Defence and Security of India - Dec2009/Jan 2010

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DEFENCE COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Defence ties between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives I K SUBRAHMANYAM COMBAT AIRCRAFT

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE India and Russia may soon sign an agreement to produce a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft I AJAI SHUKLA JANUARY 2010

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 2

ISSUE 3

Rs 250

OF After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir, the battle against militancy may have been won but the larger war for sustainable peace is still being fought I AMITABH MATTOO

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JANUARY, 2010

LETTER FROM THE

editor

D

ecember 2009 marks twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir. Years filled with grief and protests and the death of many thousands of people.

Twenty years on, it’s time to see where the Kashmir issue stands today.

The picture has certainly changed. From the violence that used to be a regular feature in the 1990s it is now at its lowest ebb ever. Officials say, last year, saw the death of 79 civilians, 72 security forces and 235 militants. It is still too many but compare that to 1995 when the toll was nearly 6,000. That was the time when the Valley had security forces dotted all over the landscape; when reporters were led to meet their separatist sources blindfolded in downtown Srinagar so that they could not reveal their whereabouts to Indian intelligence agencies.

Now there is a picture of relative calm in the beleaguered State. 30,000 security personnel have been withdrawn from the border region. Of course the situation is still not normal. After a lull, early January witnessed a prolonged high-profile gun battle with militants holed up in a hotel, in Srinagar’s busy Lal Chowk. There have been other skirmishes and the controversial death of two young girls has once again raised the question of human rights infringements by the State. But the prospect of peace in the Kashmir Valley is not a complete impossibility. In an insightful essay, on the eve of India’s 60th year of becoming a Republic, DSI looks at the how in two decades the nuances over Kashmir have changed and how there is a growing consciousness about the need to introduce certain flexibility on the part of the Indian State to resolve the Kashmir conflict.

It’s been a long pending issue. But now it seems that India and Russia are on the verge of signing an agreement on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The financial and technical partnership has been through years of hard bargaining but the deal is almost inked. The FGFA’s super maneuverability and high endurance is expected to add to the Indian Air Force’s requirements for cross-spectrum warfare from low intensity conflict to conventional and nuclear warfare.

Bangladesh, though it covers a small territory, is strategically significant for India. In many ways then Prime Minister’s Shiekh Haseena’s visit to India was an opportunity to begin a new era in bilateral ties and to resolve historic differences. DSI examines why an economically strong, secular and democratic Bangladesh is crucial for New Delhi.

As usual we welcome your feedback and suggestions which you can send to dsidelhi2010@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe to the magazine please contact our marketing team at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and it will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

DSI

Of course, the situation is still not normal.

After a lull, early January witnessed a prolonged high-profile gun battle with militants holed up in a hotel, in Srinagar’s busy Lal Chowk.

CONTENTS

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JANUARY, 2010

COVER STORY

6

VALLEY OF HOPE?

After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir and with 30,000 security personnel having been withdrawn from the Valley, its time to think of enduring ways to end the conflict.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

DSI

14

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE For years India and Russia have haggled over the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft configuration, capabilities and development workshare. Now apparently the two sides are close to signing an agreement.

FOREIGN POLICY AND COOPERATION

NATIONAL SECURITY 20

SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic action.

NEIGHBOURS

40

ACTION NOT TAKEN The debate continues over having a Chief of Defence Staff who will have encompassing control over the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force and also have command over the management of the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

26

EXPANDING HORIZONS Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India this January has potentially changed the trajectory of bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh

CLIMATE CHANGE

34

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS Rising temperatures, surging seas, melting glaciers, droughts and mass migrations, all caused by climate change, are a threat to global stability.

2

3

Cover Photo: Javeed Shah/Indian Express

CONTENTS

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JANUARY, 2010

COVER STORY

6

VALLEY OF HOPE?

After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir and with 30,000 security personnel having been withdrawn from the Valley, its time to think of enduring ways to end the conflict.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

DSI

14

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE For years India and Russia have haggled over the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft configuration, capabilities and development workshare. Now apparently the two sides are close to signing an agreement.

FOREIGN POLICY AND COOPERATION

NATIONAL SECURITY 20

SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic action.

NEIGHBOURS

40

ACTION NOT TAKEN The debate continues over having a Chief of Defence Staff who will have encompassing control over the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force and also have command over the management of the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

26

EXPANDING HORIZONS Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India this January has potentially changed the trajectory of bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh

CLIMATE CHANGE

34

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS Rising temperatures, surging seas, melting glaciers, droughts and mass migrations, all caused by climate change, are a threat to global stability.

2

3

Cover Photo: Javeed Shah/Indian Express

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JANUARY, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JANUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AMITABH MATTOO

AJAI SHUKLA

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KANWAL SIBAL

NARENDRA SISODIA

DALJEET SINGH

Amitabh Mattoo is professor of International Studies at New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University.

A member of the National Knowledge Commission, a high-level advisory group to the Prime Minister of India, he was also the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jammu. A former member of India's National Security Council's Advisory Board, he has been a member of the task force constituted by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Global Strategic Developments. A visiting Professor at Stanford University, he has published eight books and contributed to many leading publications.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard and has been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

K. Subrahmanyam is a highly-regarded and international strategic affairs analyst and commentator. Joining the Indian Administrative Service in 1951, he was Secretary Defence Production till becoming the founding Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 1968. He has chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee in New Delhi.

A Nehru Fellow and a Visiting Professor, St.John's College, he has also been a consulting editor with The Econmic Times and TheTimes of India.

He has served as the Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board and Chairman of the Kargil Review Panel. During his career Mr Subrahmanyam has authored and edited 16 books.

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003.

Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (20042007). Joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career in France (1968-1973) and was Deputy Spokesman in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975).

Currently, he is a member of the National Security Advisory Board.

Narendra Sisodia is the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He was earlier Secretary in the Ministries of Finance and Defence, Government of India and Vice-Chancellor of University of Udaipur.

He joined the Indian Administrative Service in 1968 and served as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and was Additional Secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat, where he was member of the Task Force on Reforming the Management of Defence. A former Convenor of Indian Pugwash Society, he has also been a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme.

Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, has been former army commander, Western Command. He also commanded a corps in the North East, a division in a strike corps and a brigade in Jammu & Kashmir. Having held several key operational appointments, he has taught at the Army War College and the Defence Services Staff College. He has represented the Indian Army on several delegations abroad and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, USA, and the School of Infantry, United Kingdom.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Moeen Aijaz BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi

RAHUL BEDI Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email : alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email : margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

Contributors-final 2ND.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 25/01/10 5:07 PM Page 1

JANUARY, 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JANUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AMITABH MATTOO

AJAI SHUKLA

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KANWAL SIBAL

NARENDRA SISODIA

DALJEET SINGH

Amitabh Mattoo is professor of International Studies at New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University.

A member of the National Knowledge Commission, a high-level advisory group to the Prime Minister of India, he was also the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jammu. A former member of India's National Security Council's Advisory Board, he has been a member of the task force constituted by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Global Strategic Developments. A visiting Professor at Stanford University, he has published eight books and contributed to many leading publications.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard and has been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

K. Subrahmanyam is a highly-regarded and international strategic affairs analyst and commentator. Joining the Indian Administrative Service in 1951, he was Secretary Defence Production till becoming the founding Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 1968. He has chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee in New Delhi.

A Nehru Fellow and a Visiting Professor, St.John's College, he has also been a consulting editor with The Econmic Times and TheTimes of India.

He has served as the Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board and Chairman of the Kargil Review Panel. During his career Mr Subrahmanyam has authored and edited 16 books.

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003.

Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (20042007). Joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career in France (1968-1973) and was Deputy Spokesman in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975).

Currently, he is a member of the National Security Advisory Board.

Narendra Sisodia is the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He was earlier Secretary in the Ministries of Finance and Defence, Government of India and Vice-Chancellor of University of Udaipur.

He joined the Indian Administrative Service in 1968 and served as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and was Additional Secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat, where he was member of the Task Force on Reforming the Management of Defence. A former Convenor of Indian Pugwash Society, he has also been a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme.

Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, has been former army commander, Western Command. He also commanded a corps in the North East, a division in a strike corps and a brigade in Jammu & Kashmir. Having held several key operational appointments, he has taught at the Army War College and the Defence Services Staff College. He has represented the Indian Army on several delegations abroad and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, USA, and the School of Infantry, United Kingdom.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar, Moeen Aijaz BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Ashwani Rai PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi

RAHUL BEDI Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email : alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/China Dr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA International Tel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762 E-Mail: drrosalind@tsea.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email : margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

DSI

VALLEY

OF HOPE? Two decades of insurgency have taught us that the Kashmir issue needs to be dealt with politically and diplomatically

AMITABH MATTOO

KEY POINTS

In the wake of the inclusive elections to the State Assembly last year, and these current developments, it is easy to forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisis in Jammu and Kashmir’s modern history first erupted. n Kashmir is unique, and must be dealt with accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’s uniqueness is obvious for a variety of historical reasons recognised even by the Supreme Court. n

JAVEED SHAH/INDIAN EXPRESS

O

People listening to a politician during an election campaign near Dal Lake flanked by security forces

6

n December, 18, last year, the Union Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, announced the Government of India’s decision to pull back 30,000 soldiers of the Indian Army from Jammu and Kashmir. According to Antony, now that the situation in the State was improving, the Government wanted to “reduce the visibility and presence” of the armed forces in J&K. Although there were some signs of increased violence in the State and of increased infiltration of

7

militants from Pakistan and Pakistanoccupied-Kashmir, in January this year, it was also decided that the Central Reserve Police Force would, instead, of the Indian Army, patrol the highway between the Jammu and the Kashmir Valley. In addition, instructions had been sent by the Central Government to discontinue the use of combat uniform by all Central Police organisations and the State Police.

Earlier, in October last year, addressing a public rally, while inaugurating the railway line between Anantnag and Qazigund in Kashmir, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “Today, I want to reiterate that we are ready for talks with those people who want to restore peace, tranquility and development in Jammu and Kashmir. We want to take all the sections of society of Jammu and Kashmir with us for the political and diplomatic solution of the Kashmir issue.”

The Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, had already signaled that “quiet diplomacy” was at work and dialogue with those out of the mainstream of Jammu and Kashmir’s politics was being initiated

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JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

DSI

VALLEY

OF HOPE? Two decades of insurgency have taught us that the Kashmir issue needs to be dealt with politically and diplomatically

AMITABH MATTOO

KEY POINTS

In the wake of the inclusive elections to the State Assembly last year, and these current developments, it is easy to forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisis in Jammu and Kashmir’s modern history first erupted. n Kashmir is unique, and must be dealt with accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’s uniqueness is obvious for a variety of historical reasons recognised even by the Supreme Court. n

JAVEED SHAH/INDIAN EXPRESS

O

People listening to a politician during an election campaign near Dal Lake flanked by security forces

6

n December, 18, last year, the Union Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, announced the Government of India’s decision to pull back 30,000 soldiers of the Indian Army from Jammu and Kashmir. According to Antony, now that the situation in the State was improving, the Government wanted to “reduce the visibility and presence” of the armed forces in J&K. Although there were some signs of increased violence in the State and of increased infiltration of

7

militants from Pakistan and Pakistanoccupied-Kashmir, in January this year, it was also decided that the Central Reserve Police Force would, instead, of the Indian Army, patrol the highway between the Jammu and the Kashmir Valley. In addition, instructions had been sent by the Central Government to discontinue the use of combat uniform by all Central Police organisations and the State Police.

Earlier, in October last year, addressing a public rally, while inaugurating the railway line between Anantnag and Qazigund in Kashmir, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “Today, I want to reiterate that we are ready for talks with those people who want to restore peace, tranquility and development in Jammu and Kashmir. We want to take all the sections of society of Jammu and Kashmir with us for the political and diplomatic solution of the Kashmir issue.”

The Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, had already signaled that “quiet diplomacy” was at work and dialogue with those out of the mainstream of Jammu and Kashmir’s politics was being initiated

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JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

The Insurgency It was an extraordinary sight. On December 13, 1989, as four militants of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front were released in downtown Srinagar, in exchange of the Union Home Minister’s daughter. It was, as if, the whole of the Kashmir Valley had come to celebrate the return of these “heroes” from Indian jails. Over the next few days, the streets of Srinagar were overwhelmed by Kashmiris convinced that azadi was round the corner. Ironically, the State-run Doordarshan broadcast graphic images of the fall of the Romanian communist party and the execution of its leader Nicolae Ceausescu, convincing many Kashmiris that the Indian State too was, at least in Kashmir, on the verge of collapsing as had the Communist empire.

Buses in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk would advertise their destination as Sopore, Kupwor, Upore (from Sopore to Kupwara and then across the Line of Control) as thousands of Kashmiri boys in phirans and running shoes went to Pakistan to be trained as militants.

An unprepared Indian State reacted, first with disbelief and then with an overuse of force, causing avoidable collateral damage and human rights abuses. Human Rights activists’ dubbed it India’s Kashmir war while the Indian establishment dubbed it Pakistan’s proxy war against India; part of its policy to bleed India by inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’ on the country.

The truth was somewhere in the middle: Pakistan fanned the fires that were home grown. As George Fernandes, then in charge of Kashmir Affairs, put it: “I do not believe any foreign hand created the Kashmir problem. The problem was created by us…others took advantage of it.”

Much water has flowed down the Jhelum since then. The home-grown insurgency became a virtual jihad sponsored by Pakistan, but it was probably the greatest challenge that India has ever faced as an Independent State. Even twenty years after the militant insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir caught virtually the whole Indian security establishment napping, the wounds are still with us. The battle against militancy may have been won, but the larger war for sustainable peace in Kashmir is still being fought. It is only by learning the right lessons from the two decades of pain and tragedy, can we really prevent another cycle of discontent, violence, insurgency and counterinsurgency in the future.

Unfortunately, tactical approaches based on bureaucratic ad hocism, merely to buy time, simply do not work; only through comprehensive strategic thinking that takes a long-term view of the State and puts in place in a plan-of-action that delivers can India truly win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir. The peace of a grave yard is, after all, different from the peace of a garden.

India’s counterinsurgency strategy gradually got refined.

A realisation that indiscriminate use of force would only strengthen the insurgency, led to a more sophisticated plan of action.

”

The Consequences The reality is that the consequences of the two decades of insurgency are still with us, especially in Kashmir. The most destructive impact was on Kashmiri society itself. Once deified for its culture of non-violence, tolerance and pluralism, the Valley was traumatised, scarred and its composite culture shattered. In the martyrs’ graveyard in downtown Srinagar, are buried thousands of Kashmiris who were killed fighting for what they believed was the right and just cause of their people. In regiments, all across India, are photographs and tributes to all those soldiers who died, tragically, fighting—many times—their own people, and so is the case with the Boder Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force and the J&K Police. This, of course, is not to forget the thousands who were widowed, orphaned or disabled. Kashmir almost lost its soul during these two decades and certainly its innocence, as almost every family experienced a personal tragedy.

The sight of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits living in shabby camps, in Jammu and elsewhere, is a grim reminder of this community in exile, displaced by the conflict and because of a cause they could never identify with instinctively or cerebrally.

India’s relations with Pakistan reached a

8

Security Forces flush out militants holed up in a hotel in Lal Chowk in Srinagar after a night-long gun battle AFP

with the support of the State Government.

In December, the Justice Sagheer Ahmed Report on Central-State relations (based on the recommendations of the Fifth Working Group set up by the Prime Minister) was also released. Although far from being substantive and widely criticised, the report signaled the willingness of New Delhi to deal with issues of autonomy, self-rule and devolution of power more meaningfully than before. In the wake of the inclusive elections to the State Assembly last year, and these current developments, it is easy to forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisis in Jammu and Kashmir ’s modern history first erupted.

nadir, with short periods of optimism, because of the Kashmir insurgency. In 1990, it is believed, the two countries were close to a nuclear exchange which was avoided because of a high-level intervention by the United States.

Similarly, the Kargil war of 1999 was caused by an ambitious Pakistan seeking to inject life into the insurgency, but it could have easily led to a full-blown war.

India’s counter-insurgency strategy gradually got refined during these years.

A realisation that indiscriminate use of force would only strengthen the insurgency, led to a more sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy. This included the creation of a unified headquarters, a division of responsibilities between the Indian Army, the paramilitary forces and the police: the importance of psychological warfare was also recognised.

The intelligence agencies got empowered as never before and at one stage, it seemed that it was more a war between the “agencies” then between the people and the State.

Regional tensions too were heightened with a growing polarisation between Jammu, Ladakh and the Valley, with Jammu demanding Statehood and Ladakh Union Territory status. As a guesstimate, about fifty percent of India’s diplomatic resources, in these years, were spent on countering Pakistan’s propaganda and diplomatic offensive in capitals the world over and in multilateral forums.

9

DSI

The Importance of J&K Apart from its geo-strategic location, it is Kashmir’s singular importance to the very idea of India, which is often forgotten. A Muslim-majority State that voluntarily acceded to India in 1947 lent tremendous strength to the construction of India as a vibrant, secular and pluralistic State. The battle, therefore, to win back the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people is critical not just for the recovery of the ideals that inspired Indian nationhood, but is central to the war against obscurantism and fundamentalism.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently declared: “Real empowerment, my friends, is not about slogans. Only when every man, woman and child from Ladakh to Lakhanpur and from Kargil to Kathua through Kashmir feels secure, in every sense of the word, can we truly say that people have been empowered.

Security is freedom from fear and this is what we want to achieve. We want the people of Jammu and Kashmir to be free from all fears about their future. It is only this sense of comprehensive security, within a framework of good governance that can really empower the people.

