DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI Cover press:cover-feb3.qxd 03/09/09 9:29 AM Page 1

ARIHANT

THE DESIGN AND THE DILEMMA The launch of India’s first nuclear submarine raises strategic questions I C. UDAY BHASKAR MODERNISATION

TECHNOLOGY UPGRADE There is scope for greater use of technology to make India more secure I V.P. MALIK AUGUST 2009

STATE OF

DEFENCE

National security may be compromised because of a lack of focus on building military capability I RAHUL BEDI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 2

ISSUE 1

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Letter.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 03/09/09 9:33 AM Page 2

AUGUST 2009

LETTER FROM THE

editor

T

en years after the Kargil conflict, it’s time to examine whether India’s armed forces are ready for another war. Our in-depth review of India’s defence preparedness, however, raises multiple red flags and points to an overall absence of a strategic culture. Despite annually increasing defence budgets, caught between shifting delivery dates and bureaucratic snafus, the military is facing many shortfalls in improving its warfare competence and inducting the latest technology.

There needs to be a more efficient level of coordination between the various armed forces and the creation of a common operational doctrine, including the finalising of the long pending proposal to create the post of Joint Chiefs of Staff. India is not prone to military takeovers so civilian leadership needs to overcome its fears and push for a closer coordination amongst the forces.

July was a watershed moment for the naval hierarchy with the launch of India’s first indigenously produced nuclear submarine, the Arihant. In a perceptive report, DSI outlines the strategic significance of this completion of India’s nuclear triad. Compared to the number of nuclear submarines with other advanced countries India is still far behind the international time curve but this effort should not be minimised. Ultimately, the mantra is self-reliance and self-confidence.

At the 15th Non-Aligned Summit held in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm-el Sheikh last month, Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, became a headline-grabbing word. The wide spread insurgency movement in Balochistan is not a cohesive one but a loose affiliation of groups united by a common grievance over poor governance, an ingrained sense of injustice and a clamour for greater autonomy. We examine the implication of this insurgency from both an Indian and Pakistani perspective. Also grabbing headlines, has been the ongoing Chinese military activity in Sikkim. The increasing incursions, need not be seen as part of the Sino-Indian border dispute but, perhaps, as a reflection of a more assertive and aggressive China.

In our continuous endeavour to keep our readers informed, we have started a new feature, Defence Buzz, which gives insider knowledge on military and commercial activity. The regular feature will keep you abreast of projects, ongoing and potential, and the new thinking within the defence establishment.

As you can see DSI’s editor has changed but the publication’s core values remain the same: providing impartial, exclusive analysis from established experts on issues relating to defence and security. And as usual, we always look forward to your feedback and suggestions. You can send in your comments to DSIDELHI09@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe, please contact our marketing team at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

DSI

There needs to be a more efficient level of coordination between the various armed forces and the creation of a common operational doctrine, including the finalising of the long pending proposal to create the post of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CONTENTS

contents 2nd.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 03/09/09 9:45 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

ARIHANT

COVER STORY

14

THE STATE OF

DEFENCE Ten years after Kargil and nearly one year after the terror attacks in Mumbai a review of India’s defence preparedness reveals that the country’s military establishment is found wanting on several fronts.

DSI

6

THE DILEMMA AND THE DESIGN Despite its relatively modest technical specifications and related limitations, the launch of India’s indigenously manufactured nuclearpowered submarine, the Arihant, is still a watershed event for India. Its launch last month marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency project and offers a timely look at India’s submarine programme.

MODERNISATION

22

BORDER INCURSIONS

TECHNOLOGICAL RISING UPGRADE CONCERNS Thanks to technology, it's possible to be lean and mean at affordable costs. Availability, affordability, indigenous capability and a relative combat edge should dictate the induction of technology in equipping India's security forces.

DANGEROUS GROUND NEIGHBOURWATCH

28

THE B-WORD The inclusion of the Balochistan in the Sharm-el Sheikh agreement and the subsequent Pakistani reaction highlights the fragile state of affairs in this beleaguered region.

NEIGHBOURWATCH

34

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL Insurgency in Pakistan's southwestern Province, Balochistan which used to be primarily centered in Dera Bugti, has now spread beyond the tribal belt into Sarawan, Jhalawan and Mekran divisions.

2

3

Recent intrusions by Chinese troops across the LAC, especially in Sikkim, should not be seen in the context of a border dispute but against China’s visibly growing assertiveness in international affairs and its rise in the global arena.

40

CONTENTS

contents 2nd.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 03/09/09 9:45 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

ARIHANT

COVER STORY

14

THE STATE OF

DEFENCE Ten years after Kargil and nearly one year after the terror attacks in Mumbai a review of India’s defence preparedness reveals that the country’s military establishment is found wanting on several fronts.

DSI

6

THE DILEMMA AND THE DESIGN Despite its relatively modest technical specifications and related limitations, the launch of India’s indigenously manufactured nuclearpowered submarine, the Arihant, is still a watershed event for India. Its launch last month marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency project and offers a timely look at India’s submarine programme.

MODERNISATION

22

BORDER INCURSIONS

TECHNOLOGICAL RISING UPGRADE CONCERNS Thanks to technology, it's possible to be lean and mean at affordable costs. Availability, affordability, indigenous capability and a relative combat edge should dictate the induction of technology in equipping India's security forces.

DANGEROUS GROUND NEIGHBOURWATCH

28

THE B-WORD The inclusion of the Balochistan in the Sharm-el Sheikh agreement and the subsequent Pakistani reaction highlights the fragile state of affairs in this beleaguered region.

NEIGHBOURWATCH

34

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL Insurgency in Pakistan's southwestern Province, Balochistan which used to be primarily centered in Dera Bugti, has now spread beyond the tribal belt into Sarawan, Jhalawan and Mekran divisions.

2

3

Recent intrusions by Chinese troops across the LAC, especially in Sikkim, should not be seen in the context of a border dispute but against China’s visibly growing assertiveness in international affairs and its rise in the global arena.

40

contributors 2nd.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 03/09/09 9:50 AM Page 1

AUGUST, 2009

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA AUGUST 2009 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

C. UDAY BHASKAR

RAHUL BEDI

V.P. MALIK

TALAT MASOOD

AJAI SAHNI

JAYADEVA RANADE

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years service.

He is currently Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters and has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

General V.P. Malik was Chief of the Indian Army from October 1997 to September 2000. As Army Chief, with additional responsibility of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, he planned, coordinated and oversaw execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistan’s attempted intrusion in Kargil sector in 1999. Most recently he has authored Kargil: From Surprise toVictory.

Currently, he is President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Lt. Gen. Talat Masood has served in the Pakistani Army for 39 years, retiring in 1990 as Secretary, Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence.

Closely associated with thinktanks and universities, regionally and globally, he has been working to promote peace and stability in South Asia.

Author, lecturer and security analyst, he is a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC and associated with Bradford University. He is also the chief coordinator for Pugwash, a Noble Prize winning NGO and its council member.

Dr. Ajai Sahni is Founding Member and Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia and has participated in advisory projects undertaken for various National and State Governments.

Jayadeva Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India is a security and intelligence expert. Formerly part of the Research and Analysis Service, he is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field. His foreign assignments have included Bejing, Hong Kong and his last foreign posting, prior to retirement in late 2008, was as Minister (Counselor) in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes to many leading publications, mostly on China, his chosen field of specialisation.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Parveen Kumar Ajay Kumar Moeen Aijaz BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar,Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar,Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi.

Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rs 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

contributors 2nd.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 03/09/09 9:50 AM Page 1

AUGUST, 2009

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA AUGUST 2009 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

C. UDAY BHASKAR

RAHUL BEDI

V.P. MALIK

TALAT MASOOD

AJAI SAHNI

JAYADEVA RANADE

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years service.

He is currently Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters and has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

General V.P. Malik was Chief of the Indian Army from October 1997 to September 2000. As Army Chief, with additional responsibility of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, he planned, coordinated and oversaw execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistan’s attempted intrusion in Kargil sector in 1999. Most recently he has authored Kargil: From Surprise toVictory.

Currently, he is President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Lt. Gen. Talat Masood has served in the Pakistani Army for 39 years, retiring in 1990 as Secretary, Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence.

Closely associated with thinktanks and universities, regionally and globally, he has been working to promote peace and stability in South Asia.

Author, lecturer and security analyst, he is a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC and associated with Bradford University. He is also the chief coordinator for Pugwash, a Noble Prize winning NGO and its council member.

Dr. Ajai Sahni is Founding Member and Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management; Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism Portal; Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia and has participated in advisory projects undertaken for various National and State Governments.

Jayadeva Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India is a security and intelligence expert. Formerly part of the Research and Analysis Service, he is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field. His foreign assignments have included Bejing, Hong Kong and his last foreign posting, prior to retirement in late 2008, was as Minister (Counselor) in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes to many leading publications, mostly on China, his chosen field of specialisation.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Parveen Kumar Ajay Kumar Moeen Aijaz BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar,Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar,Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi.

Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rs 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

Uday Bhaskar 16-14-44 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 9:56 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

SPECIAL REPORT

DSI

KEY POINTS

n Despite comparatively modest technical specifications, strategically the launch of Arihant is a watershed moment. n The maritime arena is one area where India can achieve strategic mutuality with China. n Arihant's launch should result in an effective policy review.

THE DILEMMA AND THE DESIGN

N

avies are indexed by their technostrategic capabilities and since the arrival of the atomic age in August 1945, major powers have been seeking the equivalent of the ultimate nuclear deterrent – one that is almost invulnerable and undetectable. This was manifest in the nuclear powered submarine (SSN) fitted with a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead which makes the platform a SSBN. On July 26, India took the first tentative step to acquire this capability when it launched the Arihant, away from the media glare, at Visakhapatnam, headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command.

It merits reiteration that this is only the launch of the vessel, that is, the hull which till now was in a dry-dock has now entered water.

To actually become fully operational and then be accorded the prefix of INS could take anything from three to four years. In short, India will not join the select group of the USA, Russia, France, China and the UK which have credible SBBN capability till about 2012-14.

Till recently the Arihant was known by a non-descript acronym ATV – advanced technology vessel – and has been kept under wraps for almost three decades. The Indian Navy (IN) like any other credible navy was cognisant of the distinctive advantages of acquiring a nuclear submarine but the decision to go ahead had to be political and due credit must be given to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who in the early 1970s gave the goahead for this project. However, this was a period when India was under severe technological sanctions due to its nuclear posture, not accepting the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) given its discriminatory nature, and hence the extreme secrecy.

Three government institutions pooled their expertise in an exceedingly challenging environment to embark upon the

The launch of the Arihant raises some strategic questions about India’s indigenous nuclear submarine programme

C.UDAY BHASKAR

Indian submarine INS Shalki leaves the port off the Goa coast during a joint Indo-US naval excercise

6

7

Uday Bhaskar 16-14-44 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 9:56 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

SPECIAL REPORT

DSI

KEY POINTS

n Despite comparatively modest technical specifications, strategically the launch of Arihant is a watershed moment. n The maritime arena is one area where India can achieve strategic mutuality with China. n Arihant's launch should result in an effective policy review.

THE DILEMMA AND THE DESIGN

N

avies are indexed by their technostrategic capabilities and since the arrival of the atomic age in August 1945, major powers have been seeking the equivalent of the ultimate nuclear deterrent – one that is almost invulnerable and undetectable. This was manifest in the nuclear powered submarine (SSN) fitted with a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead which makes the platform a SSBN. On July 26, India took the first tentative step to acquire this capability when it launched the Arihant, away from the media glare, at Visakhapatnam, headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command.

It merits reiteration that this is only the launch of the vessel, that is, the hull which till now was in a dry-dock has now entered water.

To actually become fully operational and then be accorded the prefix of INS could take anything from three to four years. In short, India will not join the select group of the USA, Russia, France, China and the UK which have credible SBBN capability till about 2012-14.

Till recently the Arihant was known by a non-descript acronym ATV – advanced technology vessel – and has been kept under wraps for almost three decades. The Indian Navy (IN) like any other credible navy was cognisant of the distinctive advantages of acquiring a nuclear submarine but the decision to go ahead had to be political and due credit must be given to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who in the early 1970s gave the goahead for this project. However, this was a period when India was under severe technological sanctions due to its nuclear posture, not accepting the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) given its discriminatory nature, and hence the extreme secrecy.

Three government institutions pooled their expertise in an exceedingly challenging environment to embark upon the

The launch of the Arihant raises some strategic questions about India’s indigenous nuclear submarine programme

C.UDAY BHASKAR

Indian submarine INS Shalki leaves the port off the Goa coast during a joint Indo-US naval excercise

6

7

Uday Bhaskar 16-14-44 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 9:58 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

SPECIAL REPORT This launch marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency national project that has been completed in the face of severe challenges and almost entirely through indigenous efforts.

Designing and building a nuclear submarine is perhaps the most complex and rigorous of all hi-tech industrial projects

”

A ‘retired’ submarine has donned the role of a museum in Visakhapatnam and become a unique tourist attraction

ATV. These included the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and the IN which were ably supported by some private sector entities.

It is to their combined credit that despite various hurdles and constraints, they were able to bring the project to a launch stage in July. Here due acknowledgement must be made of the support provided by the former USSR, now Russia, which had leased a Charlie class SSN, the INS Chakra, in 1988 to introduce the IN to the intricacies and complexities of operating a nuclear submarine.

Nuclear submarines powered by a small reactor accord the platform almost unlimited endurance at sea, since they can remain submerged for months on end and do not need to surface like their conventional counterparts. The latter, powered by a combination of diesel engines and electric batteries have to surface periodically to re-charge or ‘breathe’ which is when they are most vulnerable to detection and attack. The US Navy was the first to acquire this capability in 1955 and since then the early nuclear ‘boats’ have become exceedingly versatile and lethal, with both the USA and the

8

former USSR fielding a formidable fleet of SSBNs and SSNs. While there has been a reduction in force levels after the end of the Cold War, the major nuclear weapon powers still possess a formidable deterrent at sea.

The US now has 67 nuclear boats (14 SSBNs and 53 SSNs), while Russia has 27 nuclear subs (12 SSBNs and 19 SSNs). The most modern of these platforms have full-life reactors—meaning that they do not need to replace the core of the reactors and can hypothetically be at sea for three to four decades.

The missile fitted on the SSBN

completes the deterrent profile and the latest US and Russian SSBNs have missiles that have ranges going up to 8,000 kms with design accuracies of a mere 100 mts.

As such then an SSBN can remain submerged and fire a missile from underwater that can then traverse upto 8,000 kms and hit its target on land within a range of 100 m accuracy. Formidable, then is an understatement.

Watershed Event By this yardstick, the Arihant is a very modest platform. The proposed missile that will be fitted, the K-15, will have a

range of just 750 km. Furthermore, the reactor that will be fitted on board the submarine will have to undergo rigorous harbour and sea trials before it is deemed fully operational. As per current design, the core of the reactor will have to be changed every ten years or so and this is a further constraint when India’s strategic capabilities are assessed holistically.

However, despite the relatively modest technical specifications and related limitations, the launch of the Arihant is still a watershed event for India in a strategic perspective. This launch marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency national project that has been completed in the face of severe challenges and almost entirely through indigenous efforts.

Designing and building a nuclear submarine is perhaps the most complex and rigorous hi-tech industrial project and zero-error is mandatory in even the smallest detail. The secrecy factor and the adversarial international environment imposed their own costs and it is against this backdrop that India has been able to complete the ATV project and finally bring it into the public domain by christening it the Arihant. When fully operational and proven, the INS Arihant will complete one phase of the trajectory India embarked upon in May 1998 when it declared itself as a state with nuclear weapons.

The regional relevance of the Arihant

9

DSI

launch is best contextualised by noting the strategic profile of China. The last of the five nuclear weapon states, as per the NPT, to join the SSN club, China acquired this capability in a rudimentary form in the late 1970s. As in the case of other nations that made such a decision, it was a combination of an objective assessment of the prevailing international strategic environment and politico-military-industrial resolve that encouraged China to invest in the nuclear submarine even when it was racked by internal turmoil and grave socio-economic problems including a famine.

It has since invested in this domain with ruthless political determination— Chairman Mao and later Deng Xiaoping were staunch advocates of this platform— and by the mid-1980s the PLA Navy (PLAN) had joined the peer group of the USA, former USSR, the UK and France when it successfully tested its first submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Despite many setbacks in the early years, currently the PLAN has a fleet of 62 submarines of which there are 3 SSBNs and 6 SSNs. This submarine capability accords the People’s Republic of China considerable strategic relevance both at the global and regional level.

China will remain India’s principal strategic interlocutor in the regional grid for the foreseeable future and it is a tenet of bilateral relations between comparable major powers that certain intrinsic national capabilities shape the texture of the relationship.

Yes, the Sino-Indian relationship is chequered and the memory of 1962 has been internalised by Delhi in a very deep manner. But despite the complex territorial and border dispute, the two Asian giants have arrived at a reasonably stable relationship with the political leadership on both sides having prioritised peace and stability. China is far ahead of India in almost all aspects of tangible comprehensive national power, except in the political sphere, where the Indian democratic experience is a contrast to China’s authoritarian nature.

It is prudent for India not to seek military equivalence with China but to arrive at the appropriate degree of strategic mutuality and equipoise wherein India will not have to be either deferential to Beijing or needlessly belligerent. The only domain where India can perhaps arrive at this position is in the maritime arena and hence the need to prioritise the Indian efforts in this regard. Here, Prime Minister

Uday Bhaskar 16-14-44 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 9:58 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

SPECIAL REPORT This launch marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency national project that has been completed in the face of severe challenges and almost entirely through indigenous efforts.

Designing and building a nuclear submarine is perhaps the most complex and rigorous of all hi-tech industrial projects

”

A ‘retired’ submarine has donned the role of a museum in Visakhapatnam and become a unique tourist attraction

ATV. These included the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and the IN which were ably supported by some private sector entities.

It is to their combined credit that despite various hurdles and constraints, they were able to bring the project to a launch stage in July. Here due acknowledgement must be made of the support provided by the former USSR, now Russia, which had leased a Charlie class SSN, the INS Chakra, in 1988 to introduce the IN to the intricacies and complexities of operating a nuclear submarine.

Nuclear submarines powered by a small reactor accord the platform almost unlimited endurance at sea, since they can remain submerged for months on end and do not need to surface like their conventional counterparts. The latter, powered by a combination of diesel engines and electric batteries have to surface periodically to re-charge or ‘breathe’ which is when they are most vulnerable to detection and attack. The US Navy was the first to acquire this capability in 1955 and since then the early nuclear ‘boats’ have become exceedingly versatile and lethal, with both the USA and the

8

former USSR fielding a formidable fleet of SSBNs and SSNs. While there has been a reduction in force levels after the end of the Cold War, the major nuclear weapon powers still possess a formidable deterrent at sea.

