Defence and Security of India - Dec 2012 issue

NETWORK CENTRICITY

BATTLEFIELD OF 21ST CENTURY Battlefield Management System lifts the ‘fog of war’ to a significant extent. | SHANKAR RAJAGOPALAN CYBER WARFARE

CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFARE A new dimension of warfare has opened up in the cyber space | BRIG. (RETD.) GURMEET KANWAL DECEMBER 2012

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • ` 250

NEW LOOK INDIAN NAVY WITH FIVE SHIPS BEING DELIVERED ANNUALLY TOTHE NAVYTILL 2020,THE FORCE SEEMSTO HAVE SET UP A SCORCHING PACE, WRITES VICE ADMIRAL (RETD.) ANUP SINGH

cover2nd time.indd 1

03/01/13 10:00 AM

DECEMBER 2012

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

For the last three months, since the middle of September, the second sail ship of the Indian Navy, INS Sudarshini have been on a voyage to cement relationships and make new friends. For the first time, the Indian government has explicitly and overtly used the Navy for what diplomats’ consider their own domain. Last month, was also when the Indian Navy turned 65 years since its inception as “Indian,” after independence. This is a Navy, once a fledgling brown water tribune, now raising showers of surf as a blue water warrior. As the Defence Minister, AK Antony announced recently in Parliament, from now till 2020, the force would add five ships of different classes every year. These include three aircraft carriers and at least a couple of nuclear energy propelled nuclear warhead carrying submarines. This is also a Navy that is seeking to make the Indian Ocean live up to its name in real terms. This is also a Navy that patrols the waters in the coast of East Africa right up to the Gulf of Aden, to deter the scourge of piracy that threatens the mercantile interests of the trading nations. It does not guard just the Indian flagged ships, but have actually undertaken more voyages for foreign flagged ships to carry their cargo safely.

Two frigates of the Indian Navy alternately have been deployed permanently for this task.

Clearly, their presence is having an impact, for the pirates, who had approached up to the 400 nautical miles of the Indian western coast on the Arabian Sea, have quickly gone back to the Somali waters. The Obama Administration is now urging the Indian government to let its Navy go further afield. Though Manmohan Singh government has shown some reticence on the issue, the US Administration’s calls have left a fairly deep imprint on the minds the Naval planners. In a conversation last week, a senior Naval official told me that India could actually influence events at least in the Indian Ocean Rim by its ‘soft power’ elements of democracy, multi-culturism and maritime practices. Excepting, Indians had been loathe for long exporting democracy! New Delhi had told George W. Bush that, when he wanted the same out of India.

The Obama Administration is now urging the Indian government to let its Navy go further afield.

Pinaki Bhattacharya

01

LETTER FROM EDITOR2nd time.indd 1

03/01/13 10:07 AM

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2012

COVER STORY 06

NEW LOOK INDIAN NAVY With five ships being delivered to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

CRISIS IN ARMY 36

OFFICERS FOR THE INDIAN ARMY: WHERE ARE THEY NETWORK CENTRICITY 12

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELD OF 21ST CENTURY

With 2,100 officers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of officers.

Battlefield Management System lifts the ‘fog of war’ to a significant extent.

This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions and communicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the tactical level.

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL 18

INDIAN SHIPYARDS: DISTRESS AMONG LIMITED GAINS Indian shipyards are full up on their order books. But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can.

ANTI PIRACY 30

CYBER WARFARE 24

CHINA’S NEW

SECURING THE ACUPUNCTURE SEA LANES OF WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS In the recent past, the world has seen The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling on to the Indian Ocean created a major crisis for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - into keeping the high seas safe.

02

contents2nd time.indd 1-2

DSI

three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla is China

NEWS 42

DEFENCE BUZZ India is the current hot favourite in the armaments trade lexicon. The country plans to spend at least $ 150 billion in war materiel, from now till th next decade.

03

03/01/13 10:15 AM

CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2

COMMANDER SARABJIT SINGH PARMAR

BRIG (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL

Sarabjit Singh Parmar, is an alumnus of National Defence Academy (NDA) Kharakwasla and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Wellington he was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1987. The officer is a Naval Aviator who flies helicopters. He has commanded two ships and a frontline Indian Naval Air Squadron. He has served as Joint Director Naval Plans at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and also been Directing Staff at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He was member of the XI Indian antarctic Summer Expedition in 1991.

Gurmeet Kanwal, has recently laid down office as a director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, a think tank devoted to the Army.

He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-2003. A soldier scholar, he has extensive work on the Indian nuclear programme, authoring several books including Indian Army: Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal.

He is a well-known columnist, besides being a well-known analyst on national security issues.

RAJGOPALAN SHANKAR Rajgopalan Shankar, An experienced scientist with a consistent proven track record of successes in the R&D projects for the Indian Armed Forces. He is also credited for formulation of ‘National Mission for the Development of 1500 HP engine’, defining of specs for the most compact & complex high specific output engine for the Armoured FightingVehicles. He was involved in the successful Development of AKASH (ground to air missile system) missile vehicle which was based on tankT-72 aggregates.

He was the Project Director for the AdvancedVehicle Electrical Systems for MBT Arjun with embedded systems control.

contributors2nd time.indd 1-2

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) ANUP SINGH, Anup Singh, served the Indian Navy till October 2011 during which he commanded four Indian Naval warships.

He was the Sailing Master of the first ever squarerigged Sail Training Vessel in India, named ‘Varuna’, during 1980-82. He also skippered the Naval Yacht ‘Samudra’ for her Pacific crossing during the Tri Service round-the-world voyage in 1989. He has also served as Director of Naval Plans and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in his career. On his last sea going appointment he served as ‘Flag officer commanding Western Fleet’ where he led operation Sukoon, the evacuation of civilians from war-torn Lebanon in July 2006. He also served as Flag Officer, Commandingin-Chief, Eastern Naval Command in last two years of his career. He is a keen sportsman and an adventurer.

DR LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

BRIGADIER (RETD) SK CHATTERJEE

Dr Laxman Kumar Behera, is a Research Fellow at New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), a premier think tank under India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD).

As a member of the IDSA’s Cluster of Defence Economics and Industry, Dr Behera has vertical specialisation on issues related to Arms Procurement, Offsets, Defence Industry, Military Spending, and Defence Cooperation. He was closely associated with two high-level committees set up by Indian MoD on Defence Acquisition and Defence Expenditure. Recently, he was the Consultant to the Task Force on self-reliance and defence modernisation constituted by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India.

SK Chatterjee, commanded a Brigade in deserts and also in areas with active insurgency which was followed by handling the Army’s media engagement operations. He has a written a book called Vintage Guns of India, a Macmillan publication, which is to be published and includes a chapter named Encyclopedia of Indian Army. He headed the Corporate Social Responsibility and Media Communication functions of a corporate group and has over 150 articles in various national and international newspapers and journals to his credit.

EDITOR

Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGNER

Arijit Das Choudhury SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and Printed at Aegean Offset Printers, 220B, Udyog Kendra - 1, Greater Noida (UP)-201306. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

04/01/13 1:32 PM

CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2

COMMANDER SARABJIT SINGH PARMAR

BRIG (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL

Sarabjit Singh Parmar, is an alumnus of National Defence Academy (NDA) Kharakwasla and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Wellington he was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1987. The officer is a Naval Aviator who flies helicopters. He has commanded two ships and a frontline Indian Naval Air Squadron. He has served as Joint Director Naval Plans at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and also been Directing Staff at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He was member of the XI Indian antarctic Summer Expedition in 1991.

Gurmeet Kanwal, has recently laid down office as a director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, a think tank devoted to the Army.

He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-2003. A soldier scholar, he has extensive work on the Indian nuclear programme, authoring several books including Indian Army: Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal.

He is a well-known columnist, besides being a well-known analyst on national security issues.

RAJGOPALAN SHANKAR Rajgopalan Shankar, An experienced scientist with a consistent proven track record of successes in the R&D projects for the Indian Armed Forces. He is also credited for formulation of ‘National Mission for the Development of 1500 HP engine’, defining of specs for the most compact & complex high specific output engine for the Armoured Fighting Vehicles. He was involved in the successful Development of AKASH (ground to air missile system) missile vehicle which was based on tankT-72 aggregates.

He was the Project Director for the Advanced Vehicle Electrical Systems for MBT Arjun with embedded systems control.

contributors2nd time.indd 1-2

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) ANUP SINGH, Anup Singh, served the Indian Navy till October 2011 during which he commanded four Indian Naval warships.

He was the Sailing Master of the first ever squarerigged Sail Training Vessel in India, named ‘Varuna’, during 1980-82. He also skippered the Naval Yacht ‘Samudra’ for her Pacific crossing during the Tri Service round-the-world voyage in 1989. He has also served as Director of Naval Plans and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in his career. On his last sea going appointment he served as ‘Flag officer commanding Western Fleet’ where he led operation Sukoon, the evacuation of civilians from war-torn Lebanon in July 2006. He also served as Flag Officer, Commandingin-Chief, Eastern Naval Command in last two years of his career. He is a keen sportsman and an adventurer.

DR LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

BRIGADIER (RETD) SK CHATTERJEE

Dr Laxman Kumar Behera, is a Research Fellow at New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), a premier think tank under India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD).

As a member of the IDSA’s Cluster of Defence Economics and Industry, Dr Behera has vertical specialisation on issues related to Arms Procurement, Offsets, Defence Industry, Military Spending, and Defence Cooperation. He was closely associated with two high-level committees set up by Indian MoD on Defence Acquisition and Defence Expenditure. Recently, he was the Consultant to the Task Force on self-reliance and defence modernisation constituted by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India.

SK Chatterjee, commanded a Brigade in deserts and also in areas with active insurgency which was followed by handling the Army’s media engagement operations. He has a written a book called Vintage Guns of India, a Macmillan publication, which is to be published and includes a chapter named Encyclopedia of Indian Army. He headed the Corporate Social Responsibility and Media Communication functions of a corporate group and has over 150 articles in various national and international newspapers and journals to his credit.

EDITOR

Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGNER

Arijit Das Choudhury SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and Printed at Aegean Offset Printers, 220B, Udyog Kendra - 1, Greater Noida (UP)-201306. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

04/01/13 1:32 PM

MODERNAISATION

DECEMBER 2012

NEW LOOK IND IAN NAV Y With five ships being delivered annually to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent Indiaʼs very first naval hierarchy whose first Plan Paper had defined the need for not only a larger fleet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army i any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines

Anup Singh

KEY POINTS

From modest beginnings of 30 odd ships of “poor architecture,” the Indian Navy is well into its role of a blue water that can often go on expeditions.

India is on its way to vindicating the fact that it is a major power by modernising its armed forces, of which Navy is prime.

N

avies are known and proven to be effective instruments of state policy. They can be used to protect vital interests in the near and far areas. They are used for bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. They are routinely used for diplomatic missions.

They are most suited as first responders in disasters, contingencies at home or

A warship being built at an Indian shipyard

abroad and of course, for power projection.

These attributes are over and above the fundamental roles of a Navy in protection of trade and territory. To ensure adequate capacities for these roles --- all of which are treated as basic roles --- a Navy must be contemporary and possess a ‘balanced’ fleet.

From 1830 when it was first constituted as “The Indian Navy”, the Service went

6 06

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 6-7

through a series of labels as: “Her Majesty’s Indian Navy”, “The Bombay Marine” (a title used in the early 17th century as well), “Her Majesty’s Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Navy” and back to “The Indian Navy” on proclamation of Republic in 1950. With independence three years earlier, had come the painful division of the fleet. India’s share, a motley bunch of

33 ships had an unimpressive architecture, comprising two frigates, four sloops, a Hydrographic survey vessel, a corvette and a score plus minesweepers/ harbor defence launches etc. This was nowhere near a flotilla much less a potent maritime force.

For a maritime nation with a prominent peninsular geography and island-chains on both flanks, even basic functions of

AFP

Of a total of 44 ships on order, 42 of them are with Indian shipyards.

maritime security and trade protection was not possible for that maritime force, with a handful of antiquities in its inventory.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent India’s very first naval hierarchy whose first Plan Paper had defined the need for not only a larger fleet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the

DSI

coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army in any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines apart from some smaller ships essential for mundane tasks including training. It laid particular emphasis on the induction ofair and sub-surface (submarine) platforms. It also suggested such a force to be raised within a span of 10 years! The HMIS Delhi (later named INS Delhi), was the first cruiser to be inducted under the plan, in 1948. Between 1948 and 1949, the Delhi was followed,in quick succession, by an amphibious ship Magar and three destroyers Rajput, Rana, Ranjit. A couple of frigates and the carrier Vikrant followed a decade later. But the entire plan never got implemented mainly due to a continental (land frontier) focus of the country. The next push came after the ’62 war when the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (1964) approved a force level of 138 ships.

That figure, as a matter of record, has not been accomplished so far, unless the current figure of submarines is added to the existing number of ships.

Having missed the Industrial Revolution, being short on economic health till the late 90s and having been a victim of the “denial” regime for years, it was an uphill task to raise a proper force structure in India’s nascent years. The Navy’s current strength of 136 ships, 15 submarines, 216 aircraft and steadily expanding support infrastructure may seem impressive for a regional power; but it is never mere numbers that announce potential. What is of essence is capability which always hinges on technology and age. An important factor that remains submerged in force strength is the struggle to beat the rate of ‘attrition by age’ and succeed in growth rate (number of platforms). This struggle has its origins in the poor decade of the 90s. In the wake of the economic crisis of the late eighties, all approved projects suffered a serious setback and a full decade’s loss led to a cascade of repercussions. The first of these were a huge void in the following decades as ships at the cusp of retirement had to be put through peripheral upgrades; those on the drawing board were returned to the closet; and those

07 7

03/01/13 10:32 AM

MODERNAISATION

DECEMBER 2012

NEW LOOK IND IAN NAV Y With five ships being delivered annually to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent Indiaʼs very first naval hierarchy whose first Plan Paper had defined the need for not only a larger fleet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army i any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines

Anup Singh

KEY POINTS

From modest beginnings of 30 odd ships of “poor architecture,” the Indian Navy is well into its role of a blue water that can often go on expeditions.

India is on its way to vindicating the fact that it is a major power by modernising its armed forces, of which Navy is prime.

N

avies are known and proven to be effective instruments of state policy. They can be used to protect vital interests in the near and far areas. They are used for bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. They are routinely used for diplomatic missions.

They are most suited as first responders in disasters, contingencies at home or

A warship being built at an Indian shipyard

abroad and of course, for power projection.

These attributes are over and above the fundamental roles of a Navy in protection of trade and territory. To ensure adequate capacities for these roles --- all of which are treated as basic roles --- a Navy must be contemporary and possess a ‘balanced’ fleet.

From 1830 when it was first constituted as “The Indian Navy”, the Service went

6 06

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 6-7

through a series of labels as: “Her Majesty’s Indian Navy”, “The Bombay Marine” (a title used in the early 17th century as well), “Her Majesty’s Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Navy” and back to “The Indian Navy” on proclamation of Republic in 1950. With independence three years earlier, had come the painful division of the fleet. India’s share, a motley bunch of

33 ships had an unimpressive architecture, comprising two frigates, four sloops, a Hydrographic survey vessel, a corvette and a score plus minesweepers/ harbor defence launches etc. This was nowhere near a flotilla much less a potent maritime force.

For a maritime nation with a prominent peninsular geography and island-chains on both flanks, even basic functions of

AFP

Of a total of 44 ships on order, 42 of them are with Indian shipyards.

maritime security and trade protection was not possible for that maritime force, with a handful of antiquities in its inventory.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent India’s very first naval hierarchy whose first Plan Paper had defined the need for not only a larger fleet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the

DSI

coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army in any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines apart from some smaller ships essential for mundane tasks including training. It laid particular emphasis on the induction ofair and sub-surface (submarine) platforms. It also suggested such a force to be raised within a span of 10 years! The HMIS Delhi (later named INS Delhi), was the first cruiser to be inducted under the plan, in 1948. Between 1948 and 1949, the Delhi was followed,in quick succession, by an amphibious ship Magar and three destroyers Rajput, Rana, Ranjit. A couple of frigates and the carrier Vikrant followed a decade later. But the entire plan never got implemented mainly due to a continental (land frontier) focus of the country. The next push came after the ’62 war when the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (1964) approved a force level of 138 ships.

That figure, as a matter of record, has not been accomplished so far, unless the current figure of submarines is added to the existing number of ships.

Having missed the Industrial Revolution, being short on economic health till the late 90s and having been a victim of the “denial” regime for years, it was an uphill task to raise a proper force structure in India’s nascent years. The Navy’s current strength of 136 ships, 15 submarines, 216 aircraft and steadily expanding support infrastructure may seem impressive for a regional power; but it is never mere numbers that announce potential. What is of essence is capability which always hinges on technology and age. An important factor that remains submerged in force strength is the struggle to beat the rate of ‘attrition by age’ and succeed in growth rate (number of platforms). This struggle has its origins in the poor decade of the 90s. In the wake of the economic crisis of the late eighties, all approved projects suffered a serious setback and a full decade’s loss led to a cascade of repercussions. The first of these were a huge void in the following decades as ships at the cusp of retirement had to be put through peripheral upgrades; those on the drawing board were returned to the closet; and those

07 7

03/01/13 10:32 AM

DECEMBER 2012

AFP

under consideration were put on the backburner. As if these adversities were not enough, the Navy’s destiny hit another culde-sac with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Weapon systems on order for ships under construction and those undergoing life extensions received an abrupt blow. It took a couple of years before newer systems were offered by the Russian Federation or other sources. All these factors led to a huge loss of time and force architecture. To clearly understand this effect, one has to remember that naval platforms have long gestation periods. A setback due to a combination of fiscal shortfalls and supply source disruptions spelt an irrecoverable situation in future force levels and force architecture.

The real impetus towards transformation of the force came with the induction of the first ever indigenously designed and indigenously built destroyer in 1997. This milestone announced two accomplishments: announcing that the Indian Navy had arrived on world stage as a builder’s Navy, and, that the force level equation was poised to reverse the growth trend with a positive graph. Yet, at the time, 75% of the fleet was approaching

vintage status. Similarly, aircraft acquired from the Soviet Union and the West in the late eighties were already beginning to retire as spares supply had slowed down in the wake of disintegration of USSR in one case and the post ’98 Pokhran test in the other.

Naval aviation also witnessed a serious serviceability void caused by the resource crunch of the early 90s.

The first restoration of budgetary support in the late nineties helped recoup some platforms through “mid-life upgrades” during the last decade. Importantly, new projects started receiving financial approvals and dormant ones were revived.

Figures tell the story of revival. A total of 44 ships are currently on order --- 42 of them with Indian yards. In the recent past, a few ships were ordered from foreign yards. This was done in order to get quicker deliveries and gain easy access to contemporary technology. These include the three Talwar class, built to our specifications by Russia, in the early part of the last decade; two modern Fleet tankers built in Italy and three followon ships of the Talwar class currently being delivered by Russia. Our own shipyards

8 08

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 8-9

are a bit slow in production rate and have serious capacity constraints in the wake of a saturated order book. Apart from hastening the pace of induction (to fill shortfalls), parallel induction from foreign yards provides a much gainful benchmark for our own shipyards to compare build-periods and technologies. This practice should be continued.

The much awaited Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) should successfully complete her refit and trials in Russia in a couple of months and be home sometime next year.

Insofar as the indigenous aircraft carriers are concerned, the first one (IAC1: Vikrant) should hopefully join the fleet in a couple of years. Even if late in production, this is slated to be the biggest milestone announcing India’s arrival in the big league. After all, there are only nine maritime nations who can design and build aircraft carriers!

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the process of renewals (replacements/ additions) fructified in right earnest only with the induction of the three Delhi class destroyers (Project 15) commencing late 1997. Unlike the old days, these three

Former navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, taking a guard-of-honour aboard the INS Satpura, a Shivalik class stealth frigate INS Shahyadri at the Mazagon dock.

AFP

A surfaced Foxtrot-class submarine in high seas

ships have not been treated as a “one off” design. Three follow-ons --- Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai (Project 15A) are likely to be delivered over the next couple of years and another four (Project 15B) are slated for induction with a gap of three or four years.

Strictly speaking, while this pattern does not fall under “series production”, it has its own inherent advantages in being staggered.