We want the people to be physically secure and this can only happen if violence and terrorism ends permanently. We want the people to be economically secure and this can only happen if the tremendous potential of the State is channelised and every citizen has access to quality education and health care. We want every group to be politically secure and this can only happen once power is decentralised to the villages. Finally, we want every community to be culturally and socially secure. This means that we value the cultural distinctiveness of every community and create conditions for the flowering of their languages, their lifestyles and their arts and crafts. And we have to ensure that those who have been displaced can return to their homes. This vision of empowerment and comprehensive security is related to good governance and people’s active participation in formulating policies and monitoring their implementation.”

This vision of comprehensive security must surely guide all new initiatives towards Jammu and Kashmir and must be based on the following five Ds:

Democracy Elections in Jammu and Kashmir are much more than a democratic ritual. In the popular Kashmiri imagination, they have been powerful symbols of faith and

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JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

The Insurgency It was an extraordinary sight. On December 13, 1989, as four militants of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front were released in downtown Srinagar, in exchange of the Union Home Minister’s daughter. It was, as if, the whole of the Kashmir Valley had come to celebrate the return of these “heroes” from Indian jails. Over the next few days, the streets of Srinagar were overwhelmed by Kashmiris convinced that azadi was round the corner. Ironically, the State-run Doordarshan broadcast graphic images of the fall of the Romanian communist party and the execution of its leader Nicolae Ceausescu, convincing many Kashmiris that the Indian State too was, at least in Kashmir, on the verge of collapsing as had the Communist empire.

Buses in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk would advertise their destination as Sopore, Kupwor, Upore (from Sopore to Kupwara and then across the Line of Control) as thousands of Kashmiri boys in phirans and running shoes went to Pakistan to be trained as militants.

An unprepared Indian State reacted, first with disbelief and then with an overuse of force, causing avoidable collateral damage and human rights abuses. Human Rights activists’ dubbed it India’s Kashmir war while the Indian establishment dubbed it Pakistan’s proxy war against India; part of its policy to bleed India by inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’ on the country.

The truth was somewhere in the middle: Pakistan fanned the fires that were home grown. As George Fernandes, then in charge of Kashmir Affairs, put it: “I do not believe any foreign hand created the Kashmir problem. The problem was created by us…others took advantage of it.”

Much water has flowed down the Jhelum since then. The home-grown insurgency became a virtual jihad sponsored by Pakistan, but it was probably the greatest challenge that India has ever faced as an Independent State. Even twenty years after the militant insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir caught virtually the whole Indian security establishment napping, the wounds are still with us. The battle against militancy may have been won, but the larger war for sustainable peace in Kashmir is still being fought. It is only by learning the right lessons from the two decades of pain and tragedy, can we really prevent another cycle of discontent, violence, insurgency and counterinsurgency in the future.

Unfortunately, tactical approaches based on bureaucratic ad hocism, merely to buy time, simply do not work; only through comprehensive strategic thinking that takes a long-term view of the State and puts in place in a plan-of-action that delivers can India truly win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir. The peace of a grave yard is, after all, different from the peace of a garden.

India’s counterinsurgency strategy gradually got refined.

A realisation that indiscriminate use of force would only strengthen the insurgency, led to a more sophisticated plan of action.

”

The Consequences The reality is that the consequences of the two decades of insurgency are still with us, especially in Kashmir. The most destructive impact was on Kashmiri society itself. Once deified for its culture of non-violence, tolerance and pluralism, the Valley was traumatised, scarred and its composite culture shattered. In the martyrs’ graveyard in downtown Srinagar, are buried thousands of Kashmiris who were killed fighting for what they believed was the right and just cause of their people. In regiments, all across India, are photographs and tributes to all those soldiers who died, tragically, fighting—many times—their own people, and so is the case with the Boder Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force and the J&K Police. This, of course, is not to forget the thousands who were widowed, orphaned or disabled. Kashmir almost lost its soul during these two decades and certainly its innocence, as almost every family experienced a personal tragedy.

The sight of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits living in shabby camps, in Jammu and elsewhere, is a grim reminder of this community in exile, displaced by the conflict and because of a cause they could never identify with instinctively or cerebrally.

India’s relations with Pakistan reached a

8

Security Forces flush out militants holed up in a hotel in Lal Chowk in Srinagar after a night-long gun battle AFP

with the support of the State Government.

In December, the Justice Sagheer Ahmed Report on Central-State relations (based on the recommendations of the Fifth Working Group set up by the Prime Minister) was also released. Although far from being substantive and widely criticised, the report signaled the willingness of New Delhi to deal with issues of autonomy, self-rule and devolution of power more meaningfully than before. In the wake of the inclusive elections to the State Assembly last year, and these current developments, it is easy to forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisis in Jammu and Kashmir ’s modern history first erupted.

nadir, with short periods of optimism, because of the Kashmir insurgency. In 1990, it is believed, the two countries were close to a nuclear exchange which was avoided because of a high-level intervention by the United States.

Similarly, the Kargil war of 1999 was caused by an ambitious Pakistan seeking to inject life into the insurgency, but it could have easily led to a full-blown war.

India’s counter-insurgency strategy gradually got refined during these years.

A realisation that indiscriminate use of force would only strengthen the insurgency, led to a more sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy. This included the creation of a unified headquarters, a division of responsibilities between the Indian Army, the paramilitary forces and the police: the importance of psychological warfare was also recognised.

The intelligence agencies got empowered as never before and at one stage, it seemed that it was more a war between the “agencies” then between the people and the State.

Regional tensions too were heightened with a growing polarisation between Jammu, Ladakh and the Valley, with Jammu demanding Statehood and Ladakh Union Territory status. As a guesstimate, about fifty percent of India’s diplomatic resources, in these years, were spent on countering Pakistan’s propaganda and diplomatic offensive in capitals the world over and in multilateral forums.

9

DSI

The Importance of J&K Apart from its geo-strategic location, it is Kashmir’s singular importance to the very idea of India, which is often forgotten. A Muslim-majority State that voluntarily acceded to India in 1947 lent tremendous strength to the construction of India as a vibrant, secular and pluralistic State. The battle, therefore, to win back the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people is critical not just for the recovery of the ideals that inspired Indian nationhood, but is central to the war against obscurantism and fundamentalism.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently declared: “Real empowerment, my friends, is not about slogans. Only when every man, woman and child from Ladakh to Lakhanpur and from Kargil to Kathua through Kashmir feels secure, in every sense of the word, can we truly say that people have been empowered.

Security is freedom from fear and this is what we want to achieve. We want the people of Jammu and Kashmir to be free from all fears about their future. It is only this sense of comprehensive security, within a framework of good governance that can really empower the people.

We want the people to be physically secure and this can only happen if violence and terrorism ends permanently. We want the people to be economically secure and this can only happen if the tremendous potential of the State is channelised and every citizen has access to quality education and health care. We want every group to be politically secure and this can only happen once power is decentralised to the villages. Finally, we want every community to be culturally and socially secure. This means that we value the cultural distinctiveness of every community and create conditions for the flowering of their languages, their lifestyles and their arts and crafts. And we have to ensure that those who have been displaced can return to their homes. This vision of empowerment and comprehensive security is related to good governance and people’s active participation in formulating policies and monitoring their implementation.”

This vision of comprehensive security must surely guide all new initiatives towards Jammu and Kashmir and must be based on the following five Ds:

Democracy Elections in Jammu and Kashmir are much more than a democratic ritual. In the popular Kashmiri imagination, they have been powerful symbols of faith and

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JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

Dialogues Second is the issue of the three dialogues that are vital to re-build the culture of mutual respect, tolerance, accommodation and faith in peaceful conflict resolution.

Only the myopic will suggest that popular alienation has ended or separatist sentiment is dead. The challenge, consequently, is to ensure that there is a larger dialogue with separatists and even former militant groups which need not delegitimise the elections or undermine the elected representatives. This should not be difficult to engineer if there is a clear political will and the task of interlocuting is not left to intelligence operatives or retired babus. This is something that the Home Minister must make into a mantra.

The dialogue must be unconditional and continuous and should address both political as well as humanitarian issues that could build confidence and trust (including the issue, for example, of the release of political detainees and ensuring a stricter enforcement of human rights).

Internally, it is also vital to build, through talks, a process of reconciliation between Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammu and the sub-regions. There has been

The 2008 election will also be recognised as a marker for its inclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds. This faith in democracy must be strengthened by ensuring not just the fairness of all future elections, but that real democracy is in operation up to the panchayat level.

”

growing regional and communal polarisation, which needs to be urgently addressed. The dialogue within should be complimented by the re-starting of the New Delhi-Islamabad back channel on Kashmir, to ensure—inter alia—that Pakistan has no incentive to subvert the internal track. This should, of course, take off from precisely where the previously designated special envoys had paused in their discussions.

