Defence and Security of India - Dec 2014

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MARITIME SECURITY

SURVEILLANCE & SECURITY Significant steps has been taken to improve and secure India’s maritime borders I PVS SATISH SPECIAL FORCES

ARMY: EXPANSION & BEYOND Special Forces expansion seem overly ambitious as they are not matched by resources DECEMBER 2014

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI

www.defencesecurityindia.com

VOLUME 6

ISSUE 6

IAF STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVE AND CAPABILITY ROADMAP REFLECTS NOT JUST WHAT IS NEEDED, BUT ALSO WHAT IS GETTING DEGRADED, THUS GIVING SUGGESTIONS WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACQUIRED I SUMIT MUKERJI

` 250

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DECEMBER 2014

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

M

anohar Parrikar, the new defence minister of the country, is known amongst the Goan hoi polloi as ‘Singham’. He is considered strongwilled, focused and a good administrator.

He also is reputed to be a man of his word. He gave the Catholic Church representatives a promise during the last legislative election. That pledge was to clean Goa off all extraneous mining licencees, about 129 were cancelled by a stroke of a pen fulfilling his commitment to the Church. The Church, in turn, delivered votes for the BJP. He is also a moderate RSS man, who knows, coming from a state with significantly large Christian population that his writ as a former pracharak can run for only so much. Meanwhile, as Goa’s chief minister, his decision to cancel the mining licences, had put 200,000 people out of jobs.

Parrikar took the bull by its horns: he said that if he could not find alternative employment, he would give up his CMship. And, he found most of them accommodated in alternatives. This is the man, who Prime Minister considers to be his reportedly closest protégé, who in the five years has to decide on at least a hundred billion dollars worth of defence contracts. While the money involved in this acquisition process is huge; it is even more important that the equipments the country’s armed forces get are of cutting-edge quality that put the forces’ invincibility first. While that might sound like a bit of hyperbole, it still cannot be gainsaid that the modernisation of the Indian armed forces in conventional terms will actually deter war both between nation-states and non-conventional in nature.

Parrikar’s ascension to the defence ministry was really begun with the chairing of the Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC). As an IIT graduate, the numbers could not have mystified him in the DAC meeting, but the labyrinthine defence ministry operations could have. He postponed taking a decision on the Rs 23,000 crore Avro replacement contract as he needed time to go through the proposal. Parrikar has a lot on his plate; but he could turn out to be a guy in the mould of his mentor.

Pinaki Bhattacharya

3

While the money involved in this acquisition process is huge; it is even more important that the equipments the country’s armed forces get are of cutting-edge quality that put the forces’ invincibility first.

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CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2014

SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DSI

08

TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT The 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work. India continues to be one of the most threatened regions of the world and facing serious boundary disputes with the two nuclear armed neighbours, special operations remain the key to India’s defence.

AIRBORNE CAPABILITY

16

IAF: STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION

4

4G WARFARE

30

POLICY

42

Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired. Ongoing transformation in IAF with a strategic reach is the story of the day.

EQUIPPING THE ARMY

DPP, OFFSETS AND FDI IN DEFENCE

Fourth Generation Warfare is a decentralised form of warfare, where nation-states lose their monopoly over violence and the adversaries are driven to non-conventional warfare and blurs the dividing line between civvies and the combatants.

The FDI hike in defence is geared towards creating indigenous defence industrial base. The offset policy will make substantial progress in minimizing the import through progressive increase in domestic production.

MARITIME SECURITY

DEFENCE TIES

SPECIAL FORCES

24

36

48

SURVEILLANCE AND STRATEGY

WASHINGTON CALLING

ARMY: EXPANSION AND BEYOND

Significant steps has been taken to improve maritime domain awareness and secure India’s maritime borders after the “26/11” Mumbai terrorist attacks conducted by Pakistani infiltrators who easily reached Indian soil, launched the mayhem.

Modi’s visit to the US provides an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties, which stagnated during the UPA II government. The strengthened bilateral relationship would offer cooperation on various shared interests like economic, defence, and security.

Even with the promise of a joint command, the Special Forces expansion seem overly ambitious as they are not matched by resources and faces the problem of replacement of imported equipments.

5

Contents_7.qxp_contents-feb-R.qxd 22/12/14 1:59 pm Page 2

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

SPECIAL AIRCRAFT08

TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT The 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work. India continues to be one of the most threatened regions of the world and facing serious boundary disputes with the two nuclear armed neighbours, special operations remain the key to India’s defence.

AIRBORNE CAPABILITY 16

4G WARFARE 30

POLICY

Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired. Ongoing transformation in IAF with a strategic reach is the story of the day.

Fourth Generation Warfare is a decentralised form of warfare, where nation-states lose their monopoly over violence and the adversaries are driven to non-conventional warfare and blurs the dividing line between civvies and the combatants.

The FDI hike in defence is geared towards creating indigenous defence industrial base. The offset policy will make substantial progress in minimizing the import through progressive increase in domestic production.

MARITIME SECURITY

DEFENCE TIES 36

SPECIAL FORCES

Modi’s visit to the US provides an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties, which stagnated during the UPA II government. The strengthened bilateral relationship would offer cooperation on various shared interests like economic, defence, and security.

Even with the promise of a joint command, the Special Forces expansion seem overly ambitious as they are not matched by resources and faces the problem of replacement of imported equipments.

IAF: STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION

SURVEILLANCE AND STRATEGY

24

Significant steps has been taken to improve maritime domain awareness and secure India’s maritime borders after the “26/11” Mumbai terrorist attacks conducted by Pakistani infiltrators who easily reached Indian soil, launched the mayhem.

4

EQUIPPING THE ARMY

WASHINGTON CALLING

5

42

DPP, OFFSETS AND FDI IN DEFENCE

48

ARMY: EXPANSION AND BEYOND

Contributors_7.qxp_contributors-aug.qxd 22/12/14 2:03 pm Page 1

CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2014 AIR MARSHAL (RETD) SUMIT MUKERJI

AMIT COWSHISH

AIR MARSHAL (RETD) ANIL CHOPRA

LT GEN (RETD) ANIL CHAIT

CAPTAIN (IN) PVS SATISH

Mukerji was commissioned in 1972. A Qualified Flying Instructor (Cat ‘A’), a Fighter Combat Leader, he first commanded a MiG-29 Squadron, the second a MiG25 Squadron and the third, the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment of which he was the Commodore Commandant for 5 yrs. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for Gallantry (peace time) in 1981 and the VSM in 1997. He was appointed the Air Officer Commanding-inChief, Southern Air Command in 2009.

Amit Cowshish served as Additional Controller General of Defence Account for thirty- five years. He served on deputation to the Ministry of Defence as Under Secretary. Between 2005 and 2012, he served for almost seven years on deputation with the Finance Division, first as Additional Financial Advisor and Joint Secretary and later as Financial Advisor (Acquisition) & Additional Secretary and Member Defence Procurement Board. He is a Post Graduate in Political Science from Jawahar Lal Nehru University and also holds an M.Phil degree.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra is an ex NDA Air Force officer who was a fighter pilot in the IAF. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor and Test Pilot who was among the initial lot to train on Mirage 2000 in France. He commanded a Mirage Squadron, two operational air bases and the IAF’s Flight Test Centre ASTE. He was the Team Leader of MiG 21 Upgrade program in Russia for over 4 years.

He is currently a member of Armed Forces Tribunal.

He is also a member of Executive council of Jawahar Lal University, New Delhi

Lt Gen (Retd.) Anil Chait, PVSM, AVSM, VSM retired from service on 01 July 2014.

His last appointment was that of the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Tri-Service Organisation).

In his forty one years of military service, he has served as the Commanderin-Chief of a Field Army, HQ Central Command from 01 Mar 2012 to 30 Jun 2013. Also, He was the Commandant of Army War College, Mhow.

A retired naval officer with wide operational experience ,served on aircraft carriers, fleet ships, flotilla ships and auxiliaries. The officer has participated in operations in all three commands of the Indian Navy and Andaman and Nicobar Command and has also been a part of International peace keeping operations in Sri Lanka and Somalia.

With service in IHQ MoD(Navy) and the MoD at New Delhi in various roles, the officer has a deep understanding of the functioning of the NHQ and MoD.

VOLUME 6, ISSUE 6

EDITOR Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR Bipin Kumar ASST. ART DIRECTOR Ajay Kumar JR. FEATURES WRITER Jaya Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) MANAGER MARKETING Jakhongir Djalmetov (E-Mail: joha@mtil.biz) AD SALES Prateek Singh (E-Mail: prateeksingh@mtil.biz) Pakhee Malhotra (E-Mail: pakhee@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Jeetendra Madaan MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Benelux Cornelius W. Bontje Tel: (41) 79 635 2621 Email: cbontje@ymail.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: rem-media@sfr.fr Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/South Africa Emanuela Castagnetti-Gillberg Tel: +46 31 799 9028 E-Mail:egillberg@glocalnet.net South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr East-Central Europe/Greece/Turkey Zena Coupé Tel: (44) 1923 852537 Email: zena@expomedia.biz USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmediainc@icloud.com Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Nutech Photolithographers B-240, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I,New Delhi-110020, India. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

Contributors_7.qxp_contributors-aug.qxd 22/12/14 2:03 pm Page 1

CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2014 AIR MARSHAL (RETD) SUMIT MUKERJI

AMIT COWSHISH

AIR MARSHAL (RETD) ANIL CHOPRA

LT GEN (RETD) ANIL CHAIT

CAPTAIN (IN) PVS SATISH

Mukerji was commissioned in 1972. A Qualified Flying Instructor (Cat ‘A’), a Fighter Combat Leader, he first commanded a MiG-29 Squadron, the second a MiG25 Squadron and the third, the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment of which he was the Commodore Commandant for 5 yrs. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for Gallantry (peace time) in 1981 and the VSM in 1997. He was appointed the Air Officer Commanding-inChief, Southern Air Command in 2009.

Amit Cowshish served as Additional Controller General of Defence Account for thirty- five years. He served on deputation to the Ministry of Defence as Under Secretary. Between 2005 and 2012, he served for almost seven years on deputation with the Finance Division, first as Additional Financial Advisor and Joint Secretary and later as Financial Advisor (Acquisition) & Additional Secretary and Member Defence Procurement Board. He is a Post Graduate in Political Science from Jawahar Lal Nehru University and also holds an M.Phil degree.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra is an ex NDA Air Force officer who was a fighter pilot in the IAF. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor and Test Pilot who was among the initial lot to train on Mirage 2000 in France. He commanded a Mirage Squadron, two operational air bases and the IAF’s Flight Test Centre ASTE. He was the Team Leader of MiG 21 Upgrade program in Russia for over 4 years.

He is currently a member of Armed Forces Tribunal.

He is also a member of Executive council of Jawahar Lal University, New Delhi

Lt Gen (Retd.) Anil Chait, PVSM, AVSM, VSM retired from service on 01 July 2014.

His last appointment was that of the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Tri-Service Organisation).

In his forty one years of military service, he has served as the Commanderin-Chief of a Field Army, HQ Central Command from 01 Mar 2012 to 30 Jun 2013. Also, He was the Commandant of Army War College, Mhow.

A retired naval officer with wide operational experience ,served on aircraft carriers, fleet ships, flotilla ships and auxiliaries. The officer has participated in operations in all three commands of the Indian Navy and Andaman and Nicobar Command and has also been a part of International peace keeping operations in Sri Lanka and Somalia.

With service in IHQ MoD(Navy) and the MoD at New Delhi in various roles, the officer has a deep understanding of the functioning of the NHQ and MoD.

VOLUME 6, ISSUE 6

EDITOR Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR Bipin Kumar ASST. ART DIRECTOR Ajay Kumar JR. FEATURES WRITER Jaya Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) MANAGER MARKETING Jakhongir Djalmetov (E-Mail: joha@mtil.biz) AD SALES Prateek Singh (E-Mail: prateeksingh@mtil.biz) Pakhee Malhotra (E-Mail: pakhee@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Jeetendra Madaan MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Benelux Cornelius W. Bontje Tel: (41) 79 635 2621 Email: cbontje@ymail.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: rem-media@sfr.fr Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/South Africa Emanuela Castagnetti-Gillberg Tel: +46 31 799 9028 E-Mail:egillberg@glocalnet.net South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr East-Central Europe/Greece/Turkey Zena Coupé Tel: (44) 1923 852537 Email: zena@expomedia.biz USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmediainc@icloud.com Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Nutech Photolithographers B-240, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I,New Delhi-110020, India. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

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SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DECEMBER 2014

TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT The 9/11 attacks on WorldTrade Centre and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work. India continues to be one of the most threatened regions of the world and facing serious boundary disputes with the two nuclear armed neighbours, special operations remain the key to India’s defence.

ANIL CHOPRA

US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey aircraft conducting a helicopter support team external lift as part of a field exercise © US DoD

KEY POINTS l Transport aircrafts have been used as launch pads to the Space shuttle, UAVs and cruise missiles, platforms for airborne warning and air-refuelling. l After 9/11, anti-plane hijacking and anti-kidnapping are also special missions. l The Indian military required augmentation to quickly lift larger troops and to fight terrorism.

W

ithin just over a century of the first fixed wing flight, military aviation has come a long way.

Strategic cargo and transport aircraft have given global reach at short notice. The world has shrunk in place and time.

Changing nature of war has also made place for Special operations aircraft. The 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre and the 16/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work.

Transport and special operations aircraft could typically be fixed or rotary wing. The scope being very large, it is intended to analyse mainly the fixed wing aircraft. The tonnage capacity and non-stop flying range of bigger aircraft brought in new dynamics.

Also capability to penetrate undetected and land at short unprepared airstrips has allowed a variety of special missions.

A cargo aircraft (also known as freight aircraft, freighter, or airlifter) is a fixedwing aircraft for the carriage of goods. Such aircraft generally feature one or more large doors for loading cargo. Their features include a wide/tall fuselage cross-section, a high-wing to allow the cargo area to sit near the ground, a large number of wheels to allow it to land at unprepared locations, and a high-mounted tail to allow cargo to be driven directly into and off the aircraft.

Transport and Cargo Missions Typical military transport mission requirements are to deliver troops, weapons and other military hardware for military operations in various areas around the globe, often flying outside of civil flight routes. The delivery could be through physical landing at an airstrip with minimal facilities and aids, or a paradrop behind enemy lines. During World War II they were even used to tow military gliders.

More recently they have been launch pads to the Space shuttle, UAVs and cruise

8

9

DSI

missiles. They also have been the platforms for airborne warning and control with mounted radome, and for aerial refuelling.

Normally flight length shorter than three hours is considered ‘short-haul’, 3-6 hours as ‘medium haul’ and longer than 6 hours as ‘long-haul’. Air-ambulance is another role with both peace-time and operational roles. The type and size of payloads greatly influenced the design of aircraft fuselage, cargo doors and other on-board systems.

The piggy-back mounting of the ‘Shuttle’ and radome require strengthening of midfuselage and a revisit of aerodynamics.

Airlifts became significant during World War II. 1942 to 1945, USAF airlifted half a million tons of materials from India to China, in the often referred as the over ‘the Hump’ operation. The ‘Berlin airlift’ in 1948 to 1949 was to prevent ‘Allied’ part of Berlin from being blocked by Soviet Union.

The airlift to Punch and Srinagar in J&K in 1948, the evacuation of Indians from Kuwait in 1991 and the airlift to safety of Kashmiris after recent floods are examples of air transport operations.

Transport and Cargo Aircraft Aviation domain has seen the greatest competition between the West and Russians, and now China has become a big player too. Boeing and Lockheed have been the two big players from USA. Antonov and Ilyushin were the Soviet/Russian gaint design houses, and Airbus from France.

AVIC of China and Embraer of Brazil are up and coming entities. The 600 ton maxtake-off-weight Antonov An-225 Mriya is the world’s largest transport aircraft that can carry 225 ton payload up to 15,400 km distance. The record was earlier held by Antonov An-124 ‘Ruslan’ with 160 ton payload capacity. Especially Russians have mastered the art of heavy-engineering and such huge aircraft require, strengthened flooring, large cargo doors and big wheel trolley. Also the cockpits are moved high up to prevent the pilots getting crushed in case of accident. The fuselage interior has to match the size of standard shipping containers. Lockheed C-5 Galaxy is the nearest US competitor in size to the Russian biggies. It can carry 122 ton payload till 4445 kilometres. The McDonnell Douglas KC 10 Extender can carry 77 tons to 18,507 km. Other big names are the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and 747-8F freighter. The recent entrants

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SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DECEMBER 2014

TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT The 9/11 attacks on WorldTrade Centre and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work. India continues to be one of the most threatened regions of the world and facing serious boundary disputes with the two nuclear armed neighbours, special operations remain the key to India’s defence.

ANIL CHOPRA

US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey aircraft conducting a helicopter support team external lift as part of a field exercise © US DoD

KEY POINTS l Transport aircrafts have been used as launch pads to the Space shuttle, UAVs and cruise missiles, platforms for airborne warning and air-refuelling. l After 9/11, anti-plane hijacking and anti-kidnapping are also special missions. l The Indian military required augmentation to quickly lift larger troops and to fight terrorism.

W

ithin just over a century of the first fixed wing flight, military aviation has come a long way.

Strategic cargo and transport aircraft have given global reach at short notice. The world has shrunk in place and time.

Changing nature of war has also made place for Special operations aircraft. The 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre and the 16/11 Mumbai attacks have brought terror to our homes and place of work.

Transport and special operations aircraft could typically be fixed or rotary wing. The scope being very large, it is intended to analyse mainly the fixed wing aircraft. The tonnage capacity and non-stop flying range of bigger aircraft brought in new dynamics.

Also capability to penetrate undetected and land at short unprepared airstrips has allowed a variety of special missions.

A cargo aircraft (also known as freight aircraft, freighter, or airlifter) is a fixedwing aircraft for the carriage of goods. Such aircraft generally feature one or more large doors for loading cargo. Their features include a wide/tall fuselage cross-section, a high-wing to allow the cargo area to sit near the ground, a large number of wheels to allow it to land at unprepared locations, and a high-mounted tail to allow cargo to be driven directly into and off the aircraft.

Transport and Cargo Missions Typical military transport mission requirements are to deliver troops, weapons and other military hardware for military operations in various areas around the globe, often flying outside of civil flight routes. The delivery could be through physical landing at an airstrip with minimal facilities and aids, or a paradrop behind enemy lines. During World War II they were even used to tow military gliders.

More recently they have been launch pads to the Space shuttle, UAVs and cruise

8

9

DSI

missiles. They also have been the platforms for airborne warning and control with mounted radome, and for aerial refuelling.

Normally flight length shorter than three hours is considered ‘short-haul’, 3-6 hours as ‘medium haul’ and longer than 6 hours as ‘long-haul’. Air-ambulance is another role with both peace-time and operational roles. The type and size of payloads greatly influenced the design of aircraft fuselage, cargo doors and other on-board systems.

The piggy-back mounting of the ‘Shuttle’ and radome require strengthening of midfuselage and a revisit of aerodynamics.

Airlifts became significant during World War II. 1942 to 1945, USAF airlifted half a million tons of materials from India to China, in the often referred as the over ‘the Hump’ operation. The ‘Berlin airlift’ in 1948 to 1949 was to prevent ‘Allied’ part of Berlin from being blocked by Soviet Union.

The airlift to Punch and Srinagar in J&K in 1948, the evacuation of Indians from Kuwait in 1991 and the airlift to safety of Kashmiris after recent floods are examples of air transport operations.

Transport and Cargo Aircraft Aviation domain has seen the greatest competition between the West and Russians, and now China has become a big player too. Boeing and Lockheed have been the two big players from USA. Antonov and Ilyushin were the Soviet/Russian gaint design houses, and Airbus from France.

AVIC of China and Embraer of Brazil are up and coming entities. The 600 ton maxtake-off-weight Antonov An-225 Mriya is the world’s largest transport aircraft that can carry 225 ton payload up to 15,400 km distance. The record was earlier held by Antonov An-124 ‘Ruslan’ with 160 ton payload capacity. Especially Russians have mastered the art of heavy-engineering and such huge aircraft require, strengthened flooring, large cargo doors and big wheel trolley. Also the cockpits are moved high up to prevent the pilots getting crushed in case of accident. The fuselage interior has to match the size of standard shipping containers. Lockheed C-5 Galaxy is the nearest US competitor in size to the Russian biggies. It can carry 122 ton payload till 4445 kilometres. The McDonnell Douglas KC 10 Extender can carry 77 tons to 18,507 km. Other big names are the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and 747-8F freighter. The recent entrants

Transport.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:08 pm Page 3

SPECIAL AIRCRAFT Indian Air Force (IAF) C-130J aircraft takes off after performing an assault landing during the Iron Fist 2013 exercise in Pokhran

Airbus A 330 MRTT (45 ton) first flew 2007, and Airbus A 400 M (37 ton) first flew in 2009. Airbus had also considered having a Cargo variant of A380, but they have still to take the final call on the same.

China’s Y-20 flew for the first time in January 2013 and has a payload of 66 tons.

The active current tankers are the Airbus A400M and A310/330 MRTT, KC-130 Hercules, KC-10 Extender, KC-135 Stratotanker, and the Russian IL-78. While the C-130, A440M and IL-76 class can be termed as tactical airlift aircraft, C-5, C-17, and Y-20 are termed as strategic airlifters.

Special Operations Missions In the Indo-Pak wars, Pakistan used C-130 and India An-12 and An-32 on bombing missions. During the late 1960s, the U.S. was eager to get information on Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nor. USAF flew a six hour low level night mission from Thailand to para drop sensor pallets in Gansu province. During the Falklands war of 1982, Argentine Air Force C-130s daily undertook dangerous re-supply night flights to supply the Argentine garrison in the islands. C-130s also dropped the world’s largest bomb BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” during the Gulf war. Since 2004, the Pakistan Air Force has employed C-

All major Air Forces of the world have special operations aircraft and Armies have special operations troops. USA, because of global commitments, has a Special Operations Command, since 1990, which handles missions ranging from precision application of firepower, infiltration etc.

”

130s in the North West using FLIR sensor to enable close tracking the militants.

One of the classic Special operations missions, code named Operation Thunderbolt, was flown to rescue Israeli citizens from Entebbe airport in Uganda.

This counter-terrorist hostage-rescue

10

mission on 04 July 1976 used four Israeli Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying Israeli Defense Forces Commandos. It was flown low level at midnight to avoid radar and visual detection.

US President Jimmy Carter had ordered on 24 April 1980, Operation Eagle Clawduring Iran Hostage crisis to rescue 52 diplomats held captive it Tehran. The eight helicopter operation encountered many operational and maintainability obstacles and was eventually aborted. This led to a relook and the development of Osprey V-22 tilt rotter.

Forward looking infrared systems, night vision capability, all-weather weapon aiming sights, self-protection systems to defend from airborne radars and air/ground fired weapons are key to special operations aircraft. All major Air Forces of the world have special operations aircraft and Armies have special operations troops. USA, because of global commitments, has a Special Operations Command, since 1990, which handles missions ranging from precision application of firepower, infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply and refuelling of special force’s operational elements. Its motto ‘Any Time Any Place’ says it all. Special Forces personnel are specially selected and trained to cater to the

Always in Control

Special Mission Aircraft Superior intelligence collection and battle management

Maritime Patrol

Signal g Intelligence g

Airborne Ground Surveillance

Airborne Early Warning

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SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT)

Be-200 Multirole Amphibion Aircraft

rigours of the job. Aircraft employed by USA are indicative of the more suited types.

These include Hercules C-130 variants, CV22 Osprey, MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper and many smaller UAVs among others. For special one-off missions other aircraft including helicopters are inducted.

Some of the other missions include Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), airbase ground defence, air interdiction, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, radar assault/bursting etc. After 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, anti-plane hijacking, and anti-kidnapping are also special missions.

Special Mission Aircraft The C-130 Hercules Special operations aircraft family has the longest continuous production run of any military aircraft in history. During more than 50 years of service, the family has participated in military, civilian, and humanitarian aid operations. Fifteen nations have ordered 300 of the latest C-130Js. In Kosovo, USAF used C-17 for half of the strategic airlift missions due to its capability to use small

airfields, and rapid turnaround times. The C-17 has been used to deliver military goods and humanitarian aid during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. On 26 March 2003, 15 USAF C-17s participated in the night-time airdrop of 1,000 paratroopers over Bashur, Iraq. C-17s also ferried M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, M113s and artillery. A C-17 is also used to transport the US President’s security team and limousine during trips abroad.

The Bell-Boeing MV-22 had its first offensive combat mission in Afghanistan in December 2009, Operation Cobra’s Anger.

Ospreys assisted in inserting 1,000 Marines and 150 Afghan troops into the Now Zad Valley in southern Afghanistan to disrupt Taliban communication and supply lines. In Iraq’s western Anbar province it has been used for cargo and troop movements, as well as riskier “aero-scout” missions. On 2 May 2011, following Operation Neptune’s Spear, MV-22 was used to fly the body of Osama bin Laden to aircraft carrier Carl Vinson for his sea burial.

Russia has a dedicated ‘Ministry for

12

Emergency Situations’ as an umbrella term for Special Forces. Russian Tu-214 R is a special mission aircraft with ELINT, SIGINT and COMINT loads and has a side looking synthetic aperture radar among other sensors on board. IL 76 is the main aircraft for Russian airborne troops.

Special Forces were used extensively during the Soviet war in Afghanistan including storming of the palace and killing of President Hafizullah Amin and his over one hundred guards. The famous Moscow theatre hostage crisis, and more recently the terrorist threat to 2014 Sochi Olympics and Ukraine intervention have been handled by Special Forces.

Indian Air Force Fleet IAF has come a long way since the C-47 Dakota, Caribou, Otter, C-199 Packet aircraft were the main airlift aircraft. IAF acquired the 20 ton class An-12 in the 1960s, and later became the launch customer for the medium transport,6.7 ton payload, aircraft designated An-32.

Starting 1984, a total of 125 were bought.

Currently in inventory, nearly 100 aircraft

are under up gradation. One squadron of these has bombing and special mission roles. On 04 Jun 1987, five An-32s escorted by four Mirage 2000s undertook food supply drop mission “Poomalai” over Jaffna peninsula.

The multi-purpose four-engine IL-76 with rear cargo ramp and over 47 ton load capacity for the first time brought strategic lift capability in the sub-continent.

Inducted in mid 1980s, IAF today has 17 IL-76MD (freighter), seven IL-78MKI (Air Refuellers), and five ‘A-50’ with Israeli Phalcon radar as AWACs. IL-76s are being used to logistically sustain the Indian Army in the Northern Himalayas and for inter theatre air transportation. With the breakup of Soviet Union in late 1980s An-32 plant became part of Ukraine.

IAF purchased six C-130J-30s in early 2008 at a cost of up to US$1.2 billion for its special operations forces in a package deal with the US government under its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program with options to buy six more aircraft.

The Lockheed Martin C-130J “Super” Hercules is a four-engine turboprop

The ‘Make India’ priority of the new governament has already resulted in HS-748 replacement being offered for India manufacture. With gradual increase in FDI, foreign aircraft majors are likely to move to establish manufacturing in India

”

military transport aircraft. The C-130J is a comprehensive update of the earlier variant, with new engines, flight deck, digital avionics (including head-up displays for each pilot), thus reduced crew requirements. These changes have improved performance over its predecessors, by 40% greater range, 21% higher maximum speed, and 41% shorter take off distance. The first C-130J was delivered to the IAF in December 2010 and entered into service in February 2011.

Deliveries were concluded in December 2011. In October 2011, India announced its intent to exercise the option for the six additional aircraft. The C-130J can

13

accommodate loads up to 33 tons of the kind of three armoured personnel carriers, five pallets, 74 stretchers, 92 equipped combat troops or 64 para troops. The aircraft has an electro-optical missile warning system, a radar warning receiver, and a countermeasures system that is capable of dispensing chaff and infra-red flares in addition to the GEN-X active expendable decoys. These allow safe penetration behind enemy lines.

Optimised engine power, allows superior short-airfield performance. IAF set a new world record for C-130 J by landing it at Daulat Beg Oldie at an altitude of 16,700 feet near Karakoram pass. PM Modi preferred a C-130 over the VVIP Boeing jet for his visit to Ladakh and the Kashmir valley. C-130s played a big role in the Uttarakhand and Kashmir floods.

In a $5.8 Billion deal IAF purchased 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III from USA. The C-17 commonly performs strategic airlift missions, transporting troops and cargo throughout the world; additional roles include tactical airlift, medical evacuation and airdrop duties. The C-17 is known for easier handling (compared to IL-76) and ability to operate from short and rough airstrips. The Indian military required augmentation to quickly lift larger troops across western and eastern theatre, and to fight terrorism and low-intensity warfare, it needed to triple its lift capacity. C-17 lifts 77.5 ton vis-à-vis the IL-76′s 47 ton. Deliveries began in June 2013 and will be over by early 2015. IAF is likely to buy six more and would

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SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT)

Be-200 Multirole Amphibion Aircraft

rigours of the job. Aircraft employed by USA are indicative of the more suited types.