Firstly, ships will not get bunched up for deinduction. Secondly, series production of exactly the same model offers no respite for introduction of newer technology without time penalty between ships. Therefore, staggering batches permits remodelling features --- to incorporate the latest in stealth, introduce contemporary technology amongst weapons and control systems and most importantly, incorporate lessons learnt from a previous batch.

Amongst frigates -- work-horses of the navy – with all three ships of Project 17 (Shivalik, Satpura, Sahyadri) having been delivered, the navy has witnessed a paradigm shift from conventional designs to the truly contemporary ones, incorporating stealth, advanced weapons, sensors and control systems. These platforms should serve the nation well into the third/fourth decade of this century. Just like the Project 15 destroyers, these frigates too are likely to be followed by a batch of seven more ships (Project 17A), staggered in time. Once again, staggering of batches will have inherent advantages of newer technology infusion and continuity over longer time-frame.

In the smaller ship category, the four Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Corvettes currently under construction should supplement the much needed brown water ASW capability over the next two to three years. In so far as the seaward/inshore defence element is concerned, the Navy had assessed a renewed flotilla after 26/11, in terms of Fast Attack Craft and Fast Interceptors. These have started getting inducted and when fully delivered, should make the near shore areas secure along with the Coast Guard’s efforts.

An area that suffered gaps till recently, were the Logistic Support vessels or Fleet Tankers. With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been

DSI

AFP

MODERNAISATION

inducted over the last two years – made to our specifications by an Italian yard – the lifeblood of the navy’s Blue water capability has regained confidence. Without doubt, a couple more will be needed over the next few years to ensure that independent Task Forces can be assured ‘sea legs’ even when more than one tanker is under maintenance.

Another category of work horses are the offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). There has

been renewed demand for such vessels by even smaller maritime nations as they are relatively cheap, can be built in smaller time frames and are best suited for low-end tasks like anti-piracy patrols and offshore protection missions. A large number are on order which should start getting inducted soon. These OPVs will begin to relieve frigates and destroyers currently employed for mundane patrols.

09 9

03/01/13 10:32 AM

DECEMBER 2012

AFP

under consideration were put on the backburner. As if these adversities were not enough, the Navy’s destiny hit another culde-sac with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Weapon systems on order for ships under construction and those undergoing life extensions received an abrupt blow. It took a couple of years before newer systems were offered by the Russian Federation or other sources. All these factors led to a huge loss of time and force architecture. To clearly understand this effect, one has to remember that naval platforms have long gestation periods. A setback due to a combination of fiscal shortfalls and supply source disruptions spelt an irrecoverable situation in future force levels and force architecture.

The real impetus towards transformation of the force came with the induction of the first ever indigenously designed and indigenously built destroyer in 1997. This milestone announced two accomplishments: announcing that the Indian Navy had arrived on world stage as a builder’s Navy, and, that the force level equation was poised to reverse the growth trend with a positive graph. Yet, at the time, 75% of the fleet was approaching

vintage status. Similarly, aircraft acquired from the Soviet Union and the West in the late eighties were already beginning to retire as spares supply had slowed down in the wake of disintegration of USSR in one case and the post ’98 Pokhran test in the other.

Naval aviation also witnessed a serious serviceability void caused by the resource crunch of the early 90s.

The first restoration of budgetary support in the late nineties helped recoup some platforms through “mid-life upgrades” during the last decade. Importantly, new projects started receiving financial approvals and dormant ones were revived.

Figures tell the story of revival. A total of 44 ships are currently on order --- 42 of them with Indian yards. In the recent past, a few ships were ordered from foreign yards. This was done in order to get quicker deliveries and gain easy access to contemporary technology. These include the three Talwar class, built to our specifications by Russia, in the early part of the last decade; two modern Fleet tankers built in Italy and three followon ships of the Talwar class currently being delivered by Russia. Our own shipyards

8 08

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 8-9

are a bit slow in production rate and have serious capacity constraints in the wake of a saturated order book. Apart from hastening the pace of induction (to fill shortfalls), parallel induction from foreign yards provides a much gainful benchmark for our own shipyards to compare build-periods and technologies. This practice should be continued.

The much awaited Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) should successfully complete her refit and trials in Russia in a couple of months and be home sometime next year.

Insofar as the indigenous aircraft carriers are concerned, the first one (IAC1: Vikrant) should hopefully join the fleet in a couple of years. Even if late in production, this is slated to be the biggest milestone announcing India’s arrival in the big league. After all, there are only nine maritime nations who can design and build aircraft carriers!

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the process of renewals (replacements/ additions) fructified in right earnest only with the induction of the three Delhi class destroyers (Project 15) commencing late 1997. Unlike the old days, these three

Former navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, taking a guard-of-honour aboard the INS Satpura, a Shivalik class stealth frigate INS Shahyadri at the Mazagon dock.

AFP

A surfaced Foxtrot-class submarine in high seas

ships have not been treated as a “one off” design. Three follow-ons --- Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai (Project 15A) are likely to be delivered over the next couple of years and another four (Project 15B) are slated for induction with a gap of three or four years.

Strictly speaking, while this pattern does not fall under “series production”, it has its own inherent advantages in being staggered.

Firstly, ships will not get bunched up for deinduction. Secondly, series production of exactly the same model offers no respite for introduction of newer technology without time penalty between ships. Therefore, staggering batches permits remodelling features --- to incorporate the latest in stealth, introduce contemporary technology amongst weapons and control systems and most importantly, incorporate lessons learnt from a previous batch.

Amongst frigates -- work-horses of the navy – with all three ships of Project 17 (Shivalik, Satpura, Sahyadri) having been delivered, the navy has witnessed a paradigm shift from conventional designs to the truly contemporary ones, incorporating stealth, advanced weapons, sensors and control systems. These platforms should serve the nation well into the third/fourth decade of this century. Just like the Project 15 destroyers, these frigates too are likely to be followed by a batch of seven more ships (Project 17A), staggered in time. Once again, staggering of batches will have inherent advantages of newer technology infusion and continuity over longer time-frame.

In the smaller ship category, the four Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Corvettes currently under construction should supplement the much needed brown water ASW capability over the next two to three years. In so far as the seaward/inshore defence element is concerned, the Navy had assessed a renewed flotilla after 26/11, in terms of Fast Attack Craft and Fast Interceptors. These have started getting inducted and when fully delivered, should make the near shore areas secure along with the Coast Guard’s efforts.

An area that suffered gaps till recently, were the Logistic Support vessels or Fleet Tankers. With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been

DSI

AFP

MODERNAISATION

inducted over the last two years – made to our specifications by an Italian yard – the lifeblood of the navy’s Blue water capability has regained confidence. Without doubt, a couple more will be needed over the next few years to ensure that independent Task Forces can be assured ‘sea legs’ even when more than one tanker is under maintenance.

Another category of work horses are the offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). There has

been renewed demand for such vessels by even smaller maritime nations as they are relatively cheap, can be built in smaller time frames and are best suited for low-end tasks like anti-piracy patrols and offshore protection missions. A large number are on order which should start getting inducted soon. These OPVs will begin to relieve frigates and destroyers currently employed for mundane patrols.

09 9

03/01/13 10:32 AM

MODERNAISATION A naval corvette, INS Vibhuti firing flares in celebration as a part of the navy week

An area that suffered gaps till recently, were the Logistic Support vessels or Fleet Tankers.

With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been inducted over the last two years – made to our specifications by an Italian yard – the lifeblood of the navyʼs Blue water capability

AFP

There has been a huge shortfall in the minesweeping/minehunting category, shallow water survey vessels and shallow water ASW craft. These are also known to be round the corner.

Submarines form the backbone of a navy’s sea denial capability. The much delayed Scorpenes are just a couple of years from induction and promise to transform ‘submarining’. But six of them are not enough. The second (construction) line should get off the ground soon, to ensure force levels on de-induction of the present lot. By far, submarines are the most potent elements for a maritime nation. Their sea denial capability enables easier sea control; assist posturing and even affect the balance of power equation.

Amongst aviation acquisitions, the first aircraft of the much awaited P-8 “I” Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft should be here early next year.

This acquisition will be a game changer.

Air platforms are the eyes and ears of the surface and the sub-surface navy. Coupled with weapons like missiles and torpedoes, they become exponential force multipliers.

Intelligence gathering through them is expected to become superbly effective and efficient.

In so far as integral aircraft are concerned,

the current lot of helicopters has been in dire need of replacement and some categories – for up-gradation, for a long time. Integral helicopters transform the character of a ship by extending surveillance and weapon reach, and, enabling stand-off targeting, enabling mother platforms to engage before the enemy.

Integral fighters for the Gorshkov are known to be already here and are doing a good turn in keeping the pilots tuned to the throttle. More should follow for the indigenous carrier under construction. A very important acquisition in naval aviation will be the indigenously developed Naval Light Combat Aircraft (Naval LCA) for future carriers. With the prototype already under trials, this machine should offer immense satisfaction on operationalization --- even if late and short on desirable capabilities, as it will be a watershed event in self-reliance.

With so much having been said about platforms, the navy has also been conscious of parallel development of infrastructure.

Be it the Indian Naval Academy, addition of a large naval base and induction of maintenance facilities, foresight and timely planning are paying off.

India is claimed to be the fourth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. A study by the Carnegie Endowment

a couple of years ago had described us as one of the four ‘power centers’ in the world. Her geo-strategic location with her peninsular configuration jutting out over a 1000 miles into the sea, places the country at the convergence of the most important shipping lanes of the world. These arteries of trade are the lifeblood of the entire world as millions of tons of Oil & Gas apart from commodities crossing between the Atlantic and the Pacific also pass through these routes. Given that 90% of her external trade by volume and over 75% by value is sea borne, protection of trade and offshore resources has been a non-negotiable imperative for India’s Navy, apart from many other functions that she is charged with. The list of inductions above, may seem impressive, but there is still some distance to be covered before legacy systems and platforms are replaced and more importantly, numbers are built up, as envisaged in the navy’s perspective plan. Today, numbers matter as much as infusion of technology, because the variety and number of tasks have suddenly seen a quantum jump be it in anti-piracy patrols, enhanced need for surveillance against terorrism, appearance of asymmetric threats, or, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Modernisation is a continuous process and must receive adequate funding. DSI

10

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 10

03/01/13 10:32 AM

IN QUEST OF UNIVERSAL WARRIOR Media reports that the Indian Air Force (IAF) tender for the procurement of six versatile military transport/air refueling aircraft has been finalized are baseless.

Such announcement has been made by a source close to the IAF command who disclaimed the reports published earlier.

“There are serious differences within the IAF today as to who will be the winner: the European Airbus A330MRTT or Russian Il-78MK-90”, - he said.

According to this source, in spite of strong lobbying and active advertising pressure on the tender committee many pilots unofficially acknowledge that the Russian aircraft is not only more familiar to them but also satisfies the IAF requirements better than any other contender.

The scale of decision-making is still swaying, leaving the question “who wins” unanswered. It seems strange enough though, since the Russian aircraft Il78MK-90 developed from the very beginning as a military transport has indisputable technical advantages over its European competitor that has been derived from a commercial aircraft and, for that reason, not prepared to perform additional military, and especially military transportation tasks, all of which are vital for the Indian Armed Forces.

It makes no doubts that Airbus offers good aircraft. But in this case it is a nonmilitary design which is more fit for European customers with paved runways on each plot of land ready to accommodate heavy-weight airliners. But how many airfields of this kind has India? Not so many. Therefore it would be more wise to procure the Il-78MK-90 aircraft capable of operating from both paved and unpaved runways. It means that the Russian aircraft can operate from more than 80 percent of the runways available in India. The A330MRTT aircraft can be operated only from Class 1 paved runways at least 2.8 km long.

In this context the A330MRTT aircraft can be named for convenience “air refueling aircraft for peacetime tasks” since the possibility of dispersing these aircraft in the period of threat and during combat operations will be very limited. It should be noted that Class 1 airfields get under air attacks in the very first hours of hostilities. The Russian air refuellers will create no problems with their dispersal over India’s aerodrome network since they can operate from airfields with unpaved runways. And this is the only way to ensure survivability of a group of such air refueling aircraft.

At the same time the Il-78MK-90 can be quickly converted by technical personnel, or in case of necessity by its crew only,

ROT.indd 36

into a full-size transport aircraft allowing rapid shipment of cargos, heavy-weight vehicles and assault troops. It must be noted that even without additional fuel tanks the Il-78MK-90 aircraft meets the

checked for the European contender’s compatibility as regards contact dynamics and fuel flow rates.

There are other factors of superiority. For instance, the Ilyushin’s power plant consists of four engines providing high level of combat survivability. Whereas the A330MRTT is powered by two engines only. If one of these engines is damaged in combat situation, where anything can happen, it may lead to aborted missions and possible loss of aircraft queued for refueling.

RFP requirement for refueling at set positions. The A330MRTT aircraft has no air drop capability, and requires costly dedicated loading/unloading equipment and ramps to be installed for carrying out cargo loading/unloading operations (armoured materiel is not included). All airfields planned for operations must be equipped with additional loading facilities which will increase direct aircraft proIn general Ilyushin aircraft have proved curement and life cycle costs. It should to be reliable and simple to operate air be noted that the equipment for the Air- vehicles. The newest Il-78MK-90 aircraft bus aircraft may cost as much as tens, or is a modernized version of the converteven hundreds of thousand US dollars ible Il-78MK air tanker. It features the per unit. new PS-90A-76 low fuel consumption engines and a modified wing, an inteIn addition, the Russian aircraft is ca- grated digital avionics suite including a pable of refueling with two types of fuel “glass cabin” fitted with multifunctional in one flight whereas the A330MRTT liquid-crystal colour displays and “smart” has no such capability. The Il-78MK-90 control panels. At the same time this aircraft is also provided with a unique air aircraft will be able to fly intercontinentanker capability of dispensing fuel on tal commercial shipping flights since ground at the rate of up to 1,500 l/min it meets international ICAO noise and allowing filling up to four aircraft, trans- emissions standards. portation means and armoured vehicles at a time. The A330MRTT aircraft has no The multifunctional Ilyushin platform such capability either. allows conversion into fire-fighting, convertible air refueling, military transport, The Il-78MK-90 aircraft is checked for flying hospital, air control post and airthe ability to fuel all heavy-weight aircraft borne early warning aircraft as well as existing in the Indian Air Force inventory. others. In fact it is a universal warrior conThe A330MRTT will have to be addition- ceived by India when it has invited this ally tested for refueling the IAF airborne tender. Frankly speaking, it is not clear early warning aircraft: its engines are then why some people assert that the mounted much lower than those on the victory has already gone to Airbus. Let Il-78MK-90 aircraft and their air jets may us better wait for the official announceaffect flight controllability of the aircraft, ment of the tender results. and this is what must be tested. Besides, mid-air refueling systems are also to be Dominic Scogna

02/01/13 10:52 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

DECEMBER 2012

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELD OF 21st CENTURY Battlefield Management Systems lift the ʻfog of warʼ to a significant extent. This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions and communicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the ground level.

Shankar Rajagopalan

KEY POINTS A network centric battlefield removes substantially the ‘fog of war.’

It empowers the local commanders to take time-critical decisions in the midst of attrition.

The technology enabled infantryman increases his own survivability.

I

AFP

An Indian Army soldier kitted up with elements of F-INSAS equipment

12

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 12-13

ntroduction: The ever evolving battlefield of the modern era is extremely chaotic and fast paced. The ‘fog of war’ befuddles the observers and the participants alike.

But technology now has made it possible for battlefield leadership to: • ‘See’ their areas of responsibility in depth and in real time.

• Develop an accurate common picture of the battlespace and share it both horizontally and vertically.

• Precisely locate, identify, track and attack targets by appropriate means and monitor its effects

• Operate in a joint environment.

Technology can support to achieve this leadership in the battlefield by enabling • Rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information • Enhancing Situational awareness • Acquiring capability to react to information A system realized with the above technology enablers integrated and bringing the force’s resources • To the Right Place • At the Right Time • With the Right Lethality is called the Battlefield Management System What is BMS? Where is it required most?

How can we describe or define it?

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the subunits, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets below unit level and translate the plans made at higher level into well synchronized operations at the cutting edge. Moreover, due to the dynamic and mobile nature of ops and the unique requirement of automation for execution of operational tasks at the lower levels of military field hierarchy, there is a need to have a separate system below unit levels.

Thus BMS in short is a command and control system providing real/ near real time situational awareness and information exchange for unit commanders and below and down to individual soldiers/platforms to enable optimal management of resources within the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).

What is the BMS system: BMS will be a highly mobile tactical command and control information system, integrated with sensors, weapon platforms and decision making tools .

The system will provide common operating picture (COP)/Situational Awareness, to all entities in the Tactical Battle Area networked with secure, robust and reliable communication system

supporting voice, data and real time video services.

It will comprise of wearable/hand-held info systems with individual soldiers as well man portable and vehicle mounted information system, integrated through data enabled communication networks.

It will generate COP by integrating all entities within the TBA on a common Geographic Information System (GIS) reference frame network and provide Blue Force Tracking (BFT) using satellite- based navigation systems.

Basic Functionalities: • Communication • GIS, Navigation and Situational Awareness.

• Intelligence Systems • Target Management System • Decision Support System and Threat Analysis • Mission Planning and Management.

• Military Messaging • Operational Logistic Planning Key Requirements: • The aim is to have the shortest OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide & Act) loop • Flexible system architecture facilitating quick attachments and detachments • Quick deployment capabilities • Scalability of the operating systems • Capability to disseminate position reports in a GPS -disabled environment Features: • Geo-Spatial Information Management 1. Navigation and ‘Blue-Force’ Tracking 2. Continuous real-time location of entities and their track data to include Latitude/Longitude/ Military Grid Reference, course, speed, altitude, identification, status (friendly, neutral, hostile, unknown) and mission status 3. Generation of Track History 4. Geospatial analysis (2D & 3D), fly/walkthrough, and Geospatial computations like intervisibility, view shed analysis, distance between

DSI

two points, shortest path and optimum path etc.

5. Multi-sensor data fusion.

6. Image Processing (manipulation, interpretation, and extraction of target parameters, compression/ decompression of images, integration of text, graphics and images).

7. Logic-based generation of Military Symbols and Attribute Generation for map objects.

• Application Utilities 1. Messaging using free text and formatted, encrypted text 2. Creation of Plans and Orders 3. Tactical Situation Management by providing a Common Operational Picture (COP) 4. Data visualization 5. Logistics Management • Networking and Communications 1. Internet Protocol Radio supporting high data, long ranges and non-lineof-sight conditions.

2. Support self configuring and self healing network topology.

• Database Management.

1. Data base inter-operability between army, navy and air force.

2. Data Replication and building redundancies 3. Resource Management

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the sub- units, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets

13

03/01/13 10:35 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

DECEMBER 2012

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELD OF 21st CENTURY Battlefield Management Systems lift the ʻfog of warʼ to a significant extent. This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions and communicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the ground level.

Shankar Rajagopalan

KEY POINTS A network centric battlefield removes substantially the ‘fog of war.’

It empowers the local commanders to take time-critical decisions in the midst of attrition.

The technology enabled infantryman increases his own survivability.

I

AFP

An Indian Army soldier kitted up with elements of F-INSAS equipment

12

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 12-13

ntroduction: The ever evolving battlefield of the modern era is extremely chaotic and fast paced. The ‘fog of war’ befuddles the observers and the participants alike.

But technology now has made it possible for battlefield leadership to: • ‘See’ their areas of responsibility in depth and in real time.

• Develop an accurate common picture of the battlespace and share it both horizontally and vertically.

• Precisely locate, identify, track and attack targets by appropriate means and monitor its effects

• Operate in a joint environment.

Technology can support to achieve this leadership in the battlefield by enabling • Rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information • Enhancing Situational awareness • Acquiring capability to react to information A system realized with the above technology enablers integrated and bringing the force’s resources • To the Right Place • At the Right Time • With the Right Lethality is called the Battlefield Management System What is BMS? Where is it required most?

How can we describe or define it?

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the subunits, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets below unit level and translate the plans made at higher level into well synchronized operations at the cutting edge. Moreover, due to the dynamic and mobile nature of ops and the unique requirement of automation for execution of operational tasks at the lower levels of military field hierarchy, there is a need to have a separate system below unit levels.

