DEFENSE and SECURITY of INDIA

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MODERNISATION

THE CHALLENGE TO CHANGE The armed forces need cost effective solutions to enhance their combat edge I AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FALI H. MAJOR SECURITY

NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Twelve years down, the office of the NSA is still a work in progress I SIDDARTH VARADARAJAN FEBRUARY 2010

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 2

ISSUE 4

Rs 250

COVER STORY

CAMOUFLAGED MANOEUVRES

The countries may play down their strategic and military links but today Israel is India’s second largest arms’ supplier I RAHUL BEDI

POLICING THE SEAS

Despite attacks by terrorists from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate I C. UDAY BHASKAR

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www.atk.com

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FEBRUARY, 2010

LETTER FROM THE

editor

I

ndia’s resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 has come as a boon to its defence industry which was flagging after the end of the Cold War. Today, Israel is India’s second largest weapon supplier after Russia. In fact, India’s record procurement of arms has been one of the main reasons behind Israel’s emergence as one of the top five exporters of defence equipment in the world.

Today, there is a routine exchange of high level visits between the two countries’ military-political establishments completely over turning India’s earlier reluctance to have relations with Israel. This unparalled cooperation is underpinned by–sometimes–hidden diplomatic, military and intelligence equations between India and Israel. DSI provides an insight into this new security reality.

As the year rolls on, DSI authoritatively analyses the modernisation impetus of the Indian armed forces looking particularly at maritime security and the digitisation programme of the Indian Army. Overall, the prognosis is not good. While the quest for technological advantage continues, it has not kept pace with basic defence requirements. But a push to seek cost effective solutions to enhance India’s combative edge through technological superiority will be an essential driver to transform the armed forces.

It’s been twelve years since the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) was instituted.

With a new incumbent in place its time for a little stocktaking. Over the years, the high profile appointment has become slightly controversial. We look at whether the NSA has managed to fulfill its original mandate of being a prime mover of a long-term, planning structure connected to the National Security Council which is headed by the Prime Minister.

The recent elections in war-scarred Sri Lanka were seen as an opportunity to start a new chapter in the troubled island nation’s life. But the first elections, after the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, have been acrimonious and the verdict is not without its share of doubts. The re-election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa may well alienate the very people he wanted to win over.

Aware that March 8, International Day for Women, is around the corner, DSI takes a bird’s eye view of what it means for women to be part of the country’s Border Security Force. For Basanti Mondal, Putul Murmur and Sharbano Kazi entering the BSF has been a life-changing force. And as for the protection of our international borders—the induction of these new women recruits has not only broken down barriers but stemmed the tide of women involved in extremist activities.

As usual, we look forward to your suggestions and feedback. You can send your comments to dsidelhi2010@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe, please contact us at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

DSI

Today, there is a routine exchange of high level visits between the two countries’ militarypolitical establishments completely upturning India’s earlier reluctance to have relations with Israel.

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CONTENTS

FEBRUARY, 2010

COVER STORY

8

THE ISRAELI

CONNECTION Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 Israel has become India’s second largest weapon supplier after Russia.

The defence relationship has helped Israel’s emergence as one of the top five defence exporters in the world.

TECHNOLOGY 16

LIGHT, LETHAL AND WIRED? NOT YET The Indian Army is well equipped to defend the country’s borders but the complexion of warfare has changed. The Army needs to modernise by upgrading its capabilities for both conventional and sub-conventional conflict and prepare itself for a digitised battlefield.

2

DSI

Chinook is mission-ready, whatever the mission. Its unique flexibility and heavylift capability make it the ideal platform to deliver unconditional support. In the heat of combat, when natural disasters occur, for humanitarian and homeland security missions. And today’s Chinook is stronger and more reliable than ever. So it’s ready to work, and work, and work.

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FEBRUARY 2010

CONTENTS MODERNISATION

DSI

24

CHALLENGE TO CHANGE A nuanced modernisation and capability programme, spread over the next three Plan periods, is on the cards. If the military modernisation process is followed through it will place the Indian armed forces on a new trajectory.

But capability building is not a simple task and easier said than done.

MARITIME SECURITY

SECURITY

34

BORDER SECURITY FORCE

56

POLICING THE SEAS

ARMS AND THE WOMAN

The trauma of 26/11 has compelled the Indian Government to move with urgency to redress the many gaps in its maritime security.

But these steps are yet to be fully implemented.

By joining the BSF, women are not only breaking gender barriers but deterring women who are indulging in crossborder criminal and extremist activities.

42

NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Given their immediate responsibilities and the absence of a proper support structure, successive National Security Advisers have failed to deliver on the long-term, planning front.

NEIGHBOURS

48

PROMISES AND BETRAYALS The verdict of the recent elections have made it clear that President Mahinda Rajapaksa has alienated the Tamils in a post-war, nationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores that it still remains a divided nation.

4

Cover: Indian Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma (left) with Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Navy, Vice Admiral Eliezer Marom during the latter’s official visit to India in January 2010/AFP

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FEBRUARY, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA FEBRUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 4 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

RAHUL BEDI

GURMEET KANWAL SINGH

FALI H. MAJOR

C. UDAY BHASKAR

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Prakaram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army: Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Fali H. Major, commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1967 as a Wing Commander, has held several important staff and field appointments. As a Wing Commander, he commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his leadership. A recipient also of the Shaurya Chakra, he took over as the Air Officer Commanding Leh (Ladakh), in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999. A graduate from the National Defence College and Army War College, he is the first helicopter pilot to become the Chief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also President, Air Force Association.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years of service. He is currently Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters. He has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

AMEEN IZZADEEN

Siddharth Varadarajan is the Strategic Affairs Editor and Delhi Bureau Chief of The Hindu and a leading commentators on foreign policy. He has reported extensively from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia as well as Kashmir and the Northeast. He has edited a book on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy in 2005.

An economist, he has taught at New York University before returning to India to work as a journalist in 1995.

He is currently writing a book on the Indo-U.S. relationship.

Ameen Izzadeen is Deputy Editor with the Colombobased Sunday Times.

A visiting lecturer at the Bandaranaike Diplomatic Training Institute in Colombo and the Defence Staff College at Batalanda, he holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Colombo University. A columnist on international affairs in Sri Lanka’s Daily Mirror newspaper he looks at the region from a Third World perspective.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Sandeep Sharma BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi

AJITHA MENON Ajitha Menon is the Kolkata Bureau Chief of Asian News International. In a career spanning sixteen years, she has covered politics, as well as defence, international relations, insurgency and Maoist operations across eastern India and the Northeast. Her abiding interest, however, is covering development issues which she has done in Bhutan, China and Bangladesh. A regular contributor to the Women's Feature Service she has written extensively on women’s issues.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 08/02/10 10:07 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA FEBRUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 4 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

RAHUL BEDI

GURMEET KANWAL SINGH

FALI H. MAJOR

C. UDAY BHASKAR

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Prakaram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army: Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Fali H. Major, commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1967 as a Wing Commander, has held several important staff and field appointments. As a Wing Commander, he commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his leadership. A recipient also of the Shaurya Chakra, he took over as the Air Officer Commanding Leh (Ladakh), in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999. A graduate from the National Defence College and Army War College, he is the first helicopter pilot to become the Chief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also President, Air Force Association.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years of service. He is currently Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters. He has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

AMEEN IZZADEEN

Siddharth Varadarajan is the Strategic Affairs Editor and Delhi Bureau Chief of The Hindu and a leading commentators on foreign policy. He has reported extensively from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia as well as Kashmir and the Northeast. He has edited a book on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy in 2005.

An economist, he has taught at New York University before returning to India to work as a journalist in 1995.

He is currently writing a book on the Indo-U.S. relationship.

Ameen Izzadeen is Deputy Editor with the Colombobased Sunday Times.

A visiting lecturer at the Bandaranaike Diplomatic Training Institute in Colombo and the Defence Staff College at Batalanda, he holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Colombo University. A columnist on international affairs in Sri Lanka’s Daily Mirror newspaper he looks at the region from a Third World perspective.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Sandeep Sharma BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi

AJITHA MENON Ajitha Menon is the Kolkata Bureau Chief of Asian News International. In a career spanning sixteen years, she has covered politics, as well as defence, international relations, insurgency and Maoist operations across eastern India and the Northeast. Her abiding interest, however, is covering development issues which she has done in Bhutan, China and Bangladesh. A regular contributor to the Women's Feature Service she has written extensively on women’s issues.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

KEY POINTS

THE ISRAELI

n Over the past decade Israel has, after Russia, emerged as India’s second largest supplier of materiel annually valued by the armament industry at around $ 1 billion. n The emergent defence relationship is multi-tiered and not dependent entirely on local agents or facilitators who have effectively entered the country’s military establishment.

CONNECTION

I

India and Israel may play them down but the strategic, military and intelligence links between the countries are deeply embedded

AFP

RAHUL BEDI

8

DSI

9

srael’s strategic, military and intelligence links with India have become possibly its most significant in Asia, following the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in January 1992.

Prior to 1992 there were informal and clandestine security ties between New Delhi and Tel Aviv, but over the past decade Israel has, after Russia, emerged as India’s second largest supplier of materiel annually valued by armament industry officials at around $ 1 billion.

But despite this rapidly proliferating association, it is one that remains deeply shrouded in secrecy operating in an undefined smoke-and-mirrors environment. Both sides go to great lengths to play down this strategic Freemasonry for fear of stirring up anti-Jewish sentiments amongst India’s subDefence stantial Muslim minoriMinister ty and straining ties A.K. Antony with Arab states upon (in white) with whom India depends Indian Air Force for nearly 70 percent of officers and its hydrocarbon imports. crew of the Reciprocal visits to Airborne Delhi and Tel Aviv by Warning and Service, security and Control System intelligence officers, equipped IL-76 Defence Research and aircraft in Development OrganiNew Delhi in sation (DRDO) techniMay 2009 cians and scientists and armament company executives are kept strictly under wraps with neither side willing to comment on the burgeoning defence relationship and related military commerce.

But in a surprising revelation that somehow managed to slip through taut bureaucratic cracks, former Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee told Parliament in August 2005 that Delhi had concluded military contracts with Tel Aviv worth $ 2.76 billion since 2002. Thereafter, this traffic has multiplied manifold even with Israeli

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

KEY POINTS

THE ISRAELI

n Over the past decade Israel has, after Russia, emerged as India’s second largest supplier of materiel annually valued by the armament industry at around $ 1 billion. n The emergent defence relationship is multi-tiered and not dependent entirely on local agents or facilitators who have effectively entered the country’s military establishment.

CONNECTION

I

India and Israel may play them down but the strategic, military and intelligence links between the countries are deeply embedded

AFP

RAHUL BEDI

8

DSI

9

srael’s strategic, military and intelligence links with India have become possibly its most significant in Asia, following the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in January 1992.

Prior to 1992 there were informal and clandestine security ties between New Delhi and Tel Aviv, but over the past decade Israel has, after Russia, emerged as India’s second largest supplier of materiel annually valued by armament industry officials at around $ 1 billion.

But despite this rapidly proliferating association, it is one that remains deeply shrouded in secrecy operating in an undefined smoke-and-mirrors environment. Both sides go to great lengths to play down this strategic Freemasonry for fear of stirring up anti-Jewish sentiments amongst India’s subDefence stantial Muslim minoriMinister ty and straining ties A.K. Antony with Arab states upon (in white) with whom India depends Indian Air Force for nearly 70 percent of officers and its hydrocarbon imports. crew of the Reciprocal visits to Airborne Delhi and Tel Aviv by Warning and Service, security and Control System intelligence officers, equipped IL-76 Defence Research and aircraft in Development OrganiNew Delhi in sation (DRDO) techniMay 2009 cians and scientists and armament company executives are kept strictly under wraps with neither side willing to comment on the burgeoning defence relationship and related military commerce.

But in a surprising revelation that somehow managed to slip through taut bureaucratic cracks, former Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee told Parliament in August 2005 that Delhi had concluded military contracts with Tel Aviv worth $ 2.76 billion since 2002. Thereafter, this traffic has multiplied manifold even with Israeli

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FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

Confidential Agreements Official sources said the agreement for 24 IAI-designed Barak (lightening) next generation MRSAM systems and some 2,000 Rafael missiles with a 70 km range for the Indian Air Force (IAF) was kept confidential following fears that its disclosure could prove politically detrimental to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Congress Party-led administration in wooing Muslim votes essential for re-election.

And, earlier in 2005, even though the CBI was inquiring into “alleged irregularities” at the MoD’s behest in awarding the $45,524,137 contract to Israel’s Soltam Systems in 2000 to upgrade 180 Soviet 130mm M 46 field guns to 155 mm/45 calibre, Defence Minister Mukherjee ruled out cancelling the deal or abandoning the retrofit programme.

Before 1992, Israel is reported to have stealthily assisted India with limited military aid and weapons during its brief, albeit disastrous war with China in 1962 with its Chief of Staff General David Shaltiel visiting Delhi surreptitiously in 1963. Israel provided similar, albeit limited assistance, during subsequent conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, India sought Israel’s help to upgrade its VIP protection by training and arming the newly raised Special Protection Group and National Security Guards. These commandoes would travel to Israel via Cyprus—as no direct air links between the two countries existed—but their passports would have no record of their visit to the Jewish State. Israeli specialists also

Reciprocal visits to Delhi andTel Aviv by Service, security and intelligence officers, Defence Research and Development Organisation technicians and scientists and armament company executives are kept strictly under wraps with neither side willing to comment on the burgeoning defence relationship and related military commerce.

ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS UNDER NEGOTIATION OR FOR IMMINENT PURCHASE

”

devised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s security architecture that continues broadly up to the present.

Alongside, two Boeing 707 aircraft that form part of the secretive Aviation Research Centre operated by India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) were fitted with Israeli equipment for communication and electronic surveillance in the 1980s. Israel also provided counter-terrorism assistance to India in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger rebels in May 1990 as its security and materiel footprint was growing in the island republic during that period.

Strict secrecy was maintained over this cooperation and contacts owing to political constraints and the involvement of sensitive security issues. India’s close links with Yasser Arafat and the larger Palestinian cause also foreclosed the option of making this association public.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s longstanding ally and principal weapons supplier, came as a major blow to Delhi. Overnight, crucial supplies of arms and spares for military equipment were interminably delayed and India was compelled to consider

10

AFP

corporations under federal investigation on corruption charges.

In March 2009, for instance, three days before the announcement of general elections, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) secretly signed a $ 2.01 billion contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for a medium range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) system, ignoring the ongoing inquiry launched in 2006 against the company by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

This investigation involved alleged bribery charges against a former Indian defence minister and ex-Naval Chief following the Rs 11.25 billion acquisition in 2000 of seven IAI Barak-1 area air-defence missile systems for Indian Navy (IN) warships.

DSI

l

A possible follow-on purchase of three additional Phalcon AEW&C platforms

l

Additional Heron II UAVs

l

Procurement by the army of El-Op’s Portable Laser Designating System (PLD)

l

Additional 20,000 TAR-21 ARs for the paramilitary—the Cobra commando’s from the Central Reserve Police Force—and the possibility of locally building the weapon system in collaboration with the Ordnance Factory Board, the demand for which will eventually run into tens of thousands

l

Several hundred full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) to upgrade T-72M1s

diversifying its materiel imports, realising the danger of dependence on a single, unreliable source.

The establishment of formal diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao enabled both sides to explore and develop defence and strategic ties on the basis of mutual security and commercial interests. But it still took another six years and the nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party’s ascent to power for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India, second only to the Russians.

India’s deteriorating internal security environment through the 1990s to threatening and, at times, alarming levels and the availability of The then External modern weapon Affairs Minister systems and low Pranab Mukherjee intensity warfare (right) shakes hands know-how to terwith Israel Deputy rorists too spawned Prime Minister and the requirement for Minister of Interior updated weaponry Meir Sheetrit during and sophisticated an official meeting systems. To fulfill in New Delhi in that need too, India November 2007 views Israel’s evolved industrial-military complex favourably and as one that answered many of its defence and security needs.

Israeli expertise in manufacturing and upgrading combat aircraft, anti-tactical ballistic missile systems, electronic warfare (EW) and communication equipment and security technology particularly excited India whilst military officials also indicated an interest in the Israel defense forces’ successful warfare strategies and concepts particularly with regard to countering armed insurgencies.

Besides, the outright sale of weapons and related force multipliers and retrofitting varied outdated Soviet-Russian era military equipment, Israel’s defence

11

involvement in India presently encompasses limited joint production of conventional weapon systems like ballistic missiles. Both countries perceive their non-conventional ambitions in the form of ballistic missiles as an integral part of their objective to be regarded as threshold nuclear powers.

Limited technology transfers for EW-related systems to augment networkcentricity amongst all three Services, which remains the Indian military’s longdesired but unrealised goal, intelligence sharing on terrorism issues and Israeli military training assistance to India’s Special Forces (SF) comprise an integral part of the bilateral strategic and defence relationship.

Israel and India share similar unpublicised concerns over threats posed not only by a nuclear-weapon capable and increasingly Islamised Pakistan but the rapid radicalisation of its society and armed forces. And, as Pakistan struggles under the weight of its regional and tribal tensions there is the apocalyptic fear of its strategic weapons cache falling into the hands of radical Islamic groups, a paranoia shared by many Western countries including Israel’s closest ally, the US. Revelations in 2004, surrounding the sale of nuclear secrets and centrifuges by Pakistan’s atomic scientist A.Q. Khan to Iran—and to Libya—to help them with their respective weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, severely alarmed Israel further underpinning the need for Tel Aviv and Delhi to cement bilateral military and strategic ties to share information and construct fail safe options to neutralise this threat.

Pakistan’s atomic devices, tested in response to rival India’s in 1998, are often referred to by many analysts as the “Islamic Bomb”, an association that has chilling echoes in Israel. Itself a “closet”

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:17 AM Page 3

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

Confidential Agreements Official sources said the agreement for 24 IAI-designed Barak (lightening) next generation MRSAM systems and some 2,000 Rafael missiles with a 70 km range for the Indian Air Force (IAF) was kept confidential following fears that its disclosure could prove politically detrimental to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Congress Party-led administration in wooing Muslim votes essential for re-election.

And, earlier in 2005, even though the CBI was inquiring into “alleged irregularities” at the MoD’s behest in awarding the $45,524,137 contract to Israel’s Soltam Systems in 2000 to upgrade 180 Soviet 130mm M 46 field guns to 155 mm/45 calibre, Defence Minister Mukherjee ruled out cancelling the deal or abandoning the retrofit programme.

Before 1992, Israel is reported to have stealthily assisted India with limited military aid and weapons during its brief, albeit disastrous war with China in 1962 with its Chief of Staff General David Shaltiel visiting Delhi surreptitiously in 1963. Israel provided similar, albeit limited assistance, during subsequent conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, India sought Israel’s help to upgrade its VIP protection by training and arming the newly raised Special Protection Group and National Security Guards. These commandoes would travel to Israel via Cyprus—as no direct air links between the two countries existed—but their passports would have no record of their visit to the Jewish State. Israeli specialists also

Reciprocal visits to Delhi andTel Aviv by Service, security and intelligence officers, Defence Research and Development Organisation technicians and scientists and armament company executives are kept strictly under wraps with neither side willing to comment on the burgeoning defence relationship and related military commerce.

ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS UNDER NEGOTIATION OR FOR IMMINENT PURCHASE

”

devised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s security architecture that continues broadly up to the present.

Alongside, two Boeing 707 aircraft that form part of the secretive Aviation Research Centre operated by India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) were fitted with Israeli equipment for communication and electronic surveillance in the 1980s. Israel also provided counter-terrorism assistance to India in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger rebels in May 1990 as its security and materiel footprint was growing in the island republic during that period.

Strict secrecy was maintained over this cooperation and contacts owing to political constraints and the involvement of sensitive security issues. India’s close links with Yasser Arafat and the larger Palestinian cause also foreclosed the option of making this association public.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s longstanding ally and principal weapons supplier, came as a major blow to Delhi. Overnight, crucial supplies of arms and spares for military equipment were interminably delayed and India was compelled to consider

10

AFP

corporations under federal investigation on corruption charges.

