DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - April 2010

DSI Cover-APRIL:cover-feb3.qxd 09/04/10 3:49 PM Page 1

INSURGENCY

THE NAGA SAGA There are now possibilties of peace for one of the world’s oldest insurgencies I B.G. VERGHESE SECURITY

HOLISTIC RESPONSES With the changing nature of war democratic nations have to contend with asymmetrical conflicts I VIJAY OBEROI APRIL 2010

BATTLE

OF THE

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 2

ISSUE 5

Rs 250

Decisive trials of the Arjun and Russian T-90 Main Battle Tanks underscore the capability of the indigenous armoured vehicle I AJAI SHUKLA

216X276.indd 1

2/8/10 1:15:04 PM

Letter from the Editor.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 09/04/10 3:36 PM Page 2

APRIL, 2010

LETTER FROM THE

editor

I

n most country’s armed formations tanks are the backbone of any assault. Their induction and utilisation are of critical importance. Yet ever since the government commissioned the building of the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) nearly 40 years ago the Indian Army has been ambivalent over the role of the homebuilt defence system. Developed and designed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation, the Army has been continuously rejecting these tanks because of performance issues.

But the results of a week’s gruelling trial that took place in March in the desert terrain of the Mahajan Range in Rajasthan may bring the military closer to a final decision. Unofficially seen as a showdown between the indigenously designed Arjun and the Russian T-90, the results of these critical trials are expected this month. The final outcome of the test is a prerequisite for the Army to decide the eventual operational role of the Arjun. If the tank passes muster, and DSI has learnt that the armoured vehicle performed well on all crucial parametres, it could pave the way for the Army to induct more Arjun MBTs to the disadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72s and the T-90s.

More often than not, the announcement of the Defence Budget brings out a collective wail of anguish, mostly about shrinking funds, from the strategic community. But more worrying than the percieved shortage of funds for the defence sector is their under-utilisation. Statistics show that over the Ninth, Tenth and current Plan periods there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation to the tune of Rs 40,000 crore. In an in-depth analysis DSI makes a case for better utilisation and accountability mechanisms to bring about an improved fiscal awareness and efficiency in expenditure. Steps have already been taken to delegate more financial powers based on operational and functional requirements and not on rank. But the system needs to be tightened further to ensure a clarity in strategic assessment and projection of requirement.

The latest round of talks between the Centre and the National Social Council of NagalandIM bring renewed hope about finding a solution to the insurgency in Nagaland, perhaps one of the oldest ongoing rebellions in the world. This latest exchange holds a promise that an equitable solution may soon be possible with the Centre thinking of granting more autonomy to Nagaland within the bounds of the Constitution.

We look forward to your feedback. You can send your comments and suggestions to dsidelhi.feedback@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe to DSI, get in touch with us at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

DSI

More worrying than the percieved shortage of funds for the defence sector is their underutilisation.

Statistics show that over the last ten years approximately Rs 40,000 crore has not been utilised.

CONTENTS

Contents-April 2010.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 09/04/10 3:50 PM Page 1

APRIL, 2010

COVER STORY

12

ARMY THINKS TANKS

The field performance of the Arjun Main Battle Tank in the recent trials has, for the first time, has satisfied the Indian Army to the disadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72 armoured vehicles and the Russian T-90s.

SECURITY

20

HOLISTIC RESPONSES Increasingly, democracies are having to contend with asymmetrical conflicts in which innovative strategies and technologies are being used by weaker States or non-State actors to exploit the vulnerabilities of a larger opponent. This has two implications—firstly, a war between two States and secondly, a State fighting non-State actors.

HELICOPTERS

INSURGENCY

26

NEIGHBOURS

42

POTENT AIRPOWER

A LOOMING SHADOW

Helicopters can enhance air support capabilities and become ideal strike platforms.

If utilised efficiently, heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations can become an immensely effective instrument of aerospace, military and national power.

Landlocked Nepal has for over half a century deftly balanced relations between India and China. With Nepal having become critical in South Asian geopolitics, China has been strategically aiming to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence in the Himalayan kingdom.

30

THE NAGA SAGA One of the world’s most enduring insurgencies seems poised for a peaceful resolution with talks between the government and the Muviah faction of the NSCN-IM entering a decisive phase.

NEIGHBOURS

34

GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARD Recent bombings targetting Indian activities in Afghanistan point to a war being played out between Pakistan and India to gain influence in the ravaged country.

2

DSI

3

Cover Photo : Ajai Shukla

CONTENTS

Contents-April 2010.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 09/04/10 3:50 PM Page 1

APRIL, 2010

COVER STORY

12

ARMY THINKS TANKS

The field performance of the Arjun Main Battle Tank in the recent trials has, for the first time, has satisfied the Indian Army to the disadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72 armoured vehicles and the Russian T-90s.

SECURITY

20

HOLISTIC RESPONSES Increasingly, democracies are having to contend with asymmetrical conflicts in which innovative strategies and technologies are being used by weaker States or non-State actors to exploit the vulnerabilities of a larger opponent. This has two implications—firstly, a war between two States and secondly, a State fighting non-State actors.

HELICOPTERS

INSURGENCY

26

NEIGHBOURS

42

POTENT AIRPOWER

A LOOMING SHADOW

Helicopters can enhance air support capabilities and become ideal strike platforms.

If utilised efficiently, heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations can become an immensely effective instrument of aerospace, military and national power.

Landlocked Nepal has for over half a century deftly balanced relations between India and China. With Nepal having become critical in South Asian geopolitics, China has been strategically aiming to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence in the Himalayan kingdom.

30

THE NAGA SAGA One of the world’s most enduring insurgencies seems poised for a peaceful resolution with talks between the government and the Muviah faction of the NSCN-IM entering a decisive phase.

NEIGHBOURS

34

GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARD Recent bombings targetting Indian activities in Afghanistan point to a war being played out between Pakistan and India to gain influence in the ravaged country.

2

DSI

3

Cover Photo : Ajai Shukla

Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 09/04/10 5:07 PM Page 1

APRIL, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 5 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SHUKLA

VIJAY OBEROI

FALI H. MAJOR

Arvind Kadyan, Controller of Defence Accounts, joined the Indian Defence Accounts Service in 1987.

He was earlier Integrated Financial Advisor, South-West Command (Army) in the Ministry of Defence. He has been Deputy Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission and Director (Vigilance), Delhi Development Authority and is presently on deputation to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Vijay Oberoi, FounderDirector of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) for over four years is also the Founder President of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel. A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1961.

He retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as part of the Track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

Fali H. Major, commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1967 as a Wing Commander, has held several important staff and field appointments. As a Wing Commander, he commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his leadership.

A recipient also of the Shaurya Chakra, he took over as Air Officer Commanding Leh (Ladakh), in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999. A graduate from the National Defence College and Army War College, he is the first helicopter pilot to become the Chief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also the President, Air Force Association.

JAYADEV RANADE

RAHUL BEDI

Jayadev Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field.

His foreign assignments have included Bejing and Hong Kong and his last international posting, prior to retirement in late 2008, was as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes regularly to leading publications mostly on strategic and security issues relating to China — his chosen field of specialisation. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

B. G. VERGHESE B.G.Verghese has been with the Centre for Policy Research since 1986. A recipient of the Magsaysay Award in 1975 and Assam's Sankaradeva Award for 2005, he is currently Chairman of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Delhi.

A distinguished fellow of the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad, he was also a member of the Kargil Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil Review Committee Report. He has written several books, including Rage, Reconciliation and Security that deals with managing India's diversities.

He started his career in journalism with the Times of India and was later the editor of both Hindustan Times and Indian Express.

Maneesha Dube

JYOTI MALHOTRA

EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Jyoti Malhotra is a Contributing Editor for Business Standard in India.

She has been both a television and print journalist for 25 years, covering foreign policy and strategic issues, especially in the Indian Subcontinent.

She has travelled to Afghanistan several times since the Taliban were ousted from there after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Sandeep Sharma BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz AFP

ARVIND KADYAN

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 09/04/10 5:07 PM Page 1

APRIL, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 5 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SHUKLA

VIJAY OBEROI

FALI H. MAJOR

Arvind Kadyan, Controller of Defence Accounts, joined the Indian Defence Accounts Service in 1987.

He was earlier Integrated Financial Advisor, South-West Command (Army) in the Ministry of Defence. He has been Deputy Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission and Director (Vigilance), Delhi Development Authority and is presently on deputation to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Vijay Oberoi, FounderDirector of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) for over four years is also the Founder President of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel. A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1961.

He retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as part of the Track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

Fali H. Major, commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1967 as a Wing Commander, has held several important staff and field appointments. As a Wing Commander, he commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his leadership.

A recipient also of the Shaurya Chakra, he took over as Air Officer Commanding Leh (Ladakh), in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999. A graduate from the National Defence College and Army War College, he is the first helicopter pilot to become the Chief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also the President, Air Force Association.

JAYADEV RANADE

RAHUL BEDI

Jayadev Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field.

His foreign assignments have included Bejing and Hong Kong and his last international posting, prior to retirement in late 2008, was as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes regularly to leading publications mostly on strategic and security issues relating to China — his chosen field of specialisation. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

B. G. VERGHESE B.G.Verghese has been with the Centre for Policy Research since 1986. A recipient of the Magsaysay Award in 1975 and Assam's Sankaradeva Award for 2005, he is currently Chairman of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Delhi.

A distinguished fellow of the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad, he was also a member of the Kargil Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil Review Committee Report. He has written several books, including Rage, Reconciliation and Security that deals with managing India's diversities.

He started his career in journalism with the Times of India and was later the editor of both Hindustan Times and Indian Express.

Maneesha Dube

JYOTI MALHOTRA

EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Jyoti Malhotra is a Contributing Editor for Business Standard in India.

She has been both a television and print journalist for 25 years, covering foreign policy and strategic issues, especially in the Indian Subcontinent.

She has travelled to Afghanistan several times since the Taliban were ousted from there after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Sandeep Sharma BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz AFP

ARVIND KADYAN

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

Defence Budget.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 3:56 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET

COUNTING

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee holds up his briefcase as he leaves for Parliament to present the Union Budget in February 2010.

He is accompanied by Ministers of State for Finance Namo Narain Meena (left) and S.S Palanimanickam (right)

COSTS

feature for the last ten years or so. The problem essentially relates to Capital Expenditure and implies that the allocation meant for the modernisation of armed forces wasn’t spent in the stipulated time frame.This lag could either be due to delays in the finalisation of capital acquisition proposals or the failure of vendors to adhere to the agreed time schedule for the supply of items. In both cases, the op-readiness of the armed forces gets affected.

Quality of Expenditure

ARVIND KADIYAN

KEY POINTS

During the Ninth and Tenth Plan periods and in the current Plan period, there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation by about Rs 40,000 crore. n The accountability mechanism is weak since the Defence Budget is input oriented. The Legislature cannot make out from the Demand for Grants the purpose of funds and their outcome. n To expedite the procurement process and meet modernisation requirements, an independent defence acquisition organisation needs to be set up. n

Budget Availability vis-à-vis Utilisation

I

mmediately after the presentation of the Union Budget 2010-11 in Parliament on Febuary 26, discussions took place in the defence fraternity about the seemingly marginal increase in the allotment of funds for the defence sector.

The total defence allocation for 2010-11 was Rs 1,47,344 crore against Rs 1,41,703 crore in 2009-10, indicating a marginal

Scanning past Budgets, it is clear that recently there has been hardly any shortage of funds for defence. During last three years (2007-08 to 2009-10) the defence services received 90 to 93 percent allocations of their projected budgetary requirements.

More than this perceived sense of being shortchanged, it would be more productive to examine the worrying trend of underutilising budgetary allocations. There has

06

AFP

Utilisation and accountability are critical factors that are often overlooked in an analysis of the Defence Budget

increase of 3.98 percent. However, one cannot overlook the fact that when compared with the Revised Estimates (RE) for 2009-10, the increase actually comes to 8.13 percent. And in case of Capital Expenditure the increase is nearly 25 percent. Thus to say that the increase is small is not justified. In fact, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee even assured Parliament that additional funds could be provided later, if necessary, to meet security requirements.

Most debates on the Defence Budget centre on the adequacy of budgetary allocation to meet the modernisation requirements of the defence forces. But in that process, the issue of utilisation of budgetary allocations and aspects relating to budget accountability don’t get the required attention of defence analysts, despite the fact that these are important factors for achieving economy and efficiency in defence spending.

DSI

been an under-utilisation to the extent of Rs 40,000 crore approximately during the Ninth and Tenth Plan periods and in the current Plan period (See Table). In fact, this figure is even higher if the amount paid as advances to Public Sector Units at the fag end of the financial year, to avoid a surrender of the funds, is added. Indeed, if the report by KPMG on defence which states that 85 percent of defence equipment is outdated is to be believed than such rampant underutilisation is highly undesirable.

In fact, the under-utilisation of funds allotted for defence has been a regular

BUDGET UTILISATION TRENDS Plan/Period

Budget Allocated

Budget Utilised

(Rs. in Crore)

(Rs. in Crore)

% Utilisation

8th Plan (1992-1997)

1,12,979

1,19,033

105.4

9th Plan (1997-2002)

2,43,100

2,26,134

93.0

10th Plan (2002-2007)

3,79,300

3,57,627

94.3

11th Plan (2007-2012)**

3,43,303

3,42,168*

99.7

*Under capital budget Rs 16,000 crore were surrendered but more revenue budget was utilised **Data is only available for 2007- 2010 Source: Data compiled from Defence Services Estimates

07

The issue of Quality of Expenditure (QoE) is another area which should be considered. Indeed, the Standing Committee on Defence has been regularly highlighting the need to curb wasteful expenditure. The Thirteenth Finance Commission has also mentioned that there is a need to improve the quality and efficiency of defence expenditure.

The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on defence refer to a number of cases where procurement could have been avoided.

They also cite instances of how delays in decision making have resulted in a substantial cost escalation. It’s important to note however that these reports are based on a test checks only.

Some of the cases mentioned in the CAG report show that it’s difficult to accept how expenditure on these items was justified. A few random samples: l Though the shelf life of 300 missiles of ‘X’ type is slated to expire by June 2010, and despite having a stock of 440 missile launchers, Air HQs procured 145 additional launchers between August 2006 and March 2008. Thus it incurred a largely infructuous expenditure of Rs 66.86 crore. l The Indian Navy procured six “R” radars at a cost of Rs 18.85 crore even though the performance of this system was suboptimal and its phasing out was under consideration. l Army HQs placed three indents during 1999-2001 on Bharat Electronics Limited for the supply of 2,500 radio sets without taking into account their post-upgradation requirement. After retro-modification, the spares, valued at Rs 3.01 crore, procured much earlier became redundant. l An advance payment of Rs 156 crore to

Defence Budget.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 3:56 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET

COUNTING

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee holds up his briefcase as he leaves for Parliament to present the Union Budget in February 2010.

He is accompanied by Ministers of State for Finance Namo Narain Meena (left) and S.S Palanimanickam (right)

COSTS

feature for the last ten years or so. The problem essentially relates to Capital Expenditure and implies that the allocation meant for the modernisation of armed forces wasn’t spent in the stipulated time frame.This lag could either be due to delays in the finalisation of capital acquisition proposals or the failure of vendors to adhere to the agreed time schedule for the supply of items. In both cases, the op-readiness of the armed forces gets affected.

Quality of Expenditure

ARVIND KADIYAN

KEY POINTS

During the Ninth and Tenth Plan periods and in the current Plan period, there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation by about Rs 40,000 crore. n The accountability mechanism is weak since the Defence Budget is input oriented. The Legislature cannot make out from the Demand for Grants the purpose of funds and their outcome. n To expedite the procurement process and meet modernisation requirements, an independent defence acquisition organisation needs to be set up. n

Budget Availability vis-à-vis Utilisation

I

mmediately after the presentation of the Union Budget 2010-11 in Parliament on Febuary 26, discussions took place in the defence fraternity about the seemingly marginal increase in the allotment of funds for the defence sector.

The total defence allocation for 2010-11 was Rs 1,47,344 crore against Rs 1,41,703 crore in 2009-10, indicating a marginal

Scanning past Budgets, it is clear that recently there has been hardly any shortage of funds for defence. During last three years (2007-08 to 2009-10) the defence services received 90 to 93 percent allocations of their projected budgetary requirements.

More than this perceived sense of being shortchanged, it would be more productive to examine the worrying trend of underutilising budgetary allocations. There has

06

AFP

Utilisation and accountability are critical factors that are often overlooked in an analysis of the Defence Budget

increase of 3.98 percent. However, one cannot overlook the fact that when compared with the Revised Estimates (RE) for 2009-10, the increase actually comes to 8.13 percent. And in case of Capital Expenditure the increase is nearly 25 percent. Thus to say that the increase is small is not justified. In fact, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee even assured Parliament that additional funds could be provided later, if necessary, to meet security requirements.

Most debates on the Defence Budget centre on the adequacy of budgetary allocation to meet the modernisation requirements of the defence forces. But in that process, the issue of utilisation of budgetary allocations and aspects relating to budget accountability don’t get the required attention of defence analysts, despite the fact that these are important factors for achieving economy and efficiency in defence spending.

DSI

been an under-utilisation to the extent of Rs 40,000 crore approximately during the Ninth and Tenth Plan periods and in the current Plan period (See Table). In fact, this figure is even higher if the amount paid as advances to Public Sector Units at the fag end of the financial year, to avoid a surrender of the funds, is added. Indeed, if the report by KPMG on defence which states that 85 percent of defence equipment is outdated is to be believed than such rampant underutilisation is highly undesirable.

In fact, the under-utilisation of funds allotted for defence has been a regular

BUDGET UTILISATION TRENDS Plan/Period

Budget Allocated

Budget Utilised

(Rs. in Crore)

(Rs. in Crore)

% Utilisation

8th Plan (1992-1997)

1,12,979

1,19,033

105.4

9th Plan (1997-2002)

2,43,100

2,26,134

93.0

10th Plan (2002-2007)

3,79,300

3,57,627

94.3

11th Plan (2007-2012)**

3,43,303

3,42,168*

99.7

*Under capital budget Rs 16,000 crore were surrendered but more revenue budget was utilised **Data is only available for 2007- 2010 Source: Data compiled from Defence Services Estimates

07

The issue of Quality of Expenditure (QoE) is another area which should be considered. Indeed, the Standing Committee on Defence has been regularly highlighting the need to curb wasteful expenditure. The Thirteenth Finance Commission has also mentioned that there is a need to improve the quality and efficiency of defence expenditure.

The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on defence refer to a number of cases where procurement could have been avoided.

They also cite instances of how delays in decision making have resulted in a substantial cost escalation. It’s important to note however that these reports are based on a test checks only.

Some of the cases mentioned in the CAG report show that it’s difficult to accept how expenditure on these items was justified. A few random samples: l Though the shelf life of 300 missiles of ‘X’ type is slated to expire by June 2010, and despite having a stock of 440 missile launchers, Air HQs procured 145 additional launchers between August 2006 and March 2008. Thus it incurred a largely infructuous expenditure of Rs 66.86 crore. l The Indian Navy procured six “R” radars at a cost of Rs 18.85 crore even though the performance of this system was suboptimal and its phasing out was under consideration. l Army HQs placed three indents during 1999-2001 on Bharat Electronics Limited for the supply of 2,500 radio sets without taking into account their post-upgradation requirement. After retro-modification, the spares, valued at Rs 3.01 crore, procured much earlier became redundant. l An advance payment of Rs 156 crore to

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APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET To improve the utilisation of budgetary allocation and efficiency of expenditure, the delegation of financial powers to various authorities in the Service Headquarters was reviewed and powers were delegated to lower formations and unit levels by the Minister of Defence.

A AN-32 transport aircraft at the Fuk Che airbase in Ladakh

”

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) even before receiving approval by the sanctioning authority violated budgetary and financial controls. Failure to conclude a contract with HAL even after eight years of approval of the project thus vitiated the control framework of the project. l Exceeding authorisation, the Army HQs procured 56 imagers, involving an avoidable expenditure of Rs 10.16 crore.

On the revenue side also, there has been problem of wasteful expenditure.

There have been numerous recorded cases of items being procured without sufficient justification, or in excess quantity or purchased at higher price. Through its Internal Audit Reports, the Controller General of Defence Accounts has highlighted such cases of avoidable expenditure especially those relating to Revenue Expenditure.

Wasteful expenditure have also been caused by the self-creation of services. For example, the funds for revenue procurement are normally allocated by various directorates in the Service Headquarters (SHQ) to lower levels of authority and units.

But experience has shown that these levels often retain some funds to cover the unforeseen or for additional fund requirements at a later stage.

However, at the same time, there have also been cases when no fund requirements were received. Additional funds have been released in the last financial quarter to units without a demand even being put forward. Since

DSI

Soldiers from Gorkha Rifles take position during a training exercise in Varanasi

08

authorities lower down the food chain cannot afford to return these funds they are forced to find avenues to justify this additional expenditure.

