DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - APRIL 2011

DSI Cover April 2011.qxp print:cover-feb3.qxd 15/04/11 4:16 PM Page 1

INDIAN NAVY

FROM SHIPSHAPE The number of the Navy's major seagoing platforms has stagnated I P. S. Das INDIA-US

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE The recent publication of classified cables reveals an extaordinary defence relationship I Siddharth Vardarajan APRIL 2011

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 3

ISSUE 5

` 250

FIGHTING TO KEEP FIGHTING ECONOMIC REVIVAL AND INCREASING FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS HAVE DONE LITTLE TO REPLACE THE INDIAN ARMY’S AGEING WEAPONRY AJAI SHUKLA

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APRIL 2011

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

T

here is no doubt that the Army needs to modernise to make India more capable to meet the challenges of a new security environment. With overall changes in the global situation and especially with China’s ambitious modernisation plans and growing defence spend – a whopping $ 91 billion in 2011-12 – as DSI points out alarm bells should be ringing over the Army’s long list of obsolete equipment.

The lack of a well-directed modernisation plan is already impacting national security. India needs to build its military capabilities to cater to simultaneous confrontation, potentially on two fronts, that will be marked by short, high intensity warfare waged by adversaries equippped with high technology. This will only be possible by firstly, increasing defence expenditure and buying equipment in a global climate in which countries are lining up to sell to India and secondly, by increasing indigenous defence production. India has a vibrant private sector which can be tapped and surely the FDI debate cannot be a hurdle in allowing it to produce high-end defence equipment serving not only domestic requirements but those of other countries as well.

As our analysis of the Defence Budget shows there has been an enhanced outlay in allocations this fiscal. But though the numbers may have gone up apparently in real terms most of those monies will be swallowed up by inflation and will be used to deal with committed liabilities rather than any substantial purchase of defence equipment.

K. Subrahmanyam, one of our regular contributors, understood the dilemmas of the Indian defence sector well. Sadly, India’s best known strategic expert, described only half-jokingly as a one-man think thank, passed away recently. Despite his growing ill health over the past 15 years, he continued to contribute security papers, chair committees and deliver articles well before deadline putting his younger colleagues to shame. It was as chairperson of the Kargil Review Committee that he looked into India’s intelligence failures, making large-scale recommendations, which changed the country’s intelligence structure. In 1999, he declined the Padma Bhushan saying that journalists and bureaucrats should not accept government awards. In many ways, this strategic guru was the proverbial role model.

As usual we look forward to your feedback and suggestions which you can send to us at dsidelhi.feedback@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe to us then simply drop us a line at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing department will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

The lack of a well-directed modernisation plan is already impacting national security. India needs to build its military capabilities to cater to simultaneous, confrontation, potentially on two fronts.

Contents 2nd time :contents-feb-R.qxd 18/04/11 2:58 PM Page 2

CONTENTS

APRIL 2011

COVER STORY

06

PROMISES, PROMISES The economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocations for capital expenditure have not done much for replacing the Army’s growing inventory of grey-haired equipment.

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

16

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET India’s defence allocation for 2011-12 at `1,64,415.49 (US$ 36.1 billion) is nearly 12 percent more than the last fiscal. But this escalation will be neutralised by inflation which is around 9.3 percent. The armed forces are unhappy that the Budget which is a measly 1.83 percent of India’s GDP is less than the three percent demanded by the Services and far below China which has allocated $91 billion towards defence expenditure this year.

SECURITY

NAVY

26

44

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

Previously national security centred around the defence of India’s borders, a task that was the prime responsibility of the armed forces. Today, a number of central police and paramilitary forces help guard the country’s borders and maintain internal security.

The publication of classified cable traffic between the United States embassy in New Delhi and the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up a hornet’s nest in India with the country’s politicians and bureaucrats emerging in often unflattering colours.

32

While the Indian Navy is the largest regional littoral maritime power, the numbers of its major seagoing platforms has stagnated and even declined requiring the urgent import of some platforms.

INDIA - US

IN THE LINE OF FIRE

NOT REALLY SHIPSHAPE MIDDLE EAST

38

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The recent unravelling of some Middle East countries can have a substantial impact on India and Pakistan, though there is little to indicate that South Asia suffers from a ‘democracy deficit’.

2

DSI

3

Contents 2nd time :contents-feb-R.qxd 18/04/11 2:58 PM Page 2

CONTENTS

APRIL 2011

COVER STORY

06

PROMISES, PROMISES The economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocations for capital expenditure have not done much for replacing the Army’s growing inventory of grey-haired equipment.

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

16

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET India’s defence allocation for 2011-12 at `1,64,415.49 (US$ 36.1 billion) is nearly 12 percent more than the last fiscal. But this escalation will be neutralised by inflation which is around 9.3 percent. The armed forces are unhappy that the Budget which is a measly 1.83 percent of India’s GDP is less than the three percent demanded by the Services and far below China which has allocated $91 billion towards defence expenditure this year.

SECURITY

NAVY

26

44

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

Previously national security centred around the defence of India’s borders, a task that was the prime responsibility of the armed forces. Today, a number of central police and paramilitary forces help guard the country’s borders and maintain internal security.

The publication of classified cable traffic between the United States embassy in New Delhi and the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up a hornet’s nest in India with the country’s politicians and bureaucrats emerging in often unflattering colours.

32

While the Indian Navy is the largest regional littoral maritime power, the numbers of its major seagoing platforms has stagnated and even declined requiring the urgent import of some platforms.

INDIA - US

IN THE LINE OF FIRE

NOT REALLY SHIPSHAPE MIDDLE EAST

38

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The recent unravelling of some Middle East countries can have a substantial impact on India and Pakistan, though there is little to indicate that South Asia suffers from a ‘democracy deficit’.

2

DSI

3

Contributors_April 2011_FINAL 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 12:59 PM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

APRIL 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 5 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SHUKLA

LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

AJAY LELE

GURMEET KANWAL

PREMVIR DAS

RAHUL BEDI

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Laxman Kumar Behera is a research fellow at the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). As a member of the IDSA’s cluster on defence, economics and industry, he has specialised on issues relating to India’s arms procurement, defence offset policy, defence industry, military spending and defence co-operation. He was closely associated with two high-level committees set up by the Ministry of Defence on defence acquisition and expenditure.

Dr Ajey Lele is with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses where he specialises in space technology. Several of his articles have been published in journals, websites and newspapers. He has edited a book Space Security and Global Co-operation and most recenty he has authored Strategic Technologies for the Military which provides a holistic view of the key technologies that are expected to revolutionise military affairs in the future.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Premvir Das retired from the Indian Navy in 1998 as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has served on the Executive Councils of two leading think tanks, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and the United Service Institute, and was also a member of the National Security Advisory Board in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer) Saurabh Mishra, Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda

M.K. BHADRAKUMAR

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

M.K.Bhadrakumar has served in the Indian Foreign Service as a career diplomat.

His 30-year career was largely related to the Pakistan – Afghanistan – the Iran region and Muslim countries as well as the territories of the former Soviet Union. Following voluntary retirement in 2002, he has taken to writing and presently contributes to The Hindu, Deccan Herald, Rediff.com and Asia Times Online.

Siddharth Varadarajan is the Strategic Affairs Editor and Delhi Bureau Chief of The Hindu. A leading commentator on foreign policy, he has reported extensively from Pakistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia as well as Kashmir and the NorthEast. He has edited a book on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat: The Making of aTragedy in 2005. An economist, he is currently writing a book on the India-U.S. relationship.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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Contributors_April 2011_FINAL 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 12:59 PM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

APRIL 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA APRIL 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 5 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SHUKLA

LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

AJAY LELE

GURMEET KANWAL

PREMVIR DAS

RAHUL BEDI

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Laxman Kumar Behera is a research fellow at the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). As a member of the IDSA’s cluster on defence, economics and industry, he has specialised on issues relating to India’s arms procurement, defence offset policy, defence industry, military spending and defence co-operation. He was closely associated with two high-level committees set up by the Ministry of Defence on defence acquisition and expenditure.

Dr Ajey Lele is with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses where he specialises in space technology. Several of his articles have been published in journals, websites and newspapers. He has edited a book Space Security and Global Co-operation and most recenty he has authored Strategic Technologies for the Military which provides a holistic view of the key technologies that are expected to revolutionise military affairs in the future.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Premvir Das retired from the Indian Navy in 1998 as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has served on the Executive Councils of two leading think tanks, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and the United Service Institute, and was also a member of the National Security Advisory Board in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer) Saurabh Mishra, Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda

M.K. BHADRAKUMAR

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

M.K.Bhadrakumar has served in the Indian Foreign Service as a career diplomat.

His 30-year career was largely related to the Pakistan – Afghanistan – the Iran region and Muslim countries as well as the territories of the former Soviet Union. Following voluntary retirement in 2002, he has taken to writing and presently contributes to The Hindu, Deccan Herald, Rediff.com and Asia Times Online.

Siddharth Varadarajan is the Strategic Affairs Editor and Delhi Bureau Chief of The Hindu. A leading commentator on foreign policy, he has reported extensively from Pakistan, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia as well as Kashmir and the NorthEast. He has edited a book on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat: The Making of aTragedy in 2005. An economist, he is currently writing a book on the India-U.S. relationship.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:11 PM Page 6

MODERNISATION

APRIL 2011

DSI

PROMISES, PROMISES

Bofors guns prepare to fire at enemy positions in the Srinagar-Kargil Road

The economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocations for capital expenditure have done little to replace the Indian Army’s growing inventory of grey-haired equipment

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS n Through the 1990s, the Army’s meagre capital allocations were insufficient for the replacement of outdated equipment and weaponry. n Other than the multi-billion dollar purchase of T-90 tanks from Russia, the big-ticket military expenditure has been directed more towards warships and aircraft than towards the Army . n This gloomy situation stems largely from India’s archaic system of defence planning.

AFP

T 6

he current crisis of equipment obsolescence within the Indian Army (IA) has been brewing since the sharp cuts in defence expenditure during the economic crisis of the early 1990s. From its highs of more than four percent of Gross Domestic Product during the late 1980s, when India had pursued

7

an activist security and foreign policy (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Operation Brass Tacks, Operation Chequerboard, the Siachen Glacier), defence expenditure has plummeted to below 2.5 percent of the GDP as New Delhi’s focus shifted to fiscal stabilisation and economic reform.

Through the 1990s, before India’s economy shifted to a high growth trajectory, the Army’s meagre capital allocations were insufficient for the phased replacement of equipment and weaponry that had out lived its life. The money available barely covered the annual installments due for the tanks, infantry combat vehicles, mechanised air defence systems, assault engineering equipment and helicopters that Rajiv Gandhi, Defence Minister Arun Singh and General K. Sundarji had splashed money on before the Bofors scandal swept away the Congress in 1989.

Nor has the economic revival of the preceding decade, and the steadily

Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:11 PM Page 6

MODERNISATION

APRIL 2011

DSI

PROMISES, PROMISES

Bofors guns prepare to fire at enemy positions in the Srinagar-Kargil Road

The economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocations for capital expenditure have done little to replace the Indian Army’s growing inventory of grey-haired equipment

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS n Through the 1990s, the Army’s meagre capital allocations were insufficient for the replacement of outdated equipment and weaponry. n Other than the multi-billion dollar purchase of T-90 tanks from Russia, the big-ticket military expenditure has been directed more towards warships and aircraft than towards the Army . n This gloomy situation stems largely from India’s archaic system of defence planning.

AFP

T 6

he current crisis of equipment obsolescence within the Indian Army (IA) has been brewing since the sharp cuts in defence expenditure during the economic crisis of the early 1990s. From its highs of more than four percent of Gross Domestic Product during the late 1980s, when India had pursued

7

an activist security and foreign policy (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Operation Brass Tacks, Operation Chequerboard, the Siachen Glacier), defence expenditure has plummeted to below 2.5 percent of the GDP as New Delhi’s focus shifted to fiscal stabilisation and economic reform.

Through the 1990s, before India’s economy shifted to a high growth trajectory, the Army’s meagre capital allocations were insufficient for the phased replacement of equipment and weaponry that had out lived its life. The money available barely covered the annual installments due for the tanks, infantry combat vehicles, mechanised air defence systems, assault engineering equipment and helicopters that Rajiv Gandhi, Defence Minister Arun Singh and General K. Sundarji had splashed money on before the Bofors scandal swept away the Congress in 1989.

Nor has the economic revival of the preceding decade, and the steadily

Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 3:03 PM Page 8

MODERNISATION But boosting the clearly inadequate numbers and ranges has proved impossible since the late 1980s, when the Bofor’s scandal restricted India’s buy of 155 mm, 45 calibre FH-77B howitzers from the planned 1,510 guns to just 410.

The plan to upgrade India’s 60-odd regiments of Soviet-era 130 mm guns to 155 mm was curtailed after the Israeli company, Soltam, was criticised for a poor upgrade.

Arjun tanks during the Republic Day parade, New Delhi

AFP

”

8

increasing allocations for capital expenditure, done much for replacing the Army’s growing inventory of greyhaired equipment. Other than the multibillion dollar purchase of T-90 tanks from Russia, big-ticket military expenditure has been directed more towards warships and aircraft than towards an Army that has been engaged in relentless lowintensity combat in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam and Manipur.

Infantry modernisation has been more a slogan than a reality. India’s mechanised forces, which had constituted a formidable conventional deterrent through the 1980s and 1990s, have lost ground to Pakistan, which has dramatically cut down India’s combat power advantage with the intelligent purchase of modern tanks from Eastern Europe and self-propelled artillery from the US. The IA’s artillery has been unable to procure modern guns for a quarter of a century, while air defence artillery is even more decrepit. Logistics, traditionally consigned by India’s general staff to the unglamorous fringes of operational planning, has seen no new acquisitions of specialist vehicles and equipment.

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Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:18 PM Page 10

MODERNISATION

APRIL 2011

With no clarity on the specific capabilities that it requires, the Army’s framing of its equipment requirements also remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General Staff Qualitative Requirements on a “best of each” basis, extracting the best performance qualities from a number of different products and putting them together to create a ‘perfect’ product.

This gloomy situation stems largely from India’s archaic system of defence planning in which identifying the weapons platforms that are needed, rather than capabilities, drives the formulation of the military’s 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan; 5-year defence plans; and Annual Acquisition Plans.

Modern military’s across the globe first identify the operational capabilities that they deem essential, then they build or acquire the weapons and equipment that would provide those capabilities.

For example, a military might decide it needs the ability to bring down, at 30 minutes notice, 20 tonnes of high explosive on a target 100 x 50 m in size, 80km inside enemy territory, anywhere along a 700-km section of the border.

The planning cell would then decide whether that requirement would best be met by field artillery, multi-barrelled rocket launchers, cruise or surfaceto-surface missiles, strike aircraft, or special forces. That crucial decision would then inform equipment procurement or development.

In New Delhi, however, equipment planning consists of the incremental upgrading of equipment that the Army already holds. Line directorates for example, infantry, artillery or mechanised forces directorates, which govern the equipment planning of each arm or service, simply demand an improvement over what they already operate. The artillery, equipped with 45-calibre 155 mm howitzers, demands 52-calibre howitzers to ‘modernise’ the arm.

The armoured corps clamours for T-90s to replace the T-72 fleet, the mechanised infantry for BMP-3s to replace the BMP-2s, and the engineers for bridges with 52metre spans to replace the 40-metre bridges already in service.

The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) is charged with preventing duplication and optimising resources, but with the Army unable to rationalise equipment between its component branches, the IDS can hardly discharge that function. And so, instead of focussing intelligently on acquiring specific capabilities that are likely to be required in our specific operational environment, money is shared between various interest

10

groups, hoping to please all rather than developing specific capabilities.

With no clarity on the specific capabilities that it requires, the Army’s framing of its equipment requirements also remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) – the performance specifications that each platform must fulfil – on a ‘best of each’ basis, extracting the best performance qualities from a number of different products and putting them together to create a “perfect” product. This approach, however, disregards the simple engineering truth that performance is all about trade-offs.

For example, the specifications that the Army and the Indian Airforce (IAF) framed for the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, demanded a continuous cruise speed of 270km per hour at sea level and the ability to lift a 200 kg payload at 6,000 m. This entirely disregarded the fact that a helicopter’s rotor can either be optimised for lift at high-

Border Security Force jawans keep vigil at the Rann of Kutch bordering Pakistan

”

altitudes, or for high-speed performance.

Instead of zeroing in on the capability that it needed, the military added one and one and got eleven.

Compounding the delays caused by poorly formulated GSQRs are the Ministroy of Defence’s (MoD) complex procurement regulations, promulgated in the frequently revised Defence Procurement Policy. (DPP) Seven versions of the DPP since 2002 have culminated in the most recent one: DPP2011. Every procurement initiated during this last decade is governed by the DPP that was valid at that time, confusing vendors and ministry officials alike.

A final deterrent to expeditious procurement is the Bofors-Tehelka Syndrome, the cautious MoD mindset that emerged from those two investigations of alleged procurement transgressions.

Bureaucrats handling procurement operate with the clear understanding that procurement delays are not punishable whereas the slightest procedural infringement can result in a career scuttled.

Consequently, equipment procurement is characterised by a stultifying adherence to hidebound procedure where officials focus

AFP

Archiac Defence Planning

AFP

Soldiers stand before the national flag at Red Fort , New Delhi

DSI

11

Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:18 PM Page 10

MODERNISATION

APRIL 2011

With no clarity on the specific capabilities that it requires, the Army’s framing of its equipment requirements also remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General Staff Qualitative Requirements on a “best of each” basis, extracting the best performance qualities from a number of different products and putting them together to create a ‘perfect’ product.

This gloomy situation stems largely from India’s archaic system of defence planning in which identifying the weapons platforms that are needed, rather than capabilities, drives the formulation of the military’s 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan; 5-year defence plans; and Annual Acquisition Plans.

Modern military’s across the globe first identify the operational capabilities that they deem essential, then they build or acquire the weapons and equipment that would provide those capabilities.

For example, a military might decide it needs the ability to bring down, at 30 minutes notice, 20 tonnes of high explosive on a target 100 x 50 m in size, 80km inside enemy territory, anywhere along a 700-km section of the border.

The planning cell would then decide whether that requirement would best be met by field artillery, multi-barrelled rocket launchers, cruise or surfaceto-surface missiles, strike aircraft, or special forces. That crucial decision would then inform equipment procurement or development.

In New Delhi, however, equipment planning consists of the incremental upgrading of equipment that the Army already holds. Line directorates for example, infantry, artillery or mechanised forces directorates, which govern the equipment planning of each arm or service, simply demand an improvement over what they already operate. The artillery, equipped with 45-calibre 155 mm howitzers, demands 52-calibre howitzers to ‘modernise’ the arm.

The armoured corps clamours for T-90s to replace the T-72 fleet, the mechanised infantry for BMP-3s to replace the BMP-2s, and the engineers for bridges with 52metre spans to replace the 40-metre bridges already in service.

The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) is charged with preventing duplication and optimising resources, but with the Army unable to rationalise equipment between its component branches, the IDS can hardly discharge that function. And so, instead of focussing intelligently on acquiring specific capabilities that are likely to be required in our specific operational environment, money is shared between various interest

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groups, hoping to please all rather than developing specific capabilities.

With no clarity on the specific capabilities that it requires, the Army’s framing of its equipment requirements also remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) – the performance specifications that each platform must fulfil – on a ‘best of each’ basis, extracting the best performance qualities from a number of different products and putting them together to create a “perfect” product. This approach, however, disregards the simple engineering truth that performance is all about trade-offs.

For example, the specifications that the Army and the Indian Airforce (IAF) framed for the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, demanded a continuous cruise speed of 270km per hour at sea level and the ability to lift a 200 kg payload at 6,000 m. This entirely disregarded the fact that a helicopter’s rotor can either be optimised for lift at high-

Border Security Force jawans keep vigil at the Rann of Kutch bordering Pakistan

”

altitudes, or for high-speed performance.

Instead of zeroing in on the capability that it needed, the military added one and one and got eleven.

Compounding the delays caused by poorly formulated GSQRs are the Ministroy of Defence’s (MoD) complex procurement regulations, promulgated in the frequently revised Defence Procurement Policy. (DPP) Seven versions of the DPP since 2002 have culminated in the most recent one: DPP2011. Every procurement initiated during this last decade is governed by the DPP that was valid at that time, confusing vendors and ministry officials alike.