The US now has 67 nuclear boats (14 SSBNs and 53 SSNs), while Russia has 27 nuclear subs (12 SSBNs and 19 SSNs). The most modern of these platforms have full-life reactors—meaning that they do not need to replace the core of the reactors and can hypothetically be at sea for three to four decades.

The missile fitted on the SSBN

completes the deterrent profile and the latest US and Russian SSBNs have missiles that have ranges going up to 8,000 kms with design accuracies of a mere 100 mts.

As such then an SSBN can remain submerged and fire a missile from underwater that can then traverse upto 8,000 kms and hit its target on land within a range of 100 m accuracy. Formidable, then is an understatement.

Watershed Event By this yardstick, the Arihant is a very modest platform. The proposed missile that will be fitted, the K-15, will have a

range of just 750 km. Furthermore, the reactor that will be fitted on board the submarine will have to undergo rigorous harbour and sea trials before it is deemed fully operational. As per current design, the core of the reactor will have to be changed every ten years or so and this is a further constraint when India’s strategic capabilities are assessed holistically.

However, despite the relatively modest technical specifications and related limitations, the launch of the Arihant is still a watershed event for India in a strategic perspective. This launch marks the fruition of a very large, multi-agency national project that has been completed in the face of severe challenges and almost entirely through indigenous efforts.

Designing and building a nuclear submarine is perhaps the most complex and rigorous hi-tech industrial project and zero-error is mandatory in even the smallest detail. The secrecy factor and the adversarial international environment imposed their own costs and it is against this backdrop that India has been able to complete the ATV project and finally bring it into the public domain by christening it the Arihant. When fully operational and proven, the INS Arihant will complete one phase of the trajectory India embarked upon in May 1998 when it declared itself as a state with nuclear weapons.

The regional relevance of the Arihant

9

DSI

launch is best contextualised by noting the strategic profile of China. The last of the five nuclear weapon states, as per the NPT, to join the SSN club, China acquired this capability in a rudimentary form in the late 1970s. As in the case of other nations that made such a decision, it was a combination of an objective assessment of the prevailing international strategic environment and politico-military-industrial resolve that encouraged China to invest in the nuclear submarine even when it was racked by internal turmoil and grave socio-economic problems including a famine.

It has since invested in this domain with ruthless political determination— Chairman Mao and later Deng Xiaoping were staunch advocates of this platform— and by the mid-1980s the PLA Navy (PLAN) had joined the peer group of the USA, former USSR, the UK and France when it successfully tested its first submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Despite many setbacks in the early years, currently the PLAN has a fleet of 62 submarines of which there are 3 SSBNs and 6 SSNs. This submarine capability accords the People’s Republic of China considerable strategic relevance both at the global and regional level.

China will remain India’s principal strategic interlocutor in the regional grid for the foreseeable future and it is a tenet of bilateral relations between comparable major powers that certain intrinsic national capabilities shape the texture of the relationship.

Yes, the Sino-Indian relationship is chequered and the memory of 1962 has been internalised by Delhi in a very deep manner. But despite the complex territorial and border dispute, the two Asian giants have arrived at a reasonably stable relationship with the political leadership on both sides having prioritised peace and stability. China is far ahead of India in almost all aspects of tangible comprehensive national power, except in the political sphere, where the Indian democratic experience is a contrast to China’s authoritarian nature.

It is prudent for India not to seek military equivalence with China but to arrive at the appropriate degree of strategic mutuality and equipoise wherein India will not have to be either deferential to Beijing or needlessly belligerent. The only domain where India can perhaps arrive at this position is in the maritime arena and hence the need to prioritise the Indian efforts in this regard. Here, Prime Minister

Uday Bhaskar 16-14-44 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 9:58 AM Page 5

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SPECIAL REPORT

effective manner. A navy Manmohan Singh’s ex- Gursharan Kaur, wife of Prime that relies in the main on hortation to the country at Minister Manmohan Singh, buying its inventory from the launch of the Arihant is launches the Arihant at very instructive. Comm- Vishakapatnam, Eastern Naval abroad will always remain brittle and vulnerable. ending the composite Command Headquarters India’s track-record as team that made the launch possible, he noted: “The years of hard far as self-reliance in the military spheres is work, dedication and perseverance that concerned throws up instructive results. have gone into today’s launch are an While the army and the air force have had example worthy of emulation. They show limited success in the indigenous effort (the that no task is difficult and that there is no Main Battle Tank and the Light Combat greater power than the power of self-belief. Aircraft – the MBT and LCA respectively ), I am confident that the lessons learnt at the Indian Navy that began in a modest this launch will enable the ATV manner by building the British Leander Programme to achieve even better results in Class Frigates in Bombay in the 1970s has come a long way. The design and building the coming years.”

The operative part, in the view of this of surface ships including fairly modern analyst, is the need for India’s politico- guided missile destroyers (again with military apex to ponder the many lessons Russian support) has now been followed that need to be learnt apropos India’s by the launch of the Arihant and this cause submarine experience that precedes the for cheer – but perhaps only two cheers. formal acquisition of the first diesel India’s record of ship-building by way submarine, the INS Kalveri, in 1967 from of cost and time over-runs is very poor in the former USSR. It is a tenet of naval relation to the Asian norm set by Japan, history of the last 500 years that truly South Korea and now China. Whereas credible and sustainable navies are those these nations can deliver major ships in whose nations have nurtured both ship about two to three years, for India the design and building capabilities in a cost- timeline is marked in decades. Till recently

10

DSI

major ship-building was held captive in public sector yards and the productivity in all of them has been well below the Indian private sector average. This is where the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s focus on lessons to be learnt from the Arihant launch acquires greater salience.

It merits recall that in the early 1980’s, with Mrs Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, India embarked upon an ambitious submarine building programme. At the time, India had acquired the HDW diesel submarine from West Germany and as part of the deal two of the boats were to be built in Bombay at the Mazagon Docks. Consequently, India invested in opening a line for submarine construction and this included creating yard infrastructure and training personnel, for example, in high quality welding among other trade skills.

It is estimated that this may have cost the GOI as much as US $ 100 million—at the time a not too insignificant amount.

Lessons to be Learnt Regrettably, the HDW project was soon caught up in a political scandal (along with

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Untitled-1 1

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AUGUST 2009

SPECIAL REPORT

DSI

India’s record of ship-building by way of cost and time over-runs is very poor in relation to the Asian norm set

by Japan, South Korea and now China. Whereas these nations can deliver major ships in about two to three years, for India the timelines are marked in decades

have as many as 18 SSBNs the Bofors artillery gun ) and Soviet-built Indian and maybe 36 SSNs. Given India unilaterally decided to Charlie I class cruise jettison the HDW effort in missile submarine the India’s ship and submarine building record, it is very India. A hugely expensive INS Chakra unlikely that the necessary production line was allowed to stagnate and the greater irony was that productivity levels will be maintained so highly skilled Indian personnel found as to arrive at that figure of ten SSBNs and lucrative jobs in places as far away as SSNs in the same time frame.

Thus what India needs most urgently Singapore, Australia and Dubai. Now almost 20 years later, India is embarking is a multi-disciplinary blue ribbon upon indigenous submarine building in commission that will carry out a rigorous collaboration with France—the Scorpene audit of the domestic submarine building project—though media reports suggest programme—the ATV included—and that this is also mired in cost and provide options for the country that will allow it to acquire the strategic considerable time escalation.

The question that follows from mutuality it needs in relation to the region Dr Manmohan Singh’s observation at the and China in particular.

Here, the experience of other nations Arihant launch is: what lessons has the Indian higher defence apex learnt from its that have invested in submarine building ‘scandalous’ HDW experience? Sadly could be instructive. India is not none. Unfortunately, this characteristic seeking to emulate either the USA or institutional Indian trait, gross waste of Russia which inherited the former huge public funds, is deeply relevant Soviet mantle. France and UK are when it comes to the Arihant and its more valid comparisons. The UK which logical course of action over the next 25 by all accounts is a medium power, years. One nuclear submarine with a with no credible military threat, has puny 750 km missile—even when fully just unveiled its latest submarine, the credible—does not qualify to accord the HMS Astute, a 7,400 ton SSN. Plagued country the kind of deterrence-cum- by time and cost overruns, this boat second strike capability it needs. At the has a price tag of almost one billion bare minimum India will need a mix of British pounds per vessel—that is five SSBNs and as many SSNs over the approximately Rs 8,000 crore. It would next two decades to attain this position of be reasonable to infer that the Arihant regional equipoise. By 2030, China would would cost about half this price. But

12

”

even given such rough estimates the total investment for the desired nuclear deterrent at sea over the next 25 years would be considerable.

The question that follows is whether India has the capacity, both human and by way of infrastructure, to meet these stringent requirements. Again, going by past records, the answer must be in the negative. This bleak assessment is borne out by a macro-review of the defence public sector in India and the DRDO over the last forty years.

If navies are indexed by their relative techno-strategic capabilities, the policy responses of the national security elite of most nations are shaped by their individual strategic cultures: that is, the manner in which the elite responsible for national security comprehends the military dimension in relation to the abiding national interest. In the Indian case, the security experience since the first war for Kashmir in October, 1947, through the 1962 humiliation right through to Kargil of 1999 reveal a stubborn trait to remain reactive and not learn the right lesson from each experience and apply the appropriate correctives to institutional inadequacies.

Hopefully, the Arihant launch will result in more introspection and effective policyreview than the totally unwarranted mass jubilation that it has generated.

Towards a safer world.

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Untitled-1 1

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Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:04 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

THE STATE OF

DEFENCE Ten years after Kargil and nearly one year after 26/11, India’s national security may still be comprised because of a lack of focus on building military capability

RAHUL BEDI

KEY POINTS n After 26/11 India's immediate military onus is on addressing gaps in its internal security. n Prevailing security reorientation will affect the military’s overall modernisation plans. n India's defence purchases projected to double to more than US$ 40 billion in the 11th Five-Year Plan will increase to US$ 80 billion a decade later. n Systemic handicaps and institutional limitations have adversely impacted the armed forces.

F

rom an introspective, subcontinental tactical force, preoccupied with neighbouring nuclear rivals Pakistan and China, India’s military has long been attempting a makeover: equipping and re-orienting itself as a comprehensive, strategic force with an expanded regional role, capable of executing out-of-area operations.

Backing the country’s evolving economic and global profile, it has launched a diplomatic thrust overseas, in addition to incrementally developing force-projection capabilities to secure growing national interests extending from

the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, the northern Indian Ocean Region and to Central Asia. An increasing military priority remains securing India’s oil and gas imports which are expected to double by 2012 to fuel its flourishing economic growth seeking to rival China’s.

Since these are progressively being sourced from locations other than the Middle East, like North Africa, the Sakhalin Islands off Russia’s east coast and Venezuela, Service doctrines, operational military plans and equipping policies have been revised to cater to these rapidly changing geo-strategic imperatives.

But after the November 2008 siege of Mumbai by ten Pakistan-based gunmen, the military, caught somewhat off-balance, has been forced into refocussing its ambitions after its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and deterrence capabilities were rudely exposed.

It is widely acknowledged that the country’s military, which prided itself on its multi-spectrum war-waging capability, ranging from anti-terrorist operations to conventional and nuclear engagement, was found wanting after the Mumbai attacks on several crucial fronts.

The terrorist attacks on two of the port city’s luxury hotels and a Jewish cultural centre, which took almost three days to neutralise following a clumsy response from the National Security Guard (NSG) and Special Forces (SF), starkly revealed that the military lacked contingency planning for a rapid and robust joint Services reaction to such a crisis. What also emerged was that it simply did not possess sufficient force projection capability to dissuade a

14

strategically more focussed Pakistan from launching terrorist attacks on India or to exert punitive punishment upon it.

Alongside, it also exposed the lack of ‘jointness’ amongst the three Services with little or no ‘synergised’ planning for conflicts even though a Joint Services Doctrine exists, seemingly, only in name.

“India’s higher defence management lacks coherence,’’ former Naval Chief and Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee (CoSC) Admiral Arun Prakash bluntly stated at a seminar in New Delhi recently.

National security, he added with forthrightness, was jeopardised by a lack of action.

Security Re-orientation Presently, India’s immediate military onus is on internal security matters focussed on addressing the glaring vulnerabilities of its vast coastline, inadequate ISR capability and SF inadequacies revealed by the Mumbai attacks.

Under public and political pressure, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s frustrated and besieged administration hurriedly announced a slew of security measures, including the establishment of a coastal command headed by the Indian Navy (IN) comprising patrol boats spread across maritime defence zones; fixed-wing, rotary-wing and unmanned surveillance assets and ISR equipment.

The appointment of a maritime security adviser, possibly from the IN, remains under review as part of the immediate response.

Quadrupling the strength of the NSG with personnel drawn exclusively from

Iconic visual of 1999 Kargil battle with Indian Army soldiers firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling

15

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:04 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

THE STATE OF

DEFENCE Ten years after Kargil and nearly one year after 26/11, India’s national security may still be comprised because of a lack of focus on building military capability

RAHUL BEDI

KEY POINTS n After 26/11 India's immediate military onus is on addressing gaps in its internal security. n Prevailing security reorientation will affect the military’s overall modernisation plans. n India's defence purchases projected to double to more than US$ 40 billion in the 11th Five-Year Plan will increase to US$ 80 billion a decade later. n Systemic handicaps and institutional limitations have adversely impacted the armed forces.

F

rom an introspective, subcontinental tactical force, preoccupied with neighbouring nuclear rivals Pakistan and China, India’s military has long been attempting a makeover: equipping and re-orienting itself as a comprehensive, strategic force with an expanded regional role, capable of executing out-of-area operations.

Backing the country’s evolving economic and global profile, it has launched a diplomatic thrust overseas, in addition to incrementally developing force-projection capabilities to secure growing national interests extending from

the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, the northern Indian Ocean Region and to Central Asia. An increasing military priority remains securing India’s oil and gas imports which are expected to double by 2012 to fuel its flourishing economic growth seeking to rival China’s.

Since these are progressively being sourced from locations other than the Middle East, like North Africa, the Sakhalin Islands off Russia’s east coast and Venezuela, Service doctrines, operational military plans and equipping policies have been revised to cater to these rapidly changing geo-strategic imperatives.

But after the November 2008 siege of Mumbai by ten Pakistan-based gunmen, the military, caught somewhat off-balance, has been forced into refocussing its ambitions after its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and deterrence capabilities were rudely exposed.

It is widely acknowledged that the country’s military, which prided itself on its multi-spectrum war-waging capability, ranging from anti-terrorist operations to conventional and nuclear engagement, was found wanting after the Mumbai attacks on several crucial fronts.

The terrorist attacks on two of the port city’s luxury hotels and a Jewish cultural centre, which took almost three days to neutralise following a clumsy response from the National Security Guard (NSG) and Special Forces (SF), starkly revealed that the military lacked contingency planning for a rapid and robust joint Services reaction to such a crisis. What also emerged was that it simply did not possess sufficient force projection capability to dissuade a

14

strategically more focussed Pakistan from launching terrorist attacks on India or to exert punitive punishment upon it.

Alongside, it also exposed the lack of ‘jointness’ amongst the three Services with little or no ‘synergised’ planning for conflicts even though a Joint Services Doctrine exists, seemingly, only in name.

“India’s higher defence management lacks coherence,’’ former Naval Chief and Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee (CoSC) Admiral Arun Prakash bluntly stated at a seminar in New Delhi recently.

National security, he added with forthrightness, was jeopardised by a lack of action.

Security Re-orientation Presently, India’s immediate military onus is on internal security matters focussed on addressing the glaring vulnerabilities of its vast coastline, inadequate ISR capability and SF inadequacies revealed by the Mumbai attacks.

Under public and political pressure, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s frustrated and besieged administration hurriedly announced a slew of security measures, including the establishment of a coastal command headed by the Indian Navy (IN) comprising patrol boats spread across maritime defence zones; fixed-wing, rotary-wing and unmanned surveillance assets and ISR equipment.

The appointment of a maritime security adviser, possibly from the IN, remains under review as part of the immediate response.

Quadrupling the strength of the NSG with personnel drawn exclusively from

Iconic visual of 1999 Kargil battle with Indian Army soldiers firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling

15

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:07 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

INDIAN ARMY

OVERBURDENED AND UNDEREQUIPPED

An Indian Army soldier walks with his gun and bedding through a thicket in J&K

In the short to medium term the prevailing security re-orientation will doubtlessly impact on the military’s overall modernisation plans to replace obsolete equipment as resources will be diverted to confirm the new internal security framework

”

army units and stationing them, other than at their headquarters outside Delhi, in locations like Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Chennai has also been partially implemented. Glaring equipment gaps in NSG units that the Mumbai attacks exposed, such as a dedicated transport aircraft and helicopters, nightvision devices, body-heat detectors and other specialised SF equipment for close-quarter battle and for combating urban terrorism, are also being addressed.

But overall security and military reforms, particularly equipment procurement that acquired frenetic dimensions in the immediate aftermath of Mumbai’s siege has in the intervening months, become muted.

In the short to medium term the prevailing security re-orientation will doubtlessly impact on the military’s overall modernisation plans to replace obsolete equipment as resources will be diverted to confirm the new internal security framework. But military planners believe this will be a temporary phenomenon as the larger regional security picture,

16

focussed on the belligerent and unpredictable Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the PLA, remains turbulent and worrisome.

Simmering political, diplomatic and military tensions with China have subtly proliferated over the past two years with the number of PLA incursions along the bilaterally disputed 4,057 km-long Line of Actual Control increasing to 203 in 2008 from 170 the previous year, many of them adjoining Arunachal Pradesh province which Beijing claims in its entirety.

Senior military officers agree that the PLA, acting in tandem with close defence and nuclear ally Pakistan, remains the primary driver for Delhi’s military and strategic capability development. To this end, the Indian military’s primary aim is of deploying a technology-enabled and networked force that stays largely abreast of the revolution in military affairs.

Consequently, over the last five years India has committed US$ 12 billion to acquiring badly-needed material.

The majority of this is imported—a dependency expected to exponentially

The Indian Army’s operational efficiency is circumscribed, not only by severe equipment shortages, obsolete hardware and restricted night-fighting capability, but also by rising stress levels due to extended deployment on counterinsurgency operations.

