DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - AUG/SEPT 2011

DSI Cover final 4.8.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 05/08/11 12:21 PM Page 1

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

REACHING OUT India has become an irresistible strategic partner for the United Kindgdom I Ajai Shukla REGION

GROWING APART With the elimination of Osama Bin Laden, tensions in US-Pakistan relations are growing I G. Parathasarathy AUGUST 2011

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 4

ISSUE 1

` 250

CAN INDIA EVER STOP A TERROR ATTACK? MAJOR CHANGES ARE URGENTLY NEEDED IN THE NATION’S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS BUT NOTHING WILL EVER HAPPEN I AJAI SAHNI

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Letter from the Editor.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 05/08/11 1:01 PM Page 2

AUGUST 2011

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

T

he statistics are relentless. 18 years, 11 terror attacks, 40 different locations, over 700 hundred lives lost, over 2,500 injured. Mumbai, India’s financial hub has been battered again and again. And on July 13, when three serial bomb blasts took place on a rain-soaked evening in Mumbai at Zaveri Bazaar, Opera House and Dadar the sense of déjà vu was eerie. At the end of eleven minutes of terror, once again, the city was subjected to bad response mechanisms, utter confusion, inchoate security arrangements – it took 30 minutes for the police to reach the affected sites.

This latest attack has triggered a cycle of familiar responses. As soon as the smoke from the blasts ceased, politicians trooped into the city in full glare of the TV lights; amidst resounding cries of ‘intelligence failure’ a predictable round of the blame game began. A brief period of introspection among security agencies followed. Maybe, yet another committee looking into the shortfalls in security measures will be set up.

It is against the background of the latest terror attack on India that DSI examines why critical recommendations made by many intelligence reform committees looking into the shortcomings in our national security setup have not been carried out and why counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering bodies in the American mould are forming part of the Establishment’s preferred reaction.

Only consider: the Group of Ministers formed after the disastrous Kargil intrusions by Pakistan in 1999 had made 300 recommendations in its report tabled in Parliament in 2001, including the need for a dedicated marine police force for coastal States. The timely implementation of that one recommendation may have prevented the 26/11 attacks three years ago on Mumbai when terrorists, entering through the city’s unprotected shoreline, held a city hostage.

Moving on. The India-UK strategic partnership received a boost after Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to India last year. The UK has always been interested in India as a market for its defence industry and defence relations have always been consistent if not dynamic. But, as DSI points out, with the potential of joint R&D in the areas of high technology, the Global Combat Ship initiative, the procurement of Hawk fighther aircraft, and the development of artillery it seems that both countries will have many more opportunities to cement ties.

As usual we look forward to your suggestions and comments. Write to us at feedback.DSI@mtil.biz.

Should you want to subscribe to us then drop us an email at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

The Group of Ministers, formed after the disastrous Kargil intrusions by Pakistan in 1999, made 300 recommendations, including the setting up of a marine police force for coastal States.

The timely implementation of that one recommendation may have prevented the 26/11 attacks.

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CONTENTS

AUGUST 2011

SECURITY

DSI

12

NEEDED: A COMPLETE MAKEOVER? There is little to compare the challenges to homeland or internal security that confront India and the USA. Yet, in the wake of last month’s Mumbai attacks the Establishment is pushing for yet another imitative institution.

INTELLIGENCE

6

SAME OLD, SAME OLD Repeated terror attacks on Mumbai point to the urgent need to implement recommendations made by numerous reform committees, even though most of them have been merely reactions to sudden intrusions.

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

24

REACHING OUT With 9/11 focussing western attention towards South Asia, a stable, democratic and economically vibrant India has become an irresistible strategic and economic partner for the United Kingdom. This recent British inclination towards India, an initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron, is steadily being reflected in India’s equipment procurement profile.

REGION

38

GROWING APART BORDER MANAGEMENT 18

INIMICAL NEIGHBOURS

The elimination of Osama Bin Laden

by American Special Forces has led to a downturn in US-Pakistan relations.

Despite growing tensions voices are calling for a toning down of the rhetoric, especially as Pakistan is in dire economic straits and its leaders know that earning the wrath of the US could bankrupt the country.

India’s land borders exceed 15,000 km which the nation shares with seven countries, including a small segment with Afghanistan.

Since India’s neighbours tend to exploit her nation-building difficulties, the country’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with an effective border management.

2

HISTORY

42

LANDMARK ALLIANCE Signed forty years ago, on August 9, 1971, amidst a mounting Bangladesh crisis drawing India Pakistan inexorably towards a full-fledged war, the Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was a major milestone in international affairs.

3

Contents-August:contents-feb-R.qxd 05/08/11 1:24 PM Page 2

CONTENTS

AUGUST 2011

SECURITY

DSI

12

NEEDED: A COMPLETE MAKEOVER? There is little to compare the challenges to homeland or internal security that confront India and the USA. Yet, in the wake of last month’s Mumbai attacks the Establishment is pushing for yet another imitative institution.

INTELLIGENCE

6

SAME OLD, SAME OLD Repeated terror attacks on Mumbai point to the urgent need to implement recommendations made by numerous reform committees, even though most of them have been merely reactions to sudden intrusions.

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

24

REACHING OUT With 9/11 focussing western attention towards South Asia, a stable, democratic and economically vibrant India has become an irresistible strategic and economic partner for the United Kingdom. This recent British inclination towards India, an initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron, is steadily being reflected in India’s equipment procurement profile.

REGION

38

GROWING APART BORDER MANAGEMENT 18

INIMICAL NEIGHBOURS

The elimination of Osama Bin Laden

by American Special Forces has led to a downturn in US-Pakistan relations.

Despite growing tensions voices are calling for a toning down of the rhetoric, especially as Pakistan is in dire economic straits and its leaders know that earning the wrath of the US could bankrupt the country.

India’s land borders exceed 15,000 km which the nation shares with seven countries, including a small segment with Afghanistan.

Since India’s neighbours tend to exploit her nation-building difficulties, the country’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with an effective border management.

2

HISTORY

42

LANDMARK ALLIANCE Signed forty years ago, on August 9, 1971, amidst a mounting Bangladesh crisis drawing India Pakistan inexorably towards a full-fledged war, the Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was a major milestone in international affairs.

3

Contributors-August 2011.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 05/08/11 1:09 PM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

AUGUST 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA AUGUST 2011 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

BHASHYAM KASTURI

AJAI SAHNI

GURMEET KANWAL

AJAI SHUKLA

P.K. CHAKROVARTY

G. PARTHASARATHY

Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi heads the research and publications division at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Starting out as a lecturer at Delhi University, Dr. Kasturi subsequently became a journalist and was later associated with the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He has authored a book on India’s intelligence service and on Mahatma Gandhi and India’s Partition.

Ajai Sahni is founding member and executive director, Institute for Conflict Management. He is also editor South Asia Intelligence Review; executive director Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Major General (retd) P.K. Chakrovarty, VSM, has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade during Operation Parakram. He was posted as Additional Director-General Artillery ‘A’ in Army Headquarters and as Defence Attaché to Embassy of India, Hanoi, Vietnam. Post-retirement he has been actively involved in the activities of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

G. Parthasarathy is an eminent diplomat and columnist. Presently, he is a visiting professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. His areas of interest include developments in India’s neighbourhood, issues of economic integration and national security and terrorism. He writes prolifically for newspapers and other publications, news outlets in India and abroad on foreign policy and national security issues.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Vikas Verma (Sr. Visualiser), Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer), Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

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Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda

INDER MALHOTRA

RAHUL BEDI

Inder Malhotra has been a syndicated columnist since taking premature retirement as editor, TheTimes of India, New Delhi. He was with The Statesman for 15 years and wrote for The Guardian.

He has lectured widely in India and abroad, including major universities in the United States and England.

His publications include Indira Gandhi: A Personal & Political Biography, Dynasties Of India And Beyond and a fresh biography of Indira Gandhi. He is presently working on a book on Indian Security: Past, Present and Future.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore Constance Lee Tel: (65) 91814747 Mobile: (65) 98863762 Email: constance.lsc@gmail.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

Contributors-August 2011.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 05/08/11 1:09 PM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

AUGUST 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA AUGUST 2011 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

BHASHYAM KASTURI

AJAI SAHNI

GURMEET KANWAL

AJAI SHUKLA

P.K. CHAKROVARTY

G. PARTHASARATHY

Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi heads the research and publications division at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Starting out as a lecturer at Delhi University, Dr. Kasturi subsequently became a journalist and was later associated with the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He has authored a book on India’s intelligence service and on Mahatma Gandhi and India’s Partition.

Ajai Sahni is founding member and executive director, Institute for Conflict Management. He is also editor South Asia Intelligence Review; executive director Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Major General (retd) P.K. Chakrovarty, VSM, has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade during Operation Parakram. He was posted as Additional Director-General Artillery ‘A’ in Army Headquarters and as Defence Attaché to Embassy of India, Hanoi, Vietnam. Post-retirement he has been actively involved in the activities of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

G. Parthasarathy is an eminent diplomat and columnist. Presently, he is a visiting professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. His areas of interest include developments in India’s neighbourhood, issues of economic integration and national security and terrorism. He writes prolifically for newspapers and other publications, news outlets in India and abroad on foreign policy and national security issues.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Vikas Verma (Sr. Visualiser), Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer), Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda

INDER MALHOTRA

RAHUL BEDI

Inder Malhotra has been a syndicated columnist since taking premature retirement as editor, TheTimes of India, New Delhi. He was with The Statesman for 15 years and wrote for The Guardian.

He has lectured widely in India and abroad, including major universities in the United States and England.

His publications include Indira Gandhi: A Personal & Political Biography, Dynasties Of India And Beyond and a fresh biography of Indira Gandhi. He is presently working on a book on Indian Security: Past, Present and Future.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore Constance Lee Tel: (65) 91814747 Mobile: (65) 98863762 Email: constance.lsc@gmail.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

intelligence reform_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:19 PM Page 2

INTELLIGENCE

BHASHYAM KASTURI

AUGUST 2011

DSI

SAME OLD, SAME OLD Repeated terror attacks in Mumbai point to the need to

implement recommendations made by various intelligence reform committees agencies and several high profile reports, intelligence reforms remains non-existent.

In fact, the latest report, prepared by Rana Banerji, a former Special Secretary in the R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) is also gathering dust in the office of the National Security Advisor. It was Delhi’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses that set up a task force headed by Banerji to study, once again, the intelligence mechanism in India and suggest ways to improve it. Despite this initiative it is more than likely that Banerji’s report will unfortunately also join a long list of its predecessors which have all made excellent recommendations but their implementation has proved difficult for successive governments (see box).

Most of these reports have been crisisdriven rather than providing a sustained focus on needs. Nevertheless, all such documents are important as they provide insights into an organisation’s functioning and operations.

KEY POINTS Political interference, administrative apathy, staff shortages have all hindered the functioning of India’s intelligence organisations. n Despite successive governments intelligence reforms remain nonexistent. n The global experience should be a benchmark for Indian intelligence units. n

Police cordon off the area of a bomb blast site in Dadar, Mumbai

6

7

AFP

T

he well-planned, synchronised bomb attacks on Mumbai this July have once again raised that old battle cry of ‘intelligence failure.’

Like the 26/11 attacks on India’s finance capital, leading metropolis and port, 13/7 too caught a comatose security establishment off-guard. But this time round, though the political class quickly mobilised itself and flew off to Mumbai to express solidarity with a traumatised public, criticism of the nation’s intelligence apparatus was low key. Maybe the public has fatalistically accepted the fact that India’s intelligence agencies simply cannot live up to their mandate.

Political interference, administrative apathy, staff shortages have all hindered the functioning of India’s intelligence organisations. Ever since they were set up after Independence they have been seen as an extension of executive authority.

Susceptible to political influence they also suffered operationally, unbelievably till recently, they did not even have a written charter. Structurally, too, they are limited, as there seems to be little or no understanding in the establishment over the basic difference between the idea of secrecy and security — both within the agencies and outside.

Despite successive governments knowing the many shortfalls facing these

Timely Recommendations The main recommendations made by the new Task Force on Intelligence focusses on the absence of coordination amongst intelligence organisations; lack of financial accountability; media reports being passed off as ‘intelligence;’ an urgent need to review recruitment policies; modification of training; a weak analysis of information and a pronounced shortfall in operational drive. Each of these issues, individually, is crucially required to build efficient intelligence agencies but seen as a sum total it certainly speaks poorly of the state of intelligence agencies in this country.

Unlike the findings of the Jain Commission Report and the Verma Commission Report on the assassination of Rajiv Gandh, when many had questioned the kind of information these panels had been parcelling out in the name of ‘secret intelligence,’ Banerjee’s analysis coming, as it does, from an ‘insider’ cannot be questioned nor its analysis doubted.

intelligence reform_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:19 PM Page 2

INTELLIGENCE

BHASHYAM KASTURI

AUGUST 2011

DSI

SAME OLD, SAME OLD Repeated terror attacks in Mumbai point to the need to

implement recommendations made by various intelligence reform committees agencies and several high profile reports, intelligence reforms remains non-existent.

In fact, the latest report, prepared by Rana Banerji, a former Special Secretary in the R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) is also gathering dust in the office of the National Security Advisor. It was Delhi’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses that set up a task force headed by Banerji to study, once again, the intelligence mechanism in India and suggest ways to improve it. Despite this initiative it is more than likely that Banerji’s report will unfortunately also join a long list of its predecessors which have all made excellent recommendations but their implementation has proved difficult for successive governments (see box).

Most of these reports have been crisisdriven rather than providing a sustained focus on needs. Nevertheless, all such documents are important as they provide insights into an organisation’s functioning and operations.

KEY POINTS Political interference, administrative apathy, staff shortages have all hindered the functioning of India’s intelligence organisations. n Despite successive governments intelligence reforms remain nonexistent. n The global experience should be a benchmark for Indian intelligence units. n

Police cordon off the area of a bomb blast site in Dadar, Mumbai

6

7

AFP

T

he well-planned, synchronised bomb attacks on Mumbai this July have once again raised that old battle cry of ‘intelligence failure.’

Like the 26/11 attacks on India’s finance capital, leading metropolis and port, 13/7 too caught a comatose security establishment off-guard. But this time round, though the political class quickly mobilised itself and flew off to Mumbai to express solidarity with a traumatised public, criticism of the nation’s intelligence apparatus was low key. Maybe the public has fatalistically accepted the fact that India’s intelligence agencies simply cannot live up to their mandate.

Political interference, administrative apathy, staff shortages have all hindered the functioning of India’s intelligence organisations. Ever since they were set up after Independence they have been seen as an extension of executive authority.

Susceptible to political influence they also suffered operationally, unbelievably till recently, they did not even have a written charter. Structurally, too, they are limited, as there seems to be little or no understanding in the establishment over the basic difference between the idea of secrecy and security — both within the agencies and outside.

Despite successive governments knowing the many shortfalls facing these

Timely Recommendations The main recommendations made by the new Task Force on Intelligence focusses on the absence of coordination amongst intelligence organisations; lack of financial accountability; media reports being passed off as ‘intelligence;’ an urgent need to review recruitment policies; modification of training; a weak analysis of information and a pronounced shortfall in operational drive. Each of these issues, individually, is crucially required to build efficient intelligence agencies but seen as a sum total it certainly speaks poorly of the state of intelligence agencies in this country.

Unlike the findings of the Jain Commission Report and the Verma Commission Report on the assassination of Rajiv Gandh, when many had questioned the kind of information these panels had been parcelling out in the name of ‘secret intelligence,’ Banerjee’s analysis coming, as it does, from an ‘insider’ cannot be questioned nor its analysis doubted.

intelligence reform_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:34 PM Page 4

INTELLIGENCE

AUGUST 2011

AFP

Soldiers man a machine gun in the Uri-Poonch operational sector in Jammu and Kashmir during the 1965 India-Pakistan War

He has picked up the right approach to tackle the issue of intelligence reform since the report has focussed on the need to improve coordination between various agencies to ensure better accountability and supervision. The command-and-control system of our agencies, according to the bureaucrat, clearly needs an overhaul.

It remains to be seen whether the recently appointed Task Force on National Security, headed by Naresh Chandra, will make similar recommendations. It may well do so, but unless there is a political inclination to instill a sense of importance and relevance to the very idea of intelligence and intelligence gathering, the agencies themselves will continue to use the cover of ‘secrecy’ to hide their own deficiencies.

The Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2002, after the Kargil conflict, too had constituted a Task Force on Intelligence and had also made some recommendations — some of which were implemented. The major recommendations related to written charters, creation of oversight facilities and reform in the military intelligence community.

Political interference and administrative apathy have all hindered the functioning of India’s intelligence organisations.

Since they were set up after Independence they have been seen as an extension of executive authority. Susceptible to political influence, till recently they did not even have a written charter.

8

”

DSI

Similar suggestions had been made earlier. The L.P. Singh Committee, set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of the Information Bureau and Central Bureau of Investigation during the Emergency, highlighted the fact that both organisations had been functioning without formal charters which would outline their functions and responsibilities. The Singh report not only stressed on the need for such charters to prevent their future misuse but also prepared detailed model templates for adoption.

In a similar vein, the 2002 Task Force report also called on India’s intelligence establishment to take ‘an honest and in-depth stock of its present intelligence effort and capabilities to meet challenges and problems.’ It asked for a massive upgradation of technology, imaging, signal, electronic counter-intelligence, economic intelligence capabilities and an all India system reform of conventional humanintelligence gathering. However, much water has flown down the Ganga since then and not much follow up action was taken.

It was left to Vice-President Hamid Ansari to re-open the question of intelligence oversight while delivering the fourth R.N. Kao Memorial Lecture last year which, one suspects, probably led to the IDSA appointing a Task Force to be headed

by Banerji.

An important difference between 2002 and 2011 is the acute need for an organisational review of the agencies. The trouble is that we have a tendency for creating institutions but not letting them function. This is particularly true of intelligence agencies, most of which have become places to park retired services personnel. The political decision to control or decontrol such agencies depends on the sagacity of the establishment in power.

Actually, the global experience should be a benchmark for Indian intelligence units. Internationally, there is a movement towards greater integration of human and technical sources, improved fusion of information, the increased use of technology and better recruitment policies: these are all hallmarks of the new security sector reform. In addition, reforms have to be contextualised in the larger national security matrix and therefore, the focus is not just on intelligence but also on other affiliated matters.

Perhaps India needs a security and intelligence coordinator under the National Security Advisor to oversee the disparate

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intelligence reform_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:34 PM Page 6

INTELLIGENCE

AUGUST 2011

REPORTS REDUX • B.S. Raghavan Committee Report formed to look into allegations of intelligence failure during the India-Pakistan war of 1965.

• B.S. Raghavan Committee Report looks into allegations of intelligence failure in Mizoram.

The report’s recommendations resulted in the decision by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to split the Intelligence Bureau and create R&AW in September 1968.

• L.P. Singh Committee Report looks into the misuse of intelligence agencies during the Emergency between 1975 and 1977.

• K. Sankaran Nair Committee Report, constituted in the early 1980s, recommends the restructuring of R&AW. • Task Force on Intelligence Report formed in 2001 and headed by Girish Saxena.

• The Pradhan-Haldar-Narsimhan Task Force in the National Security Council for improving intelligence organisations in 2009.

• Naresh Chandra Task Force on Intelligence formed in 2011.

AFP

Soldiers patrol the edge of the crater at the Shakti-1 site, after an underground nuclear test

10

DSI

intelligence networks. Second, assessments and inputs should all be sourced and fusioned. But as Banerji points out: “This is a task easier said than done and requires backbreaking hours of sustained diligence searching for grain in the chaff, with many mistakes in the course of learning on the job.”