A final deterrent to expeditious procurement is the Bofors-Tehelka Syndrome, the cautious MoD mindset that emerged from those two investigations of alleged procurement transgressions.

Bureaucrats handling procurement operate with the clear understanding that procurement delays are not punishable whereas the slightest procedural infringement can result in a career scuttled.

Consequently, equipment procurement is characterised by a stultifying adherence to hidebound procedure where officials focus

AFP

Archiac Defence Planning

AFP

Soldiers stand before the national flag at Red Fort , New Delhi

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AFP

A soldier carries a heavy machine gun in Tiger Hills, Kargil

less on giving the military quality products in an acceptable timeframe, at an optimal cost, and more adhering fanatically to the DPP.

Obsolete Field Artillery The Indian Army’s crippling equipment obsolete is most alarmingly highlighted in its field artillery, the most important element of combat power in the Indian operational context. Unlike western expeditionary armies, which increasingly rely on air-delivered munitions for fire support to ground troops engaged in fleeting encounters with guerrilla opponents, IA operations are most likely to consist of set-piece attack or defence, in which sustained, heavy artillery fires are regarded as crucial for causing attrition on the enemy. This was most recently illustrated during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when India’s ability to pulverise Pakistani positions with massed artillery proved a battle-winning factor.

India has less than 220 regiments of outdated artillery to support troops deployed year-round along its sprawling 4,350km of disputed boundary with Pakistan and China. Since poor road communications disallow the quick

Although the infantry forms the bulk of the Indian Army and has long been its most combat-committed element, its modernisation has languished since 1998, when the MoD cleared what is known as ‘Modification 4B’ for the scaling of an infantry battalion. This involved boosting firepower at the platoon level and also enhancing an infantry battalion’s anti-tank and anti-aircraft capabilities.

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redeployment of guns to threatened sectors, Army planning involves prepositioning artillery all along the 740-km Line of Control, or LoC, between India and Pakistan; the 110-km Actual Ground Position Line, or AGPL, above the Siachen Glacier and the 3,500-km Line of Actual Control, or LAC, between India and China.

But boosting the clearly inadequate numbers and ranges has proved impossible since the late 1980s, when the Bofor’s scandal restricted India’s buy of 155 mm, 45 calibre FH-77B howitzers from the planned 1,510 guns to just 410. The plan to upgrade India’s 60-odd regiments of Soviet-era 130 mm guns to 155 mm was curtailed after the Israeli company, Soltam, was criticised for a poor upgrade job on the first ten regiments. The backbone of India’s artillery, especially in the mountains, remains the indigenous 105 mm gun, which was built in India in two variants: the Light Field Gun for mountain terrain and the Indian Field Gun (IFG) for plains.

Multiple procurements are envisioned under the expansively named Artillery Vision 2027, and the MoD-sanctioned Artillery Modernisation Plan. These include a tender worth an estimated `8, 000 crore for 1,580 towed 155-mm, 52-

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Tank Upgrades The Army’s tank arsenal is based predominantly on 2,418 obsolescent T-72 tanks, the first of which came into service in 1979, more than three decades ago.

Underpowered, night blind and reliant on outdated gunnery computers, many of these will be replaced by a planned arsenal of 1,657 T-90 tanks, 1,100 of which will be built at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF), Avadi. But, since more than a thousand T72s will continue to be in service beyond 2022, the Army plans to spend ` 5 crore per T-72 (it was bought for ` 9 crore each) on retrofitting crucial systems, including the fire control system, main engine and night vision devices. This procurement has sputtered along for almost a decade with barely visible success.

The early retirement of the T-72 has been stymied by the Army’s incomprehensible refusal to order larger numbers of the DRDO-developed Arjun, a 60-tonne Main Battle Tank that outperformed the

Infantry modernisation has been more a slogan than a reality. India’s mechanised forces, which constituted a formidable conventional deterrent through the 1980s and 1990s, have lost ground to Pakistan, which has dramatically cut down India’s combat power advantage with the intelligent purchase of modern tanks from Eastern Europe and self-propelled artillery from the US.

”

AFP

calibre howitzers. Another tender worth over `3,000 crore is being pursued, under the US Foreign Military Sales Programme, for 140 ultralight 155-mm, 39-calibre howitzers for mountain formations. Another `3,500 crore is chasing 100 track-mounted 155-mm, 52 calibre guns for the mechanised formations. And `4,000 crore is earmarked for 180 similar vehicle-mounted guns for self-propelled regiments. The total money in play here, some `18,500 crore, is less a problem than the glacial pace at which these procurements have been processed over the last decade.

Mounting frustration over the delays in artillery procurement have encouraged an Indian consortium, led by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), in partnership with private sector companies, to consider a domestic howitzer development programme. Such an enterprise would bypass many of the procedural and political hurdles that have stymied attempts to purchase foreign artillery systems.

Also making headway is Project Shakti, or the Artillery Combat Command and Control System, a digital network that has been jointly developed by the DRDO’s Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). Dedicated to the Army in June 2009, this is the first of India’s net-centric warfare systems that are intended to seamlessly integrate command functions in the 21st century battlefield.

APRIL 2011

T-90 during comparative trials Soldiers patrol in Infantry Modernisation conducted by the Army’s 180 Darranga village in the Although the infantry forms Armoured Brigade near Bikaner Nalbari district on the the bulk of the Indian Army in March 2010. While a bulk Indo-Bhutan border, and has long been its most order for Arjun tanks would Assam combat-committed element, allow HVF Avadi to scale up its infantry modernisation has production line, the Army has capped its languished since 1998, when the MoD order at 248 Arjuns. cleared what is known as ‘Modification 4B’ The T-72, after its planned upgrade, to the scaling of an infantry battalion. This will cost `14 crore per tank. The T-90s that involved boosting firepower at the platoon HVF has produced since 2009 cost `17.5 level and also enhancing an infantry crore apiece. In contrast, a brand new battalion’s anti-tank and anti-aircraft Arjun, with a 1,400 horsepower engine, capabilities. In 2003, a `3,500 crore infantry state-of-the-art integrated electronics, modernisation plan was cleared, which an acclaimed 120 mm gun, and the involved the procurement of 84 mm rocket indigenous, widely praised Kanchan launchers, anti-material rifles, under-barrel armour, comes in at `16.8 crore. grenade launchers, Kornet-E anti-tank Given the Arjun’s much-delayed guided missiles and modern small arms, success, the Army and the DRDO are including sniper rifles. formulating the specifications of a nextThe new game-changer for the infantry generation tank, so far referred to as the is an ambitious new development project Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT). This will called the Future Infantry Soldier as a be developed by the DRDO as an entirely System (F-INSAS), which aims to convert indigenous project. Additionally, the an infantryman into a digitally-networked Army has sent out a Request for all-terrain ll-weather, weapons platform Information (RfI) to global vendors for with enhanced lethality, survivability, light tanks, which it plans to deploy in the sustainability, mobility and situational awareness. This is still a development Northeast and for mountain warfare.

14

project, in which the DRDO, Indian industry and foreign technology partners are working together.

Modernisation of the mechanised infantry is another priority project for the Army, with four private sector companies – Tata Motors; the Mahindra Group; L&T; and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board – competing to design and build 2,600 new-generation Future Infantry Combat Vehicles (F-ICVs) to replace the IA’s aging fleet of Russiandesigned BMP-IIs. It is estimated that the development cost and the cost of manufacturing 2,600 F-ICVs for the mechanised infantry could add up to `50,000 crore, making this India’s most expensive defence contract so far. The four companies will be submitting their proposals to the MoD by May 2011.

Air Defence For Mechanised Forces Air defence remains a crucial vulnerability in India’s national defence, with even the IAF chief and the defence minister publicly admitting to gaps in the radar coverage of Indian airspace. The efficacy of the Soviet-era SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile

batteries, which have been granted several life-extensions by the OEMs, is also questionable. The air defence of India’s mechanised forces is another major gap, with the SAM-6, SAM-7 and SAM-8 medium range missile systems, procured in the 1980s, having lived out their service lives.

With the overseas procurement of replacement missile systems appearing too expensive to be viable, the MoD has initiated several development projects to produce India’s requirements indigenously. The DRDO’s Akash missile is already entering service; BEL and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) are building 8 Akash squadrons for the IAF and 6 squadrons for the Army. And DRDO, in partnership with Israeli defence manufacturers, is developing a Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LR-SAM) with a range of 70km; a Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SR-SAM) with a range of 15km and is also developing hypersonic technology for more advanced missiles. The IndoRussian Brahmos cruise missile, which was designed as an anti-ship missile with a

15

DSI

range of 290km, has been modified for the Army for use against surface targets and has been undergoing extensive testing.

The DRDO is also at an intermediate stage in developing an integrated antiballistic missile system, having tested both exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interceptors. This system is also capable of functioning as a long range air defence system, capable of engaging aircraft targets at ranges above 100km.

Meanwhile, also following the indigenisation track, the private and public sectors are competing for a development project to upgrade the L-70 air defence gun and integrate it with a fire control radar.

Signals Modernisation The provision of a state-of-the-art communication’s network for the Army is one of the MoD’s key modernisation priorities. The static communications network along the borders is being converted to optic fibre. Meanwhile, a major indigenous development project – the Tactical Communications System, or TCS – has been initiated under the ‘Make’ procedure of the DPP. Eight consortia, led

by Indian prime contractors – which include BEL, ECIL, ITI, Tata Power SED, Rolta, L&T, Wipro and HCL Infosystems – will submit bids in late April.

Also being developed indigenously are a series of electronic warfare (EW) systems under the hush-hush Project Suraj, which include a Low Power Jammer; an electronic warfare system for low intensity conflict; an Integrated EW System for Mountains; and a track and wheeled EW system for mechanised formations (EW – Track & Wheeled).

While the high number of indigenous development projects in the IA’s modernisation plan is potentially a positive development, especially if this results in the development of domestic capability, a key reason for this is the failure of the defence procurement system to provide a combat-committed Army with suitable equipment in timely fashion.

It is time for the Army to evolve realistic and well-considered GSQRs, and for the MoD to specify unbreakable time schedules for procurement, with officers being held accountable for delays. It is time also to translate into action the long-discussed proposal for a rolling, non-lapsable Defence Modernisation Fund to assure fund availability when a procurement process is reaching culmination.

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Tank Upgrades The Army’s tank arsenal is based predominantly on 2,418 obsolescent T-72 tanks, the first of which came into service in 1979, more than three decades ago.

Underpowered, night blind and reliant on outdated gunnery computers, many of these will be replaced by a planned arsenal of 1,657 T-90 tanks, 1,100 of which will be built at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF), Avadi. But, since more than a thousand T72s will continue to be in service beyond 2022, the Army plans to spend ` 5 crore per T-72 (it was bought for ` 9 crore each) on retrofitting crucial systems, including the fire control system, main engine and night vision devices. This procurement has sputtered along for almost a decade with barely visible success.

The early retirement of the T-72 has been stymied by the Army’s incomprehensible refusal to order larger numbers of the DRDO-developed Arjun, a 60-tonne Main Battle Tank that outperformed the

Infantry modernisation has been more a slogan than a reality. India’s mechanised forces, which constituted a formidable conventional deterrent through the 1980s and 1990s, have lost ground to Pakistan, which has dramatically cut down India’s combat power advantage with the intelligent purchase of modern tanks from Eastern Europe and self-propelled artillery from the US.

”

AFP

calibre howitzers. Another tender worth over `3,000 crore is being pursued, under the US Foreign Military Sales Programme, for 140 ultralight 155-mm, 39-calibre howitzers for mountain formations. Another `3,500 crore is chasing 100 track-mounted 155-mm, 52 calibre guns for the mechanised formations. And `4,000 crore is earmarked for 180 similar vehicle-mounted guns for self-propelled regiments. The total money in play here, some `18,500 crore, is less a problem than the glacial pace at which these procurements have been processed over the last decade.

Mounting frustration over the delays in artillery procurement have encouraged an Indian consortium, led by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), in partnership with private sector companies, to consider a domestic howitzer development programme. Such an enterprise would bypass many of the procedural and political hurdles that have stymied attempts to purchase foreign artillery systems.

Also making headway is Project Shakti, or the Artillery Combat Command and Control System, a digital network that has been jointly developed by the DRDO’s Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). Dedicated to the Army in June 2009, this is the first of India’s net-centric warfare systems that are intended to seamlessly integrate command functions in the 21st century battlefield.

APRIL 2011

T-90 during comparative trials Soldiers patrol in Infantry Modernisation conducted by the Army’s 180 Darranga village in the Although the infantry forms Armoured Brigade near Bikaner Nalbari district on the the bulk of the Indian Army in March 2010. While a bulk Indo-Bhutan border, and has long been its most order for Arjun tanks would Assam combat-committed element, allow HVF Avadi to scale up its infantry modernisation has production line, the Army has capped its languished since 1998, when the MoD order at 248 Arjuns. cleared what is known as ‘Modification 4B’ The T-72, after its planned upgrade, to the scaling of an infantry battalion. This will cost `14 crore per tank. The T-90s that involved boosting firepower at the platoon HVF has produced since 2009 cost `17.5 level and also enhancing an infantry crore apiece. In contrast, a brand new battalion’s anti-tank and anti-aircraft Arjun, with a 1,400 horsepower engine, capabilities. In 2003, a `3,500 crore infantry state-of-the-art integrated electronics, modernisation plan was cleared, which an acclaimed 120 mm gun, and the involved the procurement of 84 mm rocket indigenous, widely praised Kanchan launchers, anti-material rifles, under-barrel armour, comes in at `16.8 crore. grenade launchers, Kornet-E anti-tank Given the Arjun’s much-delayed guided missiles and modern small arms, success, the Army and the DRDO are including sniper rifles. formulating the specifications of a nextThe new game-changer for the infantry generation tank, so far referred to as the is an ambitious new development project Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT). This will called the Future Infantry Soldier as a be developed by the DRDO as an entirely System (F-INSAS), which aims to convert indigenous project. Additionally, the an infantryman into a digitally-networked Army has sent out a Request for all-terrain ll-weather, weapons platform Information (RfI) to global vendors for with enhanced lethality, survivability, light tanks, which it plans to deploy in the sustainability, mobility and situational awareness. This is still a development Northeast and for mountain warfare.

14

project, in which the DRDO, Indian industry and foreign technology partners are working together.

Modernisation of the mechanised infantry is another priority project for the Army, with four private sector companies – Tata Motors; the Mahindra Group; L&T; and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board – competing to design and build 2,600 new-generation Future Infantry Combat Vehicles (F-ICVs) to replace the IA’s aging fleet of Russiandesigned BMP-IIs. It is estimated that the development cost and the cost of manufacturing 2,600 F-ICVs for the mechanised infantry could add up to `50,000 crore, making this India’s most expensive defence contract so far. The four companies will be submitting their proposals to the MoD by May 2011.

Air Defence For Mechanised Forces Air defence remains a crucial vulnerability in India’s national defence, with even the IAF chief and the defence minister publicly admitting to gaps in the radar coverage of Indian airspace. The efficacy of the Soviet-era SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile

batteries, which have been granted several life-extensions by the OEMs, is also questionable. The air defence of India’s mechanised forces is another major gap, with the SAM-6, SAM-7 and SAM-8 medium range missile systems, procured in the 1980s, having lived out their service lives.

With the overseas procurement of replacement missile systems appearing too expensive to be viable, the MoD has initiated several development projects to produce India’s requirements indigenously. The DRDO’s Akash missile is already entering service; BEL and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) are building 8 Akash squadrons for the IAF and 6 squadrons for the Army. And DRDO, in partnership with Israeli defence manufacturers, is developing a Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LR-SAM) with a range of 70km; a Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SR-SAM) with a range of 15km and is also developing hypersonic technology for more advanced missiles. The IndoRussian Brahmos cruise missile, which was designed as an anti-ship missile with a

15

DSI

range of 290km, has been modified for the Army for use against surface targets and has been undergoing extensive testing.

The DRDO is also at an intermediate stage in developing an integrated antiballistic missile system, having tested both exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interceptors. This system is also capable of functioning as a long range air defence system, capable of engaging aircraft targets at ranges above 100km.

Meanwhile, also following the indigenisation track, the private and public sectors are competing for a development project to upgrade the L-70 air defence gun and integrate it with a fire control radar.

Signals Modernisation The provision of a state-of-the-art communication’s network for the Army is one of the MoD’s key modernisation priorities. The static communications network along the borders is being converted to optic fibre. Meanwhile, a major indigenous development project – the Tactical Communications System, or TCS – has been initiated under the ‘Make’ procedure of the DPP. Eight consortia, led

by Indian prime contractors – which include BEL, ECIL, ITI, Tata Power SED, Rolta, L&T, Wipro and HCL Infosystems – will submit bids in late April.

Also being developed indigenously are a series of electronic warfare (EW) systems under the hush-hush Project Suraj, which include a Low Power Jammer; an electronic warfare system for low intensity conflict; an Integrated EW System for Mountains; and a track and wheeled EW system for mechanised formations (EW – Track & Wheeled).

While the high number of indigenous development projects in the IA’s modernisation plan is potentially a positive development, especially if this results in the development of domestic capability, a key reason for this is the failure of the defence procurement system to provide a combat-committed Army with suitable equipment in timely fashion.

It is time for the Army to evolve realistic and well-considered GSQRs, and for the MoD to specify unbreakable time schedules for procurement, with officers being held accountable for delays. It is time also to translate into action the long-discussed proposal for a rolling, non-lapsable Defence Modernisation Fund to assure fund availability when a procurement process is reaching culmination.

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THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET The global fiscal crisis may have little impact on India’s allocations as seen in this year’s defence budget but in real terms the outlay falls far short of national security needs

LAXMAN BEHERA

KEY POINTS n The 2011-12 Budget has increased the defence allocation to `1,64,415.49 crore. The allocation, to be spent in the current fiscal year, represents a 12 percent increase over last year’s Budget. n The Ministry of Defence is satisfied with its new allocation. n The Budget as measured in terms of its share in national resources – such as the GDP and CGE – continues to decrease.

ike many other countries, India has a unique way of presenting its Defence Budget which is the summation of allocations for the Defence Services, which include the three armed forces, the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), an umbrella organisation consisting of 50odd laboratories engaged in defencerelated research and 40-odd Ordnance

L

AFP

Indian soldiers load a Bofor’s artillery gun during Operation Desert Strike at Pokhran, Rajasthan

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DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

APRIL 2011

DSI

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET The global fiscal crisis may have little impact on India’s allocations as seen in this year’s defence budget but in real terms the outlay falls far short of national security needs

LAXMAN BEHERA

KEY POINTS n The 2011-12 Budget has increased the defence allocation to `1,64,415.49 crore. The allocation, to be spent in the current fiscal year, represents a 12 percent increase over last year’s Budget. n The Ministry of Defence is satisfied with its new allocation. n The Budget as measured in terms of its share in national resources – such as the GDP and CGE – continues to decrease.

ike many other countries, India has a unique way of presenting its Defence Budget which is the summation of allocations for the Defence Services, which include the three armed forces, the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), an umbrella organisation consisting of 50odd laboratories engaged in defencerelated research and 40-odd Ordnance

L

AFP

Indian soldiers load a Bofor’s artillery gun during Operation Desert Strike at Pokhran, Rajasthan

16

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DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

APRIL 2011

Factories. The Budget, however, does not include defence pension, which used to be included till the late 1990s and the civil expenditure of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The latter consists of expenses of the MoD which include the Secretariat, Defence Estate Organisation, Defence Accounts Department, Coast Guard Organisation, Canteen Stores Department and the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.

In the 2011-12 outlay, the defence pension accounts for ` 34,000 crore ($7.5 billion) while the MoD’s civil expenditure amounts to ` 4,156.8 crore ($0.9 billion).

If these two heads of expenditures are included, then the total allocation available for the MoD stands at ` 2,02,572.3 crore ($44.4 billion).

Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters take part in a fly past, New Delhi

AFP

Escaping the Austerity Axe

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This year when the Defence Budget was announced, most analysts feared a cut in the outlay in view of the government’s resolve to bring the nation’s fiscal situation under the control. Analogies were being drawn to the stringent measures taken by administrations in the US, UK and some other countries which had taken steps to reign in their defence expenses to reduce the debt burden on their economies. However, contrary to expectations, India’s Defence Budget increased by 12 percent, making it one of the highest in recent years.