The majority of its mechanised forces— around 3,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), including some 2,200 Russian and domestically built T-72 and T-72 M1s, 657 T-90s MBTs (some 300 of which are yet to arrive) and around 490 T55s, along with more than 1,000 BMP-2 Sarath Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)—lack nightfighting capability compared with Pakistan’s Army, which is significantly superior in this regard.

Of the army’s 216-odd artillery regiments, only 45 are equipped with FH-77B 155 mm Bofors guns imported in the late 1980s and 130 mm M-46 field guns upgraded to 155 mm by Soltam of Israel and India’s Ordnance Factory Board. The remaining regiments still operate obsolete equipment such as the towed 105 mm and 122 mm field guns.

The Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan under which the army plans by 2020-25 on importing and locally building a mix of around over 2,500 howitzers, the majority of them 155mm/52 caliber towed, wheeled and tracked guns, is delayed by several years due to corruption allegations and delayed decision making.

This is particularly adversely impacting the

increase as the military strives to replace predominantly Soviet and Russian military hardware that has reached collective obsolescence.

In the absence of any meaningful contribution by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) that has produced little of worth in 50 years of its existence, India’s defence services will be compelled to source material from overseas. In the short and in the medium term, if not longer, India will continue to buy not build or develop its military capacity.

Defence Minister A. K. Antony endorsed as much recently by lamenting that India was compelled to import a major part of its military requirements, despite repeated governmental declarations of becoming self-reliant. “We had set up the goal of self-reliance 50 years ago. But it is unfortunate that we are still importing 70 per cent of our defence equipment. It is both shameful and dangerous” he told Parliament in July.

It is no secret that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to largely

army’s plans to raise two mountain divisions to counter the PLA in the Northeast as the tender for 140 155 mm/39 cal light howitzers was hurriedly cancelled in July following investigations into corruption allegations involving the OFB and Singapore Technologies, the frontrunner for the contract with its Pegasus gun.

Alongside, ambitious plans to modernise the army’s 465 infantry and ‘dedicated’ paramilitary battalions like the Rashtriya Rifles by 2020 under the Future Infantry Soldier (FINSAS) programme is also years behind schedule. The F-INSAS project includes a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform as well as enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitalised battlefield of the future.

Even the army’s seven to ten designated SF battalions—or around 5,000-8,000 personnel— face an identity crisis, operating without a specialised operational mandate, organisational support or “dedicated budget” resulting in piecemeal and incomplete weapon and equipment packages. They too await specialised equipment from the US agreed upon at least four years ago but caught in a bureaucratic tangle.

Efforts by the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) to replace its obsolete assets such as HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetah helicopters under the AAC Vision 2017 were postponed

disregard the private sector and opts for the economically unsound 39 Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) plants and eight Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs), along with the inefficient DRDO with its 40,000-strong work force and chain of 51 highly expensive laboratories, to develop weapon systems.

The DRDO, accused by the military of reinventing the wheel instead of giving India’s wider defence-industrial complex an incremental lead, is presently undergoing yet another revamp following a high level audit by experts. In the meantime, MoD’s three-year-old proposal to create 12 Raksha Udyog Ratnas or national ‘jewel’ defence companies from the private sector to be treated on par with the DPSUs and the OFB in order to level and expand the defence field remains stillborn.

The Shopping List India’s defence purchases are projected to double to more than US$ 40 billion in the 11th Finance Plan period ending in 2012, doubling to around US$ 80 billion a decade

17

after the MoD in November 2007 scrapped the acquisition of 197 Eurocopter AS 550 C3 Fennec light observation helicopters for US$ 500 million-US$ 600 million. The MoD claimed irregularities in the selection procedure following nearly four years of trials and evaluation and the contract is under re-tender, but unlikely to be concluded for two to three years at the very minimum.

The harsh reality is that the army is critically short of equipment necessary to operationalise its new ‘cold start’ or pro-active doctrine. This platform and asset-intensive strategy envisages converting holding formations—deployed in a defensive role along the border—into ‘pivot’, integrated battle groups capable of undertaking offensive operations with minimum reorganisation.

The advantage of such an operation in the India-Pakistan context is that it would remain ‘shallow’ and hence within the perceived nuclear threshold denying Islamabad justification for nuclear sabre-rattling something which it has effectively utilised to Delhi’s detriment in the past.

Military planners said the ‘cold start’ doctrine also allowed a ‘range’ of options to provocations like the Mumbai terror attacks rather than an-all-out-war-or-nothing approach, allowing for flexibility for shaping India’s political response through surgical strikes on terrorist training camps across Pakistan.

later to facilitate military modernisation.

Such large purchases, the MoD claims are anticipated to benefit the domestic defence industry through joint production and technology transfers via mandatory offsets estimated at between US$ 12 billion and US$ 30 billion, or a mandatory 30 per cent in all contracts over Rs 300 crore. In some cases the MoD has pegged the offsets at 50 per cent of the deal.

But this optimism remains unfounded.

The offset policy that has yielded work valued at around US$ 1.5 billion being discharged to domestic defence companies over the last three years is largely incapable of being absorbed due to the existing policies and embryonic state of the local military industry. Analysts suggest that since India’s indigenous military-industrial complex is incapable of absorbing even a limited portion of these and projected offsets the policy should be extended to other, non-military sectors requiring advanced technology inputs from abroad.

Military experts argue that India is employing offsets ‘narrowly’ by confining them exclusively to the defence sector,

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:07 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

INDIAN ARMY

OVERBURDENED AND UNDEREQUIPPED

An Indian Army soldier walks with his gun and bedding through a thicket in J&K

In the short to medium term the prevailing security re-orientation will doubtlessly impact on the military’s overall modernisation plans to replace obsolete equipment as resources will be diverted to confirm the new internal security framework

”

army units and stationing them, other than at their headquarters outside Delhi, in locations like Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Chennai has also been partially implemented. Glaring equipment gaps in NSG units that the Mumbai attacks exposed, such as a dedicated transport aircraft and helicopters, nightvision devices, body-heat detectors and other specialised SF equipment for close-quarter battle and for combating urban terrorism, are also being addressed.

But overall security and military reforms, particularly equipment procurement that acquired frenetic dimensions in the immediate aftermath of Mumbai’s siege has in the intervening months, become muted.

In the short to medium term the prevailing security re-orientation will doubtlessly impact on the military’s overall modernisation plans to replace obsolete equipment as resources will be diverted to confirm the new internal security framework. But military planners believe this will be a temporary phenomenon as the larger regional security picture,

16

focussed on the belligerent and unpredictable Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the PLA, remains turbulent and worrisome.

Simmering political, diplomatic and military tensions with China have subtly proliferated over the past two years with the number of PLA incursions along the bilaterally disputed 4,057 km-long Line of Actual Control increasing to 203 in 2008 from 170 the previous year, many of them adjoining Arunachal Pradesh province which Beijing claims in its entirety.

Senior military officers agree that the PLA, acting in tandem with close defence and nuclear ally Pakistan, remains the primary driver for Delhi’s military and strategic capability development. To this end, the Indian military’s primary aim is of deploying a technology-enabled and networked force that stays largely abreast of the revolution in military affairs.

Consequently, over the last five years India has committed US$ 12 billion to acquiring badly-needed material.

The majority of this is imported—a dependency expected to exponentially

The Indian Army’s operational efficiency is circumscribed, not only by severe equipment shortages, obsolete hardware and restricted night-fighting capability, but also by rising stress levels due to extended deployment on counterinsurgency operations.

The majority of its mechanised forces— around 3,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), including some 2,200 Russian and domestically built T-72 and T-72 M1s, 657 T-90s MBTs (some 300 of which are yet to arrive) and around 490 T55s, along with more than 1,000 BMP-2 Sarath Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)—lack nightfighting capability compared with Pakistan’s Army, which is significantly superior in this regard.

Of the army’s 216-odd artillery regiments, only 45 are equipped with FH-77B 155 mm Bofors guns imported in the late 1980s and 130 mm M-46 field guns upgraded to 155 mm by Soltam of Israel and India’s Ordnance Factory Board. The remaining regiments still operate obsolete equipment such as the towed 105 mm and 122 mm field guns.

The Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan under which the army plans by 2020-25 on importing and locally building a mix of around over 2,500 howitzers, the majority of them 155mm/52 caliber towed, wheeled and tracked guns, is delayed by several years due to corruption allegations and delayed decision making.

This is particularly adversely impacting the

increase as the military strives to replace predominantly Soviet and Russian military hardware that has reached collective obsolescence.

In the absence of any meaningful contribution by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) that has produced little of worth in 50 years of its existence, India’s defence services will be compelled to source material from overseas. In the short and in the medium term, if not longer, India will continue to buy not build or develop its military capacity.

Defence Minister A. K. Antony endorsed as much recently by lamenting that India was compelled to import a major part of its military requirements, despite repeated governmental declarations of becoming self-reliant. “We had set up the goal of self-reliance 50 years ago. But it is unfortunate that we are still importing 70 per cent of our defence equipment. It is both shameful and dangerous” he told Parliament in July.

It is no secret that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to largely

army’s plans to raise two mountain divisions to counter the PLA in the Northeast as the tender for 140 155 mm/39 cal light howitzers was hurriedly cancelled in July following investigations into corruption allegations involving the OFB and Singapore Technologies, the frontrunner for the contract with its Pegasus gun.

Alongside, ambitious plans to modernise the army’s 465 infantry and ‘dedicated’ paramilitary battalions like the Rashtriya Rifles by 2020 under the Future Infantry Soldier (FINSAS) programme is also years behind schedule. The F-INSAS project includes a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform as well as enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitalised battlefield of the future.

Even the army’s seven to ten designated SF battalions—or around 5,000-8,000 personnel— face an identity crisis, operating without a specialised operational mandate, organisational support or “dedicated budget” resulting in piecemeal and incomplete weapon and equipment packages. They too await specialised equipment from the US agreed upon at least four years ago but caught in a bureaucratic tangle.

Efforts by the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) to replace its obsolete assets such as HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetah helicopters under the AAC Vision 2017 were postponed

disregard the private sector and opts for the economically unsound 39 Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) plants and eight Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs), along with the inefficient DRDO with its 40,000-strong work force and chain of 51 highly expensive laboratories, to develop weapon systems.

The DRDO, accused by the military of reinventing the wheel instead of giving India’s wider defence-industrial complex an incremental lead, is presently undergoing yet another revamp following a high level audit by experts. In the meantime, MoD’s three-year-old proposal to create 12 Raksha Udyog Ratnas or national ‘jewel’ defence companies from the private sector to be treated on par with the DPSUs and the OFB in order to level and expand the defence field remains stillborn.

The Shopping List India’s defence purchases are projected to double to more than US$ 40 billion in the 11th Finance Plan period ending in 2012, doubling to around US$ 80 billion a decade

17

after the MoD in November 2007 scrapped the acquisition of 197 Eurocopter AS 550 C3 Fennec light observation helicopters for US$ 500 million-US$ 600 million. The MoD claimed irregularities in the selection procedure following nearly four years of trials and evaluation and the contract is under re-tender, but unlikely to be concluded for two to three years at the very minimum.

The harsh reality is that the army is critically short of equipment necessary to operationalise its new ‘cold start’ or pro-active doctrine. This platform and asset-intensive strategy envisages converting holding formations—deployed in a defensive role along the border—into ‘pivot’, integrated battle groups capable of undertaking offensive operations with minimum reorganisation.

The advantage of such an operation in the India-Pakistan context is that it would remain ‘shallow’ and hence within the perceived nuclear threshold denying Islamabad justification for nuclear sabre-rattling something which it has effectively utilised to Delhi’s detriment in the past.

Military planners said the ‘cold start’ doctrine also allowed a ‘range’ of options to provocations like the Mumbai terror attacks rather than an-all-out-war-or-nothing approach, allowing for flexibility for shaping India’s political response through surgical strikes on terrorist training camps across Pakistan.

later to facilitate military modernisation.

Such large purchases, the MoD claims are anticipated to benefit the domestic defence industry through joint production and technology transfers via mandatory offsets estimated at between US$ 12 billion and US$ 30 billion, or a mandatory 30 per cent in all contracts over Rs 300 crore. In some cases the MoD has pegged the offsets at 50 per cent of the deal.

But this optimism remains unfounded.

The offset policy that has yielded work valued at around US$ 1.5 billion being discharged to domestic defence companies over the last three years is largely incapable of being absorbed due to the existing policies and embryonic state of the local military industry. Analysts suggest that since India’s indigenous military-industrial complex is incapable of absorbing even a limited portion of these and projected offsets the policy should be extended to other, non-military sectors requiring advanced technology inputs from abroad.

Military experts argue that India is employing offsets ‘narrowly’ by confining them exclusively to the defence sector,

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:08 AM Page 5

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

United Service Institute of India in Delhi.

India’s watchdog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) too has demanded a “re-engineering” of the MoD’s complex, secretive and profligate equipment procurement procedures, finding them ill-planned, badly executed and riven by “low fulfillment”, delays and wastefulness. In four comprehensive reports on the defence services presented to Parliament in 2007, the CAG declared that a lack of co-ordination between the three Services had also led to failures in “obtaining best value for money, reducing tendering costs and minimising processing time”.

Modernisation plans, particularly for the IN, stand further jeopardised for the past four years with the acrimonious renegotiation of numerous critical deals already agreed with Russia. Despite India being Moscow’s principal customer annually providing it US$ 1,500 million in defence contracts it has been unable to leverage its commanding status.

The re-worked deals include the contentious contract for the INS Vikramaditya (the former Admiral Gorshkov), the 44,750 ton Kiev-class aircraft carrier for which Russia is demanding nearly US$ 3 billion—some US$ 2 billion more than the US$ 974 million confirmed in January 2004—and additional moneys for three Talwar class (Project 1135.6) stealth frigates.

Other material re-negotiated with Russia at revised, albeit undisclosed prices, includes the local construction of 140 Su 30 MKI fighters by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Bangalore and the retrofit of 63 MiG 29 aerial interceptor and air dominance aircraft to fighter-bombers capable of striking mobile and stationary targets on ground and at sea.

Indian soldiers taking artillery up the mountains during the Kargil 11-week operations

INDIAN AIR FORCE

IMPORT DEPENDENT The IAF, which currently operates around 26 different aircraft models, remains hopelessly import dependent in developing such capabilities, compelled to ‘buy’ an air force rather than build one domestically.

Successive Parliamentary Committees have repeatedly cautioned that an IAF with depreciated assets presents a serious security risk as Pakistan and China are jointly boosting their respective air forces, air defences, rotarywing fleets and precision-guided munitions delivery capabilities.

The IAF too has warned the Central Government that if ‘corrective measures’ to acquire additional combat aircraft are not swiftly implemented, India will lose its air superiority over nuclear rival Pakistan.

Air power played a dominant role in the three wars and the 11-week long Kargil border war in 1999.

The Pakistan Air Force was augmenting itself with 44 F-16s and Chinese J-10 and JF-17 aircraft built under license, appreciably increasing its combat squadron from 19 to 26 by 2011-12.

Conversely by 2015, the IAF’s combat squadrons will decrease to around 28 as the IAF will retire scores of ageing Russian and Soviet MiG 21 variants and other Soviet-era fighters.

In a recent worrying revelation, the Minister of Defence A.K. Antony admitted that the IAF’s air-defence ground environment systems were “inadequate” for effective surveillance as highlighted by a CAG report released last October. The CAG audit concluded that the IAF’s outdated 1970-71 plan for air defence still formed the basis for determining its radar and associated equipment requirements despite significant changes in the regional security scenario, technology and growing magnitude of sophisticated aerial threats.

However, the induction over the next two to three years of force multipliers, like six additional air-to-air refuelling tankers, three Il-76TD Airborne Early-Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft—of which one has arrived— and six Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft will beef up the IAF’s assets. The AEW&C or ‘eye in the sky’ aircraft would provide the IAF an airborne network centric battle management with a 500 km surveillance range, significantly augmenting its operational reach. So far the IAF is the only air force with AEW&C capability but Pakistan and China are not far behind in deploying similar platforms.

By 2014-15 large numbers of retiring Soviet and Russian MiG variants will be replaced by 230 imported and indigenously built Su-30MKI multirole fighter aircraft, 51 French Mirage 2000 Hs, upgraded by manufacturer Dassault under a contract to be signed imminently and 63 Russian MiG-29

B/Ss, including seven MiG-29 UB trainers, to be retrofitted by makers Russian Aircraft Corporation (RSK)-MiG. But the most avidly awaited outcome is the IAF’s Rs 42,000 crore purchase of 126 multirole combat aircraft (MRCA)— expected to increase to 200 fighters—for which six models are competing: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the Russian Aircraft Corporation (RSK) MiG-35 and Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen.

Overseas and indigenous evaluation trials lasting around 12 months are beginning in early August 2009 to assess platform and weapon performance and the ability of competing aircraft to operate in India’s desert, mountainous and humid coastal regions.

The trials will last in all probability till mid2010. They will be followed by weapon and specialised equipment assessment in the vendors’ home countries which will lead to extended price negotiations before the induction of the first 18 to be acquired off the shelf. The last of the remaining 108 MRCA built locally under licence will join service by 2022, that is if matters proceed on schedule.

India and Russia are also collaborating on developing a fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) by 2015—designated the T-50 PAK-FA by designers Sukhoi—on a “job share and costing” basis. Recently retired Air Chief F.H. Major, however, did not anticipate the FGFA being ready before 2019-20 in operational configuration.

The IAF is also readying to acquire a range of light, medium and heavy-lift and attack helicopters, retrofitting its ageing fleet of 90 An-32 and Il-76 transport platforms and finalising qualitative requirements for heavy transporters capable of ferrying loads of 70-80 tons.

The IAF is also processing bids from European, Indian and American contractors to upgrade 39 of its 80 strategic airfields in the north, west and east bordering nuclear rivals Pakistan and China by augmenting their mobility and network centricity.

To make good its long-awaited air-defence capability, the IAF recently signed a US$ 260 million contract with Israel’s Rafael for 18 Spyder surface-to-air Python 5 and Derby air defence missile Low-Level Quick Reaction Missile (LLQRM) systems with deliveries to be completed by the end of 2012.

And in January 2009 it also placed an Rs 12,000 crore order with the state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited for two squadrons of the Akash (Sky) medium-range surface-to-air missile, which has been bedevilled by operational problems since its development began in the mid-1980s.

18

DSI

thereby negating their immense ‘multiplier’ effect for the country’s technological base. Retired Major General Mrinal Suman who helped formulate the initial Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) in 2005 and advised on offsets whilst in service, said that in devising this policy the MoD had simply “abdicated” the buyer’s inherent leverages to potential vendors by letting them dictate their investment preferences.