These include Hercules C-130 variants, CV22 Osprey, MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper and many smaller UAVs among others. For special one-off missions other aircraft including helicopters are inducted.

Some of the other missions include Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), airbase ground defence, air interdiction, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, radar assault/bursting etc. After 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, anti-plane hijacking, and anti-kidnapping are also special missions.

Special Mission Aircraft The C-130 Hercules Special operations aircraft family has the longest continuous production run of any military aircraft in history. During more than 50 years of service, the family has participated in military, civilian, and humanitarian aid operations. Fifteen nations have ordered 300 of the latest C-130Js. In Kosovo, USAF used C-17 for half of the strategic airlift missions due to its capability to use small

airfields, and rapid turnaround times. The C-17 has been used to deliver military goods and humanitarian aid during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. On 26 March 2003, 15 USAF C-17s participated in the night-time airdrop of 1,000 paratroopers over Bashur, Iraq. C-17s also ferried M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, M113s and artillery. A C-17 is also used to transport the US President’s security team and limousine during trips abroad.

The Bell-Boeing MV-22 had its first offensive combat mission in Afghanistan in December 2009, Operation Cobra’s Anger.

Ospreys assisted in inserting 1,000 Marines and 150 Afghan troops into the Now Zad Valley in southern Afghanistan to disrupt Taliban communication and supply lines. In Iraq’s western Anbar province it has been used for cargo and troop movements, as well as riskier “aero-scout” missions. On 2 May 2011, following Operation Neptune’s Spear, MV-22 was used to fly the body of Osama bin Laden to aircraft carrier Carl Vinson for his sea burial.

Russia has a dedicated ‘Ministry for

12

Emergency Situations’ as an umbrella term for Special Forces. Russian Tu-214 R is a special mission aircraft with ELINT, SIGINT and COMINT loads and has a side looking synthetic aperture radar among other sensors on board. IL 76 is the main aircraft for Russian airborne troops.

Special Forces were used extensively during the Soviet war in Afghanistan including storming of the palace and killing of President Hafizullah Amin and his over one hundred guards. The famous Moscow theatre hostage crisis, and more recently the terrorist threat to 2014 Sochi Olympics and Ukraine intervention have been handled by Special Forces.

Indian Air Force Fleet IAF has come a long way since the C-47 Dakota, Caribou, Otter, C-199 Packet aircraft were the main airlift aircraft. IAF acquired the 20 ton class An-12 in the 1960s, and later became the launch customer for the medium transport,6.7 ton payload, aircraft designated An-32.

Starting 1984, a total of 125 were bought.

Currently in inventory, nearly 100 aircraft

are under up gradation. One squadron of these has bombing and special mission roles. On 04 Jun 1987, five An-32s escorted by four Mirage 2000s undertook food supply drop mission “Poomalai” over Jaffna peninsula.

The multi-purpose four-engine IL-76 with rear cargo ramp and over 47 ton load capacity for the first time brought strategic lift capability in the sub-continent.

Inducted in mid 1980s, IAF today has 17 IL-76MD (freighter), seven IL-78MKI (Air Refuellers), and five ‘A-50’ with Israeli Phalcon radar as AWACs. IL-76s are being used to logistically sustain the Indian Army in the Northern Himalayas and for inter theatre air transportation. With the breakup of Soviet Union in late 1980s An-32 plant became part of Ukraine.

IAF purchased six C-130J-30s in early 2008 at a cost of up to US$1.2 billion for its special operations forces in a package deal with the US government under its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program with options to buy six more aircraft.

The Lockheed Martin C-130J “Super” Hercules is a four-engine turboprop

The ‘Make India’ priority of the new governament has already resulted in HS-748 replacement being offered for India manufacture. With gradual increase in FDI, foreign aircraft majors are likely to move to establish manufacturing in India

”

military transport aircraft. The C-130J is a comprehensive update of the earlier variant, with new engines, flight deck, digital avionics (including head-up displays for each pilot), thus reduced crew requirements. These changes have improved performance over its predecessors, by 40% greater range, 21% higher maximum speed, and 41% shorter take off distance. The first C-130J was delivered to the IAF in December 2010 and entered into service in February 2011.

Deliveries were concluded in December 2011. In October 2011, India announced its intent to exercise the option for the six additional aircraft. The C-130J can

13

accommodate loads up to 33 tons of the kind of three armoured personnel carriers, five pallets, 74 stretchers, 92 equipped combat troops or 64 para troops. The aircraft has an electro-optical missile warning system, a radar warning receiver, and a countermeasures system that is capable of dispensing chaff and infra-red flares in addition to the GEN-X active expendable decoys. These allow safe penetration behind enemy lines.

Optimised engine power, allows superior short-airfield performance. IAF set a new world record for C-130 J by landing it at Daulat Beg Oldie at an altitude of 16,700 feet near Karakoram pass. PM Modi preferred a C-130 over the VVIP Boeing jet for his visit to Ladakh and the Kashmir valley. C-130s played a big role in the Uttarakhand and Kashmir floods.

In a $5.8 Billion deal IAF purchased 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III from USA. The C-17 commonly performs strategic airlift missions, transporting troops and cargo throughout the world; additional roles include tactical airlift, medical evacuation and airdrop duties. The C-17 is known for easier handling (compared to IL-76) and ability to operate from short and rough airstrips. The Indian military required augmentation to quickly lift larger troops across western and eastern theatre, and to fight terrorism and low-intensity warfare, it needed to triple its lift capacity. C-17 lifts 77.5 ton vis-à-vis the IL-76′s 47 ton. Deliveries began in June 2013 and will be over by early 2015. IAF is likely to buy six more and would

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SPECIAL AIRCRAFT

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

The A400M airlifter is designed for the transportation of all types of heavy military or civil loads such as vehicles, containers or pallets, as well as troops © Airbus Military

be the second largest operator. Aircraft has ability to deploy Special Forces and aid during national emergencies. No. 81 Squadron, the Skylords, is regularly flying the aircraft to high altitude airfields like Leh and Thoise. These were also used to test transport an infantry battalion to Port Blair. The foreign deployments included Tajikistan and Rwanda to support Indian peacekeepers. One C-17 was used for transporting relief materials during Cyclone Phailin. With capability to transport modern battle tanks; IAF could use these to fly Indian Army’s Armour to Ladakh and North Sikkim at short notice.

IAF routinely trains its own Commandos, the Garuds, and the Indian Army Special Forces during exercises and at the para school, Agra. IAF’s own special tasks include, assault/capture of front tier enemy radars, CSAR, capture and sustenance of front tier airfields, wartime disaster management, mass casualty evacuation, VIP evacuation, nuclear contingencies etc. among many others.

The Future China is racing ahead with indigenous Y-20 ‘large’ transport aircraft that first flew in January 2013. The aircraft appears to have has borrowed features of two famous

workhorses, the US C-17 and the Russian IL 76. Y-20 is estimated to weigh around 200 tons (pay load 66 tons vis-à-vis 47 tons for IL 76 and 78 tons for C-17).The aircraft is currently using D-30 engines borrowed from the Russian IL 76s operated by them. In parallel China also began developing a turbofan engine specifically for large transports.

The Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey is an American multi-mission, military, tilt rotor aircraft with both vertical take-off and landing (VTOL), and short take-off and landing (STOL) capability. It has advantages of a helicopter and long-range, high-speed cruise performance of a turboprop aircraft. V-22 will replace the Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights in US Marine Corps. It joined USAF in 2009 and has already seen deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Libya. It is also a contender to be the tactical refuellers for US Navy. With max speed of 565 kmph, and capability to carry up to 32 troops or 9.0 ton cargo, makes it a good special operations aircraft. Israel, Japan and UAE are serious customers. This is an aircraft that may interest India one day.

The twin-engine Multirole transport aircraft (MTA) is being developed by Russian United Aircraft Corporation and

14

India’s HAL. This 20-ton load carrying aircraft (100 passengers) is to replace the smaller An-32. The first flight is likely to be 2017 and expected to enter service by end of this decade. India is soon likely to procure 15 Japanese amphibious aircraft ‘US-2’. It will be the first ever Japanese sale of military equipment after WW II which may act as a subtle warning to China. The ShinMaywa Industries developed amphibious flying boat has a short take-off (280 m) and landing (330 m) performance over water, and could land at high sea states. It can also operate on land from runways as small as 1.3 km long.

India continues to be one of the most threatened regions of the world. Serious boundary disputes with the two nuclear armed neighbours; and Pakistan being the epicentre of world terror, special operations would remain the key to India’s defence. India is rightly building its Special Forces and air transportation capability.

The ‘Make India’ priority of the new governament has already resulted in HS748 replacement being offered for India manufacture. With gradual increase in FDI, foreign aircraft majors are likely to move to establish manufacturing in India.

In the not so far future India should have its Special Forces Command.

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IAF: STRATEGIC T RANSFORMATION Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired.

T

SUMIT MUKERJI

KEY POINTS l IAF’s ongoing transformation into afull spectrum force with a strategic er ach is the story of the day. l Some experts claim that swing role/multi role aircrafts can staunch the IAF's dwindling platforms problem. l Though 30% or 50% offset’ ‘ proposal seem small, it now appears a handful for the smaller indigenous capital to absorb it.

he massive IL-76 heavy lift transporter followed by the IL-78 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and a while later six Jaguars of the IAF took off on a mission that would remain etched in the pages of its history, immortalised forever. The “package” had set out to navigate over 10,000 miles, leapfrogging through 9 stopovers to reach Eielson AFB, Alaska in a landmark effort. The Indian Air Force had announced its arrival on the international scene, showcasing its capability, its professionalism and its transformation, from a traditionally tactical Air Force to a strategic force, capable of extending its reach across the seven seas. Additionally, it was the first time international players were exposed to IAF fighters operating shoulder to

shoulder in their midst. From executing an unplanned engine change on a Jaguar enroute through Canada, in pouring rain and freezing temperatures (this author was also with the technicians, soaked to the skin), to maintaining virtually a 100% serviceability record of the aging Jaguar fleet while at Alaska, displaying exemplary tactical skills and enviable professional and social skills, the pilots and technicians of the IAF earned the respect and appreciation of the other Air Forces participating in Ex – Cope Thunder and the USAF hosts.

But the cherry on the cake was probably the Indo- US Air Force to Air Force exercise called “Cope India” which was conducted in Gwalior later the same year.

Without having to tom-tom

about it, let the reports in the public domain speak for themselves. The exercise made the USAF pause and reflect and realise that having never faced an adversary, albeit in an exercise, not moulded in the American scheme of things, can actually be a setback and possibly intimidating. To repeat an earlier statement, “The Indian Air Force had arrived”.

The Basis of Shift Having been bloodied in the both the World Wars, the pilots of the erstwhile RIAF and the subsequent IAF were keen

to see their Air Force grow. The impact of air power in the world wars was immense with the third dimension creating terror among the ground troops from the fear of vertical envelopment and among citizens, of destruction from the air. It was the game changer in warfare and has never taken a back seat thereafter. Post WW II the jet age was upon the world and IAFs first major Air Force acquisition was the de Havilland Vampire, acquired from the British (who else ?) in 1945. The first transport aircraft to supplement the WW II Dakota was the C-119 Packet.

Successive life cycles of inductions Vampir Packet C-119 Ouragan (Toofani) Mystere IV Gnat 1958–1991 IL-14 AN-12 MiG-21 (all variants) Jaguar AN-32 IL-76 Mirage-2000 MiG-29

1945–1975 1954–1985 1954–1970 1957–1973 1961–1981 1961–1986 1964–2020 (expected) 1978–Till Date 1984–Till Date 1985–Till Date 1985–Till Date 1987–Till Date

The general life cycle information above shows that aircraft generally follow a life cycle of approximately 30 years, around which stage upgrades become necessary to extend the life by about 15-20%.

Thus a prudent planner will ensure that first, he has at least one additional source to do his acquisitions and secondly, his acquisitions are so spaced that the system (IAF) does not feel a resource crunch at any time. Missile systems and radars follow a slightly different cycle because of the dynamics and relative wear and tear compared to airborne platforms. But a life cycle is not the only occasion that one will decide to acquire new

MiG-29 aircraft is performing a low fly-by of the INS Vikramaditya during trials

16

17

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AIRBORNE CAPABILITY

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

IAF: STRATEGIC T RANSFORMATION Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired.

T

SUMIT MUKERJI

KEY POINTS l IAF’s ongoing transformation into afull spectrum force with a strategic er ach is the story of the day. l Some experts claim that swing role/multi role aircrafts can staunch the IAF's dwindling platforms problem. l Though 30% or 50% offset’ ‘ proposal seem small, it now appears a handful for the smaller indigenous capital to absorb it.

he massive IL-76 heavy lift transporter followed by the IL-78 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and a while later six Jaguars of the IAF took off on a mission that would remain etched in the pages of its history, immortalised forever. The “package” had set out to navigate over 10,000 miles, leapfrogging through 9 stopovers to reach Eielson AFB, Alaska in a landmark effort. The Indian Air Force had announced its arrival on the international scene, showcasing its capability, its professionalism and its transformation, from a traditionally tactical Air Force to a strategic force, capable of extending its reach across the seven seas. Additionally, it was the first time international players were exposed to IAF fighters operating shoulder to

shoulder in their midst. From executing an unplanned engine change on a Jaguar enroute through Canada, in pouring rain and freezing temperatures (this author was also with the technicians, soaked to the skin), to maintaining virtually a 100% serviceability record of the aging Jaguar fleet while at Alaska, displaying exemplary tactical skills and enviable professional and social skills, the pilots and technicians of the IAF earned the respect and appreciation of the other Air Forces participating in Ex – Cope Thunder and the USAF hosts.

But the cherry on the cake was probably the Indo- US Air Force to Air Force exercise called “Cope India” which was conducted in Gwalior later the same year.

Without having to tom-tom

about it, let the reports in the public domain speak for themselves. The exercise made the USAF pause and reflect and realise that having never faced an adversary, albeit in an exercise, not moulded in the American scheme of things, can actually be a setback and possibly intimidating. To repeat an earlier statement, “The Indian Air Force had arrived”.

The Basis of Shift Having been bloodied in the both the World Wars, the pilots of the erstwhile RIAF and the subsequent IAF were keen

to see their Air Force grow. The impact of air power in the world wars was immense with the third dimension creating terror among the ground troops from the fear of vertical envelopment and among citizens, of destruction from the air. It was the game changer in warfare and has never taken a back seat thereafter. Post WW II the jet age was upon the world and IAFs first major Air Force acquisition was the de Havilland Vampire, acquired from the British (who else ?) in 1945. The first transport aircraft to supplement the WW II Dakota was the C-119 Packet.

Successive life cycles of inductions Vampir Packet C-119 Ouragan (Toofani) Mystere IV Gnat 1958–1991 IL-14 AN-12 MiG-21 (all variants) Jaguar AN-32 IL-76 Mirage-2000 MiG-29

1945–1975 1954–1985 1954–1970 1957–1973 1961–1981 1961–1986 1964–2020 (expected) 1978–Till Date 1984–Till Date 1985–Till Date 1985–Till Date 1987–Till Date

The general life cycle information above shows that aircraft generally follow a life cycle of approximately 30 years, around which stage upgrades become necessary to extend the life by about 15-20%.

Thus a prudent planner will ensure that first, he has at least one additional source to do his acquisitions and secondly, his acquisitions are so spaced that the system (IAF) does not feel a resource crunch at any time. Missile systems and radars follow a slightly different cycle because of the dynamics and relative wear and tear compared to airborne platforms. But a life cycle is not the only occasion that one will decide to acquire new

MiG-29 aircraft is performing a low fly-by of the INS Vikramaditya during trials

16

17

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Mi-17V-5 weaponised helicopters © IAF

systems. Geopolitics of the region is a factor that may necessitate a change; or a quantum jump in technology which may render existing systems redundant or ineffective. Whatever the reason, because air power is the preferred medium to project power and rapidly respond to contingencies, the Air Force needs to remain contemporary and in a high state of preparedness.

Numbers Game The vast areas of the Indian sub-continent and associated large EEZ are a nightmare to protect. From the world’s highest mountain ranges to scorching deserts, tropical rain forests and thousands of miles of coastline overlooking oceans and seas, defence of such territory offers challenges that no other country in the world faces. Add to this hostile neighbours and a history of aggression by them, national security takes on enormous importance. The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace. In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and / or control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection to VAs and VPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory in a bid to cripple his centres of gravity. The nation is also facing threat to its security from anti-national elements.

While the IAF has not been deeply com-

mitted to countering these elements, it is but a matter of time.

The spectrum is vast and the requirements complex. It is but natural that only adequate numbers of platforms and equipment can perform such an onerous task.

Some pundits may propose that multirole/swing-role aeroplanes can overcome

The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace.

In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection toVAs andVPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory.

18

the shortage of numbers because of their sheer versatility. While this may hold true in countries with small areas, it is virtually impossible for a country like ours. The IAF had projected a case for an inventory of 44 combat squadrons to offset challenges of a two-front confrontation, as a worst case scenario. The government sanction of 39.5 squadrons was primarily due to resource and financial limitations at that time.

Keeping life cycles in mind, Air Force planners would have certainly factored the necessity to sustain force levels to maintain the deterrence value, but the steady decline to 34 squadrons with a possible further drop to almost 30 squadrons by end 2015 is a cause for concern.

At this point it would be appropriate to mention that no country in the world today (including the USA) has the financial strength to replace whole fleets of aeroplanes at will. Every Air Force resorts to mid-life upgrades to stretch the life cycle. The procurement process and the ability of the seller to meet deadlines from an already occupied production line follows an extended time period which has to be factored into the planning. The current profile of the Indian Air Force is that it comprises roughly 15% state-ofthe-art platforms and systems, 35% are in a ‘mature’ state of life and 50% are in a state of obsolescence. Not a very comfortable picture by any yardstick.

Planning Process The 15 year Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) of the three services and the subsequently developed Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) put up to the government by HQ IDS have been oft repeated in various articles discussing modernisation and procurement. However, what is of relevance is the Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap (TPCR), the de-classified version of the LTIPP which offers the industry and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) a look into the direction the respective services are heading. A perspective plan / roadmap is an important document which involves a lot of foresight, deep technical know-how and its futuristic progression / application, sound knowledge of economies of scale and sharp business acumen in the geopolitical backdrop. The 5 year Action Plan (a sub-set of the LTIPP), which coincides with the national 5 year plans and therefore budget

DSI

The Su-30MKI multi-role combat aircraft forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force’s fleet © Indian Air Force

allocations, provides for mid-course corrections and control to stay within budgetary trendlines and finally the Annual Action Plan caters for arisings under contingent situations.

The shopping list in the latest TPCR (2012-2027) is exhaustive but to provide a broad brush picture of the path the IAF has decided to follow, some elements of the TPCR are highlighted below :(a) Advanced Weapon Systems. We are looking at targets across the spectrum, from strategic to tactical to counter-insurgency. Weapons should not only have the desired accuracy and lethality, minimum collateral damage must be associated with such targeting – Precision munitions with jam resistant capabilities. (b) Information Dominance. The capitulating effect brought about by information dominance was aptly demonstrated in the first Gulf War by the US agencies.

Extensive use of ECM and ECCM systems and ability to sift and integrate huge volumes of intelligence from various sources is the order of the day. (c) Sensors. State-of-the-art AESA radars, advanced EO / IR sensors, laser based systems, sensor fusion systems are the progressive technologies in this area.

(d) Data Link/Transfer Systems. Essential to reduce the sensor to shooter cycle. (e) Persistent Target Detection Systems.

In this highly dynamic environment, with advanced technologies for deception and concealment, there is a need to detect a target in all-weather conditions, identify it and execute a high probability of kill from stand-off ranges, with minimal collateral damage. (f) Unmanned Aerial Systems. (g) Simulation Systems.

The elements given above are but a sample of the technologies that need to be procured and absorbed. These are over and above the platforms that are needed to protect the length and breadth of this country.

Transformation The need to overcome the technology gap that was creeping in, with the associated degradation of potential of the IAF’s airborne fleets was identified in the previous LTTP. Understanding the time frames of the acquisition cycle, the IAF had commenced fortifying itself against the slow but sure depletion of its assets. Upgradation cases were taken up and commenced on the Jaguar, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and AN-32

19

fleets. But this was just to cater to the transition period. It was time to transform the transport fleet, the helicopter fleet and augment the fighter fleet with contemporary platforms. While the erstwhile NDA I government had not articulated the “from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca” statement made famous by the subsequent UPA Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, India’s regional aspirations were showing signs of expansion in the wake of economic resurgence. It was but natural that if regional aspirations spanned the Indian Ocean and northwards to the Siberian plains, platforms with strategic capabilities and / or the ability to straddle strategic ranges were the need of the hour.

There are two issues that, to my mind, have come to play a major role in the transformation of the Indian Air Force. Firstly is the deliberate strategic lean to the West for most of the new acquisitions, with the USA, France and Israel as major benefactors.

Secondly, we decided to break the age-old shackles of the “L-1vendor” by introducing the factor of “Life Cycle Costing” providing a window of opportunity to acquire stateof-the-art systems, which though more expensive, offer far better value addition over its technical life cycle. Great emphasis

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DECEMBER 2014

Mi-17V-5 weaponised helicopters © IAF

systems. Geopolitics of the region is a factor that may necessitate a change; or a quantum jump in technology which may render existing systems redundant or ineffective. Whatever the reason, because air power is the preferred medium to project power and rapidly respond to contingencies, the Air Force needs to remain contemporary and in a high state of preparedness.

Numbers Game The vast areas of the Indian sub-continent and associated large EEZ are a nightmare to protect. From the world’s highest mountain ranges to scorching deserts, tropical rain forests and thousands of miles of coastline overlooking oceans and seas, defence of such territory offers challenges that no other country in the world faces. Add to this hostile neighbours and a history of aggression by them, national security takes on enormous importance. The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace. In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and / or control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection to VAs and VPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory in a bid to cripple his centres of gravity. The nation is also facing threat to its security from anti-national elements.

While the IAF has not been deeply com-

mitted to countering these elements, it is but a matter of time.

The spectrum is vast and the requirements complex. It is but natural that only adequate numbers of platforms and equipment can perform such an onerous task.

Some pundits may propose that multirole/swing-role aeroplanes can overcome

The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace.

In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection toVAs andVPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory.

18

the shortage of numbers because of their sheer versatility. While this may hold true in countries with small areas, it is virtually impossible for a country like ours. The IAF had projected a case for an inventory of 44 combat squadrons to offset challenges of a two-front confrontation, as a worst case scenario. The government sanction of 39.5 squadrons was primarily due to resource and financial limitations at that time.

Keeping life cycles in mind, Air Force planners would have certainly factored the necessity to sustain force levels to maintain the deterrence value, but the steady decline to 34 squadrons with a possible further drop to almost 30 squadrons by end 2015 is a cause for concern.

At this point it would be appropriate to mention that no country in the world today (including the USA) has the financial strength to replace whole fleets of aeroplanes at will. Every Air Force resorts to mid-life upgrades to stretch the life cycle. The procurement process and the ability of the seller to meet deadlines from an already occupied production line follows an extended time period which has to be factored into the planning. The current profile of the Indian Air Force is that it comprises roughly 15% state-ofthe-art platforms and systems, 35% are in a ‘mature’ state of life and 50% are in a state of obsolescence. Not a very comfortable picture by any yardstick.

Planning Process The 15 year Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) of the three services and the subsequently developed Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) put up to the government by HQ IDS have been oft repeated in various articles discussing modernisation and procurement. However, what is of relevance is the Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap (TPCR), the de-classified version of the LTIPP which offers the industry and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) a look into the direction the respective services are heading. A perspective plan / roadmap is an important document which involves a lot of foresight, deep technical know-how and its futuristic progression / application, sound knowledge of economies of scale and sharp business acumen in the geopolitical backdrop. The 5 year Action Plan (a sub-set of the LTIPP), which coincides with the national 5 year plans and therefore budget

DSI

The Su-30MKI multi-role combat aircraft forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force’s fleet © Indian Air Force

allocations, provides for mid-course corrections and control to stay within budgetary trendlines and finally the Annual Action Plan caters for arisings under contingent situations.

The shopping list in the latest TPCR (2012-2027) is exhaustive but to provide a broad brush picture of the path the IAF has decided to follow, some elements of the TPCR are highlighted below :(a) Advanced Weapon Systems. We are looking at targets across the spectrum, from strategic to tactical to counter-insurgency. Weapons should not only have the desired accuracy and lethality, minimum collateral damage must be associated with such targeting – Precision munitions with jam resistant capabilities. (b) Information Dominance. The capitulating effect brought about by information dominance was aptly demonstrated in the first Gulf War by the US agencies.

Extensive use of ECM and ECCM systems and ability to sift and integrate huge volumes of intelligence from various sources is the order of the day. (c) Sensors. State-of-the-art AESA radars, advanced EO / IR sensors, laser based systems, sensor fusion systems are the progressive technologies in this area.

(d) Data Link/Transfer Systems. Essential to reduce the sensor to shooter cycle. (e) Persistent Target Detection Systems.

In this highly dynamic environment, with advanced technologies for deception and concealment, there is a need to detect a target in all-weather conditions, identify it and execute a high probability of kill from stand-off ranges, with minimal collateral damage. (f) Unmanned Aerial Systems. (g) Simulation Systems.

The elements given above are but a sample of the technologies that need to be procured and absorbed. These are over and above the platforms that are needed to protect the length and breadth of this country.

Transformation The need to overcome the technology gap that was creeping in, with the associated degradation of potential of the IAF’s airborne fleets was identified in the previous LTTP. Understanding the time frames of the acquisition cycle, the IAF had commenced fortifying itself against the slow but sure depletion of its assets. Upgradation cases were taken up and commenced on the Jaguar, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and AN-32

19

fleets. But this was just to cater to the transition period. It was time to transform the transport fleet, the helicopter fleet and augment the fighter fleet with contemporary platforms. While the erstwhile NDA I government had not articulated the “from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca” statement made famous by the subsequent UPA Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, India’s regional aspirations were showing signs of expansion in the wake of economic resurgence. It was but natural that if regional aspirations spanned the Indian Ocean and northwards to the Siberian plains, platforms with strategic capabilities and / or the ability to straddle strategic ranges were the need of the hour.

There are two issues that, to my mind, have come to play a major role in the transformation of the Indian Air Force. Firstly is the deliberate strategic lean to the West for most of the new acquisitions, with the USA, France and Israel as major benefactors.

Secondly, we decided to break the age-old shackles of the “L-1vendor” by introducing the factor of “Life Cycle Costing” providing a window of opportunity to acquire stateof-the-art systems, which though more expensive, offer far better value addition over its technical life cycle. Great emphasis

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AIRBORNE CAPABILITY

DECEMBER 2014

Transformation in Indigenisation

US Army soldiers exit an Indian Army Aviation Corps HAL Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter during the bilateral exercise ‘Yudh Abyas 09’ ©US Army

has also been paid to systems which have architecture for growth.

The lifting of sanctions against India in 2001opened up military business opportunities with the USA and dislodged, in a manner of speaking, the Russian monkey off our back. Around the same time the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in its present avatar (avatar), found its roots. Caution was the order of the day and thus the American offer of procurement through “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) guaranteed US government backing to ensure a satisfactory acquisition. We grabbed the opportunity and the result was the procurement of C-130J Hercules for Special Operations and the Harpoon anti-ship missiles to equip the maritime Jaguars.

Following close behind were the $ 4.1 Billion deal for ten C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transporters (with likely followon orders) and the $2.1 Billion deal for eight P-8I MR aircraft for the Navy. The Indo-US strategic relationship was firmly on the rails. The CH-47 Chinook winning the contract for the heavy lift helicopters and the AH-64 Apache for the Attack

Helicopter role is indicative of the intense US influence in the IAFs purchases.

Billed as the arms deal of the century, the $10 Billion (now steadily increasing) 126 aircraft MMRCA acquisition saw world-wide interest in the fly-off for the selection. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale were shortlisted and finally, after considering all factors such as unit cost, purchase cost, life cycle costs, (and) offsets as also the transfer of technology offered, India announced that Dassault would be offered the contract for the MMRCA. While presently the process is on hold for bureaucratic reasons, it is hoped that it will be moved on a fast track in the near future.Airbus Industries has secured the contract for the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and the Israelis are hoping to follow up on their domination of the UAV fleet of the Indian armed forces, presently comprising the Searcher and the Heron. There is a huge thrust towards unmanned systems and the IAF is looking to procure Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned systems. A strong pitch has been made to

20

acquire Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) carrying precision weapons which will bolster special operations.

The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience. With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 Billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open. It has been further fortified, in fact, by the Russian offer for joint development and production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which the GoI has endorsed.

The IAF has always suffered from what can be termed as “logistical nightmare” because of the varieties of platforms and systems in the inventory. This is not likely to change when we are sourcing equipment from the USA, Russia, France, Israel, etc. The computer age, thankfully, should offset the burden. So are we on the right path? Do our efforts at transformation follow the direction provided by the LTPP and do we see the IAF of the next decade a formidable, contemporary, strategic force, comparable to the best in the world?