The prime reason why the Budget escaped elements of fiscal austerity was a turnaround in the Indian economy which was suffering from the after effects of the global financial crisis. The return of the national economic growth to its ‘precrisis’ status at nine percent gave the Finance Ministry some scope to step up its revenue collection, while keeping fiscal deficit in check.

This fiscal year, the government’s net revenue is expected to rise by 16 percent to ` 7,89,892 crore ($173.3 billion), mainly because of its increase in tax revenue which is projected to grow by 24 percent to ` 6,64,457 crore ($145.8 billion). The expected escalation in revenue collection has made it possible for the Finance Ministry to follow the twin goals of fiscal consolidation and expansion of total expenditure. This, in turn, has benefited many Central ministries and departments including the MoD. India’s Defence Budget is broadly divided into two categories – revenue expenditure and capital expenditure. The

former mainly caters to the running or operating expenditure of the defence Services. The major items under this head include pay and allowances, stores and equipments, transportation, maintenance of buildings and installations. Capital expenditure on the other hand caters to the creation of assets of a long-term nature. The most crucial part of capital expenditure is acquisition expenditure which is spent on the procurement of hardware such as aircraft, tanks, missiles, radars, naval ships and so on.

Historically, revenue expenditure accounts for the bulk of the Defence Budget, although its share has come down sharply over the years. For instance, the revenue: capital ratio which was 74:26 in the 9th Plan (1997-2002) has vastly improved in favour of capital expenditure.

Its share has gone up to 42 percent in the latest Budget indicating the MoD’s greater focus on modernisation of its armed forces.

In the new Budget, revenue expenditure totals ` 95,216.7 crore ($20.9 billion) and capital expenditure, ` 69,198.8 crore ($15.2 billion).

The reason why the Budget escaped elements of fiscal austerity was a turnaround in the economy which was suffering from the after effects of the global financial crisis.The return of the national economic growth rate to its ‘pre-crisis’ status, at 9 percent, gave the Finance Ministry some scope to step up its revenue collection while keeping fiscal deficit in check.

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In this year’s outlay, the Army has an allocation of ` 83,402 crore ($18.3 billion), accounting for 51 percent of the total Budget, distantly followed by the Air Force (` 46,152 crore or $10.1 billion), the Navy (` 25,247 crore or $5.5 billion), DRDO (`10,253 crore or $2.2 billion) and Ordnance Factories (` 777 crore or $0.2 billion). This lion’s share for the Army is due to a large-scale provision under revenue expenditure, which is primarily driven by pay and allowances. In terms of capital expenditure, the Air Force, with a budget of ` 30,224 crore ($6.6 billion), is the most capital-intensive, followed by the Army (` 19,151 crore or $4.2 billion), the Navy with `14,658 crore ($3.2 billion), DRDO with ` 4,628 crore ($1.0 billion) and OFs with ` 400 crore ($0.1 billion).

Utilising Capital Expenditure In the past, the MoD has had difficulty in spending its full budget, especially the capital portion which drives the modernisation process of the armed forces. As a result, funds amounting to billions of dollars have been surrendered at the end of each fiscal year.

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DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

APRIL 2011

Factories. The Budget, however, does not include defence pension, which used to be included till the late 1990s and the civil expenditure of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The latter consists of expenses of the MoD which include the Secretariat, Defence Estate Organisation, Defence Accounts Department, Coast Guard Organisation, Canteen Stores Department and the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.

In the 2011-12 outlay, the defence pension accounts for ` 34,000 crore ($7.5 billion) while the MoD’s civil expenditure amounts to ` 4,156.8 crore ($0.9 billion).

If these two heads of expenditures are included, then the total allocation available for the MoD stands at ` 2,02,572.3 crore ($44.4 billion).

Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters take part in a fly past, New Delhi

AFP

Escaping the Austerity Axe

18

This year when the Defence Budget was announced, most analysts feared a cut in the outlay in view of the government’s resolve to bring the nation’s fiscal situation under the control. Analogies were being drawn to the stringent measures taken by administrations in the US, UK and some other countries which had taken steps to reign in their defence expenses to reduce the debt burden on their economies. However, contrary to expectations, India’s Defence Budget increased by 12 percent, making it one of the highest in recent years.

The prime reason why the Budget escaped elements of fiscal austerity was a turnaround in the Indian economy which was suffering from the after effects of the global financial crisis. The return of the national economic growth to its ‘precrisis’ status at nine percent gave the Finance Ministry some scope to step up its revenue collection, while keeping fiscal deficit in check.

This fiscal year, the government’s net revenue is expected to rise by 16 percent to ` 7,89,892 crore ($173.3 billion), mainly because of its increase in tax revenue which is projected to grow by 24 percent to ` 6,64,457 crore ($145.8 billion). The expected escalation in revenue collection has made it possible for the Finance Ministry to follow the twin goals of fiscal consolidation and expansion of total expenditure. This, in turn, has benefited many Central ministries and departments including the MoD. India’s Defence Budget is broadly divided into two categories – revenue expenditure and capital expenditure. The

former mainly caters to the running or operating expenditure of the defence Services. The major items under this head include pay and allowances, stores and equipments, transportation, maintenance of buildings and installations. Capital expenditure on the other hand caters to the creation of assets of a long-term nature. The most crucial part of capital expenditure is acquisition expenditure which is spent on the procurement of hardware such as aircraft, tanks, missiles, radars, naval ships and so on.

Historically, revenue expenditure accounts for the bulk of the Defence Budget, although its share has come down sharply over the years. For instance, the revenue: capital ratio which was 74:26 in the 9th Plan (1997-2002) has vastly improved in favour of capital expenditure.

Its share has gone up to 42 percent in the latest Budget indicating the MoD’s greater focus on modernisation of its armed forces.

In the new Budget, revenue expenditure totals ` 95,216.7 crore ($20.9 billion) and capital expenditure, ` 69,198.8 crore ($15.2 billion).

The reason why the Budget escaped elements of fiscal austerity was a turnaround in the economy which was suffering from the after effects of the global financial crisis.The return of the national economic growth rate to its ‘pre-crisis’ status, at 9 percent, gave the Finance Ministry some scope to step up its revenue collection while keeping fiscal deficit in check.

”

DSI

In this year’s outlay, the Army has an allocation of ` 83,402 crore ($18.3 billion), accounting for 51 percent of the total Budget, distantly followed by the Air Force (` 46,152 crore or $10.1 billion), the Navy (` 25,247 crore or $5.5 billion), DRDO (`10,253 crore or $2.2 billion) and Ordnance Factories (` 777 crore or $0.2 billion). This lion’s share for the Army is due to a large-scale provision under revenue expenditure, which is primarily driven by pay and allowances. In terms of capital expenditure, the Air Force, with a budget of ` 30,224 crore ($6.6 billion), is the most capital-intensive, followed by the Army (` 19,151 crore or $4.2 billion), the Navy with `14,658 crore ($3.2 billion), DRDO with ` 4,628 crore ($1.0 billion) and OFs with ` 400 crore ($0.1 billion).

Utilising Capital Expenditure In the past, the MoD has had difficulty in spending its full budget, especially the capital portion which drives the modernisation process of the armed forces. As a result, funds amounting to billions of dollars have been surrendered at the end of each fiscal year.

Defence Budget 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:42 PM Page 20

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

However, as the new Defence Budget reveals the MoD has spent more than its 2010-11 budgetary allocations earmarked under the capital head. On the face of it, the over-utilisation of the capital fund is credible given the complexities involved in defence procurement. However, a closer examination of the Budget reveals that the spending has not been done as intended in the original Budget, leading to under-utilisation under some heads and over-utilisation in others.

For instance, 30 percent of the allocation under the head of ‘Other Equipment’ which caters to missiles, radars and electronic items remains under-utilised, whereas the allocations under ‘Aircraft and Aero-Engine’ and ‘Naval Fleet’ have been over-utilised by 24 percent and 11 per cent respectively.

AFP

AFP

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee

DSI

The Defence Budget measured in terms of its share in national resources – such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Central Government Expenditure (CGE) – continues to decrease.

For instance, in comparison to 1985 when the Defence Budget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDP and 16.10 percent of CGE, the present Defence Budget accounts for 1.83 percent of GDP and 13.07 percent of CGE.

AFP

Defence Minister A.K. Antony

APRIL 2011

It is, however, not clear whether the overspending is necessitated due to a change of plan midway, or because of the parking of funds with the stateowned enterprises so as not to surrender them. With regards the parking of funds, there have been several occasions in the past, where the MoD has deliberately transferred funds in excess of the annual budgetary provisions to its production agencies.

Impact on Modernisation India’s armed forces are now on a modernisation drive. The shopping list includes virtually all kind of weapons and platforms, including fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, radars, missiles and warships. It’s appropriate to ask whether the latest Budget has the necessary

20

financial provisions to meet such requirements (see cover story).

Given the fact that the modernisation programme of the armed forces largely depends on capital acquisitions, it boils down to how the capital budget is allocated. Of the total `69,198.8 crore ($15.2 billion) earmarked for capital expenditure, nearly 80 percent (`55,600 crore or $12.2 billion) will be spent on procurement.

Assuming that 60 percent of the procurement budget goes for “committed liabilities” (on account of contracts already signed), the MoD has around `22,240 crore ($4.9 billion) to pay for new acquisitions which are up for contract- signing in 2011-12. It is expected that the first tranche of money will flow from the new Bud get for the much awaited 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA),

C-17 Globemaster, both for the Air Force, advanced helicopters for the Air Force and Army and patrol vessels for the Navy.

If these contracts materialise, it will be a huge boost for the modernisation of the armed forces.

Need for Higher Allocations Is the amount allocated enough? Although India enjoys a geo-strategic advantage because of its location it also faces a multitude of security threats from land, sea, air and now increasingly cyberspace.

The rise of China as a strong military power supported by massive military spending, has further complicated India’s security calculations. China’s latest Defence Budget of $91.5 billion is more than two-and-a-half times that of India’s. There is a growing sense of concern among the

”

The decreasing share of defence Indian security establishment Indian Navy in national resources is a matter about Beijing’s rapid progress personnel of concern given India’s huge in military capability and its participate in a gap in military capability. For adverse impact on our national Republic Day instance, the Navy is battling security. Security analysts in Parade, with the grim prospect of particular are demanding an New Delhi retaining only 61, 44 and 20 increase in defence spending that is commensurate with national percent of the envisaged force levels for frigates, destroyers and corvettes. security requirements.

The other sister services are facing a However, contrary to the demands for higher allocation, the Defence Budget similar situation. Given that the resources measured in terms of its share in constitute the core input for augmenting national resources – such as the GDP and military capability, there is a need to Central Government Expenditure (CGE) – progressively increase defence spending continues to decrease. For instance, in to at least three percent of the GDP. comparison to 1985 when the Defence This level of spending is not only Budget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDP internationally accepted as affordable, but and 16.10 percent of the CGE, the present the one promised to be delivered to the Defence Budget accounts for 1.83 percent cause of national defence by the Prime of the GDP and 13.07 percent of the CGE. Minister in 2005.

21

Defence Budget 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:42 PM Page 20

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

However, as the new Defence Budget reveals the MoD has spent more than its 2010-11 budgetary allocations earmarked under the capital head. On the face of it, the over-utilisation of the capital fund is credible given the complexities involved in defence procurement. However, a closer examination of the Budget reveals that the spending has not been done as intended in the original Budget, leading to under-utilisation under some heads and over-utilisation in others.

For instance, 30 percent of the allocation under the head of ‘Other Equipment’ which caters to missiles, radars and electronic items remains under-utilised, whereas the allocations under ‘Aircraft and Aero-Engine’ and ‘Naval Fleet’ have been over-utilised by 24 percent and 11 per cent respectively.

AFP

AFP

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee

DSI

The Defence Budget measured in terms of its share in national resources – such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Central Government Expenditure (CGE) – continues to decrease.

For instance, in comparison to 1985 when the Defence Budget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDP and 16.10 percent of CGE, the present Defence Budget accounts for 1.83 percent of GDP and 13.07 percent of CGE.

AFP

Defence Minister A.K. Antony

APRIL 2011

It is, however, not clear whether the overspending is necessitated due to a change of plan midway, or because of the parking of funds with the stateowned enterprises so as not to surrender them. With regards the parking of funds, there have been several occasions in the past, where the MoD has deliberately transferred funds in excess of the annual budgetary provisions to its production agencies.

Impact on Modernisation India’s armed forces are now on a modernisation drive. The shopping list includes virtually all kind of weapons and platforms, including fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, radars, missiles and warships. It’s appropriate to ask whether the latest Budget has the necessary

20

financial provisions to meet such requirements (see cover story).

Given the fact that the modernisation programme of the armed forces largely depends on capital acquisitions, it boils down to how the capital budget is allocated. Of the total `69,198.8 crore ($15.2 billion) earmarked for capital expenditure, nearly 80 percent (`55,600 crore or $12.2 billion) will be spent on procurement.

Assuming that 60 percent of the procurement budget goes for “committed liabilities” (on account of contracts already signed), the MoD has around `22,240 crore ($4.9 billion) to pay for new acquisitions which are up for contract- signing in 2011-12. It is expected that the first tranche of money will flow from the new Bud get for the much awaited 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA),

C-17 Globemaster, both for the Air Force, advanced helicopters for the Air Force and Army and patrol vessels for the Navy.

If these contracts materialise, it will be a huge boost for the modernisation of the armed forces.

Need for Higher Allocations Is the amount allocated enough? Although India enjoys a geo-strategic advantage because of its location it also faces a multitude of security threats from land, sea, air and now increasingly cyberspace.

The rise of China as a strong military power supported by massive military spending, has further complicated India’s security calculations. China’s latest Defence Budget of $91.5 billion is more than two-and-a-half times that of India’s. There is a growing sense of concern among the

”

The decreasing share of defence Indian security establishment Indian Navy in national resources is a matter about Beijing’s rapid progress personnel of concern given India’s huge in military capability and its participate in a gap in military capability. For adverse impact on our national Republic Day instance, the Navy is battling security. Security analysts in Parade, with the grim prospect of particular are demanding an New Delhi retaining only 61, 44 and 20 increase in defence spending that is commensurate with national percent of the envisaged force levels for frigates, destroyers and corvettes. security requirements.

The other sister services are facing a However, contrary to the demands for higher allocation, the Defence Budget similar situation. Given that the resources measured in terms of its share in constitute the core input for augmenting national resources – such as the GDP and military capability, there is a need to Central Government Expenditure (CGE) – progressively increase defence spending continues to decrease. For instance, in to at least three percent of the GDP. comparison to 1985 when the Defence This level of spending is not only Budget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDP internationally accepted as affordable, but and 16.10 percent of the CGE, the present the one promised to be delivered to the Defence Budget accounts for 1.83 percent cause of national defence by the Prime of the GDP and 13.07 percent of the CGE. Minister in 2005.

21

India's Space Programme - LATEST 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:53 PM Page 22

SPACE

APRIL 2011

ISRO’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle - C14 lifting off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh

DSI

AJEY LELE

KEY POINTS ISRO’s dream to achieve selfsufficiency in launching heavy satellites will remain unfulfilled till it succeeds in mastering reliable cryogenic technology. n The problems with ISRO are not only connected to launch vehicles but it also faces challenges with some satellites operating in space. n Bhuvan, ISRO’s answer to Google Earth, is facing certain glitches. n

istorically, many of the world’s big events, inventions, ideas even missions have had small beginnings. India’s entry into the space arena on November 21, 1963 also had a nascent start from a small church in Thumba village located in the heart of Kerala with the launching of sounding rockets. The location of the village was important because the geomagnetic equator passes through it and the only available building in that village at that time was the local church. Since then during the last four to five decades, India’s space programme has made significant progress and is recognised globally but at the same time it continues to face growing challenges.

India actually became a ‘space-faring’ nation on July 18, 1980 with the launch of the Rohini satellite by using an indigenously made satellite launch vehicle. At that time India was the seventh nation in the world to become spaceworthy. After India, over the last thirty years only two more countries have been able to join this coveted group – Iran and North Korea whose claims are still a little doubtful. The fundamental aim of India’s space programme has always been to use space technology for socioeconomic development and to make advances in the fields of communication, meteorology, science, education and natural resource management.

In its early years, India’s space programme started under the tutelage of the Department of Atomic Energy. To develop the nation’s space agenda, the

UPWARDS AND, SOMETIMES,

DOWNWARDS The recent failure of the ambititious Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle has raised questions over the role of the Indian Space Research Organisation in the country’s space programme 22

AFP

H

Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was set up under the able stewardship of Dr Vikram Sarabhai who articulated India’s space vision. Later in 1969, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was formed under the Department of Atomic Energy.

Three years later it was subsequently brought under the Department of Space.

Reflecting the importance of space in a nation’s thinking, in the same year, a Space Commission was set up reporting directly to the Prime Minister.

Many believe that ISRO has done a commendable job over the years by successfully undertaking various missions of national importance.

Contributing to its growth have been many known and unknown people.

Perhaps the most significant contribution towards the development of India’s space programme has been made by Prof Satish Dhawan. Many believe that the former chairperson of the Space Commission has remained an unsung hero in India’s space annals.

Developing a Space Agenda Thanks to its early grounding over the last four decades ISRO has many achievements to its credit. It has established various units in the specific fields of technology, directly or indirectly related to satellite manufacture, in launch vehicles systems and ground infrastructure. It has also developed significant expertise in the arenas of propulsion, telemetry, tracking and communications systems.

Today, India is in a position to launch satellites weighing approximately 2,000 kgs. It has also established a strong infrastructure for remote sensing and created effective communications satellite systems. In 1992, it established a commercial outlet, Antrix Corporation.

This organisation looks after the commercial aspects of ISRO both in the launch market as well as in the area of telecommunication products and satellitederived data.

Clearly, India’s space programme has witnessed an exponential growth. During the 1980s, the focus of India’s space

23

programme was on experimental and lowcapability projects. With the help of international assistance the programme developed further. Some Indian scientists trained abroad in developed spacetechnology countries like the US, Russia (erstwhile USSR) and France – all countries which made a significant contribution to the growth and development of India’s space programme.

A few of the early ‘birds’ that were launched in those initial stages were the Aryabhata, the first Indian satellite (1975), Bhaskara-I and II, the first and second experimental remote sensing satellite (1979 and 1981) and the Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment – the first experimental communication satellite (1981).

But by the early eighties, India’s scientific establishment had realised that it had to focus more towards developing an indigenous launch vehicle if the nation was to make strides in space. By the mid-1980s, ISRO started designing and developing the PSLV (Polar Orbiting Satellite Launch Vehicle) and its successor the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). These vehicles were required to launch the indigenously developed Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology and telecommunications satellite, the Indian National Satellite (INSAT). PSLV commenced its operational launches in 1997 and since then it has been widely regarded as a dependable workhorse. With the help of this vehicle, India has to date launched 41 satellites into orbit, more than half for other countries. The PSLV has also been particularly successful in its low earth orbit missions. A variant of the PSLV has also been used for the first Indian moon mission.

Rise and Fall of GSLV Vehicles GSLV vehicles are designed to launch satellites into geostationary orbit some 36,000km above the earth’s surface.

Such vehicles are also used for the launching of heavy satellites usually in the range of 2,500 to 5,000 kg. In September 2007, ISRO launched its INSAT-4CR geostationary satellite with a GSLV F04 vehicle. The success of this launch

India's Space Programme - LATEST 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:53 PM Page 22

SPACE

APRIL 2011

ISRO’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle - C14 lifting off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh

DSI

AJEY LELE

KEY POINTS ISRO’s dream to achieve selfsufficiency in launching heavy satellites will remain unfulfilled till it succeeds in mastering reliable cryogenic technology. n The problems with ISRO are not only connected to launch vehicles but it also faces challenges with some satellites operating in space. n Bhuvan, ISRO’s answer to Google Earth, is facing certain glitches. n

istorically, many of the world’s big events, inventions, ideas even missions have had small beginnings. India’s entry into the space arena on November 21, 1963 also had a nascent start from a small church in Thumba village located in the heart of Kerala with the launching of sounding rockets. The location of the village was important because the geomagnetic equator passes through it and the only available building in that village at that time was the local church. Since then during the last four to five decades, India’s space programme has made significant progress and is recognised globally but at the same time it continues to face growing challenges.