“It is not the type of offset but its relevance to the country’s technological needs and economic objectives that should dictate the selection. India unfortunately has abrogated that right to the vendors, negating and rendering inconsequential its own overall needs,” Suman added.

But internecine Service rivalries, ambiguous policies, recurring corruption and vacillation in decision making have been blocking India’s military modernisation. The Services have been also battling a traditional mindset exacerbated by the continuing competition between a divided armed force and a civilian-

dominated MoD. The political leadership, largely ignorant about defence and nuclear-related issues, but the final authority on their budgetary allocations and purchases, merely adds to the beleaguered military’s woes.

“Allocation of money (for defence) has never been a problem,” Anthony declared at a military equipment-related seminar in Delhi earlier this year. The issue has rather been the timely and judicious utilisation of money allocated, he added.

In the financial year 2008-09, the MoD returned Rs 7,000 crore of the Rs 48,000 crore earmarked for capital or acquisition expenditure to the federal exchequer due to delayed decision making. Earlier, Rs 22,517 crore was handed back to the Central fund between 2002 and 2008 for similar reasons.

“Instead of collectively building capability, the services are engaged in building expensive arsenals often with overlapping functionality that is acquired at great cost,” said former Brigadier Vinod Anand from the Centre for Strategic Studies,

Clearly illustrating successive administrations’ casual and ad hoc attitude to military affairs is the situation in which the Services will have had three Chairmen of the Institutional Limitations Chiefs of Staff Committee If such systemic handicaps were not enough India’s military (CoSC) in less than a year crippling modernisation has to battle formidable after the present institutional limitations. It operates a White Paper or National incumbent Admiral without Defence Strategy enunciating government Sureesh Mehta retires policy on the Services’ overall role and

19

”

tasks or on developing optimum military capability. This, despite having fought five wars—including one with China that indelibly scarred the Indian Army—and innumerable insurgencies.

Clearly illustrating successive adminis-

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:08 AM Page 5

AUGUST 2009

COVER STORY

United Service Institute of India in Delhi.

India’s watchdog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) too has demanded a “re-engineering” of the MoD’s complex, secretive and profligate equipment procurement procedures, finding them ill-planned, badly executed and riven by “low fulfillment”, delays and wastefulness. In four comprehensive reports on the defence services presented to Parliament in 2007, the CAG declared that a lack of co-ordination between the three Services had also led to failures in “obtaining best value for money, reducing tendering costs and minimising processing time”.

Modernisation plans, particularly for the IN, stand further jeopardised for the past four years with the acrimonious renegotiation of numerous critical deals already agreed with Russia. Despite India being Moscow’s principal customer annually providing it US$ 1,500 million in defence contracts it has been unable to leverage its commanding status.

The re-worked deals include the contentious contract for the INS Vikramaditya (the former Admiral Gorshkov), the 44,750 ton Kiev-class aircraft carrier for which Russia is demanding nearly US$ 3 billion—some US$ 2 billion more than the US$ 974 million confirmed in January 2004—and additional moneys for three Talwar class (Project 1135.6) stealth frigates.

Other material re-negotiated with Russia at revised, albeit undisclosed prices, includes the local construction of 140 Su 30 MKI fighters by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Bangalore and the retrofit of 63 MiG 29 aerial interceptor and air dominance aircraft to fighter-bombers capable of striking mobile and stationary targets on ground and at sea.

Indian soldiers taking artillery up the mountains during the Kargil 11-week operations

INDIAN AIR FORCE

IMPORT DEPENDENT The IAF, which currently operates around 26 different aircraft models, remains hopelessly import dependent in developing such capabilities, compelled to ‘buy’ an air force rather than build one domestically.

Successive Parliamentary Committees have repeatedly cautioned that an IAF with depreciated assets presents a serious security risk as Pakistan and China are jointly boosting their respective air forces, air defences, rotarywing fleets and precision-guided munitions delivery capabilities.

The IAF too has warned the Central Government that if ‘corrective measures’ to acquire additional combat aircraft are not swiftly implemented, India will lose its air superiority over nuclear rival Pakistan.

Air power played a dominant role in the three wars and the 11-week long Kargil border war in 1999.

The Pakistan Air Force was augmenting itself with 44 F-16s and Chinese J-10 and JF-17 aircraft built under license, appreciably increasing its combat squadron from 19 to 26 by 2011-12.

Conversely by 2015, the IAF’s combat squadrons will decrease to around 28 as the IAF will retire scores of ageing Russian and Soviet MiG 21 variants and other Soviet-era fighters.

In a recent worrying revelation, the Minister of Defence A.K. Antony admitted that the IAF’s air-defence ground environment systems were “inadequate” for effective surveillance as highlighted by a CAG report released last October. The CAG audit concluded that the IAF’s outdated 1970-71 plan for air defence still formed the basis for determining its radar and associated equipment requirements despite significant changes in the regional security scenario, technology and growing magnitude of sophisticated aerial threats.

However, the induction over the next two to three years of force multipliers, like six additional air-to-air refuelling tankers, three Il-76TD Airborne Early-Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft—of which one has arrived— and six Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft will beef up the IAF’s assets. The AEW&C or ‘eye in the sky’ aircraft would provide the IAF an airborne network centric battle management with a 500 km surveillance range, significantly augmenting its operational reach. So far the IAF is the only air force with AEW&C capability but Pakistan and China are not far behind in deploying similar platforms.

By 2014-15 large numbers of retiring Soviet and Russian MiG variants will be replaced by 230 imported and indigenously built Su-30MKI multirole fighter aircraft, 51 French Mirage 2000 Hs, upgraded by manufacturer Dassault under a contract to be signed imminently and 63 Russian MiG-29

B/Ss, including seven MiG-29 UB trainers, to be retrofitted by makers Russian Aircraft Corporation (RSK)-MiG. But the most avidly awaited outcome is the IAF’s Rs 42,000 crore purchase of 126 multirole combat aircraft (MRCA)— expected to increase to 200 fighters—for which six models are competing: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the Russian Aircraft Corporation (RSK) MiG-35 and Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen.

Overseas and indigenous evaluation trials lasting around 12 months are beginning in early August 2009 to assess platform and weapon performance and the ability of competing aircraft to operate in India’s desert, mountainous and humid coastal regions.

The trials will last in all probability till mid2010. They will be followed by weapon and specialised equipment assessment in the vendors’ home countries which will lead to extended price negotiations before the induction of the first 18 to be acquired off the shelf. The last of the remaining 108 MRCA built locally under licence will join service by 2022, that is if matters proceed on schedule.

India and Russia are also collaborating on developing a fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) by 2015—designated the T-50 PAK-FA by designers Sukhoi—on a “job share and costing” basis. Recently retired Air Chief F.H. Major, however, did not anticipate the FGFA being ready before 2019-20 in operational configuration.

The IAF is also readying to acquire a range of light, medium and heavy-lift and attack helicopters, retrofitting its ageing fleet of 90 An-32 and Il-76 transport platforms and finalising qualitative requirements for heavy transporters capable of ferrying loads of 70-80 tons.

The IAF is also processing bids from European, Indian and American contractors to upgrade 39 of its 80 strategic airfields in the north, west and east bordering nuclear rivals Pakistan and China by augmenting their mobility and network centricity.

To make good its long-awaited air-defence capability, the IAF recently signed a US$ 260 million contract with Israel’s Rafael for 18 Spyder surface-to-air Python 5 and Derby air defence missile Low-Level Quick Reaction Missile (LLQRM) systems with deliveries to be completed by the end of 2012.

And in January 2009 it also placed an Rs 12,000 crore order with the state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited for two squadrons of the Akash (Sky) medium-range surface-to-air missile, which has been bedevilled by operational problems since its development began in the mid-1980s.

18

DSI

thereby negating their immense ‘multiplier’ effect for the country’s technological base. Retired Major General Mrinal Suman who helped formulate the initial Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) in 2005 and advised on offsets whilst in service, said that in devising this policy the MoD had simply “abdicated” the buyer’s inherent leverages to potential vendors by letting them dictate their investment preferences.

“It is not the type of offset but its relevance to the country’s technological needs and economic objectives that should dictate the selection. India unfortunately has abrogated that right to the vendors, negating and rendering inconsequential its own overall needs,” Suman added.

But internecine Service rivalries, ambiguous policies, recurring corruption and vacillation in decision making have been blocking India’s military modernisation. The Services have been also battling a traditional mindset exacerbated by the continuing competition between a divided armed force and a civilian-

dominated MoD. The political leadership, largely ignorant about defence and nuclear-related issues, but the final authority on their budgetary allocations and purchases, merely adds to the beleaguered military’s woes.

“Allocation of money (for defence) has never been a problem,” Anthony declared at a military equipment-related seminar in Delhi earlier this year. The issue has rather been the timely and judicious utilisation of money allocated, he added.

In the financial year 2008-09, the MoD returned Rs 7,000 crore of the Rs 48,000 crore earmarked for capital or acquisition expenditure to the federal exchequer due to delayed decision making. Earlier, Rs 22,517 crore was handed back to the Central fund between 2002 and 2008 for similar reasons.

“Instead of collectively building capability, the services are engaged in building expensive arsenals often with overlapping functionality that is acquired at great cost,” said former Brigadier Vinod Anand from the Centre for Strategic Studies,

Clearly illustrating successive administrations’ casual and ad hoc attitude to military affairs is the situation in which the Services will have had three Chairmen of the Institutional Limitations Chiefs of Staff Committee If such systemic handicaps were not enough India’s military (CoSC) in less than a year crippling modernisation has to battle formidable after the present institutional limitations. It operates a White Paper or National incumbent Admiral without Defence Strategy enunciating government Sureesh Mehta retires policy on the Services’ overall role and

19

”

tasks or on developing optimum military capability. This, despite having fought five wars—including one with China that indelibly scarred the Indian Army—and innumerable insurgencies.

Clearly illustrating successive adminis-

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:09 AM Page 7

AUGUST, 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

INDIAN NAVY

ACTIVE EXPANSION Operationally and doctrinally, the Indian Navy (IN) is perhaps the fastest evolving of the country’s three services, despite being the smallest and, for years, the most financially deprived.

It is actively expanding its strategic reach by inducting power-projection platforms such as two aircraft carriers, two nuclear-powered submarines (ship submersible nuclear or SSNs), eight Boeing P-8I multi-mission maritime reconnaissance (MRA) aircraft and one secondhand, US-built landing platform dock (LPD). The navy is also concentrating on developing a network-centric capability to augment its emerging ‘blue-water’ status to dominate the Indian Ocean Region sea-lanes by controlling choke points and trade routes.

Crucially, the IN with the launching of the Arihant, its locally developed SSN in July, is on the verge of completing the country’s indeterminate strategic deterrence, of which the vital sea-based leg is the most robust and survivable in the triad of India’s second, retaliatory nuclear-strike option. This includes strategic weapons deliverable by aircraft and mobile, land-based platforms.

According to the IN’s classified Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan, its present tally of 130-136 ships and submarines will increase to 160 by the end of the 13th Defence Five-Year Plan in 2022 while its fixed air-wing and rotary assets will more than double to around 350-400.

This force structure of missile destroyers, frigates and corvettes centred around at least two aircraft carrier battle groups—one for each coast and a possible third in reserve—will be supplemented by submarine and aviation assets all equipped with long-range precisionguided munitions capable of anti-ship and land-attack missions.

trations’ casual and ad hoc attitude to military affairs is the situation in which the Services will have had three Chairmen of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) in less than a year after the present incumbent Admiral Sureesh Mehta retires.

The defence minister’s five-year operational directive is invariably outdated—the last one was issued in 2002 after a 15-year hiatus and a fresh one is overdue. In addition, all five-year defence plans have been accorded retrospective clearance, imposing ‘ad hoc-ism’ on the military’s development process, particularly with regard to acquisitions, overall re-organisation and modernisation.

Aggravating matters is the generalist

Network-centric platforms and sensors, new and upgraded MRAs, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)—including rotary-wing UAVs—mine-counter measure ships and auxiliary forces will complete the navy’s emerging force structure to accentuate maritime domain awareness.

The IN’s indisputable makeover will occur by the end of 2009 or early the following year with the arrival of the Russian Akula (Bars)-class Type 971 nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) leased for ten years for around US$ 700 million.

Presently the navy has 44 ships and submarines on order, 39 of which are being indigenously built, as the navy has taken the lead over the other two services in indigenising and privatising its equipment requirements.

These include two aircraft carriers, nine destroyers and frigates, six submarines, four corvettes, one tanker, three offshore patrol vessels, ten fast attack craft and eight additional combatant and auxiliary boats.

Of these, the INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov), the 47,750 ton Kiev-class carrier, and three additional 4,000 ton Project 1135.6 Talwar-class (Krivak III) guided missile frigates are being acquired from Russia.

The IN, however, is in trouble with its ageing fleet of submarines. Last October, the CAG warned the navy that it faced the danger of operating with less than half its already-deficient submarine fleet by 2012 when 63 per cent of them will retire.

The delivery dates of between 2012 and 2017 for the Rs 188 billion-programme to licence-build six French Scorpene diesel-electric patrol submarines (SSKs) at Mazagon Dockyard Limited (MDL) in Mumbai have also been pushed back, official sources have indicated.

MoD that has no stake in developing India’s military capability in consonance with national security requirements. It places the entire onus on the Services that are invariably engaged in squabbling over higher allocations. Analysts concur that that the prevailing arbitrary model of singleService operational readiness needs replacing with one in which the MoD takes the onus of defining the contours of future national military capability in concert with national security interests.

Presently, the MoD remains a disinterested overseer and stern bookkeeper with complete financial powers but little operational responsibility. It’s just the reverse with the respective Service headquarters. Instead of seeking a way out

20

In 2008-09, the MoD returned Rs 7,000 crore of the Rs 48,000 crore earmarked for capital or acquisition expenditure to the federal exchequer due to delayed decision making.

Earlier, Rs 22,517 crore was handed back to the Centre between 2002 and 2008 for similar reasons

of this impasse by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), successive administrations have baulked at confirming this measure and instead formed the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2001 with proscribed powers that has simply failed in augmenting force capabilities or resolving inter-service aspirations.

The CDS was envisaged as a ‘single point’ military advisor to the government, head of the multi-service Strategic Forces Command, the newly created Defence Intelligence Agency and promotions and procurement for all three Services amongst other responsibilities. But inter-Service rivalry, led largely by the air force and inherent suspicion of the defence forces by Indian politicians in a turbulent

neighbourhood wracked by (Top Right) Defence Minister remained the MoD’s military coups stymied the A.K. Antony in the cockpit of exclusive domain. A longCDS’ appointment, a Hawk Advanced Jet trainer term perspective plan is prepared by each of the muddying sustained and aircraft. (Above) F-16 services that, in turn, is cocogent modernisation plans. fighter aircraft at the ordinated and prioritised “The [Service] chiefs are Bangalore Airshow 2009 by the IDS, which spells out not part of any decisionmaking apparatus”, former Major General force structures and India’s military Suman said, adding, that even critical capability profile over a 15-year period.

These recommendations are then proposals affecting national security were discussed by bureaucrats without any discussed by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by the defence input from the Services.

Perspective planning to maintain minister, and decisions taken on whether modernised forces and address to “buy, buy-and-make or simply make” obsolescence issues is currently a two- equipment. The outcome is then factored tiered process executed by the respective into five-year defence plans and, service headquarters and the Integrated theoretically forms part of the capital Defence Staff (IDS) but the budget acquisition planning of individual services

21

”

to address respective modernisation needs.

In reality this has not worked.

Acquisition plans also continue to be subjected to two contrary pulls: the Services’ desire to procure the latest weaponry without thought or consideration of fully integrating the systems and the MoD’s propensity to be guided continually by the DRDO’s misplaced capabilities for indigenous production at the cost of operational preparedness. The inevitable result is delays and costly acquisitions that eventually end up merely as product enhancers for the military and with limited benefit to local industry.

In short, India’s has military capacity but questionable military capability.

Cover Story 8 Pages 2nd.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:09 AM Page 7

AUGUST, 2009

COVER STORY

DSI

INDIAN NAVY

ACTIVE EXPANSION Operationally and doctrinally, the Indian Navy (IN) is perhaps the fastest evolving of the country’s three services, despite being the smallest and, for years, the most financially deprived.

It is actively expanding its strategic reach by inducting power-projection platforms such as two aircraft carriers, two nuclear-powered submarines (ship submersible nuclear or SSNs), eight Boeing P-8I multi-mission maritime reconnaissance (MRA) aircraft and one secondhand, US-built landing platform dock (LPD). The navy is also concentrating on developing a network-centric capability to augment its emerging ‘blue-water’ status to dominate the Indian Ocean Region sea-lanes by controlling choke points and trade routes.

Crucially, the IN with the launching of the Arihant, its locally developed SSN in July, is on the verge of completing the country’s indeterminate strategic deterrence, of which the vital sea-based leg is the most robust and survivable in the triad of India’s second, retaliatory nuclear-strike option. This includes strategic weapons deliverable by aircraft and mobile, land-based platforms.

According to the IN’s classified Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan, its present tally of 130-136 ships and submarines will increase to 160 by the end of the 13th Defence Five-Year Plan in 2022 while its fixed air-wing and rotary assets will more than double to around 350-400.

This force structure of missile destroyers, frigates and corvettes centred around at least two aircraft carrier battle groups—one for each coast and a possible third in reserve—will be supplemented by submarine and aviation assets all equipped with long-range precisionguided munitions capable of anti-ship and land-attack missions.

trations’ casual and ad hoc attitude to military affairs is the situation in which the Services will have had three Chairmen of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) in less than a year after the present incumbent Admiral Sureesh Mehta retires.

The defence minister’s five-year operational directive is invariably outdated—the last one was issued in 2002 after a 15-year hiatus and a fresh one is overdue. In addition, all five-year defence plans have been accorded retrospective clearance, imposing ‘ad hoc-ism’ on the military’s development process, particularly with regard to acquisitions, overall re-organisation and modernisation.

Aggravating matters is the generalist

Network-centric platforms and sensors, new and upgraded MRAs, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)—including rotary-wing UAVs—mine-counter measure ships and auxiliary forces will complete the navy’s emerging force structure to accentuate maritime domain awareness.

The IN’s indisputable makeover will occur by the end of 2009 or early the following year with the arrival of the Russian Akula (Bars)-class Type 971 nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) leased for ten years for around US$ 700 million.

Presently the navy has 44 ships and submarines on order, 39 of which are being indigenously built, as the navy has taken the lead over the other two services in indigenising and privatising its equipment requirements.