Devolution

The third challenge is to arrive at a consensus on devolution and decentralisation. There are many proposals on the table, including those on autonomy, self-rule, self-governance and achievable nationhood. A sincerity of purpose, together with an imaginative and creative play with many of these ideas, should make it possible to arrive at an agreement amongst the main stakeholders in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on the quantum of political space needed, at every administrative level, for true empowerment of all the people of the State, as well as on the institutions and mechanisms needed to support this architecture.

Autonomy and self-rule must not be viewed as dirty words, and an ‘autonomous’ or ‘self-ruled’ Kashmir could become a

10

AFP

betrayal; of resistance and accommodation; of hope and disillusionment; of confidence and uncertainty. Through the 1950s and the 1960s, stage-managed elections were seen as a betrayal of the trust of 1947. The 1977 election, the fairest the State had witnessed since Independence, became a liet motif of faith and accommodation. The 1987 election, neither free nor fair, paved the way for militancy in the State.

Confidence in the democratic process was restored considerably when, for the first time ever, in 2002, the electorate was able to dislodge the ruling party. The 2008 election will also be recognised as a marker for its inclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds. While 43.69 percent of the electorate had voted in 2002, the figure was 61.49 percent in 2008, respectable by any national or international standard.

More significantly, all the districts of the Kashmir Valley (outside Srinagar) witnessed a healthy turnout of more than 45 percent, with Kupwara and Bandipora —once at the heart of separatist politics— registering 68.22 percent and 59.66 percent respectively. This faith in democracy must be strengthened by ensuring not just the fairness of all future elections, but that real democracy is in operation up to the panchayat level.

model of cooperative federalism. Autonomy is about empowering people, making people feel that they belong, and about increasing the accountability of public institutions and services. It is, in essence, synonymous with decentralisation and devolution of power, phrases that have been on the charter of virtually every political party in India. In Jammu and Kashmir, autonomy carries tremendous resonance with the people because puppet leaders from the State colluded with the Central leadership and gradually eroded the autonomy promised by the Constitution.

There is no contradiction between wanting Kashmir to be part of the national mainstream and the State’s desire for autonomous self-governance.

Separatism grows when people feel disconnected from the structures of power and the process of policy formulation; in contrast, devolution ensures popular participation in the running of the polity.

If this balance is struck, Jammu and Kashmir could become a model of ‘cooperative federalism’, a special model that could be gradually applied to other States in the Union.

Six-Point Plan Restoration of autonomy in Kashmir, however, does not require elaborate reports or reference to past agreements and accords. They obfuscate rather than clarify the issue of meaningful selfgovernance. Autonomy can be achieved in

the State through a simple six-point plan.

First, restore the nomenclature. The terms Sadar-i-Riyasat and Wazir-e-Azam, which were used until 1965 for the Governor and the Chief Minister of the State, still have important symbolic value for people of the State. Literally translated, the terms stand for head of State and Prime Minister. This nomenclature should be restored. In substance, this change will neither enlarge nor diminish the powers of the Governor or the Chief Minister. This will also not lead to a shift in their order of precedence.

Second, give the State a role in the selection of its Governor. According to Article 155 of the Indian Constitution, the ‘Governor of the State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand

11

DSI

and seal.’ Until 1965, the Sadar-i-Riyasat in Kashmir was elected by the State Legislature, but it was clear that he should be a person acceptable to the Centre and be appointed by the President. The Governor is widely viewed in Jammu and Kashmir as an instrument through which the Centre— and more often the political party in power —has furthered its interests in the State. The office of the Governor, in whom the Constitution vests the executive power of the State should be above narrow partisan politics. The Governor could be elected by the State Legislature and be appointed by the President and, by virtue of Article 156(1), hold office at the pleasure of the President.

Or alternatively, the State Government could submit a panel of names for the President to appoint as Kashmiris queue Governor the person to vote in Dawar he finds the most Gurez near the suitable from the panel.

Line of Control The appointee would (LoC), during the hold office at the fifth and final President’s pleasure. phase of India’s Third, prevent national elections misuse of Article 356. during May 2009 This article deals with ‘provisions in case of the failure of the Constitutional machinery in States.’ The misuse of Article 356 is a matter that has caused widespread concern in all the States. The matter is being considered by the Inter-State Council and some agreed modifications and safeguards might emerge. While some might argue that it would be imprudent and impractical to exempt Jammu and Kashmir from the purview of the article altogether (although the State was brought under its purview only in 1964), it is still possible to modify it significantly to prevent misuse without compromising on measures that might be needed to deal with real emergencies.

In case of a Constitutional breakdown, provisions should be made for holding elections within a maximum of three months and for the appointment of an eminent persons’ group from within the State to review the situation in case elections cannot be held within three months because of violence or other disturbances. The verdict of the group should be final.

Fourth, give State services more authority and increase their quota in the All India Services. Part XIV of the Constitution which deals with the services did not apply initially to Jammu and Kashmir. But the provisions of Article 312 relating to All India Services were extended in1958. Under the

Kashmir-op 2ND.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:27 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY

Dialogues Second is the issue of the three dialogues that are vital to re-build the culture of mutual respect, tolerance, accommodation and faith in peaceful conflict resolution.

Only the myopic will suggest that popular alienation has ended or separatist sentiment is dead. The challenge, consequently, is to ensure that there is a larger dialogue with separatists and even former militant groups which need not delegitimise the elections or undermine the elected representatives. This should not be difficult to engineer if there is a clear political will and the task of interlocuting is not left to intelligence operatives or retired babus. This is something that the Home Minister must make into a mantra.

The dialogue must be unconditional and continuous and should address both political as well as humanitarian issues that could build confidence and trust (including the issue, for example, of the release of political detainees and ensuring a stricter enforcement of human rights).

Internally, it is also vital to build, through talks, a process of reconciliation between Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammu and the sub-regions. There has been

The 2008 election will also be recognised as a marker for its inclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds. This faith in democracy must be strengthened by ensuring not just the fairness of all future elections, but that real democracy is in operation up to the panchayat level.

”

growing regional and communal polarisation, which needs to be urgently addressed. The dialogue within should be complimented by the re-starting of the New Delhi-Islamabad back channel on Kashmir, to ensure—inter alia—that Pakistan has no incentive to subvert the internal track. This should, of course, take off from precisely where the previously designated special envoys had paused in their discussions.

Devolution

The third challenge is to arrive at a consensus on devolution and decentralisation. There are many proposals on the table, including those on autonomy, self-rule, self-governance and achievable nationhood. A sincerity of purpose, together with an imaginative and creative play with many of these ideas, should make it possible to arrive at an agreement amongst the main stakeholders in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on the quantum of political space needed, at every administrative level, for true empowerment of all the people of the State, as well as on the institutions and mechanisms needed to support this architecture.

Autonomy and self-rule must not be viewed as dirty words, and an ‘autonomous’ or ‘self-ruled’ Kashmir could become a

10

AFP

betrayal; of resistance and accommodation; of hope and disillusionment; of confidence and uncertainty. Through the 1950s and the 1960s, stage-managed elections were seen as a betrayal of the trust of 1947. The 1977 election, the fairest the State had witnessed since Independence, became a liet motif of faith and accommodation. The 1987 election, neither free nor fair, paved the way for militancy in the State.

Confidence in the democratic process was restored considerably when, for the first time ever, in 2002, the electorate was able to dislodge the ruling party. The 2008 election will also be recognised as a marker for its inclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds. While 43.69 percent of the electorate had voted in 2002, the figure was 61.49 percent in 2008, respectable by any national or international standard.

More significantly, all the districts of the Kashmir Valley (outside Srinagar) witnessed a healthy turnout of more than 45 percent, with Kupwara and Bandipora —once at the heart of separatist politics— registering 68.22 percent and 59.66 percent respectively. This faith in democracy must be strengthened by ensuring not just the fairness of all future elections, but that real democracy is in operation up to the panchayat level.

model of cooperative federalism. Autonomy is about empowering people, making people feel that they belong, and about increasing the accountability of public institutions and services. It is, in essence, synonymous with decentralisation and devolution of power, phrases that have been on the charter of virtually every political party in India. In Jammu and Kashmir, autonomy carries tremendous resonance with the people because puppet leaders from the State colluded with the Central leadership and gradually eroded the autonomy promised by the Constitution.

There is no contradiction between wanting Kashmir to be part of the national mainstream and the State’s desire for autonomous self-governance.

Separatism grows when people feel disconnected from the structures of power and the process of policy formulation; in contrast, devolution ensures popular participation in the running of the polity.

If this balance is struck, Jammu and Kashmir could become a model of ‘cooperative federalism’, a special model that could be gradually applied to other States in the Union.

Six-Point Plan Restoration of autonomy in Kashmir, however, does not require elaborate reports or reference to past agreements and accords. They obfuscate rather than clarify the issue of meaningful selfgovernance. Autonomy can be achieved in

the State through a simple six-point plan.