“India is the world’s largest importer of defence equipment”. Sounds like India are the world champions in cricket! But what a shame for a (the)country such as ours. Like our inability to win medals in the Olympics, we display our inability to manufacture defence equipment and our defence industry has no worthwhile credibility. Indigenisation and self-reliance is the core to survivability in a changing geopolitical environment with shifting alliances and partnerships. Why are we in this pitiable state, dependent on other countries and always in fear of someone pulling the plug? It was probably because of our misplaced sense of security that national interests may be compromised which prompted the government to make DRDO and PSUs the sole sources of military business. Bogged down with bureaucratic procedures and delays, the performance of these two organisations is best left to the proof of their output. Not allowing private industry to enter the defence sector has stunted our growth in self-reliance and indigenisation.

The turnaround or the transformation was possibly initiated in the DPP 2006 with the introduction of the “Offset” clause, in the acquisition of major systems. Offsets are de rigueur as a part of acquisitions the world over and India is a late starter. Private industry was given a

window of opportunity to participate and grow, contributing towards India’s selfreliance in defence. The 30% Offset rule seemed a tentative step by the government when compared to international businesses offering 100-110% offsets (in some cases). But as the major deals came into fructification it was realised that the investment required by local industry to

The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience.

With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open.

”

IAF Tejas LCA © HAL

21

DSI

absorb the Offset was so large that they could not afford it (other than the big business houses). While they are working their way around it, there is no doubt that the Offset clause has been the precursor of progress in private industry participation in defence.

The associated Transfer of Technology (TOT) along with the offsets has also been a major boost to motivate the private industry to enter the defence field.

Cutting-edge technology, some of it ‘dualuse’ will be hugely beneficial to the growth of industry in this country. But (for obvious reasons) foreign vendor (vendors’interest in our private industry has been minimal because of the 26% cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) imposed by the DPP. The present government has clearly seen the need for selfreliance and indigenisation in defence as well as the need for active participation by the private industry. As a first step FDI in defence has been elevated to 49%. This has not only infused confidence in foreign vendors and governments but has opened the door for larger investments and leverage for TOT. Increased FDI in defence will increase the number of JVs and therefore offer more job opportunities in contemporary and critical technologies.

Developing self –reliance and transforming the private industry to actively participate for the benefit of the fourth

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DECEMBER 2014

Transformation in Indigenisation

US Army soldiers exit an Indian Army Aviation Corps HAL Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter during the bilateral exercise ‘Yudh Abyas 09’ ©US Army

has also been paid to systems which have architecture for growth.

The lifting of sanctions against India in 2001opened up military business opportunities with the USA and dislodged, in a manner of speaking, the Russian monkey off our back. Around the same time the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in its present avatar (avatar), found its roots. Caution was the order of the day and thus the American offer of procurement through “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) guaranteed US government backing to ensure a satisfactory acquisition. We grabbed the opportunity and the result was the procurement of C-130J Hercules for Special Operations and the Harpoon anti-ship missiles to equip the maritime Jaguars.

Following close behind were the $ 4.1 Billion deal for ten C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transporters (with likely followon orders) and the $2.1 Billion deal for eight P-8I MR aircraft for the Navy. The Indo-US strategic relationship was firmly on the rails. The CH-47 Chinook winning the contract for the heavy lift helicopters and the AH-64 Apache for the Attack

Helicopter role is indicative of the intense US influence in the IAFs purchases.

Billed as the arms deal of the century, the $10 Billion (now steadily increasing) 126 aircraft MMRCA acquisition saw world-wide interest in the fly-off for the selection. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale were shortlisted and finally, after considering all factors such as unit cost, purchase cost, life cycle costs, (and) offsets as also the transfer of technology offered, India announced that Dassault would be offered the contract for the MMRCA. While presently the process is on hold for bureaucratic reasons, it is hoped that it will be moved on a fast track in the near future.Airbus Industries has secured the contract for the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and the Israelis are hoping to follow up on their domination of the UAV fleet of the Indian armed forces, presently comprising the Searcher and the Heron. There is a huge thrust towards unmanned systems and the IAF is looking to procure Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned systems. A strong pitch has been made to

20

acquire Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) carrying precision weapons which will bolster special operations.

The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience. With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 Billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open. It has been further fortified, in fact, by the Russian offer for joint development and production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which the GoI has endorsed.

The IAF has always suffered from what can be termed as “logistical nightmare” because of the varieties of platforms and systems in the inventory. This is not likely to change when we are sourcing equipment from the USA, Russia, France, Israel, etc. The computer age, thankfully, should offset the burden. So are we on the right path? Do our efforts at transformation follow the direction provided by the LTPP and do we see the IAF of the next decade a formidable, contemporary, strategic force, comparable to the best in the world?

“India is the world’s largest importer of defence equipment”. Sounds like India are the world champions in cricket! But what a shame for a (the)country such as ours. Like our inability to win medals in the Olympics, we display our inability to manufacture defence equipment and our defence industry has no worthwhile credibility. Indigenisation and self-reliance is the core to survivability in a changing geopolitical environment with shifting alliances and partnerships. Why are we in this pitiable state, dependent on other countries and always in fear of someone pulling the plug? It was probably because of our misplaced sense of security that national interests may be compromised which prompted the government to make DRDO and PSUs the sole sources of military business. Bogged down with bureaucratic procedures and delays, the performance of these two organisations is best left to the proof of their output. Not allowing private industry to enter the defence sector has stunted our growth in self-reliance and indigenisation.

The turnaround or the transformation was possibly initiated in the DPP 2006 with the introduction of the “Offset” clause, in the acquisition of major systems. Offsets are de rigueur as a part of acquisitions the world over and India is a late starter. Private industry was given a

window of opportunity to participate and grow, contributing towards India’s selfreliance in defence. The 30% Offset rule seemed a tentative step by the government when compared to international businesses offering 100-110% offsets (in some cases). But as the major deals came into fructification it was realised that the investment required by local industry to

The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience.

With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open.

”

IAF Tejas LCA © HAL

21

DSI

absorb the Offset was so large that they could not afford it (other than the big business houses). While they are working their way around it, there is no doubt that the Offset clause has been the precursor of progress in private industry participation in defence.

The associated Transfer of Technology (TOT) along with the offsets has also been a major boost to motivate the private industry to enter the defence field.

Cutting-edge technology, some of it ‘dualuse’ will be hugely beneficial to the growth of industry in this country. But (for obvious reasons) foreign vendor (vendors’interest in our private industry has been minimal because of the 26% cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) imposed by the DPP. The present government has clearly seen the need for selfreliance and indigenisation in defence as well as the need for active participation by the private industry. As a first step FDI in defence has been elevated to 49%. This has not only infused confidence in foreign vendors and governments but has opened the door for larger investments and leverage for TOT. Increased FDI in defence will increase the number of JVs and therefore offer more job opportunities in contemporary and critical technologies.

Developing self –reliance and transforming the private industry to actively participate for the benefit of the fourth

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AIRBORNE CAPABILITY largest defence force in the world will be a long drawn out process. But ‘well begun is half done’ and we will certainly see progress. Private industry needs assurance of continuity in business for it to be able to sustain itself. Red tape and bureaucracy should be minimised and smart business practices and procedures introduced by the MoD (within the bounds of clarity and control).

Interview of H.E. Ambassador of Russian Federation to India Alexander Kadakin: DSI: Russia has become the second largest arms and other military equipment supplier to India, from being the largest.

What does it entail for the country that has been otherwise described by Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi as a special, privileged partner?

Ambassador A.M.Kadakin: India is an attractive and capacious arms market, and the endeavors of many sellers to promote their defence products here are obvious.

India is striving to become a self-sufficient power in high-tech defence production.

Russia, given its huge and vigorous defence industrial complex and vast timetested potential, is capable of assisting India in reaching this goal like no one else.

No other country but Russia is ready to share razor-edge military technologies in such volume and scale.

The uniqueness of our relations persists in its scope and range, be it design and manufacture of the world best BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, or state-of-the-art fifth generation fighter. Let alone the lease of the Russian nuclear submarine inducted into the Indian Navy as INS “Chakra”, strategic handover of INS Vikramaditya or construction of the world safest nuclear power units of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant.

Multifaceted fruitful cooperation with India at the exemplary level of special and privileged strategic partnership goes far beyond the supply of military equipment.

Russia and India share similar approaches to major international issues and are committed to the principles of a multipolar world. We closely cooperate within various multilateral fora. On bilateral track, we enjoy ramified collaboration in the spheres of mutual investments, energy, hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals,

DECEMBER 2014

Conclusion The IAF is in midst of transformation, there is no denying. Legacy systems, having undergone upgrades and at the twilight of their effective lives to be set aside & contemporary equipment acquired. The IAF is doing that & as the erstwhile Chief of Air Staff had commented, “The IAF is moving towards full spectrum capability, a strategic force capable of taking on multiagriculture and processed food products, infrastructure, space, science and technology, information, bio-and nanotechnologies, culture, tourism etc. We are confident in our ability to further expand the scope of our joint endeavors.

DSI: New Delhi has been rather non-committal publicly about the Ukraine issue and its consequent Western economic and trade sanctions. What does this signify for Moscow, the special strategic partner, and the world at large?

Ambassador A.M.Kadakin:We highly appreciate the balanced, mature approach of India to the situation in Ukraine and profound understanding of its true reasons. The roots of the civil war in Eastern Ukraine lie in the harmful policies of the new Kiev leaders, fighting against their own people; not in the alleged Russian aggression that the West is groundlessly striving to impress upon the international community.

This is particularly flagrant considering the fact that violation of international law , Russia is being accused of, has been systematic from the US and its allies the way it happened in formerYugoslavia, Libya and other parts of the world.

Punishing Russia with sanctions for supporting legitimate aspirations of a large segment of the Ukrainian society while endorsing illegal February coup d’état in Kiev is a truly hypocritical and deeply immoral act from those who position themselves as world democracy leaders.

Russia will keep actively promoting political settlement in Ukraine. It must be unambiguously understood that we are doing this for the sake of peace, stability and well-being of the Ukrainian people, not for catering to someone’s ambitions.

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DSI

front, multi-dimensional threats”. The government, keen to enhance business in defence sector is promoting Offsets, TOT & FDI to seduce foreign vendors to invest & share cutting-edge technology. The private sector is bound to see growth & India is stepping into the dawn of self-reliance through indigenisation. Are we going to see a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ in private industry participation?

Besides, western sanctions against Russia, themselves a violation of the international law, are counterproductive and hit back the countries that initiate them. Without Russia resolving many pressing international issues in Afghanistan, Syria, Iranian nuclear program, etc is next to impossible.

DSI: For some time, the Indian armed forces had been complaining about various time and cost overruns on major and strategically important projects. What is the thought that is ruling in Russia on these accounts considering that Russian-Indian ties are time-tested and long-term?

Ambassador A.M.Kadakin: At such a vast scope of military and technical cooperation, unforeseen technical glitches are inevitable. Let us recall the ‘Rafale’ deal or the ‘Scorpene’ programme, fraught with great delays and cost overruns too. Russia is doing its best to avoid problems in implementing mutually beneficial projects contributing to India’s military might and defense capabilities as well as to minimise time and money losses. Being involved in joint development and production of military equipment with India at an unprecedented level brings us in the very epicenter of media attention and we are always open for constructive assessments of our activity.

The Russian Federation supports the “Make in India” policy announced by the new Indian government. We are targeted at the establishment of new joint ventures in public and private sectors in India for promoting jointly produced goods to the international market.Active discussion is on on such remarkable projectsas creation of medium-haul passenger airliners, helicopter manufacturing and space program to name a few. A vast list of agreements is expected to be finalised during the visit of President Putin to India in coming December.

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RPK-8E

ussia’s special exporter Rosoboronexport is a leading player in the naval equipment market in South-East Asia. The largest countries in the region operate Russian ships and submarines. At the same time demand is getting higher for systems and weapons compatible with ships built in countries other than Russia. Particularly it is true for a wide range of underwater weapons, including anti-submarine missiles, rocket-propelled depth charges, torpedoes and sea mines.

The following ship-based underwater weapons possess great export potential: the 533mm DTA-53 twin torpedoes tubes, RPK8 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missile system launching 212mm homing diving shells and MG-94ME hydro-acoustic jamming shells providing protection from torpedoes, RBU-6000 antisubmarine rocket launcher firing RGB-60 anti-submarine missiles or projectiles carrying 90R diving shells. The Purga-11661 system is offered for export to operate ASW weapons.

Those are timetested and wellTE-2 known in the market equipment meeting modern requirements.

Some advanced systems also attract increasing attention in the region. Among them is the 91RTE ASW missile fired by the ClubN system and Paket-E/NK small ASW torpedo launcher.

The 91RTE missile will kill all types of submarines at any depth they can go (up to 800m) and range of 5km to 40km. It flies

R

with a ballistic trajectory to the estimated area of operation of the target and parachutes to the water. As soon as the homing system is trigged it will not take the missile long to destroy the target. The 91RTE missile is also compatible with the submarinebased Club-S. The fact that Russian submarines including the Project 636 and Amur-1650 carry it is a key to their superiority over foreign counterparts.

Another advanced system – the PaketE/NK – provides effective anti-submarine defense at a range of up to 10km and torpedo protection at 100m to 800m. It features a control system, launchers, special sonar, and armaments fitted with 324mm small thermal torpedoes or countermeasure anti-torpedoes. Being one of the cutting-edge systems in the international market, the Paket-E/NK alone can make torpedo protection of the carrier ship 3-3.5 times stronger.

Speaking of submarineborne underwater weapons, apart from the Club-S that Rosoboronexport offers, there are also 533mm TE-2 all-purpose electric, remotely controlled torpedoes and UGST deep-water homing torpedoes.

The TE-2 can destroy submarines at a range of up to 25km and depth of 450m. Its ability to operate in heavy ECCM environment, powerful propulsion unit, built-in test system, long service life, and cheap operation are distinctive characteristics of the weapon.

The UGST can also hit ships and stationary targets, as well as submarines at a range of up to 50km and depth up to 500m. Once

DSI Marketing Promotion

launched it either can home on the target or be guided to it through its remotely controlled system. Its modular design makes easier a task to reconfigure the missile according to the requirements of the Customer. It is applicable to the whole range of operations form reprogramming baseline equipment to replacing engine and storage tanks. There are several warheads for the weapon varying in composition and quantity of explosive.

Another area where Russia also dominates is the mine market. Here Rosoboronexport offers the MDM-1 (packed with 1,100kg of explosive) and MDM-2 (1,030kg) bottom mines to create a mine threat and destroy surface ships and submarines. There is also the MDM-3 (200kg) mine that is destructive to ships with a small displacement and landing craft. All mines are

Clubs

Paket-E.NK

protected from attempts to retrieve them, even using non-contact assets, and detect by sonars and underwater mine hunters.

Extremely effective is also the MShM (packed with up to 380kg of explosive) rocket propelled, moored rising shelf mine designed to destroy surface ships and submarines at a depth of 60m to 600m. As soon as the mine picks noise generated by a target it will launch a rocket. Its high speed and little time required to fire it – up to 25sec – make any evasive maneuver futile.

Rosoboronexport offers underwater weapons that are deployed in Russia’s Navy and navies of many other countries, including states in South-East Asia.

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND MARITIME STRATEGY Significant steps has been taken to improve maritime domain awareness and secure India’s maritime borders after the “26/11” Mumbai terrorist attacks conducted by Pakistani infiltrators who easily reached Indian soil, using a hijacked fishing vessel to launch the mayhem.

PVS SATISH

coastal and maritime security. Numerous schemes were launched to increase physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and create communication and networking infrastructure to enable efficient collaboration and seamless exchange of information between the multiple agencies involved.

To assess the status of coastal surveillance and maritime security I intend to evaluate the status of the four pillars key to ensuring security viz. (a) Creating MDA (b) Creating a network for real time Information exchange (c) Strengthening prosecuting agents (d) Administrative Architecture.

coastline, 46 Remote Radar sites (36 in mainland, 06 in Lakshadweep & Minicoy Islands and 04 in Andaman & Nicobar Islands) were established at various lighthouses located along the coast line with specific emphasis on areas of high sensitivity and traffic density. The project is being steered by Coast Guard in collaboration with Director General of Lighthouses and Lightships (DGLL) and is being technologically implemented by BEL at a cost of about Rs 602 crores. The sensor suite

08 Mobile Surveillance Systems. Phase I was completed in early 2014 and Phase II has already begun. The picture from these radars is already networked with concerned Operational Centres and thereon with the Headquarters. On completion of Phase II, a virtually gapless radar cover will be available for the entire coastline of the country with the additional capability of EO sensors for identification of contacts. This is a significant step towards enabling constant surveillance.

India is planning to buy ShinMaywa amphibious aircraft ‘US-2’ from Japan to strengthen its coastal security

KEY POINTS l Coastal surveillance becomes imperative given the recent incident of attempted hijacking of PNS Zulfiqar. l VTMS enhances the coastal security architecture by providing comprehensive pictures around port. l Lack of coordination in the key operational agencies involved are the major shortcomings in maritime security .

O

n 26 November 2008, Mumbai was rattled by Ajmal Kasab and company (add K&Co). K&Co had travelled over 500 nm (approx. 1000 kms) by sea in a hijacked Indian fishing vessel

and landed at a fishing hamlet in densely populated South Bombay. Soon after, they launched the mayhem. Our coastal and maritime security failed miserably despite implementation of a Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) in 2005, based on recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee.

India needs security across a coastline of 7516.6 kms and EEZ of over 2.52 million sq kms. Add security of over 200 ports - 12 major and 187 minor/other; a fishing fleet of over a two lakh boats and innumerable dhows and the task is Herculean. The need for attention becomes imperative given the condition of Pakistan, (to wit, the recent incident of attempted hijacking of PNS Zulfiqar and recent threats from al Qaeda.

24

Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa alone have 2000km long coastline.

Jolted awake by the 26/11 attack, the Coastal Security Scheme (of 2005) was reviewed to assess vulnerabilities and gaps, converted to CSS Phase I and CSS Phase II. It was implemented to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and improve co-ordination between the 20-odd associated agencies.

The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) with the Cabinet Secretary as the head was created to ensure synergistic centre-state action and deliver

Domain Awareness: The vastness of our maritime domain dictates maximising use of electronic surveillance, hence a multi-layered arrangement comprising a chain of Coastal Radars, National network of Automatic Identification System (NAIS), Vessel and Traffic Monitoring Systems (VTMS) in ports, Fishing Vessel Monitoring Systems and Long range Identification and Tracking Systems (LRIT).

Coastal Security Network (CSN) – In order to provide real time surveillance cover up to 25 nautical miles (nm) from our

at each remote site comprises a 25 nm range Terma Scanter 2100 Frequency Diversity radar with a dual antenna for better performance in monsoon weather, and an Obzerv Technologies active-range gated electro-optic (EO) sensor with a range of up to 10 nautical miles in ‘fair weather’ along with night vision surveillance, VHF communication sets and meteorological equipment. It is capable of positive identification of vessels carrying class ‘A’ and ‘B’ Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders. Phase-II includes 38 additional Remote Static Radar sites and

25

Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS) - Like ATC systems in airfields, VTMS is an integrated system for safety of ships navigating in and around ports.

(Consisting of integral). It consists of radars, CCTV surveillance camera, display systems and software, communications, meteorological inputs and AIS receivers.

The VTMS provides a comprehensive picture around the port and anchorage area and when networked with the coastal surveillance network significantly enhances the coastal security architecture. The VTMS are fitted in all 12 major ports and are to be fitted in all of the 56 minor ports. Elcome Integrated Systems Ltd is one of the leaders in setting up VTMS in India with projects having been completed in the Gulf of Kutch, Murmagao, Kochi and Karwar (Naval base). The Mumbai VTMS was undertaken by ATLAS Elektronic an international leader in VTMS systems.

National Automatic Identification System (NAIS) – IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requires Automatic Identification

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MARITIME SECURITY

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND MARITIME STRATEGY Significant steps has been taken to improve maritime domain awareness and secure India’s maritime borders after the “26/11” Mumbai terrorist attacks conducted by Pakistani infiltrators who easily reached Indian soil, using a hijacked fishing vessel to launch the mayhem.

PVS SATISH

coastal and maritime security. Numerous schemes were launched to increase physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and create communication and networking infrastructure to enable efficient collaboration and seamless exchange of information between the multiple agencies involved.

To assess the status of coastal surveillance and maritime security I intend to evaluate the status of the four pillars key to ensuring security viz. (a) Creating MDA (b) Creating a network for real time Information exchange (c) Strengthening prosecuting agents (d) Administrative Architecture.

coastline, 46 Remote Radar sites (36 in mainland, 06 in Lakshadweep & Minicoy Islands and 04 in Andaman & Nicobar Islands) were established at various lighthouses located along the coast line with specific emphasis on areas of high sensitivity and traffic density. The project is being steered by Coast Guard in collaboration with Director General of Lighthouses and Lightships (DGLL) and is being technologically implemented by BEL at a cost of about Rs 602 crores. The sensor suite

08 Mobile Surveillance Systems. Phase I was completed in early 2014 and Phase II has already begun. The picture from these radars is already networked with concerned Operational Centres and thereon with the Headquarters. On completion of Phase II, a virtually gapless radar cover will be available for the entire coastline of the country with the additional capability of EO sensors for identification of contacts. This is a significant step towards enabling constant surveillance.

India is planning to buy ShinMaywa amphibious aircraft ‘US-2’ from Japan to strengthen its coastal security

KEY POINTS l Coastal surveillance becomes imperative given the recent incident of attempted hijacking of PNS Zulfiqar. l VTMS enhances the coastal security architecture by providing comprehensive pictures around port. l Lack of coordination in the key operational agencies involved are the major shortcomings in maritime security .

O

n 26 November 2008, Mumbai was rattled by Ajmal Kasab and company (add K&Co). K&Co had travelled over 500 nm (approx. 1000 kms) by sea in a hijacked Indian fishing vessel

and landed at a fishing hamlet in densely populated South Bombay. Soon after, they launched the mayhem. Our coastal and maritime security failed miserably despite implementation of a Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) in 2005, based on recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee.

India needs security across a coastline of 7516.6 kms and EEZ of over 2.52 million sq kms. Add security of over 200 ports - 12 major and 187 minor/other; a fishing fleet of over a two lakh boats and innumerable dhows and the task is Herculean. The need for attention becomes imperative given the condition of Pakistan, (to wit, the recent incident of attempted hijacking of PNS Zulfiqar and recent threats from al Qaeda.

24

Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa alone have 2000km long coastline.

Jolted awake by the 26/11 attack, the Coastal Security Scheme (of 2005) was reviewed to assess vulnerabilities and gaps, converted to CSS Phase I and CSS Phase II. It was implemented to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and improve co-ordination between the 20-odd associated agencies.

The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) with the Cabinet Secretary as the head was created to ensure synergistic centre-state action and deliver

Domain Awareness: The vastness of our maritime domain dictates maximising use of electronic surveillance, hence a multi-layered arrangement comprising a chain of Coastal Radars, National network of Automatic Identification System (NAIS), Vessel and Traffic Monitoring Systems (VTMS) in ports, Fishing Vessel Monitoring Systems and Long range Identification and Tracking Systems (LRIT).

Coastal Security Network (CSN) – In order to provide real time surveillance cover up to 25 nautical miles (nm) from our

at each remote site comprises a 25 nm range Terma Scanter 2100 Frequency Diversity radar with a dual antenna for better performance in monsoon weather, and an Obzerv Technologies active-range gated electro-optic (EO) sensor with a range of up to 10 nautical miles in ‘fair weather’ along with night vision surveillance, VHF communication sets and meteorological equipment. It is capable of positive identification of vessels carrying class ‘A’ and ‘B’ Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders. Phase-II includes 38 additional Remote Static Radar sites and

25

Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS) - Like ATC systems in airfields, VTMS is an integrated system for safety of ships navigating in and around ports.

(Consisting of integral). It consists of radars, CCTV surveillance camera, display systems and software, communications, meteorological inputs and AIS receivers.

The VTMS provides a comprehensive picture around the port and anchorage area and when networked with the coastal surveillance network significantly enhances the coastal security architecture. The VTMS are fitted in all 12 major ports and are to be fitted in all of the 56 minor ports. Elcome Integrated Systems Ltd is one of the leaders in setting up VTMS in India with projects having been completed in the Gulf of Kutch, Murmagao, Kochi and Karwar (Naval base). The Mumbai VTMS was undertaken by ATLAS Elektronic an international leader in VTMS systems.

National Automatic Identification System (NAIS) – IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requires Automatic Identification

Coastal Surveillance.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:16 pm Page 3

MARITIME SECURITY

DECEMBER 2014

To build comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness images of the CSN, AIS data from the NAIS, data fromVTMS at the major ports, data on FishingVessel traffic, LRIT information are all brought together on one ‘robust hierarchical network’.

Clusters of networked remote static sensors sites are connected to a ROS located at each CGHQ.

”

Systems (AIS) to be fitted aboard ships of 300 GRT or more, and all passenger ships regardless of size. A ‘Class A’ AIS transceiver regularly sends comprehensive data including the vessel’s identification, navigation status, radio call sign and name, cargo, destination and ETA. Co-relation of AIS data with primary radar picture exponentially increases the efficiency of maritime traffic managers and reduces the work load on maritime security agencies as the key problem of identification is resolved.

The NAIS, comprising 74 VHF Transponders for the mainland was implemented by SAAB with Indian partner, Elcome Marine . Inaugurated on 4 August, 2012 and running on SAAB’s trademark ‘Coast Watch’ traffic management system it facilitates real time decision making. DGLL being the lead agency NAIS is networked to DGLL Control Centre in the East at Vishakhapatnam and the Control Centre in the West at Mumbai.

Both these Control Centres are linked to a National Data Centre, Mumbai,from where data is disseminated to various users. In Phase II, 10 sensors will be installed in the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands. Typically vessels above 20 meters length can even be

DSI

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar inaugurates National Command Control Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) Network Operations Centre on 23 November 2014

tracked at distances of up to 1,500 nm – using the satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System developed by ISRO. With CSN, VTMS and NAIS integrated the benefits of common operating picture (COP) using correlated radar and AIS target data are already being realised. AIS has limitations - it is optional for smaller vessels i.e. less than 300 T (GRT), it is subject to cooperation of the ship since the ship borne equipment needs to be switched ‘ON’.

Fishing Vessel Surveillance and Traffic Management: With a fleet of over two lakh fishing vessels and trawlers, it is imperative that steps be taken to enable constant monitoring of the movements of the fishing boats/trawlers.

This is only possible with electronic means.

Yet, any mandated additional equipment for small boats will need to be very economical or subsidised by the state. Some steps taken to ensure the safety of fishermen and to prevent the undetected entry of any fishing trawler in coastal waters are:-

26

l All fishing vessels more than 20 metres in

length to be installed with AIS type B transponders, subsidised by the states. l For fishing vessels below 20 metres in length, two pilot projects are being conducted by the ICG. One is based on Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID), another based on a MSS receiver. The technology/product chosen will be implemented by the states for vessels below 20 m length. l Simultaneously, a mammoth effort to register all fishing vessels has been on. With powers delegated to state authorities w.e.f August 2014, all fishing boats, irrespective of their size or length, can be registered with the respective states/union territories. This data is also being updated online. l The Registrar General of India (RGI) has captured biometric details of 67, 50,719 persons of 18 years of age and above, and distributed 65, 72,523 NPR ID cards as on 31 March, 2014. The Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries has produced and delivered 11, 25,273

fishermen ID cards up to the same date. The RGI Cards are for the entire coastal population whereas the cards issued by the Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries are for the fishermen only. l Pending the fruition of electronic surveillance cover to fishing vessels are still being worked out, a few administrative steps have been attempted to overcome the identification problem at sea. State-wise colour codes have been assigned to fishermen for easy identification of a boat, e.g., for Gujarat, the hull of the fishing boat/trawler is painted black and the cabin is painted orange; and for Andhra Pradesh, it is blue and yellow. The implementation of colour coding of boats is very slow as it involves additional costs for fishermen.

For the moment, this is the weakest link in the coastal surveillance mechanisms, but it remains work in progress and an area of grave concern. Sadly, IFF (Identification of Fisherman or Fidayeen) is still a challenge.

Facilitating the exchange of all data between concerned agencies is the NC 3I system i.e.the National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network.

It is the amalgam of all these together that makes for National Maritime Domain Awareness.

Networking: To build comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness images of the CSN, AIS data from the NAIS, data from VTMS at the major ports, data on Fishing Vessel traffic, LRIT information are all brought together on one ‘robust hierarchical network’.