Given these anomalies, some steps have been taken in the right direction. To ensure greater transparency in the procurement process and eliminate discretion in government purchases, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) for Capital Acquisition in 2002 and Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) for Revenue Expenditure in 2005. The DPM was revised in 2009 to remove bottlenecks in the procurement process so that funds could be utilised to achieve value for money. Recently, the MoD has also made a proposal to revise the DPP on a yearly basis to further streamline and expedite the acquisition process.

Further, to improve the utilisation of budgetary allocation and improve efficiency of expenditure, the delegation of financial powers to various authorities in the Service Headquarters was reviewed and powers were delegated to lower formations and unit levels by the MoD. As a result of enhanced delegation of financial powers in 2006, 46 percent of the

COMPARATIVE COMMUNICATIONS “In this and accompanying Instructions, I am putting formally on record the financial authority which I am delegating to you on a personal basis, in my capacity as the Permanent Head of the Department…”

“You are personally accountable to me , in respect of my Accounting Officer, responsibility for Votes1 and 4, for the exercise of financial powers which I am delegating to you….”

—Extract from a letter written to the UK Commander-in-Chief,who is the top level budget holder, from the Permanent Under Secretary

overall procurement budget has been utilised by the Services and the balance 54 percent has been utilised by the MoD as compared to a 30 percent utilisation by the Services prior to the enhancement of powers.

Further, to ensure a uniform cash outflow the SHQ has issued instructions regarding the booking of expenditure. It has been stipulated that 40 percent expenditure needs to be booked by August 31 and 75 percent by December 31.

Additionally, to check cases of avoidable expenditure, all budget holders are

09

“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President for delegation of financial powers to Army Authorities as contained in the schedule to this letter………”

“The exercise of the financial powers will be governed by existing orders and instructions on the subject, as amended by the Government from time to time……..”

—Extract from a letter written by Director, MoD, India to the Chief of Army Staff

required to closely monitor the trend of expenditure under different heads to ensure that there is no last minute purchase rush.

Weak Accountability Mechanism India has a system of responsibility and accountability for its financial administration based on Constitutional provisions. In fact, the role and responsibility of the Legislature and the Executive have been very well defined.

Further, the Parliamentary control over

Defence Budget.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 3:56 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET To improve the utilisation of budgetary allocation and efficiency of expenditure, the delegation of financial powers to various authorities in the Service Headquarters was reviewed and powers were delegated to lower formations and unit levels by the Minister of Defence.

A AN-32 transport aircraft at the Fuk Che airbase in Ladakh

”

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) even before receiving approval by the sanctioning authority violated budgetary and financial controls. Failure to conclude a contract with HAL even after eight years of approval of the project thus vitiated the control framework of the project. l Exceeding authorisation, the Army HQs procured 56 imagers, involving an avoidable expenditure of Rs 10.16 crore.

On the revenue side also, there has been problem of wasteful expenditure.

There have been numerous recorded cases of items being procured without sufficient justification, or in excess quantity or purchased at higher price. Through its Internal Audit Reports, the Controller General of Defence Accounts has highlighted such cases of avoidable expenditure especially those relating to Revenue Expenditure.

Wasteful expenditure have also been caused by the self-creation of services. For example, the funds for revenue procurement are normally allocated by various directorates in the Service Headquarters (SHQ) to lower levels of authority and units.

But experience has shown that these levels often retain some funds to cover the unforeseen or for additional fund requirements at a later stage.

However, at the same time, there have also been cases when no fund requirements were received. Additional funds have been released in the last financial quarter to units without a demand even being put forward. Since

DSI

Soldiers from Gorkha Rifles take position during a training exercise in Varanasi

08

authorities lower down the food chain cannot afford to return these funds they are forced to find avenues to justify this additional expenditure.

Given these anomalies, some steps have been taken in the right direction. To ensure greater transparency in the procurement process and eliminate discretion in government purchases, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) for Capital Acquisition in 2002 and Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) for Revenue Expenditure in 2005. The DPM was revised in 2009 to remove bottlenecks in the procurement process so that funds could be utilised to achieve value for money. Recently, the MoD has also made a proposal to revise the DPP on a yearly basis to further streamline and expedite the acquisition process.

Further, to improve the utilisation of budgetary allocation and improve efficiency of expenditure, the delegation of financial powers to various authorities in the Service Headquarters was reviewed and powers were delegated to lower formations and unit levels by the MoD. As a result of enhanced delegation of financial powers in 2006, 46 percent of the

COMPARATIVE COMMUNICATIONS “In this and accompanying Instructions, I am putting formally on record the financial authority which I am delegating to you on a personal basis, in my capacity as the Permanent Head of the Department…”

“You are personally accountable to me , in respect of my Accounting Officer, responsibility for Votes1 and 4, for the exercise of financial powers which I am delegating to you….”

—Extract from a letter written to the UK Commander-in-Chief,who is the top level budget holder, from the Permanent Under Secretary

overall procurement budget has been utilised by the Services and the balance 54 percent has been utilised by the MoD as compared to a 30 percent utilisation by the Services prior to the enhancement of powers.

Further, to ensure a uniform cash outflow the SHQ has issued instructions regarding the booking of expenditure. It has been stipulated that 40 percent expenditure needs to be booked by August 31 and 75 percent by December 31.

Additionally, to check cases of avoidable expenditure, all budget holders are

09

“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President for delegation of financial powers to Army Authorities as contained in the schedule to this letter………”

“The exercise of the financial powers will be governed by existing orders and instructions on the subject, as amended by the Government from time to time……..”

—Extract from a letter written by Director, MoD, India to the Chief of Army Staff

required to closely monitor the trend of expenditure under different heads to ensure that there is no last minute purchase rush.

Weak Accountability Mechanism India has a system of responsibility and accountability for its financial administration based on Constitutional provisions. In fact, the role and responsibility of the Legislature and the Executive have been very well defined.

Further, the Parliamentary control over

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APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET

DSI

One way to expedite the procurement process without compromising the modernisation requirement of the armed forces would be the formation of an independent defence acquisition organisation. Its member should be experts from various fields with five years tenure and substantial financial powers.

”

public finances is ensured through various committees of Parliament members.

Parliamentary control over public finances is also an instrument of accountability with the highest level of the government. Parliament scrutinises the Budget in two stages: firstly, after its presentation in Parliament, when a general debate over Budget proposals takes place and thereafter, the Departmentally Related Standing Committee (DRSC) examines the detailed Demands for Grants and submits a report to Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also examines the reports of the CAG on Appropriation Accounts and the various performance reports of development projects or programmes and submits a report to Parliament. The CAG is an independent body and provides strength to the accountability process.

However, in the case of defence this accountability mechanism becomes a little weak since its budget is input oriented and the Legislature cannot make out from the Demand for Grants the purpose for which funds are being sought or see what outcome will be achieved. Besides, due to a lack of clear information about the nation’s Defence Policy and programmes there is hardly any meaningful discussion on the Defence Budget in Parliament.

Even the Standing Committee on Defence is unable to play a significant role since neither the required information about the programmes and their possible outcomes is

indicates that the existing accountability system has some inherent problems.

Way Forward A Sea Harrier takes off from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier INS Viraat. (Right) Defence Minister A.K. Antony

available to them nor does it have the required support of experts to examine the issues relating to defence. The PAC too is not able to examine and discuss the CAG’s paragraphs on defence for a long time.

As a result of all these shortcomings, the effectiveness of the accountability system gets compromised.

It is the administrative ministries which are responsible for the execution of the Budget proposal. Under the new management strategy introduced in 1996, the MoD introduced a substantial delegation of financial powers for Revenue Expenditure to the three Services.

Further, in 2006, the Authority-cumAccountability Centres in the SQH and budget centres at lower levels were entrusted with the responsibility of

10

planned utilisation of allocated resources.

The performance of such centres was to be monitored with the reference to the outcome achieved against expenditure incurred. While these measures have proved useful, the concept of Outcome Budgeting is yet to be implemented in the defence sector. In the Services, the concept of personal responsibility for achieving outcomes against expenditure is lacking as a result the full benefit of the delegation of powers is yet to be achieved.

For instance, a comparison of the nature of communication sent to top-level budget holders of the Services from the MoD in India and their counterparts in the UK shows the lack of emphasis on personal responsibility. The point regarding personal responsibility needs to be reinforced by

suitable communication from the Defence Secretary, since he is the chief accounting authority of the MoD, to achieve an optimal utilisation of financial resources (See Box).

In 2006, for the first time, financial powers for capital schemes were delegated to the Services at the level of the Vice Chief and further enhanced in 2009. As a result about 35-40 percent procurement cases are now finalised at this level, utilising five percent approximately of the capital budget. Thus the responsibility and accountability for utilisation of the capital budget lies mainly with the MoD, though it has to seek an approval of the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Committee on Security depending on the amount of the proposal. But the under-utilisation of the capital budget during last ten years

One way to expedite the procurement process without compromising the modernisation requirement of the Indian armed forces would be the formation of an independent defence acquisition organisation. Its member should be experts from various fields, with a minimum five year tenure and with substantial financial powers. The head of such a organisation, should also be given immunity for his decisions from the three Cs—the CAG, Central Vigilance Commission and Central Bureau of Investigation.

Additionally, the present financial power of the Defence Minister needs to be enhanced. The role of the Ministry of Finance too needs to be reviewed to avoid duplication of work.

In 2002, the DPP was issued to bring more transparency into the procurement process. However, it seems that after it was issued the decision making process has slowed down clearly reflecting the continuous under-utilisation of funds. It would be probably be more effective if more rigid guidelines are followed.

11

A primary requirement to bring accountability into the system is to institute a Defence Policy so that capability plans can be prepared. On the basis of this framework, a Long Term Perspective Plan, a Five Year Plan and a Two Year Plan can be prepared. The Two Year Plan should be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security, which in turn would ensure timely action at various levels.

Further, the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence will create a culture of accountability and improve efficiency in resource utilisation. To make the accountability system more effective the Public Accounts Committee and Standing Committee should utilise the services of experts from various fields outside the system so as to have an objective assessment of the issues.

There is also a need to have an informed debate on issues relating to defence in Parliament. Some NGOs which regularly provide research based information to Parliamentarians regarding specific issues that come up for discussion in Parliament, should also take up defence subjects but of course this can be done only if the MoD is willing to share information with them.

Defence Budget.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 5:25 PM Page 5

APRIL 2010

DEFENCE BUDGET

DSI

One way to expedite the procurement process without compromising the modernisation requirement of the armed forces would be the formation of an independent defence acquisition organisation. Its member should be experts from various fields with five years tenure and substantial financial powers.

”

public finances is ensured through various committees of Parliament members.

Parliamentary control over public finances is also an instrument of accountability with the highest level of the government. Parliament scrutinises the Budget in two stages: firstly, after its presentation in Parliament, when a general debate over Budget proposals takes place and thereafter, the Departmentally Related Standing Committee (DRSC) examines the detailed Demands for Grants and submits a report to Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also examines the reports of the CAG on Appropriation Accounts and the various performance reports of development projects or programmes and submits a report to Parliament. The CAG is an independent body and provides strength to the accountability process.

However, in the case of defence this accountability mechanism becomes a little weak since its budget is input oriented and the Legislature cannot make out from the Demand for Grants the purpose for which funds are being sought or see what outcome will be achieved. Besides, due to a lack of clear information about the nation’s Defence Policy and programmes there is hardly any meaningful discussion on the Defence Budget in Parliament.

Even the Standing Committee on Defence is unable to play a significant role since neither the required information about the programmes and their possible outcomes is

indicates that the existing accountability system has some inherent problems.

Way Forward A Sea Harrier takes off from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier INS Viraat. (Right) Defence Minister A.K. Antony

available to them nor does it have the required support of experts to examine the issues relating to defence. The PAC too is not able to examine and discuss the CAG’s paragraphs on defence for a long time.

As a result of all these shortcomings, the effectiveness of the accountability system gets compromised.

It is the administrative ministries which are responsible for the execution of the Budget proposal. Under the new management strategy introduced in 1996, the MoD introduced a substantial delegation of financial powers for Revenue Expenditure to the three Services.

Further, in 2006, the Authority-cumAccountability Centres in the SQH and budget centres at lower levels were entrusted with the responsibility of

10

planned utilisation of allocated resources.

The performance of such centres was to be monitored with the reference to the outcome achieved against expenditure incurred. While these measures have proved useful, the concept of Outcome Budgeting is yet to be implemented in the defence sector. In the Services, the concept of personal responsibility for achieving outcomes against expenditure is lacking as a result the full benefit of the delegation of powers is yet to be achieved.

For instance, a comparison of the nature of communication sent to top-level budget holders of the Services from the MoD in India and their counterparts in the UK shows the lack of emphasis on personal responsibility. The point regarding personal responsibility needs to be reinforced by

suitable communication from the Defence Secretary, since he is the chief accounting authority of the MoD, to achieve an optimal utilisation of financial resources (See Box).

In 2006, for the first time, financial powers for capital schemes were delegated to the Services at the level of the Vice Chief and further enhanced in 2009. As a result about 35-40 percent procurement cases are now finalised at this level, utilising five percent approximately of the capital budget. Thus the responsibility and accountability for utilisation of the capital budget lies mainly with the MoD, though it has to seek an approval of the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Committee on Security depending on the amount of the proposal. But the under-utilisation of the capital budget during last ten years

One way to expedite the procurement process without compromising the modernisation requirement of the Indian armed forces would be the formation of an independent defence acquisition organisation. Its member should be experts from various fields, with a minimum five year tenure and with substantial financial powers. The head of such a organisation, should also be given immunity for his decisions from the three Cs—the CAG, Central Vigilance Commission and Central Bureau of Investigation.

Additionally, the present financial power of the Defence Minister needs to be enhanced. The role of the Ministry of Finance too needs to be reviewed to avoid duplication of work.

In 2002, the DPP was issued to bring more transparency into the procurement process. However, it seems that after it was issued the decision making process has slowed down clearly reflecting the continuous under-utilisation of funds. It would be probably be more effective if more rigid guidelines are followed.

11

A primary requirement to bring accountability into the system is to institute a Defence Policy so that capability plans can be prepared. On the basis of this framework, a Long Term Perspective Plan, a Five Year Plan and a Two Year Plan can be prepared. The Two Year Plan should be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security, which in turn would ensure timely action at various levels.

Further, the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence will create a culture of accountability and improve efficiency in resource utilisation. To make the accountability system more effective the Public Accounts Committee and Standing Committee should utilise the services of experts from various fields outside the system so as to have an objective assessment of the issues.

There is also a need to have an informed debate on issues relating to defence in Parliament. Some NGOs which regularly provide research based information to Parliamentarians regarding specific issues that come up for discussion in Parliament, should also take up defence subjects but of course this can be done only if the MoD is willing to share information with them.

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APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES

ARMY THINKS TANKS

KEY POINTS n During the potentially decisive trials held in March, the Arjun tanks emerged superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing. n The Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-72 tanks remains night blind, underpowered and without a modern fire control system. n The induction of the Arjun tank by the Army still not certain.

In the Army trials held recently the indigenously produced Arjun tank was quietly impressive in comparison with the RussianT-90

T

AJAI SHUKLA

AJAI SHUKLA

An Arjun tank being test driven on the bump track at the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment at Avadi near Chennai in April 2008

12

DSI

13

he quarter century and more that it has taken India’s Combat Vehicles R&D Establishment (CVRDE) to design and build the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) has created a near-crisis of confidence between the CVRDE and its customers, the Army’s Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF). The DGMF, disillusioned by seemingly endless time and cost overruns from the CVRDE, grew to consider the Arjun a combat liability that was being forced down its throat. The CVRDE, in turn, started viewing the DGMF as obstructionist, technically inept and suspiciously inclined towards Russian equipment.

In this bad marriage, the major point of dispute––the Arjun tank’s performance––has unexpectedly become a settled issue. During a week of Army trials in early March, at the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan, the Arjun tank emerged conclusively superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing. At the time of filing this report, the trial report is still secret and is expected to reach the Army Headquarters in midApril. But Defence & Security of India (DSI) has learned from multiple sources involved in the trials that the Arjun tank has, for the first time ever, fully satisfied the Army with its field performance.

The trial pitted one squadron (14 tanks) of Arjuns against an equal number of T-90s. These squadrons were given three tactical tasks; each involved driving across 75 km of desert terrain, fully buttoned down, in battle conditions.

The Arjuns and the T-90s also compared their shooting ability twice, engaging targets by day and by night, while static and on the move. During each of these firing trials, every tank fired at least ten rounds, with each hit being carefully logged. In total, each tank drove more than 225 km and fired between 20-30

Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:03 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES

ARMY THINKS TANKS

KEY POINTS n During the potentially decisive trials held in March, the Arjun tanks emerged superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing. n The Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-72 tanks remains night blind, underpowered and without a modern fire control system. n The induction of the Arjun tank by the Army still not certain.

In the Army trials held recently the indigenously produced Arjun tank was quietly impressive in comparison with the RussianT-90

T

AJAI SHUKLA

AJAI SHUKLA

An Arjun tank being test driven on the bump track at the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment at Avadi near Chennai in April 2008

12

DSI

13

he quarter century and more that it has taken India’s Combat Vehicles R&D Establishment (CVRDE) to design and build the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) has created a near-crisis of confidence between the CVRDE and its customers, the Army’s Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF). The DGMF, disillusioned by seemingly endless time and cost overruns from the CVRDE, grew to consider the Arjun a combat liability that was being forced down its throat. The CVRDE, in turn, started viewing the DGMF as obstructionist, technically inept and suspiciously inclined towards Russian equipment.

In this bad marriage, the major point of dispute––the Arjun tank’s performance––has unexpectedly become a settled issue. During a week of Army trials in early March, at the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan, the Arjun tank emerged conclusively superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing. At the time of filing this report, the trial report is still secret and is expected to reach the Army Headquarters in midApril. But Defence & Security of India (DSI) has learned from multiple sources involved in the trials that the Arjun tank has, for the first time ever, fully satisfied the Army with its field performance.

The trial pitted one squadron (14 tanks) of Arjuns against an equal number of T-90s. These squadrons were given three tactical tasks; each involved driving across 75 km of desert terrain, fully buttoned down, in battle conditions.

The Arjuns and the T-90s also compared their shooting ability twice, engaging targets by day and by night, while static and on the move. During each of these firing trials, every tank fired at least ten rounds, with each hit being carefully logged. In total, each tank drove more than 225 km and fired between 20-30

Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:04 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES rounds. The trial also checked the tanks’ medium fording capability, driving through a water channel 5-6 feet deep.

The Arjun tanks, the Army observers all agreed, performed far beyond their expectations. Whether driving crosscountry over rugged sand-dunes; detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets; or accurately hitting targets, both stationery and moving, with pinpoint gunnery; the Arjun overshadowed the vaunted T-90. This was especially true in the crucial aspect of mobility: the 60-tonne Arjun––thanks to its lower Nominal Ground Pressure or the weight per square metre transferred to the ground––moved more easily across the soft desert sands than the lighter, 46-tonne T-90.

“The Arjun could have performed even better, had it been operated by experienced crewmen,” says an officer who has worked on the Arjun. “As the Army’s tank regiments gather experience on the Arjun, they will learn to exploit its capabilities,” he added.

“The senior officers who attended the trials were completely taken aback by the Arjun’s strong performance,” said another Army officer who was present through the trials, “and they were also pleased that the Arjun had finally come of age.”

The importance of this trial in the Army’s armour planning is evident from the list of senior officers who attended.

Many of the Army’s senior tank generals flew down for the trial, including the Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D. Bhardwaj; Strike Corps Commander, Lt Gen Anil Chait; Army Commander South, Lt Gen Pradeep Khanna and Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Lt Gen J.P. Singh. Director General of Military Operations, Lt Gen A.S. Sekhon, also attended the trials.

For months preceding the trials, a skeptical Army had signalled its opposition to buying more Arjuns. The message sent out by the Army brass was: 124 Arjun tanks have been bought already; but no more Arjuns would be ordered for the Army’s fleet of 4,000 tanks.

The comparative trial, or so went the message, merely aimed at evaluating what operational role could be given to the Army’s handful of Arjuns.

Now, confronted with the Arjun’s demonstrated capability, the Army will find it difficult to cap the Arjun order at 124, or two regiments (62 tanks each). This is especially so given the growing obsolescence of the Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-

DSI

During a week of Army trials in early March, at the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan, the Arjun tank emerged conclusively superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing.The trial report is still secret; it will only reach Army Headquarters in mid-April.

”

72 tanks, which remains night blind, underpowered, and without a modern fire control system. This outdated tank will, according to the Army’s current planning, remain in service with almost half the Army’s 59 tank regiments as far in the future as 2022.

Good Money, Bad Tank To keep its T-72 fleet battle worthy, the DGMF––traditional advocate of Russian equipment––plans to spend Rs 5 crore per T-72, hoping to add another 15-20 years to that tank’s service life by replacing crucial systems, such as its fire control system, main engine and night vision devices (see box). So far, the Army has refused to order the Arjun in larger numbers to start replacing the vintage T-72s.