In March 2009, for instance, three days before the announcement of general elections, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) secretly signed a $ 2.01 billion contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for a medium range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) system, ignoring the ongoing inquiry launched in 2006 against the company by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

This investigation involved alleged bribery charges against a former Indian defence minister and ex-Naval Chief following the Rs 11.25 billion acquisition in 2000 of seven IAI Barak-1 area air-defence missile systems for Indian Navy (IN) warships.

DSI

l

A possible follow-on purchase of three additional Phalcon AEW&C platforms

l

Additional Heron II UAVs

l

Procurement by the army of El-Op’s Portable Laser Designating System (PLD)

l

Additional 20,000 TAR-21 ARs for the paramilitary—the Cobra commando’s from the Central Reserve Police Force—and the possibility of locally building the weapon system in collaboration with the Ordnance Factory Board, the demand for which will eventually run into tens of thousands

l

Several hundred full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) to upgrade T-72M1s

diversifying its materiel imports, realising the danger of dependence on a single, unreliable source.

The establishment of formal diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao enabled both sides to explore and develop defence and strategic ties on the basis of mutual security and commercial interests. But it still took another six years and the nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party’s ascent to power for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India, second only to the Russians.

India’s deteriorating internal security environment through the 1990s to threatening and, at times, alarming levels and the availability of The then External modern weapon Affairs Minister systems and low Pranab Mukherjee intensity warfare (right) shakes hands know-how to terwith Israel Deputy rorists too spawned Prime Minister and the requirement for Minister of Interior updated weaponry Meir Sheetrit during and sophisticated an official meeting systems. To fulfill in New Delhi in that need too, India November 2007 views Israel’s evolved industrial-military complex favourably and as one that answered many of its defence and security needs.

Israeli expertise in manufacturing and upgrading combat aircraft, anti-tactical ballistic missile systems, electronic warfare (EW) and communication equipment and security technology particularly excited India whilst military officials also indicated an interest in the Israel defense forces’ successful warfare strategies and concepts particularly with regard to countering armed insurgencies.

Besides, the outright sale of weapons and related force multipliers and retrofitting varied outdated Soviet-Russian era military equipment, Israel’s defence

11

involvement in India presently encompasses limited joint production of conventional weapon systems like ballistic missiles. Both countries perceive their non-conventional ambitions in the form of ballistic missiles as an integral part of their objective to be regarded as threshold nuclear powers.

Limited technology transfers for EW-related systems to augment networkcentricity amongst all three Services, which remains the Indian military’s longdesired but unrealised goal, intelligence sharing on terrorism issues and Israeli military training assistance to India’s Special Forces (SF) comprise an integral part of the bilateral strategic and defence relationship.

Israel and India share similar unpublicised concerns over threats posed not only by a nuclear-weapon capable and increasingly Islamised Pakistan but the rapid radicalisation of its society and armed forces. And, as Pakistan struggles under the weight of its regional and tribal tensions there is the apocalyptic fear of its strategic weapons cache falling into the hands of radical Islamic groups, a paranoia shared by many Western countries including Israel’s closest ally, the US. Revelations in 2004, surrounding the sale of nuclear secrets and centrifuges by Pakistan’s atomic scientist A.Q. Khan to Iran—and to Libya—to help them with their respective weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, severely alarmed Israel further underpinning the need for Tel Aviv and Delhi to cement bilateral military and strategic ties to share information and construct fail safe options to neutralise this threat.

Pakistan’s atomic devices, tested in response to rival India’s in 1998, are often referred to by many analysts as the “Islamic Bomb”, an association that has chilling echoes in Israel. Itself a “closet”

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 5

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dramatically pushed Israel to centrestage in the Indian military arena. As the seriousness of the eventual 11-week-long conflict unfolded, Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware like the badly needed 155 mm ordnance; unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs.

”

er-known operators—former military officers, well connected businessmen and retired civil servants—on a case-by-case basis, offering them varying incentives to finalise deals.

Large Israeli corporations like IAI, ElOp and even Israem Military Industries and its breakaway Israel Weapon Industries, which have negotiated large deals selling and upgrading equipment are known to prefer hiring newly retired military officers to push their wares, con-

vinced that peer pressure will eventually deliver results.

Conversely, DRDO and MoD efforts to sell Israel Lakshya, its pilot-less drone, in 2003-04, in a token effort to offset the large amount of military equipment Tel Aviv was supplying Delhi, remained stillborn.

Pleading “insufficient funds, Israel summarily turned down the Indian drone for which price negotiations had opened, opting instead for a US-made system. Till now, Israel has bought just one locally

Skilled Manipulation

AFP

nuclear weapon State, Israel is deeply concerned about possible Pakistani atomic proliferation to Iran—presently facing international inquisition over its reportedly covert strategic weapons programme—and the wider, anti-Zionist Muslim world.

It is also important to grasp the Israeli establishments argument that like itself, Delhi is surrounded by hostile neighbours and hence a nation under “siege” which needs desperately to strengthen and bolster its security apparatus.

Furthermore, Israel markets itself as a country offering a wide range of battletested, new and upgraded materiel, in many cases of US origin and one that can effortlessly facilitate transfers that are largely not subject to international arms control regimes. Over years, this reasoning found an echo in Delhi’s political and strategic circles.

The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dramatically pushed Israel to centrestage in the Indian military arena. As the seriousness of the eventual 11-week-long conflict unfolded, Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India highend hardware like the badly-needed 155 mm ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles

officials of SIBAT, the Foreign Defence Assistance and Defence Export Organisation, approve scores of local agents to sell their wares.

Almost all negotiations with Israeli defence manufacturers, at some point involve SIBAT officials posted at the Delhi embassy who tap effectively into the reservoir of information gathered through de-briefings in Tel Aviv.

For, unlike other country’s vendors, Israeli materiel providers operate in concert given their nations inherent paranoia for security. On returning home from India, all armament company executives are exhaustively de-briefed by Israeli security services creating over years a wealth of data on the main players in the system, their weaknesses, ‘bribe-ability’ in a largely corrupt procurement milieu and, above all their vulnerabilities.

The Indian Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank was upgraded using partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems from Israel’s El-Op

DSI

(UAVs) and laser-guided bombs that contributed, in part, to vacating the mountainous regions siege and eventually terminating the fighting.

Soon after, Israel began claiming its dues in materiel sales and continues to do so, prospering greatly in the process.

Multi-Tiered Defence Relationship The emergent defence relationship is multi-tiered and not dependent entirely on local agents or facilitators who have effectively spread their tentacles into the country’s military establishment. “There is the broader context that includes politics, diplomacy and common threat perceptions like Pakistan and the fear of its ‘Islamic bomb’ falling into the wrong

12

hands” a three-star Indian military officer said, declining to be named. Israel, he admitted, has convinced India of its near indispensability as a reliable weapons provider.

India’s political leadership and the military, on the other hand, too have come to realise the efficacy of Israel in this role, firm in the belief that materiel supplies would continue uninterrupted as Tel Aviv neither believes nor adheres to any sanctions regime. Its unstinted support of South Africa during the apartheid era is evidence of this propensity.

Locally, Israeli defence contractors’ efforts coordinate with the embassy that functions as the hub for their activities.

Israeli defence manufacturers, aided by

According to armament industry sources, Israeli vendors had skillfully manipulated the DRDO, once contracts were inked, aided by co-operative insiders. Their tactics include, supplying products freely available locally—computer screens, for instance, for a command and control system for the artillery—at astronomical prices but withholding crucial components in a deal that involves transfer of technology in order to extract a higher price. This latter instance involved the cooling and display unit crucial to some 6,000 hand-held thermal imaging systems that the State-owned Bharat Electronics Limited was building under a transfer of technology (ToT) contract.

Also with DRDO connivance, Israeli companies reportedly “manage” delays in equipment development forcing the Services to opt for “intermediate imports” from Israel to meet urgent operational requirements. In addition, some Request for Proposals (RFPs) or tenders for military equipment sent to overseas suppliers are conveniently fashioned around Israeli products. In several instances, the MoD has been known to contravene established directives by sourcing equipment from a single Israeli company instead of two or more manufacturers in keeping with successive editions of the Defence Procurement Procedures.

Other than these established operators, the Israeli pursue a ‘buckshot’ approach in securing contracts, convinced that one if not more of the ‘pellets’ would eventually hit their target. Hence they work with less-

Get fit to command the skies, seas and land with Elisra's total EW & Intelligence solutions:

EE US T COME S D OUT WHA AND FIN TRIC™ N IR-CLLEABOUT! Latest generation, light-weight, all-in-one self protection systems IS A ORE ANGAL for all aircraft types EWCI B# 18, 19, 20 STAND STAND • IR-CENTRIC™ - Mission superiority for all airborne and ground platforms YSTEMS ELBIT S PAVILION • Full helicopter self protection suites against all threats OW ISRAEL PORE AIRSH • The only operationally proven IR based MWS protection suites SINGA BRUARY 65 N • Total EW and electronic intelligence (SIGINT, ELINT, ESM, COMJAM) for all forces E 2-7 F ALL STAND • Advanced command & control (C4I, BMD) solutions for all forces MAIN H PO INDIA DEFEX FEBRUARY 7 G • Data links for UAVs, satellites, net centric operations and search & rescue applications 15-18 8 STAND 18.1 HALL 1

Members of Elbit Systems

13

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 5

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dramatically pushed Israel to centrestage in the Indian military arena. As the seriousness of the eventual 11-week-long conflict unfolded, Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware like the badly needed 155 mm ordnance; unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs.

”

er-known operators—former military officers, well connected businessmen and retired civil servants—on a case-by-case basis, offering them varying incentives to finalise deals.

Large Israeli corporations like IAI, ElOp and even Israem Military Industries and its breakaway Israel Weapon Industries, which have negotiated large deals selling and upgrading equipment are known to prefer hiring newly retired military officers to push their wares, con-

vinced that peer pressure will eventually deliver results.

Conversely, DRDO and MoD efforts to sell Israel Lakshya, its pilot-less drone, in 2003-04, in a token effort to offset the large amount of military equipment Tel Aviv was supplying Delhi, remained stillborn.

Pleading “insufficient funds, Israel summarily turned down the Indian drone for which price negotiations had opened, opting instead for a US-made system. Till now, Israel has bought just one locally

Skilled Manipulation

AFP

nuclear weapon State, Israel is deeply concerned about possible Pakistani atomic proliferation to Iran—presently facing international inquisition over its reportedly covert strategic weapons programme—and the wider, anti-Zionist Muslim world.

It is also important to grasp the Israeli establishments argument that like itself, Delhi is surrounded by hostile neighbours and hence a nation under “siege” which needs desperately to strengthen and bolster its security apparatus.

Furthermore, Israel markets itself as a country offering a wide range of battletested, new and upgraded materiel, in many cases of US origin and one that can effortlessly facilitate transfers that are largely not subject to international arms control regimes. Over years, this reasoning found an echo in Delhi’s political and strategic circles.

The 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan dramatically pushed Israel to centrestage in the Indian military arena. As the seriousness of the eventual 11-week-long conflict unfolded, Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India highend hardware like the badly-needed 155 mm ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles

officials of SIBAT, the Foreign Defence Assistance and Defence Export Organisation, approve scores of local agents to sell their wares.

Almost all negotiations with Israeli defence manufacturers, at some point involve SIBAT officials posted at the Delhi embassy who tap effectively into the reservoir of information gathered through de-briefings in Tel Aviv.

For, unlike other country’s vendors, Israeli materiel providers operate in concert given their nations inherent paranoia for security. On returning home from India, all armament company executives are exhaustively de-briefed by Israeli security services creating over years a wealth of data on the main players in the system, their weaknesses, ‘bribe-ability’ in a largely corrupt procurement milieu and, above all their vulnerabilities.

The Indian Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank was upgraded using partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems from Israel’s El-Op

DSI

(UAVs) and laser-guided bombs that contributed, in part, to vacating the mountainous regions siege and eventually terminating the fighting.

Soon after, Israel began claiming its dues in materiel sales and continues to do so, prospering greatly in the process.

Multi-Tiered Defence Relationship The emergent defence relationship is multi-tiered and not dependent entirely on local agents or facilitators who have effectively spread their tentacles into the country’s military establishment. “There is the broader context that includes politics, diplomacy and common threat perceptions like Pakistan and the fear of its ‘Islamic bomb’ falling into the wrong

12

hands” a three-star Indian military officer said, declining to be named. Israel, he admitted, has convinced India of its near indispensability as a reliable weapons provider.

India’s political leadership and the military, on the other hand, too have come to realise the efficacy of Israel in this role, firm in the belief that materiel supplies would continue uninterrupted as Tel Aviv neither believes nor adheres to any sanctions regime. Its unstinted support of South Africa during the apartheid era is evidence of this propensity.

Locally, Israeli defence contractors’ efforts coordinate with the embassy that functions as the hub for their activities.

Israeli defence manufacturers, aided by

According to armament industry sources, Israeli vendors had skillfully manipulated the DRDO, once contracts were inked, aided by co-operative insiders. Their tactics include, supplying products freely available locally—computer screens, for instance, for a command and control system for the artillery—at astronomical prices but withholding crucial components in a deal that involves transfer of technology in order to extract a higher price. This latter instance involved the cooling and display unit crucial to some 6,000 hand-held thermal imaging systems that the State-owned Bharat Electronics Limited was building under a transfer of technology (ToT) contract.

Also with DRDO connivance, Israeli companies reportedly “manage” delays in equipment development forcing the Services to opt for “intermediate imports” from Israel to meet urgent operational requirements. In addition, some Request for Proposals (RFPs) or tenders for military equipment sent to overseas suppliers are conveniently fashioned around Israeli products. In several instances, the MoD has been known to contravene established directives by sourcing equipment from a single Israeli company instead of two or more manufacturers in keeping with successive editions of the Defence Procurement Procedures.

Other than these established operators, the Israeli pursue a ‘buckshot’ approach in securing contracts, convinced that one if not more of the ‘pellets’ would eventually hit their target. Hence they work with less-

Get fit to command the skies, seas and land with Elisra's total EW & Intelligence solutions:

EE US T COME S D OUT WHA AND FIN TRIC™ N IR-CLLEABOUT! Latest generation, light-weight, all-in-one self protection systems IS A ORE ANGAL for all aircraft types EWCI B# 18, 19, 20 STAND STAND • IR-CENTRIC™ - Mission superiority for all airborne and ground platforms YSTEMS ELBIT S PAVILION • Full helicopter self protection suites against all threats OW ISRAEL PORE AIRSH • The only operationally proven IR based MWS protection suites SINGA BRUARY 65 N • Total EW and electronic intelligence (SIGINT, ELINT, ESM, COMJAM) for all forces E 2-7 F ALL STAND • Advanced command & control (C4I, BMD) solutions for all forces MAIN H PO INDIA DEFEX FEBRUARY 7 G • Data links for UAVs, satellites, net centric operations and search & rescue applications 15-18 8 STAND 18.1 HALL 1

Members of Elbit Systems

13

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 7

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

DSI

MAJOR INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE DEALS SINCE 2000 l Three IAI Phalcon Ilyushin IL-76TD (Airborne Early Warning and Control) for around

$2 billion of which one arrived last year and the remaining two are expected shortly. l Around 70-odd IAI-built Searcher Mk 1 and Mk 2 and Heron UAVs and 30 Harpy

ground attack Drones that constitute an integral ingredient of the burgeoning network-centric warfare capability that all three Services seek to execute for the full spectrum of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war. l Two Green Pine radar supplemented by aerostat balloons. l 30 Rafael Industries-built AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile, specially

configured for the IAF for around $ 62.7 million. l Rafael’s SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) low level quick reaction missile

system (LLQRM) for the IAF worth some $ 260 million. l 3070 5.56 mm Tavor 21 assault rifles (TAR-21) from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI),

the break away small arms division of Israel Military Industries (IMI) for $ 20 million for India’s Special Forces (SF). l An unspecified number of Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles in addition to varied night vision

and laser range finding and targeting equipment also for the SF. l Electronics suites for Su-30MKI, MiG-27 and Jaguar combat aircraft and for Mi-35

helicopters. Advanced avionics and weaponry for 125 MiG 21 ‘bis’ upgraded ground attack aircraft. l 11 Barak-1 systems, including around 250 missiles. l 26 Derby missiles for the Indian Navy’s Sea Harrier fighters presently

undergoing a retrofit. l Upgrade of 180 M46 130 mm field guns to 155mm/39 cal for $ 45,524,137 by Soltam. l 333 partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) from El-Op to

upgrade the Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank for around $ 120,000 each. l Five Super Dovra II Extra Fast Attack Craft from IAI equipped with modern

surveillance systems acquired from December 1996 onwards; two are being constructed under licence at Goa Shipyard Limited while the requirement for another 15 is projected for the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard.

Israeli Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi inspects the Guard of Honour during his three-day visit to India in December 2009

l 130 Long Range Observation Systems (LOROS), a multi-sensor imaging system for

long range day and night observation from El-Op. l 1,200 Hand-Held Thermal Imaging Systems from El-Op. l Hi-tech sensors for the Line of Control in Kashmir also from El-Op. l Six El-Op Portable Laser Designating System for the IAF. l IAI is collaborating with the DRDO to jointly develop a next generation Barak-II ship-

borne area air defence missile system extending its strike range from 10 km to 70-80 km. The deal signed in February 2006 is valued at around $ 300 million. l IAI’s Lahav division has provided the glass cockpit package for Dhruv that includes an

IAI designed Barak-1 air-defence missile systems

designed and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-built Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) to ferry its VIP’s but has provided its avionics and several crucial systems.

Military sources, however, concede that Israeli access to India’s defence sector is ‘awesome and considerable’ bordering on ‘alarming’. It is one which Service officers remain helpless to restrict

electronic warfare suite, day and night observation capability and targeting and flexible armament systems.

or dilute backed as it is by staunch, institutionalised Government support earlier by the BJP-led coalition till 2004 and thereafter by the Congress Party-dominated administration.

With Israeli help, the Indian Air Force is developing a mobile ground-based imagery receiving and processing terminal for use by ground combat forces and the Navy to target a range of locally

14

designed nuclear-capable missiles.

Agreements are reportedly in place with Israel to lease capacity on its reconnaissance Ofeq-5 military satellites until India hones its own capabilities.

Further evidence of this continuing but unacknowledged collaboration emerged in January 2008 after the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) successfully placed an IAI-designed TecSAR

military satellite in polar orbit in a classified operation to which access, at Tel Aviv’s request, was strictly limited.

TecSAR is expected to appreciably augment Israel’s intelligence-gathering capabilities by providing 24-hour high-resolution synthetic-aperture radar imagery in all-weather conditions at an affordable cost. Two additional TecSAR satellite launches are expected imminently.

Alongside, the IAF’s plans for a country-wide deployment of integrated air command-and-control systems that comprise airborne early warning and control platforms, radar, fighter aircraft and UAVs to replace the obsolete airspace management command and reporting centres are also being incrementally resuscitated with Israeli help.

Israel has also provided India with

It is also important to grasp the Israeli establishments argument that like itself, Delhi is surrounded by hostile neighbours and hence a nation under “siege” which needs desperately to strengthen and bolster its security apparatus.

15

counter-terrorism assistance to help it deal with the Kashmiri insurgency. It made available over a dozen technical teams to assist India in augmenting its border intelligence gathering capabilities in addition to anti-terrorism counter measures like upgraded border fencing, ground sensors and hand-held thermal imagers for use by the Army and paramilitary border guards.

Israeli-built hyper band communication systems and devices to jam militant communications were also provided to enhance India’s security grid. The IN is also in the process of acquiring five Israeli aerostat programmable radars to plug vital surveillance gaps in its coastal security following the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist strikes that were launched via the sea.