This also calls for a far more active 24X7 role for the Joint Intelligence Committee, which is presently, like the National Security Council Secretariat, in a state of limbo. Third, the security aspect of intelligence needs a new dimension altogether. Fourth, intelligence coordination must perforce include police intelligence coordination. Without authentic information from the police the Mumbai attacks will keep getting repeated. Add to this is a 24x7 monitoring and analysis of terrorist organisations, an infrastructure with a view to making recommendations for offensive operations, including penetration and strikes as and when necessary.

It’s no doubt a tall order but can be helped substantially with the use of technology that will provide the basis for a large part of intelligence collection. It is inevitable that the public will want technical intelligence (techint) to be instantaneous. At the same time there has to be a fusion with human intelligence. The experience of the American intelligence network showed that prior to 9/11, there was a huge amount of techint but little human intelligence. That is why post9/11, Homeland Security started focussing on this aspect. Recall that it is not the first time that the US is facing this problem. In 1998, prior to the Indian Shakti nuclear tests in Pokhran and during the siege of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1980, the major gap in American intelligence was clearly visible.

Whatever the source of intelligence, it has to be analysed and dovetailed into other streams to make it credible. Without that fusion, some information will not make sense. That handicap was evident during the Kargil intrusions in 1999.

The predictive capacities of Indian intelligence depends on the ability to share and collate information with the forecasting analysis that will give the decision-maker various operational options. The process cannot be piecemeal; it needs to be continuous and cut across agencies to ensure that it is applied in equal measure.

Reforms are needed to ensure that we are not caught off guard as Mumbai 13/7 revealed.

The scope and direction of such reform has to be internally motivated, guided from the outside by the Government and other experts and, most importantly, institutionalised. This is the way forward.

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216X276.indd 1

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AUGUST 2011

DSI

IS A COMPLETE MA KEOVER NEEDED? India’s internal security is in need of a dramatic improvement, merely emulating the US experience in countering terrorism is absurd

AJAI SAHNI

KEY POINTS National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) strength and mandate are nothing compared to the FBI’s. n The NIA is a tiny agency with a current strength of 71, which has principally cannibalised its manpower from a range of other police organisations. n Many terror attacks later, the police constable remains stressed; poorly trained; poorly integrated into the intelligence chain. n

T

National Security Guard commandos at the inauguration of the NSG Mumbai Hub AFP

here is a curiously ignorant pattern of arguments in the strategic and security community in India, of which one currently significant, if not crucial, manifestation is the impressionable extraction of ‘lessons’ from the American experience. Thus, for example, USA has ‘succeeded’ in preventing major terrorist attacks on its soil after 9/11 by setting up a Department of Homeland Security; so India could also prevent future attacks by setting up a Department of Homeland Security. The US has a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that has demonstrated dramatic successes in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering, prevention and prosecution; so India could

12

13

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AUGUST 2011

DSI

IS A COMPLETE MA KEOVER NEEDED? India’s internal security is in need of a dramatic improvement, merely emulating the US experience in countering terrorism is absurd

AJAI SAHNI

KEY POINTS National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) strength and mandate are nothing compared to the FBI’s. n The NIA is a tiny agency with a current strength of 71, which has principally cannibalised its manpower from a range of other police organisations. n Many terror attacks later, the police constable remains stressed; poorly trained; poorly integrated into the intelligence chain. n

T

National Security Guard commandos at the inauguration of the NSG Mumbai Hub AFP

here is a curiously ignorant pattern of arguments in the strategic and security community in India, of which one currently significant, if not crucial, manifestation is the impressionable extraction of ‘lessons’ from the American experience. Thus, for example, USA has ‘succeeded’ in preventing major terrorist attacks on its soil after 9/11 by setting up a Department of Homeland Security; so India could also prevent future attacks by setting up a Department of Homeland Security. The US has a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that has demonstrated dramatic successes in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering, prevention and prosecution; so India could

12

13

Homeland security.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/08/11 3:27 PM Page 4

SECURITY that this would be like the FBI. These pretensions are utterly absurd. Once again, the NIA’s strength and mandate are nothing comparable to the FBI’s, and its budget is a tiny, indeed, insignificant fraction of the latter’s. The FBI’s budget for fiscal 2012, for instance, is well over USD16.5 billion. The NIA’s budget for 2011-12 is ` 556.8 million (about USD12.53 million), roughly 0.07 percent of the FBI’s.

Unsurprisingly, though the NIA now demands precedence over the States’ agencies in high profile cases of terrorism, though it has little by way of capacities, capabilities or demonstrated successes to justify this. The NIA is a tiny agency with a current strength of 71, which has principally cannibalised its manpower from a range of other police organisations, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). While some of these officers have experience in investigative work, it is rare that such past experience includes any large quantum of work in investigating cases of terrorism. The NIA, moreover, has little by way of technical or technological capabilities, and no database, which will give it any advantage

also emulate these successes by setting up a National Investigation Agency (NIA). Part of the successful US institutional arsenal is the National Counter-Terrorism Centre; so India must also have a National CounterTerrorism Centre (NCTC) if it is to succeed against terrorism.

Absurd Proposals Even a cursory examination of the specifics of each of these proposals will demonstrate their absurdity. For one thing, there is little comparison between the challenges to ‘homeland’ or internal security that confront the US, and those that confront India — the latter sharing a long border and an exposed coastal flank with the friendly neighbourhood exporter of terrorism. The US, moreover, needed to raise a new Department of Homeland Security, since it had no federal agency for coordination and oversight of internal security. India had a central agency charged with internal security even before Independence, in the avatar of the Home Department, and, since Independence, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

AFP

A policeman stands guard near the blast site in Zaveri Bazaar, Mumbai; (facing page) schoolchildren in Mumbai participate in a silent march in memory of those killed in the multiple blasts

After the July 13 Mumbai attacks, the MHA is making a concerted bid to push through the creation of another imitative institutional irrelevance — the NCTC, which will be like the US NCTC. It must, by now, be clear that India cannot commit any comparable resources to its NCTC to give it the efficacy or dimensions of the US NCTC.

14

”

The glaring differences in capability between the two countries arise, not out of any particular institutional arrangements — other countries have had major counter-terrorist (CT) successes without comparable structures — but out of resource allocations and, of course, the efficiency of resource utilisation. The US Department of Homeland Security has a budget for fiscal 2012 amounting to USD56.94 billion, services a population of about 312 million, and is purely a planning, monitoring and coordinating agency — with operational and response capacities concentrated in other agencies and departments, each with its own budget.

India’s MHA, in comparison, has a 2011-12 fiscal budget of USD2.26 billion, including provisions for vast operational establishments — the Central Armed Police Forces alone have a strength of 777,788 personnel and officers — a mandate that covers a range of responsibilities unrelated to security, and serves a population of 1.21 billion, nearly four times the size of the US. Similarly, when NIA was launched, there was a great deal of nonsensical talk

AFP

AUGUST 2011

DSI

over a competent State agency. Its only claim to exception is that it has a nationwide mandate, and can carry out its investigations across State boundaries.

But several State agencies have overcome limitations of jurisdiction through cooperative arrangements with other States, or through the intercession of other agencies, including the IB. In the wake of the July 13 Mumbai attacks, the MHA is making a concerted bid to push through the creation of another imitative institutional irrelevance — the NCTC, which, we must believe, will be like the US NCTC. It must, by now, be abundantly clear that India cannot commit any comparable resources to its NCTC, to give it the efficacy and dimensions of the US NCTC. Crucially, even more significant than financial limitations, is the crippling bottleneck of skilled and educated human resources, of which the security apparatus, the administration, and indeed the entire country, has an acute deficit.

There is a strong argument for some central coordination and capability in the security sector, and this was acknowledged by the G.C. Saxena Task

Homeland security.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/08/11 3:27 PM Page 4

SECURITY that this would be like the FBI. These pretensions are utterly absurd. Once again, the NIA’s strength and mandate are nothing comparable to the FBI’s, and its budget is a tiny, indeed, insignificant fraction of the latter’s. The FBI’s budget for fiscal 2012, for instance, is well over USD16.5 billion. The NIA’s budget for 2011-12 is ` 556.8 million (about USD12.53 million), roughly 0.07 percent of the FBI’s.

Unsurprisingly, though the NIA now demands precedence over the States’ agencies in high profile cases of terrorism, though it has little by way of capacities, capabilities or demonstrated successes to justify this. The NIA is a tiny agency with a current strength of 71, which has principally cannibalised its manpower from a range of other police organisations, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). While some of these officers have experience in investigative work, it is rare that such past experience includes any large quantum of work in investigating cases of terrorism. The NIA, moreover, has little by way of technical or technological capabilities, and no database, which will give it any advantage

also emulate these successes by setting up a National Investigation Agency (NIA). Part of the successful US institutional arsenal is the National Counter-Terrorism Centre; so India must also have a National CounterTerrorism Centre (NCTC) if it is to succeed against terrorism.

Absurd Proposals Even a cursory examination of the specifics of each of these proposals will demonstrate their absurdity. For one thing, there is little comparison between the challenges to ‘homeland’ or internal security that confront the US, and those that confront India — the latter sharing a long border and an exposed coastal flank with the friendly neighbourhood exporter of terrorism. The US, moreover, needed to raise a new Department of Homeland Security, since it had no federal agency for coordination and oversight of internal security. India had a central agency charged with internal security even before Independence, in the avatar of the Home Department, and, since Independence, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

AFP

A policeman stands guard near the blast site in Zaveri Bazaar, Mumbai; (facing page) schoolchildren in Mumbai participate in a silent march in memory of those killed in the multiple blasts

After the July 13 Mumbai attacks, the MHA is making a concerted bid to push through the creation of another imitative institutional irrelevance — the NCTC, which will be like the US NCTC. It must, by now, be clear that India cannot commit any comparable resources to its NCTC to give it the efficacy or dimensions of the US NCTC.

14

”

The glaring differences in capability between the two countries arise, not out of any particular institutional arrangements — other countries have had major counter-terrorist (CT) successes without comparable structures — but out of resource allocations and, of course, the efficiency of resource utilisation. The US Department of Homeland Security has a budget for fiscal 2012 amounting to USD56.94 billion, services a population of about 312 million, and is purely a planning, monitoring and coordinating agency — with operational and response capacities concentrated in other agencies and departments, each with its own budget.

India’s MHA, in comparison, has a 2011-12 fiscal budget of USD2.26 billion, including provisions for vast operational establishments — the Central Armed Police Forces alone have a strength of 777,788 personnel and officers — a mandate that covers a range of responsibilities unrelated to security, and serves a population of 1.21 billion, nearly four times the size of the US. Similarly, when NIA was launched, there was a great deal of nonsensical talk

AFP

AUGUST 2011

DSI

over a competent State agency. Its only claim to exception is that it has a nationwide mandate, and can carry out its investigations across State boundaries.

But several State agencies have overcome limitations of jurisdiction through cooperative arrangements with other States, or through the intercession of other agencies, including the IB. In the wake of the July 13 Mumbai attacks, the MHA is making a concerted bid to push through the creation of another imitative institutional irrelevance — the NCTC, which, we must believe, will be like the US NCTC. It must, by now, be abundantly clear that India cannot commit any comparable resources to its NCTC, to give it the efficacy and dimensions of the US NCTC. Crucially, even more significant than financial limitations, is the crippling bottleneck of skilled and educated human resources, of which the security apparatus, the administration, and indeed the entire country, has an acute deficit.

There is a strong argument for some central coordination and capability in the security sector, and this was acknowledged by the G.C. Saxena Task

Homeland security.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:39 PM Page 6

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AUGUST 2011

information suggests that the 160 per 100,000 figure has been arrived at on the basis of Census 2001 population figures.

Census 2011 estimates indicate a nearly 20 percent growth in population over the intervening decade, indicating that the police-population ratio will have improved, at best, marginally. This ratio, in most Western countries – where the security challenge is relatively modest, in comparison with India – ranges between 220 and over 500 per 100,000.

Worse, the operating environment for enforcement and intelligence agencies

Force on Intelligence, which examined the country’s intelligence apparatus after the Kargil debacle. Its recommendation, framed by security professionals, as opposed to the many and current flights of fancy emanating from the MHA, favoured the creation of a National CounterTerrorism Centre, called the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), within the country’s preeminent internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB). More than a decade after this recommendation was accepted, among a host of others, by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in February 2001, MAC remains a dysfunctional shell of what it was intended to be. Having failed to create what is, by comparison, a relatively modest institutional framework — essentially a systemic augmentation of capacities within an existing institution — the MHA’s ambitions are now flying ever closer to the sun.

Unfortunately, India’s counter-terrorism capabilities remain minimal, and, despite large quantities of money spent — and misspent — since the 26/11 attacks in 2008, these have been augmented at best, marginally, and in tiny pockets.

Security personnel stand guard near Chabad House, New Delhi

continue to live in temporary structures.

There is another stream of nonsense in the security discourse in India: the idea that the absence of statutory powers for the Centre, under the prevailing Constitutional system, makes the effective management of security, including insurgency and terrorism, impossible. And yet, despite these purported ‘handicaps’, terrorism in Punjab and Tripura was defeated by vigorous police-led responses, even as the Maoists have been expelled from their enduring strongholds in Andhra Pradesh by a committed local police force and a strategically capable police leadership.

There are, of course, certain functions — such as the creation of a national database of crime and terrorism — that require some centralisation. But even these would have to rely, for their effectiveness, on grassroots capabilities for information

16

generation.

Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, as has been repeatedly emphasised, are small commanders’ wars. It is only through the augmentation of capacities and capabilities at the most decentralised levels that effectiveness will be secured.

Wasteful Symbolism Unfortunately, India’s counter-terrorism capabilities on this plane remain minimal, and, despite large quantities of money spent — and misspent — since the 26/11 attacks in 2008, these have been augmented, at best, marginally, and in tiny pockets. A significant proportion of this augmentation has been purely symbolic, with little real impact on the ground; the creation of National Security Guard (NSG) hubs in the metropolis, and of the NIA, being two prominent examples of utterly wasteful symbolism. And even as another

white elephant, the NCTC is being pushed into the world, proposals to improve basic policing and intelligence gathering have made little progress.

Five years have passed since Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s observation, “Unless the ‘beat constable’ is brought into the vortex of our CT strategy, our capacity to pre-empt future attacks would be severely limited.” Yet, nothing has been done to augment the capabilities of the beat constable, or of the local police station.

Instead, grandiose schemes continue to be designed at Delhi for centralised control of CT responses and CT intelligence.

Even where the State Police has sought capacity augmentation, this has not significantly improved its preventive CT capabilities. Instead, the focus has, again, been on symbolism, such as the setting up of the ‘elite’ Force 1, and the acquisition and positioning of armoured cars at street

corners, in Mumbai. The crucial imperative of improving general police capabilities has largely been ignored, and the police constable remains essentially what he was — poorly trained; poorly integrated into the intelligence chain; operating in conditions of extraordinary stress; and held in wide contempt by both the public and his own masters.

Police-population ratios in the country have risen very slowly, from 128 per 100,000 by end-2008, to 133 per 100,000 by end-2009. The MHA now claims this figure has risen to 160 per 100,000, but data has been manipulated in the past as well. The Bureau of Police Research and Development had claimed an all- India ratio of nearly 178 per 100,000 in 2008, a figure that was subsequently debunked when the authoritative National Crime Records Bureau published its Crime in India, 2008, report in 2009. Available

17

AFP

Incomplete Success Moreover, despite the tremendous geographical and resource advantages the US enjoys, its success has not been quite as complete as is often imagined. In at least three cases, disaster has been averted, not by any preventive initiatives on the part of intelligence and enforcement agencies, but by the sheer and spectacular incompetence of terrorists: the December 2001 case of the ‘shoe bomber,’ Richard Reid; the December 2009 ‘underwear bomber,’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; and the May 2010 Times Square bombing, by Faisal Shahzad. Nor, indeed, has the US been free of major terrorist successes since 2001.

On July 28, 2006, for instance, Naveed Afzal Haq opened indiscriminate fire at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle, killing one and wounding five. On February 12, 2007, Sulejman Talovic killed five and wounded another five, at the Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Significantly, the Department of Homeland Security in the US is also responsible for the national response to major disasters — both man-made and natural. Yet, when Hurricane Katrina struck the US coast from Florida to Texas, wreaking exceptional devastation on Mississippi and Louisiana, in August 2005, the State and national response systems collapsed, leaving vast populations to fend for themselves. Enforcement agencies failed even to prevent looting and violence when the hurricane moved away. Six years later, thousands of displaced people

DSI

”

remains perverse. The rule of law is held in utter contempt — exceptionalism is, indeed, the rule — and political collusion in sustaining criminal networks and operations remains a fact across the country.

The Vohra Committee had written about the urgency of breaking down the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus after the 1993 Mumbai bombings. Eighteen years later, if anything, this nexus appears immensely stronger. Indeed, the overwhelming emphasis remains on symbolic, rather than substantive, reforms, creating layer upon layer of dysfunctional structures at the meta-institutional level, even as existing institutions are further undermined. To expect any improvement of counter-terrorism responses — particularly preventive capabilities — in such an environment is, quite simply, delusional.

Homeland security.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:39 PM Page 6

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AUGUST 2011

information suggests that the 160 per 100,000 figure has been arrived at on the basis of Census 2001 population figures.

Census 2011 estimates indicate a nearly 20 percent growth in population over the intervening decade, indicating that the police-population ratio will have improved, at best, marginally. This ratio, in most Western countries – where the security challenge is relatively modest, in comparison with India – ranges between 220 and over 500 per 100,000.

Worse, the operating environment for enforcement and intelligence agencies

Force on Intelligence, which examined the country’s intelligence apparatus after the Kargil debacle. Its recommendation, framed by security professionals, as opposed to the many and current flights of fancy emanating from the MHA, favoured the creation of a National CounterTerrorism Centre, called the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), within the country’s preeminent internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB). More than a decade after this recommendation was accepted, among a host of others, by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in February 2001, MAC remains a dysfunctional shell of what it was intended to be. Having failed to create what is, by comparison, a relatively modest institutional framework — essentially a systemic augmentation of capacities within an existing institution — the MHA’s ambitions are now flying ever closer to the sun.

Unfortunately, India’s counter-terrorism capabilities remain minimal, and, despite large quantities of money spent — and misspent — since the 26/11 attacks in 2008, these have been augmented at best, marginally, and in tiny pockets.

Security personnel stand guard near Chabad House, New Delhi

continue to live in temporary structures.

There is another stream of nonsense in the security discourse in India: the idea that the absence of statutory powers for the Centre, under the prevailing Constitutional system, makes the effective management of security, including insurgency and terrorism, impossible. And yet, despite these purported ‘handicaps’, terrorism in Punjab and Tripura was defeated by vigorous police-led responses, even as the Maoists have been expelled from their enduring strongholds in Andhra Pradesh by a committed local police force and a strategically capable police leadership.

There are, of course, certain functions — such as the creation of a national database of crime and terrorism — that require some centralisation. But even these would have to rely, for their effectiveness, on grassroots capabilities for information

16

generation.

Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, as has been repeatedly emphasised, are small commanders’ wars. It is only through the augmentation of capacities and capabilities at the most decentralised levels that effectiveness will be secured.

Wasteful Symbolism Unfortunately, India’s counter-terrorism capabilities on this plane remain minimal, and, despite large quantities of money spent — and misspent — since the 26/11 attacks in 2008, these have been augmented, at best, marginally, and in tiny pockets. A significant proportion of this augmentation has been purely symbolic, with little real impact on the ground; the creation of National Security Guard (NSG) hubs in the metropolis, and of the NIA, being two prominent examples of utterly wasteful symbolism. And even as another

white elephant, the NCTC is being pushed into the world, proposals to improve basic policing and intelligence gathering have made little progress.