Clusters of networked remote static sensors sites are connected to a Remote Operating Station (ROS) located at each CGHQ. These ROS are connected to a Remote Operating Centre (ROC) located at Coast Guard RHQs, which, in turn are connected to a central control centre at CGHQ. The sensor data generated from this network is fused with data from the other sources and correlated to create a common operating

27

picture (COP) which is exchanged on the National Command Communication Control and Intelligence Network (NC3I) of the Indian Navy. The NC3I network marries inputs from the multiple agencies responsible for coastal security with data from the four Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Port Blair, and Kochi, as well as naval and CGHQ and provides it back to all the concerned agencies. After extensive work coordinating with multiple agencies the NC3I network is now ready and is likely to be inaugurated shortly with its hub in NCR. The four Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) at Mumbai, Kochi, Vizag and Port Blair and the Maritime Operations Centres (MOCs) of the IN and the Regional Operations Centres (ROCs) of the ICG all form nodes of this vital nervous system of the MDA architecture. Provisions are also there to exchange data/communicate with other organisations involved in the maritime security grid.

Coastal Surveillance.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:16 pm Page 3

MARITIME SECURITY

DECEMBER 2014

To build comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness images of the CSN, AIS data from the NAIS, data fromVTMS at the major ports, data on FishingVessel traffic, LRIT information are all brought together on one ‘robust hierarchical network’.

Clusters of networked remote static sensors sites are connected to a ROS located at each CGHQ.

”

Systems (AIS) to be fitted aboard ships of 300 GRT or more, and all passenger ships regardless of size. A ‘Class A’ AIS transceiver regularly sends comprehensive data including the vessel’s identification, navigation status, radio call sign and name, cargo, destination and ETA. Co-relation of AIS data with primary radar picture exponentially increases the efficiency of maritime traffic managers and reduces the work load on maritime security agencies as the key problem of identification is resolved.

The NAIS, comprising 74 VHF Transponders for the mainland was implemented by SAAB with Indian partner, Elcome Marine . Inaugurated on 4 August, 2012 and running on SAAB’s trademark ‘Coast Watch’ traffic management system it facilitates real time decision making. DGLL being the lead agency NAIS is networked to DGLL Control Centre in the East at Vishakhapatnam and the Control Centre in the West at Mumbai.

Both these Control Centres are linked to a National Data Centre, Mumbai,from where data is disseminated to various users. In Phase II, 10 sensors will be installed in the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands. Typically vessels above 20 meters length can even be

DSI

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar inaugurates National Command Control Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) Network Operations Centre on 23 November 2014

tracked at distances of up to 1,500 nm – using the satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System developed by ISRO. With CSN, VTMS and NAIS integrated the benefits of common operating picture (COP) using correlated radar and AIS target data are already being realised. AIS has limitations - it is optional for smaller vessels i.e. less than 300 T (GRT), it is subject to cooperation of the ship since the ship borne equipment needs to be switched ‘ON’.

Fishing Vessel Surveillance and Traffic Management: With a fleet of over two lakh fishing vessels and trawlers, it is imperative that steps be taken to enable constant monitoring of the movements of the fishing boats/trawlers.

This is only possible with electronic means.

Yet, any mandated additional equipment for small boats will need to be very economical or subsidised by the state. Some steps taken to ensure the safety of fishermen and to prevent the undetected entry of any fishing trawler in coastal waters are:-

26

l All fishing vessels more than 20 metres in

length to be installed with AIS type B transponders, subsidised by the states. l For fishing vessels below 20 metres in length, two pilot projects are being conducted by the ICG. One is based on Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID), another based on a MSS receiver. The technology/product chosen will be implemented by the states for vessels below 20 m length. l Simultaneously, a mammoth effort to register all fishing vessels has been on. With powers delegated to state authorities w.e.f August 2014, all fishing boats, irrespective of their size or length, can be registered with the respective states/union territories. This data is also being updated online. l The Registrar General of India (RGI) has captured biometric details of 67, 50,719 persons of 18 years of age and above, and distributed 65, 72,523 NPR ID cards as on 31 March, 2014. The Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries has produced and delivered 11, 25,273

fishermen ID cards up to the same date. The RGI Cards are for the entire coastal population whereas the cards issued by the Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries are for the fishermen only. l Pending the fruition of electronic surveillance cover to fishing vessels are still being worked out, a few administrative steps have been attempted to overcome the identification problem at sea. State-wise colour codes have been assigned to fishermen for easy identification of a boat, e.g., for Gujarat, the hull of the fishing boat/trawler is painted black and the cabin is painted orange; and for Andhra Pradesh, it is blue and yellow. The implementation of colour coding of boats is very slow as it involves additional costs for fishermen.

For the moment, this is the weakest link in the coastal surveillance mechanisms, but it remains work in progress and an area of grave concern. Sadly, IFF (Identification of Fisherman or Fidayeen) is still a challenge.

Facilitating the exchange of all data between concerned agencies is the NC 3I system i.e.the National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network.

It is the amalgam of all these together that makes for National Maritime Domain Awareness.

Networking: To build comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness images of the CSN, AIS data from the NAIS, data from VTMS at the major ports, data on Fishing Vessel traffic, LRIT information are all brought together on one ‘robust hierarchical network’.

Clusters of networked remote static sensors sites are connected to a Remote Operating Station (ROS) located at each CGHQ. These ROS are connected to a Remote Operating Centre (ROC) located at Coast Guard RHQs, which, in turn are connected to a central control centre at CGHQ. The sensor data generated from this network is fused with data from the other sources and correlated to create a common operating

27

picture (COP) which is exchanged on the National Command Communication Control and Intelligence Network (NC3I) of the Indian Navy. The NC3I network marries inputs from the multiple agencies responsible for coastal security with data from the four Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Port Blair, and Kochi, as well as naval and CGHQ and provides it back to all the concerned agencies. After extensive work coordinating with multiple agencies the NC3I network is now ready and is likely to be inaugurated shortly with its hub in NCR. The four Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) at Mumbai, Kochi, Vizag and Port Blair and the Maritime Operations Centres (MOCs) of the IN and the Regional Operations Centres (ROCs) of the ICG all form nodes of this vital nervous system of the MDA architecture. Provisions are also there to exchange data/communicate with other organisations involved in the maritime security grid.

Coastal Surveillance.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:16 pm Page 5

MARITIME SECURITY

DECEMBER 2014

Scanter-5000 family used widely for coastal surveillance © Terma

L&T Shipyard and many smaller patrol boats, workboats and interceptor craft. The pace of orders is only likely to increase and presents an attractive opportunity for Indian DPSU/private shipyards.

The fleet of helicopters and aircraft is also being expanded. Plans are afoot for expansion of the Dornier 228 fleet, additional MRMR aircraft, 5-tonne class twin engine helicopters and UAVs. The strength of aircraft fleet is likely to go up to 100 in the near term and eventually to about 150.

In the last three years, the ICG has also commissioned one new Regional HQ – RHQ (NW) at Gandhinagar, 02 new District HQs and 12 new CG Stations across the subcontinent and the island territories.

These CG stations will serve as hubs for the hub and spoke concept of operations in conjunction with the marine police stations.

Marine Police

Bolstering the Indian Coast Guard: In April, 2014 the ICG had a force level of 46 ships, 45 boats/hovercrafts, 28 noncommissioned craft and 64 aircrafts. In the last three years the ICG has added 18 Patrol Vessels - 105 m and 95 m OPVs, 50 m Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs) and 35 m IPVs. In addition, the ICG has added 10 ACVs, 33 interceptor boats/crafts and 16 Dornier aircraft.

The ICG is estimated to reach strength of about 200 surface vessels and 100 aircraft by 2018. The Coast Guard Perspective Plan

2007-22 with an outlay of Rs 49,377.33 crores, is under review for enhancement and promulgation as “Coast Guard Perspective Plan 2012-2027” with a projected requirement of about 280 platforms - 154 ships and 126 boats.

The estimated value of ships currently on order from various state-owned as well as private shipyards in India is over Rs 7000 Cr. These include six 105-meter OPVs from Goa Shipyard Ltd,twenty 50-metre FPVs from Cochin Shipyard Ltd , forty 30meter class Fast Interceptor Boats from

28

Under CSS Phase-I, the Marine Police Force of the coastal States/UTs were provided with 73 coastal police stations, 97 check posts, 58 outposts, 30 barracks, 204 interceptor boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motor cycles. The Scheme was implemented from 2005-06 with a final outlay of Rs 646 crores upto March, 2011. The coastal police stations function as spokes while the Coast Guard stations function as hubs. The Scheme has been completed.

After 26/11 CSS Phase-II is being implemented over a period of 5 years from April 2011 with a total financial outlay of Rs 1579.91 crore through 9 coastal States and 4 UTs. The scheme involves construction of 131 Police Stations, procuring 10 large vessels (for A&N), 150 12-tonne interceptor boats and 65 smaller boats, building 60 jetties, procuring 131 four wheelers and 242 motor cycles and constructing 10 Marine Police Operational Centres (in A&N). As of April 2014, three years after CSS Phase II was implemented, 82 of the 131 police stations (62%) have been operational, construction has begun on only one of the sanctioned 60 jetties, only 64 four-wheelers and 74 motorcycles have been procured.

Ab-initio training of marine police personnel by the Coast Guard was started in July, 2006. 3,385 police personnel have been trained by the Indian Coast Guard as on 31.03.2014. It is proposed to establish two Marine Police Training Institutes (MPTIs), one each on the East Coast and the West Coast.

DSI

Saab’s Vessel Management solutions for a safe, efficient and secure flow of traffic in ports, waterways and coastal regions

Indian Navys The IN managed not to get myopic and go into an overdrive of acquiring assets for coastal security per se. However,a 1000 strong Sagar Prahari Bal was formed and a flotilla of Fast Interceptor Craft were ordered to provide Force Protection to the IN’s valuable ships and littoral assets. Apart from these IN ships, aircraft and personnel are regularly and actively employed to support coastal security missions wherever required to overcome the resource constraints of the Coast Guard.

So we have eyes and ears all along the coast and a nervous system to connect all these centres but do we have a suitablycoordinated brain?

Organisational Architecture: Blame for 26/11 notwithstanding it was clear that there was an appalling lack of coordination and collaboration in intelligence/information exchange, operational procedures and understanding of organisational jurisdiction.

The shortcomings lay in two areas, first – lack of coordination in the key operational agencies involved viz IN, ICG, Marine Police, Customs and Port authorities, DG Shipping, intelligence agencies and fisheries department and the HUMINT they can collect from coastal fishermen habitats; and second - lack of clear accountability at the apex level (Should it be MoD or MHA or some other ministry?).

With classic bureaucratic alacrity the government l Designated the Indian Navy as the authority responsible for overall maritime security which includes coastal security and offshore security. The Indian Coast

Guard was additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police. l The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security against Threats from the Sea (NCSMCS) was constituted in August 2009 under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary as stated above.

After a few hiccups in the form of MV Wisdom and MV Pavit in 2011, the operational agencies have settled to a working mechanism through:-

Indian Navy is responsible for overall maritime security which includes coastal security and offshore security. The Indian Coast Guard was additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police.

29

l Formulation of Standard Operating Procedures. Promulgated in 2010. l Conduct of Joint Coastal Security Exercises. Almost a 100 joint exercises with the fishing community included have been conducted since 2009. These exercises also help to revise and validate the SOPs. l The Setting up of Coordination Committees. Regular meetings at national, state and district levels are conducted to review all matters concerning coastal security. l Operationalising Joint Operation Centres (JOCs). The four JOCs in Mumbai, Kochi, Vishakhapatnam and Port Blair JOCs have become the hub of all activities related to Coastal Security and are manned and operated by the IN and the ICG. Coastal security operation centres have also been created at the regional and state levels.

At the apex level, the NCSMCS is still the only nodal body appointed to co-ordinate matters related to maritime and coastal security. This body, set-up to monitor progress of schemes under CSS II and ensure expeditious strengthening of maritime and coastal security, cannot have a permanent mandate. The recent announcement by the government to set up a national maritime authority (NMA) is an overdue measure.

So far it appears that 26/11 has given the impetus to propel the ‘Elephant’ to become aware of its vast maritime domain and set up suitable defences to protect itself. Significant forward movement has been made towards ensuring our maritime security.

The potential spoilers are:l Failure to expeditiously overcome the weakest link viz. Fishing Vessel Traffic Monitoring System. l Inadequate attention to setting up a professional Marine Police force which is a key component of the architecture. l The growth and maturing of organisations and the operational architecture falling prey to dissonant and myopic forces within various agencies.

(E.g. The ICG should be designated as the single authority responsible for coastal security, amending the charter of the ICG accordingly and easing the Indian Navy out from coastal security responsibilities so as to concentrate on its blue water and warfighting roles).

Coastal Surveillance.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:16 pm Page 5

MARITIME SECURITY

DECEMBER 2014

Scanter-5000 family used widely for coastal surveillance © Terma

L&T Shipyard and many smaller patrol boats, workboats and interceptor craft. The pace of orders is only likely to increase and presents an attractive opportunity for Indian DPSU/private shipyards.

The fleet of helicopters and aircraft is also being expanded. Plans are afoot for expansion of the Dornier 228 fleet, additional MRMR aircraft, 5-tonne class twin engine helicopters and UAVs. The strength of aircraft fleet is likely to go up to 100 in the near term and eventually to about 150.

In the last three years, the ICG has also commissioned one new Regional HQ – RHQ (NW) at Gandhinagar, 02 new District HQs and 12 new CG Stations across the subcontinent and the island territories.

These CG stations will serve as hubs for the hub and spoke concept of operations in conjunction with the marine police stations.

Marine Police

Bolstering the Indian Coast Guard: In April, 2014 the ICG had a force level of 46 ships, 45 boats/hovercrafts, 28 noncommissioned craft and 64 aircrafts. In the last three years the ICG has added 18 Patrol Vessels - 105 m and 95 m OPVs, 50 m Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs) and 35 m IPVs. In addition, the ICG has added 10 ACVs, 33 interceptor boats/crafts and 16 Dornier aircraft.

The ICG is estimated to reach strength of about 200 surface vessels and 100 aircraft by 2018. The Coast Guard Perspective Plan

2007-22 with an outlay of Rs 49,377.33 crores, is under review for enhancement and promulgation as “Coast Guard Perspective Plan 2012-2027” with a projected requirement of about 280 platforms - 154 ships and 126 boats.

The estimated value of ships currently on order from various state-owned as well as private shipyards in India is over Rs 7000 Cr. These include six 105-meter OPVs from Goa Shipyard Ltd,twenty 50-metre FPVs from Cochin Shipyard Ltd , forty 30meter class Fast Interceptor Boats from

28

Under CSS Phase-I, the Marine Police Force of the coastal States/UTs were provided with 73 coastal police stations, 97 check posts, 58 outposts, 30 barracks, 204 interceptor boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motor cycles. The Scheme was implemented from 2005-06 with a final outlay of Rs 646 crores upto March, 2011. The coastal police stations function as spokes while the Coast Guard stations function as hubs. The Scheme has been completed.

After 26/11 CSS Phase-II is being implemented over a period of 5 years from April 2011 with a total financial outlay of Rs 1579.91 crore through 9 coastal States and 4 UTs. The scheme involves construction of 131 Police Stations, procuring 10 large vessels (for A&N), 150 12-tonne interceptor boats and 65 smaller boats, building 60 jetties, procuring 131 four wheelers and 242 motor cycles and constructing 10 Marine Police Operational Centres (in A&N). As of April 2014, three years after CSS Phase II was implemented, 82 of the 131 police stations (62%) have been operational, construction has begun on only one of the sanctioned 60 jetties, only 64 four-wheelers and 74 motorcycles have been procured.

Ab-initio training of marine police personnel by the Coast Guard was started in July, 2006. 3,385 police personnel have been trained by the Indian Coast Guard as on 31.03.2014. It is proposed to establish two Marine Police Training Institutes (MPTIs), one each on the East Coast and the West Coast.

DSI

Saab’s Vessel Management solutions for a safe, efficient and secure flow of traffic in ports, waterways and coastal regions

Indian Navys The IN managed not to get myopic and go into an overdrive of acquiring assets for coastal security per se. However,a 1000 strong Sagar Prahari Bal was formed and a flotilla of Fast Interceptor Craft were ordered to provide Force Protection to the IN’s valuable ships and littoral assets. Apart from these IN ships, aircraft and personnel are regularly and actively employed to support coastal security missions wherever required to overcome the resource constraints of the Coast Guard.

So we have eyes and ears all along the coast and a nervous system to connect all these centres but do we have a suitablycoordinated brain?

Organisational Architecture: Blame for 26/11 notwithstanding it was clear that there was an appalling lack of coordination and collaboration in intelligence/information exchange, operational procedures and understanding of organisational jurisdiction.

The shortcomings lay in two areas, first – lack of coordination in the key operational agencies involved viz IN, ICG, Marine Police, Customs and Port authorities, DG Shipping, intelligence agencies and fisheries department and the HUMINT they can collect from coastal fishermen habitats; and second - lack of clear accountability at the apex level (Should it be MoD or MHA or some other ministry?).

With classic bureaucratic alacrity the government l Designated the Indian Navy as the authority responsible for overall maritime security which includes coastal security and offshore security. The Indian Coast

Guard was additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police. l The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security against Threats from the Sea (NCSMCS) was constituted in August 2009 under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary as stated above.

After a few hiccups in the form of MV Wisdom and MV Pavit in 2011, the operational agencies have settled to a working mechanism through:-

Indian Navy is responsible for overall maritime security which includes coastal security and offshore security. The Indian Coast Guard was additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police.

29

l Formulation of Standard Operating Procedures. Promulgated in 2010. l Conduct of Joint Coastal Security Exercises. Almost a 100 joint exercises with the fishing community included have been conducted since 2009. These exercises also help to revise and validate the SOPs. l The Setting up of Coordination Committees. Regular meetings at national, state and district levels are conducted to review all matters concerning coastal security. l Operationalising Joint Operation Centres (JOCs). The four JOCs in Mumbai, Kochi, Vishakhapatnam and Port Blair JOCs have become the hub of all activities related to Coastal Security and are manned and operated by the IN and the ICG. Coastal security operation centres have also been created at the regional and state levels.

At the apex level, the NCSMCS is still the only nodal body appointed to co-ordinate matters related to maritime and coastal security. This body, set-up to monitor progress of schemes under CSS II and ensure expeditious strengthening of maritime and coastal security, cannot have a permanent mandate. The recent announcement by the government to set up a national maritime authority (NMA) is an overdue measure.

So far it appears that 26/11 has given the impetus to propel the ‘Elephant’ to become aware of its vast maritime domain and set up suitable defences to protect itself. Significant forward movement has been made towards ensuring our maritime security.

The potential spoilers are:l Failure to expeditiously overcome the weakest link viz. Fishing Vessel Traffic Monitoring System. l Inadequate attention to setting up a professional Marine Police force which is a key component of the architecture. l The growth and maturing of organisations and the operational architecture falling prey to dissonant and myopic forces within various agencies.

(E.g. The ICG should be designated as the single authority responsible for coastal security, amending the charter of the ICG accordingly and easing the Indian Navy out from coastal security responsibilities so as to concentrate on its blue water and warfighting roles).

Fourth Gen.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:20 pm Page 1

4G WARFARE

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE:

EQUIPPING THE ARMY Fourth Generation Warfare is a decentralised form of warfare, where nation-states lose their monopoly over violence and the adversaries are driven to non-conventional warfare and blurs the dividing line between civvies and the combatants

ANIL CHAIT

KEY POINTS l Large number of non-state players on the international scene playing a decisiv e role in the fourth generation warfar e. l Indian Army’s potential will be augmented by Para-military forces. l Indian Special Forces tasked to deal with asymmetric warfare have been equipped with modern weapon systems, surveillance and target acquisition devices.

“4GW is not new but return to war fare before emergence of nation states.

It is mostly characterised by conflicts which not just nations but many groups will wage – It will be foughtor f many reasons beyond Clausewitzian explanation of war as an extension of politics by other means.”

—William S Lind

A

s the world progresses into the twenty-first century, the character of international security and its management appears to be in the midst of a revolutionary shift, with the forces of technology, media, ideology and globalisation, threatening to transform the theory and practice of war.

Our nation is also coming to recognize that we are at an inflection point in our history. Multiple forms of attacks upon the Indian State are incubating and a multitude of manifested threats, with one common purpose to denigrate the power of the state and the will of its people, are being used simultaneously against India, at multiple levels, through resolute, sophisticated and adaptable adversaries. These adversaries understand that conflict for domination and influence occurs across a variety of forms and through platforms which could be structured to fit one’s goals, at any particular time.

Defining the Fourth Generation: Fourth Generation of Warfare, as envisaged

by William S Lind and others, primarily focuses on the fact that there are four principal ideas from previous generations of warfare, which would carry over into this fourth generation. The first idea incorporates the battlefield, which now extends beyond traditional conflict zones to the whole of an enemy’s landmass and society. This implies dispersion coupled with increased importance for actions by small groups of combatants across the geographical matrix will emerge. The second idea pertains to the decreasing dependence on centralised logistics.

Dispersion coupled with increased tempo of operations will necessitate an ability to live off the land. The third idea emphasises on manoeuvre. Smaller, compact groups and forces, which are highly manoeuvrable and agile, will tend to dominate the battlefield and cause an internal collapse, instead of destroying the enemy physically.

30

The Negev NG7 is the 7.62 mm version of the IWI machine gun.

It can also fire in semiautomatic mode to allow accurate shooting, something that might be appreciated by special forces © IWI

Identification of enemy’s centers of gravity will be highly important.

While Lind and other authors on the subject outlined the tactical changes between the generations of modern war, what actually causes these, is even more relevant. The true drivers of generational change probably lie in the political, social, ideological and economic contexts which are resident in the society, of that time. Each of these casts a pivotal influence and widens

the impact, on account of information revolution amplifying the effect on aspirations, tactics and weapons of the contestants, in the contest between wills.

The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of geopolitics through the influence of military hard power especially in the context of scientifically advanced European nation states. In contrast, the fourth generation of war globally, is still coming of

age in the framework of globalisation characterised by balance of power deficit and in a world dominated by a single superpower—and a military hegemon.

Exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene impacted by the compression of geography and distance due to revolution in the information dominated world has further exaggerated the effect. Media intrusiveness and transparency has raised the bar of

31

international law and humanitarian code stringently on the use of force, especially against insidious agents who consider themselves as freedom fighters instead of terrorists and acts as a catalyst in their proliferation. Privatisation of war and emergence of non-state actors (NSA) empowered by the globalisation and motivated by radical ideologies with access to finance and open source technology, facilitate such an altered strategic context.

Fourth Gen.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:20 pm Page 1

4G WARFARE

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE:

EQUIPPING THE ARMY Fourth Generation Warfare is a decentralised form of warfare, where nation-states lose their monopoly over violence and the adversaries are driven to non-conventional warfare and blurs the dividing line between civvies and the combatants

ANIL CHAIT

KEY POINTS l Large number of non-state players on the international scene playing a decisiv e role in the fourth generation warfar e. l Indian Army’s potential will be augmented by Para-military forces. l Indian Special Forces tasked to deal with asymmetric warfare have been equipped with modern weapon systems, surveillance and target acquisition devices.

“4GW is not new but return to war fare before emergence of nation states.

It is mostly characterised by conflicts which not just nations but many groups will wage – It will be foughtor f many reasons beyond Clausewitzian explanation of war as an extension of politics by other means.”

—William S Lind

A

s the world progresses into the twenty-first century, the character of international security and its management appears to be in the midst of a revolutionary shift, with the forces of technology, media, ideology and globalisation, threatening to transform the theory and practice of war.

Our nation is also coming to recognize that we are at an inflection point in our history. Multiple forms of attacks upon the Indian State are incubating and a multitude of manifested threats, with one common purpose to denigrate the power of the state and the will of its people, are being used simultaneously against India, at multiple levels, through resolute, sophisticated and adaptable adversaries. These adversaries understand that conflict for domination and influence occurs across a variety of forms and through platforms which could be structured to fit one’s goals, at any particular time.

Defining the Fourth Generation: Fourth Generation of Warfare, as envisaged

by William S Lind and others, primarily focuses on the fact that there are four principal ideas from previous generations of warfare, which would carry over into this fourth generation. The first idea incorporates the battlefield, which now extends beyond traditional conflict zones to the whole of an enemy’s landmass and society. This implies dispersion coupled with increased importance for actions by small groups of combatants across the geographical matrix will emerge. The second idea pertains to the decreasing dependence on centralised logistics.

Dispersion coupled with increased tempo of operations will necessitate an ability to live off the land. The third idea emphasises on manoeuvre. Smaller, compact groups and forces, which are highly manoeuvrable and agile, will tend to dominate the battlefield and cause an internal collapse, instead of destroying the enemy physically.

30

The Negev NG7 is the 7.62 mm version of the IWI machine gun.

It can also fire in semiautomatic mode to allow accurate shooting, something that might be appreciated by special forces © IWI

Identification of enemy’s centers of gravity will be highly important.

While Lind and other authors on the subject outlined the tactical changes between the generations of modern war, what actually causes these, is even more relevant. The true drivers of generational change probably lie in the political, social, ideological and economic contexts which are resident in the society, of that time. Each of these casts a pivotal influence and widens

the impact, on account of information revolution amplifying the effect on aspirations, tactics and weapons of the contestants, in the contest between wills.

The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of geopolitics through the influence of military hard power especially in the context of scientifically advanced European nation states. In contrast, the fourth generation of war globally, is still coming of

age in the framework of globalisation characterised by balance of power deficit and in a world dominated by a single superpower—and a military hegemon.

Exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene impacted by the compression of geography and distance due to revolution in the information dominated world has further exaggerated the effect. Media intrusiveness and transparency has raised the bar of

31

international law and humanitarian code stringently on the use of force, especially against insidious agents who consider themselves as freedom fighters instead of terrorists and acts as a catalyst in their proliferation. Privatisation of war and emergence of non-state actors (NSA) empowered by the globalisation and motivated by radical ideologies with access to finance and open source technology, facilitate such an altered strategic context.

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4G WARFARE

DECEMBER 2014

The ARX-160 can quickly shift from the 5.56 to the 7.62x39 mm calibre. This allows to adapt the weapon to specific special forces missions © Beretta

“The move toward 4GW is occurring in parallel with the move into the information age; with the political, economic, and social changes affecting society as a whole - the essential characteristics of this new form of warfare have been clearly illustrated in recent conflicts” —Thomas X Hammes

While nation states still remain the primary actors, there is the presence of nonstate international actors in the form of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, European Community, Organisation of African Unity, besides a wide variety of non-governmental organisations whose influence is felt in the international arena. In addition, there are transnational actors in the form of the media, religious movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and others, who have also acquired the ability to influence international relations.

Finally, sub-national groups have attempted to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern by exploiting the networks which they create, sustain and generate.

Socially as human actors, we are also constantly developing and expanding national/ international networks in virtually every field of endeavor. There has been an

exponential increase in the number of transnational business associations, research groups, academic societies, and even hobbyists, who maintain contact through a wide variety of media. These networks with a common cause and purpose tie people together in distinctly nontraditional ways.

Further, these associations provide a rapidly increasing flow of nonofficial information between societies resulting in the weakening of the links which tie the citizen to his nation state. As national bonds become less important, allegiance to sub national groups based on ethnic, religious, or cultural ties increases. Nation states therefore are likely to find themselves torn in two directions upward toward the international security, trade, and social organizations; and downward, by sub-national movements that want to splinter the state, at ease with the tools of the evolving information age in collaboration with other tools of non-kinetic and kinetic medium.

Indian Subcontinent and its Fourth Generation Variant: The South Asian region historically has been a conflict-prone region on account of colonialism and the bloody partition of India.

Breakup of Pakistan has further increased the turmoil. An unsettled border of India with China and increasing competition has the potential to turn competing influences and interests, into rivalry. Discord amongst ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, criminalisation of politics and demographic shift and movement add to the instability in the region. South Asia has been termed as the most dangerous place in the world. Under the conditions of strategic stability/instability continues to prevail as the states facing

32

financial and legitimacy crises begin to lose their monopoly to wage war.

With China, India faces two types of threat. The first is on the immediate unsettled land borders, where China has strengthened its infrastructure, and the second is on account of being sucked into regional power play as China starts to assert itself in South and East China seas and seeks to enter India ocean region under the garb of preventing maritime piracy.

Joint war fighting, integrated across the streams, as envisaged by its strategic luminaries, forms the basis of its ‘military modernisation’. ‘Informationalisation, and localised conflict mixed and matched with the calibrated reliance on facets of ‘unrestricted warfare’ is planned to provide the framework of Sun Tzu war winning dictum “winning without fighting” or at least cost. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army of China in their highly publicised book “Unrestricted Warfare” have also championed the art of “asymmetrical warfare.” The recommended conduct involves asymmetric or multi-dimensional attacks on almost every aspect of the opponent’s social, economic and political system. People’s Liberation Army concept of war fighting for the “New Period” focuses towards this construct by incorporating asymmetric warfare means in all phases of its campaign planning process.