These include two aircraft carriers, nine destroyers and frigates, six submarines, four corvettes, one tanker, three offshore patrol vessels, ten fast attack craft and eight additional combatant and auxiliary boats.

Of these, the INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov), the 47,750 ton Kiev-class carrier, and three additional 4,000 ton Project 1135.6 Talwar-class (Krivak III) guided missile frigates are being acquired from Russia.

The IN, however, is in trouble with its ageing fleet of submarines. Last October, the CAG warned the navy that it faced the danger of operating with less than half its already-deficient submarine fleet by 2012 when 63 per cent of them will retire.

The delivery dates of between 2012 and 2017 for the Rs 188 billion-programme to licence-build six French Scorpene diesel-electric patrol submarines (SSKs) at Mazagon Dockyard Limited (MDL) in Mumbai have also been pushed back, official sources have indicated.

MoD that has no stake in developing India’s military capability in consonance with national security requirements. It places the entire onus on the Services that are invariably engaged in squabbling over higher allocations. Analysts concur that that the prevailing arbitrary model of singleService operational readiness needs replacing with one in which the MoD takes the onus of defining the contours of future national military capability in concert with national security interests.

Presently, the MoD remains a disinterested overseer and stern bookkeeper with complete financial powers but little operational responsibility. It’s just the reverse with the respective Service headquarters. Instead of seeking a way out

20

In 2008-09, the MoD returned Rs 7,000 crore of the Rs 48,000 crore earmarked for capital or acquisition expenditure to the federal exchequer due to delayed decision making.

Earlier, Rs 22,517 crore was handed back to the Centre between 2002 and 2008 for similar reasons

of this impasse by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), successive administrations have baulked at confirming this measure and instead formed the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2001 with proscribed powers that has simply failed in augmenting force capabilities or resolving inter-service aspirations.

The CDS was envisaged as a ‘single point’ military advisor to the government, head of the multi-service Strategic Forces Command, the newly created Defence Intelligence Agency and promotions and procurement for all three Services amongst other responsibilities. But inter-Service rivalry, led largely by the air force and inherent suspicion of the defence forces by Indian politicians in a turbulent

neighbourhood wracked by (Top Right) Defence Minister remained the MoD’s military coups stymied the A.K. Antony in the cockpit of exclusive domain. A longCDS’ appointment, a Hawk Advanced Jet trainer term perspective plan is prepared by each of the muddying sustained and aircraft. (Above) F-16 services that, in turn, is cocogent modernisation plans. fighter aircraft at the ordinated and prioritised “The [Service] chiefs are Bangalore Airshow 2009 by the IDS, which spells out not part of any decisionmaking apparatus”, former Major General force structures and India’s military Suman said, adding, that even critical capability profile over a 15-year period.

These recommendations are then proposals affecting national security were discussed by bureaucrats without any discussed by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by the defence input from the Services.

Perspective planning to maintain minister, and decisions taken on whether modernised forces and address to “buy, buy-and-make or simply make” obsolescence issues is currently a two- equipment. The outcome is then factored tiered process executed by the respective into five-year defence plans and, service headquarters and the Integrated theoretically forms part of the capital Defence Staff (IDS) but the budget acquisition planning of individual services

21

”

to address respective modernisation needs.

In reality this has not worked.

Acquisition plans also continue to be subjected to two contrary pulls: the Services’ desire to procure the latest weaponry without thought or consideration of fully integrating the systems and the MoD’s propensity to be guided continually by the DRDO’s misplaced capabilities for indigenous production at the cost of operational preparedness. The inevitable result is delays and costly acquisitions that eventually end up merely as product enhancers for the military and with limited benefit to local industry.

In short, India’s has military capacity but questionable military capability.

Ved Malik.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:27 AM Page 1

AUGUST 2009

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DSI

A mine detection squad member checks for landmines during the recent Maoist seige in Lalgarh, West Bengal

V.P. MALIK

In law enforcement and low-intensity conflict situations there is scope for greater use of technology and force multipliers

KEY POINTS

India's existing internal security policies have not been able to cope with growing challenges. n With technology it is possible to be lean and mean at affordable costs. n To reduce collateral damage security forces around the globe are using nonlethal weapons. n

T

he recent Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security held in New Delhi on August 17, 2009, focused on three important issues: cross-border terrorism, insurgencies and the spread of Naxalism in India. In his inaugural address Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “Cross-border terrorism remains a most pervasive threat… the levels of infiltration, which had come down very substantially, have seen a surge this year alongside an increase in attempts at infiltration. The infiltrators appear more battle-hardy,

better equipped and in possession of sophisticated communications.”

On the issue of Maoist violence, he added, “Heavy casualties have been recently inflicted on security forces by Naxalite groups.” He further warned that, “There are also indications of yet more offensive action by these groups.’’

After 62 years of Independence, India’s secular, open and pluralistic society continues to be vulnerable to many internal contradictions. The specific issues that have an impact on internal security are problems of national assimilation and integration of border areas in the north and Northeast; porous borders with neighboring nations; weak governance, including law and order machinery, largescale corruption and the nexus between crime, insurgency and politics.

Presently, 45 per cent of India’s geographical area, covering 220 districts, is facing serious internal security problems.

The problems in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast are well known.

Naxalite violence, which affected 55

NEEDED, A TECHN OLOGY UPGRADE 22

23

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MODERNISATION

DSI

A mine detection squad member checks for landmines during the recent Maoist seige in Lalgarh, West Bengal

V.P. MALIK

In law enforcement and low-intensity conflict situations there is scope for greater use of technology and force multipliers

KEY POINTS

India's existing internal security policies have not been able to cope with growing challenges. n With technology it is possible to be lean and mean at affordable costs. n To reduce collateral damage security forces around the globe are using nonlethal weapons. n

T

he recent Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security held in New Delhi on August 17, 2009, focused on three important issues: cross-border terrorism, insurgencies and the spread of Naxalism in India. In his inaugural address Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “Cross-border terrorism remains a most pervasive threat… the levels of infiltration, which had come down very substantially, have seen a surge this year alongside an increase in attempts at infiltration. The infiltrators appear more battle-hardy,

better equipped and in possession of sophisticated communications.”

On the issue of Maoist violence, he added, “Heavy casualties have been recently inflicted on security forces by Naxalite groups.” He further warned that, “There are also indications of yet more offensive action by these groups.’’

After 62 years of Independence, India’s secular, open and pluralistic society continues to be vulnerable to many internal contradictions. The specific issues that have an impact on internal security are problems of national assimilation and integration of border areas in the north and Northeast; porous borders with neighboring nations; weak governance, including law and order machinery, largescale corruption and the nexus between crime, insurgency and politics.

Presently, 45 per cent of India’s geographical area, covering 220 districts, is facing serious internal security problems.

The problems in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast are well known.

Naxalite violence, which affected 55

NEEDED, A TECHN OLOGY UPGRADE 22

23

Ved Malik.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:28 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

MODERNISATION

Golden Triangle, it’s easy districts in nine states in Following a mine blast, police 2003, has now spread to personnel inspect the mangled for insurgent groups and terrorists to acquire small 160 districts in 13 states remains of a vehicle in J&K, with increased intensity. (Right) Maoist Naxalite rebels arms and indulge in the drug trade. Corporate Such a situation makes us go through training exercises criminals like Dawood vulnerable to external anti- in Chhattisgarh Ibrahim can create supnational elements.

India also shares long stretches of portive modules and indulge in large-scale land, air and sea borders with eight terror attacks. neighbouring nations including the Maldives. Land borders run across some Growing Challenges very difficult terrains. Our special ties with It is apparent that India’s existing internal our neighbours include common ethnicity, security policies and primary instruments language, culture, historical experiences for tackling law and order and internal and, in many cases, shared access to vital security — state and Central police and natural resources.

Para Military Forces (PMF)—have not At the same time, these ties often been able to cope with these growing encourage cross-border terrorism; lead challenges. During the Internal Security to Indian secessionist groups getting a Conference, P. Chidambaram, Union Home safe haven in neighboring states; trans- Minister, acknowledged: ‘’Police reforms border illegal migration, gunrunning and have been neglected for too long. On the drug trafficking. Situated as we are other hand, there are still critical defibetween the Golden Crescent and the ciencies in budget allocations for the police,

24

recruitment, training, in the procurement of equipment, introduction of technology and personnel management.’’

Internal security management requires not only clear and unambiguous policies but also effective means and measures to implement them. It has several dimensions that continue to expand; not only in physical terms but in an abstract form as well. Such an environment makes heavy demands on the quantity and quality of forces and resources required for accomplishing their operational tasks. Till recently, our emphasis was more on quantity and less on the quality of security forces.

But excessive manpower has limitations in terms of time and space. The presence of too many armed personnel is not appreciated in civil societies. Besides, heavy-duty manpower is expensive to maintain, prone to excessive casualties and also enhances chances of possibile human right’s violations. We must,

therefore rely on an appropriate combination of human and technological means to be able to function in extended, elastic and increasingly transparent operational situations.

Need for Technology In law enforcement and low-intensity conflict situations, there is scope for greater use of technology and force multipliers to check infiltration, avoid mines and improvised explosive devices on roads, get to targets quickly and save collateral damage. New electronic war equipment allows security forces to locate and identify terrorists as soon as they open their radio sets or use any kind of telephones. The cumulative impact of such systems has negated the quantitative paradigm. With technology it is possible now to be lean and mean at affordable costs: availability, affordability, indigenous capability and a relative combat edge should dictate our

With the emphasis on human rights and the fear of collateral damage, security forces around the globe are using non-lethal weapons, wherever possible. In India we have yet to develop concepts for exploitation of non-lethal weapons

25

”

DSI

approach to the induction of technology in equipping our security forces.

Thanks to technology, battlefields are now becoming more and more transparent. Available technologies make it possible to see at night or during bad weather conditions, both visually and electronically. And what can be seen can also be engaged. Electro optical, thermal, infrared and other electronic devices have changed the nature of combat engagements. Technologies in electronics, sensors, micro-processors, aviation and robotics, easily available now, have the capability to upgrade and extend the reach of border surveillance and security; make it more effective and reduce manpower requirements substantially.

With the emphasis on human rights and the fear of collateral damage, security forces around the globe are using non-lethal weapons, wherever possible.

In India we have yet to develop concepts for exploitation of non-lethal weapons.

These weapons can supplement those already available to the armoury and thus add a new factor.

In military jargon, whatever contributes towards this objective is a force multiplier. Force multipliers cover a range of capabilities—from all weather, roundthe-clock surveillance, real-time imagery and seamless communication to innovative leadership techniques. These new systems also generate greater speed and fluidity of information flow and promote a fast, responsive and effective decision making process.

Many such systems, outlined below, are now common to the armed forces and police organisations. n Weapons and protection systems for armed personnel and vehicles n Early warning security and surveillance systems. Sights and night vision devices n Explosives sensors and disposal equipment n Communications, data transmission systems, radio interceptors and jammers and mobile command and control centres n Simulators for training Force multiplication is applicable to both tangible and intangible assets.

While high technology systems fall in the realm of tangible assets; force multiplication achieved due to better training, leadership and higher morale falls in the category of intangible assets.

Both are important. A force multiplier can thus improve attrition coefficient,

Ved Malik.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:28 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

MODERNISATION

Golden Triangle, it’s easy districts in nine states in Following a mine blast, police 2003, has now spread to personnel inspect the mangled for insurgent groups and terrorists to acquire small 160 districts in 13 states remains of a vehicle in J&K, with increased intensity. (Right) Maoist Naxalite rebels arms and indulge in the drug trade. Corporate Such a situation makes us go through training exercises criminals like Dawood vulnerable to external anti- in Chhattisgarh Ibrahim can create supnational elements.

India also shares long stretches of portive modules and indulge in large-scale land, air and sea borders with eight terror attacks. neighbouring nations including the Maldives. Land borders run across some Growing Challenges very difficult terrains. Our special ties with It is apparent that India’s existing internal our neighbours include common ethnicity, security policies and primary instruments language, culture, historical experiences for tackling law and order and internal and, in many cases, shared access to vital security — state and Central police and natural resources.

Para Military Forces (PMF)—have not At the same time, these ties often been able to cope with these growing encourage cross-border terrorism; lead challenges. During the Internal Security to Indian secessionist groups getting a Conference, P. Chidambaram, Union Home safe haven in neighboring states; trans- Minister, acknowledged: ‘’Police reforms border illegal migration, gunrunning and have been neglected for too long. On the drug trafficking. Situated as we are other hand, there are still critical defibetween the Golden Crescent and the ciencies in budget allocations for the police,

24

recruitment, training, in the procurement of equipment, introduction of technology and personnel management.’’

Internal security management requires not only clear and unambiguous policies but also effective means and measures to implement them. It has several dimensions that continue to expand; not only in physical terms but in an abstract form as well. Such an environment makes heavy demands on the quantity and quality of forces and resources required for accomplishing their operational tasks. Till recently, our emphasis was more on quantity and less on the quality of security forces.

But excessive manpower has limitations in terms of time and space. The presence of too many armed personnel is not appreciated in civil societies. Besides, heavy-duty manpower is expensive to maintain, prone to excessive casualties and also enhances chances of possibile human right’s violations. We must,

therefore rely on an appropriate combination of human and technological means to be able to function in extended, elastic and increasingly transparent operational situations.

Need for Technology In law enforcement and low-intensity conflict situations, there is scope for greater use of technology and force multipliers to check infiltration, avoid mines and improvised explosive devices on roads, get to targets quickly and save collateral damage. New electronic war equipment allows security forces to locate and identify terrorists as soon as they open their radio sets or use any kind of telephones. The cumulative impact of such systems has negated the quantitative paradigm. With technology it is possible now to be lean and mean at affordable costs: availability, affordability, indigenous capability and a relative combat edge should dictate our

With the emphasis on human rights and the fear of collateral damage, security forces around the globe are using non-lethal weapons, wherever possible. In India we have yet to develop concepts for exploitation of non-lethal weapons

25

”

DSI

approach to the induction of technology in equipping our security forces.

Thanks to technology, battlefields are now becoming more and more transparent. Available technologies make it possible to see at night or during bad weather conditions, both visually and electronically. And what can be seen can also be engaged. Electro optical, thermal, infrared and other electronic devices have changed the nature of combat engagements. Technologies in electronics, sensors, micro-processors, aviation and robotics, easily available now, have the capability to upgrade and extend the reach of border surveillance and security; make it more effective and reduce manpower requirements substantially.

With the emphasis on human rights and the fear of collateral damage, security forces around the globe are using non-lethal weapons, wherever possible.

In India we have yet to develop concepts for exploitation of non-lethal weapons.

These weapons can supplement those already available to the armoury and thus add a new factor.

In military jargon, whatever contributes towards this objective is a force multiplier. Force multipliers cover a range of capabilities—from all weather, roundthe-clock surveillance, real-time imagery and seamless communication to innovative leadership techniques. These new systems also generate greater speed and fluidity of information flow and promote a fast, responsive and effective decision making process.

Many such systems, outlined below, are now common to the armed forces and police organisations. n Weapons and protection systems for armed personnel and vehicles n Early warning security and surveillance systems. Sights and night vision devices n Explosives sensors and disposal equipment n Communications, data transmission systems, radio interceptors and jammers and mobile command and control centres n Simulators for training Force multiplication is applicable to both tangible and intangible assets.

While high technology systems fall in the realm of tangible assets; force multiplication achieved due to better training, leadership and higher morale falls in the category of intangible assets.

Both are important. A force multiplier can thus improve attrition coefficient,

Ved Malik.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:29 AM Page 5

AUGUST 2009

MODERNISATION

manoeuvre and means of enhanced mobility, surprise and deception, as well as human performance.

Lack of Synergy In the current year (2009-10), a substantial Rs 2,040 crore has been allocated in the budget for the PMFs — about Rs 500 crore more than last year. However, the real problem, is not the money but a lack of field experience, a non-technical mindset, compartmentalised functioning and an inability to synergise procurement of new technology arms and equipment for the police and paramilitary forces with outside agencies.

All police organisations tend to guard their turf with fanaticism. For example, even to procure a common item like bulletproof jackets and bulletproof vehicles, over 45 Central/State police organisations float separate qualitative requirements and tenders. Besides, senior officers involved in procurements

DSI

operationally compatible. have little or no field Pigeons fly past the Taj Induction of new techexperience. Most police Mahal hotel in Mumbai as nology systems can imorganisations neither have smoke bellows from it top the necessary expertise nor floors during the 26/11 seige prove if the modernisation of the police and PMF, the facilities for trials and evaluation. Lack of standardisation and which falls under the Home Ministry, is multiplicity of weapons and equipment done in collaboration with the defence invariably affects inter-operability within ministry which has a well established police forces and with the army in joint Acquisition Wing with evolved prooperations. Unfortunately, we have a curement procedures and processes.

The police and PMF can derive large pool of training establishments under police and the army with almost enormous benefits by establishing a cell in the Acquisition Wing of the MoD to carry negligible interaction between them.

To overcome this limitation, a joint out liaison functions and to act as an team from the Ministry of Home Affairs interface and synergising their require(MHA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) ments. Such a procedure will also benefit can be tasked to review our counter- the public and private sector defence insurgency/terrorism training capabilities. industry both in the process of developing It should suggest their interaction, optimal force multipliers.

And finally it will also enable faster utilisation at different counter terror operational levels and up-gradation communication of technological requirewhere necessary. The weapons and ments, increase competition and enable the equipment, particularly communication industry to improve their products and equipment, with all agencies should be accelerate development cycles.

26

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215x276dsi.indd 1

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AUGUST 2009

NEIGHBOURWATCH

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Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani meet in Sharm el-Sheikh at the Non-Aligned Summit

THE B-WORD By allowing the introduction of Balochistan in the Indo-Pak Joint Statement at Sharm-el Sheikh India opened itself up to accusations KEY POINTS Pakistan claims that the Sharm-el Sheikh Declaration was an admission of complicity by India in Balochistan’s insurgency. n No such evidence has ever been disclosed or shared with any credible international body. n Pakistan's allegations are reflexive seeking to counter that country's globally recognised role in supporting terrorism on Indian soil. n

AJAI SAHNI

28

P

akistan Prime Minister (Syed Yousuf Raza) Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” With this innocuous remark in the hastily improvised Indo-Pak Joint Statement at Sharm-el Sheikh, the enduring tragedy of Balochistan was abruptly transported, into the realm of a farce. Gilani scampered triumphantly back to Islamabad, claiming that the declaration constituted an admission of complicity on India’s part in the Baloch insurgency, even as Pakistan state agencies planted stories in the media about

215x276dsi.indd 1

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Ajai Sahni.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:33 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

NEIGHBOURWATCH Former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf, had earlier asserted that he had ‘documentary evidence’ of Brahamdagh Bugti, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, receiving weapons from Indian missions in Jalalabad and Kandahar and of Bugti’s long association with the R&AW

”

a ‘dossier’ of evidence ‘handed over’ to the Indian side during the ‘historical meeting’.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh assumed an air of injured innocence, declaring, “We have nothing to hide” and, “Our conduct in Balochistan is an open book”. Meanwhile the Ministry of External Affairs clarified vehemently that no ‘dossier’ had been received by the Indian side at Sharm-el Sheikh.