Five years have passed since Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s observation, “Unless the ‘beat constable’ is brought into the vortex of our CT strategy, our capacity to pre-empt future attacks would be severely limited.” Yet, nothing has been done to augment the capabilities of the beat constable, or of the local police station.

Instead, grandiose schemes continue to be designed at Delhi for centralised control of CT responses and CT intelligence.

Even where the State Police has sought capacity augmentation, this has not significantly improved its preventive CT capabilities. Instead, the focus has, again, been on symbolism, such as the setting up of the ‘elite’ Force 1, and the acquisition and positioning of armoured cars at street

corners, in Mumbai. The crucial imperative of improving general police capabilities has largely been ignored, and the police constable remains essentially what he was — poorly trained; poorly integrated into the intelligence chain; operating in conditions of extraordinary stress; and held in wide contempt by both the public and his own masters.

Police-population ratios in the country have risen very slowly, from 128 per 100,000 by end-2008, to 133 per 100,000 by end-2009. The MHA now claims this figure has risen to 160 per 100,000, but data has been manipulated in the past as well. The Bureau of Police Research and Development had claimed an all- India ratio of nearly 178 per 100,000 in 2008, a figure that was subsequently debunked when the authoritative National Crime Records Bureau published its Crime in India, 2008, report in 2009. Available

17

AFP

Incomplete Success Moreover, despite the tremendous geographical and resource advantages the US enjoys, its success has not been quite as complete as is often imagined. In at least three cases, disaster has been averted, not by any preventive initiatives on the part of intelligence and enforcement agencies, but by the sheer and spectacular incompetence of terrorists: the December 2001 case of the ‘shoe bomber,’ Richard Reid; the December 2009 ‘underwear bomber,’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; and the May 2010 Times Square bombing, by Faisal Shahzad. Nor, indeed, has the US been free of major terrorist successes since 2001.

On July 28, 2006, for instance, Naveed Afzal Haq opened indiscriminate fire at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle, killing one and wounding five. On February 12, 2007, Sulejman Talovic killed five and wounded another five, at the Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Significantly, the Department of Homeland Security in the US is also responsible for the national response to major disasters — both man-made and natural. Yet, when Hurricane Katrina struck the US coast from Florida to Texas, wreaking exceptional devastation on Mississippi and Louisiana, in August 2005, the State and national response systems collapsed, leaving vast populations to fend for themselves. Enforcement agencies failed even to prevent looting and violence when the hurricane moved away. Six years later, thousands of displaced people

DSI

”

remains perverse. The rule of law is held in utter contempt — exceptionalism is, indeed, the rule — and political collusion in sustaining criminal networks and operations remains a fact across the country.

The Vohra Committee had written about the urgency of breaking down the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus after the 1993 Mumbai bombings. Eighteen years later, if anything, this nexus appears immensely stronger. Indeed, the overwhelming emphasis remains on symbolic, rather than substantive, reforms, creating layer upon layer of dysfunctional structures at the meta-institutional level, even as existing institutions are further undermined. To expect any improvement of counter-terrorism responses — particularly preventive capabilities — in such an environment is, quite simply, delusional.

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AUGUST 2011

DSI

INIMIC AL NEIGHBOURS India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with its border management policies

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS n Long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan makes efficient border management a national priority. n India’s borders continue to be manned by disparate military, paramilitary and police forces with no real coordination among them. n With India’s growth rate outpacing that of most of its neighbours, problems of mass migrations into India have increased.

W

AFP

Gorkha Regiment soldiers walk along the snow-laden IndiaChina border near Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh

18

ith a huge landmass of sub-continental proportions, India occupies a significant strategic position in South Asia, dominating the northern Indian Ocean with a coastline that is 7,683km long and an exclusive Economic Zone that is over two million sq km in size. India’s land borders exceed 15,000km which it shares with seven countries, including a small segment with Afghanistan (106km) in northern Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), now part of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

According to the annual report of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the length of India’s land borders with its neighbours is — Bangladesh, 4,351km; with Bhutan, 700km; with China, 4,056km; with Myanmar,

19

1,643km; with Nepal, 1,751km and with Pakistan, 3,244km.

Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit the country’s nationbuilding difficulties, India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management. This is so because Indian insurgent groups have for long been provided shelter across the nation’s borders by inimical neighbours.

The challenge of coping with longstanding territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world has made effective and efficient border management a national priority. However, due to the lack of understanding of such military issues among the decision-making elite, India’s borders continue to be manned by a large number of military, paramilitary and police forces, each of which has its own ethos and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi, with almost no real coordination in managing the borders.

External threats to India’s territorial integrity are not the only complex border management issues that the national security decision makers need to deal with.

India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated peculiar problems like mass migrations into India. Indeed, the demographic map of Lower Assam has been completely redrawn by illegal migration from neighbouring Bangladesh over several decades.

Other threats and challenges have also emerged. The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of nonstate actors; a complicated nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers;

border management 2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:43 PM Page 2

SECURITY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

INIMIC AL NEIGHBOURS India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with its border management policies

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS n Long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan makes efficient border management a national priority. n India’s borders continue to be manned by disparate military, paramilitary and police forces with no real coordination among them. n With India’s growth rate outpacing that of most of its neighbours, problems of mass migrations into India have increased.

W

AFP

Gorkha Regiment soldiers walk along the snow-laden IndiaChina border near Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh

18

ith a huge landmass of sub-continental proportions, India occupies a significant strategic position in South Asia, dominating the northern Indian Ocean with a coastline that is 7,683km long and an exclusive Economic Zone that is over two million sq km in size. India’s land borders exceed 15,000km which it shares with seven countries, including a small segment with Afghanistan (106km) in northern Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), now part of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

According to the annual report of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the length of India’s land borders with its neighbours is — Bangladesh, 4,351km; with Bhutan, 700km; with China, 4,056km; with Myanmar,

19

1,643km; with Nepal, 1,751km and with Pakistan, 3,244km.

Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit the country’s nationbuilding difficulties, India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management. This is so because Indian insurgent groups have for long been provided shelter across the nation’s borders by inimical neighbours.

The challenge of coping with longstanding territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world has made effective and efficient border management a national priority. However, due to the lack of understanding of such military issues among the decision-making elite, India’s borders continue to be manned by a large number of military, paramilitary and police forces, each of which has its own ethos and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi, with almost no real coordination in managing the borders.

External threats to India’s territorial integrity are not the only complex border management issues that the national security decision makers need to deal with.

India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated peculiar problems like mass migrations into India. Indeed, the demographic map of Lower Assam has been completely redrawn by illegal migration from neighbouring Bangladesh over several decades.

Other threats and challenges have also emerged. The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of nonstate actors; a complicated nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers;

border management 2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:43 PM Page 4

SECURITY

Manning the LAC The Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China offers an illustrative example of the complete lack of coordination in border management. The western sector of the LAC in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh and the central sector along the Uttarakhand border are manned by some Vikas battalions of the Special Frontier Force of the Cabinet Secretariat and the IndoTibetan Border Police (ITBP), that is a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) police force, respectively. Infantry battalions of the Indian Army (IA) man the Sikkim border and units of the Assam Rifles (AR) man the Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram borders.

The AR is a paramilitary force under the MHA that is officered mostly by regular Army officers. Its battalions have been placed under ‘operational control’ of local Army formation commanders. Though the responsibility is that of the IA, the AR battalions given to the Army for border manning operations are amazingly not directly under its command. This arrangement is not conducive to fostering a professional relationship between the commanders and their subordinates.

The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996 were expected to reduce the operational commitments of the Army from having to permanently man the difficult LAC with China. However, it has not been possible to withdraw a single soldier from the border with China so far.

Despite the 1996 agreement on military confidence-building measures (CBMs), several incidents of Chinese transgression have been reported in the press and have been discussed in Parliament. While no violent incident has taken place in the recent past, on several occasions Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-toface. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out.

In the western sector in Ladakh, the line of the LAC is even more ambiguous because of several ‘claim lines’ and due to the paucity of easily recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin plateau. This makes it difficult to accurately co-relate

The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism, infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants, emergence of non-state actors, a nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers, leftwing extremism, separatist movements, aided and abetted, by external powers.

DSI

A soldier at Nathu La gate near the Sino-Indian border, Sikkim

”

ground and map, except in the area of the Karakoram Pass which lies on the high Karakoram Range. Both the sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which, in their perception, the LAC runs.

These patrols leave ‘tell-tale’ signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay stake to territory and assert their claim. It is imperative that the ITBP be placed under the Army’s operational control for better border management.

Other Borders In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is manned by the Border Security Force (BSF) except the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Ensuring the integrity of the LoC is the responsibility of the Army with some BSF battalions placed under its operational control. Since the LoC had been active on a daily basis till the unofficial ceasefire of November 25, 2003, this is a good arrangement.

For over 50 years since the Kashmir conflict began in 1947-48, soon after Independence, the two Armies were engaged in a so-called ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ confrontation with daily loss of life and property that could justifiably be called a ‘low-intensity, limited war.’

20

AFP

left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

AUGUST 2011

The informal cease-fire along the LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier has by and large held up well.

The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries. Since the eruption of Maoist

insurgency in Nepal, efforts have been made to gradually enhance vigilance along this border as India fears the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), the erstwhile Special Security Bureau, that is now an MHA force. For the Bhutan border, the BSF shares the responsibility with the SSB. Since the Royal Bhutanese

Army drove out the Bodo and ULFA insurgents from its territory some years ago, the border has been relatively quiet.

The border with Myanmar also remains operationally active. Several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries for themselves in Myanmar despite the cooperation extended by the Myanmarese Army. The cross-border movement of Nagas and Mizos for training, purchase of

21

arms and shelter when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, makes this border extremely challenging to manage.

This border is manned jointly by the Army and some units of the AR. Recent reports that the MHA intends to deploy BSF battalions on this border and take away the AR do not augur well for efficient border management along this area.

border management 2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:43 PM Page 4

SECURITY

Manning the LAC The Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China offers an illustrative example of the complete lack of coordination in border management. The western sector of the LAC in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh and the central sector along the Uttarakhand border are manned by some Vikas battalions of the Special Frontier Force of the Cabinet Secretariat and the IndoTibetan Border Police (ITBP), that is a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) police force, respectively. Infantry battalions of the Indian Army (IA) man the Sikkim border and units of the Assam Rifles (AR) man the Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram borders.

The AR is a paramilitary force under the MHA that is officered mostly by regular Army officers. Its battalions have been placed under ‘operational control’ of local Army formation commanders. Though the responsibility is that of the IA, the AR battalions given to the Army for border manning operations are amazingly not directly under its command. This arrangement is not conducive to fostering a professional relationship between the commanders and their subordinates.

The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996 were expected to reduce the operational commitments of the Army from having to permanently man the difficult LAC with China. However, it has not been possible to withdraw a single soldier from the border with China so far.

Despite the 1996 agreement on military confidence-building measures (CBMs), several incidents of Chinese transgression have been reported in the press and have been discussed in Parliament. While no violent incident has taken place in the recent past, on several occasions Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-toface. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out.

In the western sector in Ladakh, the line of the LAC is even more ambiguous because of several ‘claim lines’ and due to the paucity of easily recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin plateau. This makes it difficult to accurately co-relate

The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism, infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants, emergence of non-state actors, a nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers, leftwing extremism, separatist movements, aided and abetted, by external powers.

DSI

A soldier at Nathu La gate near the Sino-Indian border, Sikkim

”

ground and map, except in the area of the Karakoram Pass which lies on the high Karakoram Range. Both the sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which, in their perception, the LAC runs.

These patrols leave ‘tell-tale’ signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay stake to territory and assert their claim. It is imperative that the ITBP be placed under the Army’s operational control for better border management.

Other Borders In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is manned by the Border Security Force (BSF) except the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Ensuring the integrity of the LoC is the responsibility of the Army with some BSF battalions placed under its operational control. Since the LoC had been active on a daily basis till the unofficial ceasefire of November 25, 2003, this is a good arrangement.

For over 50 years since the Kashmir conflict began in 1947-48, soon after Independence, the two Armies were engaged in a so-called ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ confrontation with daily loss of life and property that could justifiably be called a ‘low-intensity, limited war.’

20

AFP

left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

AUGUST 2011

The informal cease-fire along the LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier has by and large held up well.

The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries. Since the eruption of Maoist

insurgency in Nepal, efforts have been made to gradually enhance vigilance along this border as India fears the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), the erstwhile Special Security Bureau, that is now an MHA force. For the Bhutan border, the BSF shares the responsibility with the SSB. Since the Royal Bhutanese

Army drove out the Bodo and ULFA insurgents from its territory some years ago, the border has been relatively quiet.

The border with Myanmar also remains operationally active. Several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries for themselves in Myanmar despite the cooperation extended by the Myanmarese Army. The cross-border movement of Nagas and Mizos for training, purchase of

21

arms and shelter when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, makes this border extremely challenging to manage.

This border is manned jointly by the Army and some units of the AR. Recent reports that the MHA intends to deploy BSF battalions on this border and take away the AR do not augur well for efficient border management along this area.

border management 2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/08/11 3:32 PM Page 6

SECURITY

AUGUST 2011

The challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made effective and efficient border management a national priority.

AFP

”

quality of aerial surveillance and the ability to move troops to quickly occupy defensive positions when it becomes necessary.

However, these are both costly ventures and need to be viewed in the overall context of the availability of funds for modernisation. Also, rapid deployment forces will need to be kept ready for unforeseen eventualities.

A Bangladeshi migrant with her son inside their submerged house at Sialmari village, Assam; (facing page) a soldier on a truck near the India-Pakistan border in Tangmarg, Kashmir

borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of single-point control must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.

Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several paramilitary and police forces, the Army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in J&K; five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

This is a massive commitment that is costly in terms of manpower as well as

22

AFP

MHA’s Role Along the Bangladesh border which has seen active action in recent years the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashes between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). This border has a peculiar problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India. Thirty-four tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession.

Though the Land Border Agreement of 1974 has provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it has not been implemented so far as the problem is politically sensitive. Unless the political leadership invests time and effort to resolve this sensitive issue, unseemly clashes that do no credit to either side will continue to occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

Ideally, border management should be the responsibility of the MHA during peace time. However, the active nature of the LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the LAC in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the Army to permanently deploy large forces for this task. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed

funds, as the deployment areas are mostly in high altitude terrain, and need to be reduced gradually. The real payoff of a rapprochement with the Chinese would be the possibility of reducing the Army’s deployment on the LAC. To some extent, advances in surveillance technology, particularly satellite and aerial imagery, can help maintain a constant vigil along the LAC and make it possible to reduce physical deployment as and when modern surveillance assets can be provided on a regular basis to the formations deployed forward.

Similarly, the availability of a larger number of helicopter units will enhance the

Ad-Hoc Decisions The deployment patterns of Centre for Police Organisations (CPOs) are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. According to G. P. Bhatnagar, a close observer of the border management scene, the major lacunae that exists in the process includes the deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations and the lack of well articulated doctrinal concepts. He has analysed that Indian border management is based on a ‘fire-fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fireprevention’ or pro-active approach; it is developed on a strategy of ‘reaction and retaliation’ rather than on a holistic response to the prevailing environment, resulting in stress and decision-making problems at the functional level leading to wastage of energy and efforts; and, the lack of coordination and synergy between the security management

organisations is all cumulatively harmful to the national interest.

A task force on Border Management was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) formed to review the major issues pertaining to the management of national security after the Kargil conflict. Led by Madhav Godbole, a former home secretary, the panel made several farreaching recommendations. It had recommended that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should be designated as the primary national-level counterinsurgency force. This would enable the other Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) like the BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management. It also recommended that all paramilitary forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the Army and that there should be lateral induction from the Army to the paramilitary forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness. Besides these recommendations, it suggested

DSI

several perceptive measures for better inter-agency and inter-ministerial intelligence coordination.

The task force studied the steps needed to improve border management and suggested measures for appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with the entry of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and small arms.

It had also examined measures to establish closer linkages with the border population to protect them from subversive propaganda to prevent unauthorised settlements and to initiate special developmental programmes.

The recommendations of the task force were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. While some action has been taken, clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective. To make the effort that much more transparent it is time the Godbole Task Force report on border management is de-classified and placed in the public domain.

border management 2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/08/11 3:32 PM Page 6

SECURITY

AUGUST 2011

The challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made effective and efficient border management a national priority.

AFP

”

quality of aerial surveillance and the ability to move troops to quickly occupy defensive positions when it becomes necessary.

However, these are both costly ventures and need to be viewed in the overall context of the availability of funds for modernisation. Also, rapid deployment forces will need to be kept ready for unforeseen eventualities.

A Bangladeshi migrant with her son inside their submerged house at Sialmari village, Assam; (facing page) a soldier on a truck near the India-Pakistan border in Tangmarg, Kashmir

borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of single-point control must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.

Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several paramilitary and police forces, the Army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in J&K; five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

This is a massive commitment that is costly in terms of manpower as well as

22

AFP

MHA’s Role Along the Bangladesh border which has seen active action in recent years the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashes between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). This border has a peculiar problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India. Thirty-four tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession.

Though the Land Border Agreement of 1974 has provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it has not been implemented so far as the problem is politically sensitive. Unless the political leadership invests time and effort to resolve this sensitive issue, unseemly clashes that do no credit to either side will continue to occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

Ideally, border management should be the responsibility of the MHA during peace time. However, the active nature of the LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the LAC in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the Army to permanently deploy large forces for this task. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed

funds, as the deployment areas are mostly in high altitude terrain, and need to be reduced gradually. The real payoff of a rapprochement with the Chinese would be the possibility of reducing the Army’s deployment on the LAC. To some extent, advances in surveillance technology, particularly satellite and aerial imagery, can help maintain a constant vigil along the LAC and make it possible to reduce physical deployment as and when modern surveillance assets can be provided on a regular basis to the formations deployed forward.

Similarly, the availability of a larger number of helicopter units will enhance the

Ad-Hoc Decisions The deployment patterns of Centre for Police Organisations (CPOs) are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. According to G. P. Bhatnagar, a close observer of the border management scene, the major lacunae that exists in the process includes the deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations and the lack of well articulated doctrinal concepts. He has analysed that Indian border management is based on a ‘fire-fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fireprevention’ or pro-active approach; it is developed on a strategy of ‘reaction and retaliation’ rather than on a holistic response to the prevailing environment, resulting in stress and decision-making problems at the functional level leading to wastage of energy and efforts; and, the lack of coordination and synergy between the security management

organisations is all cumulatively harmful to the national interest.

A task force on Border Management was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) formed to review the major issues pertaining to the management of national security after the Kargil conflict. Led by Madhav Godbole, a former home secretary, the panel made several farreaching recommendations. It had recommended that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should be designated as the primary national-level counterinsurgency force. This would enable the other Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) like the BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management. It also recommended that all paramilitary forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the Army and that there should be lateral induction from the Army to the paramilitary forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness. Besides these recommendations, it suggested

DSI

several perceptive measures for better inter-agency and inter-ministerial intelligence coordination.

The task force studied the steps needed to improve border management and suggested measures for appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with the entry of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and small arms.

It had also examined measures to establish closer linkages with the border population to protect them from subversive propaganda to prevent unauthorised settlements and to initiate special developmental programmes.

The recommendations of the task force were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. While some action has been taken, clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective. To make the effort that much more transparent it is time the Godbole Task Force report on border management is de-classified and placed in the public domain.