Pakistan is the current epicentre for major Fourth Generation Warriors (4 GW) – since India has always been a ready battleground for the al Qaida, Taliban, Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Indian Mujahideen and its affiliates such as SIMI and Lashkar-e Taiba (LET), supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI to wage attacks. The main thrust has been to create such conditions in J&K where its continuation with the Indian Union appears prohibitive to Indian polity. There have been multiple terrorist attacks against India which besides causing widespread loss of lives and property has caused wide spread

Adopted by the American special forces the FNH SCAR-H or Mk17 in 7.62x51 mm calibre was used in Afghanistan and other operational theatres © FN Herstal

polarisation between communities. Several train and marketplace attacks, across several Indian cities including Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore coinciding with religious festivals have been undertaken more for the purpose of impacting human minds and polarising the communities, than really for a few casualties. These and many more including the macabre drama in the Parliament were done to show the incompetence of the State to defend itself.

Employment of Fourth Generation asymmetrical tools and irregular means to undermine commitment of India will continue to be her preferred strategy and regularity of this irregular war will continue to haunt India in time ahead.

The announcement by Ayman Al Zawahiri in setting up of Al Qaeda’s new terror wing for the Indian subcontinentto “raise the flag of jihad” and illusion of ‘Khorasan” now becomes even more significant. It appears that the Pakistani military is “stage-managing” the terror outfit’s latest advance into India. There is “no doubt” that the announcement of a terror wing of the Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent backed by the ISI will assume significance in future for India as the advantages of their actions will directly be reaped by the Adversary State – Pakistan.

encompassed by 4GW go much beyond the military and include economic support to finance the movement, of which counterfeit currency, drug trade, money laundering facilitate support of terror activities.

Subversion of youth, high pitch religious bigotry, instigating or raising of contentious issues, with the aim of disturbing public peace and keeping some region or other in

Pakistan is the current epicenter for major Fourth Generation Warriors (4 GW) –since India has always been a ready battleground for the al Qaida, Taliban, Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Indian Mujahideen and its affiliates such as SIMI and Lashkar-e Taiba (LET), supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI to wage attacks.

Strategy Tactics and Technology: 4GW has moved much beyond the 26/11 paradigm. As known now, the means

33

DSI

turmoil through sub-conventional means, keep the networks active. Support to terrorists, their training and equipment, at levels comparable or even more advanced, than what is provided to our security forces keeps the pot boiling by providing the kinetic punch to their non-kinetic endeavours. Use of commercially available technology could be exploited for enhancing the impact of effect based operations.

Following deductions therefore emerge:(a) 4GW is a return to the way war was fought before the rise of the state. Lines are blurring as there is no defined battlefield .Many different entities wage war through different forms and formats, for many different reasons but towards one purpose. (b) Military campaigns supported by information operations are being supplanted by strategic communication campaign, supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations. (c) Many different tools to fight war, employing irregular and asymmetric means and tactics are likely to be used to deal with the adversary. These may not be new and many could be standard guerrilla tactics.

Strategy and tactics used will be dictated by the disparity resulting in exploitation of weakness and undermining of strength. (e) No state military has succeeded recently in defeating a non-state enemy. Jury is still out whether U.S. will succeed against ISIS?

Trends in Equipping of Forces for Combating 4GWs: The US military’s commandos are among the most proficient and best kitted in the world in dealing with the fourth generation threats but to become even better, U.S. Special Operations Command recently issued a formal request for “Advancement of Technologies in Equipment for use by U.S. Special Operations Forces”. An examination of their requirement is instructive as it suggests their quest of capabilities for becoming even faster, lighter, deadlier force, which could then be examined for consideration by Indian Security Forces.

While Special Forces seek 338 Lapua magnum anti-materiel ammunition that would be fired from the Precision Sniper Rifle at ranges from 500m-1500m to penetrate Level IV body armour (500m Threshold, 800m Objective), their interest in purchase of Collapsible Concealable/ Take Down Urban Sniper Rifle (CUSR) continues. The

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4G WARFARE

DECEMBER 2014

The ARX-160 can quickly shift from the 5.56 to the 7.62x39 mm calibre. This allows to adapt the weapon to specific special forces missions © Beretta

“The move toward 4GW is occurring in parallel with the move into the information age; with the political, economic, and social changes affecting society as a whole - the essential characteristics of this new form of warfare have been clearly illustrated in recent conflicts” —Thomas X Hammes

While nation states still remain the primary actors, there is the presence of nonstate international actors in the form of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, European Community, Organisation of African Unity, besides a wide variety of non-governmental organisations whose influence is felt in the international arena. In addition, there are transnational actors in the form of the media, religious movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and others, who have also acquired the ability to influence international relations.

Finally, sub-national groups have attempted to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern by exploiting the networks which they create, sustain and generate.

Socially as human actors, we are also constantly developing and expanding national/ international networks in virtually every field of endeavor. There has been an

exponential increase in the number of transnational business associations, research groups, academic societies, and even hobbyists, who maintain contact through a wide variety of media. These networks with a common cause and purpose tie people together in distinctly nontraditional ways.

Further, these associations provide a rapidly increasing flow of nonofficial information between societies resulting in the weakening of the links which tie the citizen to his nation state. As national bonds become less important, allegiance to sub national groups based on ethnic, religious, or cultural ties increases. Nation states therefore are likely to find themselves torn in two directions upward toward the international security, trade, and social organizations; and downward, by sub-national movements that want to splinter the state, at ease with the tools of the evolving information age in collaboration with other tools of non-kinetic and kinetic medium.

Indian Subcontinent and its Fourth Generation Variant: The South Asian region historically has been a conflict-prone region on account of colonialism and the bloody partition of India.

Breakup of Pakistan has further increased the turmoil. An unsettled border of India with China and increasing competition has the potential to turn competing influences and interests, into rivalry. Discord amongst ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, criminalisation of politics and demographic shift and movement add to the instability in the region. South Asia has been termed as the most dangerous place in the world. Under the conditions of strategic stability/instability continues to prevail as the states facing

32

financial and legitimacy crises begin to lose their monopoly to wage war.

With China, India faces two types of threat. The first is on the immediate unsettled land borders, where China has strengthened its infrastructure, and the second is on account of being sucked into regional power play as China starts to assert itself in South and East China seas and seeks to enter India ocean region under the garb of preventing maritime piracy.

Joint war fighting, integrated across the streams, as envisaged by its strategic luminaries, forms the basis of its ‘military modernisation’. ‘Informationalisation, and localised conflict mixed and matched with the calibrated reliance on facets of ‘unrestricted warfare’ is planned to provide the framework of Sun Tzu war winning dictum “winning without fighting” or at least cost. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army of China in their highly publicised book “Unrestricted Warfare” have also championed the art of “asymmetrical warfare.” The recommended conduct involves asymmetric or multi-dimensional attacks on almost every aspect of the opponent’s social, economic and political system. People’s Liberation Army concept of war fighting for the “New Period” focuses towards this construct by incorporating asymmetric warfare means in all phases of its campaign planning process.

Pakistan is the current epicentre for major Fourth Generation Warriors (4 GW) – since India has always been a ready battleground for the al Qaida, Taliban, Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Indian Mujahideen and its affiliates such as SIMI and Lashkar-e Taiba (LET), supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI to wage attacks. The main thrust has been to create such conditions in J&K where its continuation with the Indian Union appears prohibitive to Indian polity. There have been multiple terrorist attacks against India which besides causing widespread loss of lives and property has caused wide spread

Adopted by the American special forces the FNH SCAR-H or Mk17 in 7.62x51 mm calibre was used in Afghanistan and other operational theatres © FN Herstal

polarisation between communities. Several train and marketplace attacks, across several Indian cities including Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore coinciding with religious festivals have been undertaken more for the purpose of impacting human minds and polarising the communities, than really for a few casualties. These and many more including the macabre drama in the Parliament were done to show the incompetence of the State to defend itself.

Employment of Fourth Generation asymmetrical tools and irregular means to undermine commitment of India will continue to be her preferred strategy and regularity of this irregular war will continue to haunt India in time ahead.

The announcement by Ayman Al Zawahiri in setting up of Al Qaeda’s new terror wing for the Indian subcontinentto “raise the flag of jihad” and illusion of ‘Khorasan” now becomes even more significant. It appears that the Pakistani military is “stage-managing” the terror outfit’s latest advance into India. There is “no doubt” that the announcement of a terror wing of the Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent backed by the ISI will assume significance in future for India as the advantages of their actions will directly be reaped by the Adversary State – Pakistan.

encompassed by 4GW go much beyond the military and include economic support to finance the movement, of which counterfeit currency, drug trade, money laundering facilitate support of terror activities.

Subversion of youth, high pitch religious bigotry, instigating or raising of contentious issues, with the aim of disturbing public peace and keeping some region or other in

Pakistan is the current epicenter for major Fourth Generation Warriors (4 GW) –since India has always been a ready battleground for the al Qaida, Taliban, Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Indian Mujahideen and its affiliates such as SIMI and Lashkar-e Taiba (LET), supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI to wage attacks.

Strategy Tactics and Technology: 4GW has moved much beyond the 26/11 paradigm. As known now, the means

33

DSI

turmoil through sub-conventional means, keep the networks active. Support to terrorists, their training and equipment, at levels comparable or even more advanced, than what is provided to our security forces keeps the pot boiling by providing the kinetic punch to their non-kinetic endeavours. Use of commercially available technology could be exploited for enhancing the impact of effect based operations.

Following deductions therefore emerge:(a) 4GW is a return to the way war was fought before the rise of the state. Lines are blurring as there is no defined battlefield .Many different entities wage war through different forms and formats, for many different reasons but towards one purpose. (b) Military campaigns supported by information operations are being supplanted by strategic communication campaign, supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations. (c) Many different tools to fight war, employing irregular and asymmetric means and tactics are likely to be used to deal with the adversary. These may not be new and many could be standard guerrilla tactics.

Strategy and tactics used will be dictated by the disparity resulting in exploitation of weakness and undermining of strength. (e) No state military has succeeded recently in defeating a non-state enemy. Jury is still out whether U.S. will succeed against ISIS?

Trends in Equipping of Forces for Combating 4GWs: The US military’s commandos are among the most proficient and best kitted in the world in dealing with the fourth generation threats but to become even better, U.S. Special Operations Command recently issued a formal request for “Advancement of Technologies in Equipment for use by U.S. Special Operations Forces”. An examination of their requirement is instructive as it suggests their quest of capabilities for becoming even faster, lighter, deadlier force, which could then be examined for consideration by Indian Security Forces.

While Special Forces seek 338 Lapua magnum anti-materiel ammunition that would be fired from the Precision Sniper Rifle at ranges from 500m-1500m to penetrate Level IV body armour (500m Threshold, 800m Objective), their interest in purchase of Collapsible Concealable/ Take Down Urban Sniper Rifle (CUSR) continues. The

Fourth Gen.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:20 pm Page 5

4G WARFARE CUSR is a small and light sniper rifle that can be rapidly disassembled for concealed carry and rapid reassembly by the operator to engage targets. Compatibility with current suppressors or use of suppressed barrels continues to be preferred.

Personnel Defense Weapon (PDW is significantly smaller and lighter than the M4A1) with capabilities beyond any pistol.

There are two types of interest, those based on operator/unit armor modifications to a M4A1 carbine and those based on a unique weapon design, both of which must fire standard 5.56mm X 45mm NATO ammunition.

Small unit organic munitions capable of delivering highly accurate kinetic effects on stationary, moving, soft targets, on the interiors of hardened targets, at ranges beyond crew served weapons effective range, is being explored. Potential material approaches are likely to include guided 40mm tube launched grenades; selfpropelled, precision-guided, handheld grenades; guided 84mm Carl Gustav munitions; and handheld guided kinetically armed unmanned aerial systems.

Technologies that stop/disable individuals for an extended duration and are less lethal and capable of being used on combatant and non combatant, continues to find favour with the Special Forces.

Heads-up Display (HUD) technology for day or night operations which can securely and wirelessly support full motion video data feeds besides supporting augmented reality; integrated sensors configurable with software applications (“apps”) also figures in the demand list. Such capabilities will enable

“Globalization and other current environmental forces have distressingly exacerbated the potential influence of asymmetric and non-state actors, leading to a wider spectrum of conflicts with an extensive range of opponents and activities, making future warfare more broad and dynamic than ever”

DECEMBER 2014

Much lighter than a 12.7 mm MG and with a terminal effect double of that of a 7.62 mm one at comparable weight as far as the weapon is concerned, GDATP LWMMG might well become part of special forces armouries © GDATP

soldiers to be networked through actionable battlefield information, by possessing map displays with situational awareness data. To enable processing speeds, requirement for boosted brainpower, via drugs or other means considered to be an advantage continues to be sought.

Indian Military Modernisation and Equipment Policy Future Infantry Soldier as a System (FINSAS) programme initiated by the Indian Army to modernize its 359 Infantry battalions and 66 associated RR battalions is moving forward at a snail’s pace. It was meant to provide a fully networked, all terrain, all weather personal equipment platforms with enhanced fire power and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future. It was to include a modular weapon with a thermal imaging sight. Under Barrel Grenade Launcher and Laser range finder were the additional components. A combat helmet equipped with a head up display and communication hand set; a smart vest with a body monitoring system; a back pack with an integrated GPS and radio and protective gear are expected to be a part of the complete programme. Replicating the U.S. Army Land Warrior programme, and being built around COTS components, it is expected to cost around Rs 50,000 crores with capability being sought urgently and on priority in the 12th plan. Capability for the soldiers will also include hand held surveillance and thermal imaging devices

34

for observation at night. Standalone intrusion devices will also be needed in sufficient numbers. The DAC has already approved a new assault rifle of 5.56 calibre and a new generation carbine. The manufacturers who appear to be in race are IWI Galil Ace carbine, Italy’s Beretta with its ARX 160 and the United States Colt and Sig Saur offering the M4 AND 516 Patrol models. These weapons are undergoing the field trial. In the case of carbines the selected vendor will be required to transfer technology to the OFB to license build the weapon. The RFP for modular bullet proof vests and an equal number of helmets has already been issued and it seems that tenders for knee and elbow protection pads await finalisation. The search of Alternate NVD’s with FOM of 1800 continues. Overall the F-INSAS programme of the Army and its mission of networking all entities will go a long way in building a counter network capabilities of war fighters in combating 4GW. Along-with the desire to acquire better weapons, thrust is also to seek new generation ammunition, multi spectral camouflage suits, battle -field management system and seek more UAVs and their upgrade in the field of communication and SATA capability.

The Special Forces whose tasking includes dealing with asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare and specialist operations have been equipped with modern weapon systems along with surveillance and target

DSI

LIST OF RELEVANT RFI / RFP W.E.F 2012-2014 DEPT Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army

RFI NAME RFI for 9MM Pistol Procurement of Flexible Surveillance Device (FSD) Procurement of Flame Thrower (Disposable) Procurement of General Purpose Anti Personal Grenades Procurement of 12 Bore Pump Action Shot Gun (PASG) RFI for Anti Material Rifle Night Sight For Carbine RFI for procure Mini Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) RFI for procure Fibrescope Request for Information for Sniper Rifle for Infantry

OPENING DATE 30 May 2014 22 Apr 2014 04 Mar 2014 29 Apr 2013 26 Jul 2012 10 Jul 2012 23 May 2012 22 May 2012 22 May 2012 18 May 2012

CLOSING DATE 25 Jun 2014 15 May 2014 15 Apr 2014 15 May 2013 15 Aug 2012 05 Aug 2012 14 Jun 2012 01 Jul 2012 10 Jul 2012 15 Jun 2012

Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army

RFP NAME Remote opening tool kit (CROT) , explosive detective kits, Hook and line set Spotting Scope with Digital SLR Camera Night Sight for 7.62mm Dragunov Sniper Rifle Bullet proof shield Mini UAVs Passive Night Sight for Rif AK-47 Bullet Proof Jacket Ballistic Helmet Tactical Vest Surveillance Camera Harness for Bullet Proof Jacket Tactical Vest

14 Feb 2014 8 Nov 2013 3 Sep 2013 31 Aug 2013 27 Aug 2013 13 Aug 2013 16 Jul 2013 20 Jul 2013 20 Jul 2013 29 Jun 2013 24 May 2013 25 Mar 2013

7 Mar 2014 3 Dec 2013 14 Oct 2013 3 Oct 2013 24 Sep 2013 23 Sep 2013 13 Aug 2013 20 Aug 2013 19 Aug 2013 27 Jul 2013 28 Jun 2013 20 Apr 2013

acquisition (SATA) devices as part of the capability enhancement to conduct their tasks. Equipping of Special Forces lags woefully behind, as packaged equipping of subunits has not taken place and critical equipment is yet to be provisioned. With new technology coming in, development of SF capability will continue to remain, a

priority ongoing task. On similar lines a ‘Ghatak Brick’ has been authorised to each battalion for creating a composite package of additional capabilities. This upgradation will facilitate the platoons to do their task with enhanced efficiency and comparative ease in conventional and subconventional operations.

The 5.56 mm version of the Negev here equipped with a Mepro 21 sight © IWI

35

The capability of Indian Army will be augmented by para-military and joint forces.

Ten battalions of COBRA of CRPF are already ready and can be used for combating 4GW. Two battalions of National Security Guard could similarly be used for intelligence-led operations. Similarly Cyber Command, should it get established in the 12th Plan (2012-2017), will greatly contribute to military’s mission for dealing with these threats in the non-kinetic domain.

Future conflicts therefore are expected to be multi-model or multi-variant rather than through characterisation of one form of warfare. The construct involving more blurring and blending of war forms in combination of increasing irregular with regular with increasing probability, is what will be confronted by us.

Studies show that fourth generation tactics are rarely employed exclusively.

Rather they exist side by side with the tactics of earlier generations. Therefore, it will be essential for military leaders and security experts to make an accurate analysis of how to deal with the problem of constructing a full spectrum capability.

Fourth Gen.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:20 pm Page 5

4G WARFARE CUSR is a small and light sniper rifle that can be rapidly disassembled for concealed carry and rapid reassembly by the operator to engage targets. Compatibility with current suppressors or use of suppressed barrels continues to be preferred.

Personnel Defense Weapon (PDW is significantly smaller and lighter than the M4A1) with capabilities beyond any pistol.

There are two types of interest, those based on operator/unit armor modifications to a M4A1 carbine and those based on a unique weapon design, both of which must fire standard 5.56mm X 45mm NATO ammunition.

Small unit organic munitions capable of delivering highly accurate kinetic effects on stationary, moving, soft targets, on the interiors of hardened targets, at ranges beyond crew served weapons effective range, is being explored. Potential material approaches are likely to include guided 40mm tube launched grenades; selfpropelled, precision-guided, handheld grenades; guided 84mm Carl Gustav munitions; and handheld guided kinetically armed unmanned aerial systems.

Technologies that stop/disable individuals for an extended duration and are less lethal and capable of being used on combatant and non combatant, continues to find favour with the Special Forces.

Heads-up Display (HUD) technology for day or night operations which can securely and wirelessly support full motion video data feeds besides supporting augmented reality; integrated sensors configurable with software applications (“apps”) also figures in the demand list. Such capabilities will enable

“Globalization and other current environmental forces have distressingly exacerbated the potential influence of asymmetric and non-state actors, leading to a wider spectrum of conflicts with an extensive range of opponents and activities, making future warfare more broad and dynamic than ever”

DECEMBER 2014

Much lighter than a 12.7 mm MG and with a terminal effect double of that of a 7.62 mm one at comparable weight as far as the weapon is concerned, GDATP LWMMG might well become part of special forces armouries © GDATP

soldiers to be networked through actionable battlefield information, by possessing map displays with situational awareness data. To enable processing speeds, requirement for boosted brainpower, via drugs or other means considered to be an advantage continues to be sought.

Indian Military Modernisation and Equipment Policy Future Infantry Soldier as a System (FINSAS) programme initiated by the Indian Army to modernize its 359 Infantry battalions and 66 associated RR battalions is moving forward at a snail’s pace. It was meant to provide a fully networked, all terrain, all weather personal equipment platforms with enhanced fire power and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future. It was to include a modular weapon with a thermal imaging sight. Under Barrel Grenade Launcher and Laser range finder were the additional components. A combat helmet equipped with a head up display and communication hand set; a smart vest with a body monitoring system; a back pack with an integrated GPS and radio and protective gear are expected to be a part of the complete programme. Replicating the U.S. Army Land Warrior programme, and being built around COTS components, it is expected to cost around Rs 50,000 crores with capability being sought urgently and on priority in the 12th plan. Capability for the soldiers will also include hand held surveillance and thermal imaging devices

34

for observation at night. Standalone intrusion devices will also be needed in sufficient numbers. The DAC has already approved a new assault rifle of 5.56 calibre and a new generation carbine. The manufacturers who appear to be in race are IWI Galil Ace carbine, Italy’s Beretta with its ARX 160 and the United States Colt and Sig Saur offering the M4 AND 516 Patrol models. These weapons are undergoing the field trial. In the case of carbines the selected vendor will be required to transfer technology to the OFB to license build the weapon. The RFP for modular bullet proof vests and an equal number of helmets has already been issued and it seems that tenders for knee and elbow protection pads await finalisation. The search of Alternate NVD’s with FOM of 1800 continues. Overall the F-INSAS programme of the Army and its mission of networking all entities will go a long way in building a counter network capabilities of war fighters in combating 4GW. Along-with the desire to acquire better weapons, thrust is also to seek new generation ammunition, multi spectral camouflage suits, battle -field management system and seek more UAVs and their upgrade in the field of communication and SATA capability.

The Special Forces whose tasking includes dealing with asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare and specialist operations have been equipped with modern weapon systems along with surveillance and target

DSI

LIST OF RELEVANT RFI / RFP W.E.F 2012-2014 DEPT Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army

RFI NAME RFI for 9MM Pistol Procurement of Flexible Surveillance Device (FSD) Procurement of Flame Thrower (Disposable) Procurement of General Purpose Anti Personal Grenades Procurement of 12 Bore Pump Action Shot Gun (PASG) RFI for Anti Material Rifle Night Sight For Carbine RFI for procure Mini Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) RFI for procure Fibrescope Request for Information for Sniper Rifle for Infantry

OPENING DATE 30 May 2014 22 Apr 2014 04 Mar 2014 29 Apr 2013 26 Jul 2012 10 Jul 2012 23 May 2012 22 May 2012 22 May 2012 18 May 2012

CLOSING DATE 25 Jun 2014 15 May 2014 15 Apr 2014 15 May 2013 15 Aug 2012 05 Aug 2012 14 Jun 2012 01 Jul 2012 10 Jul 2012 15 Jun 2012

Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army Indian Army

RFP NAME Remote opening tool kit (CROT) , explosive detective kits, Hook and line set Spotting Scope with Digital SLR Camera Night Sight for 7.62mm Dragunov Sniper Rifle Bullet proof shield Mini UAVs Passive Night Sight for Rif AK-47 Bullet Proof Jacket Ballistic Helmet Tactical Vest Surveillance Camera Harness for Bullet Proof Jacket Tactical Vest

14 Feb 2014 8 Nov 2013 3 Sep 2013 31 Aug 2013 27 Aug 2013 13 Aug 2013 16 Jul 2013 20 Jul 2013 20 Jul 2013 29 Jun 2013 24 May 2013 25 Mar 2013

7 Mar 2014 3 Dec 2013 14 Oct 2013 3 Oct 2013 24 Sep 2013 23 Sep 2013 13 Aug 2013 20 Aug 2013 19 Aug 2013 27 Jul 2013 28 Jun 2013 20 Apr 2013

acquisition (SATA) devices as part of the capability enhancement to conduct their tasks. Equipping of Special Forces lags woefully behind, as packaged equipping of subunits has not taken place and critical equipment is yet to be provisioned. With new technology coming in, development of SF capability will continue to remain, a

priority ongoing task. On similar lines a ‘Ghatak Brick’ has been authorised to each battalion for creating a composite package of additional capabilities. This upgradation will facilitate the platoons to do their task with enhanced efficiency and comparative ease in conventional and subconventional operations.

The 5.56 mm version of the Negev here equipped with a Mepro 21 sight © IWI

35

The capability of Indian Army will be augmented by para-military and joint forces.

Ten battalions of COBRA of CRPF are already ready and can be used for combating 4GW. Two battalions of National Security Guard could similarly be used for intelligence-led operations. Similarly Cyber Command, should it get established in the 12th Plan (2012-2017), will greatly contribute to military’s mission for dealing with these threats in the non-kinetic domain.

Future conflicts therefore are expected to be multi-model or multi-variant rather than through characterisation of one form of warfare. The construct involving more blurring and blending of war forms in combination of increasing irregular with regular with increasing probability, is what will be confronted by us.

Studies show that fourth generation tactics are rarely employed exclusively.

Rather they exist side by side with the tactics of earlier generations. Therefore, it will be essential for military leaders and security experts to make an accurate analysis of how to deal with the problem of constructing a full spectrum capability.

Indo-US.qxp_INDO-US.qxd 22/12/14 3:23 pm Page 1

DEFENCE TIES

DECEMBER 2014

WASHINGTON

CALLING Modi’s visit to the United States provides an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties, which stagnated during the UPA II government.The strengthened bilateral relationship would offer cooperation on various shared interests like economic, defence, and security.

PINAKI BHATTACHARYA

KEY POINTS

of visa. In fact as always, there were a band of believers who would consider a high level Indo-US interaction to be the gold standard of India’s foreign policy. Those internal voices seem typically silent even a fortnight before Modi was to visit Washington to meet the US President, Barack Obama in end-September.

l The USA is wooing n I dian defence sector to get a large share of the $200 billion over ten years. l India will need the help of the USAin establishing Indian Navy’s footprint on the Ocean waters. l The negotiations on nuclear energy programme should cater to ndia’s I wish of becoming a member of the NSG.

B

etween Devyani Khobragade episode of Indo-US relations, and the election of Narendra Modi as prime minister of India, not much seem to have changed in the bilateral relationship. It might be Modi’s foreign policy prioritisations that lent credence to this thought, but it could also be the fact of the visa denial to Modi in the wake of 2002 that could have clouded the relationship.

None of the public occasions of Modi, even the event at Madison Square Garden with non-resident Indians in the USA, did not hark back to that decision of the denial

20 billion in the country building railways, roads and other infrastructure projects. Is Modi auguring a brave new world, where the ancien regime the US leadership represent, was like an ill-fitting raiment that one has to don out of compulsion?

This is the USA mired in battles in areas of West Asia against resurgent Islamist fanatics in Washington’s long dragging and militant spawning ‘war on terror.’ This is also the USA where poverty is rising; racial discrimination is deepening divides; and one where every move to alleviate some of the economic and social inequities within, is blocked at the Congress, where the Republican Party legislators, and some of the Democratic Party government officials, seek to show who is more over the edge with neo-conservative fanaticism than the other.

That, however, is the least of India’s worries. Modi has to establish a modus operandi with the US administration by which some of India’s worries about the globalised market forces are alleviated. The case in point is the veto India exercised over the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) at Bali, Indonesia.

India’s argument was simple. Unless the developed countries agreed to raise the ceiling over agricultural and food subsidies,

it would not sign on the TFA, which the former desperately want to resuscitate their ailing economies.

That was a kind of rhetoric Washington, London or Berlin have not heard in a while when Manmohan Singh government was in power. This was a level of Indocentricism that the world had not heard recently. Indeed, it resonated in Brasilia, Beijing, and Kampala.

So what was there to look for from Modi’s trip to Washington that actually led from New York, where he will be attending the newly convened United Nations General Assembly?

Agenda Points: The USA is seriously wooing Indian defence sector to get a large share of the military modernisation pie. During the time of AK Antony, the entreaties of the American businessmen and politicians alike were mostly falling on deaf ears. Will Modi government be more receptive to them?

That will be tested out.

The USA is seriously wooing Indian defence sector to get a large share of the

$ 200 billion over ten years the government has indicated for spending on the sector.

Already, Washington has made two major alterations in its wooing of the Modi government. When the Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel was here in New Delhi in August, he made the telling points: one, the US military-industrial complex was ready to “co-develop” and “co-produce” important military hardware with Indian corporates and even the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO); second, the USA was no longer seeing India as a hedge against China’s rise.

Hagel had stated that India could have an independent relationship with the USA and also with China. The two are not mutually exclusive. This should end the feverish speculation in India in certain interested sections of the elite, whether India, Japan and USA could stand ‘tall’ in the face of Chinese ‘expansionism’.

By the end of the trip the mention of the status of the international maritime agreements for South China Sea in the IndoUS joint statement showed that Washington has not entirely forgotten its strategic vision.

Then there is the issue of AfghanistanPakistan. While India is getting ready for a post-NATO withdrawal phase in Afghanistan; New Delhi can still do with some support in political terms from the US, which has so rightly vowed to stay engaged in the country, . Considering that the stock of the US is not particularly high at this

The fact that the Indian prime minister was staying in the USA for four days; with Modi’s Gujarati community booking the Madison Square Garden, New York, for a grand public appearance, and two days of meetings with Obama, the trip should have given high octane energy boosters to both the ministry of external affairs; ministry of defence etc, and sections of the media.

But New Delhi in mid-September was full of stories about how Chinese President, Xi Jinping, and his hundred odd businessmen’s delegation is going to invest $

36

DSI

moment in time, in Afghanistan, a tie-up with India’s developmental agenda can add to Washington’s shine a bit.

