low radar cross sections by avoiding the use of any protruding surfaces or even antennas. This, together with need for reducing infrared signatures by the use of serpentine air intakes for their engines,

AERIALVEHICLES

APRIL 2015

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DRDO’s Rustom UAV is meant to replace Israeli Heron

increases the complexities of the airframe by the use of complex wing and control geometry (Dragerons, for instance), which in turn calls for uniqueness in their control laws and can lead to demanding thrust vector control from their engines. These are early days for such aircrafts for the country. At present DRDO has only started looking into the options of such designs and hence these are early days. Conversion of LCA into unmanned versions or any other ageing aircraft with IAF can also be thought of. It is heartening to note that the experience gained in the manned fighter aircraft design and development like that of LCA and the vast experience of unmanned aerial vehicles from ADE will help in development of UCAV. The solar UAVs are again going to have their own space in the future of UAVs. With the lead in the development of manned flights like Solar Impulse and other solar UAVs elsewhere in the world India has to do a lot in catching up in this area. In conclusion, it is heartening to note that there is a lot of indigenous technology developed within the country for the UAVs and it is the opinion of the author that we need not go the licenced production route for the UAVs to be made in India. If we take that path in the name of ‘Make in India,’ it will be a retrograde step. We must make the

UAVs in India with the Indian technologies. We must also learn from the past and also carefully do a SWOT analysis of the current situation of UAV design, development and manufacture vis a vis the user’s needs, which are sacrosanct. The indigenous design and manufacture will help or even be mandated in the future in this highly secure area of

The unmanned combat aircraft are going to be the main workhorse of tomorrow’s aerial battle and efforts are going on for the conceptualisation of such aircraft in the country. UCAVs are designed to carry out Suppression of EnemyAir Defence (SEAD) and also in LICs for targetted operations

surveillance due to the sensitive nature of frequencies, data encryption etc to meet our specific needs, if it is our design, and thus prevent any malware, for example, being put in, it is our own design. The flexibility offered by the indigenous design for obsolescence management and software upgrade or avionics upgrade again calls for the domestic UAV design. In fact in the past, the UAV design and manufacturing community had come together in selection of a Production and Development Partner (PADP) for Rustom 2. We must avoid the mistakes made during that process at least for other ‘Make in India’ programs. We had worked on the 80-20 model even then, with 80 per cent, consisting of 70 per cent from DRDO and 10 per cent from users and 20 per cent from the PADP partners. Some of the potential PADPs backed out. We must learn to work with this model which could become the norm in future. We must not wish away the careful eyes of the users or certification agencies as acceptance agencies and instead, demand that the legal contractor (in this case ADE) becomes the accepting agency. This opportunity of a new surge to make in India must be seen as a wake-up call and we must do all that is possible to keep the ‘Make in India’ flag flying high. This is the least we can do as a service to the tax payer of this country.

DEFENCE BUZZ

APRIL 2015

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DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

BAE Systems awarded Hawk Support Contract BAE Systems has secured a five-year contract worth GBP 18.5 million to provide Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) a comprehensive package comprising Ground Support Equipment, Spares, Support andTraining for the Hawk Mk132 advanced jet trainer.This is in support of HAL’s plans to establish a dedicated Repair & Overhaul facility for the aircraft in advance of a major servicing milestone anticipated in 2016. SteveTimms, Managing Director, Defence Information,

OIS-AT showcase bird detection and UAV tracking radars at Aero India 2015 OIS-AdvancedTechnology (OIS-AT) has indigenously produced new radar that offers protection to aircraft against the bird hits while another can detect and track unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).The two radars were unveiled at the Aero India 2015.The radars are part of the four indigenously developed radar systems by OIS-AT, a company which is taking the government’s Make in India campaign to the world.The other two radars are foliage penetration minefield and IED

Training and Services, said: “This agreement deepens our partnering commitment to HAL and further develops HAL’s in-country capabilities that are helping to deliver an enhanced training capability to the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy.” India is the largest operator of the Hawk advanced jet trainer with 123 aircraft ordered to date, of which over 90 have been delivered to the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy.The Hawks in service have clocked up nearly 70,000 flying hours.

detection system and portable ground surveillance radar system for military and homeland security applications.The 3D bird detection system works on deterrence option and uses directed bio-acoustics (sound) and an eye safe laser automatically controlled by a radar system.The UAV detection system can be automatically tuned to latch UAVs on the course of collision which in turn helps the controller to take remedial action.