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 2

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

AUGUST 2011

With 9/11 drawing western attention towards South Asia, India has become an irresistible strategic partner for the United Kingdom

Cameron signalled his commitment to the UK-India relationship during his very first trip abroad, which included a threeday stay in India. In tow behind the British Prime Minister was the largest UK trade delegation in living memory, including Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Secretary, William Hague.

He chose the tested method of winning over New Delhi: accusing the Pakistani establishment of knowingly sponsoring terrorism. Speaking to Indian business leaders in Bengaluru, Cameron declared: “We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways and is able to promote the export of terror, whether to India or Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”

Cameron also named the groups that India has long accused of cross-border terrorism: “We, like you, are determined that groups like the Taliban, the Haqqani network or Lakshar-e-Taiba should not be allowed to launch attacks on Indian and British citizens in India or in Britain.” The British leader has understood that a sustainable strategic relationship, with all the compromises that it entails, must be kept afloat by the ballast of economics.

Terming his visit to India as a ‘jobs mission,’ Cameron noted that 90,000 people were employed in the UK by Indian firms, and many more due to British firms operating in India.

Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS

I

REACHING OUT pursuing a policy of multi-alignment, strengthening its relationship with every major global power centre. And with 9/11 focussing western attention towards South Asia, a stable, democratic and economically vibrant India has become an irresistible partner, both strategic and economic, for the United States and, in its wake, the United Kingdom. That multialignment is beginning to be reflected in India’s equipment procurement profile,

24

with a rapidly growing share sourced from the United States, Israel and Europe.

Cameron’s Drive The current British ‘surge’ to India is unmistakably the initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron. But he only built on a steady, if unspectacular, foundation provided by the preceding Labour Party Governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Building on the path-breaking

New Delhi Declaration of 2002, Blair had signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2004. But the key drivers during the Labour years were economic ties; the large Indian diaspora in the UK; and ‘soft’ issues like education, climate change and development. The strategic heft that Cameron has brought in simply did not exist.

Even while Cameron was in opposition, he realised that Britain was not capitalising

on its potential relationship with India. He vocally advocated an intensified engagement, declaring that India would feature larger in British calculations were a conservative Government to capture power in the 2010 elections. In implementing that strategic agenda and his plan to engage India as a future superpower Cameron’s Conservative Party had faced no opposition from its coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats.

25

AFP

n The current British ‘surge’ to India is unmistakably the initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron. n Cameron’s visit saw the two sides signing a deal worth £700 million . n The most promising proposal for bringing the two defence establishments closer is joint R&D in high-technology areas between the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Defence Science and Technology Lab.

ndia’s defence relationship with the United Kingdom has been a roller coaster ride. While all three wings of the Indian military existed as independent entities long before Independence, they were inextricably interlinked with the British armed forces in terms of organisation, ethos and equipment profile. This tradition continued after Independence in 1947, with British officers initially commanding India’s Army, Navy and Air Force and with British equipment – emblemised by Centurion tanks, Hunter and Gnat fighters and Leander class frigates – continuing to equip major sections of this country’s military. But India’s embrace of the Soviet Union and its growing distrust of the western camp, after sanctions were first imposed in 1974, saw the military tilt towards the eastern bloc, particularly in its equipment profile.

Today, the wheel has turned full circle.

From a barely-disguised Soviet ally, India is

DSI

Growing Partnership Cameron’s visit saw the two sides signing a deal worth £700 million (£500 million for BAE Systems, £200 million for Rolls-Royce) for building 57 Hawk trainer aircraft in HAL Bengaluru. These would supplement the 66 Hawks already contracted by India. But a notable absence in Cameron’s heavyweight delegation was Defence Secretary, Liam Fox. This was because of a clever political calculation: Whitehall knew that Cameron and Hague would hog the limelight, especially once the British Prime Minister had made his attention-grabbing statements on Kashmir.

And so 10 Downing Street decided that Fox would make a full-fledged visit to India later.

While that visit was delayed by a couple of weeks because of Britain’s intense focus on its new Strategic Defence and Security Review, Fox travelled to New Delhi last November and talked of an enhanced partnership with India. The UK Defence Secretary took note of the joint training exercises between the British and Indian

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 2

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

AUGUST 2011

With 9/11 drawing western attention towards South Asia, India has become an irresistible strategic partner for the United Kingdom

Cameron signalled his commitment to the UK-India relationship during his very first trip abroad, which included a threeday stay in India. In tow behind the British Prime Minister was the largest UK trade delegation in living memory, including Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Secretary, William Hague.

He chose the tested method of winning over New Delhi: accusing the Pakistani establishment of knowingly sponsoring terrorism. Speaking to Indian business leaders in Bengaluru, Cameron declared: “We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways and is able to promote the export of terror, whether to India or Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”

Cameron also named the groups that India has long accused of cross-border terrorism: “We, like you, are determined that groups like the Taliban, the Haqqani network or Lakshar-e-Taiba should not be allowed to launch attacks on Indian and British citizens in India or in Britain.” The British leader has understood that a sustainable strategic relationship, with all the compromises that it entails, must be kept afloat by the ballast of economics.

Terming his visit to India as a ‘jobs mission,’ Cameron noted that 90,000 people were employed in the UK by Indian firms, and many more due to British firms operating in India.

Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS

I

REACHING OUT pursuing a policy of multi-alignment, strengthening its relationship with every major global power centre. And with 9/11 focussing western attention towards South Asia, a stable, democratic and economically vibrant India has become an irresistible partner, both strategic and economic, for the United States and, in its wake, the United Kingdom. That multialignment is beginning to be reflected in India’s equipment procurement profile,

24

with a rapidly growing share sourced from the United States, Israel and Europe.

Cameron’s Drive The current British ‘surge’ to India is unmistakably the initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron. But he only built on a steady, if unspectacular, foundation provided by the preceding Labour Party Governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Building on the path-breaking

New Delhi Declaration of 2002, Blair had signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2004. But the key drivers during the Labour years were economic ties; the large Indian diaspora in the UK; and ‘soft’ issues like education, climate change and development. The strategic heft that Cameron has brought in simply did not exist.

Even while Cameron was in opposition, he realised that Britain was not capitalising

on its potential relationship with India. He vocally advocated an intensified engagement, declaring that India would feature larger in British calculations were a conservative Government to capture power in the 2010 elections. In implementing that strategic agenda and his plan to engage India as a future superpower Cameron’s Conservative Party had faced no opposition from its coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats.

25

AFP

n The current British ‘surge’ to India is unmistakably the initiative of Prime Minister David Cameron. n Cameron’s visit saw the two sides signing a deal worth £700 million . n The most promising proposal for bringing the two defence establishments closer is joint R&D in high-technology areas between the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Defence Science and Technology Lab.

ndia’s defence relationship with the United Kingdom has been a roller coaster ride. While all three wings of the Indian military existed as independent entities long before Independence, they were inextricably interlinked with the British armed forces in terms of organisation, ethos and equipment profile. This tradition continued after Independence in 1947, with British officers initially commanding India’s Army, Navy and Air Force and with British equipment – emblemised by Centurion tanks, Hunter and Gnat fighters and Leander class frigates – continuing to equip major sections of this country’s military. But India’s embrace of the Soviet Union and its growing distrust of the western camp, after sanctions were first imposed in 1974, saw the military tilt towards the eastern bloc, particularly in its equipment profile.

Today, the wheel has turned full circle.

From a barely-disguised Soviet ally, India is

DSI

Growing Partnership Cameron’s visit saw the two sides signing a deal worth £700 million (£500 million for BAE Systems, £200 million for Rolls-Royce) for building 57 Hawk trainer aircraft in HAL Bengaluru. These would supplement the 66 Hawks already contracted by India. But a notable absence in Cameron’s heavyweight delegation was Defence Secretary, Liam Fox. This was because of a clever political calculation: Whitehall knew that Cameron and Hague would hog the limelight, especially once the British Prime Minister had made his attention-grabbing statements on Kashmir.

And so 10 Downing Street decided that Fox would make a full-fledged visit to India later.

While that visit was delayed by a couple of weeks because of Britain’s intense focus on its new Strategic Defence and Security Review, Fox travelled to New Delhi last November and talked of an enhanced partnership with India. The UK Defence Secretary took note of the joint training exercises between the British and Indian

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 4

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

Promising Initiatives But perhaps one of the most promising initiatives for bringing the two defence establishments closer lies in a proposal for joint R&D in high-technology areas between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).

Much of the British R&D, relating to building weapons platforms, is done by high-tech companies like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, which were privatised years ago. Those companies, being publicly held, are guided by commercial logic and cannot be induced into joint R&D to fulfil strategic aims. In contrast, DSTL remains a British Government establishment that has retained key capabilities in advanced fields like nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) planning and equipping, war gaming and operational analysis for activities like equipment procurement. The DSTL also hands out Government funding for subcontracted research. New Delhi and London have agreed that the DSTL’s technological know-how complements the DRDO’s pool of competent engineers for jointly tackling projects in the realm of pure research.

Sir Mark Edward Welland, Chief Scientific Advisor to the British MoD (Ministery of Defence), has travelled to India twice recently during which time he has held discussions with the DRDO chief, V.K. Saraswat and paid visits to DRDO laboratories.

But the reality is that actual operationalising of this partnership remains merely an intention with the Indian MoD dragging its feet over signing

an agreement that would cover joint R&D. Negotiations have been stalled over a Defence Science & Technology Letter of Arrangement, which is merely a high-level Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), for the activities to follow. But over the last 18 months India has not yet signed the MoU. Sources in the MoD say that the draft has already been sent up to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) which returned it for redrafting. The MoD is now about to resubmit the draft Letter of Arrangement for CCS approval.

Says a senior British MoD official: “There is a great deal of momentum today, and

DSI

Indian soldiers with their British counterparts during a joint-training exercise with the British Army at military training village, in Salisbury Plain, England

The UK Defence Secretary took note of the joint training exercises between the British and Indian militaries, which include the Indra Dhanush series of Air Force exercises, the Konkan naval exercises, and, for the first time, a British Army infantry company trained in India in June 2010 alongside an Indian company in exercise ‘Shamsheer Bugle’.

”

even funding, for taking forward this relationship. But bureaucratic foot-dragging over non-controversial matters cannot be allowed to drag the process down.”

Driving this new British openness to high-tech cooperation with India are the interests of Britain’s 2,600-odd defence companies. With a turnover of £22.2 billion in 2009, the UK has Europe’s largest defence industry and the secondlargest in the world, behind only the United States. A British company, BAE Systems, is the world’s third-largest defence company behind, Lockheed Martin and Boeing. For the UK economy,

26

AFP

militaries, which include the Indra Dhanush series of Air Force exercises; the Konkan naval exercises; and, for the first time in 60 years, a British Army infantry company trained in India in June 2010, alongside an Indian company in exercise ‘Shamsheer Bugle’. That training has continued this year, with an Indian Army infantry company having just completed an exercise in the UK. The atmospherics of the current engagement leaves little to be desired. Joint exercises continue, and both militaries have a longstanding tradition of exchanging officers for key professional courses in each other’s countries. This year, a group of cadets from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst visited the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, and vice versa.

AUGUST 2011

defence is a major employer, with 100,000 direct employees and 220,000 benefiting from jobs indirectly.

Promoting the interests of British aerospace, defence, security and space industries, is a trade organisation, ADS with a well-established branch in Delhi.

British companies like BAE Systems; GKN Aerospace; Doncasters; Cobham and Meggitt have already made significant investments in India. These companies are steadily eroding the once unchallenged market share of Russia.

“The British defence industry’s worldclass solutions are well-suited for the

Indian military which shares a common heritage and operating practices with its British counterpart. The Indian Government’s mindset, which once favoured cheap Eastern bloc equipment, is now changing in favour of quality equipment for India’s defence forces,” says Gobinder Singh, ADS’ regional director, South Asia.

Global Combat Ship The Global Combat Ship (GCS )project is another potential game-changer with the British MoD keen on bringing India into a consortium for jointly developing a

flexible-role frigate for the future. London believes that a joint development project of this nature would bind together the two defence production establishments; while operating a common warship would strategically link the two navies.

The British MoD’s plan to develop the GCS (termed the Type 26 frigate) involves working in a coalition to spread the development costs. The specifications of the GCS would be framed jointly by the development partners but with a high degree of commonality, ideally above 80 percent. That would still leave about 20 percent of the frigate to cater for

27

individual country requirements that are specific to their respective operational environments.

After developing a broadly common design, and then customising that for individual needs, each partner country would build its requirement of GCS vessels through its indigenous defence industry. While Britain evolved the GCS concept to build a series of frigates that were similar, yet different, the environment of Defence Budget cuts imposed by Strategic Defence and Security Review has forced Whitehall to move forward on this coalition.

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 4

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

Promising Initiatives But perhaps one of the most promising initiatives for bringing the two defence establishments closer lies in a proposal for joint R&D in high-technology areas between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).

Much of the British R&D, relating to building weapons platforms, is done by high-tech companies like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, which were privatised years ago. Those companies, being publicly held, are guided by commercial logic and cannot be induced into joint R&D to fulfil strategic aims. In contrast, DSTL remains a British Government establishment that has retained key capabilities in advanced fields like nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) planning and equipping, war gaming and operational analysis for activities like equipment procurement. The DSTL also hands out Government funding for subcontracted research. New Delhi and London have agreed that the DSTL’s technological know-how complements the DRDO’s pool of competent engineers for jointly tackling projects in the realm of pure research.

Sir Mark Edward Welland, Chief Scientific Advisor to the British MoD (Ministery of Defence), has travelled to India twice recently during which time he has held discussions with the DRDO chief, V.K. Saraswat and paid visits to DRDO laboratories.

But the reality is that actual operationalising of this partnership remains merely an intention with the Indian MoD dragging its feet over signing

an agreement that would cover joint R&D. Negotiations have been stalled over a Defence Science & Technology Letter of Arrangement, which is merely a high-level Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), for the activities to follow. But over the last 18 months India has not yet signed the MoU. Sources in the MoD say that the draft has already been sent up to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) which returned it for redrafting. The MoD is now about to resubmit the draft Letter of Arrangement for CCS approval.

Says a senior British MoD official: “There is a great deal of momentum today, and

DSI

Indian soldiers with their British counterparts during a joint-training exercise with the British Army at military training village, in Salisbury Plain, England

The UK Defence Secretary took note of the joint training exercises between the British and Indian militaries, which include the Indra Dhanush series of Air Force exercises, the Konkan naval exercises, and, for the first time, a British Army infantry company trained in India in June 2010 alongside an Indian company in exercise ‘Shamsheer Bugle’.

”

even funding, for taking forward this relationship. But bureaucratic foot-dragging over non-controversial matters cannot be allowed to drag the process down.”

Driving this new British openness to high-tech cooperation with India are the interests of Britain’s 2,600-odd defence companies. With a turnover of £22.2 billion in 2009, the UK has Europe’s largest defence industry and the secondlargest in the world, behind only the United States. A British company, BAE Systems, is the world’s third-largest defence company behind, Lockheed Martin and Boeing. For the UK economy,

26

AFP

militaries, which include the Indra Dhanush series of Air Force exercises; the Konkan naval exercises; and, for the first time in 60 years, a British Army infantry company trained in India in June 2010, alongside an Indian company in exercise ‘Shamsheer Bugle’. That training has continued this year, with an Indian Army infantry company having just completed an exercise in the UK. The atmospherics of the current engagement leaves little to be desired. Joint exercises continue, and both militaries have a longstanding tradition of exchanging officers for key professional courses in each other’s countries. This year, a group of cadets from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst visited the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, and vice versa.

AUGUST 2011

defence is a major employer, with 100,000 direct employees and 220,000 benefiting from jobs indirectly.

Promoting the interests of British aerospace, defence, security and space industries, is a trade organisation, ADS with a well-established branch in Delhi.

British companies like BAE Systems; GKN Aerospace; Doncasters; Cobham and Meggitt have already made significant investments in India. These companies are steadily eroding the once unchallenged market share of Russia.

“The British defence industry’s worldclass solutions are well-suited for the

Indian military which shares a common heritage and operating practices with its British counterpart. The Indian Government’s mindset, which once favoured cheap Eastern bloc equipment, is now changing in favour of quality equipment for India’s defence forces,” says Gobinder Singh, ADS’ regional director, South Asia.

Global Combat Ship The Global Combat Ship (GCS )project is another potential game-changer with the British MoD keen on bringing India into a consortium for jointly developing a

flexible-role frigate for the future. London believes that a joint development project of this nature would bind together the two defence production establishments; while operating a common warship would strategically link the two navies.

The British MoD’s plan to develop the GCS (termed the Type 26 frigate) involves working in a coalition to spread the development costs. The specifications of the GCS would be framed jointly by the development partners but with a high degree of commonality, ideally above 80 percent. That would still leave about 20 percent of the frigate to cater for

27

individual country requirements that are specific to their respective operational environments.

After developing a broadly common design, and then customising that for individual needs, each partner country would build its requirement of GCS vessels through its indigenous defence industry. While Britain evolved the GCS concept to build a series of frigates that were similar, yet different, the environment of Defence Budget cuts imposed by Strategic Defence and Security Review has forced Whitehall to move forward on this coalition.

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 6

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS India will play a significant role all through that period in developing and upgrading the aircraft,” says a senior British MoD official.

Even as the Typhoon duels with the Rafale for the Indian order the Hawk is a clear priority area for the growing aerospace partnership between the two countries. The British MoD is evaluating the possibility of granting HAL a license for providing service backup, equipment upgrades and even mid-life upgrades, to the many Hawk users in the AsiaPacific region. With some 900 Hawks in service, with 18 customers worldwide,

Britain's Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox (left) with Defence Minister A.K. Antony in New Delhi

A year after Prime Minister Cameron’s outreach to India, concrete results are hard to find in the development of the India–UK defence relationship. There are, however, several promising projects in gestation — joint R&D, the Global Combat Ship initiative, the Hawk, and the development of artillery.

”

AFP

As a country that needs many more warships than its shipyards can currently produce, India is clearly an attractive partner for such an initiative. London has also approached other countries to participate in the GCS project, amongst them Brazil. India’s potentially large requirements of frigates for an expanding Navy would allow this country an especially large influence in shaping the GCS design.

Andrew Gallagher, president, BAE Systems India says: “This is an entirely new approach to building a new class of warships. There are ongoing discussions with the Indian Government. There has been clear interest from the Indian Navy.

But nobody has made a commitment yet.”

Indian MoD sources, on their part, say they are, “gestating this idea since it is still at the very early stages.” But a joint team from the British MoD and the Royal Navy is expected to visit New Delhi in September, to take forward this proposal.

While BAE Systems looks set to be the British partner in this project, the Indian MoD will nominate a local shipyard for building its requirement of GCS frigates.

Since the two defence shipyards that have the capacity and capability to build a frigate — Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata — are already working to capacity in constructing India’s existing orders for Project 28, Project 15A, Project 17 and Project 75 warships, any GCS order could well go to one of India’s new private sector shipyards.

Pipavav Shipyard and ABG Shipyard have idle capacities on the Gujarat coast, while Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is close to completing a spanking new shipyard at Katupalli in Tamil Nadu. While all three are keen to expand their warship-building business lines none have any experience in building a complex frigate.

While the MoD has not approached any shipyard and a GCS partnership is still no more than a proposal, it is clear that the GCS will offer India’s emerging private shipyards a safe launch project for developing such a capability, and also encourage specialisations that will accrue from such an experience. Peter Luff, Britain’s Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, who visited India for the Aero India 2011 air show in Bengaluru in February, met with L&T Chairperson, A.M. Naik. “The 20 percent indigenous component will allow partner countries to develop specialisations in

AUGUST 2011

specific aspects of the GCS, for example, the Indian shipyard might specialise in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems which will lead to the development of improved ASW systems in a Centre of Excellence in India. All of the partners can benefit from such Centres of Excellence,” explains Gallagher.