On the other hand, the absence of mention of Pakistan in any of the articulations left a lot unsaid. Though it was thought to (would be) highly appreciated in India if the US Administration could indicate to Modi how much support they would continue to provide Pakistan’s ruling elite as the latter continue to foster terrorist attacks. The two agendas – Modi’s and Washington’s – have to meld together for India to stay peaceful in the short term.

It would be interesting to see how Narendra Modi accounts to Obama for those 500-odd Muslim boys who have finally been lured into the hands of the global jihadists.

This is a time when one should recall a famous Lal Krishna Advani statement after 9/11. He, the deputy prime minister then, had pointed out despite the resurgent alQaeda spreading the message of jihad not one Indian Muslim have signed up on their irredentist plot of creating a Caliphate.

Modi too made a strong statement in the wake of the news that al Qaeda established an Indo-centric sub-continental branch.

He said that the Muslims of India can live and die for the country.

IAF C-17 Globemaster III airlifter. C-17 aircraft is the first major procurement from US. IAF is the world’s second-largest operator of the C-17 after the US © Boeing

37

Indo-US.qxp_INDO-US.qxd 22/12/14 3:23 pm Page 1

DEFENCE TIES

DECEMBER 2014

WASHINGTON

CALLING Modi’s visit to the United States provides an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties, which stagnated during the UPA II government.The strengthened bilateral relationship would offer cooperation on various shared interests like economic, defence, and security.

PINAKI BHATTACHARYA

KEY POINTS

of visa. In fact as always, there were a band of believers who would consider a high level Indo-US interaction to be the gold standard of India’s foreign policy. Those internal voices seem typically silent even a fortnight before Modi was to visit Washington to meet the US President, Barack Obama in end-September.

l The USA is wooing n I dian defence sector to get a large share of the $200 billion over ten years. l India will need the help of the USAin establishing Indian Navy’s footprint on the Ocean waters. l The negotiations on nuclear energy programme should cater to ndia’s I wish of becoming a member of the NSG.

B

etween Devyani Khobragade episode of Indo-US relations, and the election of Narendra Modi as prime minister of India, not much seem to have changed in the bilateral relationship. It might be Modi’s foreign policy prioritisations that lent credence to this thought, but it could also be the fact of the visa denial to Modi in the wake of 2002 that could have clouded the relationship.

None of the public occasions of Modi, even the event at Madison Square Garden with non-resident Indians in the USA, did not hark back to that decision of the denial

20 billion in the country building railways, roads and other infrastructure projects. Is Modi auguring a brave new world, where the ancien regime the US leadership represent, was like an ill-fitting raiment that one has to don out of compulsion?

This is the USA mired in battles in areas of West Asia against resurgent Islamist fanatics in Washington’s long dragging and militant spawning ‘war on terror.’ This is also the USA where poverty is rising; racial discrimination is deepening divides; and one where every move to alleviate some of the economic and social inequities within, is blocked at the Congress, where the Republican Party legislators, and some of the Democratic Party government officials, seek to show who is more over the edge with neo-conservative fanaticism than the other.

That, however, is the least of India’s worries. Modi has to establish a modus operandi with the US administration by which some of India’s worries about the globalised market forces are alleviated. The case in point is the veto India exercised over the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) at Bali, Indonesia.

India’s argument was simple. Unless the developed countries agreed to raise the ceiling over agricultural and food subsidies,

it would not sign on the TFA, which the former desperately want to resuscitate their ailing economies.

That was a kind of rhetoric Washington, London or Berlin have not heard in a while when Manmohan Singh government was in power. This was a level of Indocentricism that the world had not heard recently. Indeed, it resonated in Brasilia, Beijing, and Kampala.

So what was there to look for from Modi’s trip to Washington that actually led from New York, where he will be attending the newly convened United Nations General Assembly?

Agenda Points: The USA is seriously wooing Indian defence sector to get a large share of the military modernisation pie. During the time of AK Antony, the entreaties of the American businessmen and politicians alike were mostly falling on deaf ears. Will Modi government be more receptive to them?

That will be tested out.

The USA is seriously wooing Indian defence sector to get a large share of the

$ 200 billion over ten years the government has indicated for spending on the sector.

Already, Washington has made two major alterations in its wooing of the Modi government. When the Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel was here in New Delhi in August, he made the telling points: one, the US military-industrial complex was ready to “co-develop” and “co-produce” important military hardware with Indian corporates and even the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO); second, the USA was no longer seeing India as a hedge against China’s rise.

Hagel had stated that India could have an independent relationship with the USA and also with China. The two are not mutually exclusive. This should end the feverish speculation in India in certain interested sections of the elite, whether India, Japan and USA could stand ‘tall’ in the face of Chinese ‘expansionism’.

By the end of the trip the mention of the status of the international maritime agreements for South China Sea in the IndoUS joint statement showed that Washington has not entirely forgotten its strategic vision.

Then there is the issue of AfghanistanPakistan. While India is getting ready for a post-NATO withdrawal phase in Afghanistan; New Delhi can still do with some support in political terms from the US, which has so rightly vowed to stay engaged in the country, . Considering that the stock of the US is not particularly high at this

The fact that the Indian prime minister was staying in the USA for four days; with Modi’s Gujarati community booking the Madison Square Garden, New York, for a grand public appearance, and two days of meetings with Obama, the trip should have given high octane energy boosters to both the ministry of external affairs; ministry of defence etc, and sections of the media.

But New Delhi in mid-September was full of stories about how Chinese President, Xi Jinping, and his hundred odd businessmen’s delegation is going to invest $

36

DSI

moment in time, in Afghanistan, a tie-up with India’s developmental agenda can add to Washington’s shine a bit.

On the other hand, the absence of mention of Pakistan in any of the articulations left a lot unsaid. Though it was thought to (would be) highly appreciated in India if the US Administration could indicate to Modi how much support they would continue to provide Pakistan’s ruling elite as the latter continue to foster terrorist attacks. The two agendas – Modi’s and Washington’s – have to meld together for India to stay peaceful in the short term.

It would be interesting to see how Narendra Modi accounts to Obama for those 500-odd Muslim boys who have finally been lured into the hands of the global jihadists.

This is a time when one should recall a famous Lal Krishna Advani statement after 9/11. He, the deputy prime minister then, had pointed out despite the resurgent alQaeda spreading the message of jihad not one Indian Muslim have signed up on their irredentist plot of creating a Caliphate.

Modi too made a strong statement in the wake of the news that al Qaeda established an Indo-centric sub-continental branch.

He said that the Muslims of India can live and die for the country.

IAF C-17 Globemaster III airlifter. C-17 aircraft is the first major procurement from US. IAF is the world’s second-largest operator of the C-17 after the US © Boeing

37

Indo-US.qxp_INDO-US.qxd 22/12/14 3:23 pm Page 3

DEFENCE TIES

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

US based Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk, strong contender for Indian Navy multi-role helicopters contract

It will be also important to see in the immediate future that on the issue of ‘codevelopment’ and ‘co-production’ of military weapons and equipments, whether the USA urge India again to sign on what they call the “three foundational agreements” – the CISMOA, LSA and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation.

The USA failed to make Antony sign on the dotted line during his long tenure as defence minister of the country. Yet, Washington did claim earlier that unless they could conclude these agreements, sales of military items from the US would get hindered.

Having said that, Hagel, when he was here did not actually make a mention of these, at least publicly, during his recent tour of India. And now that the narrative has changed to ‘co-production,’ any movement on the agreements is to be viewed closely.

Will Modi also seek a revalidation of the US promise, made by the American President, Barack Obama during his last tour of the country about supporting New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)?

Amidst the bonhomie of the joint visit to the Lincoln Memorial, all that New Delhi was an expression of desire for UN reforms.

India has a long shopping list for sourcing military arsenals from the US. It requires a bulk quantity of helicopters – light and medium utility, attack and heavy lift choppers. Of course, Modi government has made indigenisation a mantra in the defence ministry, there are items still that will need to be possibly bought outright and/or produced under licence here.

”

Ahead of the trip, India had signed on the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, agreeing to several safeguards about separating the civilian nuclear programme from the

38

nuclear weapons programme. This was a residual agreement, stemming from the 123 agreement that ndia had signed with the Bush Administration.

The civilian agreement should also remove some of the roadblocks on India’s desire to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. India also needs membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, before it can count itself to be a de-facto nuclear weapon State.

Obama, after he had become the president, had slowed down the pace of the US’s efforts at making India a party to the N-5 without the country fulfilling the conditionalities of the Treaty on Nuclear NonProliferation (NPT). He had stayed the hand of the Administration in pushing India’s candidature to the NSG. It remains to be seen whether it pushes India’s case this time.

India, in its turn, had quite rightly pulled back from allowing American nuclear energy majors and power producers a free run in the country. It had passed a strict legislation with ‘liability’ clauses pushing the insurance costs high for companies like Westinghouse etc. Still, they wanted this new vista for doing business.

Modi certainly encountered on all these pending issues of the 2008 agreement with the US on the civilian nuclear energy cooperation during his trip.

A key element of the Indo-US defence relations are the joint exercises of the three arms – army, navy and the air force – with their American counterparts. In fact, recently, India Army and the US Army took part in their annual exercise, ‘Yudh Abhyas’.

Reports at the beginning of the Defence Framework Agreement of 2004 talked about the joint military exercises creating “interoperability” amongst the two forces.

In the latter years of the Antony ministry, the issue of exercising for building “interoperability” had been removed from the lexicon. The Americans surely sought to gauge whether Modi was agreeable to the proposition of the Indian armed forces development of interoperability, which presupposes joint action, where each force can replace of the other seamlessly.

Modi should encourage the American arms manufacturers to compete in bids instead of seeking sales to India under the Foreign Military Sales route. While it may be a secure way of transacting business with India, considering those deals are government to government – thus cutting out the influences of middlemen – they still do not offer a competitive price for the purchases made by the country. Considering the fact these sales are routed through the US government to the US Congress and then to the US administration again for

Indian Army infantryman is familiarizing with the American machine gun prior to field training as part of the annual India-US Yudh Abhyas training exercise

identifying supplier/s (suppliers), the price is also fixed by Washington in the process, leaving aside any attempt at negotiations.

India has a long shopping list for sourcing military arsenals from the US. It requires a bulk quantity of helicopters – light and medium utility, attack and heavy lift choppers. Of course, Modi government has made indigenisation a mantra in the defence ministry, there are items still that will need to be possibly bought outright and/or produced under licence here.

Considering the fact that the Indian Army is raising a full mountain corps and expanding the number of Special Forces units, the demand for American equipment can only rise. Some of the war-fighting stuff that the country needs on a short notice are night vision devices, artillery guns (though the Modi government have shown a marked preference for the homegrown variety), aircraft engines, small arms etc.

Finally, as an emerging military power, India has the desire to project its influence across the Indian Ocean, hitherto being dominated by the USA. So New Delhi will need the help of Washington in establishing Indian Navy’s footprint on the Ocean waters and the littoral states.

39

While the visit of Xi Jinping has reflected the desire of India and China to develop a full scale relationship based on cooperation, the element of competition between the two will, on occasions, underscore the US role in the Indo-Pacific. Modi’s high profile visit to Japan could augur for a balancing act, India will have to play in terms Chinese influences and disputes on the one hand and USJapan-ASEAN interests on the other.

That will only be possible if India bolsters its strategic autonomy and has the muscle to undergird its political initiatives. While all across the world US arms have normally followed US politics, in India this paradigm has to change. Modi would do well to keep the two separate compartments; only to allow synergy between the two when India needs it.

It should be borne in mind with respect to Modi’s visit, that the Indo-US defence relations really saw its acme during the Kargil conflict of 1999, when Bill Clinton had himself intervened to make Nawaz Sharif overrule the army generals led by the Chief of Army Staff, General Parvez Musharraf, and bring to an end to the conflict. That was also the beginning of the countdown that led to the de-hyphenation of the India-Pakistan

Indo-US.qxp_INDO-US.qxd 22/12/14 3:23 pm Page 3

DEFENCE TIES

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

US based Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk, strong contender for Indian Navy multi-role helicopters contract

It will be also important to see in the immediate future that on the issue of ‘codevelopment’ and ‘co-production’ of military weapons and equipments, whether the USA urge India again to sign on what they call the “three foundational agreements” – the CISMOA, LSA and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation.

The USA failed to make Antony sign on the dotted line during his long tenure as defence minister of the country. Yet, Washington did claim earlier that unless they could conclude these agreements, sales of military items from the US would get hindered.

Having said that, Hagel, when he was here did not actually make a mention of these, at least publicly, during his recent tour of India. And now that the narrative has changed to ‘co-production,’ any movement on the agreements is to be viewed closely.

Will Modi also seek a revalidation of the US promise, made by the American President, Barack Obama during his last tour of the country about supporting New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)?

Amidst the bonhomie of the joint visit to the Lincoln Memorial, all that New Delhi was an expression of desire for UN reforms.

India has a long shopping list for sourcing military arsenals from the US. It requires a bulk quantity of helicopters – light and medium utility, attack and heavy lift choppers. Of course, Modi government has made indigenisation a mantra in the defence ministry, there are items still that will need to be possibly bought outright and/or produced under licence here.

”

Ahead of the trip, India had signed on the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, agreeing to several safeguards about separating the civilian nuclear programme from the

38

nuclear weapons programme. This was a residual agreement, stemming from the 123 agreement that ndia had signed with the Bush Administration.

The civilian agreement should also remove some of the roadblocks on India’s desire to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. India also needs membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, before it can count itself to be a de-facto nuclear weapon State.

Obama, after he had become the president, had slowed down the pace of the US’s efforts at making India a party to the N-5 without the country fulfilling the conditionalities of the Treaty on Nuclear NonProliferation (NPT). He had stayed the hand of the Administration in pushing India’s candidature to the NSG. It remains to be seen whether it pushes India’s case this time.

India, in its turn, had quite rightly pulled back from allowing American nuclear energy majors and power producers a free run in the country. It had passed a strict legislation with ‘liability’ clauses pushing the insurance costs high for companies like Westinghouse etc. Still, they wanted this new vista for doing business.

Modi certainly encountered on all these pending issues of the 2008 agreement with the US on the civilian nuclear energy cooperation during his trip.

A key element of the Indo-US defence relations are the joint exercises of the three arms – army, navy and the air force – with their American counterparts. In fact, recently, India Army and the US Army took part in their annual exercise, ‘Yudh Abhyas’.

Reports at the beginning of the Defence Framework Agreement of 2004 talked about the joint military exercises creating “interoperability” amongst the two forces.

In the latter years of the Antony ministry, the issue of exercising for building “interoperability” had been removed from the lexicon. The Americans surely sought to gauge whether Modi was agreeable to the proposition of the Indian armed forces development of interoperability, which presupposes joint action, where each force can replace of the other seamlessly.

Modi should encourage the American arms manufacturers to compete in bids instead of seeking sales to India under the Foreign Military Sales route. While it may be a secure way of transacting business with India, considering those deals are government to government – thus cutting out the influences of middlemen – they still do not offer a competitive price for the purchases made by the country. Considering the fact these sales are routed through the US government to the US Congress and then to the US administration again for

Indian Army infantryman is familiarizing with the American machine gun prior to field training as part of the annual India-US Yudh Abhyas training exercise

identifying supplier/s (suppliers), the price is also fixed by Washington in the process, leaving aside any attempt at negotiations.

India has a long shopping list for sourcing military arsenals from the US. It requires a bulk quantity of helicopters – light and medium utility, attack and heavy lift choppers. Of course, Modi government has made indigenisation a mantra in the defence ministry, there are items still that will need to be possibly bought outright and/or produced under licence here.

Considering the fact that the Indian Army is raising a full mountain corps and expanding the number of Special Forces units, the demand for American equipment can only rise. Some of the war-fighting stuff that the country needs on a short notice are night vision devices, artillery guns (though the Modi government have shown a marked preference for the homegrown variety), aircraft engines, small arms etc.

Finally, as an emerging military power, India has the desire to project its influence across the Indian Ocean, hitherto being dominated by the USA. So New Delhi will need the help of Washington in establishing Indian Navy’s footprint on the Ocean waters and the littoral states.

39

While the visit of Xi Jinping has reflected the desire of India and China to develop a full scale relationship based on cooperation, the element of competition between the two will, on occasions, underscore the US role in the Indo-Pacific. Modi’s high profile visit to Japan could augur for a balancing act, India will have to play in terms Chinese influences and disputes on the one hand and USJapan-ASEAN interests on the other.

That will only be possible if India bolsters its strategic autonomy and has the muscle to undergird its political initiatives. While all across the world US arms have normally followed US politics, in India this paradigm has to change. Modi would do well to keep the two separate compartments; only to allow synergy between the two when India needs it.

It should be borne in mind with respect to Modi’s visit, that the Indo-US defence relations really saw its acme during the Kargil conflict of 1999, when Bill Clinton had himself intervened to make Nawaz Sharif overrule the army generals led by the Chief of Army Staff, General Parvez Musharraf, and bring to an end to the conflict. That was also the beginning of the countdown that led to the de-hyphenation of the India-Pakistan

Indo-US.qxp_INDO-US.qxd 22/12/14 3:23 pm Page 5

DEFENCE TIES

DECEMBER 2014

It should be borne in mind with respect to Modi’s visit, that the Indo-US defence relations really saw its acme during the Kargil conflict of 1999, when Bill Clinton had himself intervened to make Nawaz Sharif overrule the army generals led by the Chief of Army Staff, General Parvez Musharraf, and bring to an end to the conflict.

AFP

Indian Air Force is evaluating Boeing’s AH-64D Apache for attack helicopter requirements

DSI

”

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel with Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi in August 2014

construct in US diplomatic-military endeavour. Those were the days of the NDA I government. And, Atal Behari Vajpayee, then prime minister, had played a host to the Clinton as then US president in its immediate aftermath.

Epilogue: Notwithstanding that, the Obama Administration will do well to remember that Narendra Modi is a different kettle of fish.

He is someone who understands political power in all its manifestations. While he has inherited the Indian military modernisation process, he would like to quickly establish

his ownership over the programmes.

If Washington affords him that opportunity, that could erase the bitter memory of the USA blackballing him after the 2002 Gujarat carnage. On the other hand, in the penultimate year of the Obama Administration, one that seems hemmed in by adverse foreign policy choices in Europe, West Asia, and even South Asia, generosity was a commodity at a premium.

Also, the problem with the USA is its penchant for expecting returns on investments in quick time: they do not have Confucian Chinese practice of taking a millennial approach to issues of contention

40

and those that are divisive. On the other hand, the threshold for pain of the general population of the USA on foreign military adventures is low, even though the ‘war on terror’ has raised the bar a little. These contradictory factors often leave the best designs of the American national security elite go down the tube.

Modi’s advisers are well aware of these realities. They would advise him to play for time on issues that have a particular immediacy; and hasten the pace of those which policy mavens of Washington want to push to the backburner. In other words, the best effort for Modi was to seek control the pace of the interaction from the first opportunity itself. And he succeeded some.

Unless he leaves a lasting impression on his American interlocutors at the first opportunity, he would find his space constricted in the next.

These myriad factors of the Septemberend sojourn could well be the defining factor of his extensive foreign engagements in the first four months of his tenure. It will set the mood for the remaining period of Obama Administration and the one that will get ushered in 2016. Remember, Modi met the Clintons, with Hillary being a current frontrunner for the Democratic Party’s ticket for presidential polls.

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23/12/14 2:31 PM

DPP.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 24/12/14 3:09 am Page 1

POLICY

DECEMBER 2014

DPP, OFFSETS AND F DI IN DEFENCE The FDI hike in defence is geared towards creating indigenous defence industrial base.

The offset policy will make substantial progress in minimizing the import through progressive increase in domestic production.

Airbus & Tata have submited a joint bid for replacing the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Avro aircraft fleet.The team is offering combat-proven Airbus C295 medium transport for the contract, which covers replacement of 56 Avro aircraft

AMIT COWSHISH

DSI

DPP which contains this procedure has been reviewed six times since then. This document is always under the scanner because it regulates acquisition of big ticket items that form the backbone of the war fighting capability of the armed forces.

Between 2002-03 and the current fiscal, allocation for capital acquisition has also gone up from Rs 18,882 crores to Rs 75,315 crores; and till the end of the last fiscal a sum of approximately Rs 4,25,480 crores had been spent on capital acquisitions. Strangely, this seems to have made little difference.

The Indian Air Force is down to 32/34 squadrons against the targeted strength of 42/45. It is embarrassing to mention the number of submarines the Indian Navy operates. The Indian Army has been swinging between hope and despair for the last quarter of a century in its quest for artillery guns. Forget about other things, we are running low even on ammunition. We do not seem to have sufficient stock of fuses and no one knows when the spectre of night blindness of the land forces is going to become history. This is only indicative of the gigantic problem that needs to be fixed.

What has gone wrong?

There are explanations galore – political indifference, bureaucratic guile and incompetence, civil-military relations, procurement planning, inefficiency of the ordnance factories and the defence public sector undertakings, budgetary constraints, archaic procurement procedures, unexciting FDI policy and an insipid offset policy. Of these, the last three have a more proximate bearing on defence procurements.

Huge amounts are required for all that the armed forces aspire for. However, as repeated underutilisation of allocation for capital acquisition indicates, availability of funds is not a big constraint, for the present.

Since 2002-03 MoD has never been able to spend the entire capital acquisition budget, except during the years 2004-05 and 201011. But this situation may change if the procurements pick up.

The only hope lies in the economy getting back to a high growth trajectory making it possible for the finance ministry to generate more resources for eventual allocation to various claimants, including defence. But even if that happens – and one fervently hopes that it does - it will be embarrassing for a country aspiring for a seat in the UNSC to continue to be the largest importer of

KEY POINTS l There is procedure to be followed for procurement like ‘Buy (Indian)’ to ‘Buy (Global)’ but no policy on categorisation of proposals. l The basic problem of offset is that it is almost completely vendor-driven. l The policy also aims to cr eate conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour.

F

rom multi-role aircraft to munitions, armed forces have a long shopping list. It keeps getting longer as newer requirements keep getting added while the older items do not get ticked off the list.

Since the time the defence establishment was jolted out of slumber by Pakistan’s audacious attempt to capture the Indian posts across the line of control in 1999 in Kargil, MoD has taken various steps to ensure that no service chief has to repeat ‘we shall fight with what we have’.

A capital acquisition wing was set up in 2001 and the procedure for capital procurements was promulgated in 2002.

42

43

DPP.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 24/12/14 3:09 am Page 1

POLICY

DECEMBER 2014

DPP, OFFSETS AND F DI IN DEFENCE The FDI hike in defence is geared towards creating indigenous defence industrial base.

The offset policy will make substantial progress in minimizing the import through progressive increase in domestic production.

Airbus & Tata have submited a joint bid for replacing the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Avro aircraft fleet.The team is offering combat-proven Airbus C295 medium transport for the contract, which covers replacement of 56 Avro aircraft

AMIT COWSHISH

DSI

DPP which contains this procedure has been reviewed six times since then. This document is always under the scanner because it regulates acquisition of big ticket items that form the backbone of the war fighting capability of the armed forces.

Between 2002-03 and the current fiscal, allocation for capital acquisition has also gone up from Rs 18,882 crores to Rs 75,315 crores; and till the end of the last fiscal a sum of approximately Rs 4,25,480 crores had been spent on capital acquisitions. Strangely, this seems to have made little difference.

The Indian Air Force is down to 32/34 squadrons against the targeted strength of 42/45. It is embarrassing to mention the number of submarines the Indian Navy operates. The Indian Army has been swinging between hope and despair for the last quarter of a century in its quest for artillery guns. Forget about other things, we are running low even on ammunition. We do not seem to have sufficient stock of fuses and no one knows when the spectre of night blindness of the land forces is going to become history. This is only indicative of the gigantic problem that needs to be fixed.

What has gone wrong?

There are explanations galore – political indifference, bureaucratic guile and incompetence, civil-military relations, procurement planning, inefficiency of the ordnance factories and the defence public sector undertakings, budgetary constraints, archaic procurement procedures, unexciting FDI policy and an insipid offset policy. Of these, the last three have a more proximate bearing on defence procurements.

Huge amounts are required for all that the armed forces aspire for. However, as repeated underutilisation of allocation for capital acquisition indicates, availability of funds is not a big constraint, for the present.

Since 2002-03 MoD has never been able to spend the entire capital acquisition budget, except during the years 2004-05 and 201011. But this situation may change if the procurements pick up.

The only hope lies in the economy getting back to a high growth trajectory making it possible for the finance ministry to generate more resources for eventual allocation to various claimants, including defence. But even if that happens – and one fervently hopes that it does - it will be embarrassing for a country aspiring for a seat in the UNSC to continue to be the largest importer of

KEY POINTS l There is procedure to be followed for procurement like ‘Buy (Indian)’ to ‘Buy (Global)’ but no policy on categorisation of proposals. l The basic problem of offset is that it is almost completely vendor-driven. l The policy also aims to cr eate conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour.

F

rom multi-role aircraft to munitions, armed forces have a long shopping list. It keeps getting longer as newer requirements keep getting added while the older items do not get ticked off the list.

Since the time the defence establishment was jolted out of slumber by Pakistan’s audacious attempt to capture the Indian posts across the line of control in 1999 in Kargil, MoD has taken various steps to ensure that no service chief has to repeat ‘we shall fight with what we have’.

A capital acquisition wing was set up in 2001 and the procedure for capital procurements was promulgated in 2002.

42

43

DPP.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:43 pm Page 3

POLICY defence equipment. We seem to be meeting 70 per cent of our requirement of defence equipment though imports.

MoD set out to change all this in January 2011 when it came out with a defence production policy with the objective of achieving ‘substantive self reliance in the design, development and production of equipment/weapon systems/ platforms required for defence in as early a time frame as possible’. The policy also aimed at creating ‘conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour; to enhance potential of SMEs in indigenisation and to broaden the defence R&D base of the country’.

A year later a new-look defence offset policy was released in August 2012 to strengthen the domestic defence industry.

In April 2013 a technology perspective and capability roadmap was released to sensitise the defence industry about what the armed forces might be interested in buying over the next 15 year period. The idea was to help them gear up for meeting the future requirements but the information given in the document is too generic and unspecific to be of much help to the industry.

Two months later DPP 2013 was launched with the objective of ensuring faster procurement of defence equipment and higher indigenous production. These objectives were to be met through hierarchical ordering of the procurement categories, starting with ‘Buy (Indian)’, followed by ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’, ‘Make (Indian)’ and ‘Buy and Make’. From then on ‘Buy (Global)’ was to be the category of last choice. This principle was followed even earlier but DPP 2013 formalised it.

As a complementary move, the FDI policy was tweaked in August 2013 to permit FDI beyond the prescribed cap of 26 per cent on a case to case basis with the approval of the cabinet committee on security provided it entailed access to modern and state-of-the-art technology.

The expectation was that with prior notification to the industry of what the armed forces might procure, preference for procurement from the Indian industry, a thoroughly revamped offset policy and tweaking of the FDI policy, the domestic private industry will come up trumps and reduce India’s dependence on imports, with a bit of a leg up from the foreign vendors.

But all this has had little impact. If anything, defence procurement seems to

DECEMBER 2014

have slowed down. Why have all these measures not had the desired effect? Is it because of the procedures being archaic, a still born offset policy or an unexciting liberalisation of the FDI regime?

Somehow it is hard to believe that despite six reviews in twelve years, the procedure continues to be archaic or needlessly complex. There are indeed several stages through which a procurement proposal must pass before culminating in a contract but are these essential? You have to formulate the SQRs, seek approval-in-principle (AoN), solicit offers (RFP), carry out evaluations (technical, field and staff), negotiate with the vendor (CNC) and then seek the final approval of the competent financial authority (CFA) before signing the contract. It is difficult to visualise a procedure free from one or more of these stages.

The problem is not really with these stages but with the processes linked with each of these stages. These processes could do with a lot of streamlining and simplification. You cannot do away with the SQRs but you could improve the process through which these are formulated so that the procurement proposals do not fall through because of faulty SQRs. You may not be able to do away with contract negotiation but you could improve the process so that it does not take several years to conclude the negotiations.

This is true of every stage.

But one big problem that cuts across all the stages is the debility in the decision making process. The last few years have been particularly bad, what with a number of transgressions in defence deals coming to light. The system simply seems to have got immobilised at the points where decisions were required to be taken.

Policy Imbroglio: Much of this confusion in decision-making is because of the mix-up between policy and procedure. We have a defence procurement procedure but no defence procurement policy. The policy has become a subset of this procedure whereas it should have been the other way around. For example, we have the procedure to be followed for procurement under various categories starting from ‘Buy (Indian)’ to ‘Buy (Global)’ but no policy on categorisation of proposals. Inevitably, difference of opinion crops up at every stage, and with no policy in place to guide them, everyone tends to play safe, thus delaying the final decision.

44

DSI

Implementation of offset policy is the responsibility of an organisation called the defence offsets management wing (DOMW). It also operates a facilitation cell to help the vendors and the Indian offset partners. However, in the absence of any internal mechanism to resolve the issues posed by them, this cell, as indeed DOMW, has been of little help to the industry.