Nasmyth India’s impressive growth contributing to Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign Nasmyth India, established in 2013 and based in Bangalore, plays a key role in the globalisation of Nasmyth Group – a leading supplier of precision engineering, products and services worldwide. Identifying and managing supply chain opportunities for other Group companies,

Nasmyth India is currently enjoying annual sales growth rates of over 300%.This level of activity is a measure of Nasmyth’s commitment to the country, a commitment which was also evidenced by the opening of the company’s new office in Bangalore last year and its involvement in theVIP tour of India, sponsored by the

British Government’s UK Trade & Investment department and led by Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. Already partnering with manufacturing businesses across the south of India – including Bangalore, Chennai, Coimbatore, Kolar and Hyderabad – for the machining of turned and milled / prismatic

components, Nasmyth India is now expanding and further accelerating development of its services to encompass additional engineering capability, a wider range of manufacturing and the introduction of NADCAP approved metal treatment facilities to address the needs of the aerospace sector.

DEFENCE BUZZ

APRIL 2015

received by BEL from Elop in 2014. Previously, BEL had entered into aTechnical Collaboration Agreement with Elop for the joint production and D-Level maintenance of CoMPASS for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Programme. BEL had absorbed transfer of technology (ToT) for production of CoMPASS in India. It is used in the ALH being manufactured by HAL. The CoMPASS is a day-and-night surveillance system that includes a colour TV daylight camera, 3rd Generation 3-5 µm Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor, LaserTarget Designator and Range Finder (LTDRF) and automatic tracking capabilities, as well as command and control capabilities. It is distinguished

BEL receives additional Purchase Order for CoMPASSTM from Elbit Systems Navratna Defence Public Sector Undertaking Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has received an order at Aero India 2015 from Elbit Systems Electro-Optical Elop Ltd. (Elop),

of Israel, for the production of Elop’s Compact Multi-Purpose Advanced Stabilized Systems (CoMPASSTM).This is in addition to an earlier order for the supply of CoMPASS,

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by a wide variety of interfaces, enabling integration with various aircraft / helicopter systems, such as Mission Computer, fire control, radar, GPS, data downlink and helmet-mounted tracking systems. Its small dimensions, low weight, high level of stabilisation and coverage angles make it an optimal choice for long-range, day-and-night surveillance, target tracking, fire control applications and search and rescue. CoMPASS is the most advanced payload version of its family, featuring reduced weight, high degree of modularity and flexibility, space-saving packaging and advanced operational and video processing features.

Sofradir showcases new generation infrared detector for airborne and portable applications

from substantial investment by the two partners, providing it with state-of-the-art machinery and equipment. This agreement marks a major step forward in the long-standing collaboration between Snecma and HAL. The proposed joint venture will further broaden the scope of the excellent relations established over the past 60 years between Safran affiliates and the Indian aerospace industry. For example, Snecma manufactures the M53 engines powering the Mirage 2000H “Vajra” fighters operated by the Indian Air Force.

Snecma and HAL to create a joint venture and build a new production facility in India Snecma (Safran), a leading manufacturer of aircraft engines, and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), a leading aerospace manufacturer, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on January 28, 2015 in Bengaluru to explore establishing a joint venture in India for the production of aero-engine parts.The MoU was signed by Mr. Bruno Durand,Vice President for Industrial Operations & Supply Chain of

Snecma and Mr. Arunachalam Muthukumaraswami, General Manager of the Engine Division of HAL. The proposed joint venture will initially focus on the manufacture of high-tech parts for the Dassault Rafale’s Snecma M88 engine, then subsequently contribute to other major aerospace projects of HAL & Snecma, in India and worldwide. Spanning over 30,000 square meters, the proposed joint venture’s new plant is expected to benefit