India actually became a ‘space-faring’ nation on July 18, 1980 with the launch of the Rohini satellite by using an indigenously made satellite launch vehicle. At that time India was the seventh nation in the world to become spaceworthy. After India, over the last thirty years only two more countries have been able to join this coveted group – Iran and North Korea whose claims are still a little doubtful. The fundamental aim of India’s space programme has always been to use space technology for socioeconomic development and to make advances in the fields of communication, meteorology, science, education and natural resource management.

In its early years, India’s space programme started under the tutelage of the Department of Atomic Energy. To develop the nation’s space agenda, the

UPWARDS AND, SOMETIMES,

DOWNWARDS The recent failure of the ambititious Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle has raised questions over the role of the Indian Space Research Organisation in the country’s space programme 22

AFP

H

Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was set up under the able stewardship of Dr Vikram Sarabhai who articulated India’s space vision. Later in 1969, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was formed under the Department of Atomic Energy.

Three years later it was subsequently brought under the Department of Space.

Reflecting the importance of space in a nation’s thinking, in the same year, a Space Commission was set up reporting directly to the Prime Minister.

Many believe that ISRO has done a commendable job over the years by successfully undertaking various missions of national importance.

Contributing to its growth have been many known and unknown people.

Perhaps the most significant contribution towards the development of India’s space programme has been made by Prof Satish Dhawan. Many believe that the former chairperson of the Space Commission has remained an unsung hero in India’s space annals.

Developing a Space Agenda Thanks to its early grounding over the last four decades ISRO has many achievements to its credit. It has established various units in the specific fields of technology, directly or indirectly related to satellite manufacture, in launch vehicles systems and ground infrastructure. It has also developed significant expertise in the arenas of propulsion, telemetry, tracking and communications systems.

Today, India is in a position to launch satellites weighing approximately 2,000 kgs. It has also established a strong infrastructure for remote sensing and created effective communications satellite systems. In 1992, it established a commercial outlet, Antrix Corporation.

This organisation looks after the commercial aspects of ISRO both in the launch market as well as in the area of telecommunication products and satellitederived data.

Clearly, India’s space programme has witnessed an exponential growth. During the 1980s, the focus of India’s space

23

programme was on experimental and lowcapability projects. With the help of international assistance the programme developed further. Some Indian scientists trained abroad in developed spacetechnology countries like the US, Russia (erstwhile USSR) and France – all countries which made a significant contribution to the growth and development of India’s space programme.

A few of the early ‘birds’ that were launched in those initial stages were the Aryabhata, the first Indian satellite (1975), Bhaskara-I and II, the first and second experimental remote sensing satellite (1979 and 1981) and the Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment – the first experimental communication satellite (1981).

But by the early eighties, India’s scientific establishment had realised that it had to focus more towards developing an indigenous launch vehicle if the nation was to make strides in space. By the mid-1980s, ISRO started designing and developing the PSLV (Polar Orbiting Satellite Launch Vehicle) and its successor the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). These vehicles were required to launch the indigenously developed Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology and telecommunications satellite, the Indian National Satellite (INSAT). PSLV commenced its operational launches in 1997 and since then it has been widely regarded as a dependable workhorse. With the help of this vehicle, India has to date launched 41 satellites into orbit, more than half for other countries. The PSLV has also been particularly successful in its low earth orbit missions. A variant of the PSLV has also been used for the first Indian moon mission.

Rise and Fall of GSLV Vehicles GSLV vehicles are designed to launch satellites into geostationary orbit some 36,000km above the earth’s surface.

Such vehicles are also used for the launching of heavy satellites usually in the range of 2,500 to 5,000 kg. In September 2007, ISRO launched its INSAT-4CR geostationary satellite with a GSLV F04 vehicle. The success of this launch

India's Space Programme - LATEST 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:55 PM Page 24

SPACE

APRIL 2011

Below The Global Average

Last year was marked by two significant failures for ISRO. On December 25, 2010, ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with a GSAT-5P satellite onboard failed.

The vehicle broke up 53.8 seconds from lift-off.

This followed an earlier failure in Mid-April

The truth is ISRO’s current track record of successful space launches is below the global average. Critics feel that ISRO is over extending itself and not being realistic about its current capabilities. That being said, no country has been able to achieve a 100 percent success rate in its space activities.

ISRO’s problems are not only limited to launch vehicles but also to satellites operating in space. ISRO has also yet to resolve issues with the transponders made available by them for DTH television services.

Along the way, there have been many botch-ups. Last July, ISRO reported a glitch in the operation of the INSAT 4B and had to resort to switching off 50 percent of the transponders on board the satellite.

Then INSAT-4CR which was launched in September 2007 for an estimated lifespan of ten years showed some deficiencies.

Immediately after the launch, the satellite failed to reach its planned orbit but somehow managed after a few technical corrections were made. But there has been

”

proved India’s capabilities to put satellites weighing around 2,500 kg into geostationary orbit.

India’s GSLV technology has a PSLV component too. The first two stages of these GSLV vehicles are derived from PSLV technology. ISRO has ambitions of designing and developing a Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark-III (GSLV Mk-III) an entirely new launch vehicle and not based on the PSLV or GSLV Mk-I/II technology. GSLV Mk-III is expected to launch a 4,400 kg satellite to GTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit) with a growth potential towards a 6,000 kg payload capability through minor improvements.

Unfortunately, as 2010 revealed, ISRO is yet to master the GSLV-Mk-I/II vehicle technology fully. On December 25, 2010 ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with, a GSAT-5P satellite onboard, failed. The vehicle broke up 53.8 seconds from lift-off. Surprisingly, the launch failed in the “first stage” of the launch process itself. This followed an earlier failure in mid-April last year when ISRO attempted to use an indigenously made cryogenic engine with its GSLV-D3 to launch the GAST-4 satellite. It may take ISRO some more time to test this technology again.

Last December’s failure, however, cannot be associated with cryogenic engines because the launch had failed before the cryogenic stage. But it can be

AFP

Not Yet a Master

Subsequently, connected with the blending of The GSLV-F06 rocket programme.

Russia ended up selling six the GSLV technology with the before its ill-fated cryogenic technology. Any launch last December cryogenic engines to India.

For the last two decades launch vehicle, like the PSLV, has to use both solid and liquid fuels. India hasbeen working consistently However, for a satellite with more weight, a towards indigenously developing this third stage called the cryogenic stage is technology. But it has been tough. Out of required and sadly India is yet to master the six Russian engines India is now left with only one which has been this technology.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin earmarked for an upcoming second moon was to transfer this technology to India. mission in 2013. The Indian dream to He, however, rescinded, giving in to the achieve self-sufficiency in launching heavy pressure by the then US administration satellites will remain unfulfilled till which feared that India could divert this it succeeds in developing a reliable technology to strengthen its missile cryogenic technology.

24

a price to pay. According to some unconfirmed reports the mission life of this satellite has decreased by five years because of the extra fuel used to carry out the corrections.

Additionally, even though India’s first moon mission was able to perform almost all of its designated tasks correctly the mission wound up more than one year ahead of its schedule: it lasted 9 months against the designed life-span of 24. Few other projects, such as Bhuvan, which is ISRO’s answer to Google Earth, have also exhibited various inadequacies making its users unhappy.

So has ISRO spread itself for this by dreaming too big? The answer is both yes and no. No, because for any visionary organisation it’s critical to have huge dreams which is probably the reason for ISRO’s many achievements. One cannot discount the fact that ISRO discovered water on the moon; that it has launched ten satellites or that it successfully received a capsule back on earth after sending it to space.

Today, ISRO is able to capture data from

DSI

the earth’s surface with less than a metre resolution through its Cartosat series of satellites that match the best in the world.

Recently, the space organisation has also established an effective Control Room for anti-Naxal operations that provides satellite imaging of insurgency-infested areas to security and intelligence agencies.

The organisation also has major plans for the future: from a human space mission to Mars to participating in an international space station experiment to developing India’s own navigational network to launch an astronomical satellite. Also, it intends to increase its transponder capacity from the existing 200 (approximately) to 500. India’s armed forces are also demanding the launch of separate satellites and then there are numerous international clients waiting for ISRO to launch their satellites.

Maybe, just maybe, ISRO is unable to correlate available infrastructure and its existing technology base to the goals it has set itself. And maybe it’s time for ISRO to do some serious soul-searching and take some course correction.

India's Space Programme - LATEST 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:55 PM Page 24

SPACE

APRIL 2011

Below The Global Average

Last year was marked by two significant failures for ISRO. On December 25, 2010, ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with a GSAT-5P satellite onboard failed.

The vehicle broke up 53.8 seconds from lift-off.

This followed an earlier failure in Mid-April

The truth is ISRO’s current track record of successful space launches is below the global average. Critics feel that ISRO is over extending itself and not being realistic about its current capabilities. That being said, no country has been able to achieve a 100 percent success rate in its space activities.

ISRO’s problems are not only limited to launch vehicles but also to satellites operating in space. ISRO has also yet to resolve issues with the transponders made available by them for DTH television services.

Along the way, there have been many botch-ups. Last July, ISRO reported a glitch in the operation of the INSAT 4B and had to resort to switching off 50 percent of the transponders on board the satellite.

Then INSAT-4CR which was launched in September 2007 for an estimated lifespan of ten years showed some deficiencies.

Immediately after the launch, the satellite failed to reach its planned orbit but somehow managed after a few technical corrections were made. But there has been

”

proved India’s capabilities to put satellites weighing around 2,500 kg into geostationary orbit.

India’s GSLV technology has a PSLV component too. The first two stages of these GSLV vehicles are derived from PSLV technology. ISRO has ambitions of designing and developing a Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark-III (GSLV Mk-III) an entirely new launch vehicle and not based on the PSLV or GSLV Mk-I/II technology. GSLV Mk-III is expected to launch a 4,400 kg satellite to GTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit) with a growth potential towards a 6,000 kg payload capability through minor improvements.

Unfortunately, as 2010 revealed, ISRO is yet to master the GSLV-Mk-I/II vehicle technology fully. On December 25, 2010 ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with, a GSAT-5P satellite onboard, failed. The vehicle broke up 53.8 seconds from lift-off. Surprisingly, the launch failed in the “first stage” of the launch process itself. This followed an earlier failure in mid-April last year when ISRO attempted to use an indigenously made cryogenic engine with its GSLV-D3 to launch the GAST-4 satellite. It may take ISRO some more time to test this technology again.

Last December’s failure, however, cannot be associated with cryogenic engines because the launch had failed before the cryogenic stage. But it can be

AFP

Not Yet a Master

Subsequently, connected with the blending of The GSLV-F06 rocket programme.

Russia ended up selling six the GSLV technology with the before its ill-fated cryogenic technology. Any launch last December cryogenic engines to India.

For the last two decades launch vehicle, like the PSLV, has to use both solid and liquid fuels. India hasbeen working consistently However, for a satellite with more weight, a towards indigenously developing this third stage called the cryogenic stage is technology. But it has been tough. Out of required and sadly India is yet to master the six Russian engines India is now left with only one which has been this technology.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin earmarked for an upcoming second moon was to transfer this technology to India. mission in 2013. The Indian dream to He, however, rescinded, giving in to the achieve self-sufficiency in launching heavy pressure by the then US administration satellites will remain unfulfilled till which feared that India could divert this it succeeds in developing a reliable technology to strengthen its missile cryogenic technology.

24

a price to pay. According to some unconfirmed reports the mission life of this satellite has decreased by five years because of the extra fuel used to carry out the corrections.

Additionally, even though India’s first moon mission was able to perform almost all of its designated tasks correctly the mission wound up more than one year ahead of its schedule: it lasted 9 months against the designed life-span of 24. Few other projects, such as Bhuvan, which is ISRO’s answer to Google Earth, have also exhibited various inadequacies making its users unhappy.

So has ISRO spread itself for this by dreaming too big? The answer is both yes and no. No, because for any visionary organisation it’s critical to have huge dreams which is probably the reason for ISRO’s many achievements. One cannot discount the fact that ISRO discovered water on the moon; that it has launched ten satellites or that it successfully received a capsule back on earth after sending it to space.

Today, ISRO is able to capture data from

DSI

the earth’s surface with less than a metre resolution through its Cartosat series of satellites that match the best in the world.

Recently, the space organisation has also established an effective Control Room for anti-Naxal operations that provides satellite imaging of insurgency-infested areas to security and intelligence agencies.

The organisation also has major plans for the future: from a human space mission to Mars to participating in an international space station experiment to developing India’s own navigational network to launch an astronomical satellite. Also, it intends to increase its transponder capacity from the existing 200 (approximately) to 500. India’s armed forces are also demanding the launch of separate satellites and then there are numerous international clients waiting for ISRO to launch their satellites.

Maybe, just maybe, ISRO is unable to correlate available infrastructure and its existing technology base to the goals it has set itself. And maybe it’s time for ISRO to do some serious soul-searching and take some course correction.

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:14 PM Page 26

SECURITY

APRIL 2011

DSI

Till a few years ago, national security was the prime responsibility of the armed forces but today a number of central police and paramilitary forces help in guarding the country’s borders and manage internal security

IN THE LINE OF FIRE

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS n The prevailing internal security environment demands the vigorous implementation of a national-level conflict management strategy with a multi-departmental policy formulation. n The Group of Ministers decided to designate the CRPF as a strike force for internal security and to send the BSF and the ITBP back to the borders. n The NSG is responsible for counter-terrorist operations and counter-hijack tasks.

few decades ago the concept of national security revolved around the defence of India’s borders – a task that was the prime responsibility of the armed forces. Today, that scenario has changed dramatically and a number of Central Police and Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) help in guarding the country’s borders and manage internal security.

Pakistan’s proxy war first in Punjab during the 1980s and then in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) beginning in 1988-89, now in its third decade, triggered this change. The advent of international fundamentalist terrorism increased and internal instability soon became a serious challenge. The Army, which was deployed for internal

A

AFP

Paramilitary Forces guard a polling station in Nameri village, near Guwahati, Assam

26

27

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:14 PM Page 26

SECURITY

APRIL 2011

DSI

Till a few years ago, national security was the prime responsibility of the armed forces but today a number of central police and paramilitary forces help in guarding the country’s borders and manage internal security

IN THE LINE OF FIRE

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS n The prevailing internal security environment demands the vigorous implementation of a national-level conflict management strategy with a multi-departmental policy formulation. n The Group of Ministers decided to designate the CRPF as a strike force for internal security and to send the BSF and the ITBP back to the borders. n The NSG is responsible for counter-terrorist operations and counter-hijack tasks.

few decades ago the concept of national security revolved around the defence of India’s borders – a task that was the prime responsibility of the armed forces. Today, that scenario has changed dramatically and a number of Central Police and Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) help in guarding the country’s borders and manage internal security.

Pakistan’s proxy war first in Punjab during the 1980s and then in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) beginning in 1988-89, now in its third decade, triggered this change. The advent of international fundamentalist terrorism increased and internal instability soon became a serious challenge. The Army, which was deployed for internal

A

AFP

Paramilitary Forces guard a polling station in Nameri village, near Guwahati, Assam

26

27

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:17 PM Page 28

SECURITY

APRIL 2011

Central Police and Paramilitary Forces: The Super Seven According to the 2009-10 annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs , there are seven Central Police and Paramilitary Forces that are controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs. These are: ASSAM RIFLES (AR): A paramilitary force with 46 battalions under the operational control of the Indian Army.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF): Raised as a paramilitary force, now a police force with 159 battalions with 29 battalions under raising.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE (ITBP): Deployed along the Indo-Tibet border and for VIP protection duties, it is a police force with 45 (service) battalions plus four specialised battalions and 20 battalions under raising.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG): Paramilitary force with approximately 8,000 personnel and one Special Action Group (SAG), strike force, comprising Army personnel; two Special Ranger

groups (SRGs), reconnaissance and VIP protection duties, comprising police personnel; Force HQ; major component located at Manesar, near Delhi; four regional hubs at Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB, FORMERLY SPECIAL SERVICE BUREAU): Police force with 46 battalions; deployed along the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF): Police force with 1,20,000 personnel; provides security cover to 289 industrial undertakings (mostly airports, Public Sector Undertakings and heritage monuments) and ensures fire protection.

AFP

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF): Police force with 206 battalions, including two Disaster Management Battalions, three Mahila Battalions, ten RAF (Rapid Action Force) Battalions; five Signals Battalions; and six COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) Battalions; 38 battalions are under raising.

security duties in the Northeastern states since the mid-1950s began to be employed first in Punjab and then in J&K to stabilise the situation.

As Pakistan raised the ante and the number of mercenary jihadis inducted into J&K by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) rose sharply, first the Border Security Force (BSF), and then the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), was employed to assist the Army. Soon the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) was also used to guard vulnerable installations.

The Centre wisely decided to deploy the state and Central Police forces in the urban areas for active operations against militants. The Army was given a free hand to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the rural hinterland and to check infiltration through the Line of Control (LoC).

That this policy succeeded admirably is borne out by the fact that insurgency in J&K is now well under control and the government

has initiated a process of rapprochement to find a permanent solution to the state’s longstanding problems.

Under the Constitution, law and order is basically a state subject and ideally, the constabulary and provincial armed police of the states’ infested by militancy should be capable of handling all but the most vicious forms of militancy with only shortterm supplementary support from the central security forces.

But based on the recommendations of the four task forces that were appointed after the Kargil Review Committee, the Group of Ministers (GoM) decided to designate the CRPF as a strike force for internal security and to send forces such as the BSF and the ITBP to the borders, rather than continuing the ad hoc manner in which these forces were being employed before the Kargil conflict.

Since then the Central Police and Paramilitary Forces are now charged with the responsibility either to manage the

28

country’s borders during peace time or to undertake internal security duties in the country’s various trouble spots.

Border Management Border management is a responsibility that today is shared by the Army with the BSF and the ITBP. Dr G. P. Bhatnagar, former Inspector General, BSF has written that the present border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants; the emergence of non-state actors; a nexus between narcotics and arms smugglers; illegal migrations; left wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and the establishment of madrasas which could prove to be security hazards.

Smugglers, drug-traffickers and fundamentalist terrorists are often in league with local criminals, lower rung political leaders and police functionaries.

Such a situation exacerbates the challenges

of border management, making it more complex for the border guarding agencies. It is axiomatic that poor border management inevitably leads to a volatile internal security situation in the border states of the country.

Ideally, border management should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) during peace time. However, the active nature of the LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, has compelled the Army to permanently deploy large forces for this task. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Army. However, the principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.

Divided responsibilities never result in effective control.

At present, the responsibility for managing the border with China in the north is that of the ITBP’s except in some places such as Sikkim where the Army is in charge. In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is manned by the BSF except the LoC in J&K. The LoC is the responsibility of the Army with some BSF battalions placed under its operational control. On the LoC, the primary operational responsibility of the forces is to ensure its physical integrity against Pakistan Army encroachment; the Army’s secondary responsibility is to minimise trans-LoC infiltration by armed mercenary terrorists usually aided and abetted by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries. However, since the eruption of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal efforts have been made to gradually stepup vigilance along this border, as India fears the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). The Cabinet Secretariat had exercised direct operational control over the SSB till 2003 but the force is now under the MHA. Along the Bangladesh border, now seeing active action recently, the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashes between the BSF and the Bangladesh

The present border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants; an emergence of non-state actors; a nexus between narcotics and arms smugglers; illegal migrations; left wing extremism and separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers.

”

DSI

Rifles (BDR) over encroachments, enclaves and adverse possessions.

Cross-Border Movements For the Bhutan border, the responsibility is that of the SSB. The border with Myanmar also remains operationally active. Several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries for themselves in Myanmar despite the co-operation extended by the Myanmarese Army.

The cross-border movement of Nagas and Mizos for training, purchase of arms and shelter when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, makes this border extremely challenging to manage. This border is manned jointly by the Army and some units of the AR. However, recent reports have indicated that the BSF may soon be deployed to guard this border, leaving AR units free for counter-insurgency operations.