Some Western commentators, notably Christine Fair of the RAND Corporation, sought to demonstrate their expertise on the subject with sweeping generalisations about Indian consulates in Afghanistan and Iran “not issuing visas as their main activity” and asserting that, “India has run operations from its missions in Mazar and is doing so from the other Consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the border.” Fair, of course, subsequently went on to offer extended and convoluted denials, claiming, “I never said there was active support for terrorism, that was something that the Pakistanis attributed to me,” and that, “I do not know anyone who has a line of credible infor mation” on the issue.

By this time, however, the fat was happily crackling in the fire. The Dawn, for instance, insisted that the fictional ‘dossier’ handed over to the Indian Prime Minister by his Pakistani counterpart detailed evidence of India’s “involvement in terror financing in Pakistan” and of training

Activists of Pakistani Jamaat-eIslami party march against the military operations in the tribal areas

30

31

DSI

camps run by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) for the Balochistan Liberation Army in Afghanistan.

This, however, was hardly new. Former Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, had earlier asserted that he had ‘documentary evidence’ of Brahamdagh Bugti, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, receiving weapons from Indian missions in Jalalabad and Kandahar and of Bugti’s long association with R&AW. No such ‘evidence’, documentary or otherwise, has ever been publicly disclosed or shared with any credible inter national body. It is useful to recall, however, that in 2005, when the Baloch insurgency abruptly escalated in the wake of extraordinarily ham-handed interventions by the then Musharraf regime in Islamabad, the President had declared: “This is not the 1970s… they (the rebels) will not even know what and from where something has come and hit them.”

Significantly, there was no talk, then, of any ‘Indian hand’.

No Evidence More recently, Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, revealed that, while the issue was brought up during discussions in Pakistan, no “credible evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan” was ever provided. He rubbished Pakistani claims, further: “Pakistan has told me India has hundreds of people in (the Consulate) at Kandahar. I asked people, asked Americans and the UN, how big is the Indian Consulate in Kandahar? And they said six to eight people.”

In essence, Pakistan’s allegations regarding India’s role in the troubles in Balochistan are, at best, reflexive, seeking to establish an unsustainable moral parity between the two countries to counter allegations of what is now globally recognised as Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism on Indian soil. While these efforts do cause the occasional ripple, or help score trivial debating points in a fairly puerile international discourse on the subject, the appalling realities on the ground in Balochistan, and in the wider South Asian region, do eventually reassert themselves to Pakistan’s enduring discomfiture.

Quetta-based journalist Malik Siraj Akbar notes: “Gilani broached the issue with India at a time when disgruntled Baloch youth removed the Pakistani flag from schools and colleges and stopped playing the national anthem… India is not

Ajai Sahni.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:33 AM Page 3

AUGUST 2009

NEIGHBOURWATCH Former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf, had earlier asserted that he had ‘documentary evidence’ of Brahamdagh Bugti, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, receiving weapons from Indian missions in Jalalabad and Kandahar and of Bugti’s long association with the R&AW

”

a ‘dossier’ of evidence ‘handed over’ to the Indian side during the ‘historical meeting’.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh assumed an air of injured innocence, declaring, “We have nothing to hide” and, “Our conduct in Balochistan is an open book”. Meanwhile the Ministry of External Affairs clarified vehemently that no ‘dossier’ had been received by the Indian side at Sharm-el Sheikh.

Some Western commentators, notably Christine Fair of the RAND Corporation, sought to demonstrate their expertise on the subject with sweeping generalisations about Indian consulates in Afghanistan and Iran “not issuing visas as their main activity” and asserting that, “India has run operations from its missions in Mazar and is doing so from the other Consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the border.” Fair, of course, subsequently went on to offer extended and convoluted denials, claiming, “I never said there was active support for terrorism, that was something that the Pakistanis attributed to me,” and that, “I do not know anyone who has a line of credible infor mation” on the issue.

By this time, however, the fat was happily crackling in the fire. The Dawn, for instance, insisted that the fictional ‘dossier’ handed over to the Indian Prime Minister by his Pakistani counterpart detailed evidence of India’s “involvement in terror financing in Pakistan” and of training

Activists of Pakistani Jamaat-eIslami party march against the military operations in the tribal areas

30

31

DSI

camps run by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) for the Balochistan Liberation Army in Afghanistan.

This, however, was hardly new. Former Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, had earlier asserted that he had ‘documentary evidence’ of Brahamdagh Bugti, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, receiving weapons from Indian missions in Jalalabad and Kandahar and of Bugti’s long association with R&AW. No such ‘evidence’, documentary or otherwise, has ever been publicly disclosed or shared with any credible inter national body. It is useful to recall, however, that in 2005, when the Baloch insurgency abruptly escalated in the wake of extraordinarily ham-handed interventions by the then Musharraf regime in Islamabad, the President had declared: “This is not the 1970s… they (the rebels) will not even know what and from where something has come and hit them.”

Significantly, there was no talk, then, of any ‘Indian hand’.

No Evidence More recently, Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, revealed that, while the issue was brought up during discussions in Pakistan, no “credible evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan” was ever provided. He rubbished Pakistani claims, further: “Pakistan has told me India has hundreds of people in (the Consulate) at Kandahar. I asked people, asked Americans and the UN, how big is the Indian Consulate in Kandahar? And they said six to eight people.”

In essence, Pakistan’s allegations regarding India’s role in the troubles in Balochistan are, at best, reflexive, seeking to establish an unsustainable moral parity between the two countries to counter allegations of what is now globally recognised as Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism on Indian soil. While these efforts do cause the occasional ripple, or help score trivial debating points in a fairly puerile international discourse on the subject, the appalling realities on the ground in Balochistan, and in the wider South Asian region, do eventually reassert themselves to Pakistan’s enduring discomfiture.

Quetta-based journalist Malik Siraj Akbar notes: “Gilani broached the issue with India at a time when disgruntled Baloch youth removed the Pakistani flag from schools and colleges and stopped playing the national anthem… India is not

Ajai Sahni.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 03/09/09 10:34 AM Page 5

AUGUST 2009

NEIGHBOURWATCH

DSI

More recently, Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, revealed that, while the issue was brought up during discussions in Pakistan, no “credible evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan” was ever provided

”

kept the Baloch people the first to be blamed. An insurgent waits his turn to entirely out of the scope of Similar allegations were bathe in a hot spring at the development—they are levelled in the past against Bugti tribe’s mountain the now defunct Soviet headquarters near Dera Bugti, the poorest in the country, with little opportunity for Union, Afghanistan and (Right) Pakistani activists employment and an Iraq, to discredit the carry placards bearing the abysmal record on all social indigenous movement portraits of murdered Baloch indices. The entire Profor retaining a distinct nationalist politicians as they Baloch identity.” shout anti-government slogans vince has been transfor med into a massive cantonTo return to the core of the issue: of course there is a problem in ment, even as over a million people were Balochistan. There is a problem in every brought in from the outside in a contiprovince of Pakistan—in the NWFP, in nuing exercise in demographic rePakistan occupied Kashmir, in Sindh and, engineering. Vast tracts of land have been increasingly, in Punjab as well. But the forcibly ‘acquired’ and handed over to problem is not India, or Indian intelligence these outsiders, who have been the agencies. It is Pakistan itself. It is the principal beneficiaries of all ‘developenduring violence and inequity of the ment’, even as the Baloch are denied Pakistani State; it is the relentless ideology significant employment in the massive of mutual hatreds that underpins the very projects—including the Gwadar Port and gas and coal extraction industries— founding notion of this country.

Islamabad has, for the past 62 years, implemented in the Province.

32

Balochistan has the largest reserves of natural gas in Pakistan, and supplies as much as 38 per cent of the country’s total needs, though barely six per cent of the population in the Province has access to gas. Indeed, for the Baloch, the only thing in abundant supply has been the weapons that the Inter-Services Intelligence initially siphoned to them out of the ‘Afghan pipeline’, and that are now available in abundance across this Frontier region.

Islamabad’s Vacillation Islamabad’s approach to discontent in Balochistan has historically vacillated between talks for ‘political solutions’ that are never implemented and brutally repressive military campaigns. Arif Azad, a Quetta-based political commentator notes: “Balochistan has been here many times before and each time the Pakistan

state managers have bungled the situation… seeking a military solution to a purely political problem.” Rebellion has simmered in Balochistan for decades, with nationalist insurgencies flaring up in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63 and 1973-77, each of them crushed under the military jackboot.

Islamabad has done nothing to address legitimate Baloch grievances through extended periods of peace, pushing the Baloch to repeated cycles of militant protest and insurgent violence.

If there is an unwavering rage in Balochistan today, it is because of this long

history of brutal repression, which is even now being compounded. The murder of the popular leader and former Governor of the Province, Nawab Akbar Bugti, by state forces in 2006, was, of course, orchestrated by the Musharraf regime, as was the killing of Nawabzada Balach Marri in November 2007. The present dispensation could easily distance itself from these excesses.

Instead, Baloch anger has again been stoked by the murder of three prominent leaders, Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Lala Munir Baloch and Sher Mohammad

33

Baloch, whose mutilated bodies were recovered on April 9, 2009, five days after they were picked up by state agencies.

While these killings have been noticed because of the prominence of their victims, innumerable ‘disappearances’ of rebel Baloch cadres, students and civilians are hidden behind an impenetrable media blackout in the Province. Significantly, Ghulam Mohammad Baloch was a member of a committee set up to investigate the ‘disappearance’ of 1,109 people in the Province.

Islamabad has never been inclusive of the Baloch people or their leadership.

Even top Baloch officials appointed by Islamabad have no say in crucial policy.

Governor Zulfiqar Ali Magsi complains: “Although I am a representative of the Centre, I was never taken into confidence

by Islamabad.”

Islamabad imposes a repressive, colonial and exploitative regime on Balochistan and there is now a comprehensive collapse of faith between the people of this Province and a predatory Pakistani State.

The rebellions of the past were easily crushed by Pakistan’s Army, but the world has changed since. The dispensation at Islamabad presides over a fragile and increasingly vulnerable state, struggling with disorders across the country, and it is unlikely that the methods of the past will succeed.

It is, perhaps, time that Pakistan initiates a tentative experiment in providing justice and a measure of real rights to its people.

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More recently, Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, revealed that, while the issue was brought up during discussions in Pakistan, no “credible evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan” was ever provided

”

kept the Baloch people the first to be blamed. An insurgent waits his turn to entirely out of the scope of Similar allegations were bathe in a hot spring at the development—they are levelled in the past against Bugti tribe’s mountain the now defunct Soviet headquarters near Dera Bugti, the poorest in the country, with little opportunity for Union, Afghanistan and (Right) Pakistani activists employment and an Iraq, to discredit the carry placards bearing the abysmal record on all social indigenous movement portraits of murdered Baloch indices. The entire Profor retaining a distinct nationalist politicians as they Baloch identity.” shout anti-government slogans vince has been transfor med into a massive cantonTo return to the core of the issue: of course there is a problem in ment, even as over a million people were Balochistan. There is a problem in every brought in from the outside in a contiprovince of Pakistan—in the NWFP, in nuing exercise in demographic rePakistan occupied Kashmir, in Sindh and, engineering. Vast tracts of land have been increasingly, in Punjab as well. But the forcibly ‘acquired’ and handed over to problem is not India, or Indian intelligence these outsiders, who have been the agencies. It is Pakistan itself. It is the principal beneficiaries of all ‘developenduring violence and inequity of the ment’, even as the Baloch are denied Pakistani State; it is the relentless ideology significant employment in the massive of mutual hatreds that underpins the very projects—including the Gwadar Port and gas and coal extraction industries— founding notion of this country.

Islamabad has, for the past 62 years, implemented in the Province.

32

Balochistan has the largest reserves of natural gas in Pakistan, and supplies as much as 38 per cent of the country’s total needs, though barely six per cent of the population in the Province has access to gas. Indeed, for the Baloch, the only thing in abundant supply has been the weapons that the Inter-Services Intelligence initially siphoned to them out of the ‘Afghan pipeline’, and that are now available in abundance across this Frontier region.

Islamabad’s Vacillation Islamabad’s approach to discontent in Balochistan has historically vacillated between talks for ‘political solutions’ that are never implemented and brutally repressive military campaigns. Arif Azad, a Quetta-based political commentator notes: “Balochistan has been here many times before and each time the Pakistan

state managers have bungled the situation… seeking a military solution to a purely political problem.” Rebellion has simmered in Balochistan for decades, with nationalist insurgencies flaring up in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63 and 1973-77, each of them crushed under the military jackboot.

Islamabad has done nothing to address legitimate Baloch grievances through extended periods of peace, pushing the Baloch to repeated cycles of militant protest and insurgent violence.

If there is an unwavering rage in Balochistan today, it is because of this long

history of brutal repression, which is even now being compounded. The murder of the popular leader and former Governor of the Province, Nawab Akbar Bugti, by state forces in 2006, was, of course, orchestrated by the Musharraf regime, as was the killing of Nawabzada Balach Marri in November 2007. The present dispensation could easily distance itself from these excesses.

Instead, Baloch anger has again been stoked by the murder of three prominent leaders, Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Lala Munir Baloch and Sher Mohammad

33

Baloch, whose mutilated bodies were recovered on April 9, 2009, five days after they were picked up by state agencies.

While these killings have been noticed because of the prominence of their victims, innumerable ‘disappearances’ of rebel Baloch cadres, students and civilians are hidden behind an impenetrable media blackout in the Province. Significantly, Ghulam Mohammad Baloch was a member of a committee set up to investigate the ‘disappearance’ of 1,109 people in the Province.

Islamabad has never been inclusive of the Baloch people or their leadership.

Even top Baloch officials appointed by Islamabad have no say in crucial policy.

Governor Zulfiqar Ali Magsi complains: “Although I am a representative of the Centre, I was never taken into confidence

by Islamabad.”

Islamabad imposes a repressive, colonial and exploitative regime on Balochistan and there is now a comprehensive collapse of faith between the people of this Province and a predatory Pakistani State.

The rebellions of the past were easily crushed by Pakistan’s Army, but the world has changed since. The dispensation at Islamabad presides over a fragile and increasingly vulnerable state, struggling with disorders across the country, and it is unlikely that the methods of the past will succeed.

It is, perhaps, time that Pakistan initiates a tentative experiment in providing justice and a measure of real rights to its people.

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A Pakistani policeman takes position during a demonstration in Quetta against the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 (Below) A region enflamed

TALAT MASOOD

W

LOOKING DOWN

THE BARREL Insurgency has taken a turn for the worse in Pakistan’s largest province, Balochistan 34

KEY POINTS After Nawab Akbar Bugti’s assassination insurgency has spread in the Province. n Main demand of militant groups include political autonomy and control over natural resources. n International interest has heightened with the opening of Gwadar Port and the discovery of minerals. n

hen the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) coalition government assumed power in 2008 it provided President Asif Ali Zardari an excellent opportunity to refocus on the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan. Initially, he did raise hopes when, as head of the PPP and being of Balochi descent himself, the President publicly apologised for all the wrong doings of the past against the Balochi people. This was followed by further conciliatory gestures by both the President and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani which resulted in the release of political detainees and a relatively relaxed political environment. All this was welcomed by moderate leaders.

Sadly, the momentum has since been lost due to a lack of follow up action and today the province is once again drifting.

35

Insurgency has taken a turn for the worse as was evident on the third death anniversary of the tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in late August when the Province more or less came to a grinding halt.

Prior to the assassination of Bugti insurgency was primarily centered on Dera Bugti but after his death it has spread beyond the tribal belt into the settled areas of Sarawan and Jhalawan and Mekran divisions. In fact, in the latter area there is an ongoing military operation.

The whole region is in turmoil. Target killings are on the increase with Shias and Punjabis being the main victims. Gas pipe lines and high voltage transmission grids are being blown up. People are being kidnapped and gross human rights violations are taking place. And the armed forces are constantly under attack.

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A Pakistani policeman takes position during a demonstration in Quetta against the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 (Below) A region enflamed

TALAT MASOOD

W

LOOKING DOWN

THE BARREL Insurgency has taken a turn for the worse in Pakistan’s largest province, Balochistan 34

KEY POINTS After Nawab Akbar Bugti’s assassination insurgency has spread in the Province. n Main demand of militant groups include political autonomy and control over natural resources. n International interest has heightened with the opening of Gwadar Port and the discovery of minerals. n

hen the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) coalition government assumed power in 2008 it provided President Asif Ali Zardari an excellent opportunity to refocus on the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan. Initially, he did raise hopes when, as head of the PPP and being of Balochi descent himself, the President publicly apologised for all the wrong doings of the past against the Balochi people. This was followed by further conciliatory gestures by both the President and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani which resulted in the release of political detainees and a relatively relaxed political environment. All this was welcomed by moderate leaders.

Sadly, the momentum has since been lost due to a lack of follow up action and today the province is once again drifting.

35

Insurgency has taken a turn for the worse as was evident on the third death anniversary of the tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in late August when the Province more or less came to a grinding halt.

Prior to the assassination of Bugti insurgency was primarily centered on Dera Bugti but after his death it has spread beyond the tribal belt into the settled areas of Sarawan and Jhalawan and Mekran divisions. In fact, in the latter area there is an ongoing military operation.

The whole region is in turmoil. Target killings are on the increase with Shias and Punjabis being the main victims. Gas pipe lines and high voltage transmission grids are being blown up. People are being kidnapped and gross human rights violations are taking place. And the armed forces are constantly under attack.

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NEIGHBOURWATCH Lack of Political Evolution

Regrettably, on its part, the Balochi leadership has not been able to offer much to its people.The tribal chiefs have been mistreating their constituency by failing to govern well while in office.They have, justifiably, been accused of deliberately mismanaging provincial resources and the development funds provided to them.

”

All the three militant nationalist groups —the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army and the Baloch Front—are now engaged in lowlevel insurgency operations. Though all three militant groups are closely cooperating with each other, BLA, being the largest, is in the lead and seems to be taking credit for all major attacks on military installations.