Cover Story-Rahul Bedi-IInd time.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:18 AM Page 7

FEBRUARY 2010

INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE RELATIONS

DSI

MAJOR INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE DEALS SINCE 2000 l Three IAI Phalcon Ilyushin IL-76TD (Airborne Early Warning and Control) for around

$2 billion of which one arrived last year and the remaining two are expected shortly. l Around 70-odd IAI-built Searcher Mk 1 and Mk 2 and Heron UAVs and 30 Harpy

ground attack Drones that constitute an integral ingredient of the burgeoning network-centric warfare capability that all three Services seek to execute for the full spectrum of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war. l Two Green Pine radar supplemented by aerostat balloons. l 30 Rafael Industries-built AGM-142 Raptor Have Nap/Popeye missile, specially

configured for the IAF for around $ 62.7 million. l Rafael’s SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) low level quick reaction missile

system (LLQRM) for the IAF worth some $ 260 million. l 3070 5.56 mm Tavor 21 assault rifles (TAR-21) from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI),

the break away small arms division of Israel Military Industries (IMI) for $ 20 million for India’s Special Forces (SF). l An unspecified number of Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles in addition to varied night vision

and laser range finding and targeting equipment also for the SF. l Electronics suites for Su-30MKI, MiG-27 and Jaguar combat aircraft and for Mi-35

helicopters. Advanced avionics and weaponry for 125 MiG 21 ‘bis’ upgraded ground attack aircraft. l 11 Barak-1 systems, including around 250 missiles. l 26 Derby missiles for the Indian Navy’s Sea Harrier fighters presently

undergoing a retrofit. l Upgrade of 180 M46 130 mm field guns to 155mm/39 cal for $ 45,524,137 by Soltam. l 333 partial solution Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) from El-Op to

upgrade the Army’s T-72M1 Ajeya Main Battle Tank for around $ 120,000 each. l Five Super Dovra II Extra Fast Attack Craft from IAI equipped with modern

surveillance systems acquired from December 1996 onwards; two are being constructed under licence at Goa Shipyard Limited while the requirement for another 15 is projected for the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard.

Israeli Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi inspects the Guard of Honour during his three-day visit to India in December 2009

l 130 Long Range Observation Systems (LOROS), a multi-sensor imaging system for

long range day and night observation from El-Op. l 1,200 Hand-Held Thermal Imaging Systems from El-Op. l Hi-tech sensors for the Line of Control in Kashmir also from El-Op. l Six El-Op Portable Laser Designating System for the IAF. l IAI is collaborating with the DRDO to jointly develop a next generation Barak-II ship-

borne area air defence missile system extending its strike range from 10 km to 70-80 km. The deal signed in February 2006 is valued at around $ 300 million. l IAI’s Lahav division has provided the glass cockpit package for Dhruv that includes an

IAI designed Barak-1 air-defence missile systems

designed and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-built Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) to ferry its VIP’s but has provided its avionics and several crucial systems.

Military sources, however, concede that Israeli access to India’s defence sector is ‘awesome and considerable’ bordering on ‘alarming’. It is one which Service officers remain helpless to restrict

electronic warfare suite, day and night observation capability and targeting and flexible armament systems.

or dilute backed as it is by staunch, institutionalised Government support earlier by the BJP-led coalition till 2004 and thereafter by the Congress Party-dominated administration.

With Israeli help, the Indian Air Force is developing a mobile ground-based imagery receiving and processing terminal for use by ground combat forces and the Navy to target a range of locally

14

designed nuclear-capable missiles.

Agreements are reportedly in place with Israel to lease capacity on its reconnaissance Ofeq-5 military satellites until India hones its own capabilities.

Further evidence of this continuing but unacknowledged collaboration emerged in January 2008 after the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) successfully placed an IAI-designed TecSAR

military satellite in polar orbit in a classified operation to which access, at Tel Aviv’s request, was strictly limited.

TecSAR is expected to appreciably augment Israel’s intelligence-gathering capabilities by providing 24-hour high-resolution synthetic-aperture radar imagery in all-weather conditions at an affordable cost. Two additional TecSAR satellite launches are expected imminently.

Alongside, the IAF’s plans for a country-wide deployment of integrated air command-and-control systems that comprise airborne early warning and control platforms, radar, fighter aircraft and UAVs to replace the obsolete airspace management command and reporting centres are also being incrementally resuscitated with Israeli help.

Israel has also provided India with

It is also important to grasp the Israeli establishments argument that like itself, Delhi is surrounded by hostile neighbours and hence a nation under “siege” which needs desperately to strengthen and bolster its security apparatus.

15

counter-terrorism assistance to help it deal with the Kashmiri insurgency. It made available over a dozen technical teams to assist India in augmenting its border intelligence gathering capabilities in addition to anti-terrorism counter measures like upgraded border fencing, ground sensors and hand-held thermal imagers for use by the Army and paramilitary border guards.

Israeli-built hyper band communication systems and devices to jam militant communications were also provided to enhance India’s security grid. The IN is also in the process of acquiring five Israeli aerostat programmable radars to plug vital surveillance gaps in its coastal security following the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist strikes that were launched via the sea.

Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:30 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

TECHNOLOGY

DSI

LIGHT, LETHAL AND WIRED? NOT YET The Indian Army is moving too slowly towards digitisation

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS

n Cyber security and the development of offensive cyber warfare capabilities have not received the attention that they deserve. n With the Indian armed forces becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare.

T

he Indian Army is extensively engaged in border management on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LoAC) with China and needs to prepare itself for a future border conflict that may escalate to a larger conventional war in the plains with nuclear undertones.

Simultaneously, the Army has been deployed for a long time for internal security duties and counter-insurgency (CI) operations.

In keeping with these twin requirements, the Army needs to modernise itself by upgrading its capabilities for both conventional and subconventional conflict. It must enhance its firepower-mobility-cyber warfare punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China. The Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’s modernisation vision is to, “Adapt to highend technology, improve night-fighting capability… (and) information technology,

AFP

Indian Army soldiers stand beside a mobile satellite terminal vehicle during exercises held at Madhavpur, Gujarat in February 2009

16

17

Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:30 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

TECHNOLOGY

DSI

LIGHT, LETHAL AND WIRED? NOT YET The Indian Army is moving too slowly towards digitisation

GURMEET KANWAL

KEY POINTS

n Cyber security and the development of offensive cyber warfare capabilities have not received the attention that they deserve. n With the Indian armed forces becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare.

T

he Indian Army is extensively engaged in border management on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LoAC) with China and needs to prepare itself for a future border conflict that may escalate to a larger conventional war in the plains with nuclear undertones.

Simultaneously, the Army has been deployed for a long time for internal security duties and counter-insurgency (CI) operations.

In keeping with these twin requirements, the Army needs to modernise itself by upgrading its capabilities for both conventional and subconventional conflict. It must enhance its firepower-mobility-cyber warfare punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China. The Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’s modernisation vision is to, “Adapt to highend technology, improve night-fighting capability… (and) information technology,

AFP

Indian Army soldiers stand beside a mobile satellite terminal vehicle during exercises held at Madhavpur, Gujarat in February 2009

16

17

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TECHNOLOGY

DSI

AFP

Indian Army soldiers use a satellite phone and study maps in Sonamarg, Kashmir, during a search operation

information warfare and network centric warfare.” According to Lt Gen Noble Thamburaj, formerly Vice Chief of Army Staff, the Army’s modernisation focus in the ongoing 11th Defence Plan is on, “Precision fire power, air defence, aviation, future infantry soldier as a system (FINSAS), infrastructure development, network centricity and achieving battlefield transparency through improved surveillance, night vision and target acquisition…”

Net-centric Capabilities Net-centric warfare (NCW) integrates modern weapons, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition andcommunications technology by optimally networking weapons, sensors and decision makers to synergise the combat potential of a force. A “system of systems” approach must be followed so that scarce resources are optimally exploited. The war

The Indian Army is not yet a light, lethal and wired 21st century force that can deter war from breaking out. The present Defence Budget is pegged at less than 2 percent of India’s GDP. It cannot sustain a one-million strong army, leave aside allowing it to modernise

18

in Iraq fought in March-April 2003 was based on the concept of NCW. Surveillance sensors; targetting systems and “shooters” were fused together in a seamless “system of systems” that reduced response time between the acquisition of a target and its destruction to 15-20 minutes.

According to Lt Gen Prakash Katoch, formerly Director-General Information Services: “The fulcrum of net-centricity is the TacC3I System (Tactical Command, Control, Communication and Information System) being developed by the Indian Army.” Under this mother system, various other systems such as the CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System), ACCCS (Artillery Combat Command and Control System), BSS (Battlefield Surveillance System), ADC&R (Air Defence Control and Reporting System), and BMS (Battlefield Management System) are being developed. Lt Gen Katoch is of the view

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TECHNOLOGY

DSI

AFP

An Indian Army radar located in the village of Rania, near Amritsar

that, “While the development of the TacC3I System is well under way… frequent hiccups occur due to the tug of war within the service, egoistic stonewalling, resistance to change, perceived dangers to comfort zones and, more significantly, lack of understanding of technology by senior officers.” Efforts are also underway in the Army to finalise a NCW philosophy.

However, an automated command and control and decision support system for use by the General Staff is still a long way off, as are supporting systems like the BSS and ADC&R. The urgent requirement of real-time satellite reconnaissance systems has still not been operationalised despite the nuclear overhang under which the armed forces now operate. Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, military-grade photographs of still better resolution need to be purchased from the open market. These sources may dry up quickly during war. A tri-Service Defence Communication Network (DCN) is in the stages of advanced planning. However, little progress has been made towards addressing inter-Service interoperability challenges in the communications field.

While some Stentor long-range Battle

The Army needs to modernise itself by upgrading its capabilities for both conventional and sub-conventional conflict.

It must enhance its firepower-mobility-cyber warfare punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China.

”

Field Surveillance Radios have been in service for over a decade, medium-range radars are still to be acquired. Israeli Searcher-I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been introduced, but these are few in number and it will be a long time before they will really make a difference by

20

providing a real-time surveillance capability so that ground forces can initiate action even as a fresh input is received.

Only a small number of Searcher-II UAVs, with an upper ceiling that makes them suitable for the mountains, has been acquired. Indigenously designed UAVs that are in the design and development pipeline include Gagan, Pawan and Rustom. Pilot-less target aircraft include Lakshya and Nishant. India does not as yet have a programme to either acquire or indigenously produce unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) of the Predator variety being used to kill terrorists in the Af-Pak region by US and NATO forces.

Modern frequency-hopping radio sets with integral encryption devices have been introduced in recent years, but networked communications, which form the backbone of an effective C4I2SR system, need substantial upgradation. The Plan AREN system has been in service for almost three decades and is based on outdated and bulky technologies. Tenders have been floated for a Tactical Communication System (TCS) for offensive operations and a Battlefield Management System for communication at the tactical level in defensive operations. The BMS will be integrated with the ASCON communi-cation system. The ASCON

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TECHNOLOGY With the Indian armed forces becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare. India should adopt an inter-ministerial, interdepartmental, inter-Services, multiagency, multi-disciplinary approach to deal with emerging cyber warfare threats.

Soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifles walk back to their base camp in Kargil in 1999

provides voice and data links between static HQ and those in peacetime locations. It still has some years of service left as it is of modular design and can be upgraded to a limited extent. However, its capability to provide data links is rather limited as data requirements have grown by leaps and bounds over the last decade or so. The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum freed by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern landline communications.

Cyber Security Cyber security and the development of offensive cyber warfare capabilities have not received the attention that they deserve. M.K. Narayanan, the former National Security Adviser, had told The Times, London that China’s cyber warriors hacked into computers in the Prime Minister’s Office on December 15, 2009. At least 30 computers may have been penetrated. Last year, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have broken into and

Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, militarygrade photographs of still better resolution need to be purchased from the open market.These sources may dry up quickly during war.

”

22

stolen documents from hundreds of Government and private offices around the world, including those of the Indian embassy in the US. The People’s Liberation Army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in Information Technology to maintain an e-vigil. On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, had authorised the creation of a new military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks of the US armed forces against computer attacks. The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter the overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities of the Western Alliance “acupuncture warfare”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) is described as “paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of command, control, communications and information as if hitting an acupuncture point in kung fu combat.”

tender for 43,000 close-quarter battle carbines was issued in early-2008. The acquisition will be followed by the local manufacture of approximately 1,17,000 carbines. Other equipment will follow in due course.

The Indian Army is well equipped to defend the country’s borders. However, it is not yet a light, lethal and wired 21st century force that can deter war from breaking out. If war is thrust on the country, the Army must be able to fight and win against the rapidly modernising People’s Liberation Army of China and ensure that the major battles are fought inside enemy territory.

For that, it will need more budgetary resources and the elimination of red tape in decision making for weapons and equipment acquisition. The present Defence Budget is pegged at less than 2 percent of India’s GDP. It cannot sustain a one-million strong Army, leave aside allowing it to modernise.

AFP

Twin-track Strategy A nodal agency must be created to spearhead India’s cyber war efforts under a National Cyber Security Adviser who should report directly to the NSA. A twin-track strategy must be followed: defensive to guard India’s vulnerable assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure dependent on the use of cyberspace, as well as an offensive to disrupt the adversary’s C4I2SR systems and develop leverages that can be exploited at the appropriate time.

Despite the large-scale employment of infantry battalions on border management and the extensive commitments of the Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles in IS and CI operations, infantry modernisation has been languishing for several decades.

The Army’s F-INSAS project focusses on enhancing the lethality and survivability of soldiers, but it will take at least five to seven years to be fielded. F-INSAS seeks to transform soldiers into fully networked, mobile warriors with a high degree of situational awareness and the ability to operate in all weather conditions and terrains.

The programme envisages equipping infantrymen with lightweight integrated helmets with a head up display, a built-in communication system and night vision goggles, a hand-held computer display, GPS and lethal fire power, including laser-guided weapon systems at appropriate levels.

The F-INSAS programme is akin to the US Land Warrior programme. A global

DSI

T: +61 (0)8 8305 0311 E: asiasales@codan.com.au

www.codan.com.au

Digitisation in army-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:32 AM Page 7

FEBRUARY 2010

TECHNOLOGY With the Indian armed forces becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, they are already vulnerable to cyber/ information warfare. India should adopt an inter-ministerial, interdepartmental, inter-Services, multiagency, multi-disciplinary approach to deal with emerging cyber warfare threats.

Soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifles walk back to their base camp in Kargil in 1999

provides voice and data links between static HQ and those in peacetime locations. It still has some years of service left as it is of modular design and can be upgraded to a limited extent. However, its capability to provide data links is rather limited as data requirements have grown by leaps and bounds over the last decade or so. The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum freed by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern landline communications.

Cyber Security Cyber security and the development of offensive cyber warfare capabilities have not received the attention that they deserve. M.K. Narayanan, the former National Security Adviser, had told The Times, London that China’s cyber warriors hacked into computers in the Prime Minister’s Office on December 15, 2009. At least 30 computers may have been penetrated. Last year, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have broken into and

Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, militarygrade photographs of still better resolution need to be purchased from the open market.These sources may dry up quickly during war.

”

22

stolen documents from hundreds of Government and private offices around the world, including those of the Indian embassy in the US. The People’s Liberation Army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in Information Technology to maintain an e-vigil. On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, had authorised the creation of a new military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks of the US armed forces against computer attacks. The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter the overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities of the Western Alliance “acupuncture warfare”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) is described as “paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of command, control, communications and information as if hitting an acupuncture point in kung fu combat.”

tender for 43,000 close-quarter battle carbines was issued in early-2008. The acquisition will be followed by the local manufacture of approximately 1,17,000 carbines. Other equipment will follow in due course.

The Indian Army is well equipped to defend the country’s borders. However, it is not yet a light, lethal and wired 21st century force that can deter war from breaking out. If war is thrust on the country, the Army must be able to fight and win against the rapidly modernising People’s Liberation Army of China and ensure that the major battles are fought inside enemy territory.

For that, it will need more budgetary resources and the elimination of red tape in decision making for weapons and equipment acquisition. The present Defence Budget is pegged at less than 2 percent of India’s GDP. It cannot sustain a one-million strong Army, leave aside allowing it to modernise.

AFP

Twin-track Strategy A nodal agency must be created to spearhead India’s cyber war efforts under a National Cyber Security Adviser who should report directly to the NSA. A twin-track strategy must be followed: defensive to guard India’s vulnerable assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure dependent on the use of cyberspace, as well as an offensive to disrupt the adversary’s C4I2SR systems and develop leverages that can be exploited at the appropriate time.

Despite the large-scale employment of infantry battalions on border management and the extensive commitments of the Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles in IS and CI operations, infantry modernisation has been languishing for several decades.

The Army’s F-INSAS project focusses on enhancing the lethality and survivability of soldiers, but it will take at least five to seven years to be fielded. F-INSAS seeks to transform soldiers into fully networked, mobile warriors with a high degree of situational awareness and the ability to operate in all weather conditions and terrains.

The programme envisages equipping infantrymen with lightweight integrated helmets with a head up display, a built-in communication system and night vision goggles, a hand-held computer display, GPS and lethal fire power, including laser-guided weapon systems at appropriate levels.

The F-INSAS programme is akin to the US Land Warrior programme. A global

DSI

T: +61 (0)8 8305 0311 E: asiasales@codan.com.au

www.codan.com.au

Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 1

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MODERNISATION

DSI

THE CHALLENGE TO

CHANGE Armed forces must seek cost effective solutions to enhance their combat edge and increase their technological superiority

FALI H. MAJOR

KEY POINTS

n We need to focus attention on building a credible and demonstratable military capability across the entire spectrum of conflict because new power centres and unpredictable conflict zones will keep emerging. n This capability building exercise is no simple task and is easier said than done, since no country in the world can acquire an entire range of military capabilities all at once.

I

t is said that in the past 3,000 years, mankind has fought about 14,500 wars and seen only 270 years of peace.

Conflict in some form or the other is inevitable amongst humans and a peaceful, harmonious world seems to be more of an Utopian ideal. Shaping of events by nations to achieve their objectives is the intention of a national strategy and it is only since Independence that we, in India, became conscious of our identity as a nation and the responsibility of our destiny.

It was the dawn of this awareness that marked the beginning of ‘Indian Strategic Thought’. The fact that we are the world’s largest democracy and one of the fastest growing economies, bears testimony to our vision and resilience.

24

25

However, the subtle changes in global and regional inter-State dynamics has placed India at the cusp of realising it’s destiny of being a power in the region.

Today, Asia is the global engine of growth—booming economies, large populations, high productivity, great purchasing power and strategic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)—criss crossing the globe. Interestingly, every major world power has a presence and high stakes here. Economic growth in the region has also galvanised Asian military capability. The region is also witness to conflicts, instabilities, nuclear proliferation and has become a cradle and playground of terrorism.

If chaos is an indicator of progress, Asia today proves it. India’s size, resources, capabilities and growth endow it with power, visibility, influence and responsi-bility for a greater role in regional affairs. Notwithstanding the turbulence that surrounds India today and the many uncertainties in our region and indeed the whole world, these are very exciting times. This is because fresh and complex challenges provide great opportunities to set aside old mindsets and then embark upon visionary paths—ones that could potentially change the destiny of our nation, if carefully chosen.

Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

MODERNISATION

DSI

THE CHALLENGE TO

CHANGE Armed forces must seek cost effective solutions to enhance their combat edge and increase their technological superiority

FALI H. MAJOR

KEY POINTS

n We need to focus attention on building a credible and demonstratable military capability across the entire spectrum of conflict because new power centres and unpredictable conflict zones will keep emerging. n This capability building exercise is no simple task and is easier said than done, since no country in the world can acquire an entire range of military capabilities all at once.

I

t is said that in the past 3,000 years, mankind has fought about 14,500 wars and seen only 270 years of peace.

Conflict in some form or the other is inevitable amongst humans and a peaceful, harmonious world seems to be more of an Utopian ideal. Shaping of events by nations to achieve their objectives is the intention of a national strategy and it is only since Independence that we, in India, became conscious of our identity as a nation and the responsibility of our destiny.

It was the dawn of this awareness that marked the beginning of ‘Indian Strategic Thought’. The fact that we are the world’s largest democracy and one of the fastest growing economies, bears testimony to our vision and resilience.