Instead, good money is being thrown after a bad tank. The military’s Annual Acquisition Plan for 2008-2010 (AAP 200810) budgets a whopping Rs 5,000 crore for modernising the T-72 fleet as follows: l New 1,000-HP engines (identical to the T-90 tank) to replace the T-72’s old 780 HP engines. The cost of each engine: Rs. 3 crore. l Thermal Imaging Fire Control Systems (TIFCS) to improve the tank’s fire control and gunners’ night vision and accuracy.

Each TIFCS will cost Rs 1.4 crore. l Thermal Imaging (TI) sights to provide night vision to the currently night-blind T-

14

The Directorate General of Mechanised Force plans to spend Rs 5 crore per T-72 to make it battle worthy

15

Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:04 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES rounds. The trial also checked the tanks’ medium fording capability, driving through a water channel 5-6 feet deep.

The Arjun tanks, the Army observers all agreed, performed far beyond their expectations. Whether driving crosscountry over rugged sand-dunes; detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets; or accurately hitting targets, both stationery and moving, with pinpoint gunnery; the Arjun overshadowed the vaunted T-90. This was especially true in the crucial aspect of mobility: the 60-tonne Arjun––thanks to its lower Nominal Ground Pressure or the weight per square metre transferred to the ground––moved more easily across the soft desert sands than the lighter, 46-tonne T-90.

“The Arjun could have performed even better, had it been operated by experienced crewmen,” says an officer who has worked on the Arjun. “As the Army’s tank regiments gather experience on the Arjun, they will learn to exploit its capabilities,” he added.

“The senior officers who attended the trials were completely taken aback by the Arjun’s strong performance,” said another Army officer who was present through the trials, “and they were also pleased that the Arjun had finally come of age.”

The importance of this trial in the Army’s armour planning is evident from the list of senior officers who attended.

Many of the Army’s senior tank generals flew down for the trial, including the Director General of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D. Bhardwaj; Strike Corps Commander, Lt Gen Anil Chait; Army Commander South, Lt Gen Pradeep Khanna and Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Lt Gen J.P. Singh. Director General of Military Operations, Lt Gen A.S. Sekhon, also attended the trials.

For months preceding the trials, a skeptical Army had signalled its opposition to buying more Arjuns. The message sent out by the Army brass was: 124 Arjun tanks have been bought already; but no more Arjuns would be ordered for the Army’s fleet of 4,000 tanks.

The comparative trial, or so went the message, merely aimed at evaluating what operational role could be given to the Army’s handful of Arjuns.

Now, confronted with the Arjun’s demonstrated capability, the Army will find it difficult to cap the Arjun order at 124, or two regiments (62 tanks each). This is especially so given the growing obsolescence of the Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-

DSI

During a week of Army trials in early March, at the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan, the Arjun tank emerged conclusively superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameters like mobility and firing.The trial report is still secret; it will only reach Army Headquarters in mid-April.

”

72 tanks, which remains night blind, underpowered, and without a modern fire control system. This outdated tank will, according to the Army’s current planning, remain in service with almost half the Army’s 59 tank regiments as far in the future as 2022.

Good Money, Bad Tank To keep its T-72 fleet battle worthy, the DGMF––traditional advocate of Russian equipment––plans to spend Rs 5 crore per T-72, hoping to add another 15-20 years to that tank’s service life by replacing crucial systems, such as its fire control system, main engine and night vision devices (see box). So far, the Army has refused to order the Arjun in larger numbers to start replacing the vintage T-72s.

Instead, good money is being thrown after a bad tank. The military’s Annual Acquisition Plan for 2008-2010 (AAP 200810) budgets a whopping Rs 5,000 crore for modernising the T-72 fleet as follows: l New 1,000-HP engines (identical to the T-90 tank) to replace the T-72’s old 780 HP engines. The cost of each engine: Rs. 3 crore. l Thermal Imaging Fire Control Systems (TIFCS) to improve the tank’s fire control and gunners’ night vision and accuracy.

Each TIFCS will cost Rs 1.4 crore. l Thermal Imaging (TI) sights to provide night vision to the currently night-blind T-

14

The Directorate General of Mechanised Force plans to spend Rs 5 crore per T-72 to make it battle worthy

15

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APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES

AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

Pakistan bases its anti-tank defences largely on missiles (e.g. the TOW II antitank guided missile), India bought the T-90 without the Shtora active protection system, which protects the T-90 from incoming enemy missiles.

Other important systems were also pared down. The MoD opted to buy reduced numbers of the INVAR missile, which the T-90 fires. Maintenance vehicles, which are vital to keep the T-90s running, were not included in the contract. All this allowed the government to declare before Parliament that the Russian T-90s cost just Rs 11 crore apiece. The cost of the T-72 was then about Rs 9 crore each.

In fact, the first batch of ten built-inIndia T-90s, which only rolled out of HVF Avadi last August, nine long years after the tank was bought, actually cost India’s exchequer a whopping Rs 17.5 crore. Parliament has not yet been informed about the 50 per cent rise in cost. The Lok Sabha’s last update was

the MoD’s failure to manage 72 tank commanders. Each (Left) Major General its overhaul schedule: some TI sight costs Rs 0.4 crore.

H.M. Singh, considered 800 T-72s are years overdue l An Auxillary Power Unit the ‘Father of the Arjun for overhaul. Originally, each (APU) to generate power Tank’, and (right) T-72 was to be overhauled for the tank’s electrical Defence Minister A.K. twice during its service life of systems. Each APU will cost Antony with officials on 32 years. But as the overhaul Rs 0.16 crore. a Arjun Tank at the agencies––the Heavy The Rs 5 crore cost of Combat Vehicles R&D Vehicles Factory (HVF) at upgrading each T-72 will Establishment in Avadi Avadi, near Chennai and 505 ramp up the cost of each near Chennai Army Base Workshop, tank to Rs 14 crore, demolishing the argument that the T-72 is Delhi––failed to meet their overhaul value-for-money. In contrast, a brand new targets of 70 and 50 tanks respectively, the Arjun, with a 1,500 HP engine, state-of- Army decided that one overhaul was good the-art integrated electronics and the enough. And with even that schedule not indigenous, widely praised Kanchan being implemented, a desperate MoD has armour, is just marginally more expensive now approached Indian industry to take up the slack in overhauling the T-72 fleet. at Rs 16.8 crore.

Despite the poor condition of India’s “It is a folly to stick with Russian tanks despite having developed the Arjun and T-72 fleet, it was to remain a frontline the design capability to continuously tank for another two decades, because improve it,” says Lt Gen Ajai Singh, who the indigenous production of the T-90 headed the Army’s Directorate of Combat has fallen far behind schedule. Only last Vehicles before becoming Governor of year, a full nine years after the T-90 was Assam. “India can tailor the Arjun to its bought, were the first built-in-India T-90s specific requirements and continuously rolled out of HVF, Avadi. And the Army upgrade the tank to keep it state-of- was refusing to order and induct the Arjun in larger numbers to replace this the-art. Why upgrade old T-72s?”

The T-72’s drawbacks are magnified by white elephant.

16

Serial Failures The T-90s less-than-spectacular performance against the Arjun should not have come as a surprise, considering the serial failures that have plagued this tank since its induction into service in 2002.

From the start, the T-90’s reality has fallen short of expectation. In 1999, the Army decided to push through the purchase of the T-90s from Russia despite vocal opposition from Parliament. Former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda argued that fitting the T72 with modern fire control systems and night vision devices would be cheaper than buying the T-90. Deve Gowda correctly pointed out that even Russia’s Army had spurned the T-90.

To bypass Deve Gowda’s opposition, the MoD and the Army reached an understanding with Rosvoorouzhenie, Russia’s arms export agency. The T-90 would be made artificially attractive by pricing it just marginally higher than the T-72. To bring down the T-90’s ticket price, it was ordered without key systems; the Army planned to procure those through supplementary contracts once the T-90 entered service. Knowing well that

DSI

COST OF REFURBISHING ONE T-72 New 1,000 horsepower engine

Rs 3 crore

Thermal Imagining Fire Control System

Rs 1.4 crore

Commander’s Thermal Imaging Sight

Rs 0.4 crore

Auxillary Generator

Rs 0.16 crore

TOTAL

Rs 5 crore

on November 30, 2006, when the MoD stated in writing that the assembled-inIndia T-90s cost Rs 12 crore apiece.

But there were bigger issues than cost.

In 2002, with the Indian Army poised for battle against Pakistan, it was discovered that the initial batch of 310 T-90s was not battle worthy. Their thermal imaging (TI) sights, through which the tank aims its 125 mm gun, was unable to withstand Indian summer temperatures. And the INVAR missiles that were assembled in India simply didn’t work. Since nobody knew why, they were sent back to Russia.

Even more alarmingly, the Army discovered that the T-90s were unable to fire Indian tank ammunition. So, even as a panicked MoD appealed to the DRDO and other research institutions, to reorient the T-90’s fire control computer for firing Indian ammunition, Russia was rewarded with an urgent order for large quantities of Russian ammunition.

To this day, none of the supplementary contracts have gone through. With the TI sights still a problem, the Army has decided to fit each T-90 with an Environment Control System, to cool the

DEFENDER® Armor Safeguards against Lethal Threats Ceradyne DEFENDER® armor protects warfighters against the most dangerous ballistic threats. With vertically integrated manufacturing, state-of-the-art materials and progressive engineering, Ceradyne has been the leader in advanced lifesaving technology for more than forty years.

- Rugged lightweight individual combatant protection - Vehicle crew survivability armor application - Lightweight aircraft armor protection systems - Custom vehicle armor defense systems - Naval vessel modular composite armor

Defending Warfighters around the World

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India Telefax: 011-26493333 Email: rmohan19@hotmail.com www.ceradyne.com

Untitled-2 1

4/7/10 4:04:25 PM

Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 5:24 PM Page 5

APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES

AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

Pakistan bases its anti-tank defences largely on missiles (e.g. the TOW II antitank guided missile), India bought the T-90 without the Shtora active protection system, which protects the T-90 from incoming enemy missiles.

Other important systems were also pared down. The MoD opted to buy reduced numbers of the INVAR missile, which the T-90 fires. Maintenance vehicles, which are vital to keep the T-90s running, were not included in the contract. All this allowed the government to declare before Parliament that the Russian T-90s cost just Rs 11 crore apiece. The cost of the T-72 was then about Rs 9 crore each.

In fact, the first batch of ten built-inIndia T-90s, which only rolled out of HVF Avadi last August, nine long years after the tank was bought, actually cost India’s exchequer a whopping Rs 17.5 crore. Parliament has not yet been informed about the 50 per cent rise in cost. The Lok Sabha’s last update was

the MoD’s failure to manage 72 tank commanders. Each (Left) Major General its overhaul schedule: some TI sight costs Rs 0.4 crore.

H.M. Singh, considered 800 T-72s are years overdue l An Auxillary Power Unit the ‘Father of the Arjun for overhaul. Originally, each (APU) to generate power Tank’, and (right) T-72 was to be overhauled for the tank’s electrical Defence Minister A.K. twice during its service life of systems. Each APU will cost Antony with officials on 32 years. But as the overhaul Rs 0.16 crore. a Arjun Tank at the agencies––the Heavy The Rs 5 crore cost of Combat Vehicles R&D Vehicles Factory (HVF) at upgrading each T-72 will Establishment in Avadi Avadi, near Chennai and 505 ramp up the cost of each near Chennai Army Base Workshop, tank to Rs 14 crore, demolishing the argument that the T-72 is Delhi––failed to meet their overhaul value-for-money. In contrast, a brand new targets of 70 and 50 tanks respectively, the Arjun, with a 1,500 HP engine, state-of- Army decided that one overhaul was good the-art integrated electronics and the enough. And with even that schedule not indigenous, widely praised Kanchan being implemented, a desperate MoD has armour, is just marginally more expensive now approached Indian industry to take up the slack in overhauling the T-72 fleet. at Rs 16.8 crore.

Despite the poor condition of India’s “It is a folly to stick with Russian tanks despite having developed the Arjun and T-72 fleet, it was to remain a frontline the design capability to continuously tank for another two decades, because improve it,” says Lt Gen Ajai Singh, who the indigenous production of the T-90 headed the Army’s Directorate of Combat has fallen far behind schedule. Only last Vehicles before becoming Governor of year, a full nine years after the T-90 was Assam. “India can tailor the Arjun to its bought, were the first built-in-India T-90s specific requirements and continuously rolled out of HVF, Avadi. And the Army upgrade the tank to keep it state-of- was refusing to order and induct the Arjun in larger numbers to replace this the-art. Why upgrade old T-72s?”

The T-72’s drawbacks are magnified by white elephant.

16

Serial Failures The T-90s less-than-spectacular performance against the Arjun should not have come as a surprise, considering the serial failures that have plagued this tank since its induction into service in 2002.

From the start, the T-90’s reality has fallen short of expectation. In 1999, the Army decided to push through the purchase of the T-90s from Russia despite vocal opposition from Parliament. Former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda argued that fitting the T72 with modern fire control systems and night vision devices would be cheaper than buying the T-90. Deve Gowda correctly pointed out that even Russia’s Army had spurned the T-90.

To bypass Deve Gowda’s opposition, the MoD and the Army reached an understanding with Rosvoorouzhenie, Russia’s arms export agency. The T-90 would be made artificially attractive by pricing it just marginally higher than the T-72. To bring down the T-90’s ticket price, it was ordered without key systems; the Army planned to procure those through supplementary contracts once the T-90 entered service. Knowing well that

DSI

COST OF REFURBISHING ONE T-72 New 1,000 horsepower engine

Rs 3 crore

Thermal Imagining Fire Control System

Rs 1.4 crore

Commander’s Thermal Imaging Sight

Rs 0.4 crore

Auxillary Generator

Rs 0.16 crore

TOTAL

Rs 5 crore

on November 30, 2006, when the MoD stated in writing that the assembled-inIndia T-90s cost Rs 12 crore apiece.

But there were bigger issues than cost.

In 2002, with the Indian Army poised for battle against Pakistan, it was discovered that the initial batch of 310 T-90s was not battle worthy. Their thermal imaging (TI) sights, through which the tank aims its 125 mm gun, was unable to withstand Indian summer temperatures. And the INVAR missiles that were assembled in India simply didn’t work. Since nobody knew why, they were sent back to Russia.

Even more alarmingly, the Army discovered that the T-90s were unable to fire Indian tank ammunition. So, even as a panicked MoD appealed to the DRDO and other research institutions, to reorient the T-90’s fire control computer for firing Indian ammunition, Russia was rewarded with an urgent order for large quantities of Russian ammunition.

To this day, none of the supplementary contracts have gone through. With the TI sights still a problem, the Army has decided to fit each T-90 with an Environment Control System, to cool the

DEFENDER® Armor Safeguards against Lethal Threats Ceradyne DEFENDER® armor protects warfighters against the most dangerous ballistic threats. With vertically integrated manufacturing, state-of-the-art materials and progressive engineering, Ceradyne has been the leader in advanced lifesaving technology for more than forty years.

- Rugged lightweight individual combatant protection - Vehicle crew survivability armor application - Lightweight aircraft armor protection systems - Custom vehicle armor defense systems - Naval vessel modular composite armor

Defending Warfighters around the World

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India Telefax: 011-26493333 Email: rmohan19@hotmail.com www.ceradyne.com

Untitled-2 1

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Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:09 PM Page 7

APRIL 2010

ARMOURED VEHICLES

DSI

The Rs 5 crore cost of upgrading eachT-72 will ramp up the cost of each tank to Rs 14 crore, demolishing the argument that theT-72 is value-formoney. In contrast, a brand new Arjun, with a 1,500 HP engine, state-of-the-art integrated electronics and the indigenous Kanchan armour can be had for Rs 16.8 crore.

”

delicate electronics with a stream of chilled air. None of the world’s current tanks, other than France’s LeClerc, has such a system. The American Abrams and the British Challenger tanks fought in the Iraq desert without air-conditioning. India’s Arjun tank, too, has “hardened” electronics that function perfectly even in the Rajasthan summer.

Nor has the MoD managed to procure the Shtora anti-missile system. The DGMF now plans to equip India’s 1,657 T-90s with the advanced ARENA active protection system, for which it has budgeted Rs 2,500 crore in the Army Acquisition Plan for 2009-11.

Even greater concern arose when Russia held back the transfer of the technology contracted for building 1,000 T-90s in India. Instead of pressuring Moscow, the MoD rewarded it in 2007 with a contract for 347 more T-90s. In a breathtaking Catch 22-like situation, the MoD argued that the additional purchase was needed because indigenous production had not begun.

The billion-dollar question around the Arjun now is: how many more Arjuns will the Army order? The answer to this will hinge largely upon what role the Army assigns to the tank.

Despite the recent trials, which aimed at answering that question, it remains

unclear how the Army will DGMF plans to equip the Arjun. Another problem derive an answer. Says Major India’s 1,657 T-90s with is the Arjun’s high fuel General H.M. Singh, who the advanced ARENA consumption: it moves just oversaw the Arjun’s active protection system 180 km on a full load of fuel, development for decades, “If compared with the T-90’s they were evaluating where the Arjun 230 km. This appetite for diesel would should be deployed, they should have increase the burden on the strike corps’ conducted the trials in different types of logistics, especially when resupplying terrain: desert, semi-desert, plains and the Arjuns when they are deep inside riverine. It seems as if the Army has enemy territory. already decided to employ the Arjun in For the Indian Army’s generals, the the desert.”

Arjun’s success has come as a shock; but they are also realising that this is an Arjun’s Future additional stream of tanks for replacing Another question that is crucial to the the dangerously outdated T-72s. There Arjun’s future is: with its proven are already divergent opinions about mobility, firepower and armour how many more Arjuns to order: protection, should the Arjun not be ranging from an additional order of 124 cleared for equipping at least one of the Arjuns to as many as 500, followed by Army’s three strike corps? These several hundred more of the improved formations perform a tank’s most Arjun Mark II, which can be expected by devastating role: attacking deep into 2015-2016 if the DRDO allocates funding enemy territory during war. Each strike right away. corps has eight-nine tank regiments. If The Arjun assembly line at the HVF in the Army recommends the Arjun for a Avadi––set up at a cost of Rs 50 crore, and strike role, that would mean an capable of building 50 Arjuns per year–– additional order of about 500 Arjuns. will finish delivery of the current order of But the Army still has reservations 124 Arjuns this year. In order to cater for about inducting the Arjun into the strike additional orders of the Arjun, the corps. One reason for that is the Arjun’s Ordnance Factory Board (under which incompatibility with other strike corps HVF Avadi operates) could begin work equipment, for instance assault bridges right away to double the capacity of the that cannot bear the 60-tonne weight of Arjun line.

18

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4/7/10 3:57:26 PM

Asymmentrical Warfare.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:10 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

SECURITY

HOLISTIC RESPONSES

DSI

VIJAY OBEROI

With the nature of war changing rapidly, asymmetric threats which include low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare and terrorism need to be dealt with A commemorative ceremony held at the Air Force Station in New Delhi on April 7 for the slain Central Reserve Police Force servicemen. The policemen were killed in a brutal attack by Maoist rebels in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh

KEY POINTS Asymmetrical warfare is the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technologies by a weaker State which avoids the strengths and exploits the potential vulnerabilities of a larger and technologically superior opponent. n A separate unit force called the Internal Security Force of the Army should be created to fight external insurgencies, terrorism and proxy wars. n

I

n recent years, some rogue States as well as independent non-State actors have found that insurgency and terrorism are a cheaper and effective way of covertly fighting a strong State. In broad terms, such actions fall under the rubric of asymmetrical warfare. Such actions have had successes, but where ever strong counter-measures have been taken, the gains have only been marginal.

Although some analysts refer to asymmetrical warfare as Fourth Generation Warfare, others disagree. They are of the view that while asymmetrical war does confer certain advantages to a weaker adversary, it cannot be called a generational shift in warfare. Notwithstanding the semantics, there is no doubt that countries, especially democratic nations, now have to contend with asymmetrical wars or conflicts. 
Â

AFP

Understanding Asymmetric Warfare

20

21

Asymmetrical warfare is the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technologies by a weaker State or a sub-State adversary, who avoid the strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of a larger and technologically superior opponent. This definition has two distinct aspects. Firstly, a war between two States and secondly, a State fighting non-State actors.

Historically, when asymmetric methods

Asymmentrical Warfare.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:10 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

SECURITY

HOLISTIC RESPONSES

DSI

VIJAY OBEROI

With the nature of war changing rapidly, asymmetric threats which include low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare and terrorism need to be dealt with A commemorative ceremony held at the Air Force Station in New Delhi on April 7 for the slain Central Reserve Police Force servicemen. The policemen were killed in a brutal attack by Maoist rebels in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh

KEY POINTS Asymmetrical warfare is the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technologies by a weaker State which avoids the strengths and exploits the potential vulnerabilities of a larger and technologically superior opponent. n A separate unit force called the Internal Security Force of the Army should be created to fight external insurgencies, terrorism and proxy wars. n

I

n recent years, some rogue States as well as independent non-State actors have found that insurgency and terrorism are a cheaper and effective way of covertly fighting a strong State. In broad terms, such actions fall under the rubric of asymmetrical warfare. Such actions have had successes, but where ever strong counter-measures have been taken, the gains have only been marginal.