The Balochi nationalist leaders believe that the present civilian government, even if it wants to pursue a policy of reconciliation, will not succeed as the real policy and conditions on the ground are being determined by the intelligence agencies, especially the Military Intelligence, similar to what the situation was during General Pervez Musharraf’s period.

Sense of Deprivation The present situation is backed by a strong sense of deprivation, felt for decades by the Balochi people: a fact that their leadership has been exploiting to gain support for the insurgency. It is perceived that the federal government and especially the establishment (a collective euphemism for the military, intelligence agencies and bureau-

cracy) are not prepared to shed control over the rich and vast resources of Balochistan. Not surprisingly, the Balochi position is getting more and more rigid and there is a perceptible lack of engagement between the various state institutions and Balochistan.

Regrettably, on its part, the Balochi leadership has not been able to offer much to its people. The tribal chiefs have been mistreating their constituency by failing to govern effectively while in office. They have, justifiably, been accused of deliberately mismanaging provincial resources and the development funds provided to them. It is a sad commentary on the tribal chiefs that they have never tried to improve the lot of their people. On the contrary, they have deliberately kept the area backward. No effort has been made to promote education, build hospitals or create any sort of physical infrastructure.

On the other hand, Balochi nationalists and tribal chiefs claim that it is the federal government which has deprived them of their normal democratic rights and has taken control of their natural resources thus throttling Balochistan both economically and politically.

36

Certainly, Balochistan has never benefitted from a normal political evolution. The extensive involvement of the military in this area combined with age-old tribal customs has prevented any healthy, democratic commitment. Practically all the Balochi nationalist parties that have a large following, including the Jamhuri Watan Party, Balochistan National Party, and the Haq Tawar Party, boycotted the last national and provincial elections. As a result, the majority in the provincial assembly are members from PML (Q) and other parties that draw their strength (Far Left) Balochi from the tribal leader Nawab more Akbar Bugti, (Left) establishment rather than from the Balochi’s bury people. With politics Bugti after his and governance of assassination in Dera Bugti, (Below) the Province being managed and guiPakistanis gather ded mostly by in Quetta town intelligence agencies, seeing burning the representative vehicles on a character of the prestreet after sent provincial govan explosion ernment is obviously in question. Consequently, an acceptable political solution of problems becomes even more difficult.

Akbar Bugti was perhaps amongst the very few tribal leaders who had been a part of the government and was still prepared to engage with the establishment provided he was dealt with honorably. But by ordering a military operation against this stalwart, that ultimately resulted in his

37

DSI

assassination, Musharraf committed a huge blunder. General Musharraf had wrongly assumed that the majority of Balochis supported the government and that the tribal chiefs, like Bugti, had a limited following. Instead of undertaking a political course to resolve issues Musharraf regrettably adopted the fatal military option.

The younger generation of tribal leadership has since got even further alienated and is not prepared for any political engagement. All the nationalist parties have become radicalised, directly or indirectly supporting the insurgency.

Dissident tribal leaders are claiming that false cases have been registered against them to keep them out of politics, forcing them to leave the country.

The general feeling among Balochis of being marginalised, not being a part of the federal decision-making process and their own destiny has got reinforced. Geographic distances, poor communication links with the rest of the country and an absence of political and economic development, old social structures and a lack of a role in the management of its natural resources are mainly responsible for this state of frustration.

Main Demands The demands of the rebel groups include the withdrawal of security forces, the release of all political workers and insurgents under detention and a public apology by the government for its wrong doings. Their main demand, however, focusses on the control of resources and

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NEIGHBOURWATCH Lack of Political Evolution

Regrettably, on its part, the Balochi leadership has not been able to offer much to its people.The tribal chiefs have been mistreating their constituency by failing to govern well while in office.They have, justifiably, been accused of deliberately mismanaging provincial resources and the development funds provided to them.

”

All the three militant nationalist groups —the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army and the Baloch Front—are now engaged in lowlevel insurgency operations. Though all three militant groups are closely cooperating with each other, BLA, being the largest, is in the lead and seems to be taking credit for all major attacks on military installations.

The Balochi nationalist leaders believe that the present civilian government, even if it wants to pursue a policy of reconciliation, will not succeed as the real policy and conditions on the ground are being determined by the intelligence agencies, especially the Military Intelligence, similar to what the situation was during General Pervez Musharraf’s period.

Sense of Deprivation The present situation is backed by a strong sense of deprivation, felt for decades by the Balochi people: a fact that their leadership has been exploiting to gain support for the insurgency. It is perceived that the federal government and especially the establishment (a collective euphemism for the military, intelligence agencies and bureau-

cracy) are not prepared to shed control over the rich and vast resources of Balochistan. Not surprisingly, the Balochi position is getting more and more rigid and there is a perceptible lack of engagement between the various state institutions and Balochistan.

Regrettably, on its part, the Balochi leadership has not been able to offer much to its people. The tribal chiefs have been mistreating their constituency by failing to govern effectively while in office. They have, justifiably, been accused of deliberately mismanaging provincial resources and the development funds provided to them. It is a sad commentary on the tribal chiefs that they have never tried to improve the lot of their people. On the contrary, they have deliberately kept the area backward. No effort has been made to promote education, build hospitals or create any sort of physical infrastructure.

On the other hand, Balochi nationalists and tribal chiefs claim that it is the federal government which has deprived them of their normal democratic rights and has taken control of their natural resources thus throttling Balochistan both economically and politically.

36

Certainly, Balochistan has never benefitted from a normal political evolution. The extensive involvement of the military in this area combined with age-old tribal customs has prevented any healthy, democratic commitment. Practically all the Balochi nationalist parties that have a large following, including the Jamhuri Watan Party, Balochistan National Party, and the Haq Tawar Party, boycotted the last national and provincial elections. As a result, the majority in the provincial assembly are members from PML (Q) and other parties that draw their strength (Far Left) Balochi from the tribal leader Nawab more Akbar Bugti, (Left) establishment rather than from the Balochi’s bury people. With politics Bugti after his and governance of assassination in Dera Bugti, (Below) the Province being managed and guiPakistanis gather ded mostly by in Quetta town intelligence agencies, seeing burning the representative vehicles on a character of the prestreet after sent provincial govan explosion ernment is obviously in question. Consequently, an acceptable political solution of problems becomes even more difficult.

Akbar Bugti was perhaps amongst the very few tribal leaders who had been a part of the government and was still prepared to engage with the establishment provided he was dealt with honorably. But by ordering a military operation against this stalwart, that ultimately resulted in his

37

DSI

assassination, Musharraf committed a huge blunder. General Musharraf had wrongly assumed that the majority of Balochis supported the government and that the tribal chiefs, like Bugti, had a limited following. Instead of undertaking a political course to resolve issues Musharraf regrettably adopted the fatal military option.

The younger generation of tribal leadership has since got even further alienated and is not prepared for any political engagement. All the nationalist parties have become radicalised, directly or indirectly supporting the insurgency.

Dissident tribal leaders are claiming that false cases have been registered against them to keep them out of politics, forcing them to leave the country.

The general feeling among Balochis of being marginalised, not being a part of the federal decision-making process and their own destiny has got reinforced. Geographic distances, poor communication links with the rest of the country and an absence of political and economic development, old social structures and a lack of a role in the management of its natural resources are mainly responsible for this state of frustration.

Main Demands The demands of the rebel groups include the withdrawal of security forces, the release of all political workers and insurgents under detention and a public apology by the government for its wrong doings. Their main demand, however, focusses on the control of resources and

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A bomb hidden in a toilet explodes and damages a train in Colpur, some 45 kilometres from Quetta

a high level of provincial autonomy bordering on independence. The demand for provincial autonomy in accordance with the 1973 constitution is perfectly valid and the federal government should grant it but going beyond that is unacceptable.

However, more crucial in the context of Balochistan, is the introduction of social reforms. Unless these are undertaken any sustainable development will not be feasible. A centuries-old, deeply entrenched tribal structure is resistant to reforms and overall development.

The only way of bringing Balochistan in the mainstream is to allow genuine politics to take root. But for both political evolution and economic development the government has to provide security, which so far has been far from satisfactory.

At another level, the power play of global and regional actors in an insurgency ridden Balochistan is proving to be a serious challenge for Pakistan. The government accuses the BLA and other nationalist parties of having links with India, Afghanistan and other foreign agencies.

The involvement of India was even brought

The whole region is in turmoil.Target killings are on the increase, with Shias and Punjabis being the main victims.

Gas pipelines and high voltage transmission grids are being blown up.

People are being kidnapped and gross human rights violations are taking place. And the armed forces are constantly under attack.

�

38

to the attention of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh by his counterpart in their recent meeting at Sharm-el Sheikh. In addition, China, Iran and the US have a deep interest in Balochistan.

The establishment of the Gwadar deepsea port, which became operational last year; the confirmed deposits of precious metals in the Province and its borders adjoining Afghanistan and Iran have all given Balochistan a unique strategic position. Gwadar Port has the potential of becoming a highly profitable communication link between China and the Persian Gulf and between Central Asia and Pakistan. The US too has deepened its interest in Balochistan not only to protect itself in Afghanistan but also in the context of its potential rivalry with China.

Islamabad should realise that peace, security and stability of Balochistan is closely interlinked with the integrity and future well being of the state of Pakistan.

And Balochistan’s nationalism has to be assimilated and harmonised with the country’s overall interest and not be allowed to remain in a state of hostility.

215x276dsi.indd 1

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MAP/ ARCHANA KUMAR

An Indian and a Chinese soldier stand guard at the Nathu La border in Sikkim

Enter the Dragon

I

JAYADEVA RANADE

China’s redefinition of its strategic frontiers and intrusions across the LAC, especially Sikkim, should be a matter for concern for India

RISING CONCERNS 40

KEY POINTS President Hu Jintao has been consciously modernising the Chinese PLA especially focussing on enhancing its ability to conduct rapid-mobility intergrated joint operations. n It is against the backdrop of this capability that intrusions along India's borders need to be viewed. n Intrusions across Sikkim are worrying as they cast doubt on China's credibility to abide by bilateral agreements. n

41

ntrusions by Chinese troops across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) should be viewed not in the narrow context of the India-China border dispute but the larger canvas of China’s visibly growing assertiveness in international affairs in the past couple of years; coinciding with China’s much publicised rise in the global arena.

Once Hu Jintao assumed charge as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, President of China and Chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) to become the most powerful individual in China, he wrought some major changes especially in the country’s foreign policy. He also discarded Deng Xiaoping’s advice of taoguang yanghui (lie low, conceal capabilities and bide time) till China achieves its modernisation goals.

China’s economic strength, stoutly reinforced by its growing military might, contributed to Hu Jintao’s confidence that China can expand its diplomatic space during this interregnum when America is pre-occupied with Afghanistan and Iraq and major domestic issues resulting from the global economic crisis.

As part of his policy he sought to more actively expand China’s influence and strategic economic presence in nations as diverse as those in Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific and South Asia. Of concern for countries in the Asia-Pacific

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DSI

MAP/ ARCHANA KUMAR

An Indian and a Chinese soldier stand guard at the Nathu La border in Sikkim

Enter the Dragon

I

JAYADEVA RANADE

China’s redefinition of its strategic frontiers and intrusions across the LAC, especially Sikkim, should be a matter for concern for India

RISING CONCERNS 40

KEY POINTS President Hu Jintao has been consciously modernising the Chinese PLA especially focussing on enhancing its ability to conduct rapid-mobility intergrated joint operations. n It is against the backdrop of this capability that intrusions along India's borders need to be viewed. n Intrusions across Sikkim are worrying as they cast doubt on China's credibility to abide by bilateral agreements. n

41

ntrusions by Chinese troops across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) should be viewed not in the narrow context of the India-China border dispute but the larger canvas of China’s visibly growing assertiveness in international affairs in the past couple of years; coinciding with China’s much publicised rise in the global arena.

Once Hu Jintao assumed charge as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, President of China and Chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) to become the most powerful individual in China, he wrought some major changes especially in the country’s foreign policy. He also discarded Deng Xiaoping’s advice of taoguang yanghui (lie low, conceal capabilities and bide time) till China achieves its modernisation goals.

China’s economic strength, stoutly reinforced by its growing military might, contributed to Hu Jintao’s confidence that China can expand its diplomatic space during this interregnum when America is pre-occupied with Afghanistan and Iraq and major domestic issues resulting from the global economic crisis.

As part of his policy he sought to more actively expand China’s influence and strategic economic presence in nations as diverse as those in Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific and South Asia. Of concern for countries in the Asia-Pacific

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The PLA’s Doctrine of War was revised in 2006 from that of ‘winning regional wars under hi-tech conditions’ to that of ‘winning short-duration local wars under hi-tech informatised conditions’

”

and South Asia is that Hu Jintao is using the interregnum to test the limits of China’s influence and achieve its territorial ambitions.

Modernising the PLA

Ever since he became Vice Chairman of the CMC, Hu Jintao has concentrated on the modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially enhancing its ability to successfully conduct rapidmobility integrated joint operations. He has ensured double-digit increases in China’s defence budget since he took over as Party General Secretary in 2002 and accelerated improvement of the PLA’s capability for integrated joint operations since he assumed charge as Chairman of the CMC in 2004. The latter was amply reflected in his decision to expand the membership, for the first time ever, of the CMC to include the Commanders of the PLA Air Force, PLA Navy and Second Artillery. He subsequently appointed officers of the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy as Deputy and Assistant Chiefs respectively of the PLA General Staff.

The guidelines for the PLA formulated in the mid-1990s continue to be valid today and clarify the kind of war it will wage.

These task the PLA to be in readiness for: Fighting a war with limited political objectives and one which is also limited in geographical scope. n Fighting a short-duration war decisive in strategic outcome. In other words, a single campaign may decide the entire war.

n Hi-intensity operations characterised by mobility, speed and force projection. n Fighting a war employing hi-tech wea pons which cause high levels of destruction. n Fighting a logistics intensive war with high resource consumption rates; with success dependent as much on combat sustainability as the ability to inflict damage on the enemy.

n

42

The PLA’s Doctrine of War was revised in 2006 from that of ‘winning regional wars under hi-tech conditions’ to that of ‘winning short-duration local wars under hi-tech informatised conditions’. The

magnetic environments PLA’s Doctrine viewed A Chinese soldier stands including aerial and spacetogether with its guidelines, guard on the Chinese side based activities. Queshanconfirm that the PLA is pre- of the Nathu La Pass.

2007 and Jointness-2007, paring for conflict along its (Left) A Chinese and an periphery, including deter - Indian soldier fix a broken both major three-dimensional island landing exerring the US and other barbed wire at the pass cises, primarily assumed powers that might rush to Taiwan’s assistance in case China attempts Taiwan and Vietnam as targets. The latest two-month-long land-air military exercise a reunification by military means.

The PLA’s large-scale combined Kuaye-2009 (Stride-2009), which commenservices military exercises, which began to ced late last month, is the largest exercise be held for the first time from 2006, held so far. 50,000 troops are planned to be dovetail neatly with its doctrine. The rapidly deployed across 50,000 square exercises involve group armies and for - kilometres with 60,000 vehicles.

Though Chengdu Military Region, mations from different military regions and services and envisage complex electro- which is directly across India has not been

43

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DSI

The PLA’s Doctrine of War was revised in 2006 from that of ‘winning regional wars under hi-tech conditions’ to that of ‘winning short-duration local wars under hi-tech informatised conditions’

”

and South Asia is that Hu Jintao is using the interregnum to test the limits of China’s influence and achieve its territorial ambitions.

Modernising the PLA

Ever since he became Vice Chairman of the CMC, Hu Jintao has concentrated on the modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially enhancing its ability to successfully conduct rapidmobility integrated joint operations. He has ensured double-digit increases in China’s defence budget since he took over as Party General Secretary in 2002 and accelerated improvement of the PLA’s capability for integrated joint operations since he assumed charge as Chairman of the CMC in 2004. The latter was amply reflected in his decision to expand the membership, for the first time ever, of the CMC to include the Commanders of the PLA Air Force, PLA Navy and Second Artillery. He subsequently appointed officers of the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy as Deputy and Assistant Chiefs respectively of the PLA General Staff.

The guidelines for the PLA formulated in the mid-1990s continue to be valid today and clarify the kind of war it will wage.

These task the PLA to be in readiness for: Fighting a war with limited political objectives and one which is also limited in geographical scope. n Fighting a short-duration war decisive in strategic outcome. In other words, a single campaign may decide the entire war.

n Hi-intensity operations characterised by mobility, speed and force projection. n Fighting a war employing hi-tech wea pons which cause high levels of destruction. n Fighting a logistics intensive war with high resource consumption rates; with success dependent as much on combat sustainability as the ability to inflict damage on the enemy.

n

42

The PLA’s Doctrine of War was revised in 2006 from that of ‘winning regional wars under hi-tech conditions’ to that of ‘winning short-duration local wars under hi-tech informatised conditions’. The

magnetic environments PLA’s Doctrine viewed A Chinese soldier stands including aerial and spacetogether with its guidelines, guard on the Chinese side based activities. Queshanconfirm that the PLA is pre- of the Nathu La Pass.

2007 and Jointness-2007, paring for conflict along its (Left) A Chinese and an periphery, including deter - Indian soldier fix a broken both major three-dimensional island landing exerring the US and other barbed wire at the pass cises, primarily assumed powers that might rush to Taiwan’s assistance in case China attempts Taiwan and Vietnam as targets. The latest two-month-long land-air military exercise a reunification by military means.

The PLA’s large-scale combined Kuaye-2009 (Stride-2009), which commenservices military exercises, which began to ced late last month, is the largest exercise be held for the first time from 2006, held so far. 50,000 troops are planned to be dovetail neatly with its doctrine. The rapidly deployed across 50,000 square exercises involve group armies and for - kilometres with 60,000 vehicles.

Though Chengdu Military Region, mations from different military regions and services and envisage complex electro- which is directly across India has not been

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China raised it as a dispute during the External Affairs Minister’s visit to Beijing in May 2008. China’s attention significantly appears focused on the ‘Finger Area’, or the area north of Guangyong. At its closest point this area is barely 30 miles north of the ‘chicken’s neck’ or the Siliguri corridor. A sudden military move across this belt, combined with a pincer move down from the Chumbi Valley, would completely cut India off from the Northeast. China’s objective would be its claim to approximately 90,000 square kilometers of territory comprising Arunachal Pradesh or, what China calls ‘southern Tibet’.