Thus BMS in short is a command and control system providing real/ near real time situational awareness and information exchange for unit commanders and below and down to individual soldiers/platforms to enable optimal management of resources within the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).

What is the BMS system: BMS will be a highly mobile tactical command and control information system, integrated with sensors, weapon platforms and decision making tools .

The system will provide common operating picture (COP)/Situational Awareness, to all entities in the Tactical Battle Area networked with secure, robust and reliable communication system

supporting voice, data and real time video services.

It will comprise of wearable/hand-held info systems with individual soldiers as well man portable and vehicle mounted information system, integrated through data enabled communication networks.

It will generate COP by integrating all entities within the TBA on a common Geographic Information System (GIS) reference frame network and provide Blue Force Tracking (BFT) using satellite- based navigation systems.

Basic Functionalities: • Communication • GIS, Navigation and Situational Awareness.

• Intelligence Systems • Target Management System • Decision Support System and Threat Analysis • Mission Planning and Management.

• Military Messaging • Operational Logistic Planning Key Requirements: • The aim is to have the shortest OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide & Act) loop • Flexible system architecture facilitating quick attachments and detachments • Quick deployment capabilities • Scalability of the operating systems • Capability to disseminate position reports in a GPS -disabled environment Features: • Geo-Spatial Information Management 1. Navigation and ‘Blue-Force’ Tracking 2. Continuous real-time location of entities and their track data to include Latitude/Longitude/ Military Grid Reference, course, speed, altitude, identification, status (friendly, neutral, hostile, unknown) and mission status 3. Generation of Track History 4. Geospatial analysis (2D & 3D), fly/walkthrough, and Geospatial computations like intervisibility, view shed analysis, distance between

DSI

two points, shortest path and optimum path etc.

5. Multi-sensor data fusion.

6. Image Processing (manipulation, interpretation, and extraction of target parameters, compression/ decompression of images, integration of text, graphics and images).

7. Logic-based generation of Military Symbols and Attribute Generation for map objects.

• Application Utilities 1. Messaging using free text and formatted, encrypted text 2. Creation of Plans and Orders 3. Tactical Situation Management by providing a Common Operational Picture (COP) 4. Data visualization 5. Logistics Management • Networking and Communications 1. Internet Protocol Radio supporting high data, long ranges and non-lineof-sight conditions.

2. Support self configuring and self healing network topology.

• Database Management.

1. Data base inter-operability between army, navy and air force.

2. Data Replication and building redundancies 3. Resource Management

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the sub- units, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets

13

03/01/13 10:35 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

DECEMBER 2012

4. Library and

AFP

A pictorial depiction of networked BMS items

14

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 14-15

of Plans, situation

orders reactions

Building Blocks: BMS will constitute following subsystems.

1. Infrastructure-less Communication and networking system.

2. Application server 3. Database server 4. Relational Database Management System 5. Compute platforms (Different form factors) embedded with GPS. 6. Integrated GIS In addition to all these building blocks the other important feature of BMS is the Battle Command.

Battle command (BC) is the art and science of visualising, describing, directing and leading forces in operations against a hostile, thinking and adoptive enemy.

Battle command applies leadership to translate decision into actions by synchronising forces and war fighting functions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the missions.

The BC refers both processes triggered by commanders and executed by soldiers and to the system of systems that directly enables these processes. Process like Battle Command is clearly a human endeavor.

BC (Battle command) is defined as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost. Assigning missions prioritising and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act and knowing how to make adjustments during a battle.

BC is the art and science of battle field decision making and leading soldiers and units to successfully accomplish the mission. The BC elements constitute decision making, leading, and controlling.

The BC system of systems at brigade level enables commanders to lead, prioritise, and allocate assets required to employ and sustain combat power. The brigade commander must see further, process

the information faster and strike more precisely and at a fast rate.

If information is the medium of the BC process, the BC system must provide the commander with timely and accurate information on which to base the commanders decision.

BC is also known by the following terms: • C4ISR as in, Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Battle Management (BM) • Battle management is the management of activities within the operational environment based on the commands, direction and guidance given by appropriate authority. BM is considered to be the subset of BC. • Modern BC software/hardware exhibits all the traits/qualities of a System of Systems (SoS). It can be decomposed into systems such as manoeuvre, logistics, fires and air-support, intelligence, surveillance, recognition,

terrain and weather. Among the many inputs of these systems is a plethora of sensors which undergo sensor fusion and are compiled into a common operational picture/local operational picture (LOP) that enable commanders to achieve situational awareness (SA)/ situational understanding (SU). SA/ SU is paramount for commanders to command and control modern military forces .

Battle command on the move One of the problems with BC SoS is that a commander has little communication while in the battle field. Command and control planning occurs at a command post (CP) or tactical operations centre (TOC). Once a battle begins a commander leaves the CP/ TOC and moves forward to stay engaged.

A commander has little communication possibilities while in the battlefield making it difficult to follow and control all events as they happen. Battle command on the move(BCOTM) is a capability that

DSI

BC (Battle command) is defined as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost.

15

03/01/13 10:35 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

DECEMBER 2012

4. Library and

AFP

A pictorial depiction of networked BMS items

14

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 14-15

of Plans, situation

orders reactions

Building Blocks: BMS will constitute following subsystems.

1. Infrastructure-less Communication and networking system.

2. Application server 3. Database server 4. Relational Database Management System 5. Compute platforms (Different form factors) embedded with GPS. 6. Integrated GIS In addition to all these building blocks the other important feature of BMS is the Battle Command.

Battle command (BC) is the art and science of visualising, describing, directing and leading forces in operations against a hostile, thinking and adoptive enemy.

Battle command applies leadership to translate decision into actions by synchronising forces and war fighting functions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the missions.

The BC refers both processes triggered by commanders and executed by soldiers and to the system of systems that directly enables these processes. Process like Battle Command is clearly a human endeavor.

BC (Battle command) is defined as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost. Assigning missions prioritising and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act and knowing how to make adjustments during a battle.

BC is the art and science of battle field decision making and leading soldiers and units to successfully accomplish the mission. The BC elements constitute decision making, leading, and controlling.

The BC system of systems at brigade level enables commanders to lead, prioritise, and allocate assets required to employ and sustain combat power. The brigade commander must see further, process

the information faster and strike more precisely and at a fast rate.

If information is the medium of the BC process, the BC system must provide the commander with timely and accurate information on which to base the commanders decision.

BC is also known by the following terms: • C4ISR as in, Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Battle Management (BM) • Battle management is the management of activities within the operational environment based on the commands, direction and guidance given by appropriate authority. BM is considered to be the subset of BC. • Modern BC software/hardware exhibits all the traits/qualities of a System of Systems (SoS). It can be decomposed into systems such as manoeuvre, logistics, fires and air-support, intelligence, surveillance, recognition,

terrain and weather. Among the many inputs of these systems is a plethora of sensors which undergo sensor fusion and are compiled into a common operational picture/local operational picture (LOP) that enable commanders to achieve situational awareness (SA)/ situational understanding (SU). SA/ SU is paramount for commanders to command and control modern military forces .

Battle command on the move One of the problems with BC SoS is that a commander has little communication while in the battle field. Command and control planning occurs at a command post (CP) or tactical operations centre (TOC). Once a battle begins a commander leaves the CP/ TOC and moves forward to stay engaged.

A commander has little communication possibilities while in the battlefield making it difficult to follow and control all events as they happen. Battle command on the move(BCOTM) is a capability that

DSI

BC (Battle command) is defined as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost.

15

03/01/13 10:35 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY Hand-held receiver set with voice and data capabilities

AFP

provides commanders all of the information resident in their CP/TOC and the required communication necessary to command and control on the move or at a short halt from any vantage point on the battle field.

Intelligent Battle Management System: Intelligent Battle Management System is a BMS for battalions and their subordinate battle echelons. IBMS is intended for installation in Combat Vehicles, Armoured Fighting Vehicles, amphibious fighting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, artillery vehicles, helicopters as well as Battalion and Brigade Command stations. The IBMS is integrated into the vehicle without influencing the operation of any other subsystem. It exchanges information with other vehicles IBMS through the available communication resources.

IBMS information is presented both graphically and alpha-numerically. The system can be adopted to the operational needs and procedures of the particular user. There are six main areas of IBMS functionality: Situational Awareness (SA), situation update, tactical planning, tactical communications, logistics and administrative functions. SA comprises map navigation, zoom in/out and pan, friendly

‘blue force tracking’(BFT), enemy, neutral and unknown forces symbols according to NATO symbology, vehicle direction, and main line of sight of the Weapon (LOS), map features, and obstacle information, geographic distance measurements, layer control, and tools to minimise user workload.

Situation update encompasses current order of battle (ORBAT) of friendly and enemy units edited and displayed on the system map of identified enemy positions with subsequent reporting to higher echelons, where data can be managed to reflect the last updated situation, distribution of approved enemy positions to alternate detachment vehicles, with automatic update of each vehicle map and alerting vehicle commander by sound.

Battle Management systems of Israeli Army: Israeli Army is a forerunner to introduce BMS. It is essentially an add-on to virtually any combat vehicle mounted sensor or weapon system forming coordinated battle teams that perform their tasks with optimum precision It supports every requirement of battalion and below, tactical units meeting all their operational needs, including direct fire engagement and manoeuvre, indirect fire support, intelligence and logistics.

In addition to its combat networking capabilities this system of system provides commanders and crewmen with simplified operational interface, enhanced situational awareness and data communication capabilities. Elbit system was chosen by the (I)sraeli (M)inistry (O)f (D)efence to serve as prime contractor for the IDF(Israeli Defence Forces) program of Battle Management Systems for Battalion Combat Teams.

BMS is a command and control system for units of battalion size or autonomous units of equivalent size.BMS provides a COP to its users. The COP provides near real time information about the situation in the area of operations and makes it possible to prepare and transmit plans.

Commanders workstation and small BMS terminal operated by a vehicle commander

(the commanders workstation) is installed in vehicles. Operation is by touch screen.

Information about the position of one’s own vehicle in relation to one`s own unit and other units is presented on an electronic map. Crew workstations one or two in number are installed in the vehicles. Crew workstations are also installed in permanent accommodations, such as buildings or bases. Communication between the BMS system in vehicles, communication between the vehicles is done via radio or other means of communication.

Because the BMS terminals are primarily installed in wheeled and tracked vehicles the equipment must be very robust.

Benefits of Battlefield Management System: 1. Will greatly improve the combat effectiveness of the individual force commander by providing him the real time, accurate updated information integrated with available intelligence data regarding • Where am I? • Where are my friends?

• Where are my enemies?

• What is my mission?

• What is my status? of all fighting forces in the battlefield on a digital map.

2. Supports the decision making process as well as enables the commanders to plan efficiently their activities.

3. Reduce time in the decision cycle through automation and digitisation Conclusion: BMS is a force enabler providing ‘power to the edge’ and will be the vital system in the spit-fire battlefield environment of the futuristic information dominance warfare where information will no longer be an enabler but a core warfighting capability.

The increasing network-centricity of the battlefield management is creating opportunities of the higher command of the forces to have a clearer picture of the battle-space, thus enabling them to even indulge in strategic shifts, besides of course allocating resources at the tactical level DSI almost in real time.

16

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 16

03/01/13 10:35 AM

Review since it has lesser combat experience of operations in such demanding conditions.

We speak here also of its superior safety parameters.

Mi-26T2 liftiing the CH-47F Chinook up

The fact that the Mi-26T2 helicopter is capable of transporting 82 troops with their equipment demonstrates its superiority over the CH-47F helicopter by 1.5 times since the US helicopter can carry only 55 troops inside cabin. Moreover, the Mi-26T2 helicopter accommodates 2.5 times greater number of casualties laid on stretchers than the CH-47F helicopter. The Mi-26T2 has a large capacity cargo cabin allowing it to perform transportation missions with fewer helicopters than the CH-47Fs can.

We speak nothing of the fact that the Russian helicopter can quickly transport by air much greater variety of heavy-weight combat vehicles thanks to its unique load-lifting capacity.

A CASE FOR SURPRISE Moscow has been the main supplier of helicopters to India and a number of other countries for over 40 years now. The main bulk of these supplies is made up of various modifications of the Mi-8/Mi-17 type military transport helicopters. As is known, in 2008 New Delhi and Moscow struck a contract for the supply of a big lot of the Mi-15V-5 advanced helicopters. Their induction into the combat fleet of the Indian Air Force early this year made an important landmark in the relations of the two countries.

Nowadays Russia is one of few countries capable of producing and exporting all types of helicopters. This allows Moscow to firmly hold leading positions in the international helicopter market as a whole. Yet sometimes one may get an impression that in spite of all great and very positive history of the Indian-Russian cooperation in this area Moscow weakens its positions in the Indian arms market. For instance, media have recently circulated rumours about the Russian Mi-26T2 helicopter allegedly losing to the US CH-47F Chinook, even though no tender results are announced so far.

Journalists were surprised to see these rumours appear, judging them to be a provocation, since it has been clear from the very beginning that Russian positions in this tender for 15 helicopters are much stronger. Minor cost of the unique Mi-26T2 and a good, albeit not unique, CH-47F Chinook is named among reasons for this: the Russian helicopter’s price is equal the American’s, but at the same time it’s much more capable.

So all specialists were quite sure that no one in the Indian Air Force would refuse the payload lifting capability of 20 tonnes that one Russian helicopter offers and take instead 12 tonnes offered by the US contender. Figuratively speaking, it is better to buy a good-quality heavy and big jeep than a much weaker vehicle, even though the price and operational cost of the former may be two rupees higher. Who can deny oneself such a bonus? No one. This is why

ROT-1.indd 36

the rumour about the Indian Air Force making such surprise decision is rather dubious.

Judge for yourself: India has a huge fleet of the Mi-17V-5 helicopters capable of shipping four tones each, which allows them to perform missions not requiring very high lifting capacity. The procurement of the CH-47F Chinook helicopters will not remedy the situation but rather bring disturbance into the Indian Air Force which will have to remake the infrastructure already created for the Mi26 helicopters that have been long and successfully operated in India, as well as to retrain pilots and technicians for them.

Let us consider other aspects of this problem. The Mi-26T2 is an upgraded version of the Mi-26T helicopter with the pilot cabin information field modified by installing multifunctional displays of the “glass cabin” type and engines electronic control system. At present the Mi-26 helicopters are world’s biggest-size helicopters produced serially. This unique helicopter has lifting capacity comparable to that of the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.

The Mi-26T2 is favourably positioned in comparison to its competitor thanks to the simplicity of operation provided by the installation of protection devices which, according to designers, do not diminish practical service life of the engines and accessories when operating in dust formations.

The Russian helicopter is favoured also by high repairability characteristics in combat conditions.

Finally, even if one presumes that effectiveness of electronic equipment and onboard systems of both helicopters is approximately the same, generally it turns out that the Mi-26T2 helicopter considerably surpasses the CH-47F when judged by the total gamut of tasks solved. And it is offered for almost the same price. This makes rumours about the Russian helicopter losing to the US competitor surprising at the least.

- Nick Patrow Mi-26T2 carrying the CH-47F Chinook

On the other hand the CH-47F helicopter is the latest upgrade of the Chinook family helicopters that are the most aged helicopters in the US Air Force inventory.

Of course, the CH-47F helicopter features new high-quality onboard equipment made by Rockwell Collins, upgraded electronically controlled engines, and the airframe reinforced with composite materials. But that’s all.

At the same time the Mi-26T2 helicopter can perform both transport, assault, landing, search-and-rescue and specialpurpose tasks within one flight. The Mi26T2 outperforms the CH-47F helicopter in lifting capacity by about 1.7 times. Effective combat operations carried out in hot and high areas of Afghanistan and other regions testify to the Mi-26T2 superiority over the CH-47F helicopter

02/01/13 10:54 AM

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL

DECEMBER 2012

INDIAN SHIPYARDS: DISTRESS AMONG LIMITED GAINS

shipbuilding industry, particularly the defence PSU shipyards which have got bulk of the contracts. The present capacity of three defence shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) is roughly four ships per year, where as Navy alone requires induction of a minimum of eight ships per year to attain its force level of 160 ships. Moreover, as far as the construction of frontline warships (such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines) is concerned, the capability is mostly limited to MDL, which is already burdened with too many contracts, valued over Rupees One lakh crore.

So the challenge for the Navy is to get at least four more ships in a year from other shipyards some of which are preferably required to be able to construct frontline warships.

Indian workers build ships at the ABG Shipyard at Magdalla Port, India’s largest private sector shipyard.

KEY POINTS

The navy’s modernisation plans are based on indigenous production of warships.

But the existing shipyards fail invariably to meet delivery and cost schedules.

There is an immediate need to step-up the indigenous effort at strengthening the existing shipyards, and adding more capacities.

S

ince the license production of first major warship, INS Nilgiri in 1960s the Indian naval shipbuilding has come a long way, contributing much of platform requirements of the maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to build all types of frontline warships – aircraft carrier, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among

others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with over 40 more major ships being at the various stages of construction. However, beneath this healthy statistics lie some fundamental weaknesses, manifested in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns. The article takes a closer look at some of the weakness facing this vital segment of India’s defence industry and recommends few measures to revitalise it.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY: IIndia’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of 27 shipyards, of which six are under central government, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are however not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the central government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards – Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).

18

Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 36-37

The discrimination towards the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoDʼs plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be built at home

These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of India naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and private-owned Pipavav and L&T are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier.

The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping is presently building India’s first ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building, with the first major contract for five naval offshore patrol vessels (N-OPVs) being recently won by the Pipavav.

DEMAND-SUPPLY MISMATCH Maritime Perspective Plan, formulated by the Navy in 2005, projects 160 ships including 90 frontline ships consisting of aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Similarly the Coast Guard’s plan

includes 154 ships and 93 boats/crafts.

However the above force level is far from being achieved. By the end of 2010, Navy’s force level had decreased to 130 ships. In the case of Coast Guard, the present force level consists of around 45 ships only.

To address the depletion of force level, there have been frantic efforts to award major warship contracts to various shipyards.

For the Navy, till mid-2012, 43 ships have been awarded for construction to various Indian shipyards. The above number is going to increase as two more projects – six submarines under P75 (I) project and seven stealth frigates of P17 (A) – are expected to be announced soon. For the Coast Guard, 131 surface platforms are already under construction in Indian yards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted.

The above initiatives notwithstanding, there are still concerns that the maritime forces, particularly the Navy, may not get the projected force level in the near future. The concern is primarily because of various constraints of the Indian naval

AFP

Indian shipyards are full up on their order books.

But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can. This article tells us that the shipyards have the potential and can undertake the operation.

Laxman Kumar Behera

DSI

KEY GAPS The key weakness of the Indian shipbuilding industry is inefficiency and constraints of defence shipyards which constitute the backbone of the warship building. The inefficiency is due largely to the lack of competitive environment in which they operate. Like other production agencies under the MoD, PSU shipyards are treated as the captive production agencies to meet the requirements of the defence forces. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the MoD, which is the administrative head of the shipyard, takes a natural interest in ensuring orders to them, irrespective of their capacity, capability and at times, at the cost of timely delivery, developing alternative capacity and promoting competition within the large industry.

Some recent evidence in this regard is found in the CAG report which notes that the decision to award P15A project to MDL was “taken despite the inadequate infrastructure with the yard”. Similarly the decision to award P28 class of ships to the GRSE was “based not on the shipyard’s inherent advantage but because MDL was already over-loaded and GSL did not have adequate infrastructure to construct bigger warships.”

Because the shipyards are the nominated agencies and get orders in a non-competitive bidding process, they have little incentive to improve their efficiency. The defence PSU

19

03/01/13 10:39 AM

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL

DECEMBER 2012

INDIAN SHIPYARDS: DISTRESS AMONG LIMITED GAINS

shipbuilding industry, particularly the defence PSU shipyards which have got bulk of the contracts. The present capacity of three defence shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) is roughly four ships per year, where as Navy alone requires induction of a minimum of eight ships per year to attain its force level of 160 ships. Moreover, as far as the construction of frontline warships (such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines) is concerned, the capability is mostly limited to MDL, which is already burdened with too many contracts, valued over Rupees One lakh crore.

So the challenge for the Navy is to get at least four more ships in a year from other shipyards some of which are preferably required to be able to construct frontline warships.