24

25

However, the subtle changes in global and regional inter-State dynamics has placed India at the cusp of realising it’s destiny of being a power in the region.

Today, Asia is the global engine of growth—booming economies, large populations, high productivity, great purchasing power and strategic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)—criss crossing the globe. Interestingly, every major world power has a presence and high stakes here. Economic growth in the region has also galvanised Asian military capability. The region is also witness to conflicts, instabilities, nuclear proliferation and has become a cradle and playground of terrorism.

If chaos is an indicator of progress, Asia today proves it. India’s size, resources, capabilities and growth endow it with power, visibility, influence and responsi-bility for a greater role in regional affairs. Notwithstanding the turbulence that surrounds India today and the many uncertainties in our region and indeed the whole world, these are very exciting times. This is because fresh and complex challenges provide great opportunities to set aside old mindsets and then embark upon visionary paths—ones that could potentially change the destiny of our nation, if carefully chosen.

Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:41 AM Page 3

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MODERNISATION

DSI

Tangible force multipliers relate to numerical strength and are technology driven, while intangible force multipliers, by definition, are qualitative in nature and reflect the quality of people, their innate calibre, determination, adaptability and innovativeness.

Rohini Radar on display during 2010 Republic Day Parade in New Delhi

”

Serious Efforts to Modernise

The first step in this path is that India must credibly demonstrate its eminence in all facets of national power, especially its military might. Any utterance, threat, talk or offer is taken seriously only if you can deliver.

After many decades, there is a serious effort by the present Government to modernise the Indian armed forces. We must, however, put in perspective the nuances, complexities and peculiarities of “defence modernisation”.

Without exception, armed forces around the world, in some form or the other, are always in the process of modernising, upgrading, developing infrastructure and honing their combat skills to project national power. It is only the scope, scale, speed, technology levels and national aspirations that differ.

If we were to look closely and dispassionately at the way the Indian armed forces are evolving and compare it with other evolving armed forces and the path charted by some of the advanced countries, we can see some essential similarities. Modernisation and the transformation of armed forces is an inevitable process because of ageing equipment, obsolescence of weapon systems and platforms, emergin technologies, the changing security environment and threat perceptions.

Since the capability, effectiveness and credibility of a military power is premised on technology, which, in turn, is driven by operational needs—all armed

26

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Our nation has a large pool of immensely talented scientists and we need to leverage this resource for achieving self-reliance.

Our armed forces seek to harness the capabilities of space, cyberspace, smart weapons and other cuttingedge technologies.

Tejas Light Combat Aircraft designed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited

forces, without exception, will evolve on similar lines.

But for minor variations, the Indian armed forces are on a globally recognised growth path today. The luxury of falling behind in this business simply does not exist, because it is only military power that empowers, emboldens and provides credibility to all other indices of national power.

It is, however, axiomatic that the armed forces must prepare only for capabilities and not ‘intentions’. That intentions have always remain inscrutable, adds to the dilemma. It is therefore inescapable that we focus attention on building a credible and demonstratable military capability across the entire spectrum of conflict and not a threat-based or country-centric capability because new power centres and unpredictable conflict zones will keep emerging. This capability-building exercise is no simple task and is easier said than done, since no country in the world can acquire an entire range of military capabilities, all at once. It is just not possible. But the good news is that after decades of waiting for this to happen (capability-based approach) a beginning has been made, and the modernisation process for the Indian armed forces has actually commenced.

A nuanced modernisation and capability-building programme, spread over the next three Plan Periods, is on the cards. If we are successful in establishing firm foundations in this military modernisation process, it will put the Indian armed forces and indeed the

country on a trajectory that will take us a few generations ahead.

Embedded in the defence modernisation process are some very crucial technological and doctrinal challenges. The fundamental issue that always crops up when modernisation of the armed forces is discussed is ‘Does doctrine drive technology, or is it the other way around?’

What it means is that do we conduct military operations with what we get or what is available, or do we demand technology to facilitate the way we fight.

Ideally, it should be a doctrine that dictates the direction of research and development.

A desired concept of operation, or a perceived gap in capability is identified by the military planners, which requires a technological solution. This, in turn, becomes the subject of design and development. A product is then designed, manufactured and inducted.

Tangible Force Multipliers But that’s not how it usually happens. For this to happen, the country needs a very robust and indigenous technological base to develop core competencies in many complex technologies. Presently, our defence research, design and development (DRD&D) is limited and is just about adequate for license manufacture and joint ventures. What is manufactured is only by defence PSU’s, with very little or no contribution from the private sector.

It is quite likely that the defence modernisation process of our likely adversaries and indeed armed forces around the world also face similar

28

”

challenges and dilemmas. So if it is just a race, where does it leave us and what are the options?

While the quest for technological advantage must continue, the armed force that is best able to generate tangible and intangible force multipliers in the interim, will attain the edge. Tangible force multipliers relate to numerical strength and are technology-driven, while intangible force multipliers, by definition, are qualitative in nature and reflect the quality of people, their innate calibre, determination, adaptability and innovativeness.

In military parlance, force multiplication is a dramatic increase in combat effectiveness, by which the required effect can be achieved with greatly reduced numbers. To put it simply, it is an achieving of ‘the same with less’ and consequently ‘more with the same’.

The armed force which best utilises force multiplication to its advantage, both tangible and intangible, will come out victorious even against a numerically and technologically superior foe. Is that not what “asymmetric warfare” is all about?

No nation can be a major power without three attributes—a high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously, and capability to project power (hard/soft) far beyond its borders.

This comes at a cost, and therefore, keeping costs to the nation in mind, the armed forces must seek cost effective solutions to enhance their combat edge and

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MODERNISATION technological superiority.

Notwithstanding the perceived financial downturn, defence technologies are of an enduring nature and will continue to be in the fore front, since they are so deeply embedded and integral to our national security requirements, both in peace and war.

The good news is that the environment for growth of the defence industry in India is indeed very bright and conducive.

The new Government guidelines as laid down in the Defence and Procurement Policy 2009 encourages the participation of the private industry in the defence sector and the time is indeed ripe for the Indian defence industry to take advantage of this opportunity. There is a demand and there is capability in the private sector—both ingredients are necessary for catalysing growth.

Rate of Change Our nation has a large pool of immensely talented scientists and we need to leverage this resource for achieving self-reliance at the desired pace. Our armed forces seek to harness the capabilities of space, cyberspace, smart weapons and other cutting-edge technologies. These are areas, where opportunity beckons and the armed forces look forward to the best minds in the country taking up the challenge and providing them with breakthrough defence technologies.

A very unique characteristic that exemplifies the nature of technology today is the rate of change. The shelf-life of existing technologies is becoming shorter and newer technologies are emerging at a breath-taking pace. This has a direct implication in the modernisation process.

The development cycle of a product from the design to the operationalisation stage has to reduce; otherwise the equipment runs the risk of becoming obsolete in its entirety. This certainly must not happen, given the security scenario in the neighbourhood.

The question that now remains to be answered is what should be done? There is a need to identify core technologies that need to be developed and they must be aggressively designed and manufac-tured.

If this is not done in time, we run the risk of being saddled with investments outside the country that do not add value to our existing state and deny us the opportunity to be self-reliant. There is a need to collectively bring focus into our design and development activities. We must not attempt to do everything.

DSI

Progressively defence research, design and development must move from the public to the private sector; and into the capable minds and hands of young scientists and entrepreneurs.The concepts of time-bound processes, the ability to scrap a process if it does not meet the desired objective, the ability to take risks and timely decisions, are some truths that we could do well to absorb.

”

In the modern competitive environment, such a practice is simply not cost effective and nations the world over are learning from the benefits of collaboration. We must identify zones of technology that need to be developed and thereafter concentrate on these niche capabilities through joint ventures and diverse partnerships.

There has to be a better and more effective way to focus research and design activities in the country. Whilst the prevalent structures and organisations have just about served satisfactorily over the years and have brought the country to its present technological standard, it is time to evolve with changing requirements.

Research, design, development and manufacturing activities in most other countries are undertaken by private industry in coordination with the user and the Government. This is still not the case with us, and is mostly restricted to defence laboratories and PSUs, who simply do not stick to time schedules, where manufacturing processes are outdated, capacities are inadequate, quality control is suspect and

30

accountability is rarely enforced.

Progressively defence, research, design and development must move from the public to the private sector and into the capable minds and hands of young scientists and entrepreneurs. The concepts of time-bound processes, the ability to scrap a process if it does not meet the desired objective, the ability to take risks and timely decisions, are some truths, that we could do well to absorb.

As military technologies and hardware change, new capacities and capabilities are generated that sometimes radically alter the way we do business. And it is hard to do things differently with the old processes, interfaces and organisational

structures that exist in our PSUs and DRDO. Keeping pace and adapting to changes as an organisation, is the challenge.

Another area of concern is the human resources requirements of our PSUs. Quality people are the most essential energisers. This is another of our weak areas. All stake-holders must have a deep, comprehensive, multi-disciplinary understanding. DRD&D needs the best people, world-class education and most importantly they need to be retained.

Today, retention of organisational expertise is a major concern of our PSUs. The Government must take suitable measures to attract people and

make it worth their while to stay. Locally designed apex agency, to co-ordinate The requirement to increase Arjun Main Battle and regulate the activities of user interface in the design Tanks the many agencies involved in process is another crucial area. It defence production. exists to some extent, but it has to take on There is no doubt that the Indian a more intrusive and effective role. private sector has matured over the years Industry should always be able to and has a significant role to play in with research and translate user requirements into viable association technical options. In short, the user must development organisations and PSUs to achieve a competitive edge in always remain the “Captain”.

The last two decades of economic defence technology.

Ultimately, all the stake holders—the upswing, have resulted in a comparative surge in the defence industry in our armed forces and public and private country. This is an encouraging sign but sectors need to come together and grow if unregulated, it runs the risk of wasteful in a symbiotic relationship to strengthen expenditure and duplication of effort. the nation and become self-reliant in our There is therefore a definite need for an security needs.

31

Modernisation of Indian Armed Forces-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:46 AM Page 7

FEBRUARY 2010

MODERNISATION technological superiority.

Notwithstanding the perceived financial downturn, defence technologies are of an enduring nature and will continue to be in the fore front, since they are so deeply embedded and integral to our national security requirements, both in peace and war.

The good news is that the environment for growth of the defence industry in India is indeed very bright and conducive.

The new Government guidelines as laid down in the Defence and Procurement Policy 2009 encourages the participation of the private industry in the defence sector and the time is indeed ripe for the Indian defence industry to take advantage of this opportunity. There is a demand and there is capability in the private sector—both ingredients are necessary for catalysing growth.

Rate of Change Our nation has a large pool of immensely talented scientists and we need to leverage this resource for achieving self-reliance at the desired pace. Our armed forces seek to harness the capabilities of space, cyberspace, smart weapons and other cutting-edge technologies. These are areas, where opportunity beckons and the armed forces look forward to the best minds in the country taking up the challenge and providing them with breakthrough defence technologies.

A very unique characteristic that exemplifies the nature of technology today is the rate of change. The shelf-life of existing technologies is becoming shorter and newer technologies are emerging at a breath-taking pace. This has a direct implication in the modernisation process.

The development cycle of a product from the design to the operationalisation stage has to reduce; otherwise the equipment runs the risk of becoming obsolete in its entirety. This certainly must not happen, given the security scenario in the neighbourhood.

The question that now remains to be answered is what should be done? There is a need to identify core technologies that need to be developed and they must be aggressively designed and manufac-tured.

If this is not done in time, we run the risk of being saddled with investments outside the country that do not add value to our existing state and deny us the opportunity to be self-reliant. There is a need to collectively bring focus into our design and development activities. We must not attempt to do everything.

DSI

Progressively defence research, design and development must move from the public to the private sector; and into the capable minds and hands of young scientists and entrepreneurs.The concepts of time-bound processes, the ability to scrap a process if it does not meet the desired objective, the ability to take risks and timely decisions, are some truths that we could do well to absorb.

”

In the modern competitive environment, such a practice is simply not cost effective and nations the world over are learning from the benefits of collaboration. We must identify zones of technology that need to be developed and thereafter concentrate on these niche capabilities through joint ventures and diverse partnerships.

There has to be a better and more effective way to focus research and design activities in the country. Whilst the prevalent structures and organisations have just about served satisfactorily over the years and have brought the country to its present technological standard, it is time to evolve with changing requirements.

Research, design, development and manufacturing activities in most other countries are undertaken by private industry in coordination with the user and the Government. This is still not the case with us, and is mostly restricted to defence laboratories and PSUs, who simply do not stick to time schedules, where manufacturing processes are outdated, capacities are inadequate, quality control is suspect and

30

accountability is rarely enforced.

Progressively defence, research, design and development must move from the public to the private sector and into the capable minds and hands of young scientists and entrepreneurs. The concepts of time-bound processes, the ability to scrap a process if it does not meet the desired objective, the ability to take risks and timely decisions, are some truths, that we could do well to absorb.

As military technologies and hardware change, new capacities and capabilities are generated that sometimes radically alter the way we do business. And it is hard to do things differently with the old processes, interfaces and organisational

structures that exist in our PSUs and DRDO. Keeping pace and adapting to changes as an organisation, is the challenge.

Another area of concern is the human resources requirements of our PSUs. Quality people are the most essential energisers. This is another of our weak areas. All stake-holders must have a deep, comprehensive, multi-disciplinary understanding. DRD&D needs the best people, world-class education and most importantly they need to be retained.

Today, retention of organisational expertise is a major concern of our PSUs. The Government must take suitable measures to attract people and

make it worth their while to stay. Locally designed apex agency, to co-ordinate The requirement to increase Arjun Main Battle and regulate the activities of user interface in the design Tanks the many agencies involved in process is another crucial area. It defence production. exists to some extent, but it has to take on There is no doubt that the Indian a more intrusive and effective role. private sector has matured over the years Industry should always be able to and has a significant role to play in with research and translate user requirements into viable association technical options. In short, the user must development organisations and PSUs to achieve a competitive edge in always remain the “Captain”.

The last two decades of economic defence technology.

Ultimately, all the stake holders—the upswing, have resulted in a comparative surge in the defence industry in our armed forces and public and private country. This is an encouraging sign but sectors need to come together and grow if unregulated, it runs the risk of wasteful in a symbiotic relationship to strengthen expenditure and duplication of effort. the nation and become self-reliant in our There is therefore a definite need for an security needs.

31

ROSOBORONEXPORT

A new look for legendary weapons t Defexpo India 2010, to be held from 15 to 18 February in Delhi, India, Rosoboronexport will present the latest Russian developments in the field of land, naval and air materiel as well as advanced air defense weapons.

Particularly, S-400 Triumph SAM system, Mangust, Svetlyak and Mirazh patrol boats, and the upgraded BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicle will be on display. The exposition also includes both new and known, well-proven small arms, anti-tank missile systems and multi-purpose grenade launchers.

Among them are the Pecheneg, Kord, RPK-201 machine guns and also the AN-94 Abakan assault rifle unrivalled in terms of the number of embodied design solutions.

Russia's Metis-M1 and Kornet-E anti-tank missile and upgraded Shmel-M rocketassisted flamethrower offering longer range and higher lethality invariably remain in the limelight.

Kalashnikov assault rifles and RPG-7V grenade launcher are still among the top Russian exhibits. They have rightly earned the respect of several generations of soldiers and officers from many countries in the world and become a symbol for reliability, simplicity and efficiency of Russian weapons. They won a high reputation in armed conflicts that took place in a variety of geographic and climatic conditions, whether high mountains, hot deserts or humid tropics.

A

AK-100 SERIES – IN THE BEST TRADITIONS The AK-47 became the most renowned and mass-built assault rifle of the 20th century.

Hundreds of stories of its amazing ruggedness, simplicity and unsurpassed reliability can be heard. Even in the most critical situation the soldier feels certain that that the AK will not fail.

Today’s successors to the legendary weapon are the “hundredth” (AK-100) series assault rifles which are manufactured in Izhevsk. Of this new family, the export line includes the AK-101 and AK-103 versions and AK-102 AK-104 and AK-105 compact models. Moreover, a unique design of the assault rifle allows various modifications to be developed on its basis to meet the customer requirements.

Kalashnikov assault rifles In the new Kalashnikov assault rifles, the Russian arms manufacturers have managed to reduce muzzle flash and recoil energy upon firing. The rifles gained increased stability and better grouping in automatic fire.

The "hundredth" series differs in higher operational reliability and longer life through the use of modern high-strength materials.

The essential advantage of the new Kalashnikov rifle family on the world market, aside from the recognized technical merits, is the capability to use rounds of various calibers. They can fire both 5.56 mm NATO standard rounds (AK-101 AK-102) and 7.62 mm Soviet rounds mod. 1943 (AK-103, AK104) as well as 5.45 mm rounds (AK-105).

At the same time the repairability of all AK-100 series assault rifles is high due to commonality of subassemblies. Independent adjustment of subassemblies and parts is almost entirely excluded during rifle production.

The new assault rifles have a standard base for mounting optical and night sights and provision is made for installing the GP-34 anti-personnel rifle grenade projectors.

RPG-7V – PORTABLE CLOSE-IN ARTILLERY The RPG-7 grenade launcher was adopted by the Soviet Army in 1961 and is still in service with 50 countries around the world, including the Russian Army, too. Like the Kalashnikov rifles, it was successfully used in almost all present-day conflicts. Such longevity was achieved through simple and original design, system modernization of the grenade launcher and primarily through the development of new rounds with regard to combat experience.

Thus, a shaped-charge jet of the PG-7VR anti-tank rocket grenade with a tandem

warhead cuts through 600 mm armor like a knife through butter, even if it is protected by a modern add-on ERA. The TBG-7V round with a thermobaric (FAE) warhead comparable in lethality to a 120 mm artillery shell or mortar bomb is effective against enemy manpower located in fortifications. To defeat infantry in the open or and in shelters and buildings, the OG-7V round with a fragmentation grenade is used. It can also destroy soft-skinned vehicles. This round is particularly effective for engaging enemy fire emplacements during operations in residential and industrial areas.

In recent years, Russia has been actively opposing the unlicensed production of Soviet- and Russian-design weapons.

"Only license weapons meet the highest technical requirements and have known longevity. By now, we have already reached an understanding on this issue with a number of countries, - said Rosoboronexport’s Deputy Director General Viktor Komardin. - Of course, even the most reliable weapon models become outdated with time. And only the developers - in this case this is Russia - can offer modern weapon systems based on the best traditions and huge experience."

In the coming decades the Kalashnikov AK-100 series assault rifles and the upgraded RPG-7V grenade launchers with new grenades are to become a reliable and timely replacement for the legendary timetested weapons.

DSI Marketing Promotion

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MARITIME SECURITY

DSI

THE SEA

Despite attacks by terrorist from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate

C. UDAY BHASKAR

KEY POINTS

A silver lining to the 26/11 attacks is India’s renewed focus on its longneglected maritime domain. n The country’s nine coastal States have woefully inadequate marine police capacity. n With the surge in acquisitions and increase in personnel, it is envisaged that by 2012, the Indian Coastal Guard will be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force, putting it among the world’s top four coast guards. n

I

ndia’s maritime challenges and opportunities are best illustrated if the map of the Subcontinent— traditionally projected with a north-south orientation—is reversed. Peninsular India is the only sizeable landmass that straddles one of the world’s three navigable oceans in a manner that provides enormous opportunities and complex challenges to national security.

The paradox is that the politics, and hence history of modern India, is decided in Delhi that is determinedly sea-blind and consequently unable to harness opportunity or cope with challenges appropriately.

The macro-security concerns range from easy access to the peninsula through the seas to trade-energy dependence and the inexorable compulsions of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-driven strategic arena. The vulnerability was agonisingly exposed on November 26, 2008, when Mumbai was attacked by a group of ruthless terrorists who used the sea routes to enter the city. Interrogation of the lone perpetrator, currently in Indian custody,

An Indian Coast Guard helicopter and ship take part in an exercise off the coast of Porbandar in the Arabian Sea

34

35

indicates clear linkages with Pakistan and the country’s support to terrorism.