Growing Strategic Partnership If the GCS project is cleared, it promises to be an important driver of the growing strategic partnership between London and New Delhi. Besides the relationship that develops from operating a common platform, there will be significant operational benefits between the two

28

navies. A common build design will enable such frigates to operate from far-away naval bases in friendly countries that operate the same ship. For example, if South Africa joins the GCS project, an Indian Navy GCS frigate can easily operate for extended durations in the Southern Indian Ocean, drawing logistical sustenance from a South African naval base. As New Delhi looks to extend the reach of the Indian Navy, the logistical flexibility of such arrangements will greatly facilitate the development of Blue Water capability.

India’s purchase of the Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in the mid2000s was regarded in Whitehall as an

important triumph. This was not just because BAE Systems’ Hawk production line at Brough, Yorkshire got a lease of life but also because it rejuvenated an air-force-to-air-force relationship. London believes that a similar lift can be provided by an Indian decision to buy the Eurofighter Typhoon in the multi-billion dollar tender for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). “The Jaguar was pivotal in revitalising the relationship with the equipment-oriented Indian Air Force. And if India chooses to buy the Eurofighter Typhoon, that will be another massive boost to relations between the two Air Forces. And with the Typhoon slated to have a service life of 40 years,

this represents a significant business opportunity for HAL. Says Gallagher: “We have a commitment, under the contract, for 57 Hawks which will develop our relationship with HAL and create a pipeline of work for it in relation to the Hawk programme. We are exploring the possibility of taking on significant manufacturing work with HAL, with an eye on the emerging export market.”

However, BAE Systems’ portfolio of artillery gun systems has failed to provide the British-headquartered company any headway in India’s badly delayed, artillery modernisation programme worth about `20,000 crore. After the MoD’s failure to select a suitable 155 millimetre towed

29

DSI

howitzer, even in successive rounds of trials since 2002, BAE Systems decided to stay out of the latest tender worth an estimated `8,000 crore for the outright supply of 400 towed guns and the licensed production in India of another 1,180.”

Staying Out Explaining why BAE Systems decided to stay out of the competition, Gallagher says, “My technical colleagues were absolutely clear that we were not likely to win. We had developed the 155 mm gun for Indian conditions over the last nine years. So when the RfP (Request for proposal) specifications were reduced – and I understand that was to bring in other competitors – we were going to be the more expensive gun. We were no longer confident that we would be on top.

But it is the right of the Government to run their procurement programmes any way they like.”

BAE Systems still hopes to win a `3,000 crore contract for 140 ultralight howitzers (ULHs), which is being processed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route by the United States Government.

Nevertheless, indigenous capabilities are being assiduously set up for larger prizes in the future. BAE Systems has joined hands with the Mahindra group to establish a joint venture (74 percent Mahindra: 26 percent BAE Systems) called Defence Land Systems India (DLSI). This has set up a Centre of Excellence for artillery products which aims at designing and manufacturing artillery products in India.

A year after Cameron’s outreach to India, concrete results are hard to find in the development of the India-UK defence relationship. There are, however, several promising projects in gestation – joint R&D; the Global Combat Ship initiative; the Hawk; and the development of artillery – which can yield results in the period ahead.

For almost a decade, London has been obsessed with its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has left little bandwidth for careful development of the engagement with India. Nor has New Delhi’s focus on the US relationship and the management of its multiple regional problems permitted a well-considered approach to the UK partnership.

As the two countries engage more deliberately they are likely to discover a set of intrinsically attractive joint ventures.

And these, if taken forward productively, can form the building blocks of an important partnership.

Indo-UK_2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 1:49 PM Page 6

INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS India will play a significant role all through that period in developing and upgrading the aircraft,” says a senior British MoD official.

Even as the Typhoon duels with the Rafale for the Indian order the Hawk is a clear priority area for the growing aerospace partnership between the two countries. The British MoD is evaluating the possibility of granting HAL a license for providing service backup, equipment upgrades and even mid-life upgrades, to the many Hawk users in the AsiaPacific region. With some 900 Hawks in service, with 18 customers worldwide,

Britain's Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox (left) with Defence Minister A.K. Antony in New Delhi

A year after Prime Minister Cameron’s outreach to India, concrete results are hard to find in the development of the India–UK defence relationship. There are, however, several promising projects in gestation — joint R&D, the Global Combat Ship initiative, the Hawk, and the development of artillery.

”

AFP

As a country that needs many more warships than its shipyards can currently produce, India is clearly an attractive partner for such an initiative. London has also approached other countries to participate in the GCS project, amongst them Brazil. India’s potentially large requirements of frigates for an expanding Navy would allow this country an especially large influence in shaping the GCS design.

Andrew Gallagher, president, BAE Systems India says: “This is an entirely new approach to building a new class of warships. There are ongoing discussions with the Indian Government. There has been clear interest from the Indian Navy.

But nobody has made a commitment yet.”

Indian MoD sources, on their part, say they are, “gestating this idea since it is still at the very early stages.” But a joint team from the British MoD and the Royal Navy is expected to visit New Delhi in September, to take forward this proposal.

While BAE Systems looks set to be the British partner in this project, the Indian MoD will nominate a local shipyard for building its requirement of GCS frigates.

Since the two defence shipyards that have the capacity and capability to build a frigate — Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata — are already working to capacity in constructing India’s existing orders for Project 28, Project 15A, Project 17 and Project 75 warships, any GCS order could well go to one of India’s new private sector shipyards.

Pipavav Shipyard and ABG Shipyard have idle capacities on the Gujarat coast, while Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is close to completing a spanking new shipyard at Katupalli in Tamil Nadu. While all three are keen to expand their warship-building business lines none have any experience in building a complex frigate.

While the MoD has not approached any shipyard and a GCS partnership is still no more than a proposal, it is clear that the GCS will offer India’s emerging private shipyards a safe launch project for developing such a capability, and also encourage specialisations that will accrue from such an experience. Peter Luff, Britain’s Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, who visited India for the Aero India 2011 air show in Bengaluru in February, met with L&T Chairperson, A.M. Naik. “The 20 percent indigenous component will allow partner countries to develop specialisations in

AUGUST 2011

specific aspects of the GCS, for example, the Indian shipyard might specialise in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems which will lead to the development of improved ASW systems in a Centre of Excellence in India. All of the partners can benefit from such Centres of Excellence,” explains Gallagher.

Growing Strategic Partnership If the GCS project is cleared, it promises to be an important driver of the growing strategic partnership between London and New Delhi. Besides the relationship that develops from operating a common platform, there will be significant operational benefits between the two

28

navies. A common build design will enable such frigates to operate from far-away naval bases in friendly countries that operate the same ship. For example, if South Africa joins the GCS project, an Indian Navy GCS frigate can easily operate for extended durations in the Southern Indian Ocean, drawing logistical sustenance from a South African naval base. As New Delhi looks to extend the reach of the Indian Navy, the logistical flexibility of such arrangements will greatly facilitate the development of Blue Water capability.

India’s purchase of the Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in the mid2000s was regarded in Whitehall as an

important triumph. This was not just because BAE Systems’ Hawk production line at Brough, Yorkshire got a lease of life but also because it rejuvenated an air-force-to-air-force relationship. London believes that a similar lift can be provided by an Indian decision to buy the Eurofighter Typhoon in the multi-billion dollar tender for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). “The Jaguar was pivotal in revitalising the relationship with the equipment-oriented Indian Air Force. And if India chooses to buy the Eurofighter Typhoon, that will be another massive boost to relations between the two Air Forces. And with the Typhoon slated to have a service life of 40 years,

this represents a significant business opportunity for HAL. Says Gallagher: “We have a commitment, under the contract, for 57 Hawks which will develop our relationship with HAL and create a pipeline of work for it in relation to the Hawk programme. We are exploring the possibility of taking on significant manufacturing work with HAL, with an eye on the emerging export market.”

However, BAE Systems’ portfolio of artillery gun systems has failed to provide the British-headquartered company any headway in India’s badly delayed, artillery modernisation programme worth about `20,000 crore. After the MoD’s failure to select a suitable 155 millimetre towed

29

DSI

howitzer, even in successive rounds of trials since 2002, BAE Systems decided to stay out of the latest tender worth an estimated `8,000 crore for the outright supply of 400 towed guns and the licensed production in India of another 1,180.”

Staying Out Explaining why BAE Systems decided to stay out of the competition, Gallagher says, “My technical colleagues were absolutely clear that we were not likely to win. We had developed the 155 mm gun for Indian conditions over the last nine years. So when the RfP (Request for proposal) specifications were reduced – and I understand that was to bring in other competitors – we were going to be the more expensive gun. We were no longer confident that we would be on top.

But it is the right of the Government to run their procurement programmes any way they like.”

BAE Systems still hopes to win a `3,000 crore contract for 140 ultralight howitzers (ULHs), which is being processed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route by the United States Government.

Nevertheless, indigenous capabilities are being assiduously set up for larger prizes in the future. BAE Systems has joined hands with the Mahindra group to establish a joint venture (74 percent Mahindra: 26 percent BAE Systems) called Defence Land Systems India (DLSI). This has set up a Centre of Excellence for artillery products which aims at designing and manufacturing artillery products in India.

A year after Cameron’s outreach to India, concrete results are hard to find in the development of the India-UK defence relationship. There are, however, several promising projects in gestation – joint R&D; the Global Combat Ship initiative; the Hawk; and the development of artillery – which can yield results in the period ahead.

For almost a decade, London has been obsessed with its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has left little bandwidth for careful development of the engagement with India. Nor has New Delhi’s focus on the US relationship and the management of its multiple regional problems permitted a well-considered approach to the UK partnership.

As the two countries engage more deliberately they are likely to discover a set of intrinsically attractive joint ventures.

And these, if taken forward productively, can form the building blocks of an important partnership.

missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:13 PM Page 2

WEAPONRY

AUGUST 2011

JUST DO IT!

P. K. CHAKRAVORTY

India’s guided missile development programme needs to continue at a deliberate pace

KEY POINTS The first step in the nation’s missile programme was the creation of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Balasore. n The real success of the IGMDP is in the development of the ballistic surface-to-surface missiles — Prithvi and Agni. n Some missiles are in the development stages like the Shaurya and Pradyumna Ballistic Missile interceptor. n

30

AFP

T

The Prithvi surface-tosurface missile being launched during a test at Chandipur, Orissa

DSI

he use of missile dates back to the 13th century. They were possibly used by the Chinese against the Mongols in 1232. In the Indian subcontinent, they were first used by Tipu Sultan during the Second Anglo-Mysore War in 1792 which resulted in 3,820 soldiers being taken as prisoners. The rockets were deployed by Tipu’s Army by special Rocket Brigades called Kushoons.

Extremely effective and they were later reengineered by the British and used by them for a limited period.

It was after Independence, the Government made plans to develop missiles indigenously. To this end, a Special Weapons Development Team was constituted to later become the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). Tasked to undertake the development of first-generation, antitank missiles. It was later decided to manufacture anti-tank missiles under license from France. Simultaneously, DRDL was given two projects: Project Valiant which involved the development of a long-range ballistic missile and Project Devil, aimed at reverse engineering

31

the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile.

However, both these projects were terminated prematurely. Backed by this experience, DRDL developed indigenous infrastructure and facilities to undertake the design and development of missiles.

Step-by-Step It was in late July 1983 that an Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was approved by the Government of India. The Defence Minister directed the Defence and Research Development Organisation (DRDO) to simultaneously develop five variants of the guided missile — the Trishul (a short-range surface-to-air missile), Akash (a medium-range surfaceto-air missile), Nag (a third-generation fire-and-forget, anti-tank guided missile), Prithvi (a short-range, surface-to-surface missile) and Agni (an intermediate-range surface-to-surface missile.)

The first step in the development phase was the creation of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Balasore which has facilitated the testing of all missiles that were being developed. The development phase commenced when former President, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam was appointed director, DRDL. Having steered the SLV-3 programme at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) successfully he now provided leadership needed for India’s missile programme.

The missile Trishul, with a range of 9km, was fitted with a 5.5 kg warhead. It was designed to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short-range. The system has been developed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short-range surface-to-air missile on land.

As the development costs of the missile became probihitive the programme was

missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:13 PM Page 2

WEAPONRY

AUGUST 2011

JUST DO IT!

P. K. CHAKRAVORTY

India’s guided missile development programme needs to continue at a deliberate pace

KEY POINTS The first step in the nation’s missile programme was the creation of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Balasore. n The real success of the IGMDP is in the development of the ballistic surface-to-surface missiles — Prithvi and Agni. n Some missiles are in the development stages like the Shaurya and Pradyumna Ballistic Missile interceptor. n

30

AFP

T

The Prithvi surface-tosurface missile being launched during a test at Chandipur, Orissa

DSI

he use of missile dates back to the 13th century. They were possibly used by the Chinese against the Mongols in 1232. In the Indian subcontinent, they were first used by Tipu Sultan during the Second Anglo-Mysore War in 1792 which resulted in 3,820 soldiers being taken as prisoners. The rockets were deployed by Tipu’s Army by special Rocket Brigades called Kushoons.

Extremely effective and they were later reengineered by the British and used by them for a limited period.

It was after Independence, the Government made plans to develop missiles indigenously. To this end, a Special Weapons Development Team was constituted to later become the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). Tasked to undertake the development of first-generation, antitank missiles. It was later decided to manufacture anti-tank missiles under license from France. Simultaneously, DRDL was given two projects: Project Valiant which involved the development of a long-range ballistic missile and Project Devil, aimed at reverse engineering

31

the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile.

However, both these projects were terminated prematurely. Backed by this experience, DRDL developed indigenous infrastructure and facilities to undertake the design and development of missiles.

Step-by-Step It was in late July 1983 that an Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was approved by the Government of India. The Defence Minister directed the Defence and Research Development Organisation (DRDO) to simultaneously develop five variants of the guided missile — the Trishul (a short-range surface-to-air missile), Akash (a medium-range surfaceto-air missile), Nag (a third-generation fire-and-forget, anti-tank guided missile), Prithvi (a short-range, surface-to-surface missile) and Agni (an intermediate-range surface-to-surface missile.)

The first step in the development phase was the creation of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Balasore which has facilitated the testing of all missiles that were being developed. The development phase commenced when former President, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam was appointed director, DRDL. Having steered the SLV-3 programme at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) successfully he now provided leadership needed for India’s missile programme.

The missile Trishul, with a range of 9km, was fitted with a 5.5 kg warhead. It was designed to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short-range. The system has been developed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short-range surface-to-air missile on land.

As the development costs of the missile became probihitive the programme was

missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:15 PM Page 4

WEAPONRY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

AFP

Final touches being given to a BrahMos missile on display at DefExpo, New Delhi

shut down on February 27, 2008, with the missile remaining a technology demonstrator and delinked from services.

Akash is a medium-range, surface–to-air missile, with an intercept range of 30km.

With a launch weight of 720 kg, a diametre of 35 cm and a length of 5.8 m, the missile flies at supersonic speed, reaching around Mach 2.5 and can reach an altitude of 18km. The system allows multiple targets to be attacked at the scale of four per battery. The missile uses a ramjet propulsion system which allows it to maintain its speed without deceleration. Supported by a multi-target, multi-function, phased-array, fire-control radar, Rajendra, with a range of about 80km in search and 60km in terms of engagement, the missile is completely guided by the radar, without any guidance of its own, allowing it greater capability against jamming.

The design of the missile is similar to that of SAM-6 missiles. The system, meant for the Indian Army (IA) uses a T-72 tank chasis for its launcher and radar vehicles. The Indian Air Force (IAF) version uses an Ashok Leyland truck platform to tow the missile launcher, while the radar is on a BMP-2

BrahMos is a supersonic Cruise missile capable of being launched from multiple platforms — land, sea, sub-surface and air — against land and sea targets. The missile has an identical configuration for land, sea and sub-surface platforms. It has a maximum range of 290km, a maximum velocity of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach.

32

”

chassis. In either case, the launchers carry three ready-to-fire missiles.

The first flight test of Akash was carried out in 1990 and the IAF completed user trials in December 2007. Based on the success of the trials the IAF has commenced induction of the system. The IA has also accepted the system and is in the process of inducting it.

The public sector Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been developing Nag, an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) since the commencement of the missile development programme in 1983. The testing of the missiles commenced around 1990. This is a fire-and- forget system with a range from 500 m to 7,000 m.

The guidance is provided by an imaging, infra-red sensor-based seeker and the missile hits the turret of a tank in a top attack mode by flying up and falling vertically down on the most vulnerable part of the vehicle. The Nag can be carried and fired from a modified BMP-2 vehicle, Namica, which has a carriage of four readyto-fire missiles. The helicopter version is being developed on the Advanced Light

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With the elimination of Osama Bin Laden, tensions in US-Pakistan relations are growing I G. Parathasarathy AUGUST 2011

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missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:14 PM Page 6

WEAPONRY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

India’s nuclear-capable Agni-III missile rolls past during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi

AFP

Defence Minister A.K. Antony (second from left) inspects Akash missiles at Defence Research Development Organisation, Hyderabad

AFP

However, the development of missile technology will continue without any interruption. To this end, the focus shifted to Cruise missiles. BrahMos is a supersonic Cruise missile capable of being launched from multiple platforms — on land, sea, sub-surface and air — against land and sea targets. The missile has an identical configuration for land, sea and sub-surface platforms. It has a maximum range of 290km, a maximum velocity of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach and cruises at an altitude of 15km.

BrahMos supersedes most popular Cruise missiles in the world by three times in terms of velocity, flight-range, seeker-range and nine times the kill energy-range. The missile has been inducted in the IA and the Indian Navy (IN). DRDO is also developing a sub-sonic Cruise missile, Nirbhay, an extension of the Pilotless Target Aircraft Lakshya, it has a subsonic speed of 0.7 Mach. The missile is 6m in length, 520 mm diameter and has a range of 1,000 km.

Helicopter with a range of 7km named Helina. Though user trials of the missile have been completed there are a few issues yet to be resolved after which the IA will place firm orders for this variant.

Ballistic Missiles The success of the IGMDP lies in the development of the ballistic surface-tosurface missiles — Prithvi and Agni. The Prithvi-I was a single-stage, liquid-fuelled missile developed in 1990. The warhead payload was 1,000 kg, had an accuracy of 10m to 50m, range of 150km and was

launched from transport launchers. This class of missiles was inducted into the IA in 1994. The Prithvi-II had a warhead of 300 kg and an extended range of 250km. It was test fired on January 1996 and was inducted in the IA and Air Force in 2004.

The range has been further enhanced to 350km and the warhead from 500 kg to 1,000 kg. The Prithvi series forms a part of the strategic component of our missiles.

The K-15 Sagarika is a submarinelaunched variant of the Prithvi missile.

This is a two-stage missile, the first is an underwater booster that powers the

34

missile to 5km above the surface of the ocean, the second is a solid-fuelled stage with a thrust motor that propels the missiles over 700km. Dhanush is a shiplaunched variant of the Prithvi missile. An enhanced version with a range of 350km was successfully test fired from INS Subhadra in December 2009.

The Agni missile system was first tested in 1989 and is capable of carrying a strategic payload of 1,000 kg. Agni-I is a single-stage, solid propellant which ranges from 700km to 800km. The circular error of probability is estimated to be about 25 m.