An Army CH-47 helicopter attached to the 159th Aviation Regiment lifts a Naval Special Warfare 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) during a maritime external air transporation system training exercise

”

It also makes the officials inflexible. They are not confident of deviating even an inch from the written word of the DPP, even if the situation warrants, for fear of being accused of showing an undue favour to the party that benefits from their action.

Every procurement programme is unique and, therefore, has to be nurtured from beginning till the end. This is not possible if you follow the procedure mechanically.

There has to be a policy, as distinct from procedure, which the procurement officers can fall back on when confronted with a programme-specific issue.

The tendency to introduce policy obliquely through the DPP is not a smart thing. The policy-cum-procedure relating to

the Integrity Pact is another example. It is a part of the DPP but it falls between two stools. As a policy it is not comprehensive and as a procedure it is not complete as demonstrated by the VVIP helicopter case.

How do you come to the conclusion that a breach of Integrity Pact has taken place?

What procedure would you adopt for invoking the pact when you decide that there has indeed been a breach? The DPP tells you what actions can be taken in the event of any breach but it does not tell you under what circumstances which particular action is to be taken. When do you debar a company? Do you debar the company with whom MoD has the contract or you debar all the group companies, apart from the holding

company? These are the kind of issues that a comprehensive policy must address so that the officials implementing the policy are clear about what is to be done and when, rather than rushing to the attorney general every time a crisis surfaces.

This problem of policy-procedure mixup does not, however, afflict every aspect of the procurement system in equal measure.

The offsets and FDI policies are primarily intended to be policies but these suffer from a different set of problems.

Offset and FDI: The offset policy was introduced in 2006 and revamped in 2012. MoD does not release official data on the offset contracts it

45

signs but according to a question answered in the Lok Sabha on 19 August 2013, only 12 contracts had been signed till then. These contracts were for a total value of USD 3,166,306,031 and another 167,216,604 in Swiss Francs. Another estimate puts the current number of contracts at 24. Most of these contracts have been signed under the earlier versions of the offset policy.

Whatever the statistics may suggest there is no doubt that the offset policy has become more of an impediment than a mechanism for strengthening the domestic industrial base which is why the policy was promulgated.

The basic problem is that it is almost completely vendor-driven. There is no provision for MoD to demand and channelise offsets in the areas in which these are required the most. Consequently, there has been little impact of offsets in any particular area or on any particular industry.

Manufacturing sector, in particular, has not benefitted as much as it was expected.

There are a number of ambiguities in the text of the policy. One of the ways in which offset obligation can be discharged is through ‘direct purchase of’ or ‘executing export orders for’ eligible defence products.

Everyone is bound to have an opinion on

DPP.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:43 pm Page 3

POLICY defence equipment. We seem to be meeting 70 per cent of our requirement of defence equipment though imports.

MoD set out to change all this in January 2011 when it came out with a defence production policy with the objective of achieving ‘substantive self reliance in the design, development and production of equipment/weapon systems/ platforms required for defence in as early a time frame as possible’. The policy also aimed at creating ‘conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour; to enhance potential of SMEs in indigenisation and to broaden the defence R&D base of the country’.

A year later a new-look defence offset policy was released in August 2012 to strengthen the domestic defence industry.

In April 2013 a technology perspective and capability roadmap was released to sensitise the defence industry about what the armed forces might be interested in buying over the next 15 year period. The idea was to help them gear up for meeting the future requirements but the information given in the document is too generic and unspecific to be of much help to the industry.

Two months later DPP 2013 was launched with the objective of ensuring faster procurement of defence equipment and higher indigenous production. These objectives were to be met through hierarchical ordering of the procurement categories, starting with ‘Buy (Indian)’, followed by ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’, ‘Make (Indian)’ and ‘Buy and Make’. From then on ‘Buy (Global)’ was to be the category of last choice. This principle was followed even earlier but DPP 2013 formalised it.

As a complementary move, the FDI policy was tweaked in August 2013 to permit FDI beyond the prescribed cap of 26 per cent on a case to case basis with the approval of the cabinet committee on security provided it entailed access to modern and state-of-the-art technology.

The expectation was that with prior notification to the industry of what the armed forces might procure, preference for procurement from the Indian industry, a thoroughly revamped offset policy and tweaking of the FDI policy, the domestic private industry will come up trumps and reduce India’s dependence on imports, with a bit of a leg up from the foreign vendors.

But all this has had little impact. If anything, defence procurement seems to

DECEMBER 2014

have slowed down. Why have all these measures not had the desired effect? Is it because of the procedures being archaic, a still born offset policy or an unexciting liberalisation of the FDI regime?

Somehow it is hard to believe that despite six reviews in twelve years, the procedure continues to be archaic or needlessly complex. There are indeed several stages through which a procurement proposal must pass before culminating in a contract but are these essential? You have to formulate the SQRs, seek approval-in-principle (AoN), solicit offers (RFP), carry out evaluations (technical, field and staff), negotiate with the vendor (CNC) and then seek the final approval of the competent financial authority (CFA) before signing the contract. It is difficult to visualise a procedure free from one or more of these stages.

The problem is not really with these stages but with the processes linked with each of these stages. These processes could do with a lot of streamlining and simplification. You cannot do away with the SQRs but you could improve the process through which these are formulated so that the procurement proposals do not fall through because of faulty SQRs. You may not be able to do away with contract negotiation but you could improve the process so that it does not take several years to conclude the negotiations.

This is true of every stage.

But one big problem that cuts across all the stages is the debility in the decision making process. The last few years have been particularly bad, what with a number of transgressions in defence deals coming to light. The system simply seems to have got immobilised at the points where decisions were required to be taken.

Policy Imbroglio: Much of this confusion in decision-making is because of the mix-up between policy and procedure. We have a defence procurement procedure but no defence procurement policy. The policy has become a subset of this procedure whereas it should have been the other way around. For example, we have the procedure to be followed for procurement under various categories starting from ‘Buy (Indian)’ to ‘Buy (Global)’ but no policy on categorisation of proposals. Inevitably, difference of opinion crops up at every stage, and with no policy in place to guide them, everyone tends to play safe, thus delaying the final decision.

44

DSI

Implementation of offset policy is the responsibility of an organisation called the defence offsets management wing (DOMW). It also operates a facilitation cell to help the vendors and the Indian offset partners. However, in the absence of any internal mechanism to resolve the issues posed by them, this cell, as indeed DOMW, has been of little help to the industry.

An Army CH-47 helicopter attached to the 159th Aviation Regiment lifts a Naval Special Warfare 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) during a maritime external air transporation system training exercise

”

It also makes the officials inflexible. They are not confident of deviating even an inch from the written word of the DPP, even if the situation warrants, for fear of being accused of showing an undue favour to the party that benefits from their action.

Every procurement programme is unique and, therefore, has to be nurtured from beginning till the end. This is not possible if you follow the procedure mechanically.

There has to be a policy, as distinct from procedure, which the procurement officers can fall back on when confronted with a programme-specific issue.

The tendency to introduce policy obliquely through the DPP is not a smart thing. The policy-cum-procedure relating to

the Integrity Pact is another example. It is a part of the DPP but it falls between two stools. As a policy it is not comprehensive and as a procedure it is not complete as demonstrated by the VVIP helicopter case.

How do you come to the conclusion that a breach of Integrity Pact has taken place?

What procedure would you adopt for invoking the pact when you decide that there has indeed been a breach? The DPP tells you what actions can be taken in the event of any breach but it does not tell you under what circumstances which particular action is to be taken. When do you debar a company? Do you debar the company with whom MoD has the contract or you debar all the group companies, apart from the holding

company? These are the kind of issues that a comprehensive policy must address so that the officials implementing the policy are clear about what is to be done and when, rather than rushing to the attorney general every time a crisis surfaces.

This problem of policy-procedure mixup does not, however, afflict every aspect of the procurement system in equal measure.

The offsets and FDI policies are primarily intended to be policies but these suffer from a different set of problems.

Offset and FDI: The offset policy was introduced in 2006 and revamped in 2012. MoD does not release official data on the offset contracts it

45

signs but according to a question answered in the Lok Sabha on 19 August 2013, only 12 contracts had been signed till then. These contracts were for a total value of USD 3,166,306,031 and another 167,216,604 in Swiss Francs. Another estimate puts the current number of contracts at 24. Most of these contracts have been signed under the earlier versions of the offset policy.

Whatever the statistics may suggest there is no doubt that the offset policy has become more of an impediment than a mechanism for strengthening the domestic industrial base which is why the policy was promulgated.

The basic problem is that it is almost completely vendor-driven. There is no provision for MoD to demand and channelise offsets in the areas in which these are required the most. Consequently, there has been little impact of offsets in any particular area or on any particular industry.

Manufacturing sector, in particular, has not benefitted as much as it was expected.

There are a number of ambiguities in the text of the policy. One of the ways in which offset obligation can be discharged is through ‘direct purchase of’ or ‘executing export orders for’ eligible defence products.

Everyone is bound to have an opinion on

DPP.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:44 pm Page 5

POLICY

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

Airbus Helicopters is pitching for multipurpose EC725 helicopter for the Indian Coast Guard’s requirement for 14 shore-based helicopters. The proven EC725 fitted with special weapons and systems is also in the fray for the 123 Naval Multi-Role Helicopter competition

what do these terms denote but what matters is the official interpretation, which is yet to be provided after two years of the policy being in existence. Sadly, there are many other ambiguities in the policy.

Some of its provisions are impractical. The vendors are required to furnish details of the offset partners through whom the offset obligations are to be discharged. Considering that most of the contracts are spread over several years and the vendors can take another two years to discharge the obligation, this requirement is as impractical as it gets.

Implementation of offset policy is the responsibility of an organisation called the defence offsets management wing (DOMW). It also operates a facilitation cell to help the vendors and the Indian offset partners. However, in the absence of any internal mechanism to resolve the issues posed by them, this cell, as indeed DOMW, has been of little help to the industry.

MoD knows all this but has not been able to fix the problem though the 2012 policy has been under review almost since the time it was promulgated. In fact, MoD added some more uncertainty by issuing an order in May 2013 that holds services as a permissible mode of discharging offset obligation in abeyance. More than a year later MoD is still to make up its mind what to do with the abeyance orders.

Taking a step forward only to take two steps back, as in the case of the abeyance orders, is as bad as making inconsequential policy changes, as was the case with 2013

While the new government has taken some steps, which include notification of the list of defence items that require industrial licence, these are rather disjointed.The industry cannot thrive in an atmosphere of uncertainty and continuous flux. The eco-system has to be in tune with the requirement of the industry.

�

liberalisation of the FDI policy. No foreign vendor can be expected to offer state-of-theart technologies if he does not have a decisive say in the management of the affairs of the entity to which it transfers the technology.

No wonder not a single dollar came in by way of FDI between August 2013 when the FDI policy was tweaked and June 2014, for which the figures are available on the DIPP

46

website. The total FDI received since 2001 stands at Rs 24.36 crore. Of the 62 sectors for which data is available, only the coir sector has received less FDI than defence.

Judged by the yardstick of the previous attempt, the policy changes introduced last month are more pragmatic. It makes not much of a difference in regard to management and control of an entity whether the FDI is 26 per cent or 49 per cent, which is perhaps why the new government did not have qualms about raising the FDI cap to 49 per cent. It could help the medium cap defence companies, as well as SMEs, in taking defence production in India to a different level, even if it falls short of being state-of-the-art. If nothing else, this could generate greater employment and, may be, save MoD a few dollars.

Removal of the stipulation that the equity held by the single largest Indian shareholder has to be 51 per cent of the total equity will now permit a foreign investor to be the single largest stakeholder even with 49 per cent equity. But it remains to be seen if this is going to be good enough to bring in state-ofthe-art technologies.

While the new government has taken some steps, which include notification of the list of defence items that require industrial license, these are rather disjointed. The industry cannot thrive in an atmosphere of uncertainty and continuous flux. The eco-system has to be in tune with the requirement of the industry.

Issues relating to the process of industrial licensing, acquisition of land, labour laws, taxation, incentives, level playing field with the public sector, and exports have to be tackled. This requires inter-ministerial coordination. Most importantly, officials have to understand how the industry functions, are accessible to all stakeholders and take decisions.

India presently occupies 134th position in a global index of ease-of-doing business, flanked on either side by the Yemen Republic and Ecuador. Does one have to say anything more to point out what needs to be done?

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23/12/14 2:33 PM

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 1

DEFENCE PLANNING

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

ARMY SPECIAL FORCES: EXPANSION AND BEYOND Even with the promise of a joint command, the SF expansion seem overly ambitious as they are not matched by resources

A Sailor assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit helps hoist an Indian Soldier into a helicopter during multinational exercise between the US, Indian and Canadian armed forces © US Navy

DISTINGUISHED CONTRIBUTOR, DSI

KEY POINTS Special Forces cannot be divined in either quantum or qualitative terms as the process is highly rigourous. l Urge to create volumetric SFs in n I dia need to be based on ealities r like indigenised equipment; theatre specific training etc. l The army has also had the pr oblem of replacement of imported equipments. l

T

ime could not be more opportune than now to focus on our Special Forces capability. The external threats of irregular war are looming large with some 300 plus Indian youth having joined the ISIS, Ayman Zawahri’s call to establish an India Wing of al Qaeda, Pakistan’s continued state policy of terrorism, Chinese indulgence in irregular war, US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and above all lack of international pressure on Pakistan to stop spawning terrorism. Condemnation of Pakistan is only lip service as Pakistan’s ISI will always retain the strategic potential to assist the West in its containment of Russia and China through her proxies, in tandem with her global terrorist links. Both Pakistan and the West know it and West will always forgive Pakistan all her trespasses as they did in the case of Osama bin Laden. This equation may only change if major catastrophe occurs in the West that is traced back to Pakistan. China too is optimising Pakistan’s this evil potential, in addition to herself directly indulging in irregular warfare. That is what led to Ashley Tellis of

Carnegie Foundation say two years back, “India being continuously subjected to terror actually suits many …… India is a sponge that absorbs terrorism.”

Expansion of Special Forces Globally, expansion of Special Forces follows a set of norms, explicitly followed by developed countries with modern armies and Special Forces. Significantly, expansion of Chinese Special Forces too has been undertaken in very controlled fash-

48

ion. These norms are: one, Special Forces cannot be mass produced; two, quality is better than quantity; three, humans are more important than hardware, and; competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. Expansion of Special Forces in foreign militaries is very deliberate. In the case of US Special Forces, authorised annual expansion rate in the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is fixed at 1.8 percent. However, additional bids can be made which are

considered as on the basis of requirement.

For example, Admiral Olsen, then Commander SOCOM had bid for 2.5 percent expansion in 2011 because of global engagements including in Afghanistan and Middle East. Similarly, his successor Admiral McRaven, who oversaw the Abbotabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden, had asked for an addition of 3000 due to increased responsibilities, but this included support elements also. The ratio of ‘support elements’ including civilian teams (like for

psychological operations) is two third to one third, latter being actual Special Forces operatives – the cutting edge.

The US SOCOM strength stands today at about 66,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defence (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified command. In February 2014, DOD issued the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2014 QDR called for 3,700 personnel to be added to the SOCOM strength but SOCOM’s FY 2014-2015 budget request of $ 9.913 billion though with four percent reduction over the previous year may not be met completely. This proposed expansion is in accordance with SOCOM proposal to be given additional responsibility for synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, employment of special operations forces globally, broader responsibility beyond counter-terrorism activities, to include activities against other threat networks. Even with the additions, the actual Special Forces operatives would just amount to some 22,000 approximately 660 special operations teams (includes, Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) platoons.

Chinese Special Forces numbering an estimated 14,000 are specialized in rapid reaction combat in a limited regional war under high-tech conditions, commando operations, counter-terrorism, and intelligence gathering. They are organized in a number of units and sub-units like: Guangzhou Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1988 and expanded in 2000 as first PLA special operations unit capable of air, sea and land operations; Chengdu Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1992 and specialized in target surveillance, target designation, airborne insertion, sabotage, offensive strike, rescue, and has experimented new concepts, tactics, equipments including digitized army soldier system and high-mobility land weapon platforms; Beijing Military Region Special Forces Unit estab-

49

lished in early 1990s and holds high-tech equipment including UAVs, modern demolitions, laser designators and laser dazzlers; Shenyang Military Region Special Forces Unit; Nanjing Military Region Special Forces Units (two of them), Hong Kong Special Operations Company known as five minute Response Unit; and the Macau Quick Reaction Platoon. In conflict scenarios, Chinese Special Forces will likely be deployed in conjunction with China’s Airborne Corps. However, in non-war period Chinese Special Forces would be covertly deployed for information support operations, strategic surveillance, training, arming and advising dissident / terrorist / insurgent groups in target countries, and perception management.

Indian Special Forces The major part of the Indian Special Forces comes from the Army. Then there are the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Navy, the Garud of the Air Force, the Special Groups of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and the Special Action Groups of the National Security Guard (NSG).

Rapid expansion has taken place in recent years and is still ongoing – all racing up to match the numbers of cutting edge Special Forces of SOCOM without taking into account global employment of US-SF visà-vis our inward policy of not deploying Special Forces abroad other than on UN missions, the only exception being deploying all the then three para-commando (later renamed Special Forces) battalions under the IPKF in Sri Lanka. There is an apparent void of a holistic appreciation at the national level to question: what magnitude of Special Forces does India require; with our tendency to numerically go on expanding our Special Forces numbering those of the USA, where are we in terms of resources and technology compared to them; would it be more prudent to have smaller Special Forces with effective reach within areas of ‘our’ strategic interest; should we not optimize our Special Forces potential with available technology and indigenous content, and; what deliberations are required in selection of

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 1

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DECEMBER 2014

DSI

ARMY SPECIAL FORCES: EXPANSION AND BEYOND Even with the promise of a joint command, the SF expansion seem overly ambitious as they are not matched by resources

A Sailor assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit helps hoist an Indian Soldier into a helicopter during multinational exercise between the US, Indian and Canadian armed forces © US Navy

DISTINGUISHED CONTRIBUTOR, DSI

KEY POINTS Special Forces cannot be divined in either quantum or qualitative terms as the process is highly rigourous. l Urge to create volumetric SFs in n I dia need to be based on ealities r like indigenised equipment; theatre specific training etc. l The army has also had the pr oblem of replacement of imported equipments. l

T

ime could not be more opportune than now to focus on our Special Forces capability. The external threats of irregular war are looming large with some 300 plus Indian youth having joined the ISIS, Ayman Zawahri’s call to establish an India Wing of al Qaeda, Pakistan’s continued state policy of terrorism, Chinese indulgence in irregular war, US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and above all lack of international pressure on Pakistan to stop spawning terrorism. Condemnation of Pakistan is only lip service as Pakistan’s ISI will always retain the strategic potential to assist the West in its containment of Russia and China through her proxies, in tandem with her global terrorist links. Both Pakistan and the West know it and West will always forgive Pakistan all her trespasses as they did in the case of Osama bin Laden. This equation may only change if major catastrophe occurs in the West that is traced back to Pakistan. China too is optimising Pakistan’s this evil potential, in addition to herself directly indulging in irregular warfare. That is what led to Ashley Tellis of

Carnegie Foundation say two years back, “India being continuously subjected to terror actually suits many …… India is a sponge that absorbs terrorism.”

Expansion of Special Forces Globally, expansion of Special Forces follows a set of norms, explicitly followed by developed countries with modern armies and Special Forces. Significantly, expansion of Chinese Special Forces too has been undertaken in very controlled fash-

48

ion. These norms are: one, Special Forces cannot be mass produced; two, quality is better than quantity; three, humans are more important than hardware, and; competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. Expansion of Special Forces in foreign militaries is very deliberate. In the case of US Special Forces, authorised annual expansion rate in the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is fixed at 1.8 percent. However, additional bids can be made which are

considered as on the basis of requirement.

For example, Admiral Olsen, then Commander SOCOM had bid for 2.5 percent expansion in 2011 because of global engagements including in Afghanistan and Middle East. Similarly, his successor Admiral McRaven, who oversaw the Abbotabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden, had asked for an addition of 3000 due to increased responsibilities, but this included support elements also. The ratio of ‘support elements’ including civilian teams (like for

psychological operations) is two third to one third, latter being actual Special Forces operatives – the cutting edge.

The US SOCOM strength stands today at about 66,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defence (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified command. In February 2014, DOD issued the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2014 QDR called for 3,700 personnel to be added to the SOCOM strength but SOCOM’s FY 2014-2015 budget request of $ 9.913 billion though with four percent reduction over the previous year may not be met completely. This proposed expansion is in accordance with SOCOM proposal to be given additional responsibility for synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, employment of special operations forces globally, broader responsibility beyond counter-terrorism activities, to include activities against other threat networks. Even with the additions, the actual Special Forces operatives would just amount to some 22,000 approximately 660 special operations teams (includes, Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) platoons.

Chinese Special Forces numbering an estimated 14,000 are specialized in rapid reaction combat in a limited regional war under high-tech conditions, commando operations, counter-terrorism, and intelligence gathering. They are organized in a number of units and sub-units like: Guangzhou Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1988 and expanded in 2000 as first PLA special operations unit capable of air, sea and land operations; Chengdu Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1992 and specialized in target surveillance, target designation, airborne insertion, sabotage, offensive strike, rescue, and has experimented new concepts, tactics, equipments including digitized army soldier system and high-mobility land weapon platforms; Beijing Military Region Special Forces Unit estab-

49

lished in early 1990s and holds high-tech equipment including UAVs, modern demolitions, laser designators and laser dazzlers; Shenyang Military Region Special Forces Unit; Nanjing Military Region Special Forces Units (two of them), Hong Kong Special Operations Company known as five minute Response Unit; and the Macau Quick Reaction Platoon. In conflict scenarios, Chinese Special Forces will likely be deployed in conjunction with China’s Airborne Corps. However, in non-war period Chinese Special Forces would be covertly deployed for information support operations, strategic surveillance, training, arming and advising dissident / terrorist / insurgent groups in target countries, and perception management.

Indian Special Forces The major part of the Indian Special Forces comes from the Army. Then there are the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Navy, the Garud of the Air Force, the Special Groups of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and the Special Action Groups of the National Security Guard (NSG).

Rapid expansion has taken place in recent years and is still ongoing – all racing up to match the numbers of cutting edge Special Forces of SOCOM without taking into account global employment of US-SF visà-vis our inward policy of not deploying Special Forces abroad other than on UN missions, the only exception being deploying all the then three para-commando (later renamed Special Forces) battalions under the IPKF in Sri Lanka. There is an apparent void of a holistic appreciation at the national level to question: what magnitude of Special Forces does India require; with our tendency to numerically go on expanding our Special Forces numbering those of the USA, where are we in terms of resources and technology compared to them; would it be more prudent to have smaller Special Forces with effective reach within areas of ‘our’ strategic interest; should we not optimize our Special Forces potential with available technology and indigenous content, and; what deliberations are required in selection of

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 3

DEFENCE PLANNING

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

Amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) conducting joint forces exercises in the US © US Navy

Indian Army paratroopers practice parachute landing falls during airborne refresher training in Yudh Abhyas, an annual training exercise between the armies of US & India in 2013 © US Army

manpower, equipping, training and most importantly command and control?

Army Special Forces Ironically, the Army Special Forces went in for a 120 percent increase during period 2001-2004 including converting three Parachute battalions to Special Forces and adding the fourth assault team in all Special Forces units, completely disregarding the global norms with regard to expansion of Special Forces. This rapid expansion was pushed through by two successive Colonels of the Parachute Regiment (both never having served in Special Forces) to somehow convert the entire Parachute Regiment to Special Forces with the aim that every paratrooper gets entitled to the Special Forces Allowance and gets to wear the distinctive ‘Balidan’ badge authorized

to the Special Forces personnel, throwing to the wind the consequences of such rapid expansion and the shortage it would create in number of parachute battalions, now being rectified by raising additional units of this category since regular turnouts in the Parachute Brigade became impossible and parachute battalions were going without counter insurgency experience from six to nine years at a stretch.

The rapid expansion was actually set in motion during the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by somehow convincing that the US had deployed some 20,000 US-SF in operations by counting operations by US Airborne Divisions, who actually were not Special Forces in the first place. But this was not all.

Discounting a 2001 comprehensive study on modernisation of Indian Army’s

50

Special Forces that was approved along with the recommendation to consolidate on existing number of Special Forces, the then Colonel of the Parachute Regiment who also had never served with Special Forces headed a study to recommend that every army Corps should have its own Special Forces battalion – a case of gross misunderstanding of establishment of effective Special Forces and more importantly complete lack of sense about strategic employment of Special Forces in 21st century conflict environment. As a result, the Army already has nine Special Forces battalions and establishment of the tenth one is on the anvil. But the fallout of the rapid expansion has been adverse.

Manpower Every time an additional Special Forces unit is created, existing Special Forces are required to provide a nucleus of officers, junior commissioned officers and non-

commissioned officers. This breaks the cohesion of existing units, a fact not well understood by anyone who has not served with Special Forces, since even continuity in a five man assault squad contributes to success of missions.

Then is the shortage of officers. First, the Special Forces units are already sharing the poverty of shortage of officers within the army. Then shedding officers to new units is taxing especially these are young majors and captains who have been in operations, and most importantly when almost all Special Forces units are not even posted with one third of the authorised strength of 48 officers. Less the officers, less will be the combat output since Special Forces operations are designed for precision and high gains through officer led small subunits, lowest being the fiveman assault squad not counting still smaller two-man surveillance missions. The Special Forces battalions are almost down to the void of one assault team.

However, in non-war period Chinese Special Forces would be covertly deployed for information support operations, strategic surveillance, training, arming and advising dissident/ terrorist/insurgent groups in target countries, and perception management.

51

Hardware Planners need to understand that Special Forces equipping must be ‘packaged’. The concept of ‘packaged equipping’ simply implies that equipping cannot be piecemeal. For example, if an assault squad is authorized ‘X’ weapons and ‘Y’ equipment, all of them have to be provisioned together if the expected mission outcome and combat capability is to be achieved. For example, hand-held laser target designators have been authorized to army’s Special Forces since last 10 years but have not been provisioned yet. The army has also had the problem of re-supply / replacement of imported special equipment since concurrent action of ‘introducing’ the equipment into service has not been taking place. There is apparent lack of forethought and standardisation of equipment as well, leave aside measures like centralised special equipment procurement for the military and similarly for the non-military Special Forces.

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 3

DEFENCE PLANNING

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

Amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) conducting joint forces exercises in the US © US Navy

Indian Army paratroopers practice parachute landing falls during airborne refresher training in Yudh Abhyas, an annual training exercise between the armies of US & India in 2013 © US Army

manpower, equipping, training and most importantly command and control?

Army Special Forces Ironically, the Army Special Forces went in for a 120 percent increase during period 2001-2004 including converting three Parachute battalions to Special Forces and adding the fourth assault team in all Special Forces units, completely disregarding the global norms with regard to expansion of Special Forces. This rapid expansion was pushed through by two successive Colonels of the Parachute Regiment (both never having served in Special Forces) to somehow convert the entire Parachute Regiment to Special Forces with the aim that every paratrooper gets entitled to the Special Forces Allowance and gets to wear the distinctive ‘Balidan’ badge authorized

to the Special Forces personnel, throwing to the wind the consequences of such rapid expansion and the shortage it would create in number of parachute battalions, now being rectified by raising additional units of this category since regular turnouts in the Parachute Brigade became impossible and parachute battalions were going without counter insurgency experience from six to nine years at a stretch.

The rapid expansion was actually set in motion during the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by somehow convincing that the US had deployed some 20,000 US-SF in operations by counting operations by US Airborne Divisions, who actually were not Special Forces in the first place. But this was not all.

Discounting a 2001 comprehensive study on modernisation of Indian Army’s

50

Special Forces that was approved along with the recommendation to consolidate on existing number of Special Forces, the then Colonel of the Parachute Regiment who also had never served with Special Forces headed a study to recommend that every army Corps should have its own Special Forces battalion – a case of gross misunderstanding of establishment of effective Special Forces and more importantly complete lack of sense about strategic employment of Special Forces in 21st century conflict environment. As a result, the Army already has nine Special Forces battalions and establishment of the tenth one is on the anvil. But the fallout of the rapid expansion has been adverse.

Manpower Every time an additional Special Forces unit is created, existing Special Forces are required to provide a nucleus of officers, junior commissioned officers and non-

commissioned officers. This breaks the cohesion of existing units, a fact not well understood by anyone who has not served with Special Forces, since even continuity in a five man assault squad contributes to success of missions.

Then is the shortage of officers. First, the Special Forces units are already sharing the poverty of shortage of officers within the army. Then shedding officers to new units is taxing especially these are young majors and captains who have been in operations, and most importantly when almost all Special Forces units are not even posted with one third of the authorised strength of 48 officers. Less the officers, less will be the combat output since Special Forces operations are designed for precision and high gains through officer led small subunits, lowest being the fiveman assault squad not counting still smaller two-man surveillance missions. The Special Forces battalions are almost down to the void of one assault team.