Currently, India is reviewing the tragic fall-out of what is now referred to as 26/11; while the death and destruction has been considerable there is also a welcome element of determination to learn from the enormity of the tragedy. But, as in most national security experiences, India learns reluctantly.

A silver lining to 26/11 lies in the Indian State’s renewed focus on its longneglected maritime domain. It has long been averred that Independent India has been indifferent to its long coastline and distant island territories and that after the 1962 war with China the security fixation with the land borders has been pronounced. The sovereignty of the anxious post-colonial State is inextricably linked with a heightened sensitivity about territoriality and its purported loss.

Almost 46 years after the ignominy of the war with China, the trauma of 26/11 has compelled the Indian State to move with urgency to redress the many gaps in its maritime security. It merits repetition that while the Mumbai tragedy has exposed the vulnerability of the Indian coastline, the spectrum of challenges in the maritime domain range from nuclear deterrence to monitoring suspicious boats and related illegal activities across a 7,600 km-long coastline and in the farflung islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), formed on February 1, 1977, are the primary agencies responsible for maritime and coastal security with the State marine police assuming the responsibility of the waters contiguous to the shore.

It is instructive that, historically, India has

AFP

POLICING

MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

MARITIME SECURITY

DSI

THE SEA

Despite attacks by terrorist from the sea, the focus on maritime security remains inadequate

C. UDAY BHASKAR

KEY POINTS

A silver lining to the 26/11 attacks is India’s renewed focus on its longneglected maritime domain. n The country’s nine coastal States have woefully inadequate marine police capacity. n With the surge in acquisitions and increase in personnel, it is envisaged that by 2012, the Indian Coastal Guard will be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force, putting it among the world’s top four coast guards. n

I

ndia’s maritime challenges and opportunities are best illustrated if the map of the Subcontinent— traditionally projected with a north-south orientation—is reversed. Peninsular India is the only sizeable landmass that straddles one of the world’s three navigable oceans in a manner that provides enormous opportunities and complex challenges to national security.

The paradox is that the politics, and hence history of modern India, is decided in Delhi that is determinedly sea-blind and consequently unable to harness opportunity or cope with challenges appropriately.

The macro-security concerns range from easy access to the peninsula through the seas to trade-energy dependence and the inexorable compulsions of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-driven strategic arena. The vulnerability was agonisingly exposed on November 26, 2008, when Mumbai was attacked by a group of ruthless terrorists who used the sea routes to enter the city. Interrogation of the lone perpetrator, currently in Indian custody,

An Indian Coast Guard helicopter and ship take part in an exercise off the coast of Porbandar in the Arabian Sea

34

35

indicates clear linkages with Pakistan and the country’s support to terrorism.

Currently, India is reviewing the tragic fall-out of what is now referred to as 26/11; while the death and destruction has been considerable there is also a welcome element of determination to learn from the enormity of the tragedy. But, as in most national security experiences, India learns reluctantly.

A silver lining to 26/11 lies in the Indian State’s renewed focus on its longneglected maritime domain. It has long been averred that Independent India has been indifferent to its long coastline and distant island territories and that after the 1962 war with China the security fixation with the land borders has been pronounced. The sovereignty of the anxious post-colonial State is inextricably linked with a heightened sensitivity about territoriality and its purported loss.

Almost 46 years after the ignominy of the war with China, the trauma of 26/11 has compelled the Indian State to move with urgency to redress the many gaps in its maritime security. It merits repetition that while the Mumbai tragedy has exposed the vulnerability of the Indian coastline, the spectrum of challenges in the maritime domain range from nuclear deterrence to monitoring suspicious boats and related illegal activities across a 7,600 km-long coastline and in the farflung islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), formed on February 1, 1977, are the primary agencies responsible for maritime and coastal security with the State marine police assuming the responsibility of the waters contiguous to the shore.

It is instructive that, historically, India has

AFP

POLICING

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FEBRUARY 2010

MARITIME SECURITY

Low Budget The budget figures of the last two years are instructive. In FY 2008-09, the total Indian defence expenditure (DE) was budgeted at Rs 105,600 crore ($ 22.95 billion at current exchange rates) and the naval portion was Rs 18,797 crore ($4.1 billion); this works out to a share of 17.8 percent—an improvement from the single digit figures of earlier decades.

However, in FY 2009-10 the total DE has gone up to Rs 141,703 crore ($30.8 billion), the total naval allocation has been pegged at Rs 19,656 crore ($4.27 billion)—only 13.8 percent of the total Indian defence outlay.

In other words, there has been a drop in the naval budget as a percentage of the overall Defence Budget. The increase in FY 2008-2009 was in part due to the focus on the Indian Coast Guard after the Mumbai tragedy. To augment the existing force-levels, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) sanctioned 40 ships, 20 boats and 42 aircraft for the ICG in February 2009. Shortly thereafter, the Government also accorded Acceptance of Necessity for 7 offshore patrol vessels, 20 fast patrol vessels and 12 Dornier aircraft. The induction of these platforms in the near future will significantly enhance the ICG’s operational capability. It is pertinent that as many as five ships, including one advanced offshore vessel, were commissioned in the ICG during 2009.

On the infrastructure front, the CCS sanctioned 9 stations and the regional headquarters (North-West), along with requisite manpower, to cover the vulnerable gaps along the coast. The new regional headquarters in Gujarat and ICG stations at Gandhinagar, Vadinar, Karwar, Veraval and Hut Bay were com-

The Navy was and is the proverbial Cinderella service with the lowest personnel strength and the smallest budgetary allocation of the total Defence Budget.The manpower ratio of the Army, Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—in overall terms, the 50,000 plus naval strength is dwarfed by the million plus Indian Army.

”

missioned or activated in record time during the year.

To man these new platforms and stations, the Government has sanctioned as many as 3,229 additional personnel, when fully implemented these inductions will dramatically alter the profile of the ICG. Not since the 1962 war, when the Indian Army was given a dramatic fillip, has the Centre acted with such alacrity to augment the capacity of an individual armed force. The scale of the increase may be gauged from the fact that currently the ICG has 43 ships, about 25 craft/boats of different types and 45 aircraft, which are manned by about 7,500 personnel. With the surge in acquisitions and increase in personnel, it is envisaged that by 2012, the ICG will be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force, putting it among the world’s top four coast guards.

The technology augmentation by way of enhancing coastal surveillance is also sizeable. Phase 1 of the critical surveillance network includes an upgrade of 46 coastal stations/lighthouses that will receive new radars, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems and related sensors.

On the eve of Coast Guard Day, Director-General of the Indian Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, on whose watch these steps have been

36

Gujarat State Governor Dr. Kamla Beniwal at the inauguration ceremony of the regional headquarters of the Indian Coast Guard in Gandhinagar AFP

been indifferent to the challenges and opportunities posed by its maritime expanse and historians aver that this trait led to the later colonisation of the Subcontinent. The Navy was and is the proverbial Cinderella service with the lowest personnel strength and the smallest budgetary allocation of the total Defence Budget. The manpower ratio of the Army, Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—in overall terms, the 50,000 plus naval strength is dwarfed by the million plus Indian Army. Predictably, the fiscal allocations follow the same pattern, with the Navy receiving the smallest share of the defence cake.

DSI

37

MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:54 AM Page 3

FEBRUARY 2010

MARITIME SECURITY

Low Budget The budget figures of the last two years are instructive. In FY 2008-09, the total Indian defence expenditure (DE) was budgeted at Rs 105,600 crore ($ 22.95 billion at current exchange rates) and the naval portion was Rs 18,797 crore ($4.1 billion); this works out to a share of 17.8 percent—an improvement from the single digit figures of earlier decades.

However, in FY 2009-10 the total DE has gone up to Rs 141,703 crore ($30.8 billion), the total naval allocation has been pegged at Rs 19,656 crore ($4.27 billion)—only 13.8 percent of the total Indian defence outlay.

In other words, there has been a drop in the naval budget as a percentage of the overall Defence Budget. The increase in FY 2008-2009 was in part due to the focus on the Indian Coast Guard after the Mumbai tragedy. To augment the existing force-levels, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) sanctioned 40 ships, 20 boats and 42 aircraft for the ICG in February 2009. Shortly thereafter, the Government also accorded Acceptance of Necessity for 7 offshore patrol vessels, 20 fast patrol vessels and 12 Dornier aircraft. The induction of these platforms in the near future will significantly enhance the ICG’s operational capability. It is pertinent that as many as five ships, including one advanced offshore vessel, were commissioned in the ICG during 2009.

On the infrastructure front, the CCS sanctioned 9 stations and the regional headquarters (North-West), along with requisite manpower, to cover the vulnerable gaps along the coast. The new regional headquarters in Gujarat and ICG stations at Gandhinagar, Vadinar, Karwar, Veraval and Hut Bay were com-

The Navy was and is the proverbial Cinderella service with the lowest personnel strength and the smallest budgetary allocation of the total Defence Budget.The manpower ratio of the Army, Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—in overall terms, the 50,000 plus naval strength is dwarfed by the million plus Indian Army.

”

missioned or activated in record time during the year.

To man these new platforms and stations, the Government has sanctioned as many as 3,229 additional personnel, when fully implemented these inductions will dramatically alter the profile of the ICG. Not since the 1962 war, when the Indian Army was given a dramatic fillip, has the Centre acted with such alacrity to augment the capacity of an individual armed force. The scale of the increase may be gauged from the fact that currently the ICG has 43 ships, about 25 craft/boats of different types and 45 aircraft, which are manned by about 7,500 personnel. With the surge in acquisitions and increase in personnel, it is envisaged that by 2012, the ICG will be a 100-ship/100-aircraft force, putting it among the world’s top four coast guards.

The technology augmentation by way of enhancing coastal surveillance is also sizeable. Phase 1 of the critical surveillance network includes an upgrade of 46 coastal stations/lighthouses that will receive new radars, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems and related sensors.

On the eve of Coast Guard Day, Director-General of the Indian Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, on whose watch these steps have been

36

Gujarat State Governor Dr. Kamla Beniwal at the inauguration ceremony of the regional headquarters of the Indian Coast Guard in Gandhinagar AFP

been indifferent to the challenges and opportunities posed by its maritime expanse and historians aver that this trait led to the later colonisation of the Subcontinent. The Navy was and is the proverbial Cinderella service with the lowest personnel strength and the smallest budgetary allocation of the total Defence Budget. The manpower ratio of the Army, Air Force and Navy stands at 22:2:1—in overall terms, the 50,000 plus naval strength is dwarfed by the million plus Indian Army. Predictably, the fiscal allocations follow the same pattern, with the Navy receiving the smallest share of the defence cake.

DSI

37

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FEBRUARY 2010

taken, asserted: “After An Indian Coast Guard Chetak across the board (meaning Phase II with 56 addi- helicopter flies over Sikka Port Centre and State) that will have to respond effectively tional stations, there will in the Gulf of Kutch during to any security challenges not be a single place an exercise; (right) Indian that may arise. along the coast not soldiers take cover near While the ICG has under radar coverage.” Mumbai’s coastline during received a special focus in This entire coastal net- the 26/11 attacks the aftermath of the work will be linked to the national grid to provide real time Mumbai attack, it will be misleading to maritime domain awareness and inte- infer that this one initiative will redress grate this information and intelligence the many gaps in India’s maritime securiwith the Navy’s operational commands. ty. The lower end of the security spectrum encompasses the possibility that LIC (low intensity conflict) will acquire a Sustained Capacity Building On the face of it, this proposed enhance- maritime dimension and Mumbai is a ment of the ICG is very impressive but reminder, if it were needed. But as any these remain plans that are yet to be objective study of the pattern of terrorist fully implemented and address only one attacks reveals, it is very unlikely that part of the maritime spectrum. The abid- another 26/11 will be attempted by use of ing challenge to India’s holistic maritime maritime ingress. And in the event of security can be conceptually predicated such an exigency, the primary responsion a tripod of sustained capacity build- bility on the shore and the proximate ing—inventory and human—across the waters lies with the State police and their many agencies responsible for the mar- marine component.

Regrettably, this is one of the weakest itime domain; regular coordination among the principal actors involved in links in the overall maritime security the maritime arena; and the quality of chain. India’s nine coastal States have one the Indian politico-military leadership common feature: woefully inadequate

38

marine police capacity. Speedboats and patrol craft are limited and their maintenance pathetic. The personnel who man these vessels are poorly trained and have little motivation. However, the overall command and control of the local police— whether marine, car-borne or in police posts—lies with the individual States and they are loath to cede any power and space to the Centre. The entire local police recruitment process is rife with malpractices and the political masters treat these personnel very shabbily.

It is often averred that India’s LIC challenges, including the left wing Maoist movement, have their origins in the sub-optimal policing of the States.

Much of the smuggling and related crime, including syndicates linked to the Gulf, have their origins in the sea and in the maritime domain—Mumbai’s underworld with its close proximity to the local police and their political patrons is a case in point. Hence, if India’s coastal security is to be improved, the first rung at the local, State and major port level—be it marine police or revenue officials—will need to

AFP

DSI

AFP

MARITIME SECURITY

have an ethos and professionalism that is very different from what prevails among the local police. Given the close nexus between some sections of the Indian politico-bureaucratic-police establishment and the criminal/terrorist constituency, this will be the single-most difficult challenge to the management of coastal security.

The second element of improved maritime security lies in the coordination and sharing of resources between the Indian Navy and the ICG. While post-Mumbai, the ICG has been designated as the sole authority responsible for coastal security within territorial waters and for the overall coordination between Central and State agencies in all matters relating to coastal security, the actual implementation of this mandate will be tricky and is yet to be tested. The ICG is the younger service in relation to the Indian Navy and its assets are more modest. The civil-military interface as translated into Central Government ministries is fraught with multiple sensitivities and needs an empathy factor that has eluded the Indian higher-defence systemic.

It is instructive that in December 2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly ravaged the southern Indian Ocean, India’s maritime response was exemplary and little noticed. Indian ships and assets were the first to arrive in South East Asia and Sri Lanka even while providing succour nearer home.

39

”

Maritime security for a nation like India cannot be predicated on the mere accretion of platforms and personnel. By its very nature, the trans-border and inherently flexible nature of the maritime medium calls for a texture of leadership that is dynamic, confident and innovative in its ability to respond to situations as they arise.

It is instructive that in December 2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly ravaged the southern Indian Ocean, India’s maritime response was exemplary and little noticed. Indian ships and assets were the first to arrive in South East Asia and Sri Lanka even while providing succour nearer home. This was enabled by the close coordination between the naval apex and the highest levels of the national security apparatus.

However, this element failed in Mumbai 2008. Thus the abiding challenge for managing India’s complex and widespectrum maritime security challenges will be to hone these institutional skills and underlying ethos before the next exigency arises so that the collective response is appropriate and effective.

MARITIME SECURITY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 10:55 AM Page 5

FEBRUARY 2010

taken, asserted: “After An Indian Coast Guard Chetak across the board (meaning Phase II with 56 addi- helicopter flies over Sikka Port Centre and State) that will have to respond effectively tional stations, there will in the Gulf of Kutch during to any security challenges not be a single place an exercise; (right) Indian that may arise. along the coast not soldiers take cover near While the ICG has under radar coverage.” Mumbai’s coastline during received a special focus in This entire coastal net- the 26/11 attacks the aftermath of the work will be linked to the national grid to provide real time Mumbai attack, it will be misleading to maritime domain awareness and inte- infer that this one initiative will redress grate this information and intelligence the many gaps in India’s maritime securiwith the Navy’s operational commands. ty. The lower end of the security spectrum encompasses the possibility that LIC (low intensity conflict) will acquire a Sustained Capacity Building On the face of it, this proposed enhance- maritime dimension and Mumbai is a ment of the ICG is very impressive but reminder, if it were needed. But as any these remain plans that are yet to be objective study of the pattern of terrorist fully implemented and address only one attacks reveals, it is very unlikely that part of the maritime spectrum. The abid- another 26/11 will be attempted by use of ing challenge to India’s holistic maritime maritime ingress. And in the event of security can be conceptually predicated such an exigency, the primary responsion a tripod of sustained capacity build- bility on the shore and the proximate ing—inventory and human—across the waters lies with the State police and their many agencies responsible for the mar- marine component.

Regrettably, this is one of the weakest itime domain; regular coordination among the principal actors involved in links in the overall maritime security the maritime arena; and the quality of chain. India’s nine coastal States have one the Indian politico-military leadership common feature: woefully inadequate

38

marine police capacity. Speedboats and patrol craft are limited and their maintenance pathetic. The personnel who man these vessels are poorly trained and have little motivation. However, the overall command and control of the local police— whether marine, car-borne or in police posts—lies with the individual States and they are loath to cede any power and space to the Centre. The entire local police recruitment process is rife with malpractices and the political masters treat these personnel very shabbily.

It is often averred that India’s LIC challenges, including the left wing Maoist movement, have their origins in the sub-optimal policing of the States.

Much of the smuggling and related crime, including syndicates linked to the Gulf, have their origins in the sea and in the maritime domain—Mumbai’s underworld with its close proximity to the local police and their political patrons is a case in point. Hence, if India’s coastal security is to be improved, the first rung at the local, State and major port level—be it marine police or revenue officials—will need to

AFP

DSI

AFP

MARITIME SECURITY

have an ethos and professionalism that is very different from what prevails among the local police. Given the close nexus between some sections of the Indian politico-bureaucratic-police establishment and the criminal/terrorist constituency, this will be the single-most difficult challenge to the management of coastal security.

The second element of improved maritime security lies in the coordination and sharing of resources between the Indian Navy and the ICG. While post-Mumbai, the ICG has been designated as the sole authority responsible for coastal security within territorial waters and for the overall coordination between Central and State agencies in all matters relating to coastal security, the actual implementation of this mandate will be tricky and is yet to be tested. The ICG is the younger service in relation to the Indian Navy and its assets are more modest. The civil-military interface as translated into Central Government ministries is fraught with multiple sensitivities and needs an empathy factor that has eluded the Indian higher-defence systemic.

It is instructive that in December 2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly ravaged the southern Indian Ocean, India’s maritime response was exemplary and little noticed. Indian ships and assets were the first to arrive in South East Asia and Sri Lanka even while providing succour nearer home.

39

”

Maritime security for a nation like India cannot be predicated on the mere accretion of platforms and personnel. By its very nature, the trans-border and inherently flexible nature of the maritime medium calls for a texture of leadership that is dynamic, confident and innovative in its ability to respond to situations as they arise.

It is instructive that in December 2004, when a tsunami unexpectedly ravaged the southern Indian Ocean, India’s maritime response was exemplary and little noticed. Indian ships and assets were the first to arrive in South East Asia and Sri Lanka even while providing succour nearer home. This was enabled by the close coordination between the naval apex and the highest levels of the national security apparatus.

However, this element failed in Mumbai 2008. Thus the abiding challenge for managing India’s complex and widespectrum maritime security challenges will be to hone these institutional skills and underlying ethos before the next exigency arises so that the collective response is appropriate and effective.

GARDEN.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 4:35 PM Page 1

GRSE – 50 GOLDEN YEARS

In the service of the nation as a Defence PSU

Water Jet Fast Attack Craft arden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd. (GRSE), a premier Shipbuilding Yard, under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence, has come a longway since 1960 when it was taken over by the Govt of India. Having rendered yeoman service towards defence preparedness of the nation, the shipyard is poised for greater achievement in foreseeable future.

GRSE, then known as Garden Reach Workshops Ltd., started out as a small ship repair yard in 1884. It was taken over by the Government of India in 1960 which placed the company on a path of growth, diversification and modernization. GRSE now has seven units in and around Kolkata and one unit at Ranchi. GRSE is one of the leading shipbuilding yards, manufacturing a wide range of high tech ships from modern warships to hovercrafts.

GRSE is presently engaged in construction of modern Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes (ASWC) and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts (WJFAC) for the Indian Navy. It also has Fast Interceptor Boats under construction for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). These Boats will be used by the State Police Authorities for coastal patrolling and security.

GRSE has received order for eight Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) for the Indian Coast Guard in Mar 2009.