Indian workers build ships at the ABG Shipyard at Magdalla Port, India’s largest private sector shipyard.

KEY POINTS

The navy’s modernisation plans are based on indigenous production of warships.

But the existing shipyards fail invariably to meet delivery and cost schedules.

There is an immediate need to step-up the indigenous effort at strengthening the existing shipyards, and adding more capacities.

S

ince the license production of first major warship, INS Nilgiri in 1960s the Indian naval shipbuilding has come a long way, contributing much of platform requirements of the maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to build all types of frontline warships – aircraft carrier, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among

others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with over 40 more major ships being at the various stages of construction. However, beneath this healthy statistics lie some fundamental weaknesses, manifested in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns. The article takes a closer look at some of the weakness facing this vital segment of India’s defence industry and recommends few measures to revitalise it.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY: IIndia’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of 27 shipyards, of which six are under central government, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are however not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the central government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards – Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).

18

Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 36-37

The discrimination towards the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoDʼs plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be built at home

These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of India naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and private-owned Pipavav and L&T are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier.

The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping is presently building India’s first ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building, with the first major contract for five naval offshore patrol vessels (N-OPVs) being recently won by the Pipavav.

DEMAND-SUPPLY MISMATCH Maritime Perspective Plan, formulated by the Navy in 2005, projects 160 ships including 90 frontline ships consisting of aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Similarly the Coast Guard’s plan

includes 154 ships and 93 boats/crafts.

However the above force level is far from being achieved. By the end of 2010, Navy’s force level had decreased to 130 ships. In the case of Coast Guard, the present force level consists of around 45 ships only.

To address the depletion of force level, there have been frantic efforts to award major warship contracts to various shipyards.

For the Navy, till mid-2012, 43 ships have been awarded for construction to various Indian shipyards. The above number is going to increase as two more projects – six submarines under P75 (I) project and seven stealth frigates of P17 (A) – are expected to be announced soon. For the Coast Guard, 131 surface platforms are already under construction in Indian yards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted.

The above initiatives notwithstanding, there are still concerns that the maritime forces, particularly the Navy, may not get the projected force level in the near future. The concern is primarily because of various constraints of the Indian naval

AFP

Indian shipyards are full up on their order books.

But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can. This article tells us that the shipyards have the potential and can undertake the operation.

Laxman Kumar Behera

DSI

KEY GAPS The key weakness of the Indian shipbuilding industry is inefficiency and constraints of defence shipyards which constitute the backbone of the warship building. The inefficiency is due largely to the lack of competitive environment in which they operate. Like other production agencies under the MoD, PSU shipyards are treated as the captive production agencies to meet the requirements of the defence forces. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the MoD, which is the administrative head of the shipyard, takes a natural interest in ensuring orders to them, irrespective of their capacity, capability and at times, at the cost of timely delivery, developing alternative capacity and promoting competition within the large industry.

Some recent evidence in this regard is found in the CAG report which notes that the decision to award P15A project to MDL was “taken despite the inadequate infrastructure with the yard”. Similarly the decision to award P28 class of ships to the GRSE was “based not on the shipyard’s inherent advantage but because MDL was already over-loaded and GSL did not have adequate infrastructure to construct bigger warships.”

Because the shipyards are the nominated agencies and get orders in a non-competitive bidding process, they have little incentive to improve their efficiency. The defence PSU

19

03/01/13 10:39 AM

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL

DECEMBER 2012

AFP

Indian naval ship come out of the dry dock shipyards are often found lacking in the areas of build period, inventory management, labour utilization, costing and procurement among others. The inefficiency has not only contributed to slow pace of construction, but has led to higher cost of production.

A part of the reason for inefficiency in the PSU shipyards is due to the way the shipyards are allowed to function. Being the government-owned enterprises, the PSU shipyards have limited operational and financial decision making powers. In addition, they are also required to follow the strict government procurement rules which sometimes delay their modernisation programme.

For instance, MDL has to retender a procurement contract of a Goliath crane three times and in the process lost three years before it could finally sign the contract.

The most crucial operational limitation of the shipyards perhaps lies in actual warship building of large design. For the large warship projects, the shipyards do not have complete control over the ships they are supposed to build. It is primarily because of Indian Navy’s deeper involvement in crucial decision making in the shipbuilding process.

In case of major warships, the Navy prefers telescopic method of construction in which the design parameters are kept open for a long time. This often impinges upon the

schedule and cost of warship construction.

Moreover, many a times the Navy brings in major changes in the design parameters midway through the construction process which necessitate modification and cause further delays and cost overrun. Similarly, since the Navy nominates the key equipments and their sources of procurement, the shipyards find it difficult to adhere to those decisions, for the reasons of higher cost, lack of competition and timely delivery. As a result, the normal construction schedule gets affected with due impact on the cost.

Above background, the most crucial parameter of performance of the shipyard in terms of cost and build period have taken a back seat. The cost escalation in two crucial projects such as P-15A and P-17 has been 225 per cent and 260 per cent, respectively.

The time overrun is also quite significant and higher than the average international standard. As the CAG noted, “As against the international timelines [for construction of a 1st ship of a class] ranging from 66-84 months, the indigenous construction of P-15

by MDL and P-16A by GRSE took 116 and 120 months respectively.”

Lack of Level-Playing Field One of the reasons why India’s warship building is not at a pace with the induction requirement is because the private yards

20

Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 38-39

are out of ambit of the major shipbuilding projects.

Historically the defence production, including naval shipbuilding has been retained in the exclusive domain of the public sector enterprises. This continues to be so even though the 2001 reform measures have allowed 100 per cent private participation in defence production. The biggest obstacle for private yards is MoD’s shipbuilding procedures, which favour the public sector enterprises over the private yards.

The discrimination against the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoD’s plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be constructed in two defence shipyards: three at MDL and one at HSL. From the private sector’s perspective what is worrisome is the decision to involve HSL, which has no prior experience in submarine construction. Compared to that some of the private yards, particularly the L&T, has experience in the India’s nuclear submarine construction.

Lack of Design Capability of Shipyards Historically Indian shipyards are dependent on foreign sources for ship design, because of a lack of investments on R&D and shortage of qualified naval architects and engineers. This has been a major factor why the majority of the Indian shipyards, especially the private yards, are constrained to participate in major naval shipbuilding projects, which involves more complex design compared to commercial shipbuilding. Among the defence PSU shipyards, except for the MDL, no other yards have full design capability to undertake construction of bigger and complex warships. Even MDL’s design capability is not comprehensive. Like other shipyards it is also dependent on the Navy which is the overall nodal agency for design activities pertaining to warship building.

However, this arrangement has not helped the Indian shipyards, including the MDL to become independent for the entire spectrum

of shipbuilding, besides creating some other peculiar problems. As one general manager of MDL noted, “Dependence on the Navy’s design has over the years proven to be detrimental to the shipyards …which do not get direct exposure to any new design concept and have stopped thinking about generating their own designs.”

Commercial Shipbuilding Industry Weak Despite noticeable differences, a strong and competitive commercial shipbuilding industry has a positive impact on warship building. This is clearly evident from China where expansion and modernisation of commercial shipbuilding has vastly benefited all types of warship construction, in terms of quality, efficiency and output.

In India however this correlation is absent since the commercial shipbuilding industry is weak and inefficient. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea which are the global leaders in commercial shipbuilding with an individual share of more than 25 per cent each, Indian shipbuilding industry accounts for less than one per cent of the global share.

Need for a strong and competitive shipbuilding industry has been felt by many in India not only for employment generation and revenue earning potential, but also for strategic reasons. This has been highlighted by the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC), a group constituted under the Prime Minister. The NMCC has identified shipbuilding industry as one of the five strategic sectors which needs to be strengthened to build national capabilities in the long-run.

To provide an impetus to the Indian shipbuilding industry the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020, announced by the Ministry of Shipping has laid emphasis to overcome the current weakness; and increase India’s share in global shipbuilding to five per cent by 2020. According to the Agenda paper of the Commission the Indian shipbuilding industry is fraught with four key gaps. These are: manufacturing gap (mostly due to unfavorable taxation policy in comparison to foreign shipyards); technology gap; resource gap; and skill development gap.

To overcome these gaps, the Agenda

paper has given a number of policy recommendations, including tax incentive to domestic shipyards, capital subsidy to shipyards for acquisition of modern technology, formulation of maritime clusters for holistic growth of shipbuilding industry, enunciation of an offset policy in government procurement, and greater focus on ship design and R&D, among others.

Absence of a Strong Ancillary Industry Like in any other sector ancillary industry plays a vital role in shipbuilding in general and warship building in particular. In India the general ancillary industry for shipbuilding is vastly underdeveloped.

Given the poor state of ancillary industry, it is not surprising that India’s defence PSU shipyards also spend a vast amount of their resources in importing key raw materials, parts, components from foreign sources.

The import dependency which is over Rs. 4,300 crore in past five years for three key PSU shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) has also a strategic underpinning and an impact on build period of naval ships. For example, in the case of P-17 ships, which are powered by the General Electric engine, the construction of ship was halted as the Obama administration stopped – although briefly- “all work on the gas turbine engines.”

Given that external dependency has a strategic consequence apart from its bearing upon self-reliance, the Indian Navy has on its part formulated a long term indigenisation plan. The current plan, which caters to the period 2008-2022, provides some key details to domestic industry so that the industry could take up for indigenisation. However, given the capital and technology-intensive nature of naval machinery and equipment and low volume of business, few Indian companies have come forward.

One of the problems faced by the industry is the lack of hand-holding either by the MoD or the Navy to protect against failures, and long-term commitment from the government to safeguard business interests of the companies interested in manufacturing of such items.

DSI

Lack of Synergy between Public and Private Yards A key weakness in India’s naval shipbuilding is lack of synergy between public and private shipyards. Till now both of those shipyards are operating separately without combining their respective strengths. It is however noteworthy that each sector has a unique set of advantage.

While the pubic sector has long exposure to naval shipbuilding, the private yards have greater flexibility and operational autonomy, in addition to the vast infrastructure they have created in recent years.

Given that the PSU shipyards, particularly the MDL and GRSE, alone are not in a position to meet the warship requirement in the required time-frame (given their huge order book, and slow execution rate) there is scope to partner with private yards to reduce the build period. In this regard, recently, joint venture (JV) policy announced by the MoD is a welcome step.

CONCLUSION India has a huge industrial base for naval warship construction. The growing capability of the industry is evident from its ability to construct major warships, including aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates and submarines. This positive feature of the industry notwithstanding, there are certain weaknesses in the naval shipbuilding industry, which prohibit it from meeting the vast requirement of the maritime forces in the required timeframe and cost efficiently.

Among others, the industry as a whole does not operate in a competitive environment; lacks the crucial capability in warship design; and lacks civil-military integration for naval construction.

Overcoming these challenges will be critical for creating a strong and vibrant naval shipbuilding industry in India. Among others, there is a need to completely open India’s warship building to private shipyards and providing them a level-playing filed visà-vis PSU shipyards to bid for all types of naval contracts; delegate key responsibility, including warship design, to the shipyards to ensure accountability in naval construction; build a strong ancillary industry for shipbuilding; and promote close civil-military DSI integration in warship building.

21

03/01/13 10:40 AM

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL

DECEMBER 2012

AFP

Indian naval ship come out of the dry dock shipyards are often found lacking in the areas of build period, inventory management, labour utilization, costing and procurement among others. The inefficiency has not only contributed to slow pace of construction, but has led to higher cost of production.

A part of the reason for inefficiency in the PSU shipyards is due to the way the shipyards are allowed to function. Being the government-owned enterprises, the PSU shipyards have limited operational and financial decision making powers. In addition, they are also required to follow the strict government procurement rules which sometimes delay their modernisation programme.

For instance, MDL has to retender a procurement contract of a Goliath crane three times and in the process lost three years before it could finally sign the contract.

The most crucial operational limitation of the shipyards perhaps lies in actual warship building of large design. For the large warship projects, the shipyards do not have complete control over the ships they are supposed to build. It is primarily because of Indian Navy’s deeper involvement in crucial decision making in the shipbuilding process.

In case of major warships, the Navy prefers telescopic method of construction in which the design parameters are kept open for a long time. This often impinges upon the

schedule and cost of warship construction.

Moreover, many a times the Navy brings in major changes in the design parameters midway through the construction process which necessitate modification and cause further delays and cost overrun. Similarly, since the Navy nominates the key equipments and their sources of procurement, the shipyards find it difficult to adhere to those decisions, for the reasons of higher cost, lack of competition and timely delivery. As a result, the normal construction schedule gets affected with due impact on the cost.

Above background, the most crucial parameter of performance of the shipyard in terms of cost and build period have taken a back seat. The cost escalation in two crucial projects such as P-15A and P-17 has been 225 per cent and 260 per cent, respectively.

The time overrun is also quite significant and higher than the average international standard. As the CAG noted, “As against the international timelines [for construction of a 1st ship of a class] ranging from 66-84 months, the indigenous construction of P-15

by MDL and P-16A by GRSE took 116 and 120 months respectively.”

Lack of Level-Playing Field One of the reasons why India’s warship building is not at a pace with the induction requirement is because the private yards

20

Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 38-39

are out of ambit of the major shipbuilding projects.

Historically the defence production, including naval shipbuilding has been retained in the exclusive domain of the public sector enterprises. This continues to be so even though the 2001 reform measures have allowed 100 per cent private participation in defence production. The biggest obstacle for private yards is MoD’s shipbuilding procedures, which favour the public sector enterprises over the private yards.

The discrimination against the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoD’s plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be constructed in two defence shipyards: three at MDL and one at HSL. From the private sector’s perspective what is worrisome is the decision to involve HSL, which has no prior experience in submarine construction. Compared to that some of the private yards, particularly the L&T, has experience in the India’s nuclear submarine construction.

Lack of Design Capability of Shipyards Historically Indian shipyards are dependent on foreign sources for ship design, because of a lack of investments on R&D and shortage of qualified naval architects and engineers. This has been a major factor why the majority of the Indian shipyards, especially the private yards, are constrained to participate in major naval shipbuilding projects, which involves more complex design compared to commercial shipbuilding. Among the defence PSU shipyards, except for the MDL, no other yards have full design capability to undertake construction of bigger and complex warships. Even MDL’s design capability is not comprehensive. Like other shipyards it is also dependent on the Navy which is the overall nodal agency for design activities pertaining to warship building.

However, this arrangement has not helped the Indian shipyards, including the MDL to become independent for the entire spectrum

of shipbuilding, besides creating some other peculiar problems. As one general manager of MDL noted, “Dependence on the Navy’s design has over the years proven to be detrimental to the shipyards …which do not get direct exposure to any new design concept and have stopped thinking about generating their own designs.”

Commercial Shipbuilding Industry Weak Despite noticeable differences, a strong and competitive commercial shipbuilding industry has a positive impact on warship building. This is clearly evident from China where expansion and modernisation of commercial shipbuilding has vastly benefited all types of warship construction, in terms of quality, efficiency and output.

In India however this correlation is absent since the commercial shipbuilding industry is weak and inefficient. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea which are the global leaders in commercial shipbuilding with an individual share of more than 25 per cent each, Indian shipbuilding industry accounts for less than one per cent of the global share.

Need for a strong and competitive shipbuilding industry has been felt by many in India not only for employment generation and revenue earning potential, but also for strategic reasons. This has been highlighted by the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC), a group constituted under the Prime Minister. The NMCC has identified shipbuilding industry as one of the five strategic sectors which needs to be strengthened to build national capabilities in the long-run.

To provide an impetus to the Indian shipbuilding industry the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020, announced by the Ministry of Shipping has laid emphasis to overcome the current weakness; and increase India’s share in global shipbuilding to five per cent by 2020. According to the Agenda paper of the Commission the Indian shipbuilding industry is fraught with four key gaps. These are: manufacturing gap (mostly due to unfavorable taxation policy in comparison to foreign shipyards); technology gap; resource gap; and skill development gap.

To overcome these gaps, the Agenda

paper has given a number of policy recommendations, including tax incentive to domestic shipyards, capital subsidy to shipyards for acquisition of modern technology, formulation of maritime clusters for holistic growth of shipbuilding industry, enunciation of an offset policy in government procurement, and greater focus on ship design and R&D, among others.

Absence of a Strong Ancillary Industry Like in any other sector ancillary industry plays a vital role in shipbuilding in general and warship building in particular. In India the general ancillary industry for shipbuilding is vastly underdeveloped.

Given the poor state of ancillary industry, it is not surprising that India’s defence PSU shipyards also spend a vast amount of their resources in importing key raw materials, parts, components from foreign sources.

The import dependency which is over Rs. 4,300 crore in past five years for three key PSU shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) has also a strategic underpinning and an impact on build period of naval ships. For example, in the case of P-17 ships, which are powered by the General Electric engine, the construction of ship was halted as the Obama administration stopped – although briefly- “all work on the gas turbine engines.”

Given that external dependency has a strategic consequence apart from its bearing upon self-reliance, the Indian Navy has on its part formulated a long term indigenisation plan. The current plan, which caters to the period 2008-2022, provides some key details to domestic industry so that the industry could take up for indigenisation. However, given the capital and technology-intensive nature of naval machinery and equipment and low volume of business, few Indian companies have come forward.

One of the problems faced by the industry is the lack of hand-holding either by the MoD or the Navy to protect against failures, and long-term commitment from the government to safeguard business interests of the companies interested in manufacturing of such items.

DSI

Lack of Synergy between Public and Private Yards A key weakness in India’s naval shipbuilding is lack of synergy between public and private shipyards. Till now both of those shipyards are operating separately without combining their respective strengths. It is however noteworthy that each sector has a unique set of advantage.

While the pubic sector has long exposure to naval shipbuilding, the private yards have greater flexibility and operational autonomy, in addition to the vast infrastructure they have created in recent years.

Given that the PSU shipyards, particularly the MDL and GRSE, alone are not in a position to meet the warship requirement in the required time-frame (given their huge order book, and slow execution rate) there is scope to partner with private yards to reduce the build period. In this regard, recently, joint venture (JV) policy announced by the MoD is a welcome step.

CONCLUSION India has a huge industrial base for naval warship construction. The growing capability of the industry is evident from its ability to construct major warships, including aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates and submarines. This positive feature of the industry notwithstanding, there are certain weaknesses in the naval shipbuilding industry, which prohibit it from meeting the vast requirement of the maritime forces in the required timeframe and cost efficiently.

Among others, the industry as a whole does not operate in a competitive environment; lacks the crucial capability in warship design; and lacks civil-military integration for naval construction.

Overcoming these challenges will be critical for creating a strong and vibrant naval shipbuilding industry in India. Among others, there is a need to completely open India’s warship building to private shipyards and providing them a level-playing filed visà-vis PSU shipyards to bid for all types of naval contracts; delegate key responsibility, including warship design, to the shipyards to ensure accountability in naval construction; build a strong ancillary industry for shipbuilding; and promote close civil-military DSI integration in warship building.

21

03/01/13 10:40 AM

Tornado

tegrated missile system, 76.2-mm A-190E/AK-176 universal artillery mount and Palma air defence missile/gun system with the Sosna-R missiles. The ship is armed with anti-submarine weapons including two 533-mm twin torpedo tubes. All types of weapons can be employed in Sea States up to 5. In addition, to enhance its attack and antisubmarine warfare capabilities the ship carries one helicopter with up to 12-ton gross weight.

THE BACKBONE OF

NAVAL POWER Many states see the problem of reliably monitoring exclusive economic zones and defending national interests at sea as one of the top priorities.

Its military, economic and political aspects are equally important. This is the reason why experts forecast steady demand in the global market for combat ships of main types, especially for frigates and corvettes making up the core of modern navies.

Russian shipbuilding enterprises are traditional leaders in this technology segment, and Rosoboronexport, the sole state arms exporter, promotes their products to the international market.

Rosoboronexport pursues an active marketing policy based on the analysis of real needs of potential customers and offers a wide range of submarines, combat ships and boats. In many cases offers include not only delivery of finished items but also joint design and production either in customer shipyards.

It is worthy of noting that Russia is among a few countries capable of building practically all types and classes of ships, including nuclear-powered submarines. This fact is a clear illustration of a high level of Russian science, design and shipbuilding technologies.