However, in non-war period Chinese Special Forces would be covertly deployed for information support operations, strategic surveillance, training, arming and advising dissident/ terrorist/insurgent groups in target countries, and perception management.

51

Hardware Planners need to understand that Special Forces equipping must be ‘packaged’. The concept of ‘packaged equipping’ simply implies that equipping cannot be piecemeal. For example, if an assault squad is authorized ‘X’ weapons and ‘Y’ equipment, all of them have to be provisioned together if the expected mission outcome and combat capability is to be achieved. For example, hand-held laser target designators have been authorized to army’s Special Forces since last 10 years but have not been provisioned yet. The army has also had the problem of re-supply / replacement of imported special equipment since concurrent action of ‘introducing’ the equipment into service has not been taking place. There is apparent lack of forethought and standardisation of equipment as well, leave aside measures like centralised special equipment procurement for the military and similarly for the non-military Special Forces.

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 5

DEFENCE PLANNING Special Forces units in Northern Command are slightly better off because they can get some special equipment through Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers but this too is ad-hoc arrangement.

There is no concept of ‘support elements’ and integral or dedicated insertion/extraction means either.

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

Sailors practice vessel boarding techniques during a multinational, mission-based task force working under Combined Maritime Forces, to conduct counter-piracy operations on Indian Ocean region © US Navy

Use of ground robots during a search mission by special forces © ReconRobotics

”

The absence of corner shots with the NSG employed during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack was conspicuous although this equipment was held with the Special Group of the SFF for past few years.

Surveillance, communications and nightvision equipment though authorised can be improved both in quality and quantity.

When the Tavor assault rifles were initially contracted, only one night-vision was bought per four assault rifles knowing full well every Special Forces operative’s assault rifle must have a night sight. Mercifully, this folly was rectified subsequently. Presently, equipping voids exist from the very basic to bigger operational requirements.

The basic rucksack provided officially is as inferior as the basic web equipment that was supplied to the army with much fanfare. The material was so inferior and the stitching thread so inferior that first time a soldier went through the obstacle course, it ripped open in places. Special Forces units are presently using their own funds to buy good quality rucksacks.

Similarly, no worthwhile rappelling gloves and rappelling ropes are officially supplied, both in quality and quantity.

A major void exists in the provision of a battlefield information system that would enable multiple Special Forces detachments operating widespread over long dis-

tance and deep inside enemy territory communicating with a special operations command post at the parent battalion headquarters, Corps level FMCP and directly to the air-force for calling airstrikes including armed UAV’s. Equipping should be viewed in the backdrop that they must have all weather, all terrain operability and survival capacity for strategic tasks including surveillance and target designation in areas of our strategic interest.

52

Akin to shedding officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers to new raisings, the hardware of Special Forces units has taken a heavy toll on their combat potential especially when coupled with existing and never ending equipment voids and shortages. Worst hit is the holding of Tavor Assault Rifles and the ammunition as replacements are not forthcoming. So each Special Forces unit has shortages of Tavor assault rifles, made

up with AK 47s in some case. But the worst problem is severe shortages in supply of training ammunition for this rifle which is entirely dependent on import and not even 50 percent of the annual requirement is being met. There is also a ‘complete void’ against authorised quantities of hardware, major ones being: heavy machine guns; underwater rifles; 60 mm mortars, disposable anti-tank rocket launchers; disposable flame throwers; satellite phones; airborne SAR systems; VHF repeaters; solar panels for charging; light strike vehicles; GP delivery system (GPADS) 2 ton category; GPADS 4 ton category; underwater cameras; underwater driver propulsion vehicles; digital compasses; GPSs; laser target designators; video cameras for HX transmission; still cameras for HX transmission; night scope with adapter; remote detonator transmitters; remote detonator receivers, and; radio controlled detonators.

In addition, major deficiencies exist in: assault rifles with night sights; GPMG with night sights; AGL with night sights; 40 mm UBGL; pistols; ATGM with TI; SAM with night sight: carbines with night sight; tactical computers; ground to air LUP; radio transmitter beacons; combat military free-fall parachutes and compatible oxygen equipment; high resolution binoculars; passive night vision binoculars; night vision binoculars with communication and range finder; HHTIs, and; passive night vision goggles.

On balance The Army has periodically toyed with the ideas of raising more armoured regiments with just 30 tanks instead of the 46 presently authorized and even raising more infantry battalions with three rifle companies instead of the authorised four rifle companies. Luckily these idiocies were not put into effect. However in

53

going in for rapid expansion of Special Forces, the army has landed up doing just that. The utter neglect to equipping can be gauged from above. There is little movement on the equipment front and no provision of a separate Special Forces Budget as most countries have.

Special Forces units in Northern Command are slightly better off because they can get some special equipment through Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers but this too is ad-hoc arrangement. There is no concept of ‘support elements’ and integral or dedicated insertion/extraction means either.

Ironically, no corresponding increase in advance specialist training facilities has been undertaken either. Rapid expansion ignoring global Special Forces norms has proved to be a recipe for diluting the manpower of Special Forces, their equipping and most importantly their overall combat capacity.

Special Forces.qxp_INDO-PAK.qxd 22/12/14 3:58 pm Page 5

DEFENCE PLANNING Special Forces units in Northern Command are slightly better off because they can get some special equipment through Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers but this too is ad-hoc arrangement.

There is no concept of ‘support elements’ and integral or dedicated insertion/extraction means either.

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

Sailors practice vessel boarding techniques during a multinational, mission-based task force working under Combined Maritime Forces, to conduct counter-piracy operations on Indian Ocean region © US Navy

Use of ground robots during a search mission by special forces © ReconRobotics

”

The absence of corner shots with the NSG employed during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack was conspicuous although this equipment was held with the Special Group of the SFF for past few years.

Surveillance, communications and nightvision equipment though authorised can be improved both in quality and quantity.

When the Tavor assault rifles were initially contracted, only one night-vision was bought per four assault rifles knowing full well every Special Forces operative’s assault rifle must have a night sight. Mercifully, this folly was rectified subsequently. Presently, equipping voids exist from the very basic to bigger operational requirements.

The basic rucksack provided officially is as inferior as the basic web equipment that was supplied to the army with much fanfare. The material was so inferior and the stitching thread so inferior that first time a soldier went through the obstacle course, it ripped open in places. Special Forces units are presently using their own funds to buy good quality rucksacks.

Similarly, no worthwhile rappelling gloves and rappelling ropes are officially supplied, both in quality and quantity.

A major void exists in the provision of a battlefield information system that would enable multiple Special Forces detachments operating widespread over long dis-

tance and deep inside enemy territory communicating with a special operations command post at the parent battalion headquarters, Corps level FMCP and directly to the air-force for calling airstrikes including armed UAV’s. Equipping should be viewed in the backdrop that they must have all weather, all terrain operability and survival capacity for strategic tasks including surveillance and target designation in areas of our strategic interest.

52

Akin to shedding officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers to new raisings, the hardware of Special Forces units has taken a heavy toll on their combat potential especially when coupled with existing and never ending equipment voids and shortages. Worst hit is the holding of Tavor Assault Rifles and the ammunition as replacements are not forthcoming. So each Special Forces unit has shortages of Tavor assault rifles, made

up with AK 47s in some case. But the worst problem is severe shortages in supply of training ammunition for this rifle which is entirely dependent on import and not even 50 percent of the annual requirement is being met. There is also a ‘complete void’ against authorised quantities of hardware, major ones being: heavy machine guns; underwater rifles; 60 mm mortars, disposable anti-tank rocket launchers; disposable flame throwers; satellite phones; airborne SAR systems; VHF repeaters; solar panels for charging; light strike vehicles; GP delivery system (GPADS) 2 ton category; GPADS 4 ton category; underwater cameras; underwater driver propulsion vehicles; digital compasses; GPSs; laser target designators; video cameras for HX transmission; still cameras for HX transmission; night scope with adapter; remote detonator transmitters; remote detonator receivers, and; radio controlled detonators.

In addition, major deficiencies exist in: assault rifles with night sights; GPMG with night sights; AGL with night sights; 40 mm UBGL; pistols; ATGM with TI; SAM with night sight: carbines with night sight; tactical computers; ground to air LUP; radio transmitter beacons; combat military free-fall parachutes and compatible oxygen equipment; high resolution binoculars; passive night vision binoculars; night vision binoculars with communication and range finder; HHTIs, and; passive night vision goggles.

On balance The Army has periodically toyed with the ideas of raising more armoured regiments with just 30 tanks instead of the 46 presently authorized and even raising more infantry battalions with three rifle companies instead of the authorised four rifle companies. Luckily these idiocies were not put into effect. However in

53

going in for rapid expansion of Special Forces, the army has landed up doing just that. The utter neglect to equipping can be gauged from above. There is little movement on the equipment front and no provision of a separate Special Forces Budget as most countries have.

Special Forces units in Northern Command are slightly better off because they can get some special equipment through Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers but this too is ad-hoc arrangement. There is no concept of ‘support elements’ and integral or dedicated insertion/extraction means either.

Ironically, no corresponding increase in advance specialist training facilities has been undertaken either. Rapid expansion ignoring global Special Forces norms has proved to be a recipe for diluting the manpower of Special Forces, their equipping and most importantly their overall combat capacity.

Defence Buzz.14.qxp_DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 22/12/14 4:19 pm Page 2

DEFENCE BUZZ

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

Akash Air Defence System successfully completes firing trials Firing trials of the Akash Air Defence System, designed and developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and manufactured by Navratna defence PSU Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), were conducted successfully at the Integrated Test Range, Balasore, Odisha, from November 17 to 22, 2014.

The Akash Air Defence system has been designed to defend and protect the nation’s assets from penetrating aerial attacks.The Akash missile can fly at supersonic speed.

At the latest firing trials, the systems were tested successfully under extreme flight condition of near boundary low altitude, far boundary high altitude and multi-target, multi-missile scenario.The flight trials were

carried out on unmanned aerial target Banshee jet and para-flares.The targets were repeatedly destroyed by the Akash Missile System.This is

Scientist, G Chandramouli, Project Director, Akash, DRDL, and senior officers of the Indian Air Force. BEL’s team of engineers participated

the last in the series of flight trials carried out on the production version of the Akash Air Defence System for the Indian Air Force to validate complete intercept envelope of the Air Defence System.

The firing exercise was conducted under the able leadership of outstanding

and steered the critical flight exercises. The Akash Missile System is an all-weather, point / area air defence weapon system for defending vulnerable areas / points against medium range targets penetrating from low, medium and high altitudes.

BEL is involved in the

New Defence Minister takes charge Manohar Gopalkrishna Prabhu Parrikar took over as the 36th Defence Minister of the country. The Defence Minister had said, he would maintain the fast pace of acquisition set in motion by the Government for the Defence Forces while ensuring transparency at every stage. Parrikar said, “his predecessor Arun Jaitley has initiated work on many issues relating to Defence despite several constraints and that he is confident of taking these

manufacture and integration of highly complex and sophisticated Ground Radars for Surveillance and tracking and control centers for the Akash Air Defence System.

The missile guidance and air defence functions such as classification, threat evaluation, prioritization and missile launch are automated with manual over-ride.

The Akash missile utilizes an integral rocket-ramjet propulsion system to provide thrust till intercept. A digital onboard computer enables automated mission sequencing and the embedded digital autopilot ensures flight stability and missile maneuvering.

The onboard command guidance unit receives coded digital information from the Radar which is used for steering the missile towards the target.

train people to acquire not only traditional skills but also new skills, the minister added.

Parrikar expressed his anguish at the sinking of a Naval vessel off the Coast of Visakhapatnam and the earlier incident of an explosion in a submarine. Senior officials of the Ministry of Defence including the Defence Secretary Shri RK Mathur welcomed him at the South Block.The Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh and the three Service Chiefs also called on him and had greeted on assumption of office.

steps forward with speed.

Referring to the ‘Make in India’ drive of the Government, he said, “the measure will not only lead to self-reliance in Defence manufacturing but also generate employment and would ultimately contribute to economic development”.

Earlier technical skills used to be handed over from one generation to the other but that tradition is gradually vanishing.

It is for this reason, we have to

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Ad Size 216x276.indd 1

23/12/14 3:14 PM

Defence Buzz.14.qxp_DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 24/12/14 3:18 am Page 4

DEFENCE BUZZ

DECEMBER 2014

Tata-Airbus bid for IAF Avro replacement Tata Advanced Systems (TASL) and Airbus Defence and Space announced a joint bid for a government contract to supply military aircraft for the Indian Air Force.The IAF is looking forward to replace its fleet of Avro aircraft with the market-leading Airbus C295 medium transport.

A total of 56 Avro aircraft

assembly, final aircraft assembly, systems integration and testing, and management of the indigenous supply chain.

The C295 is a superbly reliable and tough aircraft with outstanding economics which is proven in the most difficult operating conditions all over the world. It has already been ordered by 19 countries, many of which have placed repeat orders. And just this year it has dominated the market with orders for no fewer than 20 aircraft from five countries.

It is a landmark for the development of aircraft manufacturing capability in India, now that Tata Advanced Systems is poised to take this step toward building entire aircraft in India. The selection of Tata Advanced Systems by Airbus demonstrates the confidence that has been built in our ability to undertake this complex programme.

are to be replaced. In the event of contract award, Airbus Defence and Space will supply the first 16 aircraft in ‘fly-away’ condition from its own final assembly line.

The subsequent 40 aircraft will be manufactured and assembled by Tata Advanced Systems in India. This will include undertaking structural

Bell, Textron expand presence in India Bell Helicopter and Textron Systems signed an agreement with Dynamatic Technologies Limited of Bangalore, India establishing Dynamatic as a single source supplier of major airframe assemblies for the Bell 407GX and 407GT. The agreement is for a seven year period with options to extend through the life of the product and follows a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2012 to mutually explore business opportunities for the production of Bell’s model 407 airframe assemblies. Textron Systems will work cooperatively with Dynamatic and Bell Helicopter to support in-country procurement operations. Both companies remain engaged in identifying additional business

efficiencies to our manufacturing process for the Bell 407,” said Mike Loeffler, Bell Helicopter’s Vice President, Supply Chain”.

Textron Systems, in conjunction with Bell Helicopter, is cultivating Indian offset relationships in support of current and future international programs.

Textron Systems is currently procuring a range of commodities in India via several prime sourcing partnerships, and continues to seek new opportunities to expand its supply base in country.

Dynamatic has already successfully completed the First Article Acceptance of Aft Fuselage detail parts and recently commenced production for shipment to Bell’s aircraft assembly site in Mirabel, Canada.

opportunities to further build on Dynamatic’s Premier supplier capabilities as Bell Helicopter looks to invest and expand operations in the region.

“This agreement with Dynamatic represents a significant milestone in Bell Helicopter’s global sourcing strategy and brings

56

India,China joint military exercise

The Fourth India-China Joint Training Exercise Hand-inHand 2014 held at Pune on 17 November 2014 with an impressive opening ceremony at the Aundh Military Cantonment in Pune.The aim of the joint exercise was to acquaint both the Armies with each other’s operating procedures in the backdrop of counter terrorism environment.

The 12 day schedule was focused upon training on crossing of obstacles, special heliborne operations, firing of various weapons, handling and neutralisation of improvised explosive devices and conduct of cordon and search operations in insurgency and terrorism environment.

An opening ceremony was held at the parade ground in Aundh Military Camp.The opening ceremony was attended by Lt General Bobby Mathews, Corps Commander of the Indian Army and Lt General Shi Xiangyuan, Deputy Commander of Chengdu Military Command of the People’s Liberation Army, besides many senior army officials of both nations.The parade was commanded by Lt ColonelTian Jeiwen, Commanding Officer of People’s Liberation Army contingent.

Tejas Trainer PV6 successfully completes first flight The Light Combat AircraftTejas Programme achieved another milestone with the first flight of its trainer PV6.The two-seater version took to the skies ,piloted by Capt Vivart Singh along with Capt Anoop Kabadwal.This is the 16thTejas variant to have flown as part of the project.

The aim of this flight was to check the twin cockpit functionality which is similar to series production twoseater aircraft. All systems functioned as expected during the 36 minute flight. PV6 is the second two- seater and has the capability to deliver all air to air and air to ground

weapons as required by the Indian Air Force for the Final Operational Clearance.

The PV6 has absorbed all the major design modifications undertaken during the last 2500 plus flights

in the programme. This is the final prototype leading to series production trainer.

Test Director Commander Jitendra Raturi, Safety Pilot Ritu RajTyagi, ADA Director P.S. Subramanyam, NFTC Chief

DSI

Test Pilot Cmde J.A. Maolankar and LCA Navy Project Director Cmde C D Balaji (Retd) were present at the telemetry monitoring centre.

This flight is the culmination of efforts of ADA, HAL, CEMILAC, DG AQA, IAF, ADA and other DRDO and CSIR organisations.

Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, Dr Avinash Chander congratulated the Tejas team on achieving this milestone and said, “having achieved success in indigenous design and development of Tejas in both its combat and trainer versions, its production and induction will add new strength to Make in India Campaign.

Indian-French Navies exploring new avenues French Chief of Naval Staff, Navy Admiral Bernard Rogel was on an official visit to India from 13 to 18 Nov 14 to discuss existing Naval cooperation, cement existing bridges of friendship as well as to explore new avenues of cooperation between the

Indian and French Navies.

Admiral Bernard Rogel was accorded a ceremonial guard of honour. He met senior Naval officers as well as various senior MoD and other government officials at Delhi.

The Admiral also visited Goa where he addressed the Naval participants at the Naval War College Goa. Also, he visited Naval facilities as well as Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai.

Indian Navy – French Naval cooperation covers a wide

spectrum of maritime activities and includes Navy to Navy Staff talks, bilateral exercise Varuna as well as regular delegation level interactions. Warships of both Navies make regular port calls to each other’s ports. The training interaction includes courses in high technology as well as at staff levels.

French Navy has been an active supporter of the Indian Navy initiated ‘IONS’ which is aimed at collaboration among IOR littorals towards enhancement of maritime security and good order at sea.

Interaction between the two navies has, over the years nurtured into a strong partnership based on mutual interest and trust. Naval cooperation has progressed most encouragingly in recent years and the increasing scale of operational interaction is indicative of the growing understanding between both navies.

India-Singapore joint military training Major General Hoo Cher Mou, Chief of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) was in New Delhi on a three day official tour . The Chief of RSAF was accorded a Guard of Honour at Air Headquarters. He met the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, and discussed matters of mutual interest.

He visited Air Force Station, Agra on Wednesday to get a firsthand account of the training pattern of IAF’s Para Troopers School (PTS) and the Mid Air Refueling Squadron

57

(MARS). Also, he visited Air Force Station, Kalaikunda where a team of RSAF personnel was already undergoing training as part of the ‘Joint Military Training’ (JMT).

The annual Air Staff talks between the air forces of India and Singapore commenced in 2006. The IAF-RSAF JMT is an annual programme that has regularly been held since 2008.

The JMT provides an ideal platform for exchange of air tactics and training philosophy to the pilots of the two countries.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

DECEMBER 2014

Tata-Airbus bid for IAF Avro replacement Tata Advanced Systems (TASL) and Airbus Defence and Space announced a joint bid for a government contract to supply military aircraft for the Indian Air Force.The IAF is looking forward to replace its fleet of Avro aircraft with the market-leading Airbus C295 medium transport.

A total of 56 Avro aircraft

assembly, final aircraft assembly, systems integration and testing, and management of the indigenous supply chain.

The C295 is a superbly reliable and tough aircraft with outstanding economics which is proven in the most difficult operating conditions all over the world. It has already been ordered by 19 countries, many of which have placed repeat orders. And just this year it has dominated the market with orders for no fewer than 20 aircraft from five countries.

It is a landmark for the development of aircraft manufacturing capability in India, now that Tata Advanced Systems is poised to take this step toward building entire aircraft in India. The selection of Tata Advanced Systems by Airbus demonstrates the confidence that has been built in our ability to undertake this complex programme.

are to be replaced. In the event of contract award, Airbus Defence and Space will supply the first 16 aircraft in ‘fly-away’ condition from its own final assembly line.

The subsequent 40 aircraft will be manufactured and assembled by Tata Advanced Systems in India. This will include undertaking structural

Bell, Textron expand presence in India Bell Helicopter and Textron Systems signed an agreement with Dynamatic Technologies Limited of Bangalore, India establishing Dynamatic as a single source supplier of major airframe assemblies for the Bell 407GX and 407GT. The agreement is for a seven year period with options to extend through the life of the product and follows a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2012 to mutually explore business opportunities for the production of Bell’s model 407 airframe assemblies. Textron Systems will work cooperatively with Dynamatic and Bell Helicopter to support in-country procurement operations. Both companies remain engaged in identifying additional business

efficiencies to our manufacturing process for the Bell 407,” said Mike Loeffler, Bell Helicopter’s Vice President, Supply Chain”.

Textron Systems, in conjunction with Bell Helicopter, is cultivating Indian offset relationships in support of current and future international programs.

Textron Systems is currently procuring a range of commodities in India via several prime sourcing partnerships, and continues to seek new opportunities to expand its supply base in country.

Dynamatic has already successfully completed the First Article Acceptance of Aft Fuselage detail parts and recently commenced production for shipment to Bell’s aircraft assembly site in Mirabel, Canada.

opportunities to further build on Dynamatic’s Premier supplier capabilities as Bell Helicopter looks to invest and expand operations in the region.

“This agreement with Dynamatic represents a significant milestone in Bell Helicopter’s global sourcing strategy and brings

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India,China joint military exercise

The Fourth India-China Joint Training Exercise Hand-inHand 2014 held at Pune on 17 November 2014 with an impressive opening ceremony at the Aundh Military Cantonment in Pune.The aim of the joint exercise was to acquaint both the Armies with each other’s operating procedures in the backdrop of counter terrorism environment.

The 12 day schedule was focused upon training on crossing of obstacles, special heliborne operations, firing of various weapons, handling and neutralisation of improvised explosive devices and conduct of cordon and search operations in insurgency and terrorism environment.

An opening ceremony was held at the parade ground in Aundh Military Camp.The opening ceremony was attended by Lt General Bobby Mathews, Corps Commander of the Indian Army and Lt General Shi Xiangyuan, Deputy Commander of Chengdu Military Command of the People’s Liberation Army, besides many senior army officials of both nations.The parade was commanded by Lt ColonelTian Jeiwen, Commanding Officer of People’s Liberation Army contingent.

Tejas Trainer PV6 successfully completes first flight The Light Combat AircraftTejas Programme achieved another milestone with the first flight of its trainer PV6.The two-seater version took to the skies ,piloted by Capt Vivart Singh along with Capt Anoop Kabadwal.This is the 16thTejas variant to have flown as part of the project.

The aim of this flight was to check the twin cockpit functionality which is similar to series production twoseater aircraft. All systems functioned as expected during the 36 minute flight. PV6 is the second two- seater and has the capability to deliver all air to air and air to ground

weapons as required by the Indian Air Force for the Final Operational Clearance.

The PV6 has absorbed all the major design modifications undertaken during the last 2500 plus flights

in the programme. This is the final prototype leading to series production trainer.

Test Director Commander Jitendra Raturi, Safety Pilot Ritu RajTyagi, ADA Director P.S. Subramanyam, NFTC Chief

DSI

Test Pilot Cmde J.A. Maolankar and LCA Navy Project Director Cmde C D Balaji (Retd) were present at the telemetry monitoring centre.

This flight is the culmination of efforts of ADA, HAL, CEMILAC, DG AQA, IAF, ADA and other DRDO and CSIR organisations.

Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, Dr Avinash Chander congratulated the Tejas team on achieving this milestone and said, “having achieved success in indigenous design and development of Tejas in both its combat and trainer versions, its production and induction will add new strength to Make in India Campaign.

Indian-French Navies exploring new avenues French Chief of Naval Staff, Navy Admiral Bernard Rogel was on an official visit to India from 13 to 18 Nov 14 to discuss existing Naval cooperation, cement existing bridges of friendship as well as to explore new avenues of cooperation between the

Indian and French Navies.

Admiral Bernard Rogel was accorded a ceremonial guard of honour. He met senior Naval officers as well as various senior MoD and other government officials at Delhi.

The Admiral also visited Goa where he addressed the Naval participants at the Naval War College Goa. Also, he visited Naval facilities as well as Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai.

Indian Navy – French Naval cooperation covers a wide

spectrum of maritime activities and includes Navy to Navy Staff talks, bilateral exercise Varuna as well as regular delegation level interactions. Warships of both Navies make regular port calls to each other’s ports. The training interaction includes courses in high technology as well as at staff levels.

French Navy has been an active supporter of the Indian Navy initiated ‘IONS’ which is aimed at collaboration among IOR littorals towards enhancement of maritime security and good order at sea.

Interaction between the two navies has, over the years nurtured into a strong partnership based on mutual interest and trust. Naval cooperation has progressed most encouragingly in recent years and the increasing scale of operational interaction is indicative of the growing understanding between both navies.

India-Singapore joint military training Major General Hoo Cher Mou, Chief of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) was in New Delhi on a three day official tour . The Chief of RSAF was accorded a Guard of Honour at Air Headquarters. He met the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, and discussed matters of mutual interest.

He visited Air Force Station, Agra on Wednesday to get a firsthand account of the training pattern of IAF’s Para Troopers School (PTS) and the Mid Air Refueling Squadron

57

(MARS). Also, he visited Air Force Station, Kalaikunda where a team of RSAF personnel was already undergoing training as part of the ‘Joint Military Training’ (JMT).

The annual Air Staff talks between the air forces of India and Singapore commenced in 2006. The IAF-RSAF JMT is an annual programme that has regularly been held since 2008.

The JMT provides an ideal platform for exchange of air tactics and training philosophy to the pilots of the two countries.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

DECEMBER 2014

DSI

India receives sixth P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft Boeing delivered the sixth P-8I maritime patrol aircraft to India, on schedule, on Nov. 24, arriving at Naval Air Station Rajali to join five others being used by the Indian Navy. The P-8I is part of a contract of eight awarded in 2009. The final two deliveries are scheduled for 2015.

“The P-8I’s arrival in India is another key milestone for the program and marks our final delivery of the year,” said Dennis Swanson, vice president, Boeing Defense, Space & Security in India. “The Indian Navy is currently conducting missions with the first five aircraft, and this newest P-8I will begin flight trials in the coming months.”

Based on the company’s Next-Generation 737 commercial airplane, the P-8I is the Indian Navy variant of the P-8A Poseidon that Boeing builds for the U.S. Navy.The P-8I incorporates not only India-unique design features, but also Indian-built sub-systems that are tailored

Indo-Russia joint exercise ”Avia Indra I” Avia Indra I, Phase II, a joint Indo – Russia Air Force exercise held at Air Force Station Halwara ,Punjab from 17 November was successfully concluded . The Phase I of the ‘Avia Indra I’ was held at Astrakhan near Caspian Sea in Russia in August 2014.

The Russian team was touched by the warmth of their host and amongst other things, encashed on the opportunity to learn a few steps of ‘Bhangra’ dance.

The joint Air Force exercise between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Russian Federation Air Force (RFAF) took the historic and strategic military partnership between India and Russia to a new level. During the exercise,

fighter, helicopter and missile crew of the two countries operated together. It included air to ground firing and fighter sorties over the mighty Himalayas. Select members of the team were taken to Bengaluru, where they were introduced to indigenous programs, including the LCA Tejas and Advanced Light Helicopter (Dhruv).

To commemorate the event, the two commanders Air Commodore PK Vohra VM and Major General Alexander N Lyapkin unveiled a hand carved stone and planted saplings next to the memorial stone to symbolize growth of this unique partnership etched in the stone for posterity.

DRDO-IAI successfully flight test LR SAM missile The Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) was successfully flight tested against a flying target in a range in Israel.Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Israel carried out the test in the presence of DRDO scientists and officials of the Indian Armed Forces. The LRSAM system is jointly

developed by DRDO and IAI Israel.

All the systems including the radar, communication launch systems and the missile system have performed as expected and hit the target directly and damaged.

The system is developed for both Israel Defence Forces

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to meet the country’s maritime patrol requirements.The P-8I features open systems architecture, advanced sensor and display technologies, and a worldwide base of suppliers, parts, and support equipment.

In order to efficiently design and build the P-8I and the P-8A, the Boeing-led team is using a first-in-industry, in-line production process that draws on the company’s Next-Generation 737 production system. P-8I aircraft are built by a Boeing-led industry team that includes CFM International, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Spirit AeroSystems, BAE Systems and GE Aviation.

Boeing has been active in India for 70 years with its commercial airplanes providing the mainstay of India’s civil aviation sector.

More recently its military aircraft have started to play an important role in the modernization and mission-readiness of India’s defense forces.

and Indian Armed Forces.

Scientific Advisor to Indian Defence Minister Dr. Avinash Chander has witnessed the test along with President of IAI Mr. Joseph Weiss and other top officials of Israel Defence Forces. He termed the event as a milestone in the cooperation between two countries in developing advanced weapon systems.

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