In order to construct warships of larger size, GRSE has embarked upon a Modernisation Programme in it’s Main Unit at an approximate

G

Landing Ship Tank (Large) cost of over US$ 113.49 million. The Modernisation is scheduled to be completed by mid 2011. Post Modernistion, GRSE will have one large Dry Dock and one large Inclined Berth, both 180 Mtr long, supported by modern integrated Paint Cell, Modular Hall, allied Workshops and a 250 T Goliath Crane.

Availability of such Modern Infrastructure facilities will enable the shipyard to undertake construction of large size ships with modern construction concept in shorter time frame.

In addition, facilities at Raja Bagan Dockyard, acquired in July 2006, are also being modernized / augmented / renovated to undertake construction of smaller vessels in large numbers.

In addition to construction of warships and patrol vessels, GRSE also manufactures Bailey Brides, various Deck Machinery and assembly of Marine Diesel Engines.

GRSE has been manufacturing and supplying various types of Bailey Bridges to Army, Border Road Organisation and civil authorities.

Recently, GRSE has developed and patented modern Double Lane Bridge which will increase market share considerably.

A number of Deck Machinery such as Capstan, Windlass, Winches, Boat Davits, Helo Traversing Systems (HTS) and Collapsible Helicopter Hangar are manufactured and supplied by GRSE to various shipbuilding yards. GRSE have developed a new HTS which can be used by different types of helicopters thus giving a DSI Marketing Promotion

viable flexibility to the Navy in operation of helicopters from warships. Efforts are in hand to obtain technology from abroad for railless HTS, which will further enhance the capability of the Navy in helo-operation.

GRSE’s Diesel Engine Plant (DEP) at Ranchi, assembles various marine diesel engines and generators for Navy and Coast Guard under licence from MTU Germany. DEP also has the facilities for repair and major overhaul of these engines. Future plans in this area include supply of spare parts and service / overhauling of MTU engines supplied to the Navy and Coast Guard under long term Rate Contract.

GRSE has also been engaged in manufacture of Pumps for the Naval Ships and Submarines.

A number of different types of Pumps have been developed and designed by GRSE and have been accepted by the Navy after extensive trials on board naval vessels.

Recently Navy has placed order for supply of about 120 Pumps on GRSE which are now under manufacture at GRSE Pump division.

Ships which are now under construction at GRSE includes Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts for the Navy and Fast Interceptor Boats for the Ministry of Home Affairs.

All these achievements have been possible with efforts of highly skilled and dedicated workmen of GRSE who are determined to take GRSE to much greater height in the near future.

GARDEN.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 4:35 PM Page 1

GRSE – 50 GOLDEN YEARS

In the service of the nation as a Defence PSU

Water Jet Fast Attack Craft arden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd. (GRSE), a premier Shipbuilding Yard, under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence, has come a longway since 1960 when it was taken over by the Govt of India. Having rendered yeoman service towards defence preparedness of the nation, the shipyard is poised for greater achievement in foreseeable future.

GRSE, then known as Garden Reach Workshops Ltd., started out as a small ship repair yard in 1884. It was taken over by the Government of India in 1960 which placed the company on a path of growth, diversification and modernization. GRSE now has seven units in and around Kolkata and one unit at Ranchi. GRSE is one of the leading shipbuilding yards, manufacturing a wide range of high tech ships from modern warships to hovercrafts.

GRSE is presently engaged in construction of modern Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes (ASWC) and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts (WJFAC) for the Indian Navy. It also has Fast Interceptor Boats under construction for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). These Boats will be used by the State Police Authorities for coastal patrolling and security.

GRSE has received order for eight Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) for the Indian Coast Guard in Mar 2009.

In order to construct warships of larger size, GRSE has embarked upon a Modernisation Programme in it’s Main Unit at an approximate

G

Landing Ship Tank (Large) cost of over US$ 113.49 million. The Modernisation is scheduled to be completed by mid 2011. Post Modernistion, GRSE will have one large Dry Dock and one large Inclined Berth, both 180 Mtr long, supported by modern integrated Paint Cell, Modular Hall, allied Workshops and a 250 T Goliath Crane.

Availability of such Modern Infrastructure facilities will enable the shipyard to undertake construction of large size ships with modern construction concept in shorter time frame.

In addition, facilities at Raja Bagan Dockyard, acquired in July 2006, are also being modernized / augmented / renovated to undertake construction of smaller vessels in large numbers.

In addition to construction of warships and patrol vessels, GRSE also manufactures Bailey Brides, various Deck Machinery and assembly of Marine Diesel Engines.

GRSE has been manufacturing and supplying various types of Bailey Bridges to Army, Border Road Organisation and civil authorities.

Recently, GRSE has developed and patented modern Double Lane Bridge which will increase market share considerably.

A number of Deck Machinery such as Capstan, Windlass, Winches, Boat Davits, Helo Traversing Systems (HTS) and Collapsible Helicopter Hangar are manufactured and supplied by GRSE to various shipbuilding yards. GRSE have developed a new HTS which can be used by different types of helicopters thus giving a DSI Marketing Promotion

viable flexibility to the Navy in operation of helicopters from warships. Efforts are in hand to obtain technology from abroad for railless HTS, which will further enhance the capability of the Navy in helo-operation.

GRSE’s Diesel Engine Plant (DEP) at Ranchi, assembles various marine diesel engines and generators for Navy and Coast Guard under licence from MTU Germany. DEP also has the facilities for repair and major overhaul of these engines. Future plans in this area include supply of spare parts and service / overhauling of MTU engines supplied to the Navy and Coast Guard under long term Rate Contract.

GRSE has also been engaged in manufacture of Pumps for the Naval Ships and Submarines.

A number of different types of Pumps have been developed and designed by GRSE and have been accepted by the Navy after extensive trials on board naval vessels.

Recently Navy has placed order for supply of about 120 Pumps on GRSE which are now under manufacture at GRSE Pump division.

Ships which are now under construction at GRSE includes Anti Submarine Warfare Corvettes and Water Jet Fast Attack Crafts for the Navy and Fast Interceptor Boats for the Ministry of Home Affairs.

All these achievements have been possible with efforts of highly skilled and dedicated workmen of GRSE who are determined to take GRSE to much greater height in the near future.

NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:03 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

SECURITY

NEEDED:

DSI

Policemen take positions outside Hotel Taj Mahal during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorists attack in 2008

PERSPECTIVE PLANNING

National Security Advisers have generally tended to treat anticipating and preparing for future security threats as something of secondary importance

KEY POINTS n The NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered, planning structure with the National Security Council headed by the Prime Minister at the apex. n Given their other short-term duties, responsibilities and the absence of a proper support structure, successive NSAs have failed to deliver on the long-term planning front.

T

he National Security Adviser (NSA) is a relatively recent innovation in the Indian system, introduced only in 1998 after the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government named Brajesh Mishra to the job. Twelve years on, however, the NSA’s role and office remain very much a work in progress, with each incumbent managing to mould the work profile to suit his own professional background, administrative preferences and bureaucratic strengths.

If we set aside the relatively brief tenure of J.N. Dixit, who died in harness in January 2005 without having had the chance of leaving his imprint, the tenures

Expanded Role of NSA As a former director of the Intelligence Bureau, Narayanan was happy to enlarge the scope of his mandate as NSA to include overseeing intelligence gathering. The results were, at best mixed, and perhaps even poor, if we take the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai as an example of intelligence failure. As Vikram Sood, a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing has argued perceptively, the NSA is the ultimate consumer of intelligence, not its producer and Narayanan often ended up confusing the two roles. “If the NSA inad-

42

vertently becomes the man responsible for the product, then he ends up being its salesman, however shoddy the product”, wrote Sood in a recent article.

But where Narayanan performed relatively well was on the external front. As NSA, his biggest achievement was in managing the inter-agency process that fed into the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. In January 2005, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, then the French President’s Diplomatic Adviser, arrived in New Delhi with a non-paper spelling out a broad proposal on behalf of the U.S., France and Britain for the resumption of nuclear commerce with India. The July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement grew out of that visit, with both Narayanan and the Ministry of External Affairs playing key roles in framing the nature of the bargain.

Negotiations with the U.S. over the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, the nature of safeguards and fuel assurances, reprocessing and other issues were difficult and often saw the Minister of External Affairs, the Indian Embassy in Washington and the Department of Atomic Energy at logger-heads with each other. As head of the ‘apex group’ overseeing the negotiations, the NSA had to reconcile these positions. Later, he had to directly step in at the highest levels to get the U.S. to stick to its commitments.

Going by the areas where both Mishra and Narayanan succeeded, it would be tempting to conclude that the role of the NSA is essentially that of a foreign policy czar, a diplomatic adviser to the Prime

AFP

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

of Mishra and M.K. Narayanan, who held the post for five years till his removal in January 2010, present a contrasting picture of what the NSA’s job is all about.

Despite combining the job of the NSA with that of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mishra was careful about not allowing his remit to expand towards internal security or day-to-day management of intelligence. As a former diplomat, he realised the most important role an NSA could play was in giving a new thrust and definition to India’s relations with the big powers. Though the problem of managing existing diplomatic issues was best handled by the foreign ministry, he believed the NSA and the Prime Minster’s Office (PMO) were best suited to innovating new approaches and effecting paradigmatic shifts in the way India dealt with the wider world.

43

NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:03 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

SECURITY

NEEDED:

DSI

Policemen take positions outside Hotel Taj Mahal during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorists attack in 2008

PERSPECTIVE PLANNING

National Security Advisers have generally tended to treat anticipating and preparing for future security threats as something of secondary importance

KEY POINTS n The NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multi-tiered, planning structure with the National Security Council headed by the Prime Minister at the apex. n Given their other short-term duties, responsibilities and the absence of a proper support structure, successive NSAs have failed to deliver on the long-term planning front.

T

he National Security Adviser (NSA) is a relatively recent innovation in the Indian system, introduced only in 1998 after the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government named Brajesh Mishra to the job. Twelve years on, however, the NSA’s role and office remain very much a work in progress, with each incumbent managing to mould the work profile to suit his own professional background, administrative preferences and bureaucratic strengths.

If we set aside the relatively brief tenure of J.N. Dixit, who died in harness in January 2005 without having had the chance of leaving his imprint, the tenures

Expanded Role of NSA As a former director of the Intelligence Bureau, Narayanan was happy to enlarge the scope of his mandate as NSA to include overseeing intelligence gathering. The results were, at best mixed, and perhaps even poor, if we take the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai as an example of intelligence failure. As Vikram Sood, a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing has argued perceptively, the NSA is the ultimate consumer of intelligence, not its producer and Narayanan often ended up confusing the two roles. “If the NSA inad-

42

vertently becomes the man responsible for the product, then he ends up being its salesman, however shoddy the product”, wrote Sood in a recent article.

But where Narayanan performed relatively well was on the external front. As NSA, his biggest achievement was in managing the inter-agency process that fed into the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. In January 2005, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, then the French President’s Diplomatic Adviser, arrived in New Delhi with a non-paper spelling out a broad proposal on behalf of the U.S., France and Britain for the resumption of nuclear commerce with India. The July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement grew out of that visit, with both Narayanan and the Ministry of External Affairs playing key roles in framing the nature of the bargain.

Negotiations with the U.S. over the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, the nature of safeguards and fuel assurances, reprocessing and other issues were difficult and often saw the Minister of External Affairs, the Indian Embassy in Washington and the Department of Atomic Energy at logger-heads with each other. As head of the ‘apex group’ overseeing the negotiations, the NSA had to reconcile these positions. Later, he had to directly step in at the highest levels to get the U.S. to stick to its commitments.

Going by the areas where both Mishra and Narayanan succeeded, it would be tempting to conclude that the role of the NSA is essentially that of a foreign policy czar, a diplomatic adviser to the Prime

AFP

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

of Mishra and M.K. Narayanan, who held the post for five years till his removal in January 2010, present a contrasting picture of what the NSA’s job is all about.

Despite combining the job of the NSA with that of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mishra was careful about not allowing his remit to expand towards internal security or day-to-day management of intelligence. As a former diplomat, he realised the most important role an NSA could play was in giving a new thrust and definition to India’s relations with the big powers. Though the problem of managing existing diplomatic issues was best handled by the foreign ministry, he believed the NSA and the Prime Minster’s Office (PMO) were best suited to innovating new approaches and effecting paradigmatic shifts in the way India dealt with the wider world.

43

NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:05 AM Page 3

FEBRUARY 2010

SECURITY this third task to his Principal Secretary, the NCA has been handled by the NSA ever since the United Progressive Alliance Government came to power in 2004.

Notwithstanding the NSA’s utility on the diplomatic and nuclear fronts, the fact remains that successive incumbents have failed to deliver on the long-term planning front. Given their other shortterm duties and responsibilities and the absence of a proper support structure and requisite talent, NSAs have generally tended to treat the task of anticipating and preparing for future threats as something that is of secondary importance.

The NSCS was created by folding the JIC into it as its core and then pulling in additional staff. But opinions are mixed about the extent to which it has been able to function as the executive “office of the NSA” in its interaction with different branches of the Government. And the fact that the JIC has been revived as a separate part of the NSCS suggests intelligence assessment and tasking is still very much a work in progress.

Negotiations with the U.S. over the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, reprocessing and other issues were difficult and often saw the MEA, the Indian Embassy in Washington and the Department of Atomic Energy at logger-heads with each other. As head of the ‘apex group’ overseeing the negotiations, the NSA had to reconcile these positions.

”

Shiv Shankar Menon at the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi. He has been appointed as the new National Security Adviser

44

AFP

Broadly speaking, the NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multitiered long-term, planning structure with the National Security Council (NSC) headed by the Prime Minister at the apex.

An NSC Secretariat (NSCS) was created to service the Council, which subsumed the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and its staff within it. Finally, a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of outside experts was set up to generate independent inputs to the NSC. As matters stand, the NSA today formally wears three broad hats. First, as coordinator of complex foreign policy initiatives and interlocutor with the big powers on strategic matters, he is diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister. Second, as head of the NSCS, he is a long-term planner, anticipating new threats and challenges to national security. Third, as chair of the Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), he is the overseer of India’s nuclear weapons programme and doctrine. Though the notification allows the Prime Minister to assign

Narayanan was aware of the fact that the NSCS was doing neither the task of intelligence collation and assessment nor long-term strategic policy and planning well and thought that explicitly splitting the mandate of the Secretariat would help improve the functioning of both the NSCS and the revived JIC. His idea was correct in principle but flawed in execution since bifurcation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the total staff strength for the two bodies. The NSA tried to increase the numbers but tough security requirements, exacerbated by the Rabindar Singh scandal in RAW and the cyber-security scandal in the NSCS, meant staff strength in both organisations remained in short supply.

The Indian Foreign Service, which might otherwise have been an ideal reservoir for the NSCS, is itself shortstaffed and has been able to send only one officer, China expert Sujan Chinoy, on deputation to the Secretariat in addition to the current Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) Alok Prasad. As for Indian academia, another potential catchment area, the NSC has done little to encourage foreign language and area studies despite being in existence for more than a decade.

At a more practical level, the lack of continuous connectivity between the NSA and

French Diplomatic Advisor Maurice GourdaultMontagne welcomes former National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan at the Elysee Palace, Paris, in September 2005

the NSCS hampers the effectiveness of both. With the Secretariat officially tasked to serve the NSCS, which rarely meets, the NSA is left to perform his diplomatic and nuclear functions with just one joint secretary and two director-level officers in the PMO. The NSCS has a staff but has never really functioned as the “Office of the NSA”. Under Mishra, Dixit and Narayanan, the National Security Adviser’s work has gradually expanded in line with the complexity of India’s interac-

45

tion with the rest of the world.

Even if the work of counter-terrorism intelligence is handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre, there is much more to intelligence than that. There is some thought being given to appointing a standalone ‘intelligence czar’ to deal with fusion and tasking. Even if that happens, the three core functions of diplomacy, nuclear command and control and longterm security planning and assessment

AFP

Correct in Principle

Minister. However, such a conclusion would be unfortunate since the National Security Adviser was actually intended to fill another vacuum in the Indian system.

Three Broad Hats

DSI

NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:05 AM Page 3

FEBRUARY 2010

SECURITY this third task to his Principal Secretary, the NCA has been handled by the NSA ever since the United Progressive Alliance Government came to power in 2004.

Notwithstanding the NSA’s utility on the diplomatic and nuclear fronts, the fact remains that successive incumbents have failed to deliver on the long-term planning front. Given their other shortterm duties and responsibilities and the absence of a proper support structure and requisite talent, NSAs have generally tended to treat the task of anticipating and preparing for future threats as something that is of secondary importance.

The NSCS was created by folding the JIC into it as its core and then pulling in additional staff. But opinions are mixed about the extent to which it has been able to function as the executive “office of the NSA” in its interaction with different branches of the Government. And the fact that the JIC has been revived as a separate part of the NSCS suggests intelligence assessment and tasking is still very much a work in progress.

Negotiations with the U.S. over the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, reprocessing and other issues were difficult and often saw the MEA, the Indian Embassy in Washington and the Department of Atomic Energy at logger-heads with each other. As head of the ‘apex group’ overseeing the negotiations, the NSA had to reconcile these positions.

”

Shiv Shankar Menon at the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi. He has been appointed as the new National Security Adviser

44

AFP

Broadly speaking, the NSA was conceived as the prime mover of a multitiered long-term, planning structure with the National Security Council (NSC) headed by the Prime Minister at the apex.

An NSC Secretariat (NSCS) was created to service the Council, which subsumed the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and its staff within it. Finally, a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of outside experts was set up to generate independent inputs to the NSC. As matters stand, the NSA today formally wears three broad hats. First, as coordinator of complex foreign policy initiatives and interlocutor with the big powers on strategic matters, he is diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister. Second, as head of the NSCS, he is a long-term planner, anticipating new threats and challenges to national security. Third, as chair of the Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), he is the overseer of India’s nuclear weapons programme and doctrine. Though the notification allows the Prime Minister to assign

Narayanan was aware of the fact that the NSCS was doing neither the task of intelligence collation and assessment nor long-term strategic policy and planning well and thought that explicitly splitting the mandate of the Secretariat would help improve the functioning of both the NSCS and the revived JIC. His idea was correct in principle but flawed in execution since bifurcation was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the total staff strength for the two bodies. The NSA tried to increase the numbers but tough security requirements, exacerbated by the Rabindar Singh scandal in RAW and the cyber-security scandal in the NSCS, meant staff strength in both organisations remained in short supply.

The Indian Foreign Service, which might otherwise have been an ideal reservoir for the NSCS, is itself shortstaffed and has been able to send only one officer, China expert Sujan Chinoy, on deputation to the Secretariat in addition to the current Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) Alok Prasad. As for Indian academia, another potential catchment area, the NSC has done little to encourage foreign language and area studies despite being in existence for more than a decade.

At a more practical level, the lack of continuous connectivity between the NSA and

French Diplomatic Advisor Maurice GourdaultMontagne welcomes former National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan at the Elysee Palace, Paris, in September 2005

the NSCS hampers the effectiveness of both. With the Secretariat officially tasked to serve the NSCS, which rarely meets, the NSA is left to perform his diplomatic and nuclear functions with just one joint secretary and two director-level officers in the PMO. The NSCS has a staff but has never really functioned as the “Office of the NSA”. Under Mishra, Dixit and Narayanan, the National Security Adviser’s work has gradually expanded in line with the complexity of India’s interac-

45

tion with the rest of the world.

Even if the work of counter-terrorism intelligence is handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre, there is much more to intelligence than that. There is some thought being given to appointing a standalone ‘intelligence czar’ to deal with fusion and tasking. Even if that happens, the three core functions of diplomacy, nuclear command and control and longterm security planning and assessment

AFP

Correct in Principle

Minister. However, such a conclusion would be unfortunate since the National Security Adviser was actually intended to fill another vacuum in the Indian system.

Three Broad Hats

DSI

NSA-Defence and Security of India.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 05/02/10 5:41 PM Page 5

FEBRUARY 2010

SECURITY

DSI

”

will need a tighter relationship between the NSA and the NSCS, with the DNSA being tasked to a much greater extent on key diplomatic and security issues.