Project 21632 Tornado small missile/gun ship is one of prospective articles of trade in the international naval systems market. Two ships of this project have been successfully commissioned by the Russian Navy.

A number of foreign customers are also showing interest in such ships.

Rosoboronexport is ready to supply three modifications of the Tornado ship based on a common platform displacing 560 tons. The first one is a gunship. Its main attack weapon is the 122-mm Grad rocket system designed to defeat coastal area targets. The second Tornado version is a missile ship armed with the UranE antiship missile system having the launch range of 130 km. Each version is armed also with one 100-mm A-190E artillery gun mount, two 30mm AK-630/AK-306 automatic sixbarrel artillery gun mounts, 14.7-mm and 7.62-mm large-calibre machine guns, one 3M-47 Gibka pedestal mount with Igla type missiles.

The third Tornado version is a patrol ship armed with less powerful artillery systems and a helipad for operations of helicopters with up to 4-tons gross weight.

The ship powered by the CODAD engines can develop a speed of up to 26 knots, and has high manoeu-

vrability in shallow waters thanks to its waterjet propulsors enabling operations even in navigable rivers and their estuaries.

The adaptable architecture of the Tornado ship makes it possible to modify composition not only of its weapon set but also machinery plant, as well as to fulfil other specific customer’s requirements.

Rosoboronexport also offers foreign customers the Gepard 3.9 frigate derived from Project 11661 patrol ship. The frigate is in service with the Russian Navy since 2003. In recent years ships of this project have been actively procured in the international market.The 2,100-ton Gepard 3.9 frigate develops a speed of up to 28 knots. The ship has high combat and operational capabilities allowing it to navigate for a long time (its sea endurance is 20 days) and control vast sea areas. The Gepard 3.9 frigate can operate autonomously or within a task force, perform escort and patrol missions, protect maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. The frigate is designed to search for and defeat surface, underwater and airborne targets, and has a balanced and diversified dedicated weapons set. It includes the Uran-E antiship missile system or unique Club-N in-

time zone. The 4,750-ton ship can develop a speed of up to 29.5 knots and navigate at a range of up to 4,500 n.miles with 30-days endurance. The first frigate of this type was built for the Russian Navy and set afloat in 2010.

Project 20382 Tigr corvette

Project 20382 Tigr corvette unveiled in 2007 is also designed to defend economic zones and maritime state borders, and effectively struggle against submarines, surface ships and air attack weapons. The third such corvette intended for the Russian Navy was launched last June.

The corvette is armed with a powerful arsenal including the Uran-E antiship missile system (two other options are the Club-N integrated missile system or Yakhont missile system with the launch range of 300 km), 100-mm A-190E or AK-176M artillery gun mount, 30-mm AK630M automatic artillery gun mount, Kashtan-M air defence missile/gun system, Paket small-size antisubmarine torpedo system, all operable at Sea States up to 5. In addition, the corvette can carry one helicopter.

Project 22356 multi-purpose frigate is designed to perform a wide range of missions in off-shore mari-

The frigate’s main weapon is the Club-N integrated missile system capable of launching both antiship and antisubmarine missiles. The frigate can effectively carry out all assigned missions thanks to a diversified weapons set including artillery, air defence and antisubmarine systems as well as Ka-28 or Ka-31 ship-based helicopters. Thanks to the optimised hull shape, sharp-rising stem and double bottom in the greater part of the hull the ship has excellent seagoing and protection qualities, while the application of advanced ship stabilisers with non-retractable fins allows unrestricted weapons employment at Sea States up to 5.

The above mentioned ships offered

by Rosoboronexport fully correspond to latest trends in shipbuilding, and can enhance combat capabilities of any country’s navy by many times.

They are fitted with most advanced combat information management systems and underwater, maritime and airspace situation awareness systems; their designs incorporate stealth technologies to the full extent. In addition, all of them possess large upgrading potentials.

Gepard 3.9 frigate

The Tigr corvette boasts a totally new design. It features a flush-deck hull and a superstructure made of glass fibre and carbon fibre materials which greatly reduce its radar signature.

Thanks to innovative technological solutions implemented in its design the Tigr corvette has only a 2,220ton displacement, which is small for its type, and boasts high seagoing characteristics (its speed attains 30 knots). As a result, thanks to the new underwater hull lines ship’s water drag is substantially reduced and required power of its main machinery plant is less by approximately 25 percent.

DSI Marketing Promotion Ship_ad.indd 30-31

02/01/13 10:53 AM

Tornado

tegrated missile system, 76.2-mm A-190E/AK-176 universal artillery mount and Palma air defence missile/gun system with the Sosna-R missiles. The ship is armed with anti-submarine weapons including two 533-mm twin torpedo tubes. All types of weapons can be employed in Sea States up to 5. In addition, to enhance its attack and antisubmarine warfare capabilities the ship carries one helicopter with up to 12-ton gross weight.

THE BACKBONE OF

NAVAL POWER Many states see the problem of reliably monitoring exclusive economic zones and defending national interests at sea as one of the top priorities.

Its military, economic and political aspects are equally important. This is the reason why experts forecast steady demand in the global market for combat ships of main types, especially for frigates and corvettes making up the core of modern navies.

Russian shipbuilding enterprises are traditional leaders in this technology segment, and Rosoboronexport, the sole state arms exporter, promotes their products to the international market.

Rosoboronexport pursues an active marketing policy based on the analysis of real needs of potential customers and offers a wide range of submarines, combat ships and boats. In many cases offers include not only delivery of finished items but also joint design and production either in customer shipyards.

It is worthy of noting that Russia is among a few countries capable of building practically all types and classes of ships, including nuclear-powered submarines. This fact is a clear illustration of a high level of Russian science, design and shipbuilding technologies.

Project 21632 Tornado small missile/gun ship is one of prospective articles of trade in the international naval systems market. Two ships of this project have been successfully commissioned by the Russian Navy.

A number of foreign customers are also showing interest in such ships.

Rosoboronexport is ready to supply three modifications of the Tornado ship based on a common platform displacing 560 tons. The first one is a gunship. Its main attack weapon is the 122-mm Grad rocket system designed to defeat coastal area targets. The second Tornado version is a missile ship armed with the UranE antiship missile system having the launch range of 130 km. Each version is armed also with one 100-mm A-190E artillery gun mount, two 30mm AK-630/AK-306 automatic sixbarrel artillery gun mounts, 14.7-mm and 7.62-mm large-calibre machine guns, one 3M-47 Gibka pedestal mount with Igla type missiles.

The third Tornado version is a patrol ship armed with less powerful artillery systems and a helipad for operations of helicopters with up to 4-tons gross weight.

The ship powered by the CODAD engines can develop a speed of up to 26 knots, and has high manoeu-

vrability in shallow waters thanks to its waterjet propulsors enabling operations even in navigable rivers and their estuaries.

The adaptable architecture of the Tornado ship makes it possible to modify composition not only of its weapon set but also machinery plant, as well as to fulfil other specific customer’s requirements.

Rosoboronexport also offers foreign customers the Gepard 3.9 frigate derived from Project 11661 patrol ship. The frigate is in service with the Russian Navy since 2003. In recent years ships of this project have been actively procured in the international market.The 2,100-ton Gepard 3.9 frigate develops a speed of up to 28 knots. The ship has high combat and operational capabilities allowing it to navigate for a long time (its sea endurance is 20 days) and control vast sea areas. The Gepard 3.9 frigate can operate autonomously or within a task force, perform escort and patrol missions, protect maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. The frigate is designed to search for and defeat surface, underwater and airborne targets, and has a balanced and diversified dedicated weapons set. It includes the Uran-E antiship missile system or unique Club-N in-

time zone. The 4,750-ton ship can develop a speed of up to 29.5 knots and navigate at a range of up to 4,500 n.miles with 30-days endurance. The first frigate of this type was built for the Russian Navy and set afloat in 2010.

Project 20382 Tigr corvette

Project 20382 Tigr corvette unveiled in 2007 is also designed to defend economic zones and maritime state borders, and effectively struggle against submarines, surface ships and air attack weapons. The third such corvette intended for the Russian Navy was launched last June.

The corvette is armed with a powerful arsenal including the Uran-E antiship missile system (two other options are the Club-N integrated missile system or Yakhont missile system with the launch range of 300 km), 100-mm A-190E or AK-176M artillery gun mount, 30-mm AK630M automatic artillery gun mount, Kashtan-M air defence missile/gun system, Paket small-size antisubmarine torpedo system, all operable at Sea States up to 5. In addition, the corvette can carry one helicopter.

Project 22356 multi-purpose frigate is designed to perform a wide range of missions in off-shore mari-

The frigate’s main weapon is the Club-N integrated missile system capable of launching both antiship and antisubmarine missiles. The frigate can effectively carry out all assigned missions thanks to a diversified weapons set including artillery, air defence and antisubmarine systems as well as Ka-28 or Ka-31 ship-based helicopters. Thanks to the optimised hull shape, sharp-rising stem and double bottom in the greater part of the hull the ship has excellent seagoing and protection qualities, while the application of advanced ship stabilisers with non-retractable fins allows unrestricted weapons employment at Sea States up to 5.

The above mentioned ships offered

by Rosoboronexport fully correspond to latest trends in shipbuilding, and can enhance combat capabilities of any country’s navy by many times.

They are fitted with most advanced combat information management systems and underwater, maritime and airspace situation awareness systems; their designs incorporate stealth technologies to the full extent. In addition, all of them possess large upgrading potentials.

Gepard 3.9 frigate

The Tigr corvette boasts a totally new design. It features a flush-deck hull and a superstructure made of glass fibre and carbon fibre materials which greatly reduce its radar signature.

Thanks to innovative technological solutions implemented in its design the Tigr corvette has only a 2,220ton displacement, which is small for its type, and boasts high seagoing characteristics (its speed attains 30 knots). As a result, thanks to the new underwater hull lines ship’s water drag is substantially reduced and required power of its main machinery plant is less by approximately 25 percent.

DSI Marketing Promotion Ship_ad.indd 30-31

02/01/13 10:53 AM

CYBER WARFARE

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFARE AFP

In the recent past, the world has seen three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla in the field is China

C Gurmeet Kanwal

KEY POINTS

The Stuxnet worm was the most lethal use of cyber weapons ever made till now.

The Chinese have an elaborate plan for cyber warfare based on the concept of peoples’ war, thought up

by Mao. ‘Acupuncture’ warfare is strategic use of cyber weapons to hit the central controlling authority of the opposition.

yber-attack: Stuxnet and other worms Space has been called the new high ground in war, but cyber space is truly the new frontier that has made boundaries irrelevant. War can now be waged against a military adversary from any computer on earth. Recent events highlight how this has been happening with increasing frequency.

On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defence, authorised the creation of a new US military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks against computer attacks. In January 2010, senior Pentagon leaders attended a simulation exercise on how the Pentagon would respond to a sophisticated cyber-attack aimed at paralysing power grids, communications systems and financial networks across the country.

Shortly after this wargame, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said, “States, terrorists and those who would act as their

24

Cyber-warfare.indd 24-25

proxies must know that the United States will protect our networks… Those who disrupt the free flow of information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our government and our civil society.” Clearly, the US has adopted a pro-active cyberwar strategy. This was evident in the Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear facility near Natanz reportedly launched jointly by the US and Israel in June 2010. Approximately 10 per cent of the centrifuges being used for the enrichment of uranium were destroyed through a worm that infected the computers controlling the facility.

India, with its growing economy and infrastructure and a military increasingly more dependent on computers for command, control, communications and surveillance, is equally vulnerable. In alarming front page news reports published by several Indian newspapers in 2010, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have hacked into computers and stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offices around the world, including those of the Indian embassy

in the US. More recently, it was reported that during the Israel-Hamas rocket attack standoff in November 2012, the Israelis successfully targeted the command and control network of the Hamas.

While the emerging cyber threats originate from various sources including non-state actors, among nation states the Chinese are suspected to be the leading purveyors of offensive cyber strategies and Pakistan is working hard to play catch up. Though information about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) cyber warriors has begun to appear in the public domain only recently, PLA watchers across the world have known for long about China’s well conceived doctrine on information operations and cyberwar.

China’s cyberwar doctrine is designed to level the playing field in a future war with better equipped Western armed forces that rely on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies and enjoy immense superiority in terms of weapon platforms and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control networks.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing field for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars. However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of peopleʼs war under modern conditions

The Chinese army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in information technology to maintain an e-vigil on China’s borders. “Chinese soldiers now swipe cards and work on laptops as they monitor the border with great efficiency, electronic sentinels functioning 24 hours a day.” Parallel to this effort, China is also engaged in raising a private army of hackers who will wage cyberwar against the state’s enemies from their laptops at home.

Informationisation as a backdrop for cyberwar Early in the first decade of the new century, the Central Military Commission (CMC) called for a detailed study of the concept of people’s war under conditions of informationisation.

Since then China has spent a lot of time and effort in assessing the implications of information technology and knowledge-based warfare on future conflict and to applying the lessons to its own war concepts.

The PLA expects to fight the next war under conditions of what it calls “informationisation”

25

28/12/12 10:52 AM

CYBER WARFARE

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFARE AFP

In the recent past, the world has seen three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla in the field is China

C Gurmeet Kanwal

KEY POINTS

The Stuxnet worm was the most lethal use of cyber weapons ever made till now.

The Chinese have an elaborate plan for cyber warfare based on the concept of peoples’ war, thought up

by Mao. ‘Acupuncture’ warfare is strategic use of cyber weapons to hit the central controlling authority of the opposition.

yber-attack: Stuxnet and other worms Space has been called the new high ground in war, but cyber space is truly the new frontier that has made boundaries irrelevant. War can now be waged against a military adversary from any computer on earth. Recent events highlight how this has been happening with increasing frequency.

On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defence, authorised the creation of a new US military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks against computer attacks. In January 2010, senior Pentagon leaders attended a simulation exercise on how the Pentagon would respond to a sophisticated cyber-attack aimed at paralysing power grids, communications systems and financial networks across the country.

Shortly after this wargame, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said, “States, terrorists and those who would act as their

24

Cyber-warfare.indd 24-25

proxies must know that the United States will protect our networks… Those who disrupt the free flow of information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our government and our civil society.” Clearly, the US has adopted a pro-active cyberwar strategy. This was evident in the Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear facility near Natanz reportedly launched jointly by the US and Israel in June 2010. Approximately 10 per cent of the centrifuges being used for the enrichment of uranium were destroyed through a worm that infected the computers controlling the facility.

India, with its growing economy and infrastructure and a military increasingly more dependent on computers for command, control, communications and surveillance, is equally vulnerable. In alarming front page news reports published by several Indian newspapers in 2010, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have hacked into computers and stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offices around the world, including those of the Indian embassy

in the US. More recently, it was reported that during the Israel-Hamas rocket attack standoff in November 2012, the Israelis successfully targeted the command and control network of the Hamas.

While the emerging cyber threats originate from various sources including non-state actors, among nation states the Chinese are suspected to be the leading purveyors of offensive cyber strategies and Pakistan is working hard to play catch up. Though information about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) cyber warriors has begun to appear in the public domain only recently, PLA watchers across the world have known for long about China’s well conceived doctrine on information operations and cyberwar.

China’s cyberwar doctrine is designed to level the playing field in a future war with better equipped Western armed forces that rely on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies and enjoy immense superiority in terms of weapon platforms and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control networks.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing field for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars. However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of peopleʼs war under modern conditions

The Chinese army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in information technology to maintain an e-vigil on China’s borders. “Chinese soldiers now swipe cards and work on laptops as they monitor the border with great efficiency, electronic sentinels functioning 24 hours a day.” Parallel to this effort, China is also engaged in raising a private army of hackers who will wage cyberwar against the state’s enemies from their laptops at home.

Informationisation as a backdrop for cyberwar Early in the first decade of the new century, the Central Military Commission (CMC) called for a detailed study of the concept of people’s war under conditions of informationisation.

Since then China has spent a lot of time and effort in assessing the implications of information technology and knowledge-based warfare on future conflict and to applying the lessons to its own war concepts.

The PLA expects to fight the next war under conditions of what it calls “informationisation”

25

28/12/12 10:52 AM

DECEMBER 2012

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwanʼs Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is re-directing its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around Chinaʼs peripheries and to seize Taiwan

AFP

or “informationalisation”. In the White Paper on National Defence issued in 2004, informationisation was explained in general terms for the first time: “To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

PLA analysts have called the ongoing RMA an “informationised military revolution”.

Informationisation “clearly relates to the PLA’s ability to adopt information technologies to command, intelligence, training and weapon systems. This would include broad investment in new automatic command systems linked by fibre-optic Internet, satellite and new high-frequency digital radio systems. The PLA can also contest the information battle space with its new space-based, airborne, naval and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems and its new anti-satellite, anti-radar, electronic warfare and information warfare system, there is increasing ‘information content’ for new PLA weapons as it moves to link new space,

airborne and ELINT sensors to missile, air, naval and ground-based ‘shooters’ to enable all its services to better use new precisionstrike weapons.” According to the 2004 White Paper, “In its modernisation drive, the PLA takes informationalisation as its orientation and strategic focus.” The PLA has adopted what it calls a “double historical mission” and a “leapfrog development strategy” – accelerating military informationisation while undergoing mechanisation.

Information Operations – Acupuncture Warfare The denial of information, strategic deception and the achievement of psychological surprise have for long been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine.

The Chinese find information warfare (IW) extremely attractive as they view it as an asymmetric tool that will enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in kinetic military hardware. The Chinese are devoting considerable time and energy to perfecting the techniques of IW to target the rapidly modernising Western armed forces that are becoming increasingly more dependent on the software that

26

Cyber-warfare.indd 26-27

runs computer networks and modern communications.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing field for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars.

However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of people’s war under modern conditions or if it is still treated as a separate but complementary pattern of war (zhanzheng xingtai). There is also some confusion created by the use of the term informationised warfare (xinxihua zhanzheng) instead of IW (xinxi zhanzheng).

However, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations: • Intelligence operations, which include intelligence reconnaissance and protection.

• Command and control operations to disrupt enemy information flow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.

• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

• Targeting enemy computer systems and

networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.

• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as C4ISR through the application of firepower.

The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter Washington’s overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities.

“Acupuncture warfare” is a term that first surfaced in a 1997 PLA National Defence University publication entitled “On Commanding Warfighting under High-Tech Conditions”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) was described as “Paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control, communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu combat.” Acupuncture warfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare dating back to the teachings of Sun Tzu, China’s pre-eminent military strategist from the 5th century BC. For quite some time now the PLA has been simulating computer virus attacks in its military exercises.

According to a US Congressional Research Service report entitled “Cyberwarfare”,

authored by Steve Hildreth, China is developing a strategic information warfare unit called “Net Force” to neutralise the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries. This new information warfare unit will “wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fire control and guidance systems.” Though the PLA’s research into the theoretical aspects of information warfare is fairly advanced, it does not appear to have developed a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine as yet.

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is redirecting its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around China’s peripheries and to seize Taiwan with minimum bloodshed and destruction.” In another five to 10 years China will develop depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations.

With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India has become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. The fact that it can be practiced from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. India can illafford to ignore this new challenge to its security.

Defence analysts Timperlake and Triplett have written that economic, political and social systems are essentially unprotected against

DSI

Chinese information warfare attack. In their view, China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to further its information warfare plans: Information warfare has the support of the top PLA brass; the PLA’s best strategists and defence scientists have had extensive open discussions about information warfare; the PLA is conducting military exercises in information warfare; it is expanding its already strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability in Cuba; and, the PLA is buying the hardware necessary. As supercomputers require huge capital investments, a strong political and financial commitment is implied.

The Chinese are recruiting scientists and technicians and are building related weapons such as high-powered microwave weapons.

The PLA is acutely conscious of its continuing relative backwardness in information technologies. To prepare itself for a conflict with an RMA-ready opponent, China’s military thinkers recommend that China must close the information gap; network all forces; attack the enemy’s C3I to paralyse it; use directed energy weapons; and computer viruses. Physical measures include the use of submarine-launched munitions; anti-satellite weapons; forces to prevent a logistics buildup; and special operations raids. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, has written about a 1999 “network battle” fought between Chinese and American “hackers after the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade”.