Although some analysts refer to asymmetrical warfare as Fourth Generation Warfare, others disagree. They are of the view that while asymmetrical war does confer certain advantages to a weaker adversary, it cannot be called a generational shift in warfare. Notwithstanding the semantics, there is no doubt that countries, especially democratic nations, now have to contend with asymmetrical wars or conflicts. 
Â

AFP

Understanding Asymmetric Warfare

20

21

Asymmetrical warfare is the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technologies by a weaker State or a sub-State adversary, who avoid the strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of a larger and technologically superior opponent. This definition has two distinct aspects. Firstly, a war between two States and secondly, a State fighting non-State actors.

Historically, when asymmetric methods

Asymmentrical Warfare.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:11 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

SECURITY

DSI

The Indian Army is paying a heavy price for its large-scale commitments to its secondary role. Besides the adverse effect on the combat potential of the Army: deployment over long periods tends to alienate the populace and tarnishes the image of the Army.

”

Rapid globalisation and the explosion of Information Technology have made the world highly inter-dependent and interconnected. This has helped the growth of groups propelled by ideological communication, religion, tribal affinities, zealotry and illegal economic activities.

The result has been economic, political or security-related instability. Security forces have to now deal with both traditional missions of deterrence and war fighting, as well as non-traditional missions like proxy war and terrorism.

Asymmetric threats now cover a vast canvas of high grade criminal actions, low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare, terrorism and even nuclear blackmail.

The nature of war is also changing rapidly. Political, economic and military dimensions of security are merging. Stateto-state wars appear to be increasingly supplemented by new forms of sub-State and trans-State conflicts. The earlier

distinctions between internal and external security and between national and societal security are fast eroding. There is no clear separation of peace and war either, as both seem to have merged.

Fighting in the future may be conducted at several levels at once. Clear distinctions between conventional and unconventional conflicts are also fading. Traditional lines of authority between military control and political responsibility have already become blurred. In the past, political control was mainly a factor at the strategic level, where statecraft was required to guide the military instrument. In future, political oversight may pervade at all levels of war.

Likely Future Threats

AFP

Changing Nature of War

AFP

were used in wars fought by two States, they had a dramatic effect on the conduct of war. Recent history also has many examples of States fighting non-State adversaries. Prominent examples of this are the Mujahideen defeating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the Indian Army successfully fighting the Pakistani sponsored insurgents and terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir for the last two decades.

Paramilitary soldiers patrol during Operation Green Hunt near the jungles of Lathehar, some 188km from Ranchi in March 2010

22

In the foreseeable future, along with conventional conflicts, terrorism and internal insurgencies will continue to be serious threats, attracting external terrorists and insurgents. Unless our neighbours cooperate, terrorist organisations will get safe havens for their sustenance and activities. Suicide terrorism, which gives maximum publicity to the insurgents, will continue as publicity is the real ‘oxygen’

The owners of States resorting to terrorism take which terrorists seek at all times. into account the price they will be The threat of terrorists’ using German Bakery chemical and biological weapons visit the site after required to pay for their activities, in exchange for the benefits is low but the threat of nuclear it was destroyed gained for attaining their policy terrorism needs to be factored in. It by a fatal bomb is important to understand that blast in February, goals. Usually, such States calibrate the extent to which their the political and psychological in Pune activities will ultimately promote consequences of even limited attacks will be enormous and hence we their goals, so that the country’s basic have to be wary and be prepared to meet interests are not endangered.

The action taken against States engaged such threats.

In recent years, terrorism has also almost in terrorism must be clear, explicit, and become the preferred tool of States. The high consistent. The way to deter a State from costs of modern warfare, concerns about engaging in terrorism or supporting terrorist non-conventional escalation and the organisations is to unambiguously show that unwillingness to appear as the aggressor, the price for these activities will be higher have turned terrorism into an efficient, than the benefits of sponsoring terrorism. convenient and generally discreet weapon India has displayed a lack of will in doing so for attaining State interests in the explicitly and therefore we continue to be the target of terrorist actions. international realm.

In our country, we have to deal with both States are involved in terrorism in a number of ways, from various levels of internal and external insurgencies and general assistance, operational aid, to terrorism. External terrorism is of two initiating and directing a terrorist categories—that which is actively supported organisation’s activities and even direct by an inimical State (proxy war) and that attacks perpetrated by official State agencies. launched independently by non-State actors.

Democratic governments and societies The most widely accepted strategy for coping with terrorism is deterrence. Most attempting to respond to internal terrorism

23

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APRIL 2010

SECURITY

DSI

The Indian Army is paying a heavy price for its large-scale commitments to its secondary role. Besides the adverse effect on the combat potential of the Army: deployment over long periods tends to alienate the populace and tarnishes the image of the Army.

”

Rapid globalisation and the explosion of Information Technology have made the world highly inter-dependent and interconnected. This has helped the growth of groups propelled by ideological communication, religion, tribal affinities, zealotry and illegal economic activities.

The result has been economic, political or security-related instability. Security forces have to now deal with both traditional missions of deterrence and war fighting, as well as non-traditional missions like proxy war and terrorism.

Asymmetric threats now cover a vast canvas of high grade criminal actions, low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare, terrorism and even nuclear blackmail.

The nature of war is also changing rapidly. Political, economic and military dimensions of security are merging. Stateto-state wars appear to be increasingly supplemented by new forms of sub-State and trans-State conflicts. The earlier

distinctions between internal and external security and between national and societal security are fast eroding. There is no clear separation of peace and war either, as both seem to have merged.

Fighting in the future may be conducted at several levels at once. Clear distinctions between conventional and unconventional conflicts are also fading. Traditional lines of authority between military control and political responsibility have already become blurred. In the past, political control was mainly a factor at the strategic level, where statecraft was required to guide the military instrument. In future, political oversight may pervade at all levels of war.

Likely Future Threats

AFP

Changing Nature of War

AFP

were used in wars fought by two States, they had a dramatic effect on the conduct of war. Recent history also has many examples of States fighting non-State adversaries. Prominent examples of this are the Mujahideen defeating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the Indian Army successfully fighting the Pakistani sponsored insurgents and terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir for the last two decades.

Paramilitary soldiers patrol during Operation Green Hunt near the jungles of Lathehar, some 188km from Ranchi in March 2010

22

In the foreseeable future, along with conventional conflicts, terrorism and internal insurgencies will continue to be serious threats, attracting external terrorists and insurgents. Unless our neighbours cooperate, terrorist organisations will get safe havens for their sustenance and activities. Suicide terrorism, which gives maximum publicity to the insurgents, will continue as publicity is the real ‘oxygen’

The owners of States resorting to terrorism take which terrorists seek at all times. into account the price they will be The threat of terrorists’ using German Bakery chemical and biological weapons visit the site after required to pay for their activities, in exchange for the benefits is low but the threat of nuclear it was destroyed gained for attaining their policy terrorism needs to be factored in. It by a fatal bomb is important to understand that blast in February, goals. Usually, such States calibrate the extent to which their the political and psychological in Pune activities will ultimately promote consequences of even limited attacks will be enormous and hence we their goals, so that the country’s basic have to be wary and be prepared to meet interests are not endangered.

The action taken against States engaged such threats.

In recent years, terrorism has also almost in terrorism must be clear, explicit, and become the preferred tool of States. The high consistent. The way to deter a State from costs of modern warfare, concerns about engaging in terrorism or supporting terrorist non-conventional escalation and the organisations is to unambiguously show that unwillingness to appear as the aggressor, the price for these activities will be higher have turned terrorism into an efficient, than the benefits of sponsoring terrorism. convenient and generally discreet weapon India has displayed a lack of will in doing so for attaining State interests in the explicitly and therefore we continue to be the target of terrorist actions. international realm.

In our country, we have to deal with both States are involved in terrorism in a number of ways, from various levels of internal and external insurgencies and general assistance, operational aid, to terrorism. External terrorism is of two initiating and directing a terrorist categories—that which is actively supported organisation’s activities and even direct by an inimical State (proxy war) and that attacks perpetrated by official State agencies. launched independently by non-State actors.

Democratic governments and societies The most widely accepted strategy for coping with terrorism is deterrence. Most attempting to respond to internal terrorism

23

Asymmentrical Warfare.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:12 PM Page 5

APRIL 2010

DSI

AFP

SECURITY

In order to ensure that the Army deals with proxy wars and external terrorism and still retains its capabilities for its primary task, we need to create a separate force within the Army, which could be named Internal Security Force of the Army or ISFA.

face a number of dilemmas. If they commit the might of the military, it is likely to reflect adversely on their democratic credentials.

There are also the inevitable dangers of military overreaction, as well as the fear that once the police and the public become used to the deployment of troops, it becomes politically difficult for the government to withdraw them.

In a democratic State, the instrument of choice for tackling internal terrorism is the civil police, assisted by units of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) like the

”

AFP

Central Reserve Police Force soldiers carry an injured civilian after shooting by suspected militants in Srinagar in March. (Right) Director General of Police for Hyderabad R. R. Girish Kumar inspects confiscated grenades recovered from Naxalites at a press conference held in March

Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Central Industry Security Force. The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, a close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of intelligence, means of acquiring fresh intelligence as well as close familiarity with the law and expertise in techniques of criminal investigation.

Although there has been an exponential growth of many types of police forces in our country, they are still incapable or

24

unwilling, or both, to tackle insurgencies.

The Government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the police, including the CPOs.

Roles of the Army In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackle internal insurgency situations. The roles of the Army are quite clear: the primary role is to fight external aggression and its secondary role is providing assistance to civil authorities. The caveat here is that the

secondary role must never dilute the ability of the Army to perform its primary role. In situations where the employment of troops becomes essential, they should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

The Indian Army is paying a heavy price for its large-scale commitments to its secondary role. Besides there is an adverse effect on the combat potential of the Army: deployment over long periods tends to alienate the populace and tarnishes the image of the Army. Therefore, over-exposure

of the Army in internal security duties is counter-productive, especially when the employment is for prolonged periods.

With regards to proxy wars and other externally sponsored high grade insurgencies, the Indian Army is the only instrument with the government that can handle them with professional competence.

However, this will result in lowering the war fighting capabilities of the Army, as is happening now. This is unacceptable since this reduces substantially the deterrent capability of the Army that is essential to

25

impose caution on our potential enemies.

In order to ensure that the Army deals with proxy wars and external terrorism and still retains its capabilities for its primary task, a separate force–called the Internal Security Force of the Army or ISFA–within the Army needs to be created to fight external insurgencies, terrorism and proxy wars. This will result in the Army still being the lead force in tackling external insurgencies and proxy wars but at the same time there will be no dilution of the combat potential and the conventional capability of the regular Army. The existing Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles already provide the kernel for raising such a force, which needs to be an integral part of the Army.

Asymmetric threats have become important in recent years. Their contours need to be fully understood, so that we can tackle them with confidence. In India, we face both the internal and external dimensions of such threats. For internal threats, we need the synergy of good governance, socio-economic development and security operations carried out largely by the police.

The external asymmetric threats, as manifested by proxy wars or independent actions by non-State groups are more serious. These need to be tackled with the Army playing the leading role. As the primary role of the Army must never get diluted, we need to restructure and form ISFA, an effective unit within the Army, for tackling external insurgents and terrorists and in dealing with proxy wars.

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DSI

AFP

SECURITY

In order to ensure that the Army deals with proxy wars and external terrorism and still retains its capabilities for its primary task, we need to create a separate force within the Army, which could be named Internal Security Force of the Army or ISFA.

face a number of dilemmas. If they commit the might of the military, it is likely to reflect adversely on their democratic credentials.

There are also the inevitable dangers of military overreaction, as well as the fear that once the police and the public become used to the deployment of troops, it becomes politically difficult for the government to withdraw them.

In a democratic State, the instrument of choice for tackling internal terrorism is the civil police, assisted by units of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) like the

”

AFP

Central Reserve Police Force soldiers carry an injured civilian after shooting by suspected militants in Srinagar in March. (Right) Director General of Police for Hyderabad R. R. Girish Kumar inspects confiscated grenades recovered from Naxalites at a press conference held in March

Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Central Industry Security Force. The police have enormous advantages over the military. They have legitimacy, a close knowledge of local conditions, an extensive bank of intelligence, means of acquiring fresh intelligence as well as close familiarity with the law and expertise in techniques of criminal investigation.

Although there has been an exponential growth of many types of police forces in our country, they are still incapable or

24

unwilling, or both, to tackle insurgencies.

The Government must take early and active measures to enhance the capabilities of the police, including the CPOs.

Roles of the Army In principle, the Army should not be committed to tackle internal insurgency situations. The roles of the Army are quite clear: the primary role is to fight external aggression and its secondary role is providing assistance to civil authorities. The caveat here is that the

secondary role must never dilute the ability of the Army to perform its primary role. In situations where the employment of troops becomes essential, they should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

The Indian Army is paying a heavy price for its large-scale commitments to its secondary role. Besides there is an adverse effect on the combat potential of the Army: deployment over long periods tends to alienate the populace and tarnishes the image of the Army. Therefore, over-exposure

of the Army in internal security duties is counter-productive, especially when the employment is for prolonged periods.

With regards to proxy wars and other externally sponsored high grade insurgencies, the Indian Army is the only instrument with the government that can handle them with professional competence.

However, this will result in lowering the war fighting capabilities of the Army, as is happening now. This is unacceptable since this reduces substantially the deterrent capability of the Army that is essential to

25

impose caution on our potential enemies.

In order to ensure that the Army deals with proxy wars and external terrorism and still retains its capabilities for its primary task, a separate force–called the Internal Security Force of the Army or ISFA–within the Army needs to be created to fight external insurgencies, terrorism and proxy wars. This will result in the Army still being the lead force in tackling external insurgencies and proxy wars but at the same time there will be no dilution of the combat potential and the conventional capability of the regular Army. The existing Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles already provide the kernel for raising such a force, which needs to be an integral part of the Army.

Asymmetric threats have become important in recent years. Their contours need to be fully understood, so that we can tackle them with confidence. In India, we face both the internal and external dimensions of such threats. For internal threats, we need the synergy of good governance, socio-economic development and security operations carried out largely by the police.

The external asymmetric threats, as manifested by proxy wars or independent actions by non-State groups are more serious. These need to be tackled with the Army playing the leading role. As the primary role of the Army must never get diluted, we need to restructure and form ISFA, an effective unit within the Army, for tackling external insurgents and terrorists and in dealing with proxy wars.

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APRIL 2010

HELICOPTER

DSI

The Mi17 aircraft fly in formation at the Air Force Day Parade

AIR POWER

ASSET

With some out-of-the-box thinking, a helicopter can be converted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice KEY POINTS Heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations will become an immensely potent instrument of aerospace, military and national power. n The mission must be to evolve the helicopter into a stand-alone, multifunction, combat system, capable of being flexibly tasked and integrated into overall military operations. n

FALI H. MAJOR

26

I

ndia’s regional security environment continues to remain unstable and prone to violent manifestations. But then, violence has not been new to us and we have had to deal with it, almost continuously since Independence.

However, in the past couple of decades, there have been some subtle changes in the security environment of our region and specifically in the Indian Subcontinent. These shifts dictate that the future shape, structure and weapons profile of the Indian armed forces will undergo some changes, especially in the Indian Air Force (IAF). Heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations will become an immensely potent instrument of aerospace, military and national power.

There are many reasons as to why the combat assets of the armed forces will undergo a weapons profile change which include the need to enhance their rotary wing assets. Firstly, all military action in our neighbourhood will take place under the shadow of a proclaimed nuclear weapon capability, rendering the likely scenario of a full scale hot-war in the Indian Subcontinent somewhat remote.

Secondly, the operating environment and battle-space for the armed forces will be

increasingly restricted because of collateral damage growing media activism, legalities and international pressure.

Thirdly, perhaps nowhere in the world is the terrain so varied, hostile and unsettling, as it is in our likely conflict zones: formidable mountains, treacherous weather conditions, little or no access to population centres, very few or no roads and a not-so-friendly border population.

And last, but not the least, there is the increased relevance and therefore requirement of an urban-warfare capability in the existing sub-conventional and lowintensity conflict zones, given our recent experiences of addressing conflict situations involving a combination of State and nonState actors.

These fundamental factors will shape the conduct of future conflicts and the pursuit of combat air operations in our region.

Versatile Helicopters The versatile helicopter will thus become an inescapable combat asset in this scenario. A ubiquitous and multifaceted machine, the helicopter has become a very visible face of modern military aviation— not just a ‘force multiplier’ but a standalone weapon system. Its presence is now

taken so much for granted that whenever and wherever something goes wrong, people expect to see a helicopter hovering above them. Be it a natural calamity, search and rescue or a conflict situation, the first question that comes up is “Where is the helicopter”? In fact, in the remote regions of the Northeast, there was a time when people were more familiar with a helicopter than a bus or any other transport. The helicopter is now an omnipresent and an essential asset in every conflict situation.

It is, therefore, appropriate that military planners take a fresh look at its extended use, throw up some new ideas, lay out options and plan out a roadmap for the future exploitation of helicopters. In its relatively short span of existence, the helicopter has re-defined military maneuver and expanded commercial and civilian exploitation in a manner, previously thought unimaginable. Few inventions have changed transportation and military aviation as rapidly and

27

dramatically as the helicopter has.

The promise of modern technology the ever-changing nature of conflict and the level of public expectations, has created an environment which can transform the unique capabilities of rotary wing platforms and take them to another level.

The quest must be to evolve a helicopter into a stand-alone, multifunction combat system, capable of being flexibly tasked and integrated into overall military operations at all levels. What this means is that a helicopter must have the potential of directly influencing the conduct of operations and creating a favourable turn of events all by itself. It is such a capability, especially in view of the existing threats and likely scenarios that will enhance the potency and application of aerospace power.

Whilst we, as a nation, face threats from across the entire spectrum of conflict, recent trends indicate, that conflicts in the future and especially in our region, are likely to shift, more towards the subconventional levels. It is in such a scenario, that a helicopter will perhaps be the only option to deliver potent air power, depending on the situation. Therefore, helicopters will be increasingly called upon to surgically address conflict

Helicopter.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:12 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

HELICOPTER

DSI

The Mi17 aircraft fly in formation at the Air Force Day Parade

AIR POWER

ASSET

With some out-of-the-box thinking, a helicopter can be converted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice KEY POINTS Heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations will become an immensely potent instrument of aerospace, military and national power. n The mission must be to evolve the helicopter into a stand-alone, multifunction, combat system, capable of being flexibly tasked and integrated into overall military operations. n

FALI H. MAJOR

26

I

ndia’s regional security environment continues to remain unstable and prone to violent manifestations. But then, violence has not been new to us and we have had to deal with it, almost continuously since Independence.

However, in the past couple of decades, there have been some subtle changes in the security environment of our region and specifically in the Indian Subcontinent. These shifts dictate that the future shape, structure and weapons profile of the Indian armed forces will undergo some changes, especially in the Indian Air Force (IAF). Heli-borne combat, assault and heavy lift operations will become an immensely potent instrument of aerospace, military and national power.

There are many reasons as to why the combat assets of the armed forces will undergo a weapons profile change which include the need to enhance their rotary wing assets. Firstly, all military action in our neighbourhood will take place under the shadow of a proclaimed nuclear weapon capability, rendering the likely scenario of a full scale hot-war in the Indian Subcontinent somewhat remote.

Secondly, the operating environment and battle-space for the armed forces will be

increasingly restricted because of collateral damage growing media activism, legalities and international pressure.

Thirdly, perhaps nowhere in the world is the terrain so varied, hostile and unsettling, as it is in our likely conflict zones: formidable mountains, treacherous weather conditions, little or no access to population centres, very few or no roads and a not-so-friendly border population.

And last, but not the least, there is the increased relevance and therefore requirement of an urban-warfare capability in the existing sub-conventional and lowintensity conflict zones, given our recent experiences of addressing conflict situations involving a combination of State and nonState actors.

These fundamental factors will shape the conduct of future conflicts and the pursuit of combat air operations in our region.

Versatile Helicopters The versatile helicopter will thus become an inescapable combat asset in this scenario. A ubiquitous and multifaceted machine, the helicopter has become a very visible face of modern military aviation— not just a ‘force multiplier’ but a standalone weapon system. Its presence is now

taken so much for granted that whenever and wherever something goes wrong, people expect to see a helicopter hovering above them. Be it a natural calamity, search and rescue or a conflict situation, the first question that comes up is “Where is the helicopter”? In fact, in the remote regions of the Northeast, there was a time when people were more familiar with a helicopter than a bus or any other transport. The helicopter is now an omnipresent and an essential asset in every conflict situation.

It is, therefore, appropriate that military planners take a fresh look at its extended use, throw up some new ideas, lay out options and plan out a roadmap for the future exploitation of helicopters. In its relatively short span of existence, the helicopter has re-defined military maneuver and expanded commercial and civilian exploitation in a manner, previously thought unimaginable. Few inventions have changed transportation and military aviation as rapidly and

27

dramatically as the helicopter has.

The promise of modern technology the ever-changing nature of conflict and the level of public expectations, has created an environment which can transform the unique capabilities of rotary wing platforms and take them to another level.