The only caveat, of course, is that the problem of long-term assessment will not be resolved through bureaucratic adjustment. The fact is that the National Security Council, whose membership is the same as that of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), rarely meets as the NSC. By definition, the CCS deliberates on current policy and not on matters of long-term planning and so long as it does not insist on meeting as the NSC, other elements of the NSC matrix will also tend to treat the longterm as irrelevant, requiring, at best, ad hoc management rather than systemic adjustment and overhaul.

Long-term planning is precisely where urgent action is needed as the country’s global clout increases. India’s problems here are systemic and chronic: it is simply not prepared in terms of talent and systems for medium and longterm planning. Indian universities do not produce talent in the quantity and quality required and there is no part of the bureaucratic system which encourages the nurturing of talent. Given this defi-

Brajesh Mishra, India’s first National Security Adviser was also Principal Secretary to former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee

ciency, the NSA tends to be burdened with everyday demands and little time is devoted to effecting systemic structural improvements in how decisions get taken when multiple Government agencies are involved. If India wants to be in a position to exercise power internationally, it requires both diplomatic instruments and internal structures.

The Copenhagen Climate Change Summit is a good example of how the lack of a proper internal system of policy articulation can lead to an unsatisfactory diplomatic outcome. Narayanan showed great skill in pulling together different parts of the system during the Indo-U.S.

46

nuclear negotiations. But the effort was ad hoc, leaving no permanent structural imprint or institutional memory.

An effective NSA can solve the problem of spatial management of bureaucratic decision-making through his own efforts but the long-term dimension is a harder nut to crack. Ensuring the NSCS is restructured to serve both as the ‘Office of the NSA’ and as the catalyst for talent generation from within and outside the system is the only way the National Security Adviser will be able to address the lacuna of perspective planning that plagues India’s strategic culture.

AFP

At a more practical level, the lack of continuous connectivity between the NSA and the NSCS hampers the effectiveness of both.With the Secretariat officially tasked to serve the NSCS, which rarely meets, the NSA is left to perform his diplomatic and nuclear functions with just one joint secretary and two director-level officers in the PMO.

DSI-Subscription-February 2010:cover-feb3.qxd

2/8/10

5:28 PM

Page 1

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Sri Lanka-final-IInd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/02/10 11:19 AM Page 1

FEBRUARY 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

PROMISES AND

BETRAYALS President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have won the war, and the recent elections, but he has not succeeded in uniting the people

KEY POINTS n The result of the Sri Lanka election establishes that President Rajapaksa has alienated the Tamils in post-war, nationalistic Sri Lanka. n India may call on the Rajapaksa Government to take measures to hold elections to the Northern Provincial Council and offer meaningful and effective devolution of power to the provincial administration.

T

he verdict has arrived: Mahinda Rajapaksa has been re-elected as the sixth Executive President of Sri Lanka. The victory is a thank you from the Sri Lankan people to the President for winning the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). His rival and co-author of the victory, former Army Chief Sarath Fonseka, however, finds himself on the losing side. Although Fonseka will be remembered as a hero, those who voted for Rajapaksa say he paid the price for teaming up with “traitors”, a reference to the United National Party (UNP), the main opposition which ridiculed Rajapaksa’s war effort.

Another factor that went against Fonseka was the fear that the former Army Chief could bring in a military dictatorship

Deep Divide Sinhalese nationalists felt that the Tamil nationalists, smarting from the defeat of the LTTE, would support Fonseka to teach Rajapaksa a lesson, so they voted for Rajapaksa. The unbearable cost of living, corruption charges, the lack of media freedom and the poor human rights record of the Rajapaksa administration did not dissuade them from voting for the incumbent President. For the rural masses, it was Rajapaksa’s leadership and resolve that won the war and, therefore, he was to be rewarded. The verdict made it clear that there is a deep divide between the aspirations of the urban people and the rural masses.

The result establishes that Rajapaksa has alienated the Tamils in post-war nationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores the fact that Sri Lanka is a divided nation. The President may have won the war but he has not united the people. Addressing the nation soon after the victory over the LTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There

48

Supporters of Sri Lanka’s People’s Alliance celebrate President Mahinda Rajapakse’s re-election in Colombo in January 2010

49

AFP

AMEEN IZZADEEN

— the State media had projected him as the Idi Amin of Sri Lanka and Adolf Hitler.

Poll analysts had predicted that the election would be a tight race; some had even talked of a loss for Rajapaksa. They felt that since the Sinhalese were divided, the minority votes would be the decider. But when the results came in, it was clear that the majority Sinhalese had decided the outcome of the election, not the minority Tamils. Some 90 percent of Rajapaksa’s total votes came from the Sinhalese, while a large percentage of the minority Tamils and Muslims voted for Fonseka.

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PROMISES AND

BETRAYALS President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have won the war, and the recent elections, but he has not succeeded in uniting the people

KEY POINTS n The result of the Sri Lanka election establishes that President Rajapaksa has alienated the Tamils in post-war, nationalistic Sri Lanka. n India may call on the Rajapaksa Government to take measures to hold elections to the Northern Provincial Council and offer meaningful and effective devolution of power to the provincial administration.

T

he verdict has arrived: Mahinda Rajapaksa has been re-elected as the sixth Executive President of Sri Lanka. The victory is a thank you from the Sri Lankan people to the President for winning the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). His rival and co-author of the victory, former Army Chief Sarath Fonseka, however, finds himself on the losing side. Although Fonseka will be remembered as a hero, those who voted for Rajapaksa say he paid the price for teaming up with “traitors”, a reference to the United National Party (UNP), the main opposition which ridiculed Rajapaksa’s war effort.

Another factor that went against Fonseka was the fear that the former Army Chief could bring in a military dictatorship

Deep Divide Sinhalese nationalists felt that the Tamil nationalists, smarting from the defeat of the LTTE, would support Fonseka to teach Rajapaksa a lesson, so they voted for Rajapaksa. The unbearable cost of living, corruption charges, the lack of media freedom and the poor human rights record of the Rajapaksa administration did not dissuade them from voting for the incumbent President. For the rural masses, it was Rajapaksa’s leadership and resolve that won the war and, therefore, he was to be rewarded. The verdict made it clear that there is a deep divide between the aspirations of the urban people and the rural masses.

The result establishes that Rajapaksa has alienated the Tamils in post-war nationalistic Sri Lanka and underscores the fact that Sri Lanka is a divided nation. The President may have won the war but he has not united the people. Addressing the nation soon after the victory over the LTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There

48

Supporters of Sri Lanka’s People’s Alliance celebrate President Mahinda Rajapakse’s re-election in Colombo in January 2010

49

AFP

AMEEN IZZADEEN

— the State media had projected him as the Idi Amin of Sri Lanka and Adolf Hitler.

Poll analysts had predicted that the election would be a tight race; some had even talked of a loss for Rajapaksa. They felt that since the Sinhalese were divided, the minority votes would be the decider. But when the results came in, it was clear that the majority Sinhalese had decided the outcome of the election, not the minority Tamils. Some 90 percent of Rajapaksa’s total votes came from the Sinhalese, while a large percentage of the minority Tamils and Muslims voted for Fonseka.

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Addressing the nation soon after the victory over the LTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There won’t be any minorities in this country after today. I want everybody to feel like one”.

But his campaign had an ultranationalist flavour that eventually produced a result that shows a nation polarised on ethnic lines.

”

AFP

A Sri Lankan in Colombo moves past a wall painting depicting the recent war between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE (right) Sri Lanka’s defeated presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka

won’t be any minorities in this country after today. I want everybody to feel like one”. But his campaign had an ultranationalist flavour that eventually produced a result that shows a nation polarised on ethnic lines.

After being defeated, the Opposition cried foul, alleging that the poll had been rigged at the counting stage. And independent analysts shook their heads in disbelief at Rajapaksa’s huge margin of

victory. A tense situation prevailed in Colombo as the results were being announced. Troops surrounded a city hotel where Fonseka was staying with his security contingent. As an Army commander, he had laid siege to many a LTTE stronghold, but hours after the election, ironically, he found himself under siege, surrounded by the very soldiers and officers who months ago had obeyed his orders.

50

On January 27, the day after the elections and hours before he left the hotel for his residence, Fonseka told journalists that he would not concede defeat and vowed to fight back. “The Government won the election by fraudulent means, resorting to dirty tricks and violating every election law. We will fight back,” he said.

Days before the election, Rajpaksa had been a worried man. While opinion polls and surveys spoke of a victory for the

Opposition, the President confided in journalists close to him that he would win by a small margin. However, he put on a brave face in his last rally before the election, and declared that he would be President on January 27. Rajapaksa was certainly not prepared to face defeat or the humiliation of being thrown out of office after just four years of his first six-year term. He did win, but the question remains whether the election was free and fair. A

highly agitated Election Commissioner admitted in his statement after declaring Rajapaksa winner that he was not allowed to do his job independently.

It was in October last year, when the south of the country was celebrating the war victory, that Rajapaksa decided to seek a fresh mandate from the people. After all, he was being hailed as a maha rajanani or great king. But he also knew that he was losing the economic war. Two more years

51

in office, he felt, would make him unpopular. So, he decided to go for a presidential election. When asked, ‘Why now?’, his answer was that he wanted to get the endorsement of the Tamil people, whom he claimed he had liberated from the clutches of the LTTE tyranny and terror.

The LTTE had called for a boycott of the last election in 2005, as a result Rajapaksa had won by a narrow margin.

Backed by the Main Opposition But in the January 26 elections, the Tamils in the north and east voted for General Fonseka. On January 28, Rajapaksa said that although he did not get the votes of the majority of the people in the north and the east, he was happy that they participated in the democratic process.

For most of them, the choice was between the one who ordered the killing and one who carried out the order to kill. They felt the former was a bigger enemy and decided to back Fonseka. Besides, they also felt that they stood to gain if the General won because he was being backed by the main opposition UNP, which advocates a political solution based on greater devolution of power to the Tamil regions.

The main Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, also endorsed the General—an endorsement that cost him the votes of the Sinhalese who oppose power devolution to the Tamils.

That it was the Sinhalese voters who decided the outcome of the election casts doubts over Rajapaksa’s willingness to

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AFP

NEIGHBOURS

Addressing the nation soon after the victory over the LTTE, Rajapaksa had declared, “There won’t be any minorities in this country after today. I want everybody to feel like one”.

But his campaign had an ultranationalist flavour that eventually produced a result that shows a nation polarised on ethnic lines.

”

AFP

A Sri Lankan in Colombo moves past a wall painting depicting the recent war between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE (right) Sri Lanka’s defeated presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka

won’t be any minorities in this country after today. I want everybody to feel like one”. But his campaign had an ultranationalist flavour that eventually produced a result that shows a nation polarised on ethnic lines.

After being defeated, the Opposition cried foul, alleging that the poll had been rigged at the counting stage. And independent analysts shook their heads in disbelief at Rajapaksa’s huge margin of

victory. A tense situation prevailed in Colombo as the results were being announced. Troops surrounded a city hotel where Fonseka was staying with his security contingent. As an Army commander, he had laid siege to many a LTTE stronghold, but hours after the election, ironically, he found himself under siege, surrounded by the very soldiers and officers who months ago had obeyed his orders.

50

On January 27, the day after the elections and hours before he left the hotel for his residence, Fonseka told journalists that he would not concede defeat and vowed to fight back. “The Government won the election by fraudulent means, resorting to dirty tricks and violating every election law. We will fight back,” he said.

Days before the election, Rajpaksa had been a worried man. While opinion polls and surveys spoke of a victory for the

Opposition, the President confided in journalists close to him that he would win by a small margin. However, he put on a brave face in his last rally before the election, and declared that he would be President on January 27. Rajapaksa was certainly not prepared to face defeat or the humiliation of being thrown out of office after just four years of his first six-year term. He did win, but the question remains whether the election was free and fair. A

highly agitated Election Commissioner admitted in his statement after declaring Rajapaksa winner that he was not allowed to do his job independently.

It was in October last year, when the south of the country was celebrating the war victory, that Rajapaksa decided to seek a fresh mandate from the people. After all, he was being hailed as a maha rajanani or great king. But he also knew that he was losing the economic war. Two more years

51

in office, he felt, would make him unpopular. So, he decided to go for a presidential election. When asked, ‘Why now?’, his answer was that he wanted to get the endorsement of the Tamil people, whom he claimed he had liberated from the clutches of the LTTE tyranny and terror.

The LTTE had called for a boycott of the last election in 2005, as a result Rajapaksa had won by a narrow margin.

Backed by the Main Opposition But in the January 26 elections, the Tamils in the north and east voted for General Fonseka. On January 28, Rajapaksa said that although he did not get the votes of the majority of the people in the north and the east, he was happy that they participated in the democratic process.

For most of them, the choice was between the one who ordered the killing and one who carried out the order to kill. They felt the former was a bigger enemy and decided to back Fonseka. Besides, they also felt that they stood to gain if the General won because he was being backed by the main opposition UNP, which advocates a political solution based on greater devolution of power to the Tamil regions.

The main Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, also endorsed the General—an endorsement that cost him the votes of the Sinhalese who oppose power devolution to the Tamils.

That it was the Sinhalese voters who decided the outcome of the election casts doubts over Rajapaksa’s willingness to

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TheTamil issue in Sri Lanka is intricately linked to India’s domestic politics. It is also a major foreign and security policy concern for India.

Although, it has undergone a paradigm shift in the post-war period.

Sri Lankan soldier stands next to the wreckage of a light aircraft belonging to LTTE in Katunayaka, near Colombo, in February 2009

”

election to the Northern Provincial Council and offer meaningful and effective devolution of power to the provincial administration.

AFP

India’s Domestic Politics

fulfil his promise to the Tamil people and India. Rajapaksa in interviews to the Indian media during the campaign had vowed to go beyond the 13th Amendment, which followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and promises to devolve authority to the provinces.

The presence of the ultranationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in his coalition is another hindrance to fulfilling this promise.

In the Indo-Sri Lankan pact of 1987,

India had advocated the merger of the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces and a political solution based on devolution of power.

However ultranationalist parties, which included Rajapaksa’s coalition partner JHU, got a Supreme Court ruling to demerge the two provinces, to the utter dismay of India. As a compromise, India may not at present insist on a re-merger of the two provinces, but it may call on the Rajapaksa Government to take measures to hold

52

Since Rajapaksa owes his re-election largely to the Sinhalese, most of whom oppose greater devolution of power to Tamil regions, it remains to be seen if he will succumb to Indian pressure.

Moreover, Rajapaksa’s party will have to whip up nationalistic fervour again for the Parliamentary election to be held within months. So, probably, the Tamils and India will have to wait till the Parliamentary elections are over until they can prod the Rajapaksa Government for a solution to the Tamil problem.

The Tamil issue in Sri Lanka is intricately linked to India’s domestic politics. It is also a major foreign and security policy concern for India.

Although, it has undergone a paradigm shift in the post-war period. The Tamils’ struggle for a political solution that will address their long-standing grievances in fields such as language, education, land and jobs has taken a backseat in the face of their immediate problems such as the rehabilitation of half a million displaced people; developin war-damaged infrastructure and ensuring the security of the people.

Misinterpreting the Tamil psyche, Rajapaksa told a news conference during the final days of his campaign that only non-Governmental organisations were keen on a political solution, the Tamil people were not in need of it. But, in the coming days, Rajapaksa is likely to come

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under Indian pressure to announce his political solution. With the Sri LankanTamil issue still a powerful political topic in Tamil Nadu, the Congress-led Central Government in India will feel compelled to please the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), its coalition partner from the southern State. Besides, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram, himself a Tamilian, has been an advocate of what he calls a “credible devolution of power” to the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

Realistic Solution

India continues to maintain close contacts with Sri Lankan Tamil leaders, who are now free from LTTE pressure to agree to a realistic solution. Rajapaksa cannot afford to play a wait-and-see game with India, because Sri Lankan leaders from both sides of the divide know that Sri Lanka is more or less doomed if it antagonises India.

Rajapaksa needs India’s help to overcome the challenges he faces post-election. Chief among them is the economic war. He faces the daunting task of steering the country on the path to development after 30 years of civil war.

Already, the European Union has withdrawn a tariff concession facility extended to Sri Lankan exports. As a result, thousands of garment factory workers could lose their jobs in the coming months.

The Government also depends on foreign loans, some of which have been obtained at

AFP

With the Sri LankanTamil issue still a powerful political topic inTamil Nadu, the Congress-led Central Government will feel compelled to please DMK, its coalition partner.

Besides, Home Minister P. Chidambaram has been an advocate of what he calls a “credible devolution of power” to Tamils of Sri Lanka.

In the current scenario, commercial rates, to shore up Tamil Nadu’s Deputy given China’s growing its foreign reserves and Chief Minister M.K. strengthen the Sri Lankan Stalin with Home Minister presence in Sri Lanka, India cannot afford to antagonise rupee. Large-scale economic P. Chidambaram during the Rajapaksa Government. assistance from European the Chief Ministers’ China is building a deepcountries has become Conference in New Delhi sea harbour in Rajapaksa’s conditional on measures to in August 2009 hometown of Hambantota in improve human rights, media freedom and a political solution to southern Sri Lanka. Some analysts say the minority Tamils. However, in post-war Hambantota is part of the ‘necklace of Sri Lanka there is space for investment. The pearl’ naval presence China is building Government’s investor-friendly policies surrounding India. China has also got the and long-term political stability created by lion’s share of the post-war development Rajapaksa’s re-election could attract projects in Sri Lanka’s northern areas.

However, Sri Lankan policymakers investors. Also, relations with the West, which were strained during the last stages of are aware of the Indira doctrine that shapes India’s security policy in the the war against the LTTE, could improve.

Just a few weeks ago, the US has said it is neighbourhood. After Sri Lanka learnt a hopeful that relations, which were strained bitter lesson by being not-so-friendly to due to Washington’s criticism of Sri Lanka’s India in the 1980s, no Sri Lankan head of human rights record and the conduct of the State has irked India. war, would improve. Indeed, Washington Over the years, Sri Lanka-India relations cannot afford to allow Sri Lanka to drift have improved immensely. Sri Lanka is away from its sphere of influence.

India’s biggest trading partner in the South A recent report by the US Senate Foreign Asian region. The trade between the two Relations Committee urged the Barack countries has reached $ 3 billion a year and is Obama administration not to neglect Sri growing. With more and more Indian and Lanka’s strategic importance. India and Sri Lankan investors going to each other’s China, like the US, were anxious about the markets, the two countries also want to January 26th election and the perception in move beyond the Free Trade Agreement Sri Lanka was that President Rajapaksa was and sign a Comprehensive Economic Pact.

India’s favourite candidate. India claimed it Sri Lanka can ill afford to lose India’s had no favourites, though it apparently support. Besides, it needs India for one believed in the dictum that a known devil important issue: to overcome the crisis that is was better than an unknown one. bound to erupt over war crime charges.

54

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ARMS AND THE W OMAN

By joining the BSF, women are not only breaking barriers but deterring women indulging in cross-border criminal and extremist activities

AJITHA MENON

KEY POINTS

When the BSF was sanctioned 700 posts for women constables, it received 8,500 applications indicating a growing interest among women to join the force. n Although the minimum qualification required to join the force is Class XII, of the 178 women constables recruited, 14 are post-graduates and 22 are graduates. n

T

AFP

Women celebrate their graduation as the first female cadets of the Border Security Force at the Jahankhelan Training Centre in Hoshairpur, Punjab, in July 2009

56

57

oday, Basanti Mondal, 20, is a celebrity in her village Kirnahar, in the Birbhum district of West Bengal.

She is the chief guest at all village functions and families come to her for suggestions on decisions like which school their children be should be sent to or which jobs the youth should try for or even on how to find grooms for their daughters. There’s something special that makes her so important. Basanti carries a gun, wears a uniform and is in the India’s armed force.

A year ago, Basanti was a rebel. In response to an adverstisement in the Employment Gazette asking for women recruits for the Border Security Force (BSF), she had left the village almost as an outcast, defying parental and social objections. The villagers were horrified at the very thought of a girl joining the force, doing a man’s work and also wearing an uniform of a security force.