Sofradir, the global leader of advanced infrared (IR) detectors for military, space and industrial applications, demonstrated SWap-C LEO at AeroIndia. SWap-C LEO is a new generation VGA format IR detector optimised for size, weight, performance and cost (SWaP). It meets the challenges of 21st century military platforms that demand the integration of smaller, lighter low power consumption devices offering better value for money. SWap-C LEO is entering commercial production. Orders are in the pipeline with planned delivery in Q2 2015. Sofradir has cut the size and weight of SWap-C LEO while maintaining its high image resolution and detection range.

DEFENCE BUZZ

APRIL 2015

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Boeing Awards Titanium Forging Contract to India’s Bharat Forge

Turbomeca Arrius 2G1 engines can be used in search-andrescue, patrol or landing operations. Its ease of handling and latest avionics means that this helicopter is easy to manoeuvre in mountainous areas or built-up urban centres. The absence of a tail rotor and its compact design mean that the Ka-226T can land even on small sites.The Ka-226T can be operated by India’s law enforcement and civilian agencies. Russian Helicopters is proposing to establish production of this model in India.

Boeing announced it has signed a multi-year contract with Bharat Forge of India to supply titanium forgings for wing components for the Next-Generation 737 and 737 MAX. Under the agreement, Bharat Forge will begin supplying pre-machined forgings from its facilities in Pune and Baramati to Boeing in the first quarter of 2016. The titanium parts will be heat-treated, shaped in a forging press, and machined by Bharat Forge before being shipped to Boeing Portland for finish machining into components.The components then will be installed in the Next-Generation 737 and 737 MAX wings at the Final Assembly plant in Renton, Washington.

Bangalore-based Dynamatic Technologies Limited has produced the first set of aft pylon and cargo ramp assemblies for Boeing’s CH-47F Chinook helicopter. The commitment of Boeing and Dynamatic to “Make in India” was highlighted by Indian Prime Minister Shri. Narendra Modi during his inaugural address at Aero India 2015 in Bengaluru. “In September 2014 DynamaticTechnologies and its collaborator Boeing inaugurated a plant in India to manufacture critical parts for a Boeing helicopter that is sold globally,” the prime minister

said. “I understand that it was a day after Make in India was launched. I am pleased to learn that the first set of parts is ready...” “In a competitive world where our customers are increasingly demanding more for less, this delivery is a milestone that demonstrates the capability we are scaling-up with our supply-chain partners, right here in India,” said Prat Kumar president for Boeing India. “We set up a new assembly line with DynamaticTechnologies soon after the Prime Minister formally launched the ‘Make in India’ programme.”

Russian Helicopters showcases commercial and military helicopters Russian Helicopters (part of State Corporation Rostec) took part in Aero India 2015 in Bangalore. At the exhibition, Russian Helicopters showcases the latest Russian-made commercial and military helicopters. “India is a key market for the Russian helicopter-building industry, and the largest operator of Russian-made helicopters in the region,” said Russian Helicopters CEO Alexander Mikheev, who is heading the State Corporation Rostec delegation. "We are planning to develop

multilateral cooperation and are pleased to be able to showcase our new projects at this exhibition. In particular, the Ka-226T, which boasts a wealth of advantageous features." The Ka-226T is a light, twin-engine multirole, coaxial helicopter. It underwent testing in India during the helicopter tender was cancelled by the Indian authorities last year.The helicopter easily out-performed competitors produced by Western companies during flights in India's hot climate and mountainous areas. The Ka-226T with

Dynamatic Technologies produces first Chinook aerostructures for Boeing

DEFENCE BUZZ

APRIL 2015

KRET introduced modern radioelectronic solutions for the Indian Air Force at Aero India 2015