The quest must be to evolve a helicopter into a stand-alone, multifunction combat system, capable of being flexibly tasked and integrated into overall military operations at all levels. What this means is that a helicopter must have the potential of directly influencing the conduct of operations and creating a favourable turn of events all by itself. It is such a capability, especially in view of the existing threats and likely scenarios that will enhance the potency and application of aerospace power.

Whilst we, as a nation, face threats from across the entire spectrum of conflict, recent trends indicate, that conflicts in the future and especially in our region, are likely to shift, more towards the subconventional levels. It is in such a scenario, that a helicopter will perhaps be the only option to deliver potent air power, depending on the situation. Therefore, helicopters will be increasingly called upon to surgically address conflict

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APRIL 2010

HELICOPTER A technician adjusts a model of a Advanced Light Helicopter on display at the India Aviation 2010 show in Hyderabad held in March

DSI

vulnerabilities but there must be a continuous effort to get around them.

There are three essential steps in this direction which the forces must take.

Firstly, create a thorough understanding of the helicopter operational potential and this will be the responsibility of all those involved in the conduct of combat helicopter operations.

Secondly, embed helicopter operational capability at various levels of strategic and tactical doctrine—in stand alone, joint operation scenarios and not simply as an add-on. There are no templates and models to follow—innovation will be the key.

And thirdly, the ability to marry the above mentioned factors to the promise of technology. A symbiotic relationship between the developments in technology and operational doctrine needs to be created, so that they drive and mutually complement each other concurrently.

Soldiers repair a tank on the battlefield using a Advanced Light Helicopter to drop spare parts during the Operation Desert Strike exercise at Pokhran

Helicopters will be increasingly called upon to surgically address conflict situations.This would present a completely new dimension to planners and tacticians.The speed of response, precise application of force and controlled destruction, will be the determining factors of combat efficiency.

”

28

system, centred around the helicopter.

Such a capability cannot develop in isolation. It will require a comprehensive impetus on a number of allied issues. The armed forces should be able to create higher utilisation rates for which they need to concentrate on maintenance-free components and an upgradeable engineering architecture. Helicopter flying has to become vibration-free, which is not only essential for comfort, but specifically for weapon delivery and sensor operations. Increased incorporation of flyby-wire controls, improved high altitude performance and better situational awareness are some areas that our R&D efforts need to concentrate on. The development of air-launched non-lethal weapons is another area for development, given the legalities and the repercussions of collateral damage.

Helicopters have emerged as supremely capable of adapting to just about any environment. They do have some

AFP

situations and this will present a completely new dimension to planners and tacticians alike. The speed of response, precise application of force and controlled destruction, will be the new factors determining combat efficiency.

With a bit of out-of-the- box thinking, a helicopter can be truly converted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice.

The armed forces need to visualise the kind of scenarios that are likely to develop in our Subcontinent and determine the kind of national response desired and the objectives to be achieved. They must then develop the necessary capability to provide a ‘heli-borne’ response—whether it is delivery of weapons, electronic warfare, surveillance, target acquisition or simple transportation of national power. Its potency and capability will be derived from the seamless combination and integration of assets, tactics, training and other complimentary capabilities. The aim should be to develop a composite combat

AFP

AFP

A Complex Machine

29

This is the challenge before all men and women in uniform and the need of the hour is for the emergence of thinkers, who can generate thought and vision to make helicopter combat operations a success story. The helicopter is an amazingly complex machine–difficult to make, fly and operate. There are many jokes and descriptions about the system that only serve to describe the complexity of helicopter operations.

But notwithstanding that, the helicopter is the only aerial vehicle that comes closest to fulfilling mankind’s ancient dreams of the Flying Horse and the Magic Carpet. From the bulky and unwieldy machines of yesteryears, they have evolved into sleek, elegant and extremely potent systems. Their potential is indeed tremendous and employment is only limited by the imagination of its commander and the ingenuity of the operators.

The good news is that today the IAF and indeed the other two services, are in the process of acquiring the most modern and potent rotary wing assets. No elaboration of rotary wing assets is necessary, as these are available for all to see in the public domain. What is important, however, is that the acquisition, induction and operationalisation of these assets will considerably augment the combat edge and effectiveness in responding to conflict situations by our armed forces.

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APRIL 2010

HELICOPTER A technician adjusts a model of a Advanced Light Helicopter on display at the India Aviation 2010 show in Hyderabad held in March

DSI

vulnerabilities but there must be a continuous effort to get around them.

There are three essential steps in this direction which the forces must take.

Firstly, create a thorough understanding of the helicopter operational potential and this will be the responsibility of all those involved in the conduct of combat helicopter operations.

Secondly, embed helicopter operational capability at various levels of strategic and tactical doctrine—in stand alone, joint operation scenarios and not simply as an add-on. There are no templates and models to follow—innovation will be the key.

And thirdly, the ability to marry the above mentioned factors to the promise of technology. A symbiotic relationship between the developments in technology and operational doctrine needs to be created, so that they drive and mutually complement each other concurrently.

Soldiers repair a tank on the battlefield using a Advanced Light Helicopter to drop spare parts during the Operation Desert Strike exercise at Pokhran

Helicopters will be increasingly called upon to surgically address conflict situations.This would present a completely new dimension to planners and tacticians.The speed of response, precise application of force and controlled destruction, will be the determining factors of combat efficiency.

”

28

system, centred around the helicopter.

Such a capability cannot develop in isolation. It will require a comprehensive impetus on a number of allied issues. The armed forces should be able to create higher utilisation rates for which they need to concentrate on maintenance-free components and an upgradeable engineering architecture. Helicopter flying has to become vibration-free, which is not only essential for comfort, but specifically for weapon delivery and sensor operations. Increased incorporation of flyby-wire controls, improved high altitude performance and better situational awareness are some areas that our R&D efforts need to concentrate on. The development of air-launched non-lethal weapons is another area for development, given the legalities and the repercussions of collateral damage.

Helicopters have emerged as supremely capable of adapting to just about any environment. They do have some

AFP

situations and this will present a completely new dimension to planners and tacticians alike. The speed of response, precise application of force and controlled destruction, will be the new factors determining combat efficiency.

With a bit of out-of-the- box thinking, a helicopter can be truly converted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice.

The armed forces need to visualise the kind of scenarios that are likely to develop in our Subcontinent and determine the kind of national response desired and the objectives to be achieved. They must then develop the necessary capability to provide a ‘heli-borne’ response—whether it is delivery of weapons, electronic warfare, surveillance, target acquisition or simple transportation of national power. Its potency and capability will be derived from the seamless combination and integration of assets, tactics, training and other complimentary capabilities. The aim should be to develop a composite combat

AFP

AFP

A Complex Machine

29

This is the challenge before all men and women in uniform and the need of the hour is for the emergence of thinkers, who can generate thought and vision to make helicopter combat operations a success story. The helicopter is an amazingly complex machine–difficult to make, fly and operate. There are many jokes and descriptions about the system that only serve to describe the complexity of helicopter operations.

But notwithstanding that, the helicopter is the only aerial vehicle that comes closest to fulfilling mankind’s ancient dreams of the Flying Horse and the Magic Carpet. From the bulky and unwieldy machines of yesteryears, they have evolved into sleek, elegant and extremely potent systems. Their potential is indeed tremendous and employment is only limited by the imagination of its commander and the ingenuity of the operators.

The good news is that today the IAF and indeed the other two services, are in the process of acquiring the most modern and potent rotary wing assets. No elaboration of rotary wing assets is necessary, as these are available for all to see in the public domain. What is important, however, is that the acquisition, induction and operationalisation of these assets will considerably augment the combat edge and effectiveness in responding to conflict situations by our armed forces.

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APRIL 2010

INSURGENCY

B.G. VERGHESE

INDIAN EXPRESS /SUBHAMOY BHATTACHARJEE

T

Thuingaleng Muivah, General Secretary of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-IM, at the 30th Republic Day celebration of the Government of the People’s Republic of ‘Nagalim’ at the outfit’s headquarters at Hebron camp in Nagaland in March

THE NAGA SAGA There are very real possibilities of peace for one of the world’s oldest insurgencies

30

KEY POINTS The Naga insurgency seems poised for a peaceful resolution with talks between the government and the Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered a decisive phase. n A sticking point is NSCN-IM’s demand to integrate all administrative units inhabited by the Naga people across Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim.’ n There could be tough bargaining ahead for which a Naga consensus will be absolutely essential. n

he Northeast has long been in a state of turmoil. One of the most enduring and intractable issues that has dogged peace has been the ongoing Naga imbroglio that, in a sense, predates Independence. This saw a sharpening of differences with the transfer of power and finally manifested itself in insurgency in 1954. That conflict fortunately seems poised for a peaceful resolution with the talks between the government and the Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered what is hopefully a final phase.

Though there are other Naga factions, the NSCN-Khaplang group and two splinters of the Naga National Council, originally established by the then acknowledged Naga leader, A.Z. Phizo, the NSCN–IM is dominant. It is the kingpin of the turbulence in the entire region, though the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), certain armed Metei Manipuri groups and smaller ethnic formations of Bodos, Kukis, Dimasas and Tripura tribals remain in the field. While some of these armed entities are by no means inconsequential, any agreement with the NSCN-IM is likely to exercise a profound influence on other warring groups and sap their capabilities and ardour.

A major rebel group that resorted to arms but then negotiated a peaceful settlement is the Mizo National Front. It subsequently assumed the reins of power through elections thus clearly indicating that there is a viable democratic alternative to the gun.

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence movement and not secessionist. The argument is that they lost their freedom to the British—as did India— and that the colonial power ruled both from Delhi as a matter of convenience, even as they fragmented the Naga peoples by placing them under different administrative jurisdictions within India and Burma, which was administratively part of India until 1937.

Hence, when the British departed in 1947, both India and the Naga people became independent. Indeed, Naga representatives stated the proposition openly and declared Naga independence a day before India regained its freedom.

31

DSI

Yet, when some British administrators and constitutionalists proposed that the Northeast tribal belt and adjacent tribal areas in then Burma be declared a Crown Colony when India became Independent, the Nagas and Mizos dissented. They opted to cast their lot with India and negotiate a settlement, no doubt aware of their landlocked situation and the obvious advantages of being with a large and powerful State that could better ensure their development and security. Thus was a nine-point agreement signed by Phizo with Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assam in 1947, which provided for a review after ten years. There were subsequent differences of interpretation, with the Nagas reading it as a right to assert their independence while the Indian State saw this as no more than implying renegotiating the terms of association within India.

The NNC and other modernising Naga elites negotiated two agreements with the Government of India. The first, in 1960, led to the formation of the State of Nagaland, with special provisions for autonomy incorporated in a new Article 371 A. The Shillong Accord followed in 1975. The underground agreed “of their own volition” unconditionally to accept the Indian Constitution and were given “reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement”. The accord and Phizo’s leadership was denounced by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Swu while on a “goodwill visit” to China. The NSCN subsequently split into the IM and K groups and the insurgency intensified. After many vicissitudes, a ceasefire was finally brokered between the NSCN-IM and the Government in 1996, later extended to the K faction as well and a dialogue got under way.

Thirteen Years of Groundwork The many rounds of talks between the Government of India’s interlocutor, K. Padmanabhiah and the NSCN, led by Muivah and Swu, over the past 13 years patiently laid the groundwork for a better understanding of the two rival points of view. Initial talks were aimed at reviewing the observance of the ceasefire and resolving complaints of violations. With growing trust and confidence, substantive issues came to the fore leading the Government to declare that it accepted the “unique history” of the Nagas. This constituted something of an emotional breakthrough and resulted in an enhanced rapport. The talks were continued through the NDA and UPA regimes with

Nagaland.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:14 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

INSURGENCY

B.G. VERGHESE

INDIAN EXPRESS /SUBHAMOY BHATTACHARJEE

T

Thuingaleng Muivah, General Secretary of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-IM, at the 30th Republic Day celebration of the Government of the People’s Republic of ‘Nagalim’ at the outfit’s headquarters at Hebron camp in Nagaland in March

THE NAGA SAGA There are very real possibilities of peace for one of the world’s oldest insurgencies

30

KEY POINTS The Naga insurgency seems poised for a peaceful resolution with talks between the government and the Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered a decisive phase. n A sticking point is NSCN-IM’s demand to integrate all administrative units inhabited by the Naga people across Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim.’ n There could be tough bargaining ahead for which a Naga consensus will be absolutely essential. n

he Northeast has long been in a state of turmoil. One of the most enduring and intractable issues that has dogged peace has been the ongoing Naga imbroglio that, in a sense, predates Independence. This saw a sharpening of differences with the transfer of power and finally manifested itself in insurgency in 1954. That conflict fortunately seems poised for a peaceful resolution with the talks between the government and the Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered what is hopefully a final phase.

Though there are other Naga factions, the NSCN-Khaplang group and two splinters of the Naga National Council, originally established by the then acknowledged Naga leader, A.Z. Phizo, the NSCN–IM is dominant. It is the kingpin of the turbulence in the entire region, though the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), certain armed Metei Manipuri groups and smaller ethnic formations of Bodos, Kukis, Dimasas and Tripura tribals remain in the field. While some of these armed entities are by no means inconsequential, any agreement with the NSCN-IM is likely to exercise a profound influence on other warring groups and sap their capabilities and ardour.

A major rebel group that resorted to arms but then negotiated a peaceful settlement is the Mizo National Front. It subsequently assumed the reins of power through elections thus clearly indicating that there is a viable democratic alternative to the gun.

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence movement and not secessionist. The argument is that they lost their freedom to the British—as did India— and that the colonial power ruled both from Delhi as a matter of convenience, even as they fragmented the Naga peoples by placing them under different administrative jurisdictions within India and Burma, which was administratively part of India until 1937.

Hence, when the British departed in 1947, both India and the Naga people became independent. Indeed, Naga representatives stated the proposition openly and declared Naga independence a day before India regained its freedom.

31

DSI

Yet, when some British administrators and constitutionalists proposed that the Northeast tribal belt and adjacent tribal areas in then Burma be declared a Crown Colony when India became Independent, the Nagas and Mizos dissented. They opted to cast their lot with India and negotiate a settlement, no doubt aware of their landlocked situation and the obvious advantages of being with a large and powerful State that could better ensure their development and security. Thus was a nine-point agreement signed by Phizo with Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assam in 1947, which provided for a review after ten years. There were subsequent differences of interpretation, with the Nagas reading it as a right to assert their independence while the Indian State saw this as no more than implying renegotiating the terms of association within India.

The NNC and other modernising Naga elites negotiated two agreements with the Government of India. The first, in 1960, led to the formation of the State of Nagaland, with special provisions for autonomy incorporated in a new Article 371 A. The Shillong Accord followed in 1975. The underground agreed “of their own volition” unconditionally to accept the Indian Constitution and were given “reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement”. The accord and Phizo’s leadership was denounced by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Swu while on a “goodwill visit” to China. The NSCN subsequently split into the IM and K groups and the insurgency intensified. After many vicissitudes, a ceasefire was finally brokered between the NSCN-IM and the Government in 1996, later extended to the K faction as well and a dialogue got under way.

Thirteen Years of Groundwork The many rounds of talks between the Government of India’s interlocutor, K. Padmanabhiah and the NSCN, led by Muivah and Swu, over the past 13 years patiently laid the groundwork for a better understanding of the two rival points of view. Initial talks were aimed at reviewing the observance of the ceasefire and resolving complaints of violations. With growing trust and confidence, substantive issues came to the fore leading the Government to declare that it accepted the “unique history” of the Nagas. This constituted something of an emotional breakthrough and resulted in an enhanced rapport. The talks were continued through the NDA and UPA regimes with

Nagaland.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:14 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

INSURGENCY

Students from Nagaland perform a street play during a protest in New Delhi. (above) R.S. Pandey, former Chief Secretary of Nagaland and presently interlocutor of the Government of India for the Naga peace talks

periodic breaks for reflection and review after high level meetings with leading Governmental figures.

This spadework has created the ground for a final push towards a settlement, with Padmanabhiah yielding place to R.S. Pandey, a senior IAS official and former Chief Secretary of Nagaland who knows the State well. Pandey is highly regarded for having implemented Nagaland’s successful communitisation programme that entailed handing over responsibility for primary education and health and retail distribution of electricity in urban areas to local communities through direct budgetary funding and corresponding accountability.

Muivah was recently in Delhi and, after meeting the Prime Minister and Home Minister, had a round of talks with Pandey before proceeding to Dimapur to consult the local Nagas for their opinion before substantive talks resume. In the run up to this round, the NSCN leaders had been invited to look at the Indian Constitution and see what parts of it might be acceptable and what special provisions might be introduced either in amplification of the

be unilaterally vivisected. In fact, the very idea of attaching parts of the State’s Northern Hills to ‘Nagalim’ aroused a storm of protest in Manipur, as it has done in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The imagined boundaries of Nagalim have no clear historical basis. Dimapur, for example, Nagaland’s road and rail head, was the clearly identified capital of the Dimasa Kingdom. It was ceded to the newly formed Naga Hills district by the British in 1936. The Dimasas claim Dimapur but history does not move backwards. Nagas, who are on the move, now dominate this and other areas.

Yet the emotional idea of ‘Nagalim’, as an entity embracing a Naga Peoplehood, can be articulated in non-territorial terms without doing violence to the integrity of any of the States concerned. Such non-territorial entities were established to provide cultural safeguards and ensure the economic and social advancement of small scattered plains tribes in Assam like the Rabhas, Tiwas and Mishings by Hiteshar Saikia. These councils receive direct budgetary grants from Dispur and can select certain personnel to administer their special needs. Naga peopled areas adjacent to Nagaland could similarly be brought under special dispensations like the Sixth Schedule or enjoy special administered laws that safeguard the Naga way of life, language and socio-economic

”

AFP

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence movement and not secessionist. The argument is that they lost their freedom to the British as did India and that the colonial power ruled both from Delhi as a matter of convenience, even as they fragmented the Naga peoples by placing them under different administrative jurisdictions within India and Burma, which was administratively part of India until 1937.

existing Article 372 A or as a sub-text within the Indian Constitution. This now offers a starting point for the new discussions.

However, two things have been clearly stated by the Government. The first is that sovereignty is not negotiable and that the Nagas, as proud partners in the Indian commonwealth of very diverse peoples, are indeed co-sovereigns in the Republic of India. Nagaland enjoys wide federal powers reinforced by the special dispensation it enjoys under Article 371 A. These can be further expanded by transferring certain heads from the concurrent list to the Nagaland State list or by incorporating certain new provisions that might be mutually agreed upon in keeping with the unique identity of the Naga people.

A clarification is in order here. It is often argued that a settlement must be outside the framework of the Indian Constitution. This

32

need be no obstacle as any understanding can be incorporated therein though an appropriate amendment. Thus the 1960 Indo-Naga agreement and the subsequent Mizo accord were both “outside” the existing Indian Constitution but brought within it through suitable amendments.

Those who might be alarmed by the ideas canvassed must remember that the Indian Constitution is a very flexible and accommodating document providing both for territorial variations (such as under Articles 370, 371 and 371 A to I) and special dispensations for categories of people though reservations, affirmative action, linguistic and religious minority rights, gender equity and so forth. These provisions have been constructively used both by the Legislatures and the Courts.

Devolution can be extended not only by a Constitutional Amendment but by exercise

of the powers of “entrustment” under Article 258, which empowers the Centre to entrust to a State “any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends”. Nor need there be undue fears of a domino effect. The case of the Nagas, like that of the people of J&K, is sui generis.

Integration of Administrative Units The other sticking point thus far has been the NSCN-IM’s demand for integration of all administrative units inhabited by Naga people across four States, namely, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal and Nagaland itself and even Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim’. The Government has stated that it is in no position to redraw State boundaries without the consent of all concerned. Manipur, in particular, is among the oldest principalities in India with an unbroken history of 2,000 years and cannot

33

DSI

interests. Thus, although under different administrative dispensations, the Naga peoples could be enabled to sing from the same page.

The all-Naga Ho-Ho or assembly of Naga tribal associations across national and even international boundaries has functioned as an umbrella organisation in the past and could be re-engineered to play such a role in the future. Imaginative and innovative solutions are available.

The fact that Muivah is a Thangkul Naga from Manipur and Khaplang a Hemi Naga from Myanmar need not be an obstacle to their full participation in all aspects of Naga life and in steering the Naga peoples towards a new future.

Indeed, they could play an equally larger role as Naga Indian leaders. But first, all major Naga groups must agree on any new concord of self-determination within India and end years of internecine strife that has played havoc with the fabric of Naga society. Many adventurous elements too will also need to be won over or isolated.

It would be premature to assume that a Naga settlement is almost concluded. There could be tough bargaining ahead and a Naga consensus, especially among the armed Naga groups and between Nagaland and the adjacent areas that fall within the ambit of any definition of a Naga peoplehood will, of course, be absolutely essential. Solutions are seldom reached with a single step. There could be interim stages, each paving the way for further advance. Patience and statesmanship will be necessary. The stakes are high, the prize great and the omens propitious.

Nagaland.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:14 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

INSURGENCY

Students from Nagaland perform a street play during a protest in New Delhi. (above) R.S. Pandey, former Chief Secretary of Nagaland and presently interlocutor of the Government of India for the Naga peace talks

periodic breaks for reflection and review after high level meetings with leading Governmental figures.