First, restore the nomenclature. The terms Sadar-i-Riyasat and Wazir-e-Azam, which were used until 1965 for the Governor and the Chief Minister of the State, still have important symbolic value for people of the State. Literally translated, the terms stand for head of State and Prime Minister. This nomenclature should be restored. In substance, this change will neither enlarge nor diminish the powers of the Governor or the Chief Minister. This will also not lead to a shift in their order of precedence.

Second, give the State a role in the selection of its Governor. According to Article 155 of the Indian Constitution, the ‘Governor of the State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand

11

DSI

and seal.’ Until 1965, the Sadar-i-Riyasat in Kashmir was elected by the State Legislature, but it was clear that he should be a person acceptable to the Centre and be appointed by the President. The Governor is widely viewed in Jammu and Kashmir as an instrument through which the Centre— and more often the political party in power —has furthered its interests in the State. The office of the Governor, in whom the Constitution vests the executive power of the State should be above narrow partisan politics. The Governor could be elected by the State Legislature and be appointed by the President and, by virtue of Article 156(1), hold office at the pleasure of the President.

Or alternatively, the State Government could submit a panel of names for the President to appoint as Kashmiris queue Governor the person to vote in Dawar he finds the most Gurez near the suitable from the panel.

Line of Control The appointee would (LoC), during the hold office at the fifth and final President’s pleasure. phase of India’s Third, prevent national elections misuse of Article 356. during May 2009 This article deals with ‘provisions in case of the failure of the Constitutional machinery in States.’ The misuse of Article 356 is a matter that has caused widespread concern in all the States. The matter is being considered by the Inter-State Council and some agreed modifications and safeguards might emerge. While some might argue that it would be imprudent and impractical to exempt Jammu and Kashmir from the purview of the article altogether (although the State was brought under its purview only in 1964), it is still possible to modify it significantly to prevent misuse without compromising on measures that might be needed to deal with real emergencies.

In case of a Constitutional breakdown, provisions should be made for holding elections within a maximum of three months and for the appointment of an eminent persons’ group from within the State to review the situation in case elections cannot be held within three months because of violence or other disturbances. The verdict of the group should be final.

Fourth, give State services more authority and increase their quota in the All India Services. Part XIV of the Constitution which deals with the services did not apply initially to Jammu and Kashmir. But the provisions of Article 312 relating to All India Services were extended in1958. Under the

Kashmir-op 2ND.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:29 PM Page 7

JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY In Jammu and Kashmir, autonomy carries tremendous resonance with the people because puppet leaders from the State colluded with the Central leadership and gradually eroded the autonomy promised by the Constitution.

”

AFP

scheme, entry into the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service is both by direct examination and selection of promotees from the State Civil Service by the Union Public Service Commission. In most States, the State quota has been around 33 percent but in the case of Kashmir this has been 50 percent.

There is reason to expect that, as elsewhere, with improvements in the quality of education in Kashmir, the number of direct recruits from Activists from the State will increase in the All Parties the years ahead. Even Hurriyat otherwise, the Jammu and Kashmir selection Conference shout pro-freedom quota (from within the State Services) should be slogans during a increased for a period of rally in Srinagar 20 years to 75 percent in August, 2009 given the disruption that the educational system in the State has faced over the last decade.

The Kashmir Administrative Services (KAS) and the Kashmir Police Service (KPS) have suffered severe neglect and marginalisation over the last decade. Part of the problem has to do with training but it is critical that KAS and KPS officers are given promotions and positions of authority and have a career track similar to IAS and IPS officers.

Fifth, provide guarantees for the future.

Many people genuinely feel that even if a package of autonomy or self-rule is worked out, a future Central Government may, in collusion with the State’s political leaders, renege on an agreement that is made today.

This is based on the past experience of the State’s relationship with the Centre. It is essential, therefore, that special Constitutional guarantees are introduced to ensure that the State’s autonomy is not eroded. It may be necessary, for instance, to introduce a provision in the Constitution which would provide for a referendum in the State before any major amendment that would affect its ties with the Union becomes a law.

Finally, ensure greater regional balance, but rule out a division of the State. There are powerful forces demanding a trifurcation of the main regions of the State —Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh—into separate administrative units. Posing as an imaginative solution, this demand, if conceded, could lead to violent social disruptions in the State and create a communal polarisation that would not just irretrievably destroy the cultural and social fabric of the State but have perilous

consequences for communal relations in the rest of India.

In addition, trifurcation would forever end the possibilities of reviving the plural traditions of communal harmony in the State that had once made it a symbol of the very idea of India: unity in diversity.

Regional harmony, it should be clear from experience, cannot be ensured through partitions, but through a decentralisation and devolution of financial and economic power that will treat the panchayat as the primary unit of governance. Jammu and Kashmir is not Assam or Uttar Pradesh where the carving of smaller States will provide for better governance. On the

12

contrary, it is a recipe for disaster.

These internal discussions must flow into the back-channel, which can then attempt to work out a non-territorial India-Pakistan settlement on Jammu and Kashmir based on providing a similar political architecture on both sides of the Line of Control while working towards converting it into a line of peace that allows for the free movement of people, goods, services and ideas. Cooperation in areas of mutual interest like water, transport, agriculture and education will require the creation gradually of transLoC mechanisms and institutions. The implementation of such an understanding

should create the conditions for a win-win solution without needing to address hard issues of political sovereignty.

particularly over the last two decades and no one action will change this reality.

In many ways, militarisation is, to use Ashis Nandy’s classic phrase, an “intimate enemy”. All stakeholders, State and nonState, have an obligation to re-create a demilitarised culture of peace. What is required is deep introspection, a changed mindset and, of course, a change of heart and policy.

A Truth Commission would be an ideal starting point for the creation of a new demilitarised culture of peace. Symbolically, the withdrawal of 30,000 troops from the Valley has sent a signal of the Government of India’s sincerity of purpose.

But much will also depend on Pakistan’s actions in ending the sponsorship of violence as well as the ability of the Kashmiris themselves to resist attempts that legitimise violence and force them to abandon once again their distinctly non-violent historic identity.

Development and Governance Demilitarisation An issue which is both controversial and yet essential to building peace is demilitarisation.

Demilitarisation must not be confused with merely the withdrawal of troops. Instead, militarisation is a culture that legitimises the use of violence and force, rewards machismo and physical aggressiveness, patronises intolerance and repression and is contemptuous of marginal groups. No one actor can be held responsible for the militarisation of Jammu and Kashmir,

Finally, of course, is the development of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been a central part of the Prime Minister’s vision for the State. Other than improved connectivity and infrastructure, it is essential to give the youth of Jammu and Kashmir a greater stake in the country’s booming knowledge economy. Given the geography of the State, and its growing endowment of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in its beneficial economic integration than the

13

DSI

export of apples and handicrafts. The State Government must also pay attention to the recommendations of the working group on ensuring good governance in the State, which include, the introduction of egovernance—to make Government at the district and tehsil level more efficient, accountable and transparent—and for extending the 73rd Amendment to truly empower the Panchayati Raj system.

However, for the State Government, an important priority must be to devise and implement a comprehensive policy for the young men and women of the State. The State has witnessed consistently high levels of educated unemployment and low levels of vocationally skilled human resources. With more than 2,00,000 unemployed, and in many case unemployable (other than as white collar workers for the Government), the youth have formed the bed rock of the militant movement over the last two decades. The challenge now is to use this energy of the young Kashmiris to build peace.

Re-training hubs in all the district headquarters must be immediately established to ensure that a significant section of unemployed educated youth become employable within six months to a year. With an extensive use of Information and Communication Technology, it should be possible to annually produce more than 20,000 skilled and employable workers from the 22 district re-training centres.

These centres could be established through a public-private partnership or by creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).

Public-private partnerships are also needed to enhance international connectivity by extending broad-band access in the State— with stronger incentives provided through the existing universal access funds for telecommunications.

In the long-term, given the geography of the State and its growing endowments of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in revitalising its economy than other traditional sectors.

Kashmir is unique, and must be dealt with accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’s uniqueness is obvious for a variety of historical reasons recognised even by the Supreme Court. In 1984, in Khazan Chand vs. the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the court unambiguously held that the State holds ‘a special place in the Constitutional set up of the country.’ The biggest lesson of the insurgency is to deal with J&K specially and politically rather than bureaucratically.

Kashmir-op 2ND.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:29 PM Page 7

JANUARY 2010

COVER STORY In Jammu and Kashmir, autonomy carries tremendous resonance with the people because puppet leaders from the State colluded with the Central leadership and gradually eroded the autonomy promised by the Constitution.

”

AFP

scheme, entry into the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service is both by direct examination and selection of promotees from the State Civil Service by the Union Public Service Commission. In most States, the State quota has been around 33 percent but in the case of Kashmir this has been 50 percent.