Factors contributing to the need for serious concern over these activities are the all-weather expressway that China has built right up to the border at Nathu La and its plans to extend the GolmudLhasa Railway to Yadong, near Nathu La. An additional incipient non-traditional threat centres around the religious dispute for the throne of the XVIIth Gyalwa Karmapa of the Karma Kargyu sect and Rumtek Monastery. Ugyen Thinley Dorje, who escaped from People's Tsurphu near Lhasa Liberation Army under mysterious cirsoldiers show cumstances in 2000, is their skills during a leading contender. a trip to the Third The majority of SikGuard Division of kimese venerate their the PLA religious leaders and many follow the Karma Kargyu sect.

Worrying in the context of these intrusions is the redefinition of China’s strategic frontiers encouraged by Hu Jintao. Chinese strategists describe it as: “China’s entire continental shelf, the north Pacific contiguous to Russia and Japan, the Bohai Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and even westward through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean.” Some stretch the definition to include the Persian Gulf. Huang Kunlun, a military commentator expanded this by articulating a ‘theory of boundless national interests’ and said: “Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission of our armed forces.” An Intelligence-affiliated researcher clarified that, “Beijing wants to occupy the vantage point and seize the initiative in global geopolitical contention.”

Chinese maps depicting their so-called traditional sphere of influence remain in circulation and include areas well beyond the newly defined strategic frontiers, a fact which should cause serious concern to its neighbours, especially India.

Chinese troop intrusions have occurred over the years, but have registered an appreciable increase recently. More significantly, they now occur along the entire length of the border, often with a fair degree of aggressiveness

”

included, presumably to avoid giving rise to concern in India, the Lanzhou Military Region, that has a support and reinforcement role for operations against India, is part of the exercise. The exercise will include joint operations of land and air troops; operations in complex electromagnetic conditions; paratrooper assault operations and comprehensive exercises by specialist forces. The exercises appear intended to tackle emergent war conditions on China’s land frontiers, which would include India and Vietnam.

Increasing Intrusions It is against the backdrop of this capability of the PLA that its intrusions along the borders with India need to be viewed.

Chinese troop intrusions have occurred over the years but have registered an appreciable increase recently. More significantly, they now occur along the entire length of the border, often with a fair degree of aggressiveness. It would be a serious error to glibly gloss over them as a ‘difference in perception’.

Sikkim is especially sensitive politically and militarily for India. The intrusions into Sikkim are particularly worrying as they also cast serious doubt on China’s credibility to abide by bilateral agreements.

After armed Chinese troops probably assessed our vulnerabilities through over 75 intrusions in northern Sikkim in 2007,

44

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China raised it as a dispute during the External Affairs Minister’s visit to Beijing in May 2008. China’s attention significantly appears focused on the ‘Finger Area’, or the area north of Guangyong. At its closest point this area is barely 30 miles north of the ‘chicken’s neck’ or the Siliguri corridor. A sudden military move across this belt, combined with a pincer move down from the Chumbi Valley, would completely cut India off from the Northeast. China’s objective would be its claim to approximately 90,000 square kilometers of territory comprising Arunachal Pradesh or, what China calls ‘southern Tibet’.

Factors contributing to the need for serious concern over these activities are the all-weather expressway that China has built right up to the border at Nathu La and its plans to extend the GolmudLhasa Railway to Yadong, near Nathu La. An additional incipient non-traditional threat centres around the religious dispute for the throne of the XVIIth Gyalwa Karmapa of the Karma Kargyu sect and Rumtek Monastery. Ugyen Thinley Dorje, who escaped from People's Tsurphu near Lhasa Liberation Army under mysterious cirsoldiers show cumstances in 2000, is their skills during a leading contender. a trip to the Third The majority of SikGuard Division of kimese venerate their the PLA religious leaders and many follow the Karma Kargyu sect.

Worrying in the context of these intrusions is the redefinition of China’s strategic frontiers encouraged by Hu Jintao. Chinese strategists describe it as: “China’s entire continental shelf, the north Pacific contiguous to Russia and Japan, the Bohai Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and even westward through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean.” Some stretch the definition to include the Persian Gulf. Huang Kunlun, a military commentator expanded this by articulating a ‘theory of boundless national interests’ and said: “Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission of our armed forces.” An Intelligence-affiliated researcher clarified that, “Beijing wants to occupy the vantage point and seize the initiative in global geopolitical contention.”

Chinese maps depicting their so-called traditional sphere of influence remain in circulation and include areas well beyond the newly defined strategic frontiers, a fact which should cause serious concern to its neighbours, especially India.

Chinese troop intrusions have occurred over the years, but have registered an appreciable increase recently. More significantly, they now occur along the entire length of the border, often with a fair degree of aggressiveness

”

included, presumably to avoid giving rise to concern in India, the Lanzhou Military Region, that has a support and reinforcement role for operations against India, is part of the exercise. The exercise will include joint operations of land and air troops; operations in complex electromagnetic conditions; paratrooper assault operations and comprehensive exercises by specialist forces. The exercises appear intended to tackle emergent war conditions on China’s land frontiers, which would include India and Vietnam.

Increasing Intrusions It is against the backdrop of this capability of the PLA that its intrusions along the borders with India need to be viewed.

Chinese troop intrusions have occurred over the years but have registered an appreciable increase recently. More significantly, they now occur along the entire length of the border, often with a fair degree of aggressiveness. It would be a serious error to glibly gloss over them as a ‘difference in perception’.

Sikkim is especially sensitive politically and militarily for India. The intrusions into Sikkim are particularly worrying as they also cast serious doubt on China’s credibility to abide by bilateral agreements.

After armed Chinese troops probably assessed our vulnerabilities through over 75 intrusions in northern Sikkim in 2007,

44

45

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AUGUST 2009

a n

u p d a t e

o n

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c o m m e r c i a l

n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

The Indian Tejas is the world's smallest, lightweight, multi-role combat aircraft

Engine Diplomacy THE MoD’s recent request for proposal (RfP) to aero-engine makers General Electric for its General Electric F-414 INS5 and Eurojet Turbo for EJ-200 to power the follow-on Mark II model of the locally developed Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) could well become a factor in deciding the outcome of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Rs 42,000 crore contract for 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA).

The GE F-414 and EJ-200 engines power three of the six competing fighters—Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Saab JAS Gripen NG and Eurofighter Typhoon. Consequently, engine commonality could become a factor in the final selection of the MRCA.The other three contenders are France’s Rafale, Lockheed Martin’s F16 and Russian Aircraft Corporations (RSK’s), MiG 35.

Either of these two engines will replace the General Electric F404-GE-IN20 after burner engine, which will power the first batch of 20 long-delayedTejas ordered by the IAF.This engine lacks the requisite thrust thus curtailing the LCA’s weapons load.

Last year, the IAF had declared that the F404-GE-IN20 power-pack compromised its

46

qualitative requirements as it provided the Tejas with an 80-85 kilonewton (KN) thrust whilst the desired LCA weapon payload required an enhanced 95-100 KN thrust.

In the RfP issued in early August, the MoD has asked the competing vendors to submit bids within 90 days to supply 99 engines—eight for outright procurement and the remainder to be locally constructed under a transfer of technology clause—in a deal estimated at around US$600 million. The MoD has also included the option to acquire 49 additional engines at the same or marginally higher cost.

But IAF sources admitted that selecting either of the two engines to power the around 108 Tejas Mark IIs—or six squadrons—earmarked for the IAF would necessitate time consuming re-engineering of the LCA, further postponing the much-delayed programme launched in 1983. The new power pack induction would also decisively kill the LCA’s floundering replacement GTX-35VS Kaveri engine under Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) development for nearly 15 years. Kaveri is being considered to power commercial and naval ships and even locomotives.

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defencebuzz Russia, meanwhile, also competing for the MRCA tender with its MiG 35, is not far behind in ‘engine’ diplomacy, albeit of a different kind. It agreed at the MAKS-2009 air show near Moscow in August 2009 to deliver 26 RD-33 series-3 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to upgrade the IAF’s fleet of 67 Fulcrum MiG 29B/S fighters. Russian officials claim the RD-33 series-3 engines—an upgraded version of the powerful RD-33 turbofan with thrust vectoring capability that provides fighters superior maneuverability and enhances close air combat performance —also power the MiG 35, a not-so-subtle push for their fighters.

The RD 33 engines, of which 120 are to be built at HAL’s Koraput plant in Orissa, also power the 16 MiG 29 KuB fighters, which will comprise the air arm of the retrofitted INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov) the 44,750-ton Russian Kiev-class aircraft carrier currently undergoing a refit in northern Russia before being handed over to India in 2012-13.

The MoD has also accorded ‘in principle’ clearance to 29 additional MiG 29 KuBs over the next three to five years for around US$ 2 billion to raise three fighter squadrons that would operate off the indigenous aircraft carrier presently under construction at Kochi.

European Manufacturers Eye India’s Submarine Market EUROPEAN warship and submarine builders are lining up to bid for the Navy’s highly lucrative and imminent contracts. These include the long standing IN proposal to build seven additional stealth frigates—split between State-owned dockyards at Mumbai and Kolkata— construct six additional submarines and a landing platform dock to augment the navy’s strategic lift capability and for deployment on relief and humanitarian missions like tsunamis.

Eyeing these programmes are Spain’s leading public sector shipbuilder Navantia and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems that also owns HDW, which supplied the IN four Type 1500 (HDW 209) Shishumar-class SSK attack submarines in the early 1990s.Two were acquired outright and two built at Mazagon Dockyard Limited in Mumbai under a contract that for years

Shishumar (Type 209/1500) submarine in the Indian Ocean was swathed in scandal.

Being a newcomer Navantia upgraded its profile in India with the recent four-day visit of the Spanish Navy frigate Blas de Lezo to Mumbai. The Lezo is equipped with the Lockheed Martin-designed Aegis ballistic missile defence shield system, which the US manufacturer wants to sell India as part of its expanding commercial links with Delhi.

Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA), which forms part of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) conglomerate, by more or less clinching the Rs 48,000 crore deal for six Airbus A-330 multi-role tanker transport, seems to have scored over rival Russian Ilyushin Il-78s. Germany, on the other hand, which woke up to India’s potential as a major weapons buyer three years ago and hastily confirmed a bilateral defence co-operation agreement in September 2006, conducted its first-ever naval exercise with India in the Arabian Sea in April 2008.

Ostensibly the three-day-long replenishment at sea (RAS) manoeuvres were to augment bilateral defence and strategic ties, but in reality were aimed at positioning German military equipment suppliers to secure access to one of the world’s larger markets. Unlike India, most Western governments work closely with local defence manufacturers and vendors to

48

advance materiel sales.

Other leading German defence manufacturers like Rheinmettal, which participated in Delhi’s Defexpo 2008, too, are waiting to bid for the profitable 155mm/52 calibre self-propelled howitzer contract, the RfP for which is expected soon.

Delayed Delivery of Light Utility Helicopters SUMMER trials to import desperately required 197 light utility helicopters (LUHs) for the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and the IAF have been rescheduled following bureaucratic wrangling and will be replaced by winter try-outs expected to begin next February. Summer trials would follow.

AAC officials concede that even in the best case scenario it would take at least three years before trial reports are finalised, price negotiations concluded and the deal inked. Thereafter it would be another 3-4 years before the first lot of LUHs arrive, sometime around 2015 if not later.

The adjournment was due to the Technical Oversight Committee, instituted by the MoD, finding a ‘mismatch’ between the stipulated qualitative requirements mandated in the RfP and the declared capability of rival platforms on offer.

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Airborne Cheetah (SA-315B Lama) Eurocopter, Italy’s Augusta Westland, Russia’s Kamov, MD helicopters of the US and Sikorsky are competing for the $ 650-700 million tender. They will participate in summer and winter trials in Kashmir, in rhe nearby plains of hot and dusty Punjab and in the Rajasthan desert, regions where they would eventually be deployed.

These 197 helicopters—133 for the AAC and 64 for the IAF—constitute the imported portion of the AAC’s and IAF’s total requirement of 384 LUHs to replace the ageing Chetak (Alouette III) and Cheetah (SA-315B Lama) fleet that primarily services army units deployed in Kashmir and Siachen Glacier, at heights above 14,000 ft. Of these 384 LUH’s weighing between 2.2 and 3 tons and with an operational ceiling of 6-7 km, the AAC would get 259 and the IAF 125.

The LUH procurement entails an offset obligation of 50 per cent of the contract value, far higher than the mandated 30 per cent obligation decreed by the DPP. This requirement however, led to Bell Textron declining to compete for the LUH contract, terming the offset “restrictive” and consequently, the bid non-competitive.

The LUH requirement was re-tendered in July 2008 after the MoD scrapped the acquisition of 197 Eurocopter AS 550 C3 Fennec over Bell Textron’s Bell 407 model seven months earlier following two rounds of extensive trials in 2004 and 2005 because of ‘discrepancies’ in the evaluation process.

The MoD maintained that Eurocopter had fielded its AS 350 B3 Ecureuil civilian model

for trials in addition to reportedly using an agent to further its chances, a provision banned under all editions of the DPP.

The race for the MRCA heats up THE book, meanwhile, is open on which of the six MRCA are likely to make the final cut in what is one of the largest such military deals in recent times. Feverish speculation continues on which of the rivals is most likely to succeed in bagging the deal in which geo-politics, without doubt, will play a key role.

According to insiders involved with the MRCA project, the MoD has adopted a Verifiable Cost Model (VCM) evaluation yardstick that makes its calculation based on the selected fighters remaining in squadron service for 40 years or flying time of 6,000 hours, whichever comes earlier.

The VCM method that is expected to ultimately guide the selection process includes appraising: n Direct acquisition cost or initial cost including that of weapons and spares, warranty for the first two years, licence royalty for manufacture in India, cost of transfer of technology, cost of initial training and operating costs like consumption of fuel and lubricants n Insistence upon guaranteed serviceability and adequate supply of spares throughout the fighter’s operational life. The IAF is equally insistent on this issue as it wants

50

watertight ‘insurance’ against the possibility of sanctions at a future date, especially with regard to the US. The IAF and the Indian Navy (IN) widely suffered the consequences of sanctions after India’s multiple nuclear tests in 1998. The IAF was forced to take remedial measures as development of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was stymied following an embargo on its General Electric F404-GE-IN20 after burner engines and the IN’s entire Sea King helicopter fleet was grounded for lack of spares.

Concern over Western competition over the MRCA, however, has a worried Russia, India’s largest and most reliable weapons supplier, promising Delhi a range of nuclear and military goodies as well as related technology as a ‘sweetener’.

Moscow’s incentives include nuclear fuel, four civilian atomic reactors, assistance on developing nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), joint ventures in the military and aviation sectors, and access to Russia’s global navigation satellite system (GLONASS), the rival to the American Global Positioning System designed for civilian and military use.

India and Russia are also jointly developing in an equal financial and technical partnership, a fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) with supermanoeuvrability, long-range strike and high-endurance air defence capabilities that will significantly augment the IAF’s strike capability.

Designated the T-50 PAK-FA project, designers Sukhoi estimate the FGFA programme to cost over US$10 billion and expect the new aircraft to eventually surpass the capabilities of the US F/A-22 ‘Raptor’, the world’s only operational fifth generation fighter and match those of the F-35 ‘Lightning-II’ currently under development. The IAF, however, does not foresee the FGFA being ready before 2019-20 in operational configuration although the Russians are more optimistic about these dates.

The Lockheed Advantage LOCKHEED Martin is in talks with the Indian Army to supply some 8,000-12,000 rounds of Hellfire II Modular Missile Systems for aerial and ground-based platforms. Lockheed is also negotiating the possibility of building Hellfire IIs in collaboration with State-owned missile

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defencebuzz Defence Procurement Procedures, New and Perhaps Improved

Hellfire II Modular Missile Systems for aerial platforms makers Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), in addition to working towards developing the weapon systems range and capabilities.

The Indian Army is desperately short of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) as it had only partially accepted the locally designed Nag ‘fire and forget’ ATGM nearly 23 years after the DRDO launched its design and development. The army has only just successfully completed the second phase of Nag’s final user trials in the Rajasthan desert, possibly paving the way for their series production and early and expanded induction.

DRDO officials claimed that during trials the tandem warheads of the additionally ‘ruggedized’ Nag had accurately struck both stationary and moving targets at ranges varying from 800-1400 m.

Earlier, this year the army had secured a deal with MBDA of France to transfer technology to BDL to build around 4,000

advanced Milan 2T ATGMs over the next three years for US$ 14,000 each.

BDL, which has produced Milan ATGMs since 1983, was also given the contract last year for some 4,000 Russian Konkurs ATGMs with a 4 km range, a mere 443 Nags and 13 accompanying tracked Namica carriers scheduled for induction around 2011-12.

Also on offer from Lockheed to the Indian Army is the newly developed DAGR semi-active laser guidance kit that adapts to provide guidance to 70 mm rockets providing them the Hellfire II’s precision strike capability.

If acquired DAGR would provide the army air-to-ground precision-strike capability for use against non-armoured or lightly armoured targets close to civilian assets, assuring limited collateral damage. Special Forces could effectively employ such a system in urban terrorist siege situations similar to the one in Mumbai last November.

52

THE stalled pace of procuring badlyneeded material for India’s military has once again prompted the MoD to do what it does best: promise yet another, updated edition of the Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) sometime soon.

Updated last year, the DPP 2008 was to be reviewed in 2010. But the MoD believes that to keep pace with changing times and abreast of the elusive revolution in military affairs, the procedures need annual revision.

Industry sources, however, fervently hope the altered DPP addresses their long standing requirements: increasing foreign direct investment in the defence sector from 26 per cent at present to 49 per cent, creating a more equitable playing field between the private sector and the state-owned military-industrial complex, and greater emphasis on indigenous product development.

Private industry also desires a less narrow and more equitable offset requirement that mandates a 30 per cent offset commitment of the value of all weapon imports above Rs 300 crore, but confines it exclusively to the defence sector. But above all, it wants the government to make good its promise of greater private-public partnership, which despite frequently parroted intentions remains stillborn.

According to a recent report by Assocham and consultancy firm Ernst andYoung, India’s monopolistic military public sector was inadequate. “Excessive protection extended by government to defence undertakings including their management and ordnance factories has bred so much noncompetitiveness in defence production that a meagre sum of Rs 11.6 billion was earned in foreign exchange through export of defence items in the last three years,” their joint analysis declared recently.

India’s behemoth military-industrial sector comprises the technologically overstretched and cash-rich DRDO, forever under attack by the Services for producing little of any use, the 8 Defence Public Sector Units and 39 Ordnance Factory Board plants.

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