This spadework has created the ground for a final push towards a settlement, with Padmanabhiah yielding place to R.S. Pandey, a senior IAS official and former Chief Secretary of Nagaland who knows the State well. Pandey is highly regarded for having implemented Nagaland’s successful communitisation programme that entailed handing over responsibility for primary education and health and retail distribution of electricity in urban areas to local communities through direct budgetary funding and corresponding accountability.

Muivah was recently in Delhi and, after meeting the Prime Minister and Home Minister, had a round of talks with Pandey before proceeding to Dimapur to consult the local Nagas for their opinion before substantive talks resume. In the run up to this round, the NSCN leaders had been invited to look at the Indian Constitution and see what parts of it might be acceptable and what special provisions might be introduced either in amplification of the

be unilaterally vivisected. In fact, the very idea of attaching parts of the State’s Northern Hills to ‘Nagalim’ aroused a storm of protest in Manipur, as it has done in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The imagined boundaries of Nagalim have no clear historical basis. Dimapur, for example, Nagaland’s road and rail head, was the clearly identified capital of the Dimasa Kingdom. It was ceded to the newly formed Naga Hills district by the British in 1936. The Dimasas claim Dimapur but history does not move backwards. Nagas, who are on the move, now dominate this and other areas.

Yet the emotional idea of ‘Nagalim’, as an entity embracing a Naga Peoplehood, can be articulated in non-territorial terms without doing violence to the integrity of any of the States concerned. Such non-territorial entities were established to provide cultural safeguards and ensure the economic and social advancement of small scattered plains tribes in Assam like the Rabhas, Tiwas and Mishings by Hiteshar Saikia. These councils receive direct budgetary grants from Dispur and can select certain personnel to administer their special needs. Naga peopled areas adjacent to Nagaland could similarly be brought under special dispensations like the Sixth Schedule or enjoy special administered laws that safeguard the Naga way of life, language and socio-economic

”

AFP

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence movement and not secessionist. The argument is that they lost their freedom to the British as did India and that the colonial power ruled both from Delhi as a matter of convenience, even as they fragmented the Naga peoples by placing them under different administrative jurisdictions within India and Burma, which was administratively part of India until 1937.

existing Article 372 A or as a sub-text within the Indian Constitution. This now offers a starting point for the new discussions.

However, two things have been clearly stated by the Government. The first is that sovereignty is not negotiable and that the Nagas, as proud partners in the Indian commonwealth of very diverse peoples, are indeed co-sovereigns in the Republic of India. Nagaland enjoys wide federal powers reinforced by the special dispensation it enjoys under Article 371 A. These can be further expanded by transferring certain heads from the concurrent list to the Nagaland State list or by incorporating certain new provisions that might be mutually agreed upon in keeping with the unique identity of the Naga people.

A clarification is in order here. It is often argued that a settlement must be outside the framework of the Indian Constitution. This

32

need be no obstacle as any understanding can be incorporated therein though an appropriate amendment. Thus the 1960 Indo-Naga agreement and the subsequent Mizo accord were both “outside” the existing Indian Constitution but brought within it through suitable amendments.

Those who might be alarmed by the ideas canvassed must remember that the Indian Constitution is a very flexible and accommodating document providing both for territorial variations (such as under Articles 370, 371 and 371 A to I) and special dispensations for categories of people though reservations, affirmative action, linguistic and religious minority rights, gender equity and so forth. These provisions have been constructively used both by the Legislatures and the Courts.

Devolution can be extended not only by a Constitutional Amendment but by exercise

of the powers of “entrustment” under Article 258, which empowers the Centre to entrust to a State “any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends”. Nor need there be undue fears of a domino effect. The case of the Nagas, like that of the people of J&K, is sui generis.

Integration of Administrative Units The other sticking point thus far has been the NSCN-IM’s demand for integration of all administrative units inhabited by Naga people across four States, namely, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal and Nagaland itself and even Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim’. The Government has stated that it is in no position to redraw State boundaries without the consent of all concerned. Manipur, in particular, is among the oldest principalities in India with an unbroken history of 2,000 years and cannot

33

DSI

interests. Thus, although under different administrative dispensations, the Naga peoples could be enabled to sing from the same page.

The all-Naga Ho-Ho or assembly of Naga tribal associations across national and even international boundaries has functioned as an umbrella organisation in the past and could be re-engineered to play such a role in the future. Imaginative and innovative solutions are available.

The fact that Muivah is a Thangkul Naga from Manipur and Khaplang a Hemi Naga from Myanmar need not be an obstacle to their full participation in all aspects of Naga life and in steering the Naga peoples towards a new future.

Indeed, they could play an equally larger role as Naga Indian leaders. But first, all major Naga groups must agree on any new concord of self-determination within India and end years of internecine strife that has played havoc with the fabric of Naga society. Many adventurous elements too will also need to be won over or isolated.

It would be premature to assume that a Naga settlement is almost concluded. There could be tough bargaining ahead and a Naga consensus, especially among the armed Naga groups and between Nagaland and the adjacent areas that fall within the ambit of any definition of a Naga peoplehood will, of course, be absolutely essential. Solutions are seldom reached with a single step. There could be interim stages, each paving the way for further advance. Patience and statesmanship will be necessary. The stakes are high, the prize great and the omens propitious.

Afghanistan-final.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:15 PM Page 1

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GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARD

With the US planning to drawdown its forces in Afghanistan by mid-2011, the question is which country will fill the vacuum in this battle-scarred nation?

KEY POINTS n As President Hamid Karzai is trying to broker peace with moderate factions of the Taliban, regional players active in Afghanistan are watching each other’s moves closely. n Over the last nine years, since the Taliban were ousted by the Americans, after the 26/11 attacks, India has ramped up its presence in Afghanistan. n America seem to be denying that Indians were being targetted in suicide attacks in Afghanistan.

T

he Hindukush is in ferment again.

The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, said to be the most important man in the Taliban hierarchy, second only to Mullah Omar, in February from a slum town called Baldia just outside Karachi in Pakistan has provoked a new round of the Afghan great game.

On the face of it, the capture is a coup in favour of Pakistan. As Islamabad, with its all-powerful Army and its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), attempts to deal with the impending, grand bargain that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is seeking to broker between various factions of the moderate Taliban, all the players in the region––from India to the US, from Russia to Saudi Arabia and Iran to Pakistan—are watching each other’s next move on this geo-strategic chessboard with total concentration.

Karzai is already scheduling a loya

34

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao inspects the damage incurred by a suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in October 2009

AFP

JYOTI MALHOTRA

jirga, a grand assembly of Afghan tribal chieftains, to take place on April 29, to discuss the process of reintegration between disaffected and dissenting Afghans who may have shifted their loyalties elsewhere over the last, severely conflicted years—whether to the Quetta Shura, headed by the redoubtable Mullah Omar, to the Hizb-e-Islamic grouping of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban, responsible for carrying out several bomb attacks in and around Kabul, including the one against the Indian embassy in July 2008 and the Karzai government.

An end to violence is a precursor to reintegration, although Karzai is said to be willing to accommodate the process of give-and-take that entails the surrender of arms in exchange for the sharing of power.

At the heart of the matter is the return to the dialogue table, arguably a fundamental principle of the Indian state as well as democracies around the world.

Let’s talk about the future of Afghanistan, discuss and debate the contours of the kind of country all of us want to recreate, we can imagine Karzai saying to the loya jirga. An Islamic Republic with a titular head? Perhaps even a grandson or two of the late Afghan King Zahir Shah and the continuation of a 25 percent quota for women parliamentarians? What should be the dynamics of power-sharing between the Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest and most powerful tribal dispensation), the Hazaras as well as the former Northern Alliance?

Karzai will emphasise that the future belongs to all Afghans and underline the spirit of neutrality that can end the civil war, something he publicly stressed in Islamabad in early March: “Afghanistan does not want any proxy wars on its territory. It does not want a proxy war between India and Pakistan. It does not

35

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DSI

GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARD

With the US planning to drawdown its forces in Afghanistan by mid-2011, the question is which country will fill the vacuum in this battle-scarred nation?

KEY POINTS n As President Hamid Karzai is trying to broker peace with moderate factions of the Taliban, regional players active in Afghanistan are watching each other’s moves closely. n Over the last nine years, since the Taliban were ousted by the Americans, after the 26/11 attacks, India has ramped up its presence in Afghanistan. n America seem to be denying that Indians were being targetted in suicide attacks in Afghanistan.

T

he Hindukush is in ferment again.

The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, said to be the most important man in the Taliban hierarchy, second only to Mullah Omar, in February from a slum town called Baldia just outside Karachi in Pakistan has provoked a new round of the Afghan great game.

On the face of it, the capture is a coup in favour of Pakistan. As Islamabad, with its all-powerful Army and its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), attempts to deal with the impending, grand bargain that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is seeking to broker between various factions of the moderate Taliban, all the players in the region––from India to the US, from Russia to Saudi Arabia and Iran to Pakistan—are watching each other’s next move on this geo-strategic chessboard with total concentration.

Karzai is already scheduling a loya

34

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao inspects the damage incurred by a suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in October 2009

AFP

JYOTI MALHOTRA

jirga, a grand assembly of Afghan tribal chieftains, to take place on April 29, to discuss the process of reintegration between disaffected and dissenting Afghans who may have shifted their loyalties elsewhere over the last, severely conflicted years—whether to the Quetta Shura, headed by the redoubtable Mullah Omar, to the Hizb-e-Islamic grouping of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban, responsible for carrying out several bomb attacks in and around Kabul, including the one against the Indian embassy in July 2008 and the Karzai government.

An end to violence is a precursor to reintegration, although Karzai is said to be willing to accommodate the process of give-and-take that entails the surrender of arms in exchange for the sharing of power.

At the heart of the matter is the return to the dialogue table, arguably a fundamental principle of the Indian state as well as democracies around the world.

Let’s talk about the future of Afghanistan, discuss and debate the contours of the kind of country all of us want to recreate, we can imagine Karzai saying to the loya jirga. An Islamic Republic with a titular head? Perhaps even a grandson or two of the late Afghan King Zahir Shah and the continuation of a 25 percent quota for women parliamentarians? What should be the dynamics of power-sharing between the Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest and most powerful tribal dispensation), the Hazaras as well as the former Northern Alliance?

Karzai will emphasise that the future belongs to all Afghans and underline the spirit of neutrality that can end the civil war, something he publicly stressed in Islamabad in early March: “Afghanistan does not want any proxy wars on its territory. It does not want a proxy war between India and Pakistan. It does not

35

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want a proxy war between Iran and US in Afghanistan.”

Raging Proxy Wars Actually, the proxy wars that are anathema to Karzai and his countrymen have been raging now for several centuries. From Alexander the Great to Babur, from the Russians and the British in the 19th century to the Soviets and the Americans in the 20th, control over the Hindukush has been an adrenalin surge.

By the time US forces begin to drawdown in 2011, the Americans would have occupied Afghanistan for exactly a decade.

Pakistan is waiting for the American forces to leave Afghanistan. And this is exactly what India fears. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani has warned the Americans that it would be “unhelpful” if India continue to expand its sphere of influence in Afghanistan.

But India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, showing both steel and spine in a recent visit to the US, declared that India had no intention of downsizing its significant presence in that country.

Over the last nine years, since the Taliban were ousted by the Americans,

AFP

Victims being rescued by policemen from a blast that occurred outside Noor Guesthouse in Kabul in February

An end to violence is a precursor to reintegration, although Karzai is said to be willing to accommodate the process of give-and-take that entails the surrender of arms in exchange of power sharing.

”

after the 26/11 attacks, India has determinedly ramped up its presence in Afghanistan, as if to make up for the 15odd years that it was kept out during the Taliban years. The first big project was a 214-km-long road from Zaranj in Nimroz province (neighbouring Iran) to Delaram in southern Afghanistan, ultimately connecting to Kabul. The idea behind

36

choosing a highway in the south was to connect Zaranj to the Chabahar port in Iran with another highway (which Iran has since done), so that ships carrying goods from India could dock at Chabahar and then take the north-east road to Zaranj in Afghanistan.

Two years ago, former External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee inaugurated the Zaranj-Delaram Highway as a gift from the people of India to Afghanistan. Soon, other projects were at hand, which included the building of electricity transmission lines from Kabul to the northern town of Termez, bordering Uzbekistan. A power-deficient city until the summer of 2009, Kabul now has surplus power thanks to this project. A third major project is the building of the Salma Dam in the heart of Hazara territory in Bamyan province. A fourth is the building of Afghanistan’s Parliament in Kabul.

Indian officials point out that the committed aid, amounting to $1.3 billion, doesn’t include the vast number of NGOs working in the social sector. In fact, in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, one or another Indian project, including the training of women by

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INSURGENCY

THE NAGA SAGA There are now possibilties of peace for one of the world’s oldest insurgencies I B.G. VERGHESE SECURITY

HOLISTIC RESPONSES With the changing nature of war democratic nations have to contend with asymmetrical conflicts I VIJAY OBEROI APRIL 2010

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APRIL 2010

NEIGHBOURS Ela Bhatt’s Self-Employed Women’s Association operates in full swing. A recent survey commissioned by BBC, ABC and ARD-–the British, American and German broadcasters respectively— found that 71 percent of the Afghan population wanted India to play a significant role in Afghanistan.

So when Kayani recently offered to Karzai that Pakistan could train the Afghan Army, Karzai politely refused.

This is despite the fact that the Americans seem desperate to broker peace between the neighbours on either side of the Durand Line, so that all countries have a common enemy in the US-led war against terror: mutual mistrust, hostility and suspicion have tended to overshadow the occasional lapses into sentimental brotherhood.

The arrest of Mullah Baradar is a case in point. Karzai wanted Pakistan to extradite Baradar, not only because he was from Karzai’s own Popalzai tribe but also because he could have become the thin end of the wedge to split the radicalised Taliban forces. That would have been the basis of Karzai’s own reintegration strategy, in which he called upon all Pashtuns to unite and save the country.

Clearly, Pakistan wasn’t giving up Mullah Baradar for exactly the same reasons. If Afghanistan was to remain the “strategic depth” for Pakistan, as had been enunciated by Kayani, then the Pakistanis needed to keep alive its linkages with key Taliban leaders. If Baradar had crossed the lakshman rekha, then Pakistan needed to know why.

“Baradar’s arrest was a cull, not a capture,” said a highly placed source in the Indian establishment, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Talks between Mullah Baradar and people close to Karzai had been going on for over six months. The Pakistanis decided to take him out because they didn’t want the talks to succeed.”

A US Army trainer observing an Afghan soldier during combat training at the Afghan National Army camp on the outskirts of Kabul in September, 2009

AFP

Training Soldiers and Officers

38

Meanwhile, as it became crystal clear that the US and NATO-led drawdown in mid2011 would require that much larger numbers of Afghans be trained to take over responsibilities in the Army and the civilian police, both Pakistan and India offered to train both soldiers and officers.

In Kabul, in early December, as snow carpeted the Hindukush just beyond the street lights and a raging bonfire at the home of India’s defence attaché Brigadier

DSI

Canada and the Netherlands had announced that they no longer had the stomach to fight someone else’s war so many thousands of kms away and would shut shop next year.

Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’s speech at West Point was aimed at recharging his own re-election campaign.

”

Surinder Singh kept the cold at bay, it seemed as if Afghanistan’s status as the chessboard of great powers was being overhauled, dissected and reaffirmed.

As we feasted on several kinds of kebabs, chicken and vegetables, the young men and women from India’s Army Education Corps as well as those working on several civilian projects that India has a stake in (dams, roads, women’s Self-Help Groups), spoke of their growing fondness and respect for the manner in which the Afghans continued to display both raw courage and guile in order to manage their decades-old adversity. The Afghans had been through everything—occupation, civil war and in the current situation, a foreign stiffening of Karzai’s spine—and they had lost so much, but giving up didn’t seem an option.

We toasted the Afghan spirit again and again that evening. Three months later, two young Majors at the party, who were teaching English to the Afghan Army, were dead. They were killed by suicide-bombers of the Lashkare-Toiba, the terrorist group based in Pakistan, expanding its anti-Indian footprint into Afghanistan.

But I am getting ahead of my story.

As US President Barack Obama, in his speech at West Point in early December, announced that he would send in 30,000

more soldiers into Afghanistan Afghan plans fell into place. By the end of in the first half of 2010, before President January 2010, the London the drawdown began in mid- Hamid Karzai conference on Afghanistan openly 2011, the question on every addressing a came out in support of Karzai’s plan person’s lips that night at loya jirga held for reintegrating the dissenting Singh’s house was: Which in Kabul Taliban, especially those low-and countries were going to fill in the middle-level forces that had vacuum left by the withdrawal of the gravitated towards the opposition because foreign forces? Since there was so little it had been a lucrative thing to do. time left for the American and the Moreover, a $500 million fund for paying International Capital Security Assistance off the Taliban fighters was instituted.

Force to expand the Afghan Army and There was, however, absolutely no convert it into a fighting force, good word on the need to expand the Afghan enough to take on the Taliban? Who was National Army and civil police so as to going to train these boys? touch 171,600 and 134,000 respectively by Already, Canada and the Netherlands October 2011 (current levels are at 86,000 had announced that they no longer had and 80,000 respectively). Even more the stomach to fight someone else’s war significant, there was no talk of who so many thousands of kms away and that would fill in the political and security they would shut shop next year. vacuum once Western forces began to Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’s leave Afghanistan. speech at West Point was aimed at recharging his own re-election campaign Attack on Indians that would begin soon after.

Meanwhile, India was once again being Sure, he had promised to end both the drawn into the action in Kabul. In the “good war” in Afghanistan as well as the early hours of February 28, just before “bad war” in Iraq that he had inherited the Congress-led government in Delhi from George Bush, but did that mean was about to present its Budget, the that the never-ending Taliban insurgency Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) struck the Noor would determine Obama’s course. Guesthouse and the Park Residence Television visuals of body bags returning Hotel in Kabul, where Indian doctors home was hardly the way to win the working in the Indira Gandhi Hospital hearts and minds of Americans. for children and the small team from the Over the next few weeks, Obama’s Army Education Corps were staying. Of

39

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NEIGHBOURS Ela Bhatt’s Self-Employed Women’s Association operates in full swing. A recent survey commissioned by BBC, ABC and ARD-–the British, American and German broadcasters respectively— found that 71 percent of the Afghan population wanted India to play a significant role in Afghanistan.

So when Kayani recently offered to Karzai that Pakistan could train the Afghan Army, Karzai politely refused.

This is despite the fact that the Americans seem desperate to broker peace between the neighbours on either side of the Durand Line, so that all countries have a common enemy in the US-led war against terror: mutual mistrust, hostility and suspicion have tended to overshadow the occasional lapses into sentimental brotherhood.

The arrest of Mullah Baradar is a case in point. Karzai wanted Pakistan to extradite Baradar, not only because he was from Karzai’s own Popalzai tribe but also because he could have become the thin end of the wedge to split the radicalised Taliban forces. That would have been the basis of Karzai’s own reintegration strategy, in which he called upon all Pashtuns to unite and save the country.

Clearly, Pakistan wasn’t giving up Mullah Baradar for exactly the same reasons. If Afghanistan was to remain the “strategic depth” for Pakistan, as had been enunciated by Kayani, then the Pakistanis needed to keep alive its linkages with key Taliban leaders. If Baradar had crossed the lakshman rekha, then Pakistan needed to know why.

“Baradar’s arrest was a cull, not a capture,” said a highly placed source in the Indian establishment, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Talks between Mullah Baradar and people close to Karzai had been going on for over six months. The Pakistanis decided to take him out because they didn’t want the talks to succeed.”

A US Army trainer observing an Afghan soldier during combat training at the Afghan National Army camp on the outskirts of Kabul in September, 2009

AFP

Training Soldiers and Officers

38

Meanwhile, as it became crystal clear that the US and NATO-led drawdown in mid2011 would require that much larger numbers of Afghans be trained to take over responsibilities in the Army and the civilian police, both Pakistan and India offered to train both soldiers and officers.

In Kabul, in early December, as snow carpeted the Hindukush just beyond the street lights and a raging bonfire at the home of India’s defence attaché Brigadier

DSI

Canada and the Netherlands had announced that they no longer had the stomach to fight someone else’s war so many thousands of kms away and would shut shop next year.

Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’s speech at West Point was aimed at recharging his own re-election campaign.

”

Surinder Singh kept the cold at bay, it seemed as if Afghanistan’s status as the chessboard of great powers was being overhauled, dissected and reaffirmed.

As we feasted on several kinds of kebabs, chicken and vegetables, the young men and women from India’s Army Education Corps as well as those working on several civilian projects that India has a stake in (dams, roads, women’s Self-Help Groups), spoke of their growing fondness and respect for the manner in which the Afghans continued to display both raw courage and guile in order to manage their decades-old adversity. The Afghans had been through everything—occupation, civil war and in the current situation, a foreign stiffening of Karzai’s spine—and they had lost so much, but giving up didn’t seem an option.