Agni-II ranges between 2,000km to 3,000km and is a two-staged missile. AgniIII, a three-stage solid propellant missile was successfully test fired on April 12, 2007 and again on February 7, 2010. This has a range from 3,500km to 5,000km with a payload of 2,000 kg to 2,500 kg. Agni-V with, an additional stage, is slated to be test fired in December, 2011, has a range of more than 5,000km. The Agni series is again with our strategic forces.

DRDO undertook an appraisal of IGDMP on January 8, 2008, and formally announced its successful completion.

Future Scenarios Apart from these missiles there are certain other missiles in the development stages.

Shaurya, the land version of underwater launcher K-1 , is stored in a canister and has a range of 600km. Tested in December 2008, Shaurya missiles can remain hidden in silos which enhance their survivability.

Shaurya, however, will need further tests before induction. The Prithvi air defence missile, named as the Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor, has a maximum interception altitude of 80km and is capable of engaging the 300km to 2,000 km of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5. 0

35

DRDO is also currently working on a missile for intercepting targets of ranges more than 5,000km and engaging them at altitudes of up to 150km. These tests are to commence shortly. Recently, DRDO tested a 150km ballistic missile Prahar which has an accuracy of less than 10 m. The requirement of this variant is to be weighed against the availability of cruise missiles which offer numerous advantages at these ranges. The DRDO is also developing a Beyond Visual Range Missile for fighter aircrafts. The Astra missile uses a terminal active radar seeker to find targets and a mid-course internal guidance with updates to track targets. The missile uses a solid propellant and attains a speed of Mach 4.0 and an altitude of 20km.

The range is 80km in a head-on situation and 15km in a tail chase.

The IGMDP has provided us a strategic, operational and tactical capability vis-a-vis our adversaries. However, there is a crucial need to focus on numerous developmental issues. First of all, there is an important aspect of achieving a greater degree of precision. Currently, all our strategic systems rely on the Inertial Navigation System (INS), a Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System). The precision obtained through these combinations gives you an accuracy of about 10 m. To attain greater accuracy there is a need for precision code which will entail the signing of communication agreements with the USA or Russia.

But, as is well known, such agreements enable other countries to peep into India’s entire military apparatus making it

missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:14 PM Page 6

WEAPONRY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

India’s nuclear-capable Agni-III missile rolls past during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi

AFP

Defence Minister A.K. Antony (second from left) inspects Akash missiles at Defence Research Development Organisation, Hyderabad

AFP

However, the development of missile technology will continue without any interruption. To this end, the focus shifted to Cruise missiles. BrahMos is a supersonic Cruise missile capable of being launched from multiple platforms — on land, sea, sub-surface and air — against land and sea targets. The missile has an identical configuration for land, sea and sub-surface platforms. It has a maximum range of 290km, a maximum velocity of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach and cruises at an altitude of 15km.

BrahMos supersedes most popular Cruise missiles in the world by three times in terms of velocity, flight-range, seeker-range and nine times the kill energy-range. The missile has been inducted in the IA and the Indian Navy (IN). DRDO is also developing a sub-sonic Cruise missile, Nirbhay, an extension of the Pilotless Target Aircraft Lakshya, it has a subsonic speed of 0.7 Mach. The missile is 6m in length, 520 mm diameter and has a range of 1,000 km.

Helicopter with a range of 7km named Helina. Though user trials of the missile have been completed there are a few issues yet to be resolved after which the IA will place firm orders for this variant.

Ballistic Missiles The success of the IGMDP lies in the development of the ballistic surface-tosurface missiles — Prithvi and Agni. The Prithvi-I was a single-stage, liquid-fuelled missile developed in 1990. The warhead payload was 1,000 kg, had an accuracy of 10m to 50m, range of 150km and was

launched from transport launchers. This class of missiles was inducted into the IA in 1994. The Prithvi-II had a warhead of 300 kg and an extended range of 250km. It was test fired on January 1996 and was inducted in the IA and Air Force in 2004.

The range has been further enhanced to 350km and the warhead from 500 kg to 1,000 kg. The Prithvi series forms a part of the strategic component of our missiles.

The K-15 Sagarika is a submarinelaunched variant of the Prithvi missile.

This is a two-stage missile, the first is an underwater booster that powers the

34

missile to 5km above the surface of the ocean, the second is a solid-fuelled stage with a thrust motor that propels the missiles over 700km. Dhanush is a shiplaunched variant of the Prithvi missile. An enhanced version with a range of 350km was successfully test fired from INS Subhadra in December 2009.

The Agni missile system was first tested in 1989 and is capable of carrying a strategic payload of 1,000 kg. Agni-I is a single-stage, solid propellant which ranges from 700km to 800km. The circular error of probability is estimated to be about 25 m.

Agni-II ranges between 2,000km to 3,000km and is a two-staged missile. AgniIII, a three-stage solid propellant missile was successfully test fired on April 12, 2007 and again on February 7, 2010. This has a range from 3,500km to 5,000km with a payload of 2,000 kg to 2,500 kg. Agni-V with, an additional stage, is slated to be test fired in December, 2011, has a range of more than 5,000km. The Agni series is again with our strategic forces.

DRDO undertook an appraisal of IGDMP on January 8, 2008, and formally announced its successful completion.

Future Scenarios Apart from these missiles there are certain other missiles in the development stages.

Shaurya, the land version of underwater launcher K-1 , is stored in a canister and has a range of 600km. Tested in December 2008, Shaurya missiles can remain hidden in silos which enhance their survivability.

Shaurya, however, will need further tests before induction. The Prithvi air defence missile, named as the Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor, has a maximum interception altitude of 80km and is capable of engaging the 300km to 2,000 km of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5. 0

35

DRDO is also currently working on a missile for intercepting targets of ranges more than 5,000km and engaging them at altitudes of up to 150km. These tests are to commence shortly. Recently, DRDO tested a 150km ballistic missile Prahar which has an accuracy of less than 10 m. The requirement of this variant is to be weighed against the availability of cruise missiles which offer numerous advantages at these ranges. The DRDO is also developing a Beyond Visual Range Missile for fighter aircrafts. The Astra missile uses a terminal active radar seeker to find targets and a mid-course internal guidance with updates to track targets. The missile uses a solid propellant and attains a speed of Mach 4.0 and an altitude of 20km.

The range is 80km in a head-on situation and 15km in a tail chase.

The IGMDP has provided us a strategic, operational and tactical capability vis-a-vis our adversaries. However, there is a crucial need to focus on numerous developmental issues. First of all, there is an important aspect of achieving a greater degree of precision. Currently, all our strategic systems rely on the Inertial Navigation System (INS), a Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System). The precision obtained through these combinations gives you an accuracy of about 10 m. To attain greater accuracy there is a need for precision code which will entail the signing of communication agreements with the USA or Russia.

But, as is well known, such agreements enable other countries to peep into India’s entire military apparatus making it

missiles.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:15 PM Page 8

AUGUST 2011

DSI

A soldier peers through the MILAN anti-tank missile launcher at an Army Day exhibition in Amritsar

vulnerable. There is no option but to develop indigenous communication and navigation systems to ensure that missiles are able to engage targets with a circular error of probability of less than 5 m.

Necessarily, the Government will have to discuss and task ISRO to launch a mininavigation system for guiding weapon systems thereby enabling surgical strikes to be undertaken. Presently, all missiles, except the country’s Shaurya and Sagarika, are fired from platforms above groundlevel. Since it is easy to detect them there is a requirement to develop the capability to fire them from silos which offer greater protection to weapon systems.

Significantly, ballistic missile defence systems being developed by India’s adversaries can intercept all missiles up to Mach 4.0. As a counter, the defence establishment needs to develop hypersonic missiles. More importantly, the satellites provide battlefield transparency enabling them to discern and track our weapon systems. Since there is a military requirement, during operations, to destroy them, missiles with satellite destruction capabilities need also to be developed and tested.

Further, the development of a Multiple, Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)

The development of a Multiple, Independent Re-entry Vehicle needs to be speeded up. Any future conflict in the subcontinent will be fought against a nuclear backdrop and necessarily nucleartipped ballistic missiles will only be used for deterrence. During the conflict both sides will use Cruise missiles.

36

”

needs to be speeded up. Any future conflict in the subcontinent will be fought against a nuclear backdrop and necessarily nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles will only be used for deterrence.

During the conflict both sides will use Cruise missiles for furthering their military aims which means that there is a requirement to counter them. This possibly will require sensors to be located in outer space to locate, track and finally guide and intercept missile to destroy any incoming weapon systems. Development in this field, possibly with collaborative technological assistance from abroad, will be a step in the right direction.

The IGMDP has made us capable of developing and manufacturing state-ofthe-art missiles at a reasonable cost and enhanced India’s military capabilities to deter Pakistan and dissuade China from undertaking war-like postures despite disputed border issues. As the nation’s areas of dispute mainly lie in the mountainous region her missiles should be capable of being deployed and fired in these terrain. Development of missiles is invariably an ongoing process which because of regional security considerations must continue at a deliberate pace.

AFP

WEAPONRY

216X276.indd 1

8/10/11 10:06:21 AM

America-pak relation_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:22 PM Page 2

REGION

AUGUST 2011

DSI

GROWING APART The elimination of Osama Bin Laden has increased tensions in US-Pakistan relations

G. PARTHASARATHY

ould you please explain how you justify your recommendation to American taxpayers that they should dole out billions from their hard earned money to assist a foreign Army that harbours, arms and trains terrorists who kill your soldiers in Afghanistan?” This question was posed to a top Pentagon official in 2009, just after he had called for Congressional approval for enhanced military assistance to Pakistan.

“That is a complicated issue,” was the only reply from the senior official. He, like many of his colleagues, believed that ‘soldier to soldier’ exchanges with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani will persuade the Pakistan Army to crackdown on Taliban’s Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura, its allies like the Haqqani network and the Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami, then led by ‘most wanted’ Ilyas Kashmiri.

C

38

Different Reality Politically, the Kayani-led Pakistani military establishment found that it could easily dominate decision making in the country, overriding the wishes of the civilian leadership. The Army consciously gave people in Pakistan the impression that while it was willing to take a nononsense position on relations with the US on issues like turning down American requests for military operations in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network,

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Islamabad

AFP

n America’s Afpak problems rose when Operation Enduring Freedom was launched to oust Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. n In May, the elimination of Osama Bin Laden led to a drastic downturn in US-Pakistan relations. n Pakistan is in dire economic straits and the establishment knows that earning the wrath of the US could well make the country bankrupt.

terror, the Pakistani military establishment had really adopted a policy of running with the Taliban hare while hunting with the American hound. Secondranking Al-Qaeda leaders captured with tip-offs from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were handed over to the Americans. But the ISI had no intention of handing over either the top Taliban or AlQaeda leadership. By 2009, a rearmed, re-equipped and well-trained Taliban militia struck back all across Afghanistan.

American casualties mounted at a time when President Barrack Obama was already showing signs of war fatigue.

Pakistan’s military leadership had, by then, calculated that with its economy in tatters and war weariness setting in, the US will sue for peace, at any cost. They also led themselves to believe that given the heavy dependence of the US on supply routes through their country, the US was just not in a position to alienate them through any form of punitive action.

AFP

KEY POINTS

Nearly two years have elapsed since that conversation with the American official, who is now hopefully a chastened and wiser man. America’s Afpak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) problems arose from the very first days of Operation Enduring Freedom, launched in October 2001, to oust Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers from the portals of power. This was unquestionably one of the worst planned and executed military operations in modern warfare. The Taliban was pushed out of Kabul not by the Americans but by forces of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance which had for years been trained, backed and equipped by Russia, Iran and India.

Worse still, no effort was made by the Americans to block the exit routes for the Taliban from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership went from Kandahar to Quetta. They were hosted in Pakistan in safe houses of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers and their Chechen and Uzbek affiliates, together with the cadres of the Haqqani network, escaped into the tribal areas of Pakistan’s then Northwest Frontier Agency. Operation Enduring Freedom only succeeded in dispersing, but not destroying, the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda leadership.

For nearly a decade thereafter, both the Bush and Obama Administrations chose to ignore the reality that while professing to be a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ally in America’s war on

39

America-pak relation_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:22 PM Page 2

REGION

AUGUST 2011

DSI

GROWING APART The elimination of Osama Bin Laden has increased tensions in US-Pakistan relations

G. PARTHASARATHY

ould you please explain how you justify your recommendation to American taxpayers that they should dole out billions from their hard earned money to assist a foreign Army that harbours, arms and trains terrorists who kill your soldiers in Afghanistan?” This question was posed to a top Pentagon official in 2009, just after he had called for Congressional approval for enhanced military assistance to Pakistan.

“That is a complicated issue,” was the only reply from the senior official. He, like many of his colleagues, believed that ‘soldier to soldier’ exchanges with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani will persuade the Pakistan Army to crackdown on Taliban’s Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura, its allies like the Haqqani network and the Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami, then led by ‘most wanted’ Ilyas Kashmiri.

C

38

Different Reality Politically, the Kayani-led Pakistani military establishment found that it could easily dominate decision making in the country, overriding the wishes of the civilian leadership. The Army consciously gave people in Pakistan the impression that while it was willing to take a nononsense position on relations with the US on issues like turning down American requests for military operations in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network,

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Islamabad

AFP

n America’s Afpak problems rose when Operation Enduring Freedom was launched to oust Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. n In May, the elimination of Osama Bin Laden led to a drastic downturn in US-Pakistan relations. n Pakistan is in dire economic straits and the establishment knows that earning the wrath of the US could well make the country bankrupt.

terror, the Pakistani military establishment had really adopted a policy of running with the Taliban hare while hunting with the American hound. Secondranking Al-Qaeda leaders captured with tip-offs from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were handed over to the Americans. But the ISI had no intention of handing over either the top Taliban or AlQaeda leadership. By 2009, a rearmed, re-equipped and well-trained Taliban militia struck back all across Afghanistan.

American casualties mounted at a time when President Barrack Obama was already showing signs of war fatigue.

Pakistan’s military leadership had, by then, calculated that with its economy in tatters and war weariness setting in, the US will sue for peace, at any cost. They also led themselves to believe that given the heavy dependence of the US on supply routes through their country, the US was just not in a position to alienate them through any form of punitive action.

AFP

KEY POINTS

Nearly two years have elapsed since that conversation with the American official, who is now hopefully a chastened and wiser man. America’s Afpak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) problems arose from the very first days of Operation Enduring Freedom, launched in October 2001, to oust Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers from the portals of power. This was unquestionably one of the worst planned and executed military operations in modern warfare. The Taliban was pushed out of Kabul not by the Americans but by forces of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance which had for years been trained, backed and equipped by Russia, Iran and India.

Worse still, no effort was made by the Americans to block the exit routes for the Taliban from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership went from Kandahar to Quetta. They were hosted in Pakistan in safe houses of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers and their Chechen and Uzbek affiliates, together with the cadres of the Haqqani network, escaped into the tribal areas of Pakistan’s then Northwest Frontier Agency. Operation Enduring Freedom only succeeded in dispersing, but not destroying, the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda leadership.

For nearly a decade thereafter, both the Bush and Obama Administrations chose to ignore the reality that while professing to be a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ally in America’s war on

39

America-pak relation_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:23 PM Page 4

REGION

AFP

Increasing Suspicions As tensions over the drone strikes grew, CIA suspicions about the ISI also increased, especially after an attack on Pakistan’s tribal areas by the Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani affiliates killed seven Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) personnel, deployed in a forward operating base in Khost on December 30, 2009. Unable to rely on the ISI for any real time intelligence on ISI assets like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was being looked upon by the Obama Administration as being a dangerous group, the CIA increasingly deployed contractors like Raymond Davis for meeting its needs.

The arrest of Raymond Davis on January 27, 2011, after he gunned down two Pakistanis, evidently trailing him in Lahore and his subsequent release on March 16, was a turning point in the outward manifestations of camaraderie between the CIA and the ISI. Then CIA director Leon Panetta who was already hot on the trail of Osama Bin Laden evidently realised that the gloves would have to come off, sooner rather than later, in dealing with a duplicitous ally.

If Panetta was infuriated by Pakistani duplicity on dealing with terrorist networks, the views of the American military commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, were not very different. General Petraeus soon realised that as long as Pakistan believed that it held the trump cards of being the route predominantly used for meeting the logistical needs of the US forces in Afghanistan, it would use this leverage to inhibit and prevent American punitive

Pakistanis in Multan protest against the arrest of Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, accused of acting as a Pakistani Government agent in America

AFP

or on the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Bill the civilian leadership was weak and was bowing to American pressures. The reality was somewhat different as it was the Army which privately informed the US Administration that it had no objection to drone attacks as long as they also included strikes on the Pakistani Taliban led by Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.

The understanding evidently was that the Pakistan Army would disclaim publicly any role in the US drone strikes. This was an arrangement fraught with dangers. As the Army kept denying any role in the American drone strikes it was forced by enraged domestic public opinion to condemn and demand an end to these strikes. As the stage was set for an inevitable showdown on the issue of drone strikes, civilian casualties from the strikes mounted.

AUGUST 2011

actions against safe havens on its territory.

It was largely as a result of his efforts — from the days when he was Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – that Petraeus ensured that dependence on the Southern route for supplies through Pakistan was reduced and the northern distribution network, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics, became the main route for meeting American logistical needs in Afghanistan. Indeed, the head of the US Army’s Transportation Command General William N. Fraser most recently informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that as against 70 percent two years ago, barely 35 percent of American supplies for forces in Afghanistan were now coming through Pakistan.

40

It is evident that as the US progressively lowers its troop levels in Afghanistan, the importance of Pakistan being critical to its supply needs in Afghanistan will also be significantly reduced.

Indications are that even after the Americans end participation in active combat operations in December 2014, they will retain enough forces to mount aerial operations in Afghanistan and in operations against terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. As the joint statement issued when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited New Delhi on July 19 states: “The two leaders reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security requires elimination of safe havens and infrastructure of terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan.” As

things stand, Pakistan appears to have made a grave miscalculation by believing that it held all the trump cards on relations with the US and that it would be able to ensure the early exit of US forces with its Taliban assets filling in the ensuing military and political vacuum.

The May 2, 2011, operation by American Special Forces, which eliminated Osama Bin Laden, has led to a drastic downturn in US-Pakistan relations. The Pakistan military establishment made the unbelievable assertion that it had no knowledge of the fact that the most wanted terrorist in the world had been residing for around six years in the garrison town of Abbotabad in a house less than a mile away from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy.

The arrest of a physician in Abbotabad, Dr Shakil Afridi, who has been charged with assisting the CIA, has been followed by an American retaliation against the ISI-funded Washington-based, head of the Kashmiri American Council, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai.

41

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Rather than acknowledging its role in Osama’s presence in Pakistan or apologising that it had been criminally negligent in allowing Osama to hide in Abbotabad, the Army raised anti-American sentiments on the issue by claiming that the US had blatantly violated Pakistan’s territorial integrity. The arrest of a physician in Abbotabad, Dr Shakil Afridi, who has been charged with assisting the CIA, has been followed by an American retaliation against the ISI-funded Washington-based, head of the Kashmiri American Council, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai. Despite tensions in US-Pakistan relations, there are strong and influential voices in both sides calling for cooling existing anger and rhetoric. Pakistan is in dire economic straits and its rulers know that earning the wrath of the US could well make the country bankrupt.

Moreover, Pakistan’s attempts to get China to fill the vacuum, in the event of an end to American military and economic assistance, have been rebuffed by Beijing. It should have been evident to the likes of General Kayani that while the Chinese will go along with military and economic assistance to Pakistan to ‘contain’ India, they will not risk American wrath merely to bail out a cash-strapped Pakistan which has avoidably incurred American ire.