There is reason to expect that, as elsewhere, with improvements in the quality of education in Kashmir, the number of direct recruits from Activists from the State will increase in the All Parties the years ahead. Even Hurriyat otherwise, the Jammu and Kashmir selection Conference shout pro-freedom quota (from within the State Services) should be slogans during a increased for a period of rally in Srinagar 20 years to 75 percent in August, 2009 given the disruption that the educational system in the State has faced over the last decade.

The Kashmir Administrative Services (KAS) and the Kashmir Police Service (KPS) have suffered severe neglect and marginalisation over the last decade. Part of the problem has to do with training but it is critical that KAS and KPS officers are given promotions and positions of authority and have a career track similar to IAS and IPS officers.

Fifth, provide guarantees for the future.

Many people genuinely feel that even if a package of autonomy or self-rule is worked out, a future Central Government may, in collusion with the State’s political leaders, renege on an agreement that is made today.

This is based on the past experience of the State’s relationship with the Centre. It is essential, therefore, that special Constitutional guarantees are introduced to ensure that the State’s autonomy is not eroded. It may be necessary, for instance, to introduce a provision in the Constitution which would provide for a referendum in the State before any major amendment that would affect its ties with the Union becomes a law.

Finally, ensure greater regional balance, but rule out a division of the State. There are powerful forces demanding a trifurcation of the main regions of the State —Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh—into separate administrative units. Posing as an imaginative solution, this demand, if conceded, could lead to violent social disruptions in the State and create a communal polarisation that would not just irretrievably destroy the cultural and social fabric of the State but have perilous

consequences for communal relations in the rest of India.

In addition, trifurcation would forever end the possibilities of reviving the plural traditions of communal harmony in the State that had once made it a symbol of the very idea of India: unity in diversity.

Regional harmony, it should be clear from experience, cannot be ensured through partitions, but through a decentralisation and devolution of financial and economic power that will treat the panchayat as the primary unit of governance. Jammu and Kashmir is not Assam or Uttar Pradesh where the carving of smaller States will provide for better governance. On the

12

contrary, it is a recipe for disaster.

These internal discussions must flow into the back-channel, which can then attempt to work out a non-territorial India-Pakistan settlement on Jammu and Kashmir based on providing a similar political architecture on both sides of the Line of Control while working towards converting it into a line of peace that allows for the free movement of people, goods, services and ideas. Cooperation in areas of mutual interest like water, transport, agriculture and education will require the creation gradually of transLoC mechanisms and institutions. The implementation of such an understanding

should create the conditions for a win-win solution without needing to address hard issues of political sovereignty.

particularly over the last two decades and no one action will change this reality.

In many ways, militarisation is, to use Ashis Nandy’s classic phrase, an “intimate enemy”. All stakeholders, State and nonState, have an obligation to re-create a demilitarised culture of peace. What is required is deep introspection, a changed mindset and, of course, a change of heart and policy.

A Truth Commission would be an ideal starting point for the creation of a new demilitarised culture of peace. Symbolically, the withdrawal of 30,000 troops from the Valley has sent a signal of the Government of India’s sincerity of purpose.

But much will also depend on Pakistan’s actions in ending the sponsorship of violence as well as the ability of the Kashmiris themselves to resist attempts that legitimise violence and force them to abandon once again their distinctly non-violent historic identity.

Development and Governance Demilitarisation An issue which is both controversial and yet essential to building peace is demilitarisation.

Demilitarisation must not be confused with merely the withdrawal of troops. Instead, militarisation is a culture that legitimises the use of violence and force, rewards machismo and physical aggressiveness, patronises intolerance and repression and is contemptuous of marginal groups. No one actor can be held responsible for the militarisation of Jammu and Kashmir,

Finally, of course, is the development of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been a central part of the Prime Minister’s vision for the State. Other than improved connectivity and infrastructure, it is essential to give the youth of Jammu and Kashmir a greater stake in the country’s booming knowledge economy. Given the geography of the State, and its growing endowment of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in its beneficial economic integration than the

13

DSI

export of apples and handicrafts. The State Government must also pay attention to the recommendations of the working group on ensuring good governance in the State, which include, the introduction of egovernance—to make Government at the district and tehsil level more efficient, accountable and transparent—and for extending the 73rd Amendment to truly empower the Panchayati Raj system.

However, for the State Government, an important priority must be to devise and implement a comprehensive policy for the young men and women of the State. The State has witnessed consistently high levels of educated unemployment and low levels of vocationally skilled human resources. With more than 2,00,000 unemployed, and in many case unemployable (other than as white collar workers for the Government), the youth have formed the bed rock of the militant movement over the last two decades. The challenge now is to use this energy of the young Kashmiris to build peace.

Re-training hubs in all the district headquarters must be immediately established to ensure that a significant section of unemployed educated youth become employable within six months to a year. With an extensive use of Information and Communication Technology, it should be possible to annually produce more than 20,000 skilled and employable workers from the 22 district re-training centres.

These centres could be established through a public-private partnership or by creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).

Public-private partnerships are also needed to enhance international connectivity by extending broad-band access in the State— with stronger incentives provided through the existing universal access funds for telecommunications.

In the long-term, given the geography of the State and its growing endowments of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in revitalising its economy than other traditional sectors.

Kashmir is unique, and must be dealt with accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’s uniqueness is obvious for a variety of historical reasons recognised even by the Supreme Court. In 1984, in Khazan Chand vs. the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the court unambiguously held that the State holds ‘a special place in the Constitutional set up of the country.’ The biggest lesson of the insurgency is to deal with J&K specially and politically rather than bureaucratically.

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT

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LEAP INTO THE FUTURE AJAI SHUKLA

India is close to signing an agreement with Russia to jointly develop the Sukhoi T-50, termed as PAK-FA by Russia and known in India as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft KEY POINTS

The contract is likely to be signed between the Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation.

They will commit to jointly developing and building 250 fighters for the Indian Air Force and an equal number for Russia. n The joint venture will cater to both the Russian and Indian Air Forces, producing two different, but closely related aircraft. n

I

n the world of combat aviation, the last decade has been ruled by an unchallenged king—the United States Air Force’s F-22 Raptor—the world’s only Fifth Generation (Gen5) fighter. The Raptor has all the attributes of a Gen5 fighter, be it stealth (both active and passive), advanced data fusion techniques for giving the pilot near-total situational awareness, high super cruise ability and high agility through devices like thrust vectoring.

But the Raptor is under a cloud. The US will build only 187 of these Gen5 fighters after experiencing its big

14

An artist’s impression of the Sukhoi T-50 Fighter Aircraft

problems: high costs and maintenance.

Each hour that the US $350 millionfighter flies, it costs America almost US $50,000. And for each hour of flying, it needs 30 hours of maintenance. The Soviet threat might have justified this expense, but today as US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, the Raptor is a “niche silver-bullet solution” against a threat that is nowhere in sight.

Even as Gates spoke, a new challenger to the Raptor was being born in Russia.

During the closing weeks of 2009, Sukhoi’s T-50 fighter prototype (termed the PAK-FA, an acronym for Perspektivnyi

Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, which translates into English as Prospective Aircraft Complex of Frontline Aviation) has carried out high-speed taxi trials in Siberia, the final preparation for its first-ever flight, which is evidently imminent. The PAK-FA programme aims to produce the first Gen5 fighter built outside America.

Sources in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in New Delhi say that India is very close to signing a detailed agreement with Russia to jointly develop the PAK-FA, which India terms as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). For years

Moscow and New Delhi have haggled over the FGFA’s configuration, capabilities and development workshare. Now, apparently, the two sides are close to an agreement.

The contract will be signed between Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which owns a controlling interest in Sukhoi. They will commit to jointly developing and building 250 fighters for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and an equal number for Russia. The door will remain open for additional orders from either partner

15

country, as well as for export, which will be contingent on both sides agreeing.

Equal Stakes HAL and UAC will set up a joint venture company, similar to the Brahmos JV, in which both sides will own equal stakes.

Much of the development work will continue to take place in the aviation R&D establishments of both partner countries. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which oversees the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, will not be concerned with the FGFA. Instead, the ADA will focus on

Sukhoi-T50-edited 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:31 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

DSI

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE AJAI SHUKLA

India is close to signing an agreement with Russia to jointly develop the Sukhoi T-50, termed as PAK-FA by Russia and known in India as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft KEY POINTS

The contract is likely to be signed between the Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation.

They will commit to jointly developing and building 250 fighters for the Indian Air Force and an equal number for Russia. n The joint venture will cater to both the Russian and Indian Air Forces, producing two different, but closely related aircraft. n

I

n the world of combat aviation, the last decade has been ruled by an unchallenged king—the United States Air Force’s F-22 Raptor—the world’s only Fifth Generation (Gen5) fighter. The Raptor has all the attributes of a Gen5 fighter, be it stealth (both active and passive), advanced data fusion techniques for giving the pilot near-total situational awareness, high super cruise ability and high agility through devices like thrust vectoring.