We toasted the Afghan spirit again and again that evening. Three months later, two young Majors at the party, who were teaching English to the Afghan Army, were dead. They were killed by suicide-bombers of the Lashkare-Toiba, the terrorist group based in Pakistan, expanding its anti-Indian footprint into Afghanistan.

But I am getting ahead of my story.

As US President Barack Obama, in his speech at West Point in early December, announced that he would send in 30,000

more soldiers into Afghanistan Afghan plans fell into place. By the end of in the first half of 2010, before President January 2010, the London the drawdown began in mid- Hamid Karzai conference on Afghanistan openly 2011, the question on every addressing a came out in support of Karzai’s plan person’s lips that night at loya jirga held for reintegrating the dissenting Singh’s house was: Which in Kabul Taliban, especially those low-and countries were going to fill in the middle-level forces that had vacuum left by the withdrawal of the gravitated towards the opposition because foreign forces? Since there was so little it had been a lucrative thing to do. time left for the American and the Moreover, a $500 million fund for paying International Capital Security Assistance off the Taliban fighters was instituted.

Force to expand the Afghan Army and There was, however, absolutely no convert it into a fighting force, good word on the need to expand the Afghan enough to take on the Taliban? Who was National Army and civil police so as to going to train these boys? touch 171,600 and 134,000 respectively by Already, Canada and the Netherlands October 2011 (current levels are at 86,000 had announced that they no longer had and 80,000 respectively). Even more the stomach to fight someone else’s war significant, there was no talk of who so many thousands of kms away and that would fill in the political and security they would shut shop next year. vacuum once Western forces began to Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’s leave Afghanistan. speech at West Point was aimed at recharging his own re-election campaign Attack on Indians that would begin soon after.

Meanwhile, India was once again being Sure, he had promised to end both the drawn into the action in Kabul. In the “good war” in Afghanistan as well as the early hours of February 28, just before “bad war” in Iraq that he had inherited the Congress-led government in Delhi from George Bush, but did that mean was about to present its Budget, the that the never-ending Taliban insurgency Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) struck the Noor would determine Obama’s course. Guesthouse and the Park Residence Television visuals of body bags returning Hotel in Kabul, where Indian doctors home was hardly the way to win the working in the Indira Gandhi Hospital hearts and minds of Americans. for children and the small team from the Over the next few weeks, Obama’s Army Education Corps were staying. Of

39

Afghanistan-final.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:20 PM Page 7

APRIL 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

AFP

The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his visit to the US in November, 2009

the four-member LeT team, one killed himself when they blew up the gate to the guesthouse. The remaining three terrorists then went from room to room searching for the Indian residents, shouting in Urdu, “Where is the Indian director?” When the Afghan receptionist pleaded that he was Afghani and they should let him go, he was shot at pointblank range. They threw a grenade inside the room of an Indian Army doctor, but he wasn’t there.

Another doctor, Major Laishram Jyotin Singh, had in fact engaged one of the terrorists in a physical struggle, thereby enabling several other residents of the guesthouse to escape, but he was killed along with the bomber who blew himself up. In the gunfight that ensued, Major Deepak Yadav of the Army Education Corps was killed, while Major Roy was evacuated on a special flight to Delhi, along with the other injured. He died at the Army hospital in the Capital two days later.

US special envoy for Af-Pak Richard Holbrooke was already denying the Indian sacrifice. “I don’t accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility…There were foreigners and nonIndian foreigners hurt,” he said. He quickly denied his own remarks two days later, but the truth was out.

Holbrooke, in conjunction with other senior members of the Obama

Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, was telling Delhi that it was the only democracy in the region and was also the only country that could bail out both the US as well as the Afghans in the battle for Afghanistan.

”

administration, was clearly articulating the view that nothing should be done to upset Pakistan, otherwise it would not fight the war against terror on the AfghanistanPakistan frontier with the same dedication that it had cleared the Swat and Malakand Valleys and gone into South Waziristan.

Kayani, once named by Time magazine as “democracy’s best friend,” told the Americans that it would be “unhelpful” if India expanded its reach in Afghanistan. The war on terror could become a casualty, he implied, if India

40

was allowed to expand its sphere of influence in Afghanistan.

It seemed that India was being asked by its closest allies, the Americans, to take a back seat in Afghanistan. Officials promised the setback was temporary and that the Afghans needed to decide who they could trust with rebuilding their lives. Let the world ask the Afghans they said, instead of allowing the Americans or the Pakistanis to decide what Kabul should do.

In this murky world, a sliver of light would soon appear on the horizon: Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, was telling Delhi that the US believed that India, as the only democracy in the region, was also the only country that could bail out both the US as well as the Afghans in the battle for Afghanistan.

Behind the scenes, US officials went one step further. Pakistan’s Army still maintained close linkages with the Haqqani group in North Waziristan as well as with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami.

Perhaps, India could be asked to train the Afghan civil police as a way of balancing the veto power Islamabad was beginning to exercise in other, powerful parts of the US establishment.

Clearly, the Americans were divided over their own policy projections in Kabul. It would now be up to India to clarify matters both at home as well as in Washington.

dsi ads layout.indd 1

4/7/10 4:54:47 PM

Nepal-China.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

NEIGHBOURS KEY POINTS

A LOOMING

n The triangular relationship between Kathmandu, Delhi and Beijing was generally evenly balanced for over half a century. The situation has altered from the middle of the current decade. n China’s strategic objective in Nepal is to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence, secure its borders by ensuring that the Tibetan refugee population is effectively curbed and recover what it considers as one of its ‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’.

SHADOW

N

estled in the lee of snow capped mountains in the sub-Himalayas, the landlocked nation of Nepal has for nearly half a century deftly balanced relations between India and China. But China’s strategic objectives in Nepal are clear: to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence; secure China’s borders by ensuring that the Tibetan refugee population is effectively curbed; and recover what it considers as one of its ‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’. Effectively then, Nepal is an important part of China’s South Asia policy.

After China took over Tibet in 1951, it viewed Nepal, along with Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh, as a ‘new buffer’ between India and China. Till recently, its efforts in Nepal were circumscribed by culture and geography.

Despite occasional turbulence, the triangular relationship between Kathmandu, Delhi and Beijing, was generally evenly balanced for over half a century. The situation altered only from the middle of the current decade.

China’s policy towards Nepal has become more aggressive perhaps with the aim to neutralise Indian influence in the region

JAYADEVA RANADE

Expanding Economic Ties

AFP

A father and his daughter in Anduo County of Tibet Autonomous Region in China walk along the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway Line, which connects western Nepal to Tibet

42

Till recently, China followed a cautious policy, which included supporting Kathmandu’s effort to designate Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’ and signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1960. A boundary agreement followed. Gradually, as its modernisation programme began to yield results, China’s policy towards Nepal became more confident and political efforts were supplemented with economic content. Simultaneously, Chinese officials began increasingly alluding to India’s ‘hegemonism’ and assured Nepalese dignitaries that China will continue to support Nepal’s effort to safeguard its national independence, sovereignty and develop its economy.

As imbalances between coastal areas and the hinterland got accentuated, consequent

43

DSI

to the implementation of economic reforms, China’s leaders sought to assuage popular discontent by encouraging the landlocked, hinterland provinces to explore economic opportunities. Trade was encouraged between the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Nepal and it increased remarkably between 1983 and 89. A fiveyear trade agreement was concluded followed by an agreement on economic and technical cooperation during the late Nepalese Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s visit to China in 1992. The year after that Koirala visited Lhasa becoming the first Nepalese Prime Minister to ever visit Tibet.

China began providing Nepal grants and assistance. In 2006, it offered a grant of Yuan 100 million ($13 million) and a concessional loan of Yuan 200 million ($26 million). The advent of the Maoist Government under Prime Minister Prachanda, who was openly critical of India, elevated China-Nepal ties.

China increased the grant offered to Nepal to Yuan 150 million ($21 million) and allowed duty free access to 500 Nepalese goods. As part of its policy, where strategic interests are involved, China identified infrastructure projects for cooperation and particularly eyed Nepal’s estimated 83,000 MWs of hydro-electricity. It extended a loan of $187 million for the construction of two power plants.

China soon expanded the scope of relations to include the sensitive defence sector. In June 1992, it offered Nepal antiaircraft guns worth $70 million. This was not-too-subtle a pointer that India was not to be regarded as a ‘friend’. Though not accepted, the offer paved the way for further contacts. Next year Nepal’s defence secretary led a delegation to China, described by China’s then Defence Minister Chi Haotian as “a major event in the history of contacts between the armed forces of the two countries”.

In mid-1994, Nepal’s Inspector General of Police visited Beijing for the first time ever, during which Beijing voiced its concern about ‘anti-China’ activities by Tibetans inside Nepal. China was assured that such activities would be stopped. Chinese defence supplies to Nepal and military exchanges escalated appreciably after the visit of the Royal Nepal Army Chief to Beijing in 1999. The shift in Nepal’s weapons procurement policy was enunciated in June 2005 by the Royal Nepal Army’s Master General of Ordnance. He identified China as the only country that continued to supply arms and ammunition to Nepal and even added that Nepal was entirely dependent

Nepal-China.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 1

APRIL 2010

NEIGHBOURS KEY POINTS

A LOOMING

n The triangular relationship between Kathmandu, Delhi and Beijing was generally evenly balanced for over half a century. The situation has altered from the middle of the current decade. n China’s strategic objective in Nepal is to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence, secure its borders by ensuring that the Tibetan refugee population is effectively curbed and recover what it considers as one of its ‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’.

SHADOW

N

estled in the lee of snow capped mountains in the sub-Himalayas, the landlocked nation of Nepal has for nearly half a century deftly balanced relations between India and China. But China’s strategic objectives in Nepal are clear: to neutralise and eliminate Indian influence; secure China’s borders by ensuring that the Tibetan refugee population is effectively curbed; and recover what it considers as one of its ‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’. Effectively then, Nepal is an important part of China’s South Asia policy.

After China took over Tibet in 1951, it viewed Nepal, along with Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh, as a ‘new buffer’ between India and China. Till recently, its efforts in Nepal were circumscribed by culture and geography.

Despite occasional turbulence, the triangular relationship between Kathmandu, Delhi and Beijing, was generally evenly balanced for over half a century. The situation altered only from the middle of the current decade.

China’s policy towards Nepal has become more aggressive perhaps with the aim to neutralise Indian influence in the region

JAYADEVA RANADE

Expanding Economic Ties

AFP

A father and his daughter in Anduo County of Tibet Autonomous Region in China walk along the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway Line, which connects western Nepal to Tibet

42

Till recently, China followed a cautious policy, which included supporting Kathmandu’s effort to designate Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’ and signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1960. A boundary agreement followed. Gradually, as its modernisation programme began to yield results, China’s policy towards Nepal became more confident and political efforts were supplemented with economic content. Simultaneously, Chinese officials began increasingly alluding to India’s ‘hegemonism’ and assured Nepalese dignitaries that China will continue to support Nepal’s effort to safeguard its national independence, sovereignty and develop its economy.

As imbalances between coastal areas and the hinterland got accentuated, consequent

43

DSI

to the implementation of economic reforms, China’s leaders sought to assuage popular discontent by encouraging the landlocked, hinterland provinces to explore economic opportunities. Trade was encouraged between the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Nepal and it increased remarkably between 1983 and 89. A fiveyear trade agreement was concluded followed by an agreement on economic and technical cooperation during the late Nepalese Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s visit to China in 1992. The year after that Koirala visited Lhasa becoming the first Nepalese Prime Minister to ever visit Tibet.

China began providing Nepal grants and assistance. In 2006, it offered a grant of Yuan 100 million ($13 million) and a concessional loan of Yuan 200 million ($26 million). The advent of the Maoist Government under Prime Minister Prachanda, who was openly critical of India, elevated China-Nepal ties.

China increased the grant offered to Nepal to Yuan 150 million ($21 million) and allowed duty free access to 500 Nepalese goods. As part of its policy, where strategic interests are involved, China identified infrastructure projects for cooperation and particularly eyed Nepal’s estimated 83,000 MWs of hydro-electricity. It extended a loan of $187 million for the construction of two power plants.

China soon expanded the scope of relations to include the sensitive defence sector. In June 1992, it offered Nepal antiaircraft guns worth $70 million. This was not-too-subtle a pointer that India was not to be regarded as a ‘friend’. Though not accepted, the offer paved the way for further contacts. Next year Nepal’s defence secretary led a delegation to China, described by China’s then Defence Minister Chi Haotian as “a major event in the history of contacts between the armed forces of the two countries”.

In mid-1994, Nepal’s Inspector General of Police visited Beijing for the first time ever, during which Beijing voiced its concern about ‘anti-China’ activities by Tibetans inside Nepal. China was assured that such activities would be stopped. Chinese defence supplies to Nepal and military exchanges escalated appreciably after the visit of the Royal Nepal Army Chief to Beijing in 1999. The shift in Nepal’s weapons procurement policy was enunciated in June 2005 by the Royal Nepal Army’s Master General of Ordnance. He identified China as the only country that continued to supply arms and ammunition to Nepal and even added that Nepal was entirely dependent

Nepal-China.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

Wait and Watch Policy Overall, Beijing adopted a watch and wait policy amidst the fast-paced political developments, which witnessed consecutively the removal of King Gyanendra, rise of the Maoists, gathering momentum of the pro-democracy movement and protracted impasse over the Constituent Assembly. China moderated its

A network of China Study Centres, set up to popularise the Chinese language and, more importantly, disseminate anti-India propaganda, reinforced traditional Chinese diplomacy.

”

stance and veered to supporting prodemocracy forces. Chinese State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to Kathmandu, in March 2006, signalled this shift and marked the commencement of a more assertive policy. He urged reconciliation between the contesting forces and, breaking from the earlier practice of only meeting Palace officials, met prominent leaders of the ‘antiKing’ Seven Party Alliance. China additionally initiated contact with the Maoists, whom a Chinese Ambassador had in 2003, described as an embarrassment to

44

the image of China’s Chairman Mao. Significant visits were those of Wang Hongwei in July 2006 and Wang Jiarui the following year. Wang Hongwei, a retired Major General of the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Research Fellow at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, expanded China’s political base and quietly met Maoist cadres. China already had contact with the then almost 30,000-strong Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist). He expressed hope that they would participate in the interim Government in Kathmandu. Wang Hongwei was later instrumental in inviting a number of senior Maoist leaders to China.

Similarly, Wang Jiarui, a Minister in the Chinese Communist Party’s powerful International Liaison Department, met a number of senior Nepalese leaders including the then Prime Minister Koirala and Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) leader Madhav Nepal. He emphasised that stability in Nepal would benefit China’s bordering regions and that Nepal should hold elections early. He requested assistance in curbing the activities of Tibetan refugees who could plan to enter China to disrupt the Olympics.

Political interaction accelerated once Prachanda took over as Prime Minister. He

DSI

Tibetans gather beside framed portraits of the Dalai Lama in Kathmandu to mark the 51st anniversary of the Tibetan uprising in March 2010

broke away from tradition and travelled to Beijing on his first visit abroad. He went twice after that. An estimated 38 Chinese delegations visited Nepal in 2008-09 while 12 high-level Nepalese economic, technology and defence delegations travelled to China. China cultivated a spectrum of political parties including the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPNM), the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) and the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum. In April 2009, a NCP-UML delegation led by Jhala Nath Khanal visited Beijing and was informed that China wants “a new kind of relationship” with Nepal.

Enhancing Connectivity A network of China Study Centres (CSCs), set up to popularise the Chinese language and, more importantly, disseminate antiIndia propaganda, reinforced traditional Chinese diplomacy. At least 35 CSCs, entirely funded by Beijing, are strategically established in southern Nepal along India’s border. China’s propaganda offensive includes the China Radio International’s local FM radio station in Kathmandu and a Nepal-China Mutual Cooperation Society (NCMCS), funded by the Chinese Embassy in Nepal.

The real game changer in China-Nepal

AFP

on China for its military supplies. Major deals for the purchase of ammunition and military equipment were signed in the years that followed, ousting India from the position of solitary supplier of ammunition.

In December 2008, the visiting Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Chinese President Lieutenant General Ma Hu Jintao with Xiaotian, pledged $2.6 Nepal Prime million as military Minister Madhav assistance for Nepal.

Kumar Nepal The previous year, during their China had announced meeting at the military aid worth $1.3 Great Hall of the million, the first such People in Beijing assistance to the Maoist in December 2009 Government in Nepal.

Beijing also supported the Maoists’ proposal to integrate approximately 19,000 Maoist guerrillas with the Nepalese Army.

Meanwhile, China ingressed Nepal’s critical telecommunications sector thus ensuring long-term leverage in that country. Within two years, Chinese companies were engaged in 27 projects. The ZTE Corporation and Huawei made major inroads. Huawei set up the mobile telephone networks in Kathmandu and other cities, while ZTE secured an over $50 million turnkey contract for upgrading Nepal Telecom’s nationwide mobile phone capacity.

The Tibetan community residents in Nepal were the first to feel the impact of China’s rising influence in Nepal. After King Gyanendra assumed power in a Palace coup in 2001, in a reversal of policy, two offices of the Dalai Lama were promptly shut down at Chinese insistence.

Chinese pressure continued to be maintained and increased once Prachanda took over as Prime Minister. Instances of Tibetans fleeing Tibet, to seek refuge in Nepal or India, being captured by the Nepalese police at the border and handed back to the Chinese authorities began to be reported. A visible effect of this sustained Chinese pressure is the drastic reduction in number of Tibetans reported to be seeking refuge in Nepal and the severely curtailed activities of Tibetans residents in Nepal.

AFP

NEIGHBOURS

relations has been, however, the QinghaiLhasa railway operationalised in July 2006.

China’s decision to extend the QinghaiTibet Railway line—capable of carrying an estimated 7 million tonnes of cargo a year— from Lhasa to Zhangmu, bordering western Nepal and Yadong in the east by 2015, underscores China’s strategic interests. The railway is augmented by allweather expressways radiating out of Lhasa and stretching up to Yadong, on the border with India’s Sikkim and connecting with the Western Highway that runs to the north of the border along western Nepal.

To enhance connectivity, China built a road link between Lhasa and Khasa, a border town located some 80 km north of Kathmandu, and is constructing another road along the shortest route from Tibet to Kathmandu. Though built to cater to the need of military logistics, the expressways fulfill important strategic objectives.

Completion of these infrastructure projects, coincidentally when Nepal was undergoing historic political changes, has given China a crucial immediate advantage.

China’s new transportation network has provided alternate trade routes to a landlocked Nepal. China moved quickly to exploit Nepal’s sensitivities and reopened the Kathmandu-Lhasa highway in 2008 and

45

designated Zham in Tibet Autonomous Region as a dry port for Nepal. Next year it agreed to open two more custom posts bringing the total to seven.

Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin observed in August 2008 that “Nepal is situated in a favourable geographical position in South Asia and a passage linking China and South Asia”. Separately, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi indicated that both countries were working towards a ‘strategic partnership’, while Liu Hongcai, a Vice-Minister in the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, reiterated the caution in February 2009 when he said, “We oppose any move to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal by any force.”

Koirala’s demise this February, before the new Constitution has been finalised, reintroduced a high degree of uncertainty in Nepal’s politics and in India-Nepal relations.

A lot will depend on the support that Prachanda and the Maoists are able to garner and their determination to alter the various agreements that bind India-Nepal relations.

Nevertheless, compulsions of culture, geography that inhibits easy travel and similarities among the people of India and Nepal will continue to impose limits on Nepal-China relations for at least a few years.

Nepal-China.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 3

APRIL 2010

Wait and Watch Policy Overall, Beijing adopted a watch and wait policy amidst the fast-paced political developments, which witnessed consecutively the removal of King Gyanendra, rise of the Maoists, gathering momentum of the pro-democracy movement and protracted impasse over the Constituent Assembly. China moderated its

A network of China Study Centres, set up to popularise the Chinese language and, more importantly, disseminate anti-India propaganda, reinforced traditional Chinese diplomacy.

”

stance and veered to supporting prodemocracy forces. Chinese State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to Kathmandu, in March 2006, signalled this shift and marked the commencement of a more assertive policy. He urged reconciliation between the contesting forces and, breaking from the earlier practice of only meeting Palace officials, met prominent leaders of the ‘antiKing’ Seven Party Alliance. China additionally initiated contact with the Maoists, whom a Chinese Ambassador had in 2003, described as an embarrassment to

44

the image of China’s Chairman Mao. Significant visits were those of Wang Hongwei in July 2006 and Wang Jiarui the following year. Wang Hongwei, a retired Major General of the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Research Fellow at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, expanded China’s political base and quietly met Maoist cadres. China already had contact with the then almost 30,000-strong Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist). He expressed hope that they would participate in the interim Government in Kathmandu. Wang Hongwei was later instrumental in inviting a number of senior Maoist leaders to China.

Similarly, Wang Jiarui, a Minister in the Chinese Communist Party’s powerful International Liaison Department, met a number of senior Nepalese leaders including the then Prime Minister Koirala and Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) leader Madhav Nepal. He emphasised that stability in Nepal would benefit China’s bordering regions and that Nepal should hold elections early. He requested assistance in curbing the activities of Tibetan refugees who could plan to enter China to disrupt the Olympics.