Attempts to play the ‘Iranian Card’ by high-level visits to Tehran by Pakistani leaders are also unlikely to impress the Americans, who know the importance of Saudi Arabia’s role in Pakistan.

The Americans, in turn, have a vital interest in developments in Pakistan. They have to ensure that Pakistani soil is not used for yet another 9/11 style terrorist strike. Moreover, they have to remain physically present, given international concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

India has a vital interest in the manner in which developments in its Afpak neighbourhood play out. While Pakistan evidently realises that another 26/11 type terrorist will have serious consequences, there is nothing to indicate that General Kayani and his Corps Commanders have any intention to act decisively against terrorist and extremist groups they have backed for over two decades now. Thus, while engagement with Pakistan through dialogue is desirable and necessary, it will be unwise to raise hopes or expectations that India is anywhere near reaching a normal, good neighbourly relationship with its western neighbour.

America-pak relation_3.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:23 PM Page 4

REGION

AFP

Increasing Suspicions As tensions over the drone strikes grew, CIA suspicions about the ISI also increased, especially after an attack on Pakistan’s tribal areas by the Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani affiliates killed seven Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) personnel, deployed in a forward operating base in Khost on December 30, 2009. Unable to rely on the ISI for any real time intelligence on ISI assets like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was being looked upon by the Obama Administration as being a dangerous group, the CIA increasingly deployed contractors like Raymond Davis for meeting its needs.

The arrest of Raymond Davis on January 27, 2011, after he gunned down two Pakistanis, evidently trailing him in Lahore and his subsequent release on March 16, was a turning point in the outward manifestations of camaraderie between the CIA and the ISI. Then CIA director Leon Panetta who was already hot on the trail of Osama Bin Laden evidently realised that the gloves would have to come off, sooner rather than later, in dealing with a duplicitous ally.

If Panetta was infuriated by Pakistani duplicity on dealing with terrorist networks, the views of the American military commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, were not very different. General Petraeus soon realised that as long as Pakistan believed that it held the trump cards of being the route predominantly used for meeting the logistical needs of the US forces in Afghanistan, it would use this leverage to inhibit and prevent American punitive

Pakistanis in Multan protest against the arrest of Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, accused of acting as a Pakistani Government agent in America

AFP

or on the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Bill the civilian leadership was weak and was bowing to American pressures. The reality was somewhat different as it was the Army which privately informed the US Administration that it had no objection to drone attacks as long as they also included strikes on the Pakistani Taliban led by Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.

The understanding evidently was that the Pakistan Army would disclaim publicly any role in the US drone strikes. This was an arrangement fraught with dangers. As the Army kept denying any role in the American drone strikes it was forced by enraged domestic public opinion to condemn and demand an end to these strikes. As the stage was set for an inevitable showdown on the issue of drone strikes, civilian casualties from the strikes mounted.

AUGUST 2011

actions against safe havens on its territory.

It was largely as a result of his efforts — from the days when he was Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – that Petraeus ensured that dependence on the Southern route for supplies through Pakistan was reduced and the northern distribution network, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics, became the main route for meeting American logistical needs in Afghanistan. Indeed, the head of the US Army’s Transportation Command General William N. Fraser most recently informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that as against 70 percent two years ago, barely 35 percent of American supplies for forces in Afghanistan were now coming through Pakistan.

40

It is evident that as the US progressively lowers its troop levels in Afghanistan, the importance of Pakistan being critical to its supply needs in Afghanistan will also be significantly reduced.

Indications are that even after the Americans end participation in active combat operations in December 2014, they will retain enough forces to mount aerial operations in Afghanistan and in operations against terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. As the joint statement issued when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited New Delhi on July 19 states: “The two leaders reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security requires elimination of safe havens and infrastructure of terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan.” As

things stand, Pakistan appears to have made a grave miscalculation by believing that it held all the trump cards on relations with the US and that it would be able to ensure the early exit of US forces with its Taliban assets filling in the ensuing military and political vacuum.

The May 2, 2011, operation by American Special Forces, which eliminated Osama Bin Laden, has led to a drastic downturn in US-Pakistan relations. The Pakistan military establishment made the unbelievable assertion that it had no knowledge of the fact that the most wanted terrorist in the world had been residing for around six years in the garrison town of Abbotabad in a house less than a mile away from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy.

The arrest of a physician in Abbotabad, Dr Shakil Afridi, who has been charged with assisting the CIA, has been followed by an American retaliation against the ISI-funded Washington-based, head of the Kashmiri American Council, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai.

41

”

DSI

Rather than acknowledging its role in Osama’s presence in Pakistan or apologising that it had been criminally negligent in allowing Osama to hide in Abbotabad, the Army raised anti-American sentiments on the issue by claiming that the US had blatantly violated Pakistan’s territorial integrity. The arrest of a physician in Abbotabad, Dr Shakil Afridi, who has been charged with assisting the CIA, has been followed by an American retaliation against the ISI-funded Washington-based, head of the Kashmiri American Council, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai. Despite tensions in US-Pakistan relations, there are strong and influential voices in both sides calling for cooling existing anger and rhetoric. Pakistan is in dire economic straits and its rulers know that earning the wrath of the US could well make the country bankrupt.

Moreover, Pakistan’s attempts to get China to fill the vacuum, in the event of an end to American military and economic assistance, have been rebuffed by Beijing. It should have been evident to the likes of General Kayani that while the Chinese will go along with military and economic assistance to Pakistan to ‘contain’ India, they will not risk American wrath merely to bail out a cash-strapped Pakistan which has avoidably incurred American ire.

Attempts to play the ‘Iranian Card’ by high-level visits to Tehran by Pakistani leaders are also unlikely to impress the Americans, who know the importance of Saudi Arabia’s role in Pakistan.

The Americans, in turn, have a vital interest in developments in Pakistan. They have to ensure that Pakistani soil is not used for yet another 9/11 style terrorist strike. Moreover, they have to remain physically present, given international concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

India has a vital interest in the manner in which developments in its Afpak neighbourhood play out. While Pakistan evidently realises that another 26/11 type terrorist will have serious consequences, there is nothing to indicate that General Kayani and his Corps Commanders have any intention to act decisively against terrorist and extremist groups they have backed for over two decades now. Thus, while engagement with Pakistan through dialogue is desirable and necessary, it will be unwise to raise hopes or expectations that India is anywhere near reaching a normal, good neighbourly relationship with its western neighbour.

Indo Sovit_2_2nd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:33 PM Page 2

HISTORY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

LANDMARK ALLIANCE

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with Soviet leader and General Secretary of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev during a visit to Moscow; (facing page) with American President Richard Nixon during an official visit to the US

Forty years later, the Indo-Soviet Treaty has outlived its original objective but when it was signed it was a major landmark in international affairs

S

INDER MALHOTRA

KEY POINTS Initially, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was with Soviet Russia in no hurry to formalise a partnership that would offend the other superpower. n The growing proximity of America to Pakistan and China resulted in the signing of the treaty. n The treaty is the only international accord, bilateral or multilateral, that recognises India’s policy of Non-Alignment.

AFP

n

42

43

friendship treaty to Delhi in 1969, Indira Gandhi put it on the back-burner. She was in no hurry to affix her signature to a document that might offend the USA, the other superpower. Moreover, she and her Government did not care for some clauses in the Soviet draft.

This situation could have lasted much longer but for the profound change in the international power balance resulting from the secret visit to Beijing of Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser in July 1971. The Bangladesh crisis had reached its crescendo. Millions of hapless Bangladeshi refugees were pouring into India for shelter and succor. Before his clandestine flight to China, Kissinger had visited Delhi and left no doubt that the notorious

AFP

igned on August 9, 1971, amidst the mounting Bangladesh crisis that was inexorably leading to an IndiaPakistan war, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is more or less forgotten now, but at that time it was a major milestone in international affairs, rather like some other climactic events that contributed hugely to making it inevitable. It was Prime Minister Morarji Desai, of all people, who remarked that the United States had ‘driven us to signing this treaty,’ that he didn’t particularly like the US, is well known. He was right, of course, but let me begin the story from the beginning.

The original idea of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the leading non-aligned nation and the mighty leader of the Communist Bloc goes back exactly sixty years. In 1951, the Soviet Foreign Office suggested to India’s then Ambassador, S. Radhakrishnan, that such a treaty will promote all-round, especially economic, relations between the two sides.

The proposal made no headway, however, because then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told Dr Radhakrishnan to convey to his interlocutors that the idea was very good but ‘in the interest of India’s wider foreign policy,’ it was best avoided. There were no hard feelings on either side.

By the end of the 1960s, Indo-Soviet relations had expanded enormously. Given the attitude of the West, the USSR (Russia) had become the major supplier of military hardware to India. Yet, when the then Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, brought the first draft of a

Indo Sovit_2_2nd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:33 PM Page 2

HISTORY

AUGUST 2011

DSI

LANDMARK ALLIANCE

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with Soviet leader and General Secretary of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev during a visit to Moscow; (facing page) with American President Richard Nixon during an official visit to the US

Forty years later, the Indo-Soviet Treaty has outlived its original objective but when it was signed it was a major landmark in international affairs

S

INDER MALHOTRA

KEY POINTS Initially, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was with Soviet Russia in no hurry to formalise a partnership that would offend the other superpower. n The growing proximity of America to Pakistan and China resulted in the signing of the treaty. n The treaty is the only international accord, bilateral or multilateral, that recognises India’s policy of Non-Alignment.

AFP

n

42

43

friendship treaty to Delhi in 1969, Indira Gandhi put it on the back-burner. She was in no hurry to affix her signature to a document that might offend the USA, the other superpower. Moreover, she and her Government did not care for some clauses in the Soviet draft.

This situation could have lasted much longer but for the profound change in the international power balance resulting from the secret visit to Beijing of Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser in July 1971. The Bangladesh crisis had reached its crescendo. Millions of hapless Bangladeshi refugees were pouring into India for shelter and succor. Before his clandestine flight to China, Kissinger had visited Delhi and left no doubt that the notorious

AFP

igned on August 9, 1971, amidst the mounting Bangladesh crisis that was inexorably leading to an IndiaPakistan war, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is more or less forgotten now, but at that time it was a major milestone in international affairs, rather like some other climactic events that contributed hugely to making it inevitable. It was Prime Minister Morarji Desai, of all people, who remarked that the United States had ‘driven us to signing this treaty,’ that he didn’t particularly like the US, is well known. He was right, of course, but let me begin the story from the beginning.

The original idea of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the leading non-aligned nation and the mighty leader of the Communist Bloc goes back exactly sixty years. In 1951, the Soviet Foreign Office suggested to India’s then Ambassador, S. Radhakrishnan, that such a treaty will promote all-round, especially economic, relations between the two sides.

The proposal made no headway, however, because then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told Dr Radhakrishnan to convey to his interlocutors that the idea was very good but ‘in the interest of India’s wider foreign policy,’ it was best avoided. There were no hard feelings on either side.

By the end of the 1960s, Indo-Soviet relations had expanded enormously. Given the attitude of the West, the USSR (Russia) had become the major supplier of military hardware to India. Yet, when the then Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, brought the first draft of a

Indo Sovit_2_2nd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:33 PM Page 4

HISTORY

AUGUST 2011

Nixon-Kissinger ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan would continue. Now the US and China, erstwhile enemies for 20 years, had suddenly become virtual allies. In relation to Bangladesh both were determined to back the side that was morally in the wrong and militarily doomed to defeat.

Worse was to follow.

Strategic Virtuosity Two days after what the Japanese nicknamed the ‘Nixon Shockku’ Kissinger told then Indian Ambassador to the US, L.K. Jha, that if China intervened in any India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh, New Delhi ‘should not accept any help from Washington.’ That is when Indira Gandhi displayed both the steel that was in her and her strategic virtuosity.

She asked her trusted aide and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, D.P. Dhar, to go to Moscow and settle, to Indian satisfaction, the contents of the draft treaty that had been under discussion for two years. This he did with remarkable speed

Beijing made any attempt to and skill. It is noteworthy Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora intervene in any war that there is no military (centre), points to a between India and Pakistan clause in the treaty. Its Article photograph showing him 9 only says that in the event with Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi that might develop over Bangladesh it would have to of the security of either of the of the Pakistan Army reckon with Moscow’s parties being threatened, the signing the surrender two sides would ‘engage in document in 1971, at War reaction. When Nixon arrogantly ordered a mutual consultations.’ That Museum, Dhaka nuclear naval task force of made nonsense of the Western, particularly American, criticism the US Sixth Fleet to sail across the Malacca that India had become a military ally of the Straits into the Bay of Bengal, Soviet submarines and surface ships followed it Soviet Union.

Within India criticism of the treaty was all the way.

Moreover, the Soviet leader Leonid limited and muted because people were generally conscious of the escalating Brezhnev warned Nixon never to attempt dangers to Indian security. Another the kind of Marine landings at Chittagong remarkable feature of the treaty was that it that had taken place at Inchon during the is the only international accord, bilateral or Korean War in the early 1950s.

If the tectonic change in US-China multilateral, that specifically recognises relations, and thus in the world powerIndia’s policy of Non-Alignment.

Did the treaty actually serve any balance, convinced Indira Gandhi of the purpose during the Bangladesh War? Of need for the Indo-Soviet treaty, the course it did in ample measure. As soon as it American essay in nuclear gunboat was inked the Soviet Union warned China, diplomacy during the Bangladesh War in the strongest possible terms, that if that India was winning speedily drove her

44

AFP

AFP

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry A. Medvedev, in Sanya, China

to an even more far-reaching resolve. She was infuriated but remained calm. She simply called Raja Ramanna, the country’s premier nuclear scientist and director of the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC), named after the legendary founder of the nuclear research and development programme in India, to Delhi. In complete secrecy she told him to start preparing for India’s first ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) underground.

PNEs were at that time very much on the world’s nuclear agenda. Both the US and the Soviet Union were conducting a great many of these. After the first Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had sanctioned Dr Homi Bhaba’s proposal for a subterranean nuclear explosion project. But because of the untimely deaths of both Shastri and Bhaba, in quick succession, nothing was done. Before the Bangladesh crisis, however, the nuclear weapon powers, determined to prevent all non-nuclear countries from going nuclear, had started

arguing — correctly — that there was no difference between a PNE and a nuclear test.

Political Turmoil It was on May 18, 1974, that Indian scientists, headed by Dr Ramanna, conducted a successful underground detonation at Pokhran in Rajasthan. Indira Gandhi was by then in deep political trouble in the country.

The afterglow of the tremendous triumph in Bangladesh was gone. Feeding 10 million refugees had emptied the Government’s overflowing granaries. At this juncture the rains also failed. And then came the 1973 oil shock. Consequent shortages led to soaring prices and mass discontent, further aggravated by corruption and arrogance of many of her followers. The Nav Nirman agitation in Gujarat soon morphed into the countrywide ‘J P Movement,’ so called because it was spearheaded by Jayaprakash Narayan, the respected Gandhian leader, to oust Indira Gandhi.

Against this backdrop the swelling ranks of India’s critics alleged she had ‘staged’ the

45

DSI

nuclear explosion to divert attention from her misdeeds and concomitant unpopularity. These innocent souls did not know that it is impossible to have a nuclear test at the spur of the moment.

Celebration of India’s entry into the most exclusive nuclear club could not stem the tide of discontent against the Prime Minister and her Government. Thirteen months later, a shattering misfortune hit her. The Allahabad High Court unseated her in Parliament and barred her from holding public office for six years. The rest is history. To save herself she declared a state of Emergency, suspended the Constitution, arrested her political opponents and censored the press. When she decided to hold the much-delayed election, she was thrown out.

When the successor Janata Government, headed by Morarji Desai, came to power it looked for ‘secret clauses’ in the Indo-Soviet Treaty but found none. Desai was inclined to forswear India’s nuclear option. Luckily, his colleagues did not allow him to do so. Even so, he transferred Ramanna out of the Atomic Energy establishment to the Defence Ministry.

On her return to power in January 1980, Indira Gandhi sent Ramanna back to BARC, and saw to it that there was no let up in the quest for up-to-date nuclear technology. Yet she did not want India to make nuclear weapons.

On succeeding his mother after her assassination, Rajiv Gandhi, stuck to her policy until 1988 when he authorised the manufacture of nuclear weapons after he was sure that Pakistan had crossed the red line and developed a bomb. But for all this, the Shakti series of tests in June 1998 might not have been possible.

To revert to the Indo-Soviet treaty, it came within Indira Gandhi’s ken only once again – in 1981. Soviet Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, sought a meeting with her to suggest that the 10th anniversary of the treaty be observed with due éclat. She talked to him pleasantly but said nothing about his proposal. He got the message. One reason for this was that the Soviet Union was by then deep in the Afghan quagmire. The more pertinent cause, however, was that the treaty had outlived its objective.

Together with some other analysts, I believe, that the 1974 nuclear detonation was addressed to both Washington and Moscow: the Americans were told that they shouldn’t try nuclear blackmail on India, the Russians that their nuclear umbrella was no longer needed.

Indo Sovit_2_2nd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/08/11 2:33 PM Page 4

HISTORY

AUGUST 2011

Nixon-Kissinger ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan would continue. Now the US and China, erstwhile enemies for 20 years, had suddenly become virtual allies. In relation to Bangladesh both were determined to back the side that was morally in the wrong and militarily doomed to defeat.

Worse was to follow.

Strategic Virtuosity Two days after what the Japanese nicknamed the ‘Nixon Shockku’ Kissinger told then Indian Ambassador to the US, L.K. Jha, that if China intervened in any India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh, New Delhi ‘should not accept any help from Washington.’ That is when Indira Gandhi displayed both the steel that was in her and her strategic virtuosity.

She asked her trusted aide and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, D.P. Dhar, to go to Moscow and settle, to Indian satisfaction, the contents of the draft treaty that had been under discussion for two years. This he did with remarkable speed

Beijing made any attempt to and skill. It is noteworthy Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora intervene in any war that there is no military (centre), points to a between India and Pakistan clause in the treaty. Its Article photograph showing him 9 only says that in the event with Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi that might develop over Bangladesh it would have to of the security of either of the of the Pakistan Army reckon with Moscow’s parties being threatened, the signing the surrender two sides would ‘engage in document in 1971, at War reaction. When Nixon arrogantly ordered a mutual consultations.’ That Museum, Dhaka nuclear naval task force of made nonsense of the Western, particularly American, criticism the US Sixth Fleet to sail across the Malacca that India had become a military ally of the Straits into the Bay of Bengal, Soviet submarines and surface ships followed it Soviet Union.

Within India criticism of the treaty was all the way.

Moreover, the Soviet leader Leonid limited and muted because people were generally conscious of the escalating Brezhnev warned Nixon never to attempt dangers to Indian security. Another the kind of Marine landings at Chittagong remarkable feature of the treaty was that it that had taken place at Inchon during the is the only international accord, bilateral or Korean War in the early 1950s.

If the tectonic change in US-China multilateral, that specifically recognises relations, and thus in the world powerIndia’s policy of Non-Alignment.

Did the treaty actually serve any balance, convinced Indira Gandhi of the purpose during the Bangladesh War? Of need for the Indo-Soviet treaty, the course it did in ample measure. As soon as it American essay in nuclear gunboat was inked the Soviet Union warned China, diplomacy during the Bangladesh War in the strongest possible terms, that if that India was winning speedily drove her

44

AFP

AFP

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry A. Medvedev, in Sanya, China

to an even more far-reaching resolve. She was infuriated but remained calm. She simply called Raja Ramanna, the country’s premier nuclear scientist and director of the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC), named after the legendary founder of the nuclear research and development programme in India, to Delhi. In complete secrecy she told him to start preparing for India’s first ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) underground.