In fact, efforts to inculcate an IT culture are being extended all the way down to the troops deployed to guard China’s borders: “With a vast pool of IT-trained officers in place, China’s border vigil is turning electronic. Sentries

A cyber security specialist speaks at a cybersecurity and communication centre in the USA

AFP

CYBER WARFARE

27

28/12/12 10:53 AM

DECEMBER 2012

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwanʼs Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is re-directing its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around Chinaʼs peripheries and to seize Taiwan

AFP

or “informationalisation”. In the White Paper on National Defence issued in 2004, informationisation was explained in general terms for the first time: “To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

PLA analysts have called the ongoing RMA an “informationised military revolution”.

Informationisation “clearly relates to the PLA’s ability to adopt information technologies to command, intelligence, training and weapon systems. This would include broad investment in new automatic command systems linked by fibre-optic Internet, satellite and new high-frequency digital radio systems. The PLA can also contest the information battle space with its new space-based, airborne, naval and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems and its new anti-satellite, anti-radar, electronic warfare and information warfare system, there is increasing ‘information content’ for new PLA weapons as it moves to link new space,

airborne and ELINT sensors to missile, air, naval and ground-based ‘shooters’ to enable all its services to better use new precisionstrike weapons.” According to the 2004 White Paper, “In its modernisation drive, the PLA takes informationalisation as its orientation and strategic focus.” The PLA has adopted what it calls a “double historical mission” and a “leapfrog development strategy” – accelerating military informationisation while undergoing mechanisation.

Information Operations – Acupuncture Warfare The denial of information, strategic deception and the achievement of psychological surprise have for long been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine.

The Chinese find information warfare (IW) extremely attractive as they view it as an asymmetric tool that will enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in kinetic military hardware. The Chinese are devoting considerable time and energy to perfecting the techniques of IW to target the rapidly modernising Western armed forces that are becoming increasingly more dependent on the software that

26

Cyber-warfare.indd 26-27

runs computer networks and modern communications.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing field for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars.

However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of people’s war under modern conditions or if it is still treated as a separate but complementary pattern of war (zhanzheng xingtai). There is also some confusion created by the use of the term informationised warfare (xinxihua zhanzheng) instead of IW (xinxi zhanzheng).

However, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations: • Intelligence operations, which include intelligence reconnaissance and protection.

• Command and control operations to disrupt enemy information flow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.

• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

• Targeting enemy computer systems and

networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.

• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as C4ISR through the application of firepower.

The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter Washington’s overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities.

“Acupuncture warfare” is a term that first surfaced in a 1997 PLA National Defence University publication entitled “On Commanding Warfighting under High-Tech Conditions”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) was described as “Paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control, communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu combat.” Acupuncture warfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare dating back to the teachings of Sun Tzu, China’s pre-eminent military strategist from the 5th century BC. For quite some time now the PLA has been simulating computer virus attacks in its military exercises.

According to a US Congressional Research Service report entitled “Cyberwarfare”,

authored by Steve Hildreth, China is developing a strategic information warfare unit called “Net Force” to neutralise the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries. This new information warfare unit will “wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fire control and guidance systems.” Though the PLA’s research into the theoretical aspects of information warfare is fairly advanced, it does not appear to have developed a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine as yet.

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is redirecting its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around China’s peripheries and to seize Taiwan with minimum bloodshed and destruction.” In another five to 10 years China will develop depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations.

With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India has become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. The fact that it can be practiced from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. India can illafford to ignore this new challenge to its security.

Defence analysts Timperlake and Triplett have written that economic, political and social systems are essentially unprotected against

DSI

Chinese information warfare attack. In their view, China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to further its information warfare plans: Information warfare has the support of the top PLA brass; the PLA’s best strategists and defence scientists have had extensive open discussions about information warfare; the PLA is conducting military exercises in information warfare; it is expanding its already strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability in Cuba; and, the PLA is buying the hardware necessary. As supercomputers require huge capital investments, a strong political and financial commitment is implied.

The Chinese are recruiting scientists and technicians and are building related weapons such as high-powered microwave weapons.

The PLA is acutely conscious of its continuing relative backwardness in information technologies. To prepare itself for a conflict with an RMA-ready opponent, China’s military thinkers recommend that China must close the information gap; network all forces; attack the enemy’s C3I to paralyse it; use directed energy weapons; and computer viruses. Physical measures include the use of submarine-launched munitions; anti-satellite weapons; forces to prevent a logistics buildup; and special operations raids. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, has written about a 1999 “network battle” fought between Chinese and American “hackers after the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade”.

In fact, efforts to inculcate an IT culture are being extended all the way down to the troops deployed to guard China’s borders: “With a vast pool of IT-trained officers in place, China’s border vigil is turning electronic. Sentries

A cyber security specialist speaks at a cybersecurity and communication centre in the USA

AFP

CYBER WARFARE

27

28/12/12 10:53 AM

CYBER WARFARE Cyber ‘soldiers’ (hackers) exchanging views

AFP

work with IC cards and other sophisticated equipment. The use of electronic devices has enhanced the army’s ability to deal with emergencies quickly and efficiently, according to sources…”

Developing cyberwarfare capabilities is seen in presenting a level playing field in an otherwise David versus Goliath scenario as Chinese hardware is no match for the weapons technology fielded today by the US and its allies. Recent cyber attacks directed against Taiwan and the US are indicative of the efforts to develop new techniques, viruses and logic bombs. Information warfare will be crucial in the opening phases of a war aimed at the reunification of Taiwan or a border conflict with India as it will be important to knock out the adversary’s communications infrastructure by cyber as well as physical means.

Compared with China’s historically reactive stance of luring the enemy in deep and destroying him through strategic defence, the country’s cyber strategy is essentially proactive and seeks to take the battle into enemy territory. It also strives to achieve surprise in a pro-active manner that is demonstrated by new “quick-strike” tactics. The aim is to catch the enemy unprepared in order to inflict substantial damage on strategic targets and disrupt logistics to gain psychological ascendancy. While the land frontier is

expected to continue to generate some local tensions, the CMC has identified space and the oceans as the new areas where future conflict might take place.

Cyber Pearl Harbour: Increasing Indian Vulnerabilities In another five to 10 years China will develop much greater depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations. With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India will also become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques.

Major infrastructure like telecom, railways, air traffic control, banks, stock exchanges, power grids and the C4I2SR systems of the armed forces are all dependent on computer networks, which are vulnerable to cyber attacks and cyber manipulation.

The nothingness of cyberspace connects China’s laptop warriors directly with Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad and other Indian cities, as also India’s strategic establishments. The fact that cyberwar can be launched from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture or paralysis warfare even more diabolical.

India can ill-afford to ignore this new challenge to its security. India should adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, interServices, multi-agency approach to dealing with emerging cyber warfare threats and must develop appropriate responses. No single agency in India is charged with ensuring cyber and IT security. A nodal agency must be created to spearhead India’s cyberwar efforts under a national cyber security advisor who should report directly to the NSA. The armed forces must be part of the overall national effort from the very beginning so that emerging tactics, techniques and procedures can be incorporated into doctrine and training.

Hence, India too needs a Cyber Command to lead efforts within the military to safeguard computer networks from hackers and cyber attacks. The strategy must be defensive to guard India’s vulnerable assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure dependent on the use of cyber space, as well as offensive to disrupt the adversary’s C4I2SR systems and develop leverages that can be exploited at the appropriate time. With some of the finest software brains in the world available to India, it should not prove to be an insurmountable challenge.

It is heartening to note that the Indian government has taken note of the seriousness of the threat and the Cabinet Committee on Security has initiated steps to evolve a comprehensive cyber security strategy.

It was reported in November 2012 that Mr. Gulshan Rai, who presently heads the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN), would be named the first National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC).

It is proposed to establish a National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIPC). This will be a command and control nerve centre that will monitor protection of the critical infrastructure. The NCIPC will in all probability be managed by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), India’s technical intelligence gathering agency. The NTRO and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) are best suited to plan and execute offensive cyber operations.

The NSA should be at the apex of India’s cyber security strategy as the chief planner and DSI trouble shooter.

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ANTI PIRACY

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

SECURING THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONS The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling over the Indian Ocean created a major problem for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - in keeping the high seas safe.

F Sarabjeet Singh Parmar

KEY POINTS

The failure of the Somalian state and bloody tribal warfares have caused the Somalian fishermen and others who lived off the sea, to turn into pirates.

The world reacted to the threat of Somali piracy in a delayed fashion.

The delay was caused by the piracy lying below the threshold of pain of the maritime nations.

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions provide enough teeth to the anti-piracy operations that are truly multi-national

or centuries pirates have long been regarded as hostes humani generis, “common enemies of mankind.” In fact, piracy like murder is one of the earliest of recorded human activities. This recognition of piracy as a universal crime resulted in nations as far back as the Roman Empire capturing and executing pirates. Notwithstanding the long standing fight against piracy down the ages crime still persists and has from time to time re-emerged to plague mankind.

The reason is very simple – it is a lucrative business that can be called a cyclic enterprise that feeds itself. This is an aspect that arises from the fact that the initial inputs are comparatively minuscule when compared to the remunerations thereby permitting pirates to increase both their activities and area of operations. In addition, the increase in maritime trade over the centuries and non-recognition of piracy as a threat has aided in the flourishing of piracy. History

30

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 18-19

is testament that only when the maritime trade and the safety of a nation’s people have been threatened that action has been taken against it.

The last few decades has seen a rise in piracy, most significantly, in the Malacca Straits, off Somalia and the western coast of Africa. Although the reasons are varied the main pillars that led to the rise are instability, geography, safe havens and economics. Captain Henry Kebbel the renowned nineteenth century hunter of oriental pirates, wrote – “As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks and reefs”.

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a

PLA (Navy) soldiers board a pirate ship in the sea AFP

AFP

Indian Navy officers with the detained pirates

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa

great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa, however, stems from the issue of instability, which is considered the greatest driver for piracy.

In this regard piracy off Somalia makes an interesting case as it has seen a united global effort that is now making a difference and has resulted in a substantial decrease in piracy this year.

Growth of Somali Piracy The advent of piracy from Somalia is a classic case. Somalia was a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001.

This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high scale poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy. The first activity was fishing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fishermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation.

However the collapse in governance and the subsequent inability to patrol the waters led to illegal fishing by fishing trawlers from other nations and the loss of a livelihood for the Somalian fishermen amounting to $100 million in 2003-2004.

The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste like uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium and mercury in Somalian waters.

This further depleted the fish in the waters surrounding Somalia.

The first incidents of piracy occurred between 1995 and 2000 when the local fishermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fishing vessels accusing them of fishing illegally and sought compensation. In a nation with an estimated per capita income of $ 600 this method was seen as an easy and lucrative way of earning a livelihood.

These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and

to coordinate actions against the foreign interlopers at sea.

Many groups referred to themselves as a “coast guard,” protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases vessels were taken to Somali ports and their cargoes and crews held for ransom.

These indications were largely ignored by the international community and therefore remained unchecked and paved the way for piracy to evolve and spread its tentacles over a large part of the Indian Ocean. By the time the global community started to take action, the price of piracy had already burgeoned. In 2011 the cost as per the study by One Earth Foundation had been estimated between $ 6.6 and $ 6.9 billion, of which the shipping industry bore over 80% of the cost, between $ 5.3 and $ 5.5 billion.

Global Actions Two reasons could be attributed to the

31

03/01/13 10:44 AM

ANTI PIRACY

DECEMBER 2012

DSI

SECURING THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONS The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling over the Indian Ocean created a major problem for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - in keeping the high seas safe.

F Sarabjeet Singh Parmar

KEY POINTS

The failure of the Somalian state and bloody tribal warfares have caused the Somalian fishermen and others who lived off the sea, to turn into pirates.

The world reacted to the threat of Somali piracy in a delayed fashion.

The delay was caused by the piracy lying below the threshold of pain of the maritime nations.

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions provide enough teeth to the anti-piracy operations that are truly multi-national

or centuries pirates have long been regarded as hostes humani generis, “common enemies of mankind.” In fact, piracy like murder is one of the earliest of recorded human activities. This recognition of piracy as a universal crime resulted in nations as far back as the Roman Empire capturing and executing pirates. Notwithstanding the long standing fight against piracy down the ages crime still persists and has from time to time re-emerged to plague mankind.

The reason is very simple – it is a lucrative business that can be called a cyclic enterprise that feeds itself. This is an aspect that arises from the fact that the initial inputs are comparatively minuscule when compared to the remunerations thereby permitting pirates to increase both their activities and area of operations. In addition, the increase in maritime trade over the centuries and non-recognition of piracy as a threat has aided in the flourishing of piracy. History

30

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 18-19

is testament that only when the maritime trade and the safety of a nation’s people have been threatened that action has been taken against it.

The last few decades has seen a rise in piracy, most significantly, in the Malacca Straits, off Somalia and the western coast of Africa. Although the reasons are varied the main pillars that led to the rise are instability, geography, safe havens and economics. Captain Henry Kebbel the renowned nineteenth century hunter of oriental pirates, wrote – “As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks and reefs”.

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a

PLA (Navy) soldiers board a pirate ship in the sea AFP

AFP

Indian Navy officers with the detained pirates

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa

great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa, however, stems from the issue of instability, which is considered the greatest driver for piracy.

In this regard piracy off Somalia makes an interesting case as it has seen a united global effort that is now making a difference and has resulted in a substantial decrease in piracy this year.

Growth of Somali Piracy The advent of piracy from Somalia is a classic case. Somalia was a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001.

This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high scale poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy. The first activity was fishing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fishermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation.

However the collapse in governance and the subsequent inability to patrol the waters led to illegal fishing by fishing trawlers from other nations and the loss of a livelihood for the Somalian fishermen amounting to $100 million in 2003-2004.

The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste like uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium and mercury in Somalian waters.

This further depleted the fish in the waters surrounding Somalia.

The first incidents of piracy occurred between 1995 and 2000 when the local fishermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fishing vessels accusing them of fishing illegally and sought compensation. In a nation with an estimated per capita income of $ 600 this method was seen as an easy and lucrative way of earning a livelihood.

These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and

to coordinate actions against the foreign interlopers at sea.

Many groups referred to themselves as a “coast guard,” protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases vessels were taken to Somali ports and their cargoes and crews held for ransom.

These indications were largely ignored by the international community and therefore remained unchecked and paved the way for piracy to evolve and spread its tentacles over a large part of the Indian Ocean. By the time the global community started to take action, the price of piracy had already burgeoned. In 2011 the cost as per the study by One Earth Foundation had been estimated between $ 6.6 and $ 6.9 billion, of which the shipping industry bore over 80% of the cost, between $ 5.3 and $ 5.5 billion.

Global Actions Two reasons could be attributed to the

31

03/01/13 10:44 AM

ANTI PIRACY

Crew of the Dutch warship HNLMS Amsterdam approaching a suspect skiff off the coast of Somalia.

Force (CTF) 151 was established as part of the US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) structure on January 12, 2009, to conduct counter-piracy operations throughout the CMF area of responsibility, to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security, and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.

The NATO deployed its Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 to the region as part of its 2009 deployment to the Far East under Operation Pearl, before quickly establishing Operation Ocean Shield as a permanent counter-piracy task group. Apart from these task forces nations like Russia, China, Japan and South Korea also deployed ships that like India operate individually but in consonance with each other under the cooperative mechanism of Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE).

Under the auspices of SHADE, nations cooperate and escort ships and patrol areas to optimise usage of assets. For example India, Japan and China have established a mechanism by which ships are escorted

32

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 20-21

DSI

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

AFP

AFP PHOTO / DUTCH NAVY

delayed global response. Firstly, Somalia was of no ‘Strategic Interest’ to the international community. Secondly, the impact was felt by nations only when their maritime trade was affected and the hostage crisis reached a level of ‘unacceptability’ and action initiated when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’.

The United Nations Security Council adopted various resolutions commencing from UNSCR 1816 on 02 June 2008.

UNSCR 1816 authorised states acting in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and authorised entry to the territorial waters of Somalia with prior notification of the TFG. This mandate was extended by subsequent resolutions on an annual basis. UNSCR 1851 of December 2008 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816 by authorising land based operations which was repeated in subsequent resolutions.

This was an aspect long accepted that piracy had to be addressed on land. However, in the absence of a common understanding on the methodology to be adopted for such actions, the issue remained stagnant.

The aspect of land based operations has recently been addressed with operations undertaken by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces that have notably reduced piracy attacks in 2012.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

In pursuance of the UNSCRs nations commenced deploying maritime assets with India deploying a ship from October 2008. The European Union (EU) deployed its naval force (EUNAVFOR) on December 8, 2008 as Operation Atalanta six days after UNSCR 1846 was passed on December 2, 2008. The UNSCR 1846 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816. Coalition Task

DECEMBER 2012

through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in a manner that ensures sufficient gaps between convoys and avoids duplication of effort by the respective maritime assets deployed. The IRTC is a corridor established in the Gulf of Aden wherein merchant ships are escorted.

As easy as it may appear the coordination and cooperation did take some time in coming by. The main reason for this understanding arose from the fact that the number of maritime assets deployed was quite inadequate when compared to the area to be covered. Although the presence of maritime assets operating as part of the multinational forces and by individual nations resulted in a reduction in acts of piracy in the waters near Somalia, the spread of piracy to open ocean areas compounded the problem of forces providing assistance to ships in these open sea areas.

Major General Buster Howes, Operation Commander European Union Naval Force Somalia, while giving oral evidence before the US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee in response to a question

regarding number of assets required stated that he would require 83 helicopterequipped frigates or destroyers to manage a 30 minute-equivalent response time in the Indian Ocean.

A major issue faced by the forces was the legal angle. There are three clear aspects driving the legal factor. First, the internationally accepted definition of piracy. Secondly, the national laws and trans-border legal complexities thereon that govern the prosecution of pirates. Thirdly, the capacity of prisons and imprisonment cost. The definition of piracy as per Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) restricted piracy to the high seas.

This aspect has been overcome by the UNSCRs that permitted nations to enter the territorial waters of Somalia. The second and third issues brought about debates that identified three main weak areas - mechanics of implementing judicial processes between nations, political will and national anti piracy laws. Cooperation amongst nations in working about a

methodology has resulted in some nations agreeing to prosecute and imprison pirates.

In 2008 Kenya opened a special court to try suspected pirates operating from Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. The court is a national court exercising universal jurisdiction on behalf of the international community and is funded by a number of international organizations and States including the UN, the EU, Australia and Canada. Other nations in the region that prosecute pirates are Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania. Such actions are significant in the fight against piracy and promulgation of national anti piracy laws by nations would also augur well.

Another important step to harmonise global efforts was the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) on 14 January 2009. This was based on UNSCR 1851 that encouraged all states and regional organisations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea, off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and

among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalian coast.

From the initial 24 nations and five organisations (UN Secretariat, IMO, NATO, EU and the AU) this group now has more than 50 nations and organisations consisting of civilians, military and industry. A trust fund has been set up by the group to support interactional action against piracy particularly costs relating to prosecution and imprisonment.

The CGPCS started with four working groups and a fifth group for looking into the financial flow of piracy related money was set up when this aspect gained due global importance because of the large amounts involved. These five working groups focus on six issues: • Improving operational and information support to counter piracy operations.

• Establishing a counter piracy coordination mechanism.

• Strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates.

33

03/01/13 10:45 AM

ANTI PIRACY

Crew of the Dutch warship HNLMS Amsterdam approaching a suspect skiff off the coast of Somalia.

Force (CTF) 151 was established as part of the US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) structure on January 12, 2009, to conduct counter-piracy operations throughout the CMF area of responsibility, to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security, and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.

The NATO deployed its Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 to the region as part of its 2009 deployment to the Far East under Operation Pearl, before quickly establishing Operation Ocean Shield as a permanent counter-piracy task group. Apart from these task forces nations like Russia, China, Japan and South Korea also deployed ships that like India operate individually but in consonance with each other under the cooperative mechanism of Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE).

Under the auspices of SHADE, nations cooperate and escort ships and patrol areas to optimise usage of assets. For example India, Japan and China have established a mechanism by which ships are escorted

32

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 20-21

DSI

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

AFP

AFP PHOTO / DUTCH NAVY

delayed global response. Firstly, Somalia was of no ‘Strategic Interest’ to the international community. Secondly, the impact was felt by nations only when their maritime trade was affected and the hostage crisis reached a level of ‘unacceptability’ and action initiated when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’.