HAL hands over first Su-30MKI aircraft modified for BrahMos missile to BrahMos Aerospace Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on 19 February 2015 handed over the first Su-30MKI fighter aircraft modified for BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to BrahMos Aerospace during the second day of Aero India airshow at Yelahanka, Bengaluru. T. Suvarna Raju, HAL Chairman handed over the model of Su-30MKI integrated with BrahMos missile to Sudhir Mishra, CEO & MD, BrahMos Aerospace at an official ceremony held during the ongoing Aero India 2015. Air Marshal SBP Sinha AVSMVM, DCAS, Air Marshal Sukhchain Singh AVSMVSM (AOM), KTamilmani, DS & DG (Aero), S Subhrahmanyan, MD (MiG Complex),VM Chamola Director (HR), M Raja Kannu DG (DGAQA), AK Mishra Director (Finance) and K Naresh Babu MD (Bangalore

Complex) were also present during the receiving of aircraft documents from HAL. Reliance Infrastructure Limited today announced the acquisition of Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Company Limited, together with sole management control. Reliance Infrastructure, together with its wholly owned subsidiary Reliance Defence Systems Private Limited, has agreed to acquire from the Promoters of Pipavav Defence 13,00,00,000 equity shares representing approx. 18% shareholding in the company at a price of Rs. 63 per Share, aggregating Rs. 819 crore. Post the transaction, the existing promoters of Pipavav Defence will continue to retain a minority stake in the company, together with two non-executive Board seats.

Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET), a part of the Rostec State Corporation, presented its products at the Aero India 2015 international aerospace exhibition. Within the Russian stand, the foreign partners have become familiar with the latest achievements in a field of the identification friend or foe, special electronics, electronic systems for aviation and radio-electronic solutions. India is one of the priority markets for the KRET. Concern is ready to export both the latest complexes for EW solutions and the latest avionics. The KRET introduced its unique designs of avionics, including SAP-518 and SAP-14 jamming station, L187AE jamming system for helicopters, which were highly appreciated by the US experts. Laser optical-electronic suppression station of airborne defense system President-S surely was in the loop of the exhibition's participants. It ensures effective protection from missiles with the infrared

homing heads.This solution is especially relevant for the protection of the class of military and civil helicopters and airplanes in the context of increasing threat of terrorists using the man-portable air defense systems. Zhuk-AE, multimode airborne radars, with active phased-array antenna (FGA 35 version) was shown at the KRET’s stand as well. Its uniqueness lies in the possibility to detect and track various classes of air and surface targets with simultaneous missiles guidance to them.The system surpasses the rivals in performance characteristics and designed to be installed on the next generation aircrafts. Twelve companies of the Concern took part in the exhibition.They are specialized in production of friend or foe systems, special electronics, electronic systems for aviation and radio-electronic devices. Companies presented their production are following: JSC Concern “Avionica”, JSC “Corporation Fazotron-NIIP”, JSC “Aviaavtomatika by V.V.Tarasova”, JSC “RPZ”, JSC “Ramenskoe Instrument Design Bureau JSC”, JSC “Russian Scientific Research Institute “Ekran”, JSC “Aeropribor –Voshod”.

training and operational aspects of the Navy.The ships would be returning to Mumbai on completion of the

professional engagements. INSVikramaditya, the latest aircraft carrier inducted by the Indian Navy, is presently based at Karwar and is commanded by Capt Suraj Berry.The ship has been fully integrated with the fleet post trials and has successfully participated in the recently concludedTheatre level Readiness and Operational Exercise (TROPEX) where it was extensively used in its operational role. INSVirat, the other aircraft carrier is commanded by Capt Rajesh Pendharkar.

Western Fleet Ships in Kochi Seven ships ofWestern Fleet based at Mumbai, including the two Aircraft Carriers INSVirat and INSVikramaditya recently took part inTROPEX. TheWestern fleet is being commanded by Rear Admiral R Hari Kumar,VSM, Flag Officer CommandingWestern Fleet.This is the first time that the newly acquired Aircraft Carrier INSVikramaditya is visiting Kochi after joining the fleet. A number of professional interactions are planned

between the officers and men of the different training units based at Kochi and the visiting ships in order to synergize the

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