“The common reaction was that I will not be unable to do it physically. After all, a woman is weaker and more frail than a man. She is not expected to bear the hard training of a soldier,” says Basanti. But she did it. “After completing 36-week of rigorous training, I am finally a constable with the BSF. My hard work and perse-

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ARMS AND THE W OMAN

By joining the BSF, women are not only breaking barriers but deterring women indulging in cross-border criminal and extremist activities

AJITHA MENON

KEY POINTS

When the BSF was sanctioned 700 posts for women constables, it received 8,500 applications indicating a growing interest among women to join the force. n Although the minimum qualification required to join the force is Class XII, of the 178 women constables recruited, 14 are post-graduates and 22 are graduates. n

T

AFP

Women celebrate their graduation as the first female cadets of the Border Security Force at the Jahankhelan Training Centre in Hoshairpur, Punjab, in July 2009

56

57

oday, Basanti Mondal, 20, is a celebrity in her village Kirnahar, in the Birbhum district of West Bengal.

She is the chief guest at all village functions and families come to her for suggestions on decisions like which school their children be should be sent to or which jobs the youth should try for or even on how to find grooms for their daughters. There’s something special that makes her so important. Basanti carries a gun, wears a uniform and is in the India’s armed force.

A year ago, Basanti was a rebel. In response to an adverstisement in the Employment Gazette asking for women recruits for the Border Security Force (BSF), she had left the village almost as an outcast, defying parental and social objections. The villagers were horrified at the very thought of a girl joining the force, doing a man’s work and also wearing an uniform of a security force.

“The common reaction was that I will not be unable to do it physically. After all, a woman is weaker and more frail than a man. She is not expected to bear the hard training of a soldier,” says Basanti. But she did it. “After completing 36-week of rigorous training, I am finally a constable with the BSF. My hard work and perse-

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verance is paying rich dividends. The villagers revere me now. Not in their wildest dreams had they thought a girl from their village would make it to the force.”

It was in 2008 that the BSF was sanctioned 700 posts for women constables.

About 8,500 applications were received, indicating the growing interest among women to join the forces. As the first batch of the armed women contingent, 178 women recruits passed out with flying colours from BSF’s training camp, in Hoshiarpur, Punjab in July 2009. Of these, 108 were from Punjab, 46 from West Bengal and 24 from Assam.

Same Training as Men

“Anu Tamang from North Bengal led the passing out parade for both men and women. It was a proud moment for women recruits to see the flag being borne gracefully in her hands,” recalls Tia Roy, 20, from Beliatore village in Bankura. She says that women recruits are fully trained in the use of weapons, “Even the Indian Army does not have an armed women’s force yet. We had the same physical training as for the men and I am proud to say that we could undergo the strict regimen confidently.”

Currently, BSF women constables from West Bengal are posted in Petrapole in North 24 Parganas District, Gede in Nadia District, Lalgola in Murshidabad District and Hily in South Dinajpur District of West Bengal. All these areas have international borders with Bangladesh.

AJITHA MENON\WFS

As the first batch of the armed women contingent, 178 women recruits passed out with flying colours from BSF’s training camp, in Hoshiarpur, Punjab, in July 2009. Of these, 108 were from Punjab, 46 fromWest Bengal and 24 from Assam.

The BSF’s 36 Battalion, which Women recruits that BSF would be unable to take action without impunity. But has 50.52 kilometres of the Indo- in the Border now, with women constables in Bangladesh border within its Security Force Bengal and Assam, criminal and Area of Responsibility (AoR), has undergo arms anti-national activities can be to contend with problems like training tackled better,” adds Shrabanti, cross-border smuggling of drugs, arms and ammunition and cattle, who also hails from Bankura.

The armed women guards are in along with illegal immigration and trafficking in women. “There was dire need themselves a huge deterrent for women of women BSF personnel as otherwise it indulging in cross-border criminal and was impossible to frisk or detain women extremist activities. The BSF had long felt without facing allegations of human the need for women personnel and now rights violation,” points out Shrabanti that an armed women’s force has been Karmakar, 21, who along with five other raised and deployed, it is hoped that the women constables, has been deployed deployment of women for cross-border with the 36 Battalion at the Haridaspur illegal activities will be curtailed significantly, believes C.V. Murlidhar, Inspector Border Outpost.

India has a 4,023-km border with General, BSF, South-Bengal Frontier.

Bangladesh through West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram. With Improved Economic Status 2, 216 km, Bengal has the longest stretch Constable Putul Murmu, 22, with the 36 to guard. The border is extremely porous Battalion, says it was the Maoist problem with large tracts being completely river- in West Midnapore that prompted her to ine. “Until now, most of the smuggling join the force. “I hated to feel like a victim operations and trafficking were being all the time. It’s true that the area has seen conducted by women, as it was known no development over several decades but

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The BSF had long felt the need for women personnel and now that an armed women’s force has been raised and deployed, it is hoped that the deployment of women for cross-border illegal activities will be curtailed significantly.

AJITHA MENON\WFS

”

being anti-national cannot be the A women Border village under the Haridaspur Border Outpost. solution. Serving the nation is the Security Force “Trafficking of women across right thing to do and joining the constable on the border is a big problem. force has also improved my eco- border vigil Most of these young girls and nomic status considerably with a women are too scared to protest when starting salary of Rs 11,000,” she adds.

All the women constables are fully touts pass them off as relatives at the trained for 12-hour shifts of guard and check posts. They also fear detention by patrol duty along the borders. They are also men constables and remain quiet. Now, trained in the handling and use of the 5.56 it is hoped that the trafficked girls will mm INSAS rifles, 9 mm Carbine Machine feel more emboldened to voice their predicament to someone of the same Guns and 5.56 Light Machine Guns.

For women living along the border, who sex,” adds Mollah. cross the gates daily to tend to their fields or graze cattle on their property on one side or Uncomfortable with Male Guards the other of the zero line, the presence of Sharbano Kazi, 58, also from Jayantipur women constables is a Godsend. “Not only village, observes that even local women has it become easier to be frisked and thor- like her always felt uncomfortable with oughly checked, it’s also easier to answer male guards. “It was as though we were questions put by women personnel,” says always under suspicion. Since they could Ayesha Mollah, 41, a resident of Jayantipur not frisk us, the doubt always remained. I

60

used to feel like a thief every day while crossing through the gates. Now I can boldly pass through knowing they cannot suspect me any more.”

Despite the obvious advantages, one reason why the armed forces are reluctant to recruit women is the possibility of them quitting after marriage or getting pregnant. But Purnima Kundu, 23, from the Ayodhya village of Bankura, dismisses this apprehension. “There is no question of my quitting ever. If that is a precondition to marriage, it will be preferable to remain unmarried,” she says. The other women constables have a more practical stand on this. “We will try to find boys within the BSF itself as they would be more understanding about our professional compulsions. The force also has a policy of posting couples together.

That will bring down such problems significantly,” adds Purnima.

Although the minimum qualification required to join the force is Class XII, of the 178 women constables in the first batch of women aged between 18-22 years, 14 are post-graduates and 22, graduates. There are also 25 sports women and 11 National Cadet Corps volunteers.

Obviously, these women have made a clear career choice. They are here to stay on the country’s international borders.

The BSF plans to recruit 35,000 women guards in the paramilitary forces over the next four years. Many of these women don bangles but they have certainly broken a stereotype. The country will be in safe, strong hands.

—Women’s Features Service

12

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RAHUL BEDI

The locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer-32 aircrafts need replacement

Safety Measures Needed THE Indian Air Force (IAF) is in a crisis over training its fighter pilots some six months after having grounded its entire fleet of Stage-1 trainer aircraft following a series of accidents.

To cope with this serious problem, that adds to its collective woes, the IAF has dispatched an urgent Request For Proposal (RFP) to 7 overseas manufactures for the outright purchase of 75 basic turbo-prop trainers to replace its 200-strong fleet of locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer (HPT)-32 initial trainers.

The RFP sent to Brazil’s Embraer, EADS PZL Warszawa-Okecie in Poland, Germany’s Grob Aircraft Company, Italy’s Finmeccanica, Korea Aerospace Industries, Switzerland’s Pilatus and USA’s Raytheon requires all bids to be submitted

by March 17.

The tender requires the first 12 of 75 trainers to be handed over to the IAF within 25 months of the contract being inked and all deliveries completed within four years.

IAF sources said these 75 trainers were part of a larger requirement for around 180 aircraft, but the decision on whether the remaining 105 units would be imported—in complete or kit form—or built locally in partnership with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was awaited.

Industry sources said that some of the rival

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contenders had offered to lease out their aircraft to instruct IAF pilots till the final selection was made but had received no response from air headquarters.

Some European manufacturers have even offered to supply all 75 aircraft within 36 months of the agreement being signed, an offer that would, no doubt be considered by the distressed air force.

The IAF retired around 200 HPT-32s with two side-by-side seats after 10 crashed between 1999 and 2009, the last decisive accident taking place on July 31, 2009 in which two instructors from the Air Force Academy (AFA) at Hyderabad were killed.

Earlier, in May 2008, a female IAF cadet had died after an aircraft crashed after fuel leaked into its engine confirming the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) assessment that the training aircraft was “technologically outdated and beset by flight safety hazards”.

The CAG had declared in its 2008 audit, “In spite of the loss of 11 pilots and 15 aircraft, it (HPT-32) continues to be used today. Further, HPT-32 does not aid in the smooth transition of trainees to the next stage of training.”

IAF sources indicated that problems in ‘mating’ the HPT-32’s Avco Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5 engine with the air frame had led to problems that resulted in their grounding.

Since the late 1980s, 140-150 IAF cadets had

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annually received instruction on the HPT-32s before moving onto to the locally constructed Hindustan Jet Trainer-16 Surya Kiran MKI intermediate flight and weapons training aircraft followed by the newly imported BAE Systems Hawk 132 Advanced JetTrainers.

But with the HPT-32s grounded for nearly six months, a batch of IAF cadets had been trained directly on Surya Kiran MKIs placing undue pressure on the aircraft. Long term plans to use the imported trainers till HAL can design and construct the single-engine HindustanTurboTrainer—40 (HTT-40) it had proposed by 2015 too has run into technological problems, adding to the beleaguered IAF’s anguish.

New C-17 for IAF THE IAF is planning on acquiring 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster-III advanced airlift aircraft from the US via the Foreign Military Sales Programme (FMS) for over $2.4 billion.

If confirmed, the C-17 sale will be India’s biggest ever deal with the US surpassing last January’s $2.1 billion procurement of eight Boeing P-8I long-range, maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRA). Also overtaking the earlier $962 million acquisition of six Lockheed Martin-built C-130 J-30 Super Hercules military transport aircraft specially configured for Special Forces operations.

At present, the IAF operates barely a dozen Russian-origin Ilyushin IL-76 Gajraj transporters capable of carrying cargoes of around 45 tonnes and some 104 medium-lift Russian-built Antonov-32 twin-engine turboprop planes that are undergoing a $400 million upgrade in Ukraine. But the IAF’s entirely Soviet and Russian transport fleet has for years been plagued by a shortage of spares and unsatisfactory after sales service and it has desperately been seeking a substitute.

Consequently, at the IAF’s behest the MoD issued the letter of request in early January 2010 for the 10 C-17s to be obtained via the FMS route following clearance by the Defence Acquisitions Council headed by Defence Minister A. K. Antony.

Last year, Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik had declared that the C-17s powered by four Pratt & Whitney F-117-PW-100 turbofan engines were preferred not only for their ability to ferry up to 70 tonnes to a distance of 2,400 nautical mile but also for their overall operational efficiency and capability to use short, even make-shift runways at high altitudes.

The high-wing, T-tailed C-17 can carry large equipment including tanks, supplies and troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain in day or night. It is operated by a two-man crew and one loadmaster, can seat two observers and also double as an

Boeing C-17 Globemaster-III advanced airlift aircraft

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aerial ambulance.

Around 212 C-17s were in service around the world, the majority of them with the US Air Force but were also operated by Australia, Britain, Canada, Qatar and NATO. Since 2002 India has, under the FMS track acquired 12 Thales-Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery for $142.4 million and the USS Trenton (re-named INS Jalshawa), a 16,900 tonnes refurbished Austin-class landing platform dock and six embarked second hand UH-3H Sea King helicopters for $ 92.5 million in 2006.The six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft and eight P8I MRA were also acquired via the FMS programme.

India also bought three wide-bodied Boeing Business Jets (BBJs) for over $212 million for the IAF’sVVIP squadron two years ago to transport officials like the President, the Prime Minister and other dignitaries.

Last July, India and the US confirmed the long pending End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in New Delhi mandatory under American law to facilitate the sale of sophisticated American materiel to Delhi.

However, the concomitant, but equally crucial, Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement and Basic Exchange Co-operation Agreement are under bilateral negotiation. Discussions on it were held during US Defence Secretary

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Robert Gates’ two-day visit to Delhi that ended on January 20. Under US law both pacts need to be signed to ensure compliance with the export of sensitive technology control requirements.

Small Arms for Nepal

New Delhi’s decision to lift the arms embargo follows the eight-day trip to India in December 2009 by the Nepalese Army Chief General Chhatraman Singh and the reciprocal visit to Kathmandu by his Indian counterpart, General Deepak Kapoor a month later.

India is also considering increasing the number of Nepalese Army officers and personnel it trains at several of its military institutions particularly the counter insurgency jungle warfare school at Virangte in Mizoram.

Night Blind Tanks

AFP

INDIA has finally decided to end its four-year long self-imposed embargo on supplying small arms to Nepal and plans to provide it a range of assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and revolvers in addition to bomb-detection and disposal equipment.

But this supply that includes 7.62mm medium machine guns, locally designed 5.56 mm assault rifles and ammunition too is somewhat mealy mouthed as Ministry of Defence officials said such requests from Kathmandu will be dealt with on a ‘case-to-case’ basis. Other than small arms, Nepalese Army requirements include armoured and other multi-purpose military vehicles, 81 mm mortars and ordnance for 105 mm light field guns, provided earlier by India.

India’s cautious approach is despite its continued agitation over Nepali plans to source its military hardware from Pakistan and China in an area that Delhi considers to be part of its strategic ambit. But it is, sadly, in keeping with its continued diffidence in such matters. Senior Indian officials, including the former National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan, had complained when the Sri Lankan Army began sourcing materiel from Islamabad and Beijing to fight the Tamil Tigers. But like in Nepal’s case, India doggedly declined to supply it any weaponry, securing a badly-needed strategic foothold in its neighbourhood.

To counter Delhi’s influence over Kathmandu, both China and Pakistan have upgraded diplomatic, political and strategic links with Nepal in recent years with Islamabad offering it a line of credit to facilitate arms transfers. China’s foreign minister visited Nepal recently while Pakistan’s ambassador to Kathmandu declared some weeks ago that Islamabad would be willing to provide it military aid if requested.

Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor with his Nepalese counterpart General Chhatraman Singh in New Delhi in December 2009

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The Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor recently admitted that around 80 percent of his force’s Main Battle Tanks (MBT) were 'night blind'.

“One of the major areas of my concerns is to remove the night blindness of the tanks so that we are able to effectively fight at night as we are able to do in the day," General Kapoor said in his press conference ahead of Army Day in mid-January.

Grudgingly, he admitted that the armoured columns of nuclear rivals Pakistan and China’s were 80 percent and 100 percent respectively capable of night fighting.

"There are projects already in the pipeline for ensuring the kind of night vision capability that some of our adversaries have. It takes at least three to four years and some of the projects are likely to fructify in the next year or so” declared the Army Chief defensively.

General Kapoor’s confession—common to all his numerous predecessors—fuelled the incredulous spectacle of a medieval battlefield in which feuding armies retired at dusk to regroup in order to resume fighting the following morning.

The only problem with that set of gentlemanly Queensbury rules of warfare is that they do not apply in a nuclearised environment in the 21st century. This situation becomes even more laughable in light of the Army’s newly formulated and much touted “cold start” strategy of going on the offensive in a limited war scenario to achieve suitable military gains against a nuclear backdrop.

India’s armour fleet comprises some 2,000 T-72 Ajeya MBTs, made locally under licence by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi and the Bhishma T-90s series of which 310 were imported in 2001-124 in a completed form and the remaining 186 assembled by HVF. Two years ago, the Army agreed on contract for 347 additionalT-90s in completed and kit form following technical

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problems with locally building 1,000 of them at Avadi.

The Mechanised Forces Directorate is also in the process of inducting some 124 locally designed Arjun MBTs but remains unclear about placing additional orders for the Defence and Research Organisation (DRDO)-designed combat vehicle, because of its reportedly inadequate performance and technological shortcomings.

Additional orders of another 124 Arjun’s and 250 Arjun Mk II remained under consideration.

Of this large fleet, only around a fifth have night fighting capability as repeated trials lasting several years for equipment to provide them that capability have been inconclusive. To make matters worse, there was a backlog of some 1,500 T-72s in need of overhauling, a number that could rise to around 2,000 over the next five years.Though the HVF has an installed capacity of annually overhauling 200 tanks it falls woefully short as do Army Base Workshops tasked with retrofitting another 100 MBTs. In comparison, the Pakistan Army’s armoured fleet of around 1,800 MBTs including 320 UkrainianT-80UDs, some 200 Al Khalid/ MBT 2000 developed in collaboration with China alongsideT-69s,T-59s andT-85 IIs, are largely equipped with night fighting capability. Ironically, India’s decision to import T-90s MBT’s followed Pakistan’s import ofT-80UDs in the early 1990s.

The armoured assets of the China’s People’s Liberation Army, on the other hand, too are equally well equipped to operate in the dark, leaving India the only major Army in the region that continues to doggedly believe in the non-existent Queensbury rules of tank warfare of fighting only in daylight hours.

Gunning for Arms THE Indian Army is soon to acquire 145 ultra-light M777 BAE-Systems-designed 155 mm Field Howitzers via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programme for $647 million as part of its much-postponed attempt to standardise its artillery inventory.

The imminent purchase of M777s, with laser inertial artillery pointing systems, will equip two mountain divisions currently under raising for deployment along the unresolved frontier with China in India’s Northeast. It will be New Delhi’s first artillery purchase after the controversial acquisition of 410 FH 77B 155mm/39 cal guns in 1987.

The FH 77B Howitzer import has been swathed in corruption charges for over 23 years that remain under prosecution.

Ultra-light M777 155 mm Field Howitzers The M777 with a 25-30 km range became the obvious choice after Singapore Technology Kinetics, makers of the rival albeit favoured Pegasus Lightweight Howitzer, were blacklisted last June for alleged corruption involving India’s Ordnance Factory Board that is presently under inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Consequently, on January 22, 2010, the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of its intent to sell India the M777s following a request from its Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Once acquired, the M777 will be the first offensive weapon system the US supplies its new found strategic ally India, having sold it materiel worth over $3.29 billion since 2001.This includes 12Thales/Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37(V) firefinder artillery locating radar, a troop ship, maritime reconnaissance and a military transporter aircraft respectively.

No formal trials of the M777 are expected to take place in India, as the Army accepts it to be a proven weapon system, deployed by the US and British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But an Indian Army artillery evaluation team is likely to travel to the US sometime

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over the next few weeks to witness a live fire demonstration prior to inking the deal.

“This proposed sale (of M777 Howitzers) will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the US by strengthening the US-India strategic relationship. It will also improve the security of an important partner, which continues to be an important force for political stability, peace and economic progress in South Asia,” the DSCA notification declared.

Military sources in Delhi said the requirement for M777s were expected to increase to around 400-500 guns which, in all likelihood, will be built locally under the recently concluded joint venture between BAE Systems and Mahindra Defence Systems, one of India’s larger defence firms.

The BAE-Mahindra JV is the only such entity formed so far under India’s revised Defence Procurement Procedures that permits foreign direct investment of up to 26 percent in the military-industrial sector. BAE Systems' startup share in the JV was reportedly $5.83 million with Mahindra making up the balance and providing the Chief Executive Officer for the JV to be based in Delhi.

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