The United Nations Security Council adopted various resolutions commencing from UNSCR 1816 on 02 June 2008.

UNSCR 1816 authorised states acting in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and authorised entry to the territorial waters of Somalia with prior notification of the TFG. This mandate was extended by subsequent resolutions on an annual basis. UNSCR 1851 of December 2008 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816 by authorising land based operations which was repeated in subsequent resolutions.

This was an aspect long accepted that piracy had to be addressed on land. However, in the absence of a common understanding on the methodology to be adopted for such actions, the issue remained stagnant.

The aspect of land based operations has recently been addressed with operations undertaken by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces that have notably reduced piracy attacks in 2012.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

In pursuance of the UNSCRs nations commenced deploying maritime assets with India deploying a ship from October 2008. The European Union (EU) deployed its naval force (EUNAVFOR) on December 8, 2008 as Operation Atalanta six days after UNSCR 1846 was passed on December 2, 2008. The UNSCR 1846 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816. Coalition Task

DECEMBER 2012

through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in a manner that ensures sufficient gaps between convoys and avoids duplication of effort by the respective maritime assets deployed. The IRTC is a corridor established in the Gulf of Aden wherein merchant ships are escorted.

As easy as it may appear the coordination and cooperation did take some time in coming by. The main reason for this understanding arose from the fact that the number of maritime assets deployed was quite inadequate when compared to the area to be covered. Although the presence of maritime assets operating as part of the multinational forces and by individual nations resulted in a reduction in acts of piracy in the waters near Somalia, the spread of piracy to open ocean areas compounded the problem of forces providing assistance to ships in these open sea areas.

Major General Buster Howes, Operation Commander European Union Naval Force Somalia, while giving oral evidence before the US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee in response to a question

regarding number of assets required stated that he would require 83 helicopterequipped frigates or destroyers to manage a 30 minute-equivalent response time in the Indian Ocean.

A major issue faced by the forces was the legal angle. There are three clear aspects driving the legal factor. First, the internationally accepted definition of piracy. Secondly, the national laws and trans-border legal complexities thereon that govern the prosecution of pirates. Thirdly, the capacity of prisons and imprisonment cost. The definition of piracy as per Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) restricted piracy to the high seas.

This aspect has been overcome by the UNSCRs that permitted nations to enter the territorial waters of Somalia. The second and third issues brought about debates that identified three main weak areas - mechanics of implementing judicial processes between nations, political will and national anti piracy laws. Cooperation amongst nations in working about a

methodology has resulted in some nations agreeing to prosecute and imprison pirates.

In 2008 Kenya opened a special court to try suspected pirates operating from Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. The court is a national court exercising universal jurisdiction on behalf of the international community and is funded by a number of international organizations and States including the UN, the EU, Australia and Canada. Other nations in the region that prosecute pirates are Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania. Such actions are significant in the fight against piracy and promulgation of national anti piracy laws by nations would also augur well.

Another important step to harmonise global efforts was the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) on 14 January 2009. This was based on UNSCR 1851 that encouraged all states and regional organisations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea, off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and

among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalian coast.

From the initial 24 nations and five organisations (UN Secretariat, IMO, NATO, EU and the AU) this group now has more than 50 nations and organisations consisting of civilians, military and industry. A trust fund has been set up by the group to support interactional action against piracy particularly costs relating to prosecution and imprisonment.

The CGPCS started with four working groups and a fifth group for looking into the financial flow of piracy related money was set up when this aspect gained due global importance because of the large amounts involved. These five working groups focus on six issues: • Improving operational and information support to counter piracy operations.

• Establishing a counter piracy coordination mechanism.

• Strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates.

33

03/01/13 10:45 AM

French soldiers arresting presumed Somalian pirates in the Gulf of Aden

• Strengthening commercial shipping self awareness and other capabilities.

• Pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts • Tracking financial flows related to piracy.

Most recently on 21 February 2012 England announced the setting up of a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC) in Seychelles that would be operational from January 2013. This centre would target the ‘kingpins’ of piracy, namely the leaders, financiers and enablers by gathering evidence to prosecute them. RAPPICC has evinced the interest of a number of global players like the US, Seychelles, the Netherlands, Mauritius, Norway, Tanzania, Australia, UAE, EUNAVFOR and INTERPOL. Indian Efforts The Indian Navy commenced anti piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from 23 October 2008. A total of 1104 ships (139 Indian flagged and 965 foreign flagged from 50 different countries) have been escorted by Indian Naval ships through the IRTC. In addition, due to the seaward spread of piracy the Indian Navy has been patrolling open ocean areas especially along major sea routes used by ships and has prevented 40 piracy attempts.

The biggest capture of 61 pirates in

March 2011 brought the number of pirates undergoing trial in India to around 100.

The efforts of the Indian Navy have been well recognised and stem from the fact that piracy has been recognised as a threat to international and Indian shipping. In order to strengthen the fight against piracy the Cabinet Committee on Security in March 2011 considered proposals with regard to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia and approved a series of measures to address the legal, administrative and operational aspects of combating piracy.

The legal dimension of combating piracy is a weak area. Piracy is dealt with under sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and antiquated Admiralty laws that are considered relatively ineffective to combat this menace. Therefore, in April 2012 an Anti-Piracy bill was introduced in Parliament that would address issues related to piracy and enable agencies and the judiciary to effectively handle such cases.

Director General (DG), Shipping has launched a web-based registration service (www.dgshipping.com) where merchant ships can register with DG Shipping in order to avail Anti-Piracy escort by Indian Naval ships in the Gulf of Aden. Through this service, the shipping industry can access the Anti-Piracy escort schedule of the Indian

AFP

ANTI PIRACY Navy and request for inclusion in a particular escort cycle.

India is a founder member of the CGPCS and has been taking up the various issues of piracy and pushing forth viable options.

In January 2011 India proposed a five point plan in the UN to strengthen international cooperation: • Reinforcement of tracking the trail of ransom money to different parts of the world.

• Prosecution of the beneficiaries of ransom money for abetting piracy.

• Consideration of the conduct of the naval operations under the UN as the preferred option.

• Sanitisation of the Somali coast line through identified corridors and buffer zones and tracking of fishing vessels around the Somali coast.

• Enactment of national laws on priority to criminalise piracy as defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia as required under UNSCR 1918 (2010).

Is the End in Sight?

Although the number of piracy attacks has reduced in 2012 as compared to earlier years there is still the fear of piracy increasing if the initiative gained so far is lost. There are concerns being raised about the long term effectiveness of actions being taken.

The cost of deploying maritime assets by nations on their national budgets is being questioned. There is a debate that the cost of deployment should be borne by oil and shipping companies. The use of PCASP is being accepted, albeit slowly, and this issue raises questions on the carriage of arms and ammunition on merchant ships in relation to international and national laws. The recent incidents of firing on fisher men off the coast of Kerala and Yemen raises judicial and diplomatic issues. The jury will be out for a long time on this aspect and it is highly unlikely that a consensus would be reached.

The only general consensus on the issue of piracy is the restoration of stability and economic well being in Somalia. Until this is achieved piracy is likely to exist and the fight DSI against piracy will continue.

34

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 22

03/01/13 10:45 AM

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THE WORLD LEADING DEFENCE & SECURITY EVENT

CRISIS IN ARMY

DECEMBER 2012

OFFICERS FOR THE INDIAN ARMY: WHERE ARE THEY

DSI

Soldiers from the Indian Army march during the Republic Day Parade rehearsal in New Delhi in January 2010

With 2,100 officers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of officers, a 24 per cent shortage makes force underled and under the optimum level of efficiency.

Brig SK Chatterji (Retd)

KEY POINTS Almost a full quarter of the officer corps is absent from the Indian Army due to shortage of eligible men The continuous downgrading of the officer corps hurts the image of the Indian Army in the eye of the people The diminution of academic standards at the feeder schools’ level have caused a major harm

A

n army, it’s oft said, is as good as its officers’ corps. Perhaps, seasoned soldiers across all divides would converge in supporting such an opinion. The art of war places a huge dividend on leadership in combat being a decisive factor in dictating the outcome of military engagements.

The officers cadre provides this critical necessity.

Great Generals have turned the tide in operations to salvage situations and advance towards objectives even when faced with impossible situations. Rommel did it in Africa. Patton did it in Europe.

Deficiencies in terms of numbers in the officers cadre reduce the combat potential of a force, far more than deficiencies in equipment or logistics support.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the officers’ corps in any Army would be the cause for concern in any country. When the shortage remains a persistent problem over a decade, it’s definitely time to take notice. When the army concerned is among the largest in the world that has continuously been fighting

36

Officer Shortage2nd time.indd 30-31

insurgencies for the past few decades there is reason to study the whole system that allows an anomaly to become a deep seated malaise.

Induction of Officers The authorized strength of officers in the 1.3 million strong army works out to approximately 46,600. The Indian Army’s annual requirement of officer induction is approximately 2100 and the prime officer induction establishments include the National Defence Academy (NDA), Indian Military Academy (IMA), Officer Training Academies (OTA) at Chennai and Gaya. The NDA is a tri-service facility that provides the basic training for officer cadets of all the three services. On passing out successfully from the NDA, the cadets undergo specialised training in their respective service training institutes. For Army cadets, it is the IMA.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the officers corps in any Army would be cause for concern in any country.

The current models of entry include the NDA stream where eligibility entails qualifying in the higher secondary exam.

The training involves three years at the NDA, followed by a year in the IMA. A special entry for students who do well in Sciences in higher secondary and wish to become engineers in army has also been formalised.

The cadets undergo four years of Engineering Degree and six months of military training at IMA. Graduates can directly enter the IMA or opt for OTA, Chennai. A few more entries have been successfully put in practice. These are all focused on attracting NCC cadets with C certificate, law qualified candidates and engineers into the army. All entries except for NDA, Graduate entry to IMA and Short Service Entry in OTA are non-UPSC, where the candidates are called for interview

directly based on their educational qualification and cut-off marks.

The Army started inducting women candidates some years back. It is now recruiting women in Technical, NonTechnical and Legal cadres, also.

Sanction has also been accorded for the creation of a 6,000 strong support cadre of Special Commissioned Officers by eligible personnel below the officers’ rank, in age group of 30-35 years. Post qualifying in the Services Selection Boards (SSB), they will undergo a pre-commission training of one year and can earn promotions up to the rank of Colonel.

Identification of Reasons for Shortage There are multiple reasons for officer shortage. Perhaps, the foremost among these is the fact of erosion of the status of the officer in our society. In an increasingly materialistic society where financial means

37

03/01/13 10:49 AM

CRISIS IN ARMY

DECEMBER 2012

OFFICERS FOR THE INDIAN ARMY: WHERE ARE THEY

DSI

Soldiers from the Indian Army march during the Republic Day Parade rehearsal in New Delhi in January 2010

With 2,100 officers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of officers, a 24 per cent shortage makes force underled and under the optimum level of efficiency.

Brig SK Chatterji (Retd)

KEY POINTS Almost a full quarter of the officer corps is absent from the Indian Army due to shortage of eligible men The continuous downgrading of the officer corps hurts the image of the Indian Army in the eye of the people The diminution of academic standards at the feeder schools’ level have caused a major harm

A

n army, it’s oft said, is as good as its officers’ corps. Perhaps, seasoned soldiers across all divides would converge in supporting such an opinion. The art of war places a huge dividend on leadership in combat being a decisive factor in dictating the outcome of military engagements.

The officers cadre provides this critical necessity.

Great Generals have turned the tide in operations to salvage situations and advance towards objectives even when faced with impossible situations. Rommel did it in Africa. Patton did it in Europe.

Deficiencies in terms of numbers in the officers cadre reduce the combat potential of a force, far more than deficiencies in equipment or logistics support.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the officers’ corps in any Army would be the cause for concern in any country. When the shortage remains a persistent problem over a decade, it’s definitely time to take notice. When the army concerned is among the largest in the world that has continuously been fighting

36

Officer Shortage2nd time.indd 30-31

insurgencies for the past few decades there is reason to study the whole system that allows an anomaly to become a deep seated malaise.

Induction of Officers The authorized strength of officers in the 1.3 million strong army works out to approximately 46,600. The Indian Army’s annual requirement of officer induction is approximately 2100 and the prime officer induction establishments include the National Defence Academy (NDA), Indian Military Academy (IMA), Officer Training Academies (OTA) at Chennai and Gaya. The NDA is a tri-service facility that provides the basic training for officer cadets of all the three services. On passing out successfully from the NDA, the cadets undergo specialised training in their respective service training institutes. For Army cadets, it is the IMA.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the officers corps in any Army would be cause for concern in any country.

The current models of entry include the NDA stream where eligibility entails qualifying in the higher secondary exam.

The training involves three years at the NDA, followed by a year in the IMA. A special entry for students who do well in Sciences in higher secondary and wish to become engineers in army has also been formalised.

The cadets undergo four years of Engineering Degree and six months of military training at IMA. Graduates can directly enter the IMA or opt for OTA, Chennai. A few more entries have been successfully put in practice. These are all focused on attracting NCC cadets with C certificate, law qualified candidates and engineers into the army. All entries except for NDA, Graduate entry to IMA and Short Service Entry in OTA are non-UPSC, where the candidates are called for interview

directly based on their educational qualification and cut-off marks.

The Army started inducting women candidates some years back. It is now recruiting women in Technical, NonTechnical and Legal cadres, also.

Sanction has also been accorded for the creation of a 6,000 strong support cadre of Special Commissioned Officers by eligible personnel below the officers’ rank, in age group of 30-35 years. Post qualifying in the Services Selection Boards (SSB), they will undergo a pre-commission training of one year and can earn promotions up to the rank of Colonel.

Identification of Reasons for Shortage There are multiple reasons for officer shortage. Perhaps, the foremost among these is the fact of erosion of the status of the officer in our society. In an increasingly materialistic society where financial means

37

03/01/13 10:49 AM

CRISIS IN ARMY

DECEMBER 2012

Increasing the strength of the Short Service Officers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These officers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects

being asked to supplement knowledge by the distance education endeavour, are too stressed in their battalions to find the time required for professional studies.

Stress levels also increase when a young officer finds himself leading a patrol or undertaking an operation too often in active insurgency areas. The problem is compounded by the army not being able to give its junior officers adequate tenures in peace stations after a tenure in insurgency areas.

The officer – men relationship is an important intangible influencing operational efficiency of a combat unit.

Fewer officers entail dilution of contact between officers and the men they lead in battle. The effects of diluted officer – men bonding have lead to problems in a few units, lately. Though the situation is not critical, prudence calls for immediate measures to ensure battalions are manned by adequate officers.

dilution of this strategic asset erodes the combat potential of the armed forces.

The million plus Indian Army is bound to reflect these deficiencies in the combat zone and stressful, ‘no war no peace’ Cold War environment in counter-insurgency areas.

The deficiency is primarily in the lower rungs, upto the rank of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Thereafter, the selection system for higher ranks, based on a system of vacancies available, caters for promotion of adequate officers. Today, the primary combat involvement of the Army remains in counter insurgency environment. The employment of forces in this part of the spectrum of conflict entails units and formations fighting at battalion and lower levels, aided by technology and intelligence, largely. The dearth of officers is to be found exactly at these levels.

Training of officers is also affected adversely. The battalions, already deficient of officers, are unable to spare officers for professional courses. Notwithstanding the merits of distance education system, the reduction in course durations implemented by the army causes a downward slide in the knowledge absorption by officers. It needs to be understood that the officer lot

Recommendations: Initiatives required Of late, the government has realised that shortages of officers is not merely an organisational issue for the armed forces, but of enough import to be a national concern. In a seminar a few years back, the Adjutant General outlined the fundamentals of the approach to the vexing issue. His strategy rested on the following pillars: • Increasing the strength of the Short Service Officers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These officers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects post-release from the army. Such facilities like Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Services will also be extended to them.

• Enhancing the career prospects of in-house intakes like the Special Commissioned officers and the Special List Officers to the rank of Colonels and Major Generals.

• Improve the scope of NDA entry by holding SSBs when the candidates are in Class XI and thereafter the medical

AFP

New Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh meets Army Officers

have become the predominant yardstick for deciding status of an individual, an indifferently paid officer no longer commands the same esteem. The fall from grace is further aggravated by large numbers of cases of misappropriation that are routinely coming to light.

In today’s world, no army will be able to attract and retain talent without adequate emoluments being offered. With pay and allowances in the private sector having risen steeply, a career in the army is no longer an attractive proposition. The situation cannot be eased by projecting the superior quality of life in cantonments, which is also far from being true with the average waiting period for a married officer to get accommodation being a minimum six to eight months in most stations. The stay in a peace station is further reduced due to regular training exercises and a multitude of events. The tenures in family stations barely range between two to three years, derogatorily affecting children schooling.

After entry into the army an officer’s release is a harrowing experience that can quite be compared to a bonded labour. Young men and women do not join a profession today for a lifetime. They job hop.

Inspite of a decision having been taken to increase the intake in the short service officers category, the entry fails to attract adequate talent. The induction of women entry officers has bridged the gap between demand and supply to a limited extent, however, their conservative utilisation potential envisaged by the armed forces disallows greater numbers being inducted and employed gainfully.

The opportunities of inducting more officers from the serving personnel below the officers’ ranks have been increased.

However, the exacting standards of the Army, limit their numbers. Further, induction through this avenue entails drawing from a category that is older in age profile. The attendant problems include their utilisation in combat arms where a higher degree of physical endurance is called for.

The army has stuck to its qualitative standards. In the bargain the rejection rates in services selection boards are extremely high. The options in battle are quite unlike that faced in the corporate world. In the corporate environment increasing market share from 10 to 15 percent may be considered as gains. In combat, there are no percentage

38

Officer Shortage2nd time.indd 32-33

gains. Either you win or you lose. In such an environment the obsession with quality is definitely of overriding import and dilutions in leadership are definitely not justified. But, the old argument resurfaces, i.e., quality calls for a costs.

The army’s attempts at wooing the youth to join its ranks through such advertisements as ‘Do you have it in you’, has either not struck a chord or not had enough evidence of significant material gains in the proposal. The fact remains, the cash content in the job and a lack of liberty to decide on his termination of relationship with the army, are not comforting enough.

The feeder school like the Sainik and Military Schools have not been able to keep pace with public schools. Their reputations have gone down. Over the years, patronage and interference have led to questionable standards of faculty, facilities, teaching methodology and more importantly, reputation.

Effects of Shortage of Officers With the quality of officers being identified as a core battle winning factor, the officer corps needs to be viewed as an army’s strategic asset; just as we view critical equipment or technology absorption. A

DSI

tests in Class XII. Such a philosophy is supported by the fact that as long as eligibility for joining the NDA was Class XI; the armed forces received far more applicants. After Class XII, the students have multiple choices available and the option of joining the army slips lower in their priorities. Today, though the vacancies in NDA are being fully subscribed, the best boys in school are keeping away.

Notwithstanding the strategy outlined by the Adjutant General, the fundamental issues on which the possibility of ameliorating the situation rests on two pillars; pay and perks, and status.

Even in the 6th Pay Commission there was no member of the army to project its case forcefully. It would be pertinent to have a look at the way the Americans went about deciding on pay and perks for their forces. A series of studies were conducted to arrive at the full import of life in the forces. Such studies included one on Army officers’ spouses to arrive at the lost opportunities and possible earnings on account of frequent move of their spouses.

The recommendations of the studies were utilised in arriving at compensation packages of the armed forces. In our country there is an immediate requirement of a separate pay commission for the armed forces.

As of now, a Joint Secretary with approximately 18 years of service is being equated with a Major General with 35 years in the Army. The anomaly could not be more stark. Its affect on pay and perks is staggering.

The erosion in status is also immense and definitely a demotivating factor. There is an urgent requirement to ensure that service officers in the same service bracket as IAS officers, draw the same pay and allowances and are also equated so in the order of precedence as their IAS counterparts.

The exit policy needs an overhaul. Officers should be permitted to leave after completion of contractual service. Should the Army want to retain them, a system of an attractive retention bonus needs to be implemented.