The NSG is responsible for counterterrorist operations and counter-hijack

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:17 PM Page 28

SECURITY

APRIL 2011

Central Police and Paramilitary Forces: The Super Seven According to the 2009-10 annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs , there are seven Central Police and Paramilitary Forces that are controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs. These are: ASSAM RIFLES (AR): A paramilitary force with 46 battalions under the operational control of the Indian Army.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF): Raised as a paramilitary force, now a police force with 159 battalions with 29 battalions under raising.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE (ITBP): Deployed along the Indo-Tibet border and for VIP protection duties, it is a police force with 45 (service) battalions plus four specialised battalions and 20 battalions under raising.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG): Paramilitary force with approximately 8,000 personnel and one Special Action Group (SAG), strike force, comprising Army personnel; two Special Ranger

groups (SRGs), reconnaissance and VIP protection duties, comprising police personnel; Force HQ; major component located at Manesar, near Delhi; four regional hubs at Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB, FORMERLY SPECIAL SERVICE BUREAU): Police force with 46 battalions; deployed along the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF): Police force with 1,20,000 personnel; provides security cover to 289 industrial undertakings (mostly airports, Public Sector Undertakings and heritage monuments) and ensures fire protection.

AFP

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF): Police force with 206 battalions, including two Disaster Management Battalions, three Mahila Battalions, ten RAF (Rapid Action Force) Battalions; five Signals Battalions; and six COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) Battalions; 38 battalions are under raising.

security duties in the Northeastern states since the mid-1950s began to be employed first in Punjab and then in J&K to stabilise the situation.

As Pakistan raised the ante and the number of mercenary jihadis inducted into J&K by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) rose sharply, first the Border Security Force (BSF), and then the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), was employed to assist the Army. Soon the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) was also used to guard vulnerable installations.

The Centre wisely decided to deploy the state and Central Police forces in the urban areas for active operations against militants. The Army was given a free hand to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the rural hinterland and to check infiltration through the Line of Control (LoC).

That this policy succeeded admirably is borne out by the fact that insurgency in J&K is now well under control and the government

has initiated a process of rapprochement to find a permanent solution to the state’s longstanding problems.

Under the Constitution, law and order is basically a state subject and ideally, the constabulary and provincial armed police of the states’ infested by militancy should be capable of handling all but the most vicious forms of militancy with only shortterm supplementary support from the central security forces.

But based on the recommendations of the four task forces that were appointed after the Kargil Review Committee, the Group of Ministers (GoM) decided to designate the CRPF as a strike force for internal security and to send forces such as the BSF and the ITBP to the borders, rather than continuing the ad hoc manner in which these forces were being employed before the Kargil conflict.

Since then the Central Police and Paramilitary Forces are now charged with the responsibility either to manage the

28

country’s borders during peace time or to undertake internal security duties in the country’s various trouble spots.

Border Management Border management is a responsibility that today is shared by the Army with the BSF and the ITBP. Dr G. P. Bhatnagar, former Inspector General, BSF has written that the present border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants; the emergence of non-state actors; a nexus between narcotics and arms smugglers; illegal migrations; left wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and the establishment of madrasas which could prove to be security hazards.

Smugglers, drug-traffickers and fundamentalist terrorists are often in league with local criminals, lower rung political leaders and police functionaries.

Such a situation exacerbates the challenges

of border management, making it more complex for the border guarding agencies. It is axiomatic that poor border management inevitably leads to a volatile internal security situation in the border states of the country.

Ideally, border management should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) during peace time. However, the active nature of the LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, has compelled the Army to permanently deploy large forces for this task. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Army. However, the principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.

Divided responsibilities never result in effective control.

At present, the responsibility for managing the border with China in the north is that of the ITBP’s except in some places such as Sikkim where the Army is in charge. In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is manned by the BSF except the LoC in J&K. The LoC is the responsibility of the Army with some BSF battalions placed under its operational control. On the LoC, the primary operational responsibility of the forces is to ensure its physical integrity against Pakistan Army encroachment; the Army’s secondary responsibility is to minimise trans-LoC infiltration by armed mercenary terrorists usually aided and abetted by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries. However, since the eruption of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal efforts have been made to gradually stepup vigilance along this border, as India fears the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). The Cabinet Secretariat had exercised direct operational control over the SSB till 2003 but the force is now under the MHA. Along the Bangladesh border, now seeing active action recently, the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashes between the BSF and the Bangladesh

The present border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants; an emergence of non-state actors; a nexus between narcotics and arms smugglers; illegal migrations; left wing extremism and separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers.

”

DSI

Rifles (BDR) over encroachments, enclaves and adverse possessions.

Cross-Border Movements For the Bhutan border, the responsibility is that of the SSB. The border with Myanmar also remains operationally active. Several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries for themselves in Myanmar despite the co-operation extended by the Myanmarese Army.

The cross-border movement of Nagas and Mizos for training, purchase of arms and shelter when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, makes this border extremely challenging to manage. This border is manned jointly by the Army and some units of the AR. However, recent reports have indicated that the BSF may soon be deployed to guard this border, leaving AR units free for counter-insurgency operations.

The NSG is responsible for counterterrorist operations and counter-hijack

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:17 PM Page 30

AFP

SECURITY

damage to property, especially tasks. It is also responsible National Security heritage buildings that are the for providing security to Guard Commandos nation’s pride.

VIPs while on the move. during the Mumbai The NSG was tested during terrorist attack the Mumbai terrorist strikes Conflict Management Strategy of November 2008 and while its overall The prevailing internal security performance was satisfactory, many environment demands an astute nationalequipment and training deficiencies were level conflict management strategy, a highlighted. It was also found to have comprehensive multi-departmental policy taken too long to reach Mumbai from Delhi formulation and vigorous implementation, as an Air Force aircraft had to be flown in while simultaneously ensuring that from Chandigarh. Most of these structural requisite steps are initiated to address problems have been suitably addressed by the socio-political and socio-economic Home Minister P. Chidambaram and his problems that lead people to militancy. team at the MHA. However, there are downsides to the However, the proposed National employment of a plethora of forces. It Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is still to inevitably results in a lack of cohesiveness see the light of day and the well-conceived and dissonance in the execution of policy National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) has and is bound to lead to institutionally also not been established as yet – debilitating turf battles. presumably due to turf battles among The employment of multiple forces various intelligence agencies. results in problems of command and Without effective intelligence, counter- control as well as the lack of accountability terrorist operations can never be for encroachments, poor intelligence and conducted successfully. Another Mumbai- inept handling of local sensitivities. type terror strike cannot be ruled out and it Though some BSF battalions in J&K is necessary to firstly prevent its recurrence were replaced by CRPF battalions in 2003and if there is another intelligence failure, to 04, the Central government continues to be able to react effectively so as to save repose its faith in a ‘mix-n-match’ policy of maximum lives and ensure minimum committing almost all types of central police

30

forces like the BSF, the CRPF and the ITBP, along with the Army, in counter-insurgency operations. Unfortunately, each of the forces has been raising new battalions in an ad hoc manner. This policy has not produced results commensurate with the force levels employed, as counterinsurgency operations require a high degree of specialisation and higherlevel of coordination.

To reduce the deployment of the Army for internal security duties, the capability of the police and paramilitary forces at the disposal of the state and Central governments should be upgraded to enable them to effectively tackle internal security problems. They must develop an Army-like ethos and must raise their standards to match the Army’s levels of proven junior leadership, motivation and training. The Army can assist in this gradual transformation of the CPMFs and state police forces.

Though the Group of Ministers task force on internal security identified the CRPF as the most suitable force for reorganisation as the primary Central government force for counter-insurgency operations its effectiveness has been severely challenged.

The CRPF is now deployed not only in J&K but also against left wing extremists like Naxalites in Central India where it has repeatedly come up short in its performance during counter-insurgency operations. The infamous Dantewada incident in 2010 in which 76 personnel were brutally killed by Naxalites made the government sit up and take notice of the operational deficiencies of this force.

In order to be successful in their new role, the CRPF units must be suitably equipped with modern close quarter battle weapons and battalion-level support weapons. Its leadership should be drawn through lateral induction of volunteers from the Army, as was done when the BSF was initially raised.

Another aspect of reorientation necessary will be to ensure that CRPF units operate as cohesive battalions under the direct command of the Commanding Officer (CO) and not as independent companies in penny packets, with the CO being given only administrative responsibility.

Dealing with the various insurgencies threatening India’s security requires a holistic inter-ministerial and inter-departmental approach. Above all, it requires political courage and vision to evolve and implement a comprehensive national policy.

ROE 15-03-2011.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 2:35 PM Page 1

ROSOBORONEXPORT presents a unique combat vehicle At the 10th anniversary IDEX 2011 in Abu Dhabi (UAE) Rosoboronexport presented the BMPT, a unique tank support combat vehicle.

The BMPT is virtually unrivaled in the world: it is truly a new dawn in the world of armored vehicles. Experts note that the new Russian vehicle can operate both independently and jointly with tanks.

When tanks and BMPT are used together, the efficiency is achieved through allocation of targets: fortifications and heavily armored vehicles are destroyed by tanks, while manpower, antitank weapons and lightly armored vehicles are engaged by the BMPT. Independently, the BMPT can be used to strengthen and support the infantry, escort and guard convoys and facilities, defeat terrorist groups.

Power The vehicle’s main armament fire-control system, based on a multi-channel sight (with optical and thermal channels) and a panoramic low-level TV sight, can detect and recognize small targets at long ranges, day and night, in bad weather and engage them with two 30mm 2A42 automatic cannons firing HE and AP projectiles. The ammunition load of is 850 rounds in two magazines.

The main armament system includes also two launchers with four supersonic Ataka-T ATGMs carrying HEAT and thermobaric warheads.

Secondary armament, consisting of two 30mm AG-17D automatic grenade launchers, is housed in armored compartments on the sides. The ammunition load consisting of 300 grenades for each AG-17D is located at the same place. The grenade launchers are remotely controlled and vertically stabilized. A 7.62mm machine gun coupled with the 30mm cannons is used as ancillary armament.

BMPT’s crew includes three operators enabling quick detection and simultaneous destruction of three different targets in the 360-degree sector at once.

BMPT, a unique tank support combat vehicle

The targets are allocated among the crew members by the vehicle’s commander who himself can independently fire in duplicate control mode, if required.

Survivability During the BMPT development, particular attention was given to crew protection.

The vehicle is low observable, due to its small dimensions and disrupting camouflage painting. Explosive reactive armor (ERA) increases the level of protection against single-charge HEAT warheads, APFSDS projectiles and ATGMs fitted with tandem HEAT warheads.

The vehicle’s sides are completely protected by add-on ERA screens and grilled shields, which, in conjunction with armored compartments on the hull sides, provide reliable crew protection against light anti-tank weapons. The hull rear is also protected by grilled shields.

Moreover, because the main armament is mounted on the turret roof, the turret front plate has no weak areas and is strengthened by integral ERA. Protection

of the crew from secondary fragments inside the hull and turret is provided by anti-spall fabric liners. In addition, the fuel inside and outside the vehicle is housed in armored compartments.

Maneuverability Despite its impressive armoring, the BMPT features high mobility and maneuverability. This is achieved by installing a 1000hp four-stroke liquidcooled turbocharged diesel engine, advanced powertrain and chassis, ensuring soft riding and increased crosscountry capacity.

The Russian vehicle is ideal for combat missions in urban areas, mountainous and forest terrain. It is maneuverable, because its armaments do not extend beyond the hull when the turret turns, while the laying angles allow engagement of various targets, from basements to the upper floors of buildings.

Today, buying the tank support combat vehicle, the Army takes care of every soldier, the whole unit and its combatants, protecting them reliably from enemy fire.

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NAVY

APRIL 2011

NOT REALLY SHIPSHAPE

DSI

PREMVIR DAS

KEY POINTS n At sea, India’s naval power is superior than that of her immediate neighbours but it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. n As a capable regional maritime power India must be proactive in cooperating with littoral maritime forces. n To stem the fall of force levels an urgent import of some platforms is needed especially since older ships need to be scrapped even as new ones are brought in.

The Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largest littoral regional maritime power, but the number of its major seagoing platforms has stagnated over the last several years and even declined

T

he global security environment has shifted to the Asia-Pacific. In ongoing disputes in the East and South China Sea, or in regard to Taiwan, the potential for confrontation is at sea. Safe transit in the narrow channels of the South East Asian archipelago, through which energy lifelines of many countries must pass, is another important concern. More than 60 percent of the world’s energy moves across the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean (IO), principally from the Gulf.

Looming instability in some Gulf littorals adds to the concern. And, if this was not enough, the waters off Somalia are infested with pirates who have hijacked several dozen ships, including oil tankers, extracting millions of dollars from the owners of those ships as ransom. This is a complex brew, almost all of it in the maritime domain. It is not surprising then the Asia-Pacific is increasingly being referred to as ‘Indo-Pacific’.

India’s Concerns

AFP

INS Vidyut during an exercise in the Arabian Sea off the Porbandar coast, Gujarat

32

33

As the largest country in the IO region, sitting astride its east-west shipping routes, India has responsibilities in ensuring safety of the sea commons. Until recently, the focus of its security concerns has rested in its immediate neighbourhood but in the emerging scenario, developments in the IO littoral and even beyond, have become equally important. On a different plane,

Navy Looks Ahead7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:20 PM Page 32

NAVY

APRIL 2011

NOT REALLY SHIPSHAPE

DSI

PREMVIR DAS

KEY POINTS n At sea, India’s naval power is superior than that of her immediate neighbours but it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. n As a capable regional maritime power India must be proactive in cooperating with littoral maritime forces. n To stem the fall of force levels an urgent import of some platforms is needed especially since older ships need to be scrapped even as new ones are brought in.

The Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largest littoral regional maritime power, but the number of its major seagoing platforms has stagnated over the last several years and even declined

T

he global security environment has shifted to the Asia-Pacific. In ongoing disputes in the East and South China Sea, or in regard to Taiwan, the potential for confrontation is at sea. Safe transit in the narrow channels of the South East Asian archipelago, through which energy lifelines of many countries must pass, is another important concern. More than 60 percent of the world’s energy moves across the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean (IO), principally from the Gulf.

Looming instability in some Gulf littorals adds to the concern. And, if this was not enough, the waters off Somalia are infested with pirates who have hijacked several dozen ships, including oil tankers, extracting millions of dollars from the owners of those ships as ransom. This is a complex brew, almost all of it in the maritime domain. It is not surprising then the Asia-Pacific is increasingly being referred to as ‘Indo-Pacific’.

India’s Concerns

AFP

INS Vidyut during an exercise in the Arabian Sea off the Porbandar coast, Gujarat

32

33

As the largest country in the IO region, sitting astride its east-west shipping routes, India has responsibilities in ensuring safety of the sea commons. Until recently, the focus of its security concerns has rested in its immediate neighbourhood but in the emerging scenario, developments in the IO littoral and even beyond, have become equally important. On a different plane,

Navy Looks Ahead7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:20 PM Page 34

NAVY

APRIL 2011

Even as the Pakistan military establishment sees asymmetric terror actions, such as those of November 2008, as cost effective it continues to seethe with the humiliation of its defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is a real possibility. It is, therefore, essential that India maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and must continue to remain so.

personnel, co-ordinated patrols and joint exercises, all of which go to build trust and confidence. Similar interface with other non-littoral IO players is necessary. The waters off Somalia, even those quite far from the coast, have now become the piracy centre of the world and India’s maritime forces must be at the forefront of the anti-piracy effort. Effective surveillance and patrolling of coastal waters by maritime forces is, therefore, necessary. To this list should be added capabilities to respond to natural disasters and oil spills, accidental or deliberate.

Need for Reach

”

Nature of Threats Pakistan and China have been in military conflict with India, the former as many as four times, and are the two countries which could pose a future military threat to India. While the probability that either may seek military conflict with us is not high, it can not be ruled out. Even as the

Navy cadets during the Navy Day celebrations , Mumbai

AFP

India’s energy dependence, estimated at 80 percent in 2020, and its overseas trade, likely to exceed $2 trillion in the same time frame, are both linked to safe movement in the seas around it.

India shares maritime boundaries not only with three South Asian neighbours but also with three nations of South East Asia – Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia; there is also close proximity with Malaysia. This has its own complexities in terms of poaching or other criminal activity.

Maritime terror, generated through organisations located across its western border is another concern. The very daring raid launched by sea on high profile targets in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 was a visible manifestation of that threat. As can be seen, the challenges are many and they are increasing.

DSI

Pakistan military establishment sees asymmetric terror actions, such as those of November 2008, as cost effective it continues to seethe with the humiliation of its defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is a real possibility.

It is, therefore, essential that India maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and must continue to remain so; it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. High state of

34

preparedness to cope with terrorist threats, at and from the sea, is equally essential.

China falls in a different category.

While, in the last decade, relations have been tranquil, there are many areas of discord. Yet, China is a country that India needs to engage. So, a positive but watchful stratagem is necessary. At sea, China is modernising its naval forces by building ships and submarines at a fast rate and an induction of an aircraft carrier in the next few years, to be reinforced by

another by 2020, is likely. The urge to have and exploit maritime power consistent with its growing stature is visible, as witnessed recently in the East Asian waters; it may also seek a more comprehensive presence in the IO. China is building ports in three littoral countries and there are apprehensions that one or more of these might be made available by the hosts to the Chinese for such use. India must monitor the developments closely and ensure that its

own capabilities at sea are commensurate with the potential threats.

With economic growth being of a vital national interest and security of energy and trade being its two prime ingredients, safety of the IO commons has become critical. Quite apart from safeguarding its own interests, India, as the most capable regional maritime power, must be proactive in co-operating with littoral maritime forces through the sharing of information, port visits, exchange of

35

The Indo-Pacific is a large canvas and the challenges at sea quite formidable. The essence of maritime power is to have multifaceted capabilities which can be used in both traditional and non-traditional threat scenarios. ‘Reach’, which means the ability to go wherever one is needed, stay there for as long as one needs to, and, finally, to operate credibly in the area of operations, is essential.

Different types of platforms are needed, both in numbers and of quality and in all three dimensions that is ships, submarines and aircraft. These forces need to be networked and supported by efficient surveillance and reconnaissance, both from aircraft and satellites. Quick and decisive command and control with real time communications are other imperatives.

Finally, no credible operations are possible at sea without control of the immediate air space, a capability that only aircraft carriers can provide. Given the spread of India’s maritime interests, at least three such ships are needed so that two might be available for duty at any time. With one being acquired from Russia in 2012 and another being built in the country and likely to be ready in the next three years, the Navy will have two of them; early ordering of another vessel for indigenous manufacture should be a high priority so that a level of three is reached by 2020.

In equipment, apart from the normal weapons and sensors that any major seagoing platform must have, long range missile capability should be given importance so that targets deep in the adversary’s hinterland can be attacked from sea. In the emerging environment, the Navy should be able to lead ‘out of area’ joint operations, in rescue efforts such as the tsunami of 2004 as well as in situations where our vital interests are threatened. More platforms like the INS

Navy Looks Ahead7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:20 PM Page 34

NAVY

APRIL 2011

Even as the Pakistan military establishment sees asymmetric terror actions, such as those of November 2008, as cost effective it continues to seethe with the humiliation of its defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is a real possibility. It is, therefore, essential that India maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and must continue to remain so.

personnel, co-ordinated patrols and joint exercises, all of which go to build trust and confidence. Similar interface with other non-littoral IO players is necessary. The waters off Somalia, even those quite far from the coast, have now become the piracy centre of the world and India’s maritime forces must be at the forefront of the anti-piracy effort. Effective surveillance and patrolling of coastal waters by maritime forces is, therefore, necessary. To this list should be added capabilities to respond to natural disasters and oil spills, accidental or deliberate.

Need for Reach

”

Nature of Threats Pakistan and China have been in military conflict with India, the former as many as four times, and are the two countries which could pose a future military threat to India. While the probability that either may seek military conflict with us is not high, it can not be ruled out. Even as the

Navy cadets during the Navy Day celebrations , Mumbai

AFP

India’s energy dependence, estimated at 80 percent in 2020, and its overseas trade, likely to exceed $2 trillion in the same time frame, are both linked to safe movement in the seas around it.

India shares maritime boundaries not only with three South Asian neighbours but also with three nations of South East Asia – Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia; there is also close proximity with Malaysia. This has its own complexities in terms of poaching or other criminal activity.

Maritime terror, generated through organisations located across its western border is another concern. The very daring raid launched by sea on high profile targets in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 was a visible manifestation of that threat. As can be seen, the challenges are many and they are increasing.

DSI

Pakistan military establishment sees asymmetric terror actions, such as those of November 2008, as cost effective it continues to seethe with the humiliation of its defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is a real possibility.