Political interaction accelerated once Prachanda took over as Prime Minister. He

DSI

Tibetans gather beside framed portraits of the Dalai Lama in Kathmandu to mark the 51st anniversary of the Tibetan uprising in March 2010

broke away from tradition and travelled to Beijing on his first visit abroad. He went twice after that. An estimated 38 Chinese delegations visited Nepal in 2008-09 while 12 high-level Nepalese economic, technology and defence delegations travelled to China. China cultivated a spectrum of political parties including the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPNM), the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) and the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum. In April 2009, a NCP-UML delegation led by Jhala Nath Khanal visited Beijing and was informed that China wants “a new kind of relationship” with Nepal.

Enhancing Connectivity A network of China Study Centres (CSCs), set up to popularise the Chinese language and, more importantly, disseminate antiIndia propaganda, reinforced traditional Chinese diplomacy. At least 35 CSCs, entirely funded by Beijing, are strategically established in southern Nepal along India’s border. China’s propaganda offensive includes the China Radio International’s local FM radio station in Kathmandu and a Nepal-China Mutual Cooperation Society (NCMCS), funded by the Chinese Embassy in Nepal.

The real game changer in China-Nepal

AFP

on China for its military supplies. Major deals for the purchase of ammunition and military equipment were signed in the years that followed, ousting India from the position of solitary supplier of ammunition.

In December 2008, the visiting Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Chinese President Lieutenant General Ma Hu Jintao with Xiaotian, pledged $2.6 Nepal Prime million as military Minister Madhav assistance for Nepal.

Kumar Nepal The previous year, during their China had announced meeting at the military aid worth $1.3 Great Hall of the million, the first such People in Beijing assistance to the Maoist in December 2009 Government in Nepal.

Beijing also supported the Maoists’ proposal to integrate approximately 19,000 Maoist guerrillas with the Nepalese Army.

Meanwhile, China ingressed Nepal’s critical telecommunications sector thus ensuring long-term leverage in that country. Within two years, Chinese companies were engaged in 27 projects. The ZTE Corporation and Huawei made major inroads. Huawei set up the mobile telephone networks in Kathmandu and other cities, while ZTE secured an over $50 million turnkey contract for upgrading Nepal Telecom’s nationwide mobile phone capacity.

The Tibetan community residents in Nepal were the first to feel the impact of China’s rising influence in Nepal. After King Gyanendra assumed power in a Palace coup in 2001, in a reversal of policy, two offices of the Dalai Lama were promptly shut down at Chinese insistence.

Chinese pressure continued to be maintained and increased once Prachanda took over as Prime Minister. Instances of Tibetans fleeing Tibet, to seek refuge in Nepal or India, being captured by the Nepalese police at the border and handed back to the Chinese authorities began to be reported. A visible effect of this sustained Chinese pressure is the drastic reduction in number of Tibetans reported to be seeking refuge in Nepal and the severely curtailed activities of Tibetans residents in Nepal.

AFP

NEIGHBOURS

relations has been, however, the QinghaiLhasa railway operationalised in July 2006.

China’s decision to extend the QinghaiTibet Railway line—capable of carrying an estimated 7 million tonnes of cargo a year— from Lhasa to Zhangmu, bordering western Nepal and Yadong in the east by 2015, underscores China’s strategic interests. The railway is augmented by allweather expressways radiating out of Lhasa and stretching up to Yadong, on the border with India’s Sikkim and connecting with the Western Highway that runs to the north of the border along western Nepal.

To enhance connectivity, China built a road link between Lhasa and Khasa, a border town located some 80 km north of Kathmandu, and is constructing another road along the shortest route from Tibet to Kathmandu. Though built to cater to the need of military logistics, the expressways fulfill important strategic objectives.

Completion of these infrastructure projects, coincidentally when Nepal was undergoing historic political changes, has given China a crucial immediate advantage.

China’s new transportation network has provided alternate trade routes to a landlocked Nepal. China moved quickly to exploit Nepal’s sensitivities and reopened the Kathmandu-Lhasa highway in 2008 and

45

designated Zham in Tibet Autonomous Region as a dry port for Nepal. Next year it agreed to open two more custom posts bringing the total to seven.

Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin observed in August 2008 that “Nepal is situated in a favourable geographical position in South Asia and a passage linking China and South Asia”. Separately, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi indicated that both countries were working towards a ‘strategic partnership’, while Liu Hongcai, a Vice-Minister in the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, reiterated the caution in February 2009 when he said, “We oppose any move to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal by any force.”

Koirala’s demise this February, before the new Constitution has been finalised, reintroduced a high degree of uncertainty in Nepal’s politics and in India-Nepal relations.

A lot will depend on the support that Prachanda and the Maoists are able to garner and their determination to alter the various agreements that bind India-Nepal relations.

Nevertheless, compulsions of culture, geography that inhibits easy travel and similarities among the people of India and Nepal will continue to impose limits on Nepal-China relations for at least a few years.

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 1

DSI

APRIL, 2010

a n

u p d a t e

o n

d e f e n c e

AFP

c o m m e r c i a l

n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his short visit to New Delhi in March 2010

From Russia with Deals INDIA has yet again approved a clutch of agreements with Russia for defence hardware estimated at over $4 billion during Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's brief stopover in New Delhi in mid-March. This comes at a time when the efficacy of Moscow’s own military-industrial complex is questionable, plagued as it is by quality control problems.

Algeria, for instance, recently returned a shipment of 15 MiG aircraft delivered in 2006-07 citing the "inferior quality" of certain components and units. Rosoboronexport, Russia’s premier weapon-selling agency, had signed a $1.28 billion deal for 29 one-seat MiG-29SMT ‘Fulcrum’ fighters and six two-seat MiG-29UB fighters in March 2006 as part of an $8 billion military-technical cooperation agreement with Algeria.

Deliveries were to be made from March 2007 until February 2008, but Algeria began refusing deliveries from May 2007, demanding that Russia take back the first 15 aircraft it had delivered. Importantly, Russia is presently upgrading the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) fleet of around 65 MiG-29B fighters.

But more significantly, Russia is in negotiations with France to buy four French amphibious assault ships, which, if concluded, would be Moscow’s first noteworthy materiel import since World War II. Ironically, the Indian Navy (IN) awaits delivery of

46

three Russian 4,000 tonne Project 1135.6 Talwar-class (Krivak III) frigates.

However, during Putin’s visit the long-negotiated and highly contentious $2.34 billion deal to refurbish Admiral Gorshkov, the 44,500 tonne, second-hand Kiev-class aircraft carrier, which the IN acquired in 2004 for the price of its refit, was finally confirmed.

Russia had originally agreed to retrofit the 23-year old decrepit carrier crippled by a fire in 1994 for $975 million. But the eventual cost of resurrecting it had nearly tripled, resulting in bitter acrimony with Moscow, the largest supplier of assorted weaponry to India for over four decades.

Re-christened INS Vikramaditya, the carrier is now likely to be delivered in 2013, nearly four years behind schedule due to the price wrangle.

The two sides also agreed on the $1.2 billion purchase of 29 additional MiG-29K maritime fighters, which would form part of the air arm of the 37,500-tonne aircraft carrier being constructed at Kochi. The IN had acquired 16 similar MiG-29Ks for $525 million in 2004 along with the Gorshkov.

Putin's visit also set the stage for the induction of the Akula-II nuclear-powered submarine (SSN Nerpa) into the IN later this year, under a ten-year lease for an estimated $700 million.The SSN’s earlier induction was delayed due to its involvement in an accident in November 2008 during trials in the Sea of

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DEFENCE BUZZ Japan, in which 20 people including sailors and technicians died and 21 others were injured.

The two sides also furthered negotiations to acquire 40 additional Su-30MKI Multi-Role Fighters to augment IAF’s depleting force levels as Soviet-era MiG variant combat aircraft were retired. By 2017, the IAF plans on operating some 280 Su-30MKIs, of which some 150 are being constructed locally under licence.

Agreements on the joint development of a Fifth Generation stealth fighter and a Multi-Role Military Transport Aircraft, costs for which will be shared equally between Moscow and Delhi, were also confirmed.

Since the early 1960s, India has bought over $30 billion worth of Soviet and Russian military equipment and last December both sides agreed to extend their strategic and military partnership by another decade to 2020.This would include the supply of materiel and maintenance contracts worth some $10 billion to Moscow.

Moscow remains India’s largest materiel supplier—nearly 70 per cent of its military hardware is of Soviet or Russian origin—and annually conducts defence business with Delhi worth over $1.5 billion.

In reality, however, India’s military is frustrated with Russia for its gross inefficiency in providing adequate spares and back-up services for its equipment, Moscow’s overall unprofessional approach and, above all, rampant corruption in what many in the Services classify as a ‘cash-and-carry’ system, a hangover of the Soviet era.

Life cycle costs, in times of financial prudence, have never been a consideration for Soviet and Russian equipment. And though ‘buy back’ clauses do exist with regard to excess spares and other materiel, India’s military invariably comes off worse as they are invariably shown to be in the wrong

by Moscow, rendering Delhi ineligible to encash its options.

In 2001, for instance, the IN became the first—and since then the only—Service that openly admitted to buying "vintage" spares from Russia for astronomical sums, despite being one of its largest customers.

Former IN chief Admiral Arun Prakash who headed the Navy’s Personnel branch in 2001 conceded that the price of the same spare could range from $15 to $6,000 since a Russian presidential decree till recently foreclosed buyers from dealing directly with original equipment manufacturers.

The IN was forced into paying Russia these prices to maintain operational preparedness, Prakash admitted at the time.

This was because over decades, India had acquired these at "friendship rates" and was never told their "true" commercial value.

The IN is known to have paid Rs 17,805 for a crystal worth Rs 15 and Rs 11,192 for a relay costing Rs 95. It also paid Rs 47,650 for a balancing piston valued at Rs 1,475 and acquired a host of other parts at astronomically high prices.

Howitzers Undergo Trial THE Indian Army is to finally begin summer trials of rival 155mm 52-calibre towed and wheeled or mounted Light Weight Howitzers (LWH) in support of its long postponed artillery modernisation drive.

The trials scheduled for April at Pokhran for an initial procurement of 400 towed 155mm/52 cal guns are expected to feature Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK) FH2000, BAE Systems FH77 B05 L52 and possibly Germany’s Rheinmetall PHZ 2000 and Israel’s Soltam SystemsTIG-2002 guns.

The eventual contract for the towed guns will include a transfer of technology for local manufacture, as their numbers are expected to significantly increase in accordance with the Army’s much-delayed Artillery Rationalisation Plan formulated in the 1990s.

This envisages the Army importing and locally building, by 2020, a mix of around 3,600 lightweight 155 mm/39-calibre and 155 mm/ 52-calibre towed Howitzers, along with wheeled or mounted and tracked artillery to equip around 180 of 220 artillery regiments in

F77 L52 Field Howitzer

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an estimated $3-5 billion programme.

At present, the Army operates around five different calibre guns, the majority comprising around 380 FH77B 155mm/39 cal Bofors guns of which 410 were imported in 1987 (and are awaiting an upgrade to 155mm/45 cal) and some 180 Soviet 130 mm M-46 field guns retrofitted by Israel’s Soltam to 155mm/39 cal.

The accompanying field evaluation to acquire 180 wheeled or mounted 155mm/52 cal Howitzers will feature the Rheinmetall Wheeled Gun (RWG) and Slovakia’s ShKH Zuzana.

Army officials in New Delhi said summer trials for all competing 155mm/52 cal guns—towed, wheeled or mounted—will be followed by cold weather testing sometime after October in Kashmir where many will eventually be deployed.

Meanwhile, the MoD has approached the US Government for the procurement of 145 BAE Systems M777 155 mm/39 cal Lightweight Howitzers (LWH) and Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $647 million through the US Foreign Military Sales or Government-to-Government route. India urgently requires the LWHs to equip two mountain divisions that are presently under raising for deployment along India’s disputed north-east frontier with China.

In a related development, the Army’s artillery directorate is likely to resurrect the proposal to upgrade the FH77B 155 mm/39 calibre Howitzers to a 155 mm/45 calibre standard over a year, after it was abandoned following overambitious Qualitative Requirements.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

Austrian Steyr’s A3 Assault Rifle

Lack of Accountability THE Army’s decision to replace the inefficient, locally designed Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) 5.56 mm Assault Rifle (AR), it has reluctantly employed since the mid-1990s, with an imported alternative is yet another instance of casual planning, financial profligacy and overall lack of accountability in India’s military.

After spending crores of rupees over several years in developing and building the incompetent INSAS AR, the Army is now poised to secure one of the world’s largest small arms contracts estimated at over $2 billion.

The Army is also seeking an alternative to its obsolete 9mm carbine in addition to acquiring lightweight ARs for its Special Forces (SF).The quantity of all three weapon systems is expected to climb to over three million pieces as they will eventually be issued to the paramilitary units and respective provincial State police forces. It is expected to employ the same weaponry as the Army as part of the ongoing reconstruction of the national security grid and for counter insurgency (COIN) operations.

Official sources say that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will soon dispatch three separate tenders to source the Army’s initial requirement for some 220,000 ARs, 160,000 carbines and an additional 11,000 lightweight ARs. The tenders envisage the outright purchase of limited numbers of each weapon system with the bulk being built locally via a transfer of technology either to the State-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB),

private sector companies or, in some instances, both.

The competing ARs are expected to include Austrian Steyr’s A3, Belgium FN’s Herstal’s F2000, Bulgaria Arsenal’s AK-47, German Heckler & Koch’s G36, Israel IMI’s Galil, Israel IWI’s Tavor-21, Italian Baretta’s 70/90, SingaporeTechnologies Kinetics’ SAR 21, Switzerland SIG’s SG 515 and USA Heckler & Koch’s XM8.

The AR and carbine acquisitions are also expected to meet the Army’s long-postponed Future Infantry Soldier as a system programme aimed at upgrading its 359 infantry and 66 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions that comprise the Army’s dedicated COIN force.

The Army’s association with the INSAS AR programme has been turbulent and problematic, as for years it has objected to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-designed and OFB-built INSAS 5.56 mm AR. The INSAS replaced the bulkier and less efficient 7.62mm FN FAL Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs).

But despite protestations centered round the INSAS ARs sights that malfunctioned in Kashmir’s cold weather and its firing mechanism which jammed at crucial moments, the Army was coerced by the MoD into inducting the rifle that took the DRDO over eight years to design and the OFB another five to build.

Infantry and RR units deployed on COIN duties, however, preferred the tested Kalashnikov-designed AK-47, of which 100,000 were imported from Bulgaria in 1995 for $8.3 million as a ‘stop gap’ measure till the

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INSAS AR became operational.

The DRDO’s decision to develop the INSAS range of weapons in the early 1980s followed a proposal by the MoD to import around 8000 5.56mm ARs for select parachute regiments that later converted to SF. The Army wanted to replace the 7.62MM SLR, its main assault weapons. Subsequently, Germany’s Heckler & Koch G-41 and Austria’s Steyr AUG were short-listed, with both vendors offering free transfer of technology worth $4.5 million. Thereafter, the Army’s requirements doubled and the Federal Government facing a foreign exchange crunch turned down the import proposal.

Alongside, the DRDO claimed to have made progress in developing the 5.56mm AR at its Armaments Research and Development Establishment in Pune, but it took almost a decade before it fructified.

Weapon experts at the time claimed that the INSAS 5.56mm AR was an ‘amalgam’ of Kalishnikov, FN FAL, the G41 and AUG designs and not in consonance with modern engineering production techniques which, in turn, would render it expensive. The INSAS AR was eventually priced at around Rs 20,000 per rifle compared to the imported Bulgarian AK-47’s that cost around $93 or around Rs 2,400 each.

“The INSAS-AR is a non-competitive weapon system and the Army became a tied customer with little choice but to pay the quoted price, however high it might be and whatever operational objections it had to the rifle,” former Major General Sheru Thapliyal said.

For, unlike the financially accountable private sector, the OFB's costing is flexible and being Government-owned their manpower is considered "free" and cost, time and technological overruns matter little, he added.

The initial INSAS family of 5.56 mm weapons also include a light machine gun and carbine, both of which have long been abandoned necessitating hugely expensive imports nearly two decades later.

Fight to Flight THE first round of winter trials in support of the Indian military’s long pending requirement for 197 Light Observation Helicopters (LOHs) estimated at around $750 million has concluded.

Three rival helicopters—Augusta Westland’s AW 119, Eurocopter’s AS 550 Fennec and Russia’s Kamov Ka-26—took part in the trials that ended in February at Bhatinda in Punjab and Leh. These are

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DEFENCE BUZZ locations where the majority of helicopters would eventually be deployed.

The 197 LOHs—133 for the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and 64 for the IAF—that would replace the AACs ageing Chetak (Alouette III) and Cheetah (SA-315B Lama) fleet would undergo a second round of testing in June at the same locations before they were short-listed and price negotiations opened.

AAC sources said all three competing models had performed “well” but maintained that even under the most ‘optimistic’ circumstances they did not envisage the helicopters would begin arriving before 2014-15 at the earliest.

The AAC and the IAF are anxious to induct the new LOH’s to support Army units deployed along the mountainous frontier with nuclear rivals Pakistan and China at heights above 4,200m.

The tender for the 197 helicopters dispatched in July 2008 followed the December 2007 cancellation of the $650-600 million order by the MoD for Eurocopter AS 550C3 Fennec LoHs claiming ‘discrepancies’ in the evaluation process.

Eurocopter that prevailed over the rival Bell-Textron Bell 407 model was accused not only of using an agent to secure the deal, an arrangement that is banned in India, but also of fielding its AS 350B3 Ecureuil civilian variant for extended hot weather and high altitude trials in 2004 and 2005.

Thereafter, when the LOH tender was reissued, Bell-Textron withdrew on the grounds that the requirement to invest 50 per cent of the contract value as offset into India’s defence industry was “restrictive”. It claimed this obligation would render participation in the tender commercially non-competitive and unviable.

Alongside, the MoD has quietly signed a Euro 560 million deal for 12 AugustaWestland medium-lift AW101 helicopters for the IAF’s VIP squadron despite vociferous and extended objections from the Central finance ministry over their high cost.

The AW101 would replace Russian Mi-8 helicopters at the IAF’s VIP squadron at Palam Airport which were acquired in the early 1980s for search and rescue missions before being converted for VIP transportation. The first two helicopters are to be delivered within 24 months and the remaining 10 within the following year.

Global tenders for the medium lift helicopters were dispatched in September 2006 to USA’s Sikorsky for its S92/S76, AugustaWestland and Kamov of Russia, which was eventually disqualified technically.

Officials said the AW 101 was selected

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Eurocopter AS 550 Fennec over Sikorsky’s S92/S76 following trials in early 2008 after fulfilling the IAF’s requirement to operate at heights between 4.5 km-5.5 km and other technical specifications.

Deep Sea Troubles THE Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has finally cleared the long pending payment of an additional Rs 2,000 crore to France’s DCNS for the import of varied components essential for the stalled construction of six Scorpene submarines for the Indian Navy (IN) at Mazagaon Dockyard Limited (MDL).

Contentious price negotiations with DCNS over providing these components that include sub-assemblies and special steel for integration into the three submarines being built since end-2006 has delayed the programme by two-three years to 2014-2015.

In February, the CCS agreed to pay the supplementary money to Mazagaon Procurement Materials (MPM), a specially created entity, to source the necessary materials from DCNS. Of the overall Rs 18,798-crore Scorpene deal, inked in October 2005, the contract was divided under separate heads: Rs 6,135 crore went to Armaris—then a joint venture between DCNS, Thales and Spain’s Navantia—and Rs 1,062 crore to the European MBDA, for sea-skimming Exocet SM39 missiles with a 50 km range.

A third Rs 5,888 crore agreement was between the vendor and MDL for indigenous submarine construction, the fourth was for Rs 3,553 crore for taxes, whilst a fifth for Rs 2,160 crore—now almost doubled—was to

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provide ‘varied items’ like engines, generators and sub-assemblies to the project.

Senior IN and armament industry sources, however, blame delays in the Scorpene project on protracted price negotiations for the MPM packages over the past 18-24 months. Citing inflation, DCNS had ‘significantly’ hiked its price as many items needed to be acquired from other suppliers many of them European.

In June 2009, Defence Minister A. K. Antony had informed Parliament that “teething problems, absorption of technology, delays in augmentation of industrial infrastructure and procurement of MDL purchased materials” had delayed the Scorpene programme.

A month later, the watchdog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in its report submitted to Parliament castigated the Government for taking nine years to finalise the Scorpene deal, resulting in a Rs 2,838 crore price escalation.

The CAG also revealed that though construction work on the first Scorpene began in December 2006, the progress till December 2008 was a mere 9.34 per cent against the envisaged 27.43 per cent.

The IN too is deeply concerned by its depleting force levels, as by 2012-13 it would be left with only nine of its current fleet of 16 diesel-electric submarines: 10 Russian Kilo-class and four GermanType 1500 (HDW 209) boats and two obsolete Foxtrot boats.

This number will further reduce to five by 2014-2015 when the first of six Scorpene submarines would be ready. Under the revised schedule, the last Scorpene is expected to be delivered to the IN by 2019-20.

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