PNEs were at that time very much on the world’s nuclear agenda. Both the US and the Soviet Union were conducting a great many of these. After the first Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had sanctioned Dr Homi Bhaba’s proposal for a subterranean nuclear explosion project. But because of the untimely deaths of both Shastri and Bhaba, in quick succession, nothing was done. Before the Bangladesh crisis, however, the nuclear weapon powers, determined to prevent all non-nuclear countries from going nuclear, had started

arguing — correctly — that there was no difference between a PNE and a nuclear test.

Political Turmoil It was on May 18, 1974, that Indian scientists, headed by Dr Ramanna, conducted a successful underground detonation at Pokhran in Rajasthan. Indira Gandhi was by then in deep political trouble in the country.

The afterglow of the tremendous triumph in Bangladesh was gone. Feeding 10 million refugees had emptied the Government’s overflowing granaries. At this juncture the rains also failed. And then came the 1973 oil shock. Consequent shortages led to soaring prices and mass discontent, further aggravated by corruption and arrogance of many of her followers. The Nav Nirman agitation in Gujarat soon morphed into the countrywide ‘J P Movement,’ so called because it was spearheaded by Jayaprakash Narayan, the respected Gandhian leader, to oust Indira Gandhi.

Against this backdrop the swelling ranks of India’s critics alleged she had ‘staged’ the

45

DSI

nuclear explosion to divert attention from her misdeeds and concomitant unpopularity. These innocent souls did not know that it is impossible to have a nuclear test at the spur of the moment.

Celebration of India’s entry into the most exclusive nuclear club could not stem the tide of discontent against the Prime Minister and her Government. Thirteen months later, a shattering misfortune hit her. The Allahabad High Court unseated her in Parliament and barred her from holding public office for six years. The rest is history. To save herself she declared a state of Emergency, suspended the Constitution, arrested her political opponents and censored the press. When she decided to hold the much-delayed election, she was thrown out.

When the successor Janata Government, headed by Morarji Desai, came to power it looked for ‘secret clauses’ in the Indo-Soviet Treaty but found none. Desai was inclined to forswear India’s nuclear option. Luckily, his colleagues did not allow him to do so. Even so, he transferred Ramanna out of the Atomic Energy establishment to the Defence Ministry.

On her return to power in January 1980, Indira Gandhi sent Ramanna back to BARC, and saw to it that there was no let up in the quest for up-to-date nuclear technology. Yet she did not want India to make nuclear weapons.

On succeeding his mother after her assassination, Rajiv Gandhi, stuck to her policy until 1988 when he authorised the manufacture of nuclear weapons after he was sure that Pakistan had crossed the red line and developed a bomb. But for all this, the Shakti series of tests in June 1998 might not have been possible.

To revert to the Indo-Soviet treaty, it came within Indira Gandhi’s ken only once again – in 1981. Soviet Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, sought a meeting with her to suggest that the 10th anniversary of the treaty be observed with due éclat. She talked to him pleasantly but said nothing about his proposal. He got the message. One reason for this was that the Soviet Union was by then deep in the Afghan quagmire. The more pertinent cause, however, was that the treaty had outlived its objective.

Together with some other analysts, I believe, that the 1974 nuclear detonation was addressed to both Washington and Moscow: the Americans were told that they shouldn’t try nuclear blackmail on India, the Russians that their nuclear umbrella was no longer needed.

Defence Buzz_2.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 05/08/11 2:35 PM Page 2

DEFENCE BUZZ

AUGUST 2011

DSI

a n

u p d a t e

o n

d e f e n c e

Soldiers in Kargil during the 1999 war

Old Whine, New Bottle A 14-MEMBER task force comprising former military chiefs, nuclear, intelligence, foreign and home office officials began on July 1 a review of the country’s military reforms a decade after changes were initiated following the 1999 Kargil conflict.

Headed by Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and India’s Ambassador to the US, the task force will in six months assess defence management measures initiated by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2001 and recommend changes to make good the many remaining shortfalls.

Task force members include former Air Chief Marshal S.Krishnaswamy, (retd), Lt Gen V.R. Raghavan, former Atomic Energy chief Anil Kakodkar, former Indian Navy (IN) Chief Admiral Arun Prakash, former R&AW head, K.C.Verma, ex-Home Secretary V.K.Duggal, former diplomat G.Parthasarathy and senior journalist Manoj Joshi. The GoM followed the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) established by former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s Government to investigate the Pakistani military’s undetected intrusion into Kargil’s mountainous region in May 1999. This led to an 11-week long conflict in which 1,200 soldiers, from both sides died, and brought the rivals to the brink of a nuclear exchange before the US intervened to end the conflagration.

Four committees were established after the KRC’s report to restructure India’s inchoate defence and border management, intelligence gathering and internal security measures some of their recommendations were implemented by the GoM. These included the establishment of the Defence Procurement Board and the Defence

46

Acquisition Council but crucial changes like merging the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the respective Services Headquarters for smoother functioning were not implemented.

Several of the Group of Minister’s other crucial recommendations like the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) also remain unfulfilled and require swift execution particularly as India is now a nuclear weapon state. For this real-time intelligence, seamless communication and increasingly automated battlefield requirements’ demand that the Services be restructured, trained and equipped in an integrated manner for which a CDS is vital. But successive administrations have been loath to appoint a four-star CDS in order to nurture ‘jointmanship’ between the three Services and reduce internecine turf battles particularly with regard to allocating military budgets.

According to the GoM, the CDS was envisaged as a ‘single-point’ military advisor to the Government and overall head of the multi-service Strategic Forces Command, the newly formed Defence Intelligence Agency, handling promotions and all Service procurements. Military and MoD officials admit that differences between the three Services over the appointment of a CDS are hampering not only the long overdue revamp of India’s military apparatus but are also adversely impacting management of the newly created Strategic Forces Command.

More importantly, the armed forces continue largely to be excluded from the national security loop and are not “adequately consulted” by the Government on operational and strategic matters.

AFP

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n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

216X276.indd 1

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Defence Buzz_2.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 05/08/11 2:36 PM Page 4

DEFENCE BUZZ “This [disconnect] can result in huge communication gaps between what is politically desirable and what is being planned by the military,” a former military chief declared without wanting to be named.

The Integrated Defence Staff was created as a ‘watered down CDS’ in October 2001, and as a precursor to appointing a CDS. But his secretariat has been unsuccessful in reducing the military’s isolation from nuclear-policy and overall strategic planning that is conducted largely by the MoD and associated civilians with limited stakes.

And as there is no horizontal integration between the Service Headquarters and the Defence Ministry, a combative mentality has grown between the two. Moreover, there is strong inter-Service competition for a larger share of the country’s nuclear arsenal and resources for developing it with little attempt at a unified approach. The CDS was intended as the central authority to harmonise those efforts, a position, hopefully, the present task force will emphasise.

AUGUST 2011

additional 10 in 2005 — in France by end-2014 and the remaining 47 retrofitted in as many months by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bengaluru. The cost for creating the necessary infrastructure at HAL, estimated at around ` 30 billion, comprises part of the overall upgrade programme.

The Mirage 2000H retrofit was repeatedly deferred by the IAF and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) following price differences with manufacturers Dassault Aviation and Thales. The Thales-Dassault combine were demanding ` 100-150 billion-or ` 2.2-2.9 billion per aircraft, to retrofit the Mirage2000Hs, an amount the MoD maintained was ‘unacceptable’ as each aircraft upgrade cost was equivalent to the price a new fighter.

Thales officials, however, have rationalised this expense claiming that the upgrade will provide IAF commanders the flexibility to commit fewer aircraft on combat missions for higher success rates, thereby rendering the upgrade cost effective

The French Connection The long-postponed retrofit of the Indian Air Forces (IAF’s) 51 medium-role Vajra Mirage 2000H fighters to Mirage 2000-5 levels for an estimated ` 109 billion (USD2.4 billion) was inked recently in Paris ending years of contentious, often belligerent negotiation.

The retrofit includes equipping the Mirage2000H fleet with advanced avionics, fully integrated electronic warfare suites, advanced Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability, mission computers, pulse-doppler radar capable of identifying objects up to a distance of 70 nm and superior ordnance.

An all-glass cockpit, jammers, countermeasure systems and aerial re-fuelling pods for enhanced endurance will be part of the upgrade to keep the Mirage 2000Hs in service with the IAF for over 20-25 years and increasing its reach, maneuverability and lethality.

However, IAF sources say that the proposed weapons package for the retrofit for an additional USD700-900 million – driving the overall upgrade package to over USD 3 billion – which includes some 450 MBDA-supplied fire-and-forget interception and aerial combat MICA missiles – was still under negotiation. This reportedly follows objections from the Finance Ministry over the high price MBDA is demanding for the ordnance.

The Mirage 2000H retrofit envisages upgrading four Mirage 2000Hs – of which the IAF has inducted 42 single-seat and eight trainers in the mid-1980s and acquired an

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listed in support of the IAF’s ongoing procurement of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). A final decision on the MMRCA is expected ‘soon’ and both European aircraft manufacturers are lobbying hard to push their respective models in a contract.

Earlier, in January 2008 with an eye on the MMRCA tender Dassault’s Chief Executive Officer Charles Edelstenne, accompanying French President Nicholas Sarkozy on his India visit, had made an unsolicited offer of supplying the IAF 40 Rafale fighters pending an ‘eventual decision’ to augment its dwindling fighter fleet. “If India is interested, we are ready to answer [with Rafale fighters].

The offer stands,” Edelstenne had declared, adding, that the proposal to supply 40 Rafale’s was a ‘short-term measure’ keeping in mind delays that normally accompany all Indian defence contracts. “We have some experience with Indian delays which is why Dassault has made the unsolicited offer,” he stated adding that French Government’s Mirage 2000H

albeit without the critical active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

In comparison, upgrading the IAF’s 63 MiG-29 fighters presently underway in Russia, is costing USD964 million or a reasonable USD15.3 million each. The retrofit will render the MiG-29 from being an aerial interceptor and air dominance fighter to becoming a fighter-bomber capable of striking mobile and stationary targets on ground and at sea with high-precision weapons under all weather conditions.

Industry analysts, meanwhile, link the Mirage 2000H upgrade to the acquisition of Dassault’s Rafale, one of the two fighters, alongside Eurofighter’s Typhoon, short-

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policies were more conducive than those of the US for smooth defence ties with India.

“Our market is for countries that want to be independent of the US. The US policy [of imposing sanctions and stopping military deals] is well-known. We are a country which sells military equipment without any preconditions,” he said with ill-disguised Gaelic disdain for the US. The Dassault head was referring to USimposed sanctions on India for its 1998 nuclear tests that impacted negatively on several domestic military projects and in providing spares to Indian Navy (IN) helicopters, a measure that severely curtailed their operational mobility. The

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DEFENCE BUZZ sanctions were eventually lifted in October 2001 also impacted adversely on Tejas, India’s indigenous Light Combat Aircraft programme delaying its development by several years as it is powered by a USsupplied engine.

In the brouhaha surrounding the ongoing MMRCA purchase, few will recall that the IAF, under Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy, had, in early 2002 opened preliminary discussions with Dassualt with a view to acquiring 126 Mirage 2000-5 fighters to enhance its strike and nuclear deterrence capabilities. This followed tacit French support for India’s multiple nuclear tests and envisaged the IAF acquiring 36 Mirage 20005s, as an adjunct to the earlier Mirage 2000H procurement in completed form with the remainder to be assembled by HAL. But soon thereafter, much to France’s chagrin, the MoD and the IAF expanded the IAF’s acquisition to the MMRCA tender to eventually include six rival aircraft. Dassault also discontinued building the Mirage 2000-5, investing heavily instead developing the Rafale which presently is in service only with the French Air Force.

Room for Improvement The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) anticipates additional orders for Arjun Mk-II, the upgraded version of its locally designed Main Battle Tank (MBT), once it completes user-trials around October 2012. Officials from DRDO’s Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) in Chennai say they expect an order for around 250 Arjun Mk-II MBTs that aims to incorporate some 88 improvements over the Arjun Mk-I model which the Army has taken delivery of 124 and has an equal number on order.

Staggered Arjun Mk-II trials, incorporating many of the improvements, have already started and by early 2012 the MBT will integrate some 45 changes including a new transmission control system and modified fuel tanks which will undergo 1,000km of trials in the Rajasthan desert.

Thereafter in October 2012, the Arjun Mk-II, absorbing all enhancements like a new, locally developed engine and transmission system, missile firing capability through its 120mm gun, advanced explosive reactive armour and a modified hull and turret to reduce its sizeable silhouette, will be handed over to the Army for final user-trials.

Advanced thermal imaging and communication systems, panoramic sights and air conditioning will also be incorporated into the upgraded MBT.

AUGUST 2011

Arjun Mk-I Main Battle Tank

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comparative trials in Rajasthan in March 2010 after which additional orders followed.

Defence industry sources, however, question DRDO-CVRDE claims that Arjun Mk-II will be 90 percent indigenous and consequently cheaper than the Mk-I model which costs `150-170 million (USD 3.33-3.77 million) each as a large proportion of its systems and assemblies will continue to be imported. Currently, some 60 percent of the Arjun Mk-Is comprises imported components, a status, many industry specialists believe, is unlikely to vary.

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions To accomplish this makeover CVRDE has concluded consultancies with Israel Military Industries and Elbit Systems of Israel to assist in improving the Arjun MK-II’s mobility, redesigning its turret and hull, improving its production-line processes, enhancing its firepower and overall battlefield survivability. The retrofitted MBT is likely to be powered by the liquid-cooled, direct injection 38 litre V12 QSK-38 engine from Cummins of the US which will be linked to the French SESM ESM-500 transmission system, an amalgamation presently under development. This will replace the German MTU 838Ka-501 diesel engine and semiautomatic RENK RK-304A transmission combination fitted onto Arjun Mk-I. Under development for nearly 40 years, the overweight, hugely expensive and technologically overstretched Arjun has for years been rejected by the Army as its MBT till it ‘bested’ the Russian T-90S in

The Swiss-made Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II tandemseat, turbo-trainer has emerged as the frontrunner in support of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) crucial requirement for basic trainer aircraft in a deal estimated at over USD1 billion. But objections to the selection procedure by a rival vendor can delay finalising the contract beyond the yearend, recent media reports have suggested.

Korea Aerospace Industries have reportedly written to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) questioning the ‘incomplete’ Swiss bid. The company’s KT-1 trainers is one of three aircraft, alongside US’ HawkerBeechcraft Corporations T-6C model, shortlisted by the IAF out of a total of seven competing models. But both the IAF and the MoD have denied any hitch in the procurement procedure. An MoD spokesperson denied any delay in the trainer procurement process declaring that commercial negotiations with the Swiss trainer manufacturer were continuing in order to finalise the acquisition by end-2011.

PC-7 Mk-II, turbo-trainer aircraft

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DEFENCE BUZZ “We have short-listed three companiesthe Americans, Swiss and the Koreans. Now we have short-listed it down to the lowest bidder which is the Swiss vendor, Pilatus,” recently retired Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik said at the IAF’s training command headquarters in Bengalaru in June. Naik declared that commercial negotiations for the PC-7 were in progress and deliveries of the low-wing aircraft capable of all basic training functions including aerobatics, instrument, tactical and night flying will begin within 18-24 months of the contract being signed. This includes the acquisition of trainer simulators and computer-aided learning systems.

Other vendors competing for the outright purchase of 75 trainers, trials for which were concluded recently at the Jamnagar fighter base on the west coast, included EADS’s PZL Warszawa-Okecie (with its PZL-130 Orlik TC-II), Brazil’s Embraer (EMB-312 Super Tucano), Germany’s Grob Aircraft Company (G-120 TP) and Italy’s Finmeccanica (M-311).

Besides acquiring 75 trainers in ‘fly away’ condition the IAF will locally build an additional 106, dubbed the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40. They will replace the fleet of 180-200 indigenously-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer (HPT)-32 initial trainer aircraft grounded in July 2009 following a series of fatal accidents. The first 12 of 75 trainers will be supplied to the IAF within 24 months of the contract being inked and the remaining deliveries completed within 48 months.

The reliability of the HPT-32s that became operational in 1984 has been questioned for some time following technical problems caused by the integration between its air frame and the Avco Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5 engine. This ‘faulty mating’ has resulted in some 90 ‘engine cut-outs’ in mid-air and given the HPT-32’s limited gliding power, causing frequent fatalities.

Meanwhile, to mitigate the crisis afflicting IAF’s pilot training schedules the Air Force is also actively considering fitting around 100-120 of the faulty HPT-32s with parachute recovery systems (PRS) to bolster pilot confidence and enhance survivability during an emergency.

The move to equip the HAL-designed and built HPT-32 trainers with PRS is aimed to tide over pilot training timetables till the new basic trainers arrive. Once the supplier from amongst two competing PRS vendors, that includes USA’s Ballistic Recovery Systems Aviation, is selected the HPT 32s airframes will be strengthened. HAL, which will be the prime contractor for integrating the PRS’

AUGUST 2011

onto the HPT 32s, estimates it will take 18-24 months for the fitments to begin.

Rookie pilots are presently receiving instruction on the locally constructed Hindustan Jet Trainer-16 Surya Kiran Mk-I intermediate flight and weapons training aircraft followed by BAE Systems’ Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT). But the IAF admits that the ageing Surya Kirans which are facing imminent retirement were under ‘under pressure’.

Clear Plan The DRDO has started work on the Indian Navy’s (IN) second ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) at the secretive Ship Building Centre (SBC) in Visakhapatnam as part of firming up the country’s strategic, retaliatory deterrence. The fabrication of the SSBN’s hull and body has begun in the dry dock vacated two years ago following the launch of INS Arihant, the indigenously

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quoting DRDO sources, say naval engineers and atomic scientists have a ‘clear plan’ in building it, having learnt from ‘mistakes’ in designing the much-delayed Arihant with Russian help, particularly in miniaturising its reactor. The DRDO also claims the second SSBN will be ready for sea trials by 2015 but for now it remains unclear whether Russia will also assist in the follow-on SSBNs. Meanwhile the INS Arihant currently undergoing fitment and trials will be on deterrence patrol after joining service in 2011-12, Naval Chief Admiral NIrmal Verma has repeatedly declared, indicating that it will be equipped with a complement of strategic weapons, the development of which many Indian defence planners believed to be several years distant.

Alongside, by the year-end, the IN is expected to induct the Russian Project 971 (Akula II) nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) acquired on a 10-year lease for an estimated Akula II, nuclearpowered submarine

designed 6,000-tonne nuclear SSBN, a derivative of the Soviet SSN of the 670A Skat series (Charlie-I class boat). The IN in conjunction with Mumbai-based private military contractor, Larsen &Toubro, plans to build three to five additional SSBNs by 2015-17.

It also aims on developing submarinelaunched Cruise missiles, with ranges of more than 1,000km under a classified DRDO programme as part of its strategic, retaliatory deterrence. SSBNs constitute the nucleus of India’s nuclear deterrence based on a mix of weapons deliverable by air, mobile, land-based platforms and sea-based assets. IN officials declined to comment on the second SSBN but local media reports,

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USD 650-700. Christened INS Chakra, the 12,000 tonne K-152 Nerpa SSN, leased under a 2004 clandestine agreement, was scheduled for IN induction in August 2009 but construction delays and an accident aboard the boat in November 2008 in the Sea of Japan during trials led to delays. Twenty sailors and technicians died and 21 others were injured aboard the SSN due to the leakage of Freon gas.

“We will hand this submarine to the client (IN) by the year-end,” Russian Naval Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky told RIA Novosti, a Russian State News Agency, in Moscow on July 2. “The IN crew (undergoing training aboard the SSN) is absolutely prepared to operate it, he added.

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