It is, therefore, essential that India maintain a convincing military deterrent against Pakistan. At sea, our naval power is superior and must continue to remain so; it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. High state of

34

preparedness to cope with terrorist threats, at and from the sea, is equally essential.

China falls in a different category.

While, in the last decade, relations have been tranquil, there are many areas of discord. Yet, China is a country that India needs to engage. So, a positive but watchful stratagem is necessary. At sea, China is modernising its naval forces by building ships and submarines at a fast rate and an induction of an aircraft carrier in the next few years, to be reinforced by

another by 2020, is likely. The urge to have and exploit maritime power consistent with its growing stature is visible, as witnessed recently in the East Asian waters; it may also seek a more comprehensive presence in the IO. China is building ports in three littoral countries and there are apprehensions that one or more of these might be made available by the hosts to the Chinese for such use. India must monitor the developments closely and ensure that its

own capabilities at sea are commensurate with the potential threats.

With economic growth being of a vital national interest and security of energy and trade being its two prime ingredients, safety of the IO commons has become critical. Quite apart from safeguarding its own interests, India, as the most capable regional maritime power, must be proactive in co-operating with littoral maritime forces through the sharing of information, port visits, exchange of

35

The Indo-Pacific is a large canvas and the challenges at sea quite formidable. The essence of maritime power is to have multifaceted capabilities which can be used in both traditional and non-traditional threat scenarios. ‘Reach’, which means the ability to go wherever one is needed, stay there for as long as one needs to, and, finally, to operate credibly in the area of operations, is essential.

Different types of platforms are needed, both in numbers and of quality and in all three dimensions that is ships, submarines and aircraft. These forces need to be networked and supported by efficient surveillance and reconnaissance, both from aircraft and satellites. Quick and decisive command and control with real time communications are other imperatives.

Finally, no credible operations are possible at sea without control of the immediate air space, a capability that only aircraft carriers can provide. Given the spread of India’s maritime interests, at least three such ships are needed so that two might be available for duty at any time. With one being acquired from Russia in 2012 and another being built in the country and likely to be ready in the next three years, the Navy will have two of them; early ordering of another vessel for indigenous manufacture should be a high priority so that a level of three is reached by 2020.

In equipment, apart from the normal weapons and sensors that any major seagoing platform must have, long range missile capability should be given importance so that targets deep in the adversary’s hinterland can be attacked from sea. In the emerging environment, the Navy should be able to lead ‘out of area’ joint operations, in rescue efforts such as the tsunami of 2004 as well as in situations where our vital interests are threatened. More platforms like the INS

Navy Looks Ahead7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:20 PM Page 36

NAVY

APRIL 2011

DSI

AFP

A Sea Harrier takes off from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier INS Viraat

Jalashva, capable of carrying reasonably large numbers of troops and heavy equipment and enough helicopters to airdrop them, are needed.

While the Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largest littoral maritime power, the numbers of its major seagoing platforms has stagnated over the last several years and even declined in some categories; force level of submarines is the worst affected. There are many reasons that have led to this unhappy state of affairs including unjustifiable delays in decision making; inadequate capacities in public sector shipyards have also been, and are, a serious constraint. Recent measures to farm out some orders to private shipyards are a step in the right direction but will take some time to fructify.

In order that force levels do not fall further, urgent import of some platforms, therefore, merits serious consideration. It must be realised that older ships have to be scrapped even as new ones are brought in. Acquisition decisions must ensure that the latter process is faster.

Finally, being a nuclear weapon state, India needs to have credible deterrence which only a submarine-based delivery system can provide. Such a project has to be

India’s maritime security interests are spread across a broad spectrum covering geostrategic considerations arising from the country’s size and location, its energy and trade security, traditional threats posed by nation state adversaries, and those that are of a different but equally threatening kind.We have to ensure that we can safeguard our interests across this canvas.

36

”

indigenous. After some unfortunate delays, the first of such vessels, INS Arihant , has been launched last year and should be operational by 2014. Reports indicate that at least two more are to be built. A suitable missile is also under development. When deployed, these will complete the triad that India has decided to put in place.

India’s maritime security interests are spread across a broad spectrum covering geostrategic considerations arising from the country’s size and location, its energy and trade security, traditional threats posed by nation state adversaries, and those that are of a different but equally threatening kind. We have to ensure that we can safeguard our interests across this canvas. Ability to respond to natural disasters which visit the IO region is also necessary. A mix of forces is needed, ocean going as well as coastal.

Last, but not the least, to answer the challenges arising from the evolving scenario, it is imperative that the nation’s diplomacy and its maritime capabilities function in tune with each other. A meshed approach is essential if India’s sea power is first, built to the required level, and then, exploited consistent with the nation’s security interests.

Russian Helicopters final.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 2:38 PM Page 1

Mi-26T2

Russian-made multifunctional Ka-32A11BC is one of the best in firefighting

RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS

MAKE NEW STEP FORWARD TO ESTABLISH GLOBAL SUPPORT NETWORK FOR ROTORCRAFT

R

ussian Helicopters, the subsidiary of United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom, has opened a service centre in Greater Noida in a joint venture with India-based Vectra Group to cater to the needs of its helicopters in India.

Integrated Helicopter Services Private Limited (IHSPL) is for all type of civil Russian-made helicopters.

“The opening of a service centre in India is a very important event for us” said Dmitry Petrov, CEO, Russian Helicopters.

“We are planning to make this centre one of the key elements of our support network for existing Russian-made rotorcraft and Mi and Kamov helicopters delivered in the future to India and South-East Asia as a whole.”

The plans of the Indo-Russian joint venture IHSPL envision that the service centre will become the stronghold for warranty service of Russian-made rotorcraft in India. The centre will offer Indian operators and state aviation organisations aftersale service, as well as scheduled maintenance and unscheduled repairs of any Mi and Kamov helicopters.

The aim of the existing Russian Helicopters programme is to create a global support of Russian-made rotorcraft throughout their lifecycle. As part of this programme, new MRO centres are being established and the existing centres are being certified in key for Russian Helicopters markets of the world, including India, which is a traditional one for the Russian helicopters.

Today Russian-made rotorcraft form

the core helicopter fleet of the Indian armed forces and Russian Helicopters is the only official supplier of Russian civil helicopters to the country. More than 200 Russian helicopters including Mi-25 (export variant of Mi-24D), Mi-35, Mi-26, and Mi-8/17 are already in service in India.

“Talking about the future growth of helicopter market, we would be bringing in 12 to 15 rotor-blade aircraft within the next two years. These would be Ka-32 and Mi-171 or Mi-172 helicopters,” Ravi Rishi, Chairman, Vectra Group, said.

According to the latest KPMG research, Indian Ministry of Defense is also planning to purchase 15 heavy transport helicopters, 22 attack and 197 multi-purpose light helicopters.

New Russian-made Ka-226T with Turbomeca engines is one of the “light” tender participants for 197 helicopters.

Ka-226T has already demonstrated its outstanding flight structure, altitude and manoeuvring characteristics. The 5700 m operating ceiling, exceptional for a light helicopter, is yet another unique achievement of Ka-226T. Unrivalled performance of Ka-226T

KA-226T

KA-32A11BC

makes it a helicopter of choice in mountainous terrains and hot climates, over water, in windy conditions, and in urban high-rise operations.

Ka-226T has a MTOW of 4 tons with a payload of 1.45 tons. Its max speed is 250 km/h. It can take up to 9 people including two pilots. With 10-minute emergency reserves max flight time is 3.3 hours and range is 525 km.

Separate cabin modules allow using the same helicopter for transportation, patrol, construction, medevac, firefighting, search & rescue, and evacuation without handicapping technical and economic performance.

Russian Helicopters offers its Indian partners a diversified Russian rotorcraft lineup capable of performing any missions, from passenger transportation and commercial operations to special missions in natural disaster areas. These helicopters can be employed for corporate, passenger, cargo, search & rescue, construction, patrol, and firefighting purposes.

In July 2010 the Russian helicopter industry holding Russian Helicopters signed a contract with the Indian company Global Vectra Helicorp on the delivery of Ka-32A11BC helicopter which had already being certified for operations in India. Unlike Mi-17, traditional for the Indian market, Ka-32A11BC is making its debut in the region. Global Vectra Helicorp is planning to use the Russian rotorcraft for cargo transportation and construction work in the civilian segment.

Ka-32A11BC is scheduled for delivery to India in 2011.

Russian heavy lift Mi-26T2 and combat Mi-28NE are also bidding in Indian tenders for helicopters.

Russian rotorcrafts are currently operated in more than 100 countries worldwide. Many countries have already highly appraised the unique economic and operating capabilities of Russian helicopters and expressed a need for such rotorcrafts.

– Gopal Dubey

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:23 PM Page 38

MIDDLE EAST

APRIL 2011

DSI

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The unrest in the Middle East can have a substantial impact on South Asia though there is little to suggest that the region suffers from a democracy deficit

M.K. BHADRAKUMAR

KEY POINTS n Neither India nor Pakistan face any real prospect of the spread of the ‘democracy’ virus blowing in from Arabia. n Continued western intervention, as in Libya, can generate a security climate which will help extremist forces upto Pakistan and Afghanistan. n US regional policies are poised to undergo profound changes which will see a new security paradigm in our extended neighborhood.

AFP

T

38

he absence of a consensus to encapsulate the happenings in the Middle East underscores that while there could be common features, situations vary from country to country and it is problematic to bring them under a single rubric. Some call it an uprising, some see it as a revolt, while there are a few inclined to see it as nothing less than a revolution.

Most certainly, the happenings do not proceed in a uniform direction, nor is the reaction by the international community

39

consistent or based on common principles, which make the strategic implications hard to fathom in the near term and highly uncertain in the fullness of time. What can be said with a measure of confidence for the present is that their impact on both India and Pakistan can prove to be substantial while there is little to suggest that the ‘democracy deficit’ in these two South Asian countries is comparable to the Middle Eastern syndrome.

The Middle Eastern developments constitute a march of history. Simply put, the great Middle Eastern settlement of 1922 has by far outlived its utility and despite repeated patch-ups, continued western dominance – political, economic and cultural – of the region has become untenable. The unravelling began surfacing as early as the 1950s with the rise of Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran and Gamel Nasser in Egypt but the West successfully smothered the historical forces.

However, by the end of the 1970s, the process began gathering momentum. The oil crisis in the 1970s, the Islamic revolution in Iran (surge of nationalism under Islamist garb, imbued with ideology of resistance and justice), the injection of radical Islam into the barricades of the cold war in Afghanistan, the consequent birth of ‘nonstate actors’, the ‘de-ideologisation’ of the Middle East divide following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the lingering Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli problem and of course globalisation and its discontent –

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:23 PM Page 38

MIDDLE EAST

APRIL 2011

DSI

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The unrest in the Middle East can have a substantial impact on South Asia though there is little to suggest that the region suffers from a democracy deficit

M.K. BHADRAKUMAR

KEY POINTS n Neither India nor Pakistan face any real prospect of the spread of the ‘democracy’ virus blowing in from Arabia. n Continued western intervention, as in Libya, can generate a security climate which will help extremist forces upto Pakistan and Afghanistan. n US regional policies are poised to undergo profound changes which will see a new security paradigm in our extended neighborhood.

AFP

T

38

he absence of a consensus to encapsulate the happenings in the Middle East underscores that while there could be common features, situations vary from country to country and it is problematic to bring them under a single rubric. Some call it an uprising, some see it as a revolt, while there are a few inclined to see it as nothing less than a revolution.

Most certainly, the happenings do not proceed in a uniform direction, nor is the reaction by the international community

39

consistent or based on common principles, which make the strategic implications hard to fathom in the near term and highly uncertain in the fullness of time. What can be said with a measure of confidence for the present is that their impact on both India and Pakistan can prove to be substantial while there is little to suggest that the ‘democracy deficit’ in these two South Asian countries is comparable to the Middle Eastern syndrome.

The Middle Eastern developments constitute a march of history. Simply put, the great Middle Eastern settlement of 1922 has by far outlived its utility and despite repeated patch-ups, continued western dominance – political, economic and cultural – of the region has become untenable. The unravelling began surfacing as early as the 1950s with the rise of Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran and Gamel Nasser in Egypt but the West successfully smothered the historical forces.

However, by the end of the 1970s, the process began gathering momentum. The oil crisis in the 1970s, the Islamic revolution in Iran (surge of nationalism under Islamist garb, imbued with ideology of resistance and justice), the injection of radical Islam into the barricades of the cold war in Afghanistan, the consequent birth of ‘nonstate actors’, the ‘de-ideologisation’ of the Middle East divide following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the lingering Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli problem and of course globalisation and its discontent –

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:23 PM Page 40

MIDDLE EAST all these have made the continuance of the regional political order of autocratic rule by dictators supported by the West extremely untenable.

APRIL 2011

led to an overt western intervention. But the West may still prefer a negotiated ‘regime change’ in Tripoli.

DSI

Rebels ride on an armoured personnel carrier, near Brega in north-eastern Libya

The Western Dilemma If the aftermath of the Iraq war highlighted the contradictions emanating out of the steady loss of the influence of the United States on the one hand and the rise of Iran as a regional power on the other, Israel’s disastrous attack on Lebanon in 2006 showed up for the first time the growing irrelevance of Israel’s military superiority in the geopolitics of the region. Change, in short, has become inevitable in the US’ regional policies.

The autocratic Arab regimes have shown extreme reluctance to reform and largely remain resistant to change. There are no doubt peculiarities in the given situations, too. In Tunisia, the dictator almost instinctively abdicated. In Egypt, he tried to hold on hoping that the seemingly inchoate popular call for change would eventually fizzle out or can be weathered by the truculent regime. In Jordan, the dictator is trying his best to ride the wave and stay in power as a responsive and accountable ruler.

Meanwhile, in Bahrain and Syria, strong sectarian overtones threaten to subsume all else. In Yemen, the political confrontation is morphing into acute tribal and clan rivalry, while Saudi Arabia is a category by itself where by raising the bogey of Shi’ite empowerment and by doling out largesse to the populace and keeping the Wahhabi religious establishment on its side, the regime strives to deflect popular discontent, but the simmering rivalries and jockeying for power within the royal family threaten the cohesion of the regime. The fate of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region will be largely determined by what happens in Saudi Arabia, which is itself highly susceptible to any regime change in Bahrain.

Amidst all this, Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively as part of the overall tapestry of the ‘Middle East revolution’. In reality, though, what happened in Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that didn’t quite follow the script – given the country’s tortuous history of state formation and its complicated tribal structure and regional imbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’s mercurial personality. Unlike in Georgia or Ukraine, things took a bloody turn, which

While the western attempt is to calibrate the region’s political transition and to prioritise between countries, fine-tuning may be hard to achieve. Clearly, the West has shown a great appetite for change in Libya, but it condones repression in Bahrain (where the US’s Fifth Fleet is based) and just can’t contemplate the prospect of an overthrow of the political order in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. What is often overlooked is that the petrodollar recycling is integral to the prosperity of western societies and at a time when economic recovery is still patchy, if Qatar or Kuwait or the UAE and Saudi Arabia were to ‘call back’ their monies, amounting to trillions of dollars, the western banking system would collapse.

This lies at the root of the western dilemma over the emergence of a new political order drawing legitimacy from

Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively as part of the overall tapestry of the ‘Middle East revolution’. In reality, though, what happened in Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that didn’t quite follow the script – given the country’s tortuous history of state formation and its complicated tribal structure and regional imbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’s mercurial personality.

40

”

AFP

Change is Inevitable

41

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:23 PM Page 40

MIDDLE EAST all these have made the continuance of the regional political order of autocratic rule by dictators supported by the West extremely untenable.

APRIL 2011

led to an overt western intervention. But the West may still prefer a negotiated ‘regime change’ in Tripoli.

DSI

Rebels ride on an armoured personnel carrier, near Brega in north-eastern Libya

The Western Dilemma If the aftermath of the Iraq war highlighted the contradictions emanating out of the steady loss of the influence of the United States on the one hand and the rise of Iran as a regional power on the other, Israel’s disastrous attack on Lebanon in 2006 showed up for the first time the growing irrelevance of Israel’s military superiority in the geopolitics of the region. Change, in short, has become inevitable in the US’ regional policies.

The autocratic Arab regimes have shown extreme reluctance to reform and largely remain resistant to change. There are no doubt peculiarities in the given situations, too. In Tunisia, the dictator almost instinctively abdicated. In Egypt, he tried to hold on hoping that the seemingly inchoate popular call for change would eventually fizzle out or can be weathered by the truculent regime. In Jordan, the dictator is trying his best to ride the wave and stay in power as a responsive and accountable ruler.

Meanwhile, in Bahrain and Syria, strong sectarian overtones threaten to subsume all else. In Yemen, the political confrontation is morphing into acute tribal and clan rivalry, while Saudi Arabia is a category by itself where by raising the bogey of Shi’ite empowerment and by doling out largesse to the populace and keeping the Wahhabi religious establishment on its side, the regime strives to deflect popular discontent, but the simmering rivalries and jockeying for power within the royal family threaten the cohesion of the regime. The fate of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region will be largely determined by what happens in Saudi Arabia, which is itself highly susceptible to any regime change in Bahrain.

Amidst all this, Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively as part of the overall tapestry of the ‘Middle East revolution’. In reality, though, what happened in Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that didn’t quite follow the script – given the country’s tortuous history of state formation and its complicated tribal structure and regional imbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’s mercurial personality. Unlike in Georgia or Ukraine, things took a bloody turn, which

While the western attempt is to calibrate the region’s political transition and to prioritise between countries, fine-tuning may be hard to achieve. Clearly, the West has shown a great appetite for change in Libya, but it condones repression in Bahrain (where the US’s Fifth Fleet is based) and just can’t contemplate the prospect of an overthrow of the political order in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. What is often overlooked is that the petrodollar recycling is integral to the prosperity of western societies and at a time when economic recovery is still patchy, if Qatar or Kuwait or the UAE and Saudi Arabia were to ‘call back’ their monies, amounting to trillions of dollars, the western banking system would collapse.

This lies at the root of the western dilemma over the emergence of a new political order drawing legitimacy from

Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively as part of the overall tapestry of the ‘Middle East revolution’. In reality, though, what happened in Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that didn’t quite follow the script – given the country’s tortuous history of state formation and its complicated tribal structure and regional imbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’s mercurial personality.

40

”

AFP

Change is Inevitable

41

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:24 PM Page 42

MIDDLE EAST

APRIL 2011

popular support. The Arab revolt has not assumed any “anti-western” overtones but the spectre that haunts the West is that successor regimes will somehow assume nationalistic overtones and militate against foreign hegemony. Besides, the Middle East (and Africa) is fast becoming contested ground, with China robustly seeking access to minerals and other resources.

Furthermore, Libya has become the testing ground for the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a global security body and for the efficacy of its unilateralist operations in global “hotspots”, even without the mandate of the United Nations. (The resolution 1973 did not mandate NATO’s military intervention or ‘regime change’ in Libya.)

Now, this has serious implications for not only the Middle East and Africa but also for international security. Quite obviously, it sets far-reaching precedents for the working of the international system if a clutch of countries or a regional body arrogates to themselves the prerogative – on whatever pretext – to violate the United

AFP

Indians in Hyderabad protest in a rally against the ongoing political turmoil in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen

The Indian policy is to be just on the right side of history without being over zealous, intrusive or prescriptive and allowing the native genius of the region to work its way out peacefully through dialogue and reconciliation. It is the right approach under the circumstances.

42

”

Nations’ Charter and trash the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a member state. The UN stands as diminished as the League of Nations was over the Abyssinia crisis.

The countries of the South Asian region, especially India and Pakistan, are deeply interested in the stability of the Middle East. However, their capacity to influence the march of history is marginal. Nor should they aspire to exert such influence.

Which makes Pakistan’s aspirations to assume the role of a provider of security to the Sunni regimes of the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, in particular) somewhat pretentious. The Indian policy is to be just on the right side of history without being over zealous, intrusive or prescriptive and allowing the native genius of the region to work its way out peacefully through dialogue and reconciliation. It is the right approach under the circumstances.

A prolonged period of volatility shouldn’t come as a surprise until a new equilibrium emerges in the regional order.

However, there is no need for any paranoia

Tunisians protest in front of the Libyan embassy in Tunisa

AFP

that the existing political order may give way to extremist regimes. On the contrary, it is continued western intervention (like in Libya) that could generate a political and security climate which works to the advantage of extremist forces in a wide arc leading all the way to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nor is the appearance of Islamism in the political economy per se disagreeable, if the overarching structure happens to be democratic.