The reputation of feeder schools like Sainik Schools and the Military Schools requires immediate attention. The

39

03/01/13 10:49 AM

CRISIS IN ARMY

DECEMBER 2012

Increasing the strength of the Short Service Officers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These officers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects

being asked to supplement knowledge by the distance education endeavour, are too stressed in their battalions to find the time required for professional studies.

Stress levels also increase when a young officer finds himself leading a patrol or undertaking an operation too often in active insurgency areas. The problem is compounded by the army not being able to give its junior officers adequate tenures in peace stations after a tenure in insurgency areas.

The officer – men relationship is an important intangible influencing operational efficiency of a combat unit.

Fewer officers entail dilution of contact between officers and the men they lead in battle. The effects of diluted officer – men bonding have lead to problems in a few units, lately. Though the situation is not critical, prudence calls for immediate measures to ensure battalions are manned by adequate officers.

dilution of this strategic asset erodes the combat potential of the armed forces.

The million plus Indian Army is bound to reflect these deficiencies in the combat zone and stressful, ‘no war no peace’ Cold War environment in counter-insurgency areas.

The deficiency is primarily in the lower rungs, upto the rank of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Thereafter, the selection system for higher ranks, based on a system of vacancies available, caters for promotion of adequate officers. Today, the primary combat involvement of the Army remains in counter insurgency environment. The employment of forces in this part of the spectrum of conflict entails units and formations fighting at battalion and lower levels, aided by technology and intelligence, largely. The dearth of officers is to be found exactly at these levels.

Training of officers is also affected adversely. The battalions, already deficient of officers, are unable to spare officers for professional courses. Notwithstanding the merits of distance education system, the reduction in course durations implemented by the army causes a downward slide in the knowledge absorption by officers. It needs to be understood that the officer lot

Recommendations: Initiatives required Of late, the government has realised that shortages of officers is not merely an organisational issue for the armed forces, but of enough import to be a national concern. In a seminar a few years back, the Adjutant General outlined the fundamentals of the approach to the vexing issue. His strategy rested on the following pillars: • Increasing the strength of the Short Service Officers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These officers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects post-release from the army. Such facilities like Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Services will also be extended to them.

• Enhancing the career prospects of in-house intakes like the Special Commissioned officers and the Special List Officers to the rank of Colonels and Major Generals.

• Improve the scope of NDA entry by holding SSBs when the candidates are in Class XI and thereafter the medical

AFP

New Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh meets Army Officers

have become the predominant yardstick for deciding status of an individual, an indifferently paid officer no longer commands the same esteem. The fall from grace is further aggravated by large numbers of cases of misappropriation that are routinely coming to light.

In today’s world, no army will be able to attract and retain talent without adequate emoluments being offered. With pay and allowances in the private sector having risen steeply, a career in the army is no longer an attractive proposition. The situation cannot be eased by projecting the superior quality of life in cantonments, which is also far from being true with the average waiting period for a married officer to get accommodation being a minimum six to eight months in most stations. The stay in a peace station is further reduced due to regular training exercises and a multitude of events. The tenures in family stations barely range between two to three years, derogatorily affecting children schooling.

After entry into the army an officer’s release is a harrowing experience that can quite be compared to a bonded labour. Young men and women do not join a profession today for a lifetime. They job hop.

Inspite of a decision having been taken to increase the intake in the short service officers category, the entry fails to attract adequate talent. The induction of women entry officers has bridged the gap between demand and supply to a limited extent, however, their conservative utilisation potential envisaged by the armed forces disallows greater numbers being inducted and employed gainfully.

The opportunities of inducting more officers from the serving personnel below the officers’ ranks have been increased.

However, the exacting standards of the Army, limit their numbers. Further, induction through this avenue entails drawing from a category that is older in age profile. The attendant problems include their utilisation in combat arms where a higher degree of physical endurance is called for.

The army has stuck to its qualitative standards. In the bargain the rejection rates in services selection boards are extremely high. The options in battle are quite unlike that faced in the corporate world. In the corporate environment increasing market share from 10 to 15 percent may be considered as gains. In combat, there are no percentage

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gains. Either you win or you lose. In such an environment the obsession with quality is definitely of overriding import and dilutions in leadership are definitely not justified. But, the old argument resurfaces, i.e., quality calls for a costs.

The army’s attempts at wooing the youth to join its ranks through such advertisements as ‘Do you have it in you’, has either not struck a chord or not had enough evidence of significant material gains in the proposal. The fact remains, the cash content in the job and a lack of liberty to decide on his termination of relationship with the army, are not comforting enough.

The feeder school like the Sainik and Military Schools have not been able to keep pace with public schools. Their reputations have gone down. Over the years, patronage and interference have led to questionable standards of faculty, facilities, teaching methodology and more importantly, reputation.

Effects of Shortage of Officers With the quality of officers being identified as a core battle winning factor, the officer corps needs to be viewed as an army’s strategic asset; just as we view critical equipment or technology absorption. A

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tests in Class XII. Such a philosophy is supported by the fact that as long as eligibility for joining the NDA was Class XI; the armed forces received far more applicants. After Class XII, the students have multiple choices available and the option of joining the army slips lower in their priorities. Today, though the vacancies in NDA are being fully subscribed, the best boys in school are keeping away.

Notwithstanding the strategy outlined by the Adjutant General, the fundamental issues on which the possibility of ameliorating the situation rests on two pillars; pay and perks, and status.

Even in the 6th Pay Commission there was no member of the army to project its case forcefully. It would be pertinent to have a look at the way the Americans went about deciding on pay and perks for their forces. A series of studies were conducted to arrive at the full import of life in the forces. Such studies included one on Army officers’ spouses to arrive at the lost opportunities and possible earnings on account of frequent move of their spouses.

The recommendations of the studies were utilised in arriving at compensation packages of the armed forces. In our country there is an immediate requirement of a separate pay commission for the armed forces.

As of now, a Joint Secretary with approximately 18 years of service is being equated with a Major General with 35 years in the Army. The anomaly could not be more stark. Its affect on pay and perks is staggering.

The erosion in status is also immense and definitely a demotivating factor. There is an urgent requirement to ensure that service officers in the same service bracket as IAS officers, draw the same pay and allowances and are also equated so in the order of precedence as their IAS counterparts.

The exit policy needs an overhaul. Officers should be permitted to leave after completion of contractual service. Should the Army want to retain them, a system of an attractive retention bonus needs to be implemented.

The reputation of feeder schools like Sainik Schools and the Military Schools requires immediate attention. The

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CRISIS IN ARMY A tri-service homage at Raj Ghat, the final resting place of the Father of the Nation

If we want an intellectually superior lot to join the army it is essential to understand that intellect, like commodities, has a market price and has to be paid for at market rates. The army has to have a more rational exit policy that accommodates the option an individual decides to exercise.

AFP

management of these institutions has to be far more professional. It would definitely be better if these schools could associate with premier educational groups and attempt to become institutions of excellence. Similarly, state governments need to open such feeder schools.

Keeping in view the pyramidal structure of the armed forces, there would be a large number of officers superseded at every stage. Further increase in number of vacancies in higher ranks would also be most detrimental for the organisation. In any case the AB Singh Committee’s implementation had no effect on the recruitment of officers. The only way out is to transfer officers to para military forces. If IPS officers with little experience of border management can provide the leadership positions in Border Security Forces, there is no reason why army officers cannot.

The current switchover to online application system has increased the number of applicants. This needs to be followed up with inducting better

techniques and technology in the selection system. The five day schedule at the Services Selection Board (SSB) for the entire selection procedure is cumbersome. Some of the tests conducted there could be accomplished online, thus reducing the load factor at SSBs, allowing the staff greater evaluation time per candidate.

Generating greater awareness among the student community of the advantages of opting for Army as a career needs more emphasis. Certain new initiatives like commanders visiting local colleges may have paid dividends. However, rather than tasking already harassed serving commanders, selection teams of retired or short service officers, released to undertake the task more intensively, could be better.

Conclusion The concept of having a bigger pool of short service, commissioned officers is an answer to both the problems of officer shortage in the junior ranks as also enhancing the career prospects

of officers who decide to serve longer or have initially taken the route of permanent commission in the army. To transform this concept into a successful execution model requires making this cadre very attractive. Of import is the bouquet that needs to be offered at the end of the contractual service period.

This should include a two year academic course at government expense along with a lump sum resettlement package. The possibility of pro-rata pension to officers doing 14 years, the max stipulated period, also deserves consideration.

Overall, the intake levels cannot increase till such time as pay and allowances are substantially enhanced and the anomalies vis-Ă -vis the IAS cadre, eliminated. The greater privations and risks faced by men in uniform needs to be compensated in addition by military service pay and other allowances.

If we want an intellectually superior lot to join the army it is essential to understand that intellect, like commodities, has a market price and has DSI to be paid for at market rates.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

India Train 600 Afghan Soldiers Annually India will train about 600 Afghan soldier each year, according to local media reports. India and Afghanistan signed a pact in November, 2012 during President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi.

In 2011, Kabul and New Delhi signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement for militaryto-military cooperation under which India agreed to train, equip and build the capacity of the Afghan forces.

According to reports, three areas of focus have been identified -- increasing the intake of officers in India’s premier training institutes; providing specialized training to middle and higher level officers already operating in the Afghan National Army (ANA); and training soldiers in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations.

Each year, the National Defence Academy, the Officers’ Training Academies and the Indian Military Academy will train over 200 Afghan cadets. And 600 Afghan National Army officers who will undergo a variety of other courses including four weeks at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS).

Russia Delivers IN 2nd Stealth Frigate The Indian Navy early November, 2012, inducted the second of three stealth frigates built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad.

Sergei Mikhailov, a spokesman for the Yantar Shipyard, the solemn ceremony of delivering the warship will be held in Kaliningrad and be attended by highranking military officers both from Russia and India.

In 2006, the two countries signed a $ 1.6 billion contract for the construction of three modified Krivak III class (also known as Talwar class) guided missile frigates for India. INS Teg, the first frigate, was inducted earlier this year. And the last ship is currently undergoing trials and will join the navy in 2013.

The Russian-made frigates will be equipped with eight supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles, a 100-mm gun, a Shtil surface-to-air missile system, two Kashtan air-defense gun/missile systems, two twin 533mm torpedo launchers, and an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter.

Russia previously built three Talwar class frigates for India - INS Talwar (Sword), INS Trishul (Trident), and INS Tabar (Axe).

Indian MoD Review Defence Budget The Indian Defence Ministry will conduct a review of all the major modernisation programmes amid the possibility of a budget cut.

Defense Minister AK Antony and the three Service vice chiefs will review the expenditure made by the Armed Forces this year and their plans for the remaining part of the fiscal.

The meeting comes at a time when there is a possibility of a budget cut in view of the economic slowdown, according to the Press Trust of India. The Defence Ministry has been allocated Rs 1.93 lakh crore for the current fiscal but it had made a demand for additional funds of more than Rs 40,000 crore for meeting its capital expenditure requirements, the report added.

Defence Ministry has undertaken a major project such as the purchase of 126 fighter aircraft, howitzers, heavy-lift aircraft and aircraft carriers.The Armed Forces will spend approximately $ 100 billion on procurement in the next 10 years.

Defence Minister AK Antony will review the expenditure made by the Armed Forces this year and their plans for the remaining part of the fiscal, ministry officials said.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

India To Buy Russian Anti-Tank Missiles India and Russia recently finalised two defence deals including the supply of Russian anti-tank missiles.

Russia will deliver 10,000 Konkurs-M and 10,000 Invar missiles in a deal estimated to be worth $ 240 million. The Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles will be supplied for India’s motorised troops and infantry, while the Invar missiles will be procured for India’s T-90 tanks supplied

by Russia.

According to reports, India will buy 10,000 Invar missiles from Russian manufacturers and that a further 15,000 missiles will be manufactured under license in India.

IN To Get Overhauled Kilo Class Sub From Russia This Year The INS Sindhurakshak will begin a two-week sea trial followed by additional tests before being delivered.

“The Indian submarine, which has been repaired and modernised at the Zvezdochka shipyard, sailed for sea trials “, the company said in a statement.

The upgrade program, reported worth $80 million, included a complete overhaul of the submarine, including its hull structures, as well as improved control systems, electronic warfare systems, and an integrated weapon control system.

Saab Invest In Offshore Pipavav Co Saab has signed a deal with Pipavav Offshore and Defence Engineering Ltd (Pipavav), India, to invest about Rs 201.6 crore in the company. The investment is made in shares which will be issued through a directed share issue, which is dependent on approval from an extraordinary General Meeting held by Pipavav in the fourth quarter 2012. After the investment, Saab will hold approximately 3.5 per cent of the capital and votes in Pipavav.

The investment will be made through an issue of new shares issued to Saab. Finalisation of the investment is expected to be made within 3 months, under the condition it meets the necessary approval of the shareholders meeting of Pipavav and government approvals. After the investment, Saab will hold approximately 3.5 percent of the capital and votes in Pipavav.

The two companies earlier jointly formed the Combat System Engineering group, which analyses naval combat system design and architecture. The companies are also exploring next generation combat management systems for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.

Boeing Clinches Indian Deal for Chinooks Boeing is all set to win a $ 2.5 billion helicopter contract from the Indian Air Force. A senior air force official said recent that New Delhi has decided on the Chinook and Apache in the attack helicopter deal.

Commercial negotiations will begin soon for the purchase of 15 Chinook CH-47F heavy-lift helicopters and 22 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters, the official was quoted as saying.

Boeing’s twin-rotor Chinook was chosen as the preferred bidder over Russia-based MiL Moscow Helicopter Plant’s Mi-26, while the Apache was selected over the Mi-28.

The Chinook CH47D emerged as the lowest bidder in the tender, Defence Ministry officials were quoted as saying. While the Apache won on technical grounds beating out the Mi-28.

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DEFENCE BUZZ Indian Govt Approves $1.5 Bn Russian Deal The Indian government has approved a $1.5 billion deal to buy 200 air-launched variants of the Russian-Indian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and 10,000 Russian-made Invar antitank missiles.

The Indo-Russian missile will be deployed on Su-30MKI strike aircraft. The first test of the air-launched missile is due in December 2012.

The Indian Air Force is expected to get about 200 of these missiles. The Su-30 MKI will have to be modified to enable them to carry the air version of the BrahMos. The 10,000 Invar missiles for India’s T-90 tanks will be procured from a Russian manufacturer but in the future 15,000 will be produced under license by India’s Bharat Technologies Ltd (BEL).

BrahMos, a supersonic missile that can travel at about 3 mach speed, is already being used by the Indian Navy and the Indian Army.

India Cut Down FGFA Order India’s Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne has announced that the country will be reducing its order for the fifth-generation stealth fighter being developed jointly with Russia by a third.

In 2011, the two countries signed an agreement to jointly build the aircraft. While Russia is testing prototypes of the T-50 aircraft (due to enter service with the Russian Air Force by 2017) and India’s Hindustan Aeronatics Limited (HAL) is to build the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), a derivative of the Sukhoi T-50.

According to Browne, India will now order just 144 of the fighters - down from an originally-intended batch of around 200, including 48 two-seaters.

India now wants to take on a greater share of development and produce the aircraft’s software, guidance systems which means pushing back the production date for the Indian variant, which now is likely to be ready by 2020.

A total cost for the program has yet to be worked out, but could total around $ 30 billion including development costs, HAL sources said.

The two countries are in talks on the first research and development phase.

After this agreement is signed, a first prototype will likely be delivered to India in 2014, followed by two more in 2017 and 2019. Series production aircraft “will only be ordered based on the final configuration and performance of the third prototype,” Browne said.

India’s Def Min Calls For Less Imports India’s Defence Minister AK Antony has urged the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) to make sustained efforts to reduce the dependence on imports to the maximum extent possible.

Speaking at the Raksha Mantri’s awards for excellence ceremony, Antony said, “While in the era of globalisation, it is not possible to completely do away with imports, particularly for a growing nation like ours, still the extent of our continuous dependence on foreign sources is not desirable and the situation must change. It can be achieved only by strengthening our research and development capabilities,” he said.

Speaking about the recently revised defence offset guidelines, Antony said that “it recognizes Transfer of Technology and investment in kind as eligible for discharge of offset obligations”.

He added that technology acquisition by the DRDO for specific technologies will be treated as an eligible offset.

In the era of changing times and stiff competition from private sector, the time has come for OFB and Defence PSUs to shed their complacency, as their time of enjoying a monopoly in the market is over, Antony said.

India And Indonesia Boost Maritime Security The defense ministers of Indonesia and India are planning to jointly start training and possible co-production sale of military, defense equipment and increase maritime security.

Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony and Indonesia defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, also discussed about joint patrols of Indian and Indonesian warships in the Strait of Malacca, a vital waterway for sea traffic, including petroleum shipments from the Arabian Gulf.

The sale of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to Indonesia was also discussed.

The two countries exchanged views on issues relating to regional and global security, bilateral exercises, training, coproduction of defence equipment and ammunitions.

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DEFENCE BUZZ Indian Air Force, IAI To Upgrade 150 UAVs The Indian Air Force and Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) will join hands to upgrade UAVs from all three services under a project worth $ 958 million.

The country’s armed forces currently operate a fleet of 150 UAVs procured from IAI. Under the Rs 5,000 crore projects, “We will upgrade the capabilities of the UAVs in all the three services with the help of the original equipment manufacturer IAI,” a senior IAF official was quoted as saying.

About 100 Searchers operate along the western, eastern and northern borders of India while the IAF operates Searcher II and Heron UAVs for recon and surveillance.

Once the upgrades are complete, the air force will be able to use the aircraft for far-off missions and control them through satellite communication system.

The Army, with a sizeable number of aircraft, began inducting the first UAVs in the 90s, the IAF followed suit with the acquisition of the Searcher Mark I, Searcher Mark II and the Heron UAVs. The Navy has three UAV squadrons deployed along both the eastern and the western sea board.

IAF Rubbishes Bribery Charge, To Go Ahead with AgustaWestland VVIP Helo Deal The Indian Air Force (IAF) intends to go ahead with the purchase of 12 AgustaWestland VVIP helicopters despite the latest string of bribery and corruption allegations which have appeared in an Indian newspaper and had been reported by the Italian press also.

The IAF has rubbished reports of its former pilots being involved in an alleged bribery scandal surrounding the procurement of VVIP helicopters from Agus-

agreed schedules.

A section of the Indian media has been reporting on the Italian government’s probe into AW’s parent company, Finmeccanica as part of which the allegation of money laundering in the $650 million Indian deal reportedly surfaced.

The reports identified Sanjeev Kumar Tyagi, whom it claimed was a former IAF pilot, as being involved in the deal, a claim denied by the IAF. “On checking our records, we have found no such person --either serving or retired,” the IAF spokesperson said.

Italian police probe names at least 15 people including Guido Haschke and Christian Michel, Praveen Bakshi, the chief officer of Chandigarh-based firm Aeromatrix, Gautam Khaitan, a Delhi lawyer who represents Aeromatrix, and Sanjeev Kumar Tyagi, a Delhi businessman and former air force pilot, as those being investigated.

Praveen Bakshi and Gautam Khaitan have both denied having any knowledge about the deal in strongly worded press releases.

The report adds that taped conversations between the alleged middleman indicate that 10-15

taWestland.

“The Air Force will go ahead with the deal. We have conducted the transaction with professionalism, procedurally and thoroughly.

There is no basis to the media reports,” IAF spokesperson Wing Commander Gerard Galway held.

The IAF is scheduled to receive its first AW101 helicopter in VVIP passenger configuration within the next 2-3 months.

According to AgustaWestland, the first of 12 choppers is being outfitted as per the Indian order with delivery to be made within

million euros of the commission may have been routed to India.

Following reports of bribery and kickbacks in the Indian VVIP helicopter deal with Italian aircraftmaker AgustaWestland, India had requested information from the Italian government over the alleged deals.

Earlier in March, Defence Minister A K Antony informed Parliament that “no specific probe is being conducted about India-related transactions” by Italy.

The 12 VVIP helicopter contract had been finalized in March 2010. AgustaWestland had said in statement after the award of the contract, “AgustaWestland, a Finmeccanica company, is pleased to announce that a contract has been signed by the Government of India for the acquisition of twelve AW101 helicopters that will perform government transport duties. The contract, valued at around € 560 million, includes an extensive five year logistic support service and initial aircrew and technician training”.

(Defence Buzz Courtsey: Mohd. Ahmedullah)

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