But the Raptor is under a cloud. The US will build only 187 of these Gen5 fighters after experiencing its big

14

An artist’s impression of the Sukhoi T-50 Fighter Aircraft

problems: high costs and maintenance.

Each hour that the US $350 millionfighter flies, it costs America almost US $50,000. And for each hour of flying, it needs 30 hours of maintenance. The Soviet threat might have justified this expense, but today as US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, the Raptor is a “niche silver-bullet solution” against a threat that is nowhere in sight.

Even as Gates spoke, a new challenger to the Raptor was being born in Russia.

During the closing weeks of 2009, Sukhoi’s T-50 fighter prototype (termed the PAK-FA, an acronym for Perspektivnyi

Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, which translates into English as Prospective Aircraft Complex of Frontline Aviation) has carried out high-speed taxi trials in Siberia, the final preparation for its first-ever flight, which is evidently imminent. The PAK-FA programme aims to produce the first Gen5 fighter built outside America.

Sources in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in New Delhi say that India is very close to signing a detailed agreement with Russia to jointly develop the PAK-FA, which India terms as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). For years

Moscow and New Delhi have haggled over the FGFA’s configuration, capabilities and development workshare. Now, apparently, the two sides are close to an agreement.

The contract will be signed between Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which owns a controlling interest in Sukhoi. They will commit to jointly developing and building 250 fighters for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and an equal number for Russia. The door will remain open for additional orders from either partner

15

country, as well as for export, which will be contingent on both sides agreeing.

Equal Stakes HAL and UAC will set up a joint venture company, similar to the Brahmos JV, in which both sides will own equal stakes.

Much of the development work will continue to take place in the aviation R&D establishments of both partner countries. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which oversees the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, will not be concerned with the FGFA. Instead, the ADA will focus on

Sukhoi-T50-edited 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:31 PM Page 3

JANUARY 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT Russia wants a single-seat fighter; the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI, insists upon a twin-seat fighter with one pilot flying and the other handling the sensors, networks and weaponry.

Now, India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.

”

indigenously developing a Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA).

India and Russia will pick up equal shares of the tab while co-developing the FGFA. The cost is expected to be around US $8-$10 billion (Rs 37,000-Rs 45,000 crore).

Once developed, say IAF and MoD sources, the cost of manufacturing each FGFA will be approximately US $100 million (Rs 400Rs 500 crore); that is under one-third the price of the F-22 Raptor.

Sukhoi’s current prototype is tailored to Russian Air Force requirements. But the IAF has different specifications and the JV will cater to both air forces, producing two different, but closely related aircraft. For example, Russia wants a single-seat fighter; the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI, insists upon a twin-seat fighter with one pilot flying and the other handling the sensors, networks and weaponry. Now, India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.

Russia, in turn, will consider buying more twin-seat aircraft to use as trainers.

Enthusiasm is growing on the Indian side, especially amongst planners in the IAF and in HAL. Late last year, a Defence Ministry delegation to Komsomolsk-onAmur Aircraft Production Organisation (KnAAPO), Sukhoi’s flagship aircraft facility in Siberia, was shown the PAK-FA prototype, on which Russia claims to have worked for almost five years: that first viewing, carefully choreographed by Sukhoi, deeply impressed the Indians. The new fighter, standing dramatically alone

DSI

SKETCHES OF PAK-FA

on the tarmac, simultaneously (Above) The exist. Sukhoi, he confided to waggling all its control surfaces current prototype the IAF officer, had completed appeared to be waving a welcome of PAK-FA is the design of a Gen5 fighter, to the visiting Indians. as advanced as the F-22 tailored to the An official from India’s MoD, Russian Air Force Raptor. Sukhoi would go who was a part of that delegation, requirements ahead with developing the recounts: “It is an amazing looking new fighter if India partnered aircraft. It has a Radar Cross Section (RCS) Russia, sharing the costs of developing the of just 0.5 square metres as compared to the fighter at KnAAPO. Sukhoi-30 MKI’s RCS of about 20 square metres… it is a true stealth aircraft.” (SeeBox). A Different Ball Game Russia’s interest in having India on Getting India to fund Russian weapons board was first conveyed a decade ago, in programmes was Moscow’s mantra for 2000, when Sukhoi’s celebrated chief those difficult times. Through the 1990s— Mikhail Pogosyan invited a visiting Indian when thousands of Russian military design Air Force officer out to dinner in Moscow. bureaus were folding up for want of funds Boris Yeltsin’s disastrous presidency had and a bankrupt Moscow was forced to just ended, and Russia’s near-bankruptcy cancel 1,149 ongoing R&D projects—India’s was reflected in the run-down condition of defence purchases had kept Russia’s the famous restaurant where they dined. defence industry alive. New Delhi had The IAF officer recounts that Pogosyan was bankrolled, in turn, the development of the in his element, a string of jokes translated Sukhoi-30 fighter, the Talwar-class stealth by a female interpreter. frigates, the Uran and Klub ship-borne After many toasts Pogosyan turned missiles and the MiG-21 upgrade. serious, switching the conversation to a But co-developing a Fifth Generation secret project that, officially, did not even Fighter is a different ball game, financially

16

and technologically and at that time, India’s Tejas LCA programme was still to gain momentum. Low on confidence, capability and cash, India’s MoD was not then ready to sign up with Russia for the Gen5 programme. In the mid-2000, Russia’s new hydrocarbon revenues and Putin’s geopolitical ambitions brought a go-ahead for Sukhoi to develop the PAKFA. A string of lucrative Su-27 and Su-30 sales to China, India and Malaysia also brought Sukhoi cash to pursue development of the PAK-FA. Those jingling cash registers notwithstanding, Moscow knew that going alone in developing a Fifth Generation Fighter would be risky and expensive. A partner like India would allow Russia to spread the development risk and provide a large assured purchase of the final product. The success of the Indo-Russian Brahmos partnership further encouraged both countries to co-develop the FGFA. Today, five years into the FGFA’s development, the final lap is underway to

bring in India. In November 2007, India and Russia signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement on co-developing the fighter, but it has taken two more years to agree upon common specifications, define work shares for development and manufacture and to resolve issues of Intellectual Property Rights.

The Russian Goliath has been unsparing in negotiating with the Indian David. Having designed over a 100 aircraft (including India’s Su-30MKI), built over 10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviation records to its credit, the Sukhoi Corporation, understandably, regards HAL as very much the greenhorn.

But HAL has managed to obtain a 25 percent share of design and development work in the FGFA programme. This will include critical software, including the mission computer (the Su-30MKI mission computer is entirely Indian), navigation systems, most of the cockpit displays, the counter measure dispensing systems and the major design task of modifying Sukhoi’s single-seat prototype into the twin-seat

17

SUPERIOR STEALTH

A

n aircraft is made stealthy by minimising a range of detection signatures, including radar, infrared, visual, accoustic and smoke; reducing Radar Cross Section (RCS) is especially challenging. Categorising the RCS of a Sukhoi-30MKI as 20 square metres implies that the fighter is as visible to enemy radar as a metallic disc with a surface of 20 square metres.The FGFA, far less visible to radar, would have a signature barely 1/40th of that.

fighter that the Indian Air Force demands.

India will also contribute its expertise in aircraft composites, honed while developing the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.

Russia has traditionally built metallic aircraft; just 10 percent of the Su-30MKI fuselage is built from titanium and composites. In contrast, the FGFA’s fuselage will be 25 percent titanium and 20 percent composites. For this, Russia’s expertise in

Sukhoi-T50-edited 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:31 PM Page 3

JANUARY 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT Russia wants a single-seat fighter; the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI, insists upon a twin-seat fighter with one pilot flying and the other handling the sensors, networks and weaponry.

Now, India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.

”

indigenously developing a Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA).

India and Russia will pick up equal shares of the tab while co-developing the FGFA. The cost is expected to be around US $8-$10 billion (Rs 37,000-Rs 45,000 crore).

Once developed, say IAF and MoD sources, the cost of manufacturing each FGFA will be approximately US $100 million (Rs 400Rs 500 crore); that is under one-third the price of the F-22 Raptor.

Sukhoi’s current prototype is tailored to Russian Air Force requirements. But the IAF has different specifications and the JV will cater to both air forces, producing two different, but closely related aircraft. For example, Russia wants a single-seat fighter; the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI, insists upon a twin-seat fighter with one pilot flying and the other handling the sensors, networks and weaponry. Now, India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.

Russia, in turn, will consider buying more twin-seat aircraft to use as trainers.

Enthusiasm is growing on the Indian side, especially amongst planners in the IAF and in HAL. Late last year, a Defence Ministry delegation to Komsomolsk-onAmur Aircraft Production Organisation (KnAAPO), Sukhoi’s flagship aircraft facility in Siberia, was shown the PAK-FA prototype, on which Russia claims to have worked for almost five years: that first viewing, carefully choreographed by Sukhoi, deeply impressed the Indians. The new fighter, standing dramatically alone

DSI

SKETCHES OF PAK-FA

on the tarmac, simultaneously (Above) The exist. Sukhoi, he confided to waggling all its control surfaces current prototype the IAF officer, had completed appeared to be waving a welcome of PAK-FA is the design of a Gen5 fighter, to the visiting Indians. as advanced as the F-22 tailored to the An official from India’s MoD, Russian Air Force Raptor. Sukhoi would go who was a part of that delegation, requirements ahead with developing the recounts: “It is an amazing looking new fighter if India partnered aircraft. It has a Radar Cross Section (RCS) Russia, sharing the costs of developing the of just 0.5 square metres as compared to the fighter at KnAAPO. Sukhoi-30 MKI’s RCS of about 20 square metres… it is a true stealth aircraft.” (SeeBox). A Different Ball Game Russia’s interest in having India on Getting India to fund Russian weapons board was first conveyed a decade ago, in programmes was Moscow’s mantra for 2000, when Sukhoi’s celebrated chief those difficult times. Through the 1990s— Mikhail Pogosyan invited a visiting Indian when thousands of Russian military design Air Force officer out to dinner in Moscow. bureaus were folding up for want of funds Boris Yeltsin’s disastrous presidency had and a bankrupt Moscow was forced to just ended, and Russia’s near-bankruptcy cancel 1,149 ongoing R&D projects—India’s was reflected in the run-down condition of defence purchases had kept Russia’s the famous restaurant where they dined. defence industry alive. New Delhi had The IAF officer recounts that Pogosyan was bankrolled, in turn, the development of the in his element, a string of jokes translated Sukhoi-30 fighter, the Talwar-class stealth by a female interpreter. frigates, the Uran and Klub ship-borne After many toasts Pogosyan turned missiles and the MiG-21 upgrade. serious, switching the conversation to a But co-developing a Fifth Generation secret project that, officially, did not even Fighter is a different ball game, financially

16

and technologically and at that time, India’s Tejas LCA programme was still to gain momentum. Low on confidence, capability and cash, India’s MoD was not then ready to sign up with Russia for the Gen5 programme. In the mid-2000, Russia’s new hydrocarbon revenues and Putin’s geopolitical ambitions brought a go-ahead for Sukhoi to develop the PAKFA. A string of lucrative Su-27 and Su-30 sales to China, India and Malaysia also brought Sukhoi cash to pursue development of the PAK-FA. Those jingling cash registers notwithstanding, Moscow knew that going alone in developing a Fifth Generation Fighter would be risky and expensive. A partner like India would allow Russia to spread the development risk and provide a large assured purchase of the final product. The success of the Indo-Russian Brahmos partnership further encouraged both countries to co-develop the FGFA. Today, five years into the FGFA’s development, the final lap is underway to

bring in India. In November 2007, India and Russia signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement on co-developing the fighter, but it has taken two more years to agree upon common specifications, define work shares for development and manufacture and to resolve issues of Intellectual Property Rights.

The Russian Goliath has been unsparing in negotiating with the Indian David. Having designed over a 100 aircraft (including India’s Su-30MKI), built over 10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviation records to its credit, the Sukhoi Corporation, understandably, regards HAL as very much the greenhorn.

But HAL has managed to obtain a 25 percent share of design and development work in the FGFA programme. This will include critical software, including the mission computer (the Su-30MKI mission computer is entirely Indian), navigation systems, most of the cockpit displays, the counter measure dispensing systems and the major design task of modifying Sukhoi’s single-seat prototype into the twin-seat

17

SUPERIOR STEALTH

A

n aircraft is made stealthy by minimising a range of detection signatures, including radar, infrared, visual, accoustic and smoke; reducing Radar Cross Section (RCS) is especially challenging. Categorising the RCS of a Sukhoi-30MKI as 20 square metres implies that the fighter is as visible to enemy radar as a metallic disc with a surface of 20 square metres.The FGFA, far less visible to radar, would have a signature barely 1/40th of that.

fighter that the Indian Air Force demands.

India will also contribute its expertise in aircraft composites, honed while developing the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.

Russia has traditionally built metallic aircraft; just 10 percent of the Su-30MKI fuselage is built from titanium and composites. In contrast, the FGFA’s fuselage will be 25 percent titanium and 20 percent composites. For this, Russia’s expertise in

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT

DSI

The Russian Goliath has been unsparing in negotiating with the Indian David. Having designed over a 100 aircraft (including India’s Su-30MKI), built over 10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviation records to its credit, the Sukhoi Corporation understandably regards HAL as very much the greenhorn.

”

titanium structures will be complemented

by India’s experience in composites.

AFP

Emerging Military Aeronautical Power

18

Even with just a 25 percent share of design, South Block policymakers consider the FGFA project an important step towards India’s emergence as a military aeronautical power. Developing 25 percent of this fighter is far better than just transferring technology to build it in India, as we did with the Su-30MKI,” points out a senior MoD official.

The HAL-UAC partnership, when functional, will mark a significant shift in the aeronautical relationship between India and Russia. For decades during the Soviet era, HAL was very much the kid brother to Moscow’s big brother. Even while developing experience in manufacturing high-quality aviation products, HAL continued for decades to play a technologically subordinate role, assembling and building fighters that Russia had designed. Now, forced to accept HAL as a design partner, the Russians have made it clear that they expect quality and Sukhoi will not let its aviation reputation be tarnished.

In June 2008, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, then Russia’s Ambassador to India and an expert on Russia’s defence industry, made it

clear that equity in work shares was secondary to ensuring a successful product.

Trubnikov gave an insight into Russian thinking when he said, “The (FGFA) brand is Indian-Russian… whether the aircraft is 30 percent Indian or 70 percent Indian. It is a joint product and we together are responsible for it. No one will say that Russians are excellent because their part of the aircraft is excellent. If the product is excellent, then our partnership in creating this product is excellent, independent of the percentage of our cooperation in terms of money value or technical characteristics. We should be equally demanding of each other… This is not just a show of our political friendship.”

Highlighting Russia’s scepticism about HAL’s credentials for designing a Gen5 fighter, Trubnikov pointed out, “I know perfectly well the Russian ability. But I don’t know what contribution the Indian side might make. So one must ask the question to the Indian designers, to HAL… what is their claim for building a fighter of the Fifth Generation type, either avionics or engine?

What might be India’s contribution? To be absolutely frank, I don’t know.”

On Russia’s contribution, though, there is no doubt in India. Ashok Baweja, who headed HAL until April 2009, frankly admitted: “India can only (develop a FGFA)

Pallam Raju, admits that the by partnering with Russia. They (Above) Minister of delay has been damaging. Raju have so much experience. It’s State for Defence points out that: “The longer not just the design… you must Pallam Raju. (Left) India waits to join the project; also have materials like merging Former Russian steel, titanium, composite alloys Ambassador to India the lesser will be our and the industrial base to Vyacheslav Trubnikov contribution. But we are not sitting idle. Through the MoD’s convert these into high-tech components like gyros, sensors and optics.” existing programmes (such as the Tejas India’s work share is also reduced by its LCA), we are building up our capabilities.”

The FGFA, says a senior MoD official, is late arrival in the FGFA development project. Russia’s UAC argues that Sukhoi unlikely to enter service with the IAF for at has already finished much of the work, with least another decade. In his estimation, “It 5,000 Sukhoi engineers having already will take another four to five years to worked for five years on the FGFA design. develop many of the FGFA’s systems. Then Such claims are hard to verify, but it is the aircraft will undergo at least 2,000 hours known that Sukhoi Design Bureau has of certification flying and, possibly, some about 8,000 engineers, distributed between reconfiguration.” Even by this optimistic estimation, the first single-seat FGFAs will many different programmes. start being produced around 2017. And India’s twin-seat fighter will take at least Not Sitting Idle Indian officials believe, though, that the another two years.

But whenever it is inducted into service, project is still at an early stage. Baweja in early 2009 assessed: “The FGFA’s first flight the FGFA is likely to be a clear notch above is just the beginning of the programme. My the aircraft that India is currently evaluating understanding is that the Russians are for its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft going ahead (with the test) to validate the purchase. Even the most advanced of FGFA’s “proof of concept” (conceptual these—the Dassault Rafale, the Gripen NG design). Whatever composite materials they and the Eurofighter—are Generation 4.5 have now, they’ll use. But, because the fighters. The FGFA and the MCA, composites will change, the FGFA will keep whenever the ADA produces that aircraft, are planned as the IAF’s backbone into the evolving for a fairly long time.”

India’s Minister of State for Defence, second half of this century.

19

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT

DSI

The Russian Goliath has been unsparing in negotiating with the Indian David. Having designed over a 100 aircraft (including India’s Su-30MKI), built over 10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviation records to its credit, the Sukhoi Corporation understandably regards HAL as very much the greenhorn.

”

titanium structures will be complemented

by India’s experience in composites.

AFP

Emerging