If Turkey’s example is anything to go by – or even, arguably, of Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – extremism breeds when political space is denied to grassroots or ‘neighborhood’ movements rather than if an inclusive environment is provided for them to become responsible ‘stakeholders’.

Having said that, India and Pakistan need to factor in that the US’ regional policies are poised to undergo profound changes in the very near future. A new security paradigm is shaping up in our ‘extended neighborhood’ comprising states that are surely going to be more independent and we will be called upon to adapt to the winds of change. A new

DSI

discourse is needed and a new political idiom needs to be crafted. Indeed, the countries of the Persian Gulf are inherently friendly in their disposition toward India and the preservation of our vital interests and core concerns can be handled without disruption.

Neither India nor Pakistan faces any real prospect of the spread of the democracy virus blowing in from Arabia.

The problem that India and Pakistan face is more in the nature of lack of good and responsive governance, degradation of state organs and institutions and failings of established political parties – and not the absence of democratic space as such.

The state may have become dysfunctional in Pakistan’s tribal tracts or in India’s ‘red corridor’ but the solution needs to be found within the existing democratic framework by a vigilant civil society. Anna Hazare’s fast-unto-death in the heart of New Delhi underlines that this crusade is quintessentially different from Arab revolt.

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:24 PM Page 42

MIDDLE EAST

APRIL 2011

popular support. The Arab revolt has not assumed any “anti-western” overtones but the spectre that haunts the West is that successor regimes will somehow assume nationalistic overtones and militate against foreign hegemony. Besides, the Middle East (and Africa) is fast becoming contested ground, with China robustly seeking access to minerals and other resources.

Furthermore, Libya has become the testing ground for the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a global security body and for the efficacy of its unilateralist operations in global “hotspots”, even without the mandate of the United Nations. (The resolution 1973 did not mandate NATO’s military intervention or ‘regime change’ in Libya.)

Now, this has serious implications for not only the Middle East and Africa but also for international security. Quite obviously, it sets far-reaching precedents for the working of the international system if a clutch of countries or a regional body arrogates to themselves the prerogative – on whatever pretext – to violate the United

AFP

Indians in Hyderabad protest in a rally against the ongoing political turmoil in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen

The Indian policy is to be just on the right side of history without being over zealous, intrusive or prescriptive and allowing the native genius of the region to work its way out peacefully through dialogue and reconciliation. It is the right approach under the circumstances.

42

”

Nations’ Charter and trash the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a member state. The UN stands as diminished as the League of Nations was over the Abyssinia crisis.

The countries of the South Asian region, especially India and Pakistan, are deeply interested in the stability of the Middle East. However, their capacity to influence the march of history is marginal. Nor should they aspire to exert such influence.

Which makes Pakistan’s aspirations to assume the role of a provider of security to the Sunni regimes of the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, in particular) somewhat pretentious. The Indian policy is to be just on the right side of history without being over zealous, intrusive or prescriptive and allowing the native genius of the region to work its way out peacefully through dialogue and reconciliation. It is the right approach under the circumstances.

A prolonged period of volatility shouldn’t come as a surprise until a new equilibrium emerges in the regional order.

However, there is no need for any paranoia

Tunisians protest in front of the Libyan embassy in Tunisa

AFP

that the existing political order may give way to extremist regimes. On the contrary, it is continued western intervention (like in Libya) that could generate a political and security climate which works to the advantage of extremist forces in a wide arc leading all the way to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nor is the appearance of Islamism in the political economy per se disagreeable, if the overarching structure happens to be democratic.

If Turkey’s example is anything to go by – or even, arguably, of Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – extremism breeds when political space is denied to grassroots or ‘neighborhood’ movements rather than if an inclusive environment is provided for them to become responsible ‘stakeholders’.

Having said that, India and Pakistan need to factor in that the US’ regional policies are poised to undergo profound changes in the very near future. A new security paradigm is shaping up in our ‘extended neighborhood’ comprising states that are surely going to be more independent and we will be called upon to adapt to the winds of change. A new

DSI

discourse is needed and a new political idiom needs to be crafted. Indeed, the countries of the Persian Gulf are inherently friendly in their disposition toward India and the preservation of our vital interests and core concerns can be handled without disruption.

Neither India nor Pakistan faces any real prospect of the spread of the democracy virus blowing in from Arabia.

The problem that India and Pakistan face is more in the nature of lack of good and responsive governance, degradation of state organs and institutions and failings of established political parties – and not the absence of democratic space as such.

The state may have become dysfunctional in Pakistan’s tribal tracts or in India’s ‘red corridor’ but the solution needs to be found within the existing democratic framework by a vigilant civil society. Anna Hazare’s fast-unto-death in the heart of New Delhi underlines that this crusade is quintessentially different from Arab revolt.

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of the Indian military response to the humanitarian disaster, India was included in the ‘core group’ of the U.S.-led Combined Support Force (CSF-536) operating out of Utapao, Thailand.

In a secret cable on ‘Challenges and Opportunities in 2005’ sent shortly after, the then U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford noted how the largest-ever joint India-US naval exercises held in 2004 had laid the groundwork for the unprecedented posttsunami co-operation between the two militaries (24643 ; February 4 , 2005). He further told Washington that the Indian Air Force had extended the deadline for the U.S. to submit a bid for the 126 MRCAs and advised Pentagon to leverage the engagement that had gone on so far in to commercial gain: “This represents the best opportunity we have had in years to cap three years of successful exercises and other military engagement with a decision to seriously compete in India’s annual $14 billion defence market...”

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

An insight into the tug of war on defence policies and purchases revealing a state of play between India and the United States

Founder of the Wikileaks website Julian Assange

T

SIDDARTH VARADARJAN

KEY POINTS n The cables are part of over 5,000 secret, confidential distribution cables, accessed by The Hindu from the WikiLeak’s organisation. n Though a handful of cables go back to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of the diplomatic correspondence covers the period 2005-2009. n This was a period of rapid and extraordinary developments in the India-U.S. bilateral relationship.

he recent publication of classified cable traffic between the United States embassy in New Delhi and the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up a hornet’s nest in India with the country’s politicians and bureaucrats emerging in often unflattering colours.

The cables, part of a cache of over 5,000 secret, confidential or limited distribution cables, are being published by The Hindu, which, in turn, has obtained the material from the WikiLeak’s organisation. Though a handful of cables go back to the PokhranII nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of the diplomatic correspondence covers the period 2005-2009.

This was a period of rapid and extraordinary developments in the IndoU.S. bilateral relationship centred around three broad pillars – defence; high technology trade issues leading to civil

44

nuclear co-operation and expanding trade and investment links. The cables which WikiLeaks has obtained are not a complete set and are, in many ways, quite fragmentary. The sheer volume of traffic on the defence and military front, however, does allow us to piece together a reasonably coherent picture of the state of play at the bilateral level.

The cables confirm clearly, from the American policy perspective, the centrality of defence to the emerging strategic partnership and the centrality of arms sales and ‘interoperability’ to the American expectations from India in defence matters.

The cables also offer a glimpse into India’s expectations and priorities, though this glimpse is understandably refracted through the lens of American diplomats who were often frustrated by the fact that Washington was not always able to get its way.

Emerging Strategic Relationship At the start of 2005, the U.S. believed the time had come to make a big push. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that the Bush administration had launched the previous year in tandem with the National Democratic Alliance government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee had already established a framework of mutual undertakings in which India and the U.S. would move the bilateral relationship forward. In the initial phases, India undertook to bring its export control and end use verification procedures for dual use items in sync with U.S. requirements, while the American side would lift some export restrictions, provide a classified briefing on missile defence and allow India to buy the Patriot system.

The Asian tsunami of December 2004 provided an opportunity to open other doors. Impressed by the speed and nature

“This represents the best opportunity we have had in years to cap three years of successful exercises and other military engagement with a decision to seriously compete in India's annual $14 billion defence market...”

–– (24643; February 4, 2005)

45

”

AFP

Military Sales Pitch A month later, a cable sent in the name of Ambassador Mulford provides Washington with the crucial insight that its military sales pitch would only work if it were connected to the wider economic and technology benefits the Indian side hopes to harvest. “At this juncture, it is critical that we devise a strategy to strengthen appreciation in the Indian bureaucracy of the economic benefits derived from a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S. Our strongest advocates will be the economists who are running the government not the traditional military establishment.” (29616 ; March 28 , 2005 ; confidential) .

The U.S. message has to be simple, he suggested: “That [it] is a reliable strategic partner for defence co-production, technology sharing and joint research.

Using military sales as the platform for co-operation will catalyse development of India’s defence sector, spin off new industries, catalyse economic growth, and create jobs”.

Apart from breaking bureaucratic mindsets on both sides and involving the private sector, the diplomat proposed the establishment of a ‘Defence Production Co-operation Group’ that would, “lay the foundation for direct interaction among Indian and U.S. business leaders aimed at creating corporate structures as the basis for defence co-operation, beginning with a few discreet projects”.

In stressing the need to emphasise

wikileaks 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:27 PM Page 44

INDIA - U.S.

APRIL 2011

DSI

of the Indian military response to the humanitarian disaster, India was included in the ‘core group’ of the U.S.-led Combined Support Force (CSF-536) operating out of Utapao, Thailand.

In a secret cable on ‘Challenges and Opportunities in 2005’ sent shortly after, the then U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford noted how the largest-ever joint India-US naval exercises held in 2004 had laid the groundwork for the unprecedented posttsunami co-operation between the two militaries (24643 ; February 4 , 2005). He further told Washington that the Indian Air Force had extended the deadline for the U.S. to submit a bid for the 126 MRCAs and advised Pentagon to leverage the engagement that had gone on so far in to commercial gain: “This represents the best opportunity we have had in years to cap three years of successful exercises and other military engagement with a decision to seriously compete in India’s annual $14 billion defence market...”

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

An insight into the tug of war on defence policies and purchases revealing a state of play between India and the United States

Founder of the Wikileaks website Julian Assange

T

SIDDARTH VARADARJAN

KEY POINTS n The cables are part of over 5,000 secret, confidential distribution cables, accessed by The Hindu from the WikiLeak’s organisation. n Though a handful of cables go back to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of the diplomatic correspondence covers the period 2005-2009. n This was a period of rapid and extraordinary developments in the India-U.S. bilateral relationship.

he recent publication of classified cable traffic between the United States embassy in New Delhi and the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up a hornet’s nest in India with the country’s politicians and bureaucrats emerging in often unflattering colours.

The cables, part of a cache of over 5,000 secret, confidential or limited distribution cables, are being published by The Hindu, which, in turn, has obtained the material from the WikiLeak’s organisation. Though a handful of cables go back to the PokhranII nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of the diplomatic correspondence covers the period 2005-2009.

This was a period of rapid and extraordinary developments in the IndoU.S. bilateral relationship centred around three broad pillars – defence; high technology trade issues leading to civil

44

nuclear co-operation and expanding trade and investment links. The cables which WikiLeaks has obtained are not a complete set and are, in many ways, quite fragmentary. The sheer volume of traffic on the defence and military front, however, does allow us to piece together a reasonably coherent picture of the state of play at the bilateral level.

The cables confirm clearly, from the American policy perspective, the centrality of defence to the emerging strategic partnership and the centrality of arms sales and ‘interoperability’ to the American expectations from India in defence matters.

The cables also offer a glimpse into India’s expectations and priorities, though this glimpse is understandably refracted through the lens of American diplomats who were often frustrated by the fact that Washington was not always able to get its way.

Emerging Strategic Relationship At the start of 2005, the U.S. believed the time had come to make a big push. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that the Bush administration had launched the previous year in tandem with the National Democratic Alliance government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee had already established a framework of mutual undertakings in which India and the U.S. would move the bilateral relationship forward. In the initial phases, India undertook to bring its export control and end use verification procedures for dual use items in sync with U.S. requirements, while the American side would lift some export restrictions, provide a classified briefing on missile defence and allow India to buy the Patriot system.

The Asian tsunami of December 2004 provided an opportunity to open other doors. Impressed by the speed and nature

“This represents the best opportunity we have had in years to cap three years of successful exercises and other military engagement with a decision to seriously compete in India's annual $14 billion defence market...”

–– (24643; February 4, 2005)

45

”

AFP

Military Sales Pitch A month later, a cable sent in the name of Ambassador Mulford provides Washington with the crucial insight that its military sales pitch would only work if it were connected to the wider economic and technology benefits the Indian side hopes to harvest. “At this juncture, it is critical that we devise a strategy to strengthen appreciation in the Indian bureaucracy of the economic benefits derived from a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S. Our strongest advocates will be the economists who are running the government not the traditional military establishment.” (29616 ; March 28 , 2005 ; confidential) .

The U.S. message has to be simple, he suggested: “That [it] is a reliable strategic partner for defence co-production, technology sharing and joint research.

Using military sales as the platform for co-operation will catalyse development of India’s defence sector, spin off new industries, catalyse economic growth, and create jobs”.

Apart from breaking bureaucratic mindsets on both sides and involving the private sector, the diplomat proposed the establishment of a ‘Defence Production Co-operation Group’ that would, “lay the foundation for direct interaction among Indian and U.S. business leaders aimed at creating corporate structures as the basis for defence co-operation, beginning with a few discreet projects”.

In stressing the need to emphasise

wikileaks 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:28 PM Page 46

INDIA - U.S.

APRIL 2011

undertook to “work to conclude defence transactions, not solely as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to ... reinforce our strategic partnership.”

Ambitious language was also used to envisage a collaboration in “multinational operations”, a concept elastic enough to include humanitarian operations like tsunami relief as well as more muscular actions like PSI-style interdictions.

Regardless of the high expectations the agreement aroused within the U.S. defence and political establishment, the Indian side returned to Delhi with what they considered to be a singular achievement: “ US acceptance of India’s desire for co-production and technology transfer”. The American priorities, of course, lay elsewhere – on effecting actual big ticket sales and pushing the mil-mil agenda of interoperability.

The U.S. embassy took heart from the robust defence both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Mukherjee mounted of the new framework agreement in Parliament despite the criticism of their Left coalition partners.

“PM and DEFMIN scoff at Leftist criticism of U.S. defence ties; we should, too”, was the title of a triumphalist post-mortem cable (36415 ; July 12 , 2005 ; confidential) .

Again, it was left to Indian officials to sound a word of caution.

“…the importance of a deeper defence relationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India; highlighting the opportunities presented by a larger FMS (military sales) relationship while addressing concerns about US reliability as an arms supplier (and) pressing for negotiation of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement...”

–– (35111, June 21, 2005)

the U.S. government would authorise American aircraft like the F-16 and F-18 to take part in the MRCA bid. Her visit, the secret cable said, “has produced the most substantial agenda for US-India cooperation ever” (30136 ; April 5, 2005) noting that “military ties have developed into one of the most important and robust aspects of the US-India bilateral relationship and have often led the dramatic improvements in relations that we have witnessed since the end of the Cold War”.

The cable flags the need for the two countries to establish a new framework for defence engagement that could transcend the limitations of the 1995 Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation and take the security relationship to a new level.

One aim apart from flagging the usual thrust areas – arms sales, exercises, cooperation in the Indian Ocean – the cable says is, ... “one key administrative goal we need to complete to further advance our defence co-operation programmes is

46

completing the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) which PACOM has been trying to get signed for close to three years... Recommend you stress with (Pranab) Mukherjee and other officials the importance of getting this signed.”

On the eve of Defence Minister Mukherjee’s visit to Washington, the U.S. embassy sent a ‘scene-setter’ cable to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

Mukherjee, it noted was “in effect, the Deputy Prime Minister, and we believe he aspires to the top job. By demonstrating our understanding of his influence beyond the military realm, it may be easier to advance our defence-related objectives”.

Signing the Framework for US-India Strategic Defence Relationship was one deliverable it identified upfront.

The minister’s visit was taking place “at a time when the goal of establishing a key strategic relationship ... with one of Asia’s rising giants ... is becoming a reality”, the secret cable noted. Laying out specific

objectives - “we can advance during his visit ... in light of Mr Mukherjee’s position as de facto deputy PM.” (35111, June 21, 2005).

These included the ‘strategic’ objective of getting India into the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) the U.S.-led counterproliferation campaign to interdict ships on the high seas suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or their components as a full member; emphasising “the importance of a deeper defence relationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India; highlighting the opportunities presented by a larger FMS (military sales) relationship while addressing concerns about US reliability as an arms supplier (and) pressing for negotiation of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement...”

‘ Breakthrough Arms Sales ’ Crucial, too, was the pursuit of a “breakthrough arms sale”. The “pending obsolescence of much of India’s Soviet-

origin equipment will create oncein-a-decade opportunities for foreign suppliers” and if the U.S. could address Indian concerns about its reliability as a supplier, this would “lay the foundation for a breakthrough arms sale”. Such a sale was, noted the cable, “key to deepening our relationship and to developing the military interoperability that will help our strategic partnership realise its potential. Despite the US lifting of sanctions in 2001, we have not yet achieved a breakthrough sale of a major platform”, the cable lamented.

The new Defence Framework by the U.S. was signed on June 28, 2005, though in its final avatar, the word ‘strategic’ was removed from the title along with language from the draft text that the Indian side felt was too sweeping. As Ambassador Mulford had recommended, a Defence Production and Procurement Group (DPPG) was set up to address Indian concerns about the need for a link between arms sales and technology transfer. The two sides

47

Status of Forces Agreement AFP

”

co-production and technology sharing, Ambassador Mulford showed he understood India well. Three days later, Pranab Mukherjee, who was defence minister at the time, told him that “defence equipment sales while important, do not carry the same strategic significance as co-production/technology transfer and that this type of arrangement will establish a long-term sturdy relationship.”

(29834 ; March 31 , 2005 ; confidential) .

The ambassador agreed.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had just been to Delhi and announced America’s desire to help India realise its goal of becoming a world power in the coming years. “Energy, military cooperation, space and defence sales were the key areas where the US seeks to assist India in assuming its place as a world power in the 21st century,” Mulford told the minister.

A U.S. embassy cable sent a few days later as a ‘scene-setter’ for the United State’s Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander William Fallon’s forthcoming visit to India tried to tie the various strands that had emerged so far on the Indo-U.S. defence front. Rice had told the Indians

Former US Ambassador to India David C. Mulford addressing a commemorative service in Mumbai

DSI

The point was driven home less than a month later when U.S. officials tried to raise the possibility of India signing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) granting protection and immunity to U.S. military personnel present in India for exercises and other mutually agreed activities. The MEA strongly discouraged them from doing so. (38759 ; August 18 , 2005; confidential).

Since 2005, the proposal to sign ACSA has been dropped in favour of the (Logistic Support Analysis) LSA. But India is not yet ready to commit to that agreement or theCISMOA or the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement for Geospatial Co-operation (BECA) which the U.S. says are essential for any transfer of sensitive electronics and avionics. On all of these agreements, New Delhi has told Washington ‘Don’t call us, we’ll call you.’

Despite demonstrating a willingness to take part in PSI-like actions, India refused to join the Initiative citing legal difficulties.

The MRCA tender is still being evaluated but what has moved ahead is arms sales.

wikileaks 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:28 PM Page 46

INDIA - U.S.

APRIL 2011

undertook to “work to conclude defence transactions, not solely as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to ... reinforce our strategic partnership.”

Ambitious language was also used to envisage a collaboration in “multinational operations”, a concept elastic enough to include humanitarian operations like tsunami relief as well as more muscular actions like PSI-style interdictions.

Regardless of the high expectations the agreement aroused within the U.S. defence and political establishment, the Indian side returned to Delhi with what they considered to be a singular achievement: “ US acceptance of India’s desire for co-production and technology transfer”. The American priorities, of course, lay elsewhere – on effecting actual big ticket sales and pushing the mil-mil agenda of interoperability.

The U.S. embassy took heart from the robust defence both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Mukherjee mounted of the new framework agreement in Parliament despite the criticism of their Left coalition partners.

“PM and DEFMIN scoff at Leftist criticism of U.S. defence ties; we should, too”, was the title of a triumphalist post-mortem cable (36415 ; July 12 , 2005 ; confidential) .

Again, it was left to Indian officials to sound a word of caution.

“…the importance of a deeper defence relationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India; highlighting the opportunities presented by a larger FMS (military sales) relationship while addressing concerns about US reliability as an arms supplier (and) pressing for negotiation of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement...”

–– (35111, June 21, 2005)

the U.S. government would authorise American aircraft like the F-16 and F-18 to take part in the MRCA bid. Her visit, the secret cable said, “has produced the most substantial agenda for US-India cooperation ever” (30136 ; April 5, 2005) noting that “military ties have developed into one of the most important and robust aspects of the US-India bilateral relationship and have often led the dramatic improvements in relations that we have witnessed since the end of the Cold War”.

The cable flags the need for the two countries to establish a new framework for defence engagement that could transcend the limitations of the 1995 Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation and take the security relationship to a new level.

One aim apart from flagging the usual thrust areas – arms sales, exercises, cooperation in the Indian Ocean – the cable says is, ... “one key administrative goal we need to complete to further advance our defence co-operation programmes is

46

completing the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) which PACOM has been trying to get signed for close to three years... Recommend you stress with (Pranab) Mukherjee and other officials the importance of getting this signed.”

On the eve of Defence Minister Mukherjee’s visit to Washington, the U.S. embassy sent a ‘scene-setter’ cable to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

Mukherjee, it noted was “in effect, the Deputy Prime Minister, and we believe he aspires to the top job. By demonstrating our understanding of his influence beyond the military realm, it may be easier to advance our defence-related objectives”.

Signing the Framework for US-India Strategic Defence Relationship was one deliverable it identified upfront.

The minister’s visit was taking place “at a time when the goal of establishing a key strategic relationship ... with one of Asia’s rising giants ... is becoming a reality”, the secret cable noted. Laying out specific

objectives - “we can advance during his visit ... in light of Mr Mukherjee’s position as de facto deputy PM.” (35111, June 21, 2005).

These included the ‘strategic’ objective of getting India into the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) the U.S.-led counterproliferation campaign to interdict ships on the high seas suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or their components as a full member; emphasising “the importance of a deeper defence relationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India; highlighting the opportunities presented by a larger FMS (military sales) relationship while addressing concerns about US reliability as an arms supplier (and) pressing for negotiation of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement...”

‘ Breakthrough Arms Sales ’ Crucial, too, was the pursuit of a “breakthrough arms sale”. The “pending obsolescence of much of India’s Soviet-

origin equipment will create oncein-a-decade opportunities for foreign suppliers” and if the U.S. could address Indian concerns about its reliability as a supplier, this would “lay the foundation for a breakthrough arms sale”. Such a sale was, noted the cable, “key to deepening our relationship and to developing the military interoperability that will help our strategic partnership realise its potential. Despite the US lifting of sanctions in 2001, we have not yet achieved a breakthrough sale of a major platform”, the cable lamented.

The new Defence Framework by the U.S. was signed on June 28, 2005, though in its final avatar, the word ‘strategic’ was removed from the title along with language from the draft text that the Indian side felt was too sweeping. As Ambassador Mulford had recommended, a Defence Production and Procurement Group (DPPG) was set up to address Indian concerns about the need for a link between arms sales and technology transfer. The two sides

47

Status of Forces Agreement AFP

”

co-production and technology sharing, Ambassador Mulford showed he understood India well. Three days later, Pranab Mukherjee, who was defence minister at the time, told him that “defence equipment sales while important, do not carry the same strategic significance as co-production/technology transfer and that this type of arrangement will establish a long-term sturdy relationship.”

(29834 ; March 31 , 2005 ; confidential) .

The ambassador agreed.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had just been to Delhi and announced America’s desire to help India realise its goal of becoming a world power in the coming years. “Energy, military cooperation, space and defence sales were the key areas where the US seeks to assist India in assuming its place as a world power in the 21st century,” Mulford told the minister.

A U.S. embassy cable sent a few days later as a ‘scene-setter’ for the United State’s Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander William Fallon’s forthcoming visit to India tried to tie the various strands that had emerged so far on the Indo-U.S. defence front. Rice had told the Indians

Former US Ambassador to India David C. Mulford addressing a commemorative service in Mumbai

DSI

The point was driven home less than a month later when U.S. officials tried to raise the possibility of India signing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) granting protection and immunity to U.S. military personnel present in India for exercises and other mutually agreed activities. The MEA strongly discouraged them from doing so. (38759 ; August 18 , 2005; confidential).

Since 2005, the proposal to sign ACSA has been dropped in favour of the (Logistic Support Analysis) LSA. But India is not yet ready to commit to that agreement or theCISMOA or the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement for Geospatial Co-operation (BECA) which the U.S. says are essential for any transfer of sensitive electronics and avionics. On all of these agreements, New Delhi has told Washington ‘Don’t call us, we’ll call you.’

Despite demonstrating a willingness to take part in PSI-like actions, India refused to join the Initiative citing legal difficulties.

The MRCA tender is still being evaluated but what has moved ahead is arms sales.

wikileaks 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:27 PM Page 48

INDIA - U.S.

APRIL 2011

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Through standalone FMS purchases of a landing dock ship, maritime reconnaissance heavy lift aircraft, India has already spent (or committed to spend) more than $10 billion on American hardware. The End Use Monitoring (EUM) obstacle was also overcome in July 2009 with the initialing of an agreed language on inspections and permissible use of U.S.-supplied equipment. Nevertheless, a secret ‘scenesetter’ cable sent by the U.S. embassy to Under Secretary for Defence Michelle Flournoy at the end of October 2009 – the most recent cable in the WikiLeaks archive to deal with defence matters in detail – paints a cautious picture of the state of play with India on the defence front.

Even if the U.S. was dissatisfied by the current level of interaction with India, it should take comfort from the fact that this is making a difference and that “our relationship with India is more robust than that of any other country India partners with”, the cable notes. (232002, October 23, 2009) The way forward lies in “nudging India to expand their commitments by signing the foundational agreements and by moving forward with military sales [which] will provide opportunities for a sustained relationship far more robust than exercises and exchanges. If we can continue our trend of major military sales,

AFP

A US Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft

‘ If we can continue our trend of major military sales, we will cement a relationship for the next several decades with the most stable country in South Asia’ –– (232002, October 23, 2009)

”

we will cement a relationship for the next several decades with the most stable country in South Asia’.

Interestingly, the Flournoy ‘scene-setter’ and another 2009 cable addressed to Hillary Clinton blame the civilian leadership and bureaucracy for slowing down a relationship that the military brass is keen to accelerate. “India’s bureaucracy remains stove piped and slow-moving, and in many instances, populated by senior officials who

48

came of age during the Cold War, steeped in the ‘non-aligned’ rhetoric of the 60s and 70s, and perhaps afraid to take forward leaning stances … While the Indian uniformed leadership of all three Services, and in particular the Indian Navy, appreciate their improving ties with the United States’s military, bureaucratic inertia and recalcitrant officials in the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence continue to complicate attempts to improve the partnership”. (216716; July 15 2009; secret).

As for politicians, the Flournoy cable was blunt: “All of the PACOM theatre security co-operation objectives can be implemented only with the acquiescence of the civilian leadership which, at times, appears to be at odds with the Services’ milto-mil desires. Specific examples include Minister of Defence Antony’s rejection of the multilateral Malabar exercises despite the Indian Navy’s preference for them”.

The cable sent under the signature of Ambassador Roemer, noted that the “civilian leadership continues to defer on key foundational documents necessary to move the US-India mil-to-mil relationship closer”. This, the ambassador noted, was “for fear that the political opposition would seize on it to further their often repeated claims that India is sub-serving its foreign policy to that of the US”.

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Defence Buzz - April.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 18/04/11 2:48 PM Page 50

DEFENCE BUZZ

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RAHUL BEDI

IAF Mi-8 helicopters fly during the Aero India 2011 at the Yelhanka Air Force Station, Bangalore

Coming Soon, Hopefully, to a Conflict Near You INDIA undoubtedly remains the world’s largest materiel procurer as it strives to modernise its equipment profile to meet local and regional challenges.

The recently concluded Aero India 2011 in which participation over its previous edition two years ago was significantly larger was adequately indicative that India is the most sought after destination for overseas armament suppliers.

According to a recent report by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and financial consultants KPMG (Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler), India is expected to shortly ink defence deals worth an estimated $42 billion.

This includes the much-awaited $10 billion contract for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) – expected to rise to 200 fighters for around $16 billion, 145 BAE Systems’ M777 155mm/39 calibre lightweight howitzers, Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $647 million and 197 Light Observation Helicopters for the Army Aviation Corps and the Indian Air Force (IAF) estimated at $600 million to $700 million.

Basic trainers, 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III Very Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft and possibly 22 attack and 15 Heavy Lift Helicopters, all for the IAF, make up the list of procurements under various stages of evaluation and imminent price negotiation.

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At Aero India in Bangalore in early February, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik had said, “barring complications” the MMRCA contract will be confirmed by September. Price negotiations for the MMRCA, he stated, were scheduled to begin within a few weeks for which Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN, Russian Aircraft Corporation’s (RSK’s) MiG-35 and Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen are competing. If the Air Chief’s predictions are vindicated, the MMRCA will be the fastest ever deal of such huge proportions that India has clinched.

Media reports indicate that a shortlist of the rival MMRCA models is likely to be announced by April following which the two or possibly three finalists will be asked to re-submit their offset proposals in keeping with the revised Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) that expand offsets to the hitherto circumscribed civil aviation and internal security sectors.

The CII-KPMG study also reveals that India has confirmed $25 billion worth of military purchases since 2007 of which the IAF has acquired equipment worth $17.46 billion, the Indian Navy (IN) $6.16 billion, the Army $420 million and the Indian Coast Guard $616 million. “Over the last decade India’s huge defence industry has been in the process of undertaking one of the

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DEFENCE BUZZ Leaky Business THEArmy’s long-postponed procurement of 145 BAE Systems’ M777 155 mm/39-cal lightweight howitzers (LWH) can be delayed further following an investigation into the recent leakage of their field trial reports.

Several pages from the report of the M777 trials conducted in Rajasthan and the mountainous Sikkim region were posted anonymously to the Army Headquarters in January alongside a note claming that the guns were inadequate and urging the Army Chief, General V. K. Singh to cancel the $647 million LWH order.

The M777s were being acquired via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route after the rival Pegasus 155mm/39 cal LWH from SingaporeTechnologies Kinetics (SKT) was blacklisted for alleged corruption in June 2009 and is currently under investigation. The STK has denied all charges of any wrongdoing.

The anonymous note has also threatened dire consequences for General Singh unless he terminates the howitzer deal which was high on the Army Chief’s priority list during his six-day US visit in early March.The M777s are urgently needed to equip two mountain divisions that are under raising for

DSI

deployment along the disputed Chinese frontier in the Northeast.

Official sources, however, say that the Army Headquarters is playing down the incident maintaining that leaking five pages of the M777s ‘confirmatory’ trial reports will in no way prove detrimental to their procurement which will continue apace as the Army has acquired no howitzers since the import of 410 Bofors FH-77B guns in 1987. Of these around 200 to 225 remain serviceable but these too need replacing.

Official sources indicate that the M777, a tried and tested weapon system extensively and efficiently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US, British and Allied Forces, has failed in meeting the Indian Army’s Service Qualitative Requirements (SQR) during last year’s trials in terrain where they will eventually be used.

These alleged shortcomings include compatibility with the Indian Army’s firing tables, difficulties in air transportation, para-dropping and a helicopter under-slung mode, problems with night vision, communication systems and a questionable barrel life. But senior officers were of the view that the M777’s failure in meeting the SQRs in no way reflects adversely on the operational capabilities of this proven system.

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largest procurement cycles in the world,” the study maintained.

The big ticket items acquired so far include six Lockheed Martin-designed C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft configured for Special Forces operations and also eight Boeing P-8I Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (MRA) with a anti-submarine warfare capability.

The joint analysis further reveals that the present profile of military equipment in the Service highlights a pressing need for modernisation with ‘obsolete’ materiel accounting for 50 percent of the Services’ inventory which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) wants to reduce to 30 percent. The proportion of state-of-the-art equipment also needs to double from its present level of 15 percent, the report says.

Consequently, some 62 percent of major overseas defence equipment vendors believe that India is an ‘attractive proposition’ and also one where homeland security, prompted by the November 2008 attack on Mumbai by 10 gunmen from Pakistan, is projected to be one of the key focus areas. The CII-KPMG study reckons that by 2016 the Central and state government budget for homeland security will grow to around $10 billion which will include better weaponry, surveillance equipment, body armour and transportation for the paramilitaries and provincial police forces.

But India’s defence allocation for financial year 2011-12 of `1,644.15 billion – a 11.94 percent increase over the previous year’s outlay – will largely be ‘neutralised’ by the rate of inflation presently running at around 9.3 percent. Military officials have regretted that the Defence Budget this year has amounted to merely 1.83 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product , far less than the three percent consistently demanded by the Services and far below that of nuclear rival China that has officially allocated $ 91 billion towards its defence expenditure this year.

Analysts, however, believe that the undeclared amount allocated to China’s defence spending is significantly higher.

Of India’s defence outlay, `691.99 billion has been earmarked for capital expenditure or acquisition of weapon systems and modernisation. But armament industry sources say that around 60 percent of this will be used up as payment for equipment already acquired leaving only around `200 billion to `250 billion for additional purchases.

APRIL 2011

Chief of Army Staff General V. K. Singh

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Defence Buzz - April.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 18/04/11 2:51 PM Page 54

DEFENCE BUZZ “Under the FMS route India has to accept the equipment as it exists and its own parametres become inconsequential,” says former Major General Mrinal Suman, one of India’s foremost experts on military procurement. The US government has accepted no change in the draft contract and has presented a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ option for the buyer country, General Suman adds.

But the M777s alleged inability in meeting the Indian Army’s SQRs is not the only hurdle. In India’s Byzantine, highly bureaucratic and often corrupt military procurement process anonymous letters of the kind sent to the Army Headquarters have previously resulted in extended procurement delays, pending investigation, resulting in contracts even being cancelled.

Artillery officers concede that any postponement, leave alone cancellation of the M777 contract, will disastrously defer the Army’s Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan already delayed by over a decade by complex bureaucratic procedures and vacillation in decision making. Defence Minister A. K. Antony, however, has assured the Army that nobody will be allowed to manipulate the howitzer procurement process.

The Army, meanwhile, remains wary about acquiring US military equipment via the FMS route. Last June, General

APRIL 2011

Singh cautioned the government over pursuing FMS purchases as after sales maintenance support for such equipment can prove ‘problematic’.

In a letter to Antony, the Army Chief maintained that his force was facing recurring trouble with 12 Thales-Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery-locating radar acquired in 2002 for $ 142.4 million via the FMS route.

Artillery sources say that up to two-thirds of these radar – India’s first significant US military equipment purchase for nearly four decades after Washington lifted sanctions on New Delhi in October 2001 following its 1998 nuclear tests – were ‘frequently’ out of commission awaiting either spare parts, maintenance or both but decidedly precluding their operational deployment.

Mounted on locally built vehicles and equipped with a package supplied by Israel’s Tadiran Communications, the fire-finder radar were deemed capable of detecting artillery positions at a distance of between 28km to 32km and tactical missiles up to 50km away with an accuracy of 10m. Army sources say that the radar which were being upgraded by an Israeli company has intermittently remained ‘off road’ since their induction was completed in mid-2007.

Sepecat Jaguar

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Hiccups On Upgrade UK’s Rolls Royce (RR) has opted out of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) $670 million Sepecat Jaguar IS/IM fighter upgrade, a move that can delay the programme to up the engines of around 60 of the hardy combat aircraft.

Official sources say RR’s decision in early February to withdraw from the competition followed the IAF’s requirement for a brand new engine and not the upgraded Adour MK 821 turbofan – an advanced version of the incumbent Adour Mk 811 power pack – on offer.

In June 2009, RR successfully tested the Adour Mk 821 turbofan in a Sepecat Jaguar in UK in the presence of an Indian Air Force delegation and was confident of meeting India’s requirement, especially as the upgraded power pack would necessitate the minimum amount of platform re-engineering for fitment.

As a part of its sales pitch, RR maintained that the decades-old experience of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in locally building the Adour 811 engines under licence could also be harnessed in constructing the Adrour 821 power pack but to no avail. Last year, RR signed a $200-million deal with HAL to supply

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DEFENCE BUZZ

APRIL 2011

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Adour Mk 871 engines for 57 additional BAE Systems’ Hawk 312 advanced jet trainers being acquired by the IAF and the Indian Navy (IN).

Along with a new engine, the HAL-built upgraded Jaguar IS/IM/IB versions will also be equipped with the DARIN III (Display Attack Ranging Inertial Navigation) avionics suite capable of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) delivery and possibly, fitted even for strategic employment.

The lone Jaguar/IM squadron of 20 fighters based at Jamnagar will soon be armed with 26 Boeing AGM/ATM-84L/84 Harpoon Block II missiles acquired recently via the FMS programme to reinforce their maritime warfare capability by striking at land-based targets and ships in littoral environments.

One Step Forward BRAZIL’S Embraer handed over the first of three EMB 145 aircraft in late February to India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at their headquarters in São José dos Campos. The aircraft were unveiled for their eventual conversion to Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) platforms after being fitted with Embraer’s locally designed phased-array radar, a project that has been delayed by nearly three years to 2014.

The three EMB 145 that feature an in-flight refueling system, satellite communication (SATCOM) capability, enhanced electrical and cooling capacities besides varied aerodynamic and structural changes were acquired in July 2008 for $210 million. On the aircraft, DRDO’s Centre for Airborne Systems-developed S-band active electronically-scanned array radar will be integrated.

But official sources say technical and ‘mating’ problems have postponed the project well beyond the 2011 deadline set by the Cabinet Committee on Security in September 2004.

These three AEW&C aircraft will supplement an equal number of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI)-built Phalcon AEW7C radar mounted on Ilyushin Il-76 A-50 Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft which the IAF has acquired for $1.1 billion in 2004. Two Phalcon systems have been delivered to the Indian Air Force (IAF) while the third is expected shortly and the IAF is presently employing them to effectively hone their battle space management involving Su-30MKI multi-role fighters, Jaguars and upgraded MiG-27s.

EMB-145 aircraft The under-development of the AEW&C platforms are a replacement for the DRDO’s earlier Air Surveillance Platform (ASP), the prototype of which crashed in 1999. The DRDO’s revolving dorsal rotodome mounted atop a modified Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) HS 748 aircraft fell off around five km short of the runway as the ASP was coming into land at the Indian naval station, Rajali, in south India in 1999. All eight people, including four DRDO test pilots and four military scientists, involved in the ASP programme died in the accident postponing the DRDO’s AEW&C programme till its revival five years later.

Since 2009, DRDO scientists have been working closely with Embraer which has considerable experience in building AEW&C systems. It was also selected in 2004, along with USA’s Lockheed Martin, to develop the US Army’s next generation of intelligence systems known as the aerial common sensor (ACS) mounted on its ERJ 145 platform.

Once operational, the EMB 145 aircraft with DRDO’s radar will attain surveillance ranges between 250km to 375km with a 240-degree coverage and a fivehour endurance.

In a related development, Embrarer is on the verge of confirming the $500 million sale of nine specially configured ERJ 145s to the IAF to augment its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

The aircraft will also be capable of target-towing, aerial photography and VIP passenger transportations.

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The varied electronic, radar and surveillance equipment, which the IAF wants integrated onto these aircraft, will be sourced from local and overseas vendors, European and US companies.

“Our lowest bid was accepted in late 2009 and we are in the process of finalising the deal shortly,” Embraer’s executive vice-president Orlando J. F. Netohe said at Aero India. Military sources say the ERJ 145s with an operational range of 3,200nm and a ceiling of around 42,000 feet, has been selected over the IAI-designed Gulfstream G200.

Two of the nine ERJ 145 aircraft will be dedicated to signals intelligence gathering, a requirement that has gained urgency after the Mumbai terrorist strikes.

All nine ERJ 145s will complement aerial surveillance activity presently conducted by the shadowy Aviation Research Centre (ARC) that employs IAF pilots and operates closely with the country’s primary external intelligence gathering agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). But the ARC is handicapped by its ageing assets badly in need of replacing in order to execute communication and electronic surveillance along Pakistani and Chinese frontiers.

Earlier in 2005, the Indian Air Force and the Border Security Force had inducted five Embraer 135BJ Legacy jets equipped with self-protection suites, costing $166.66 million, to transport VVIP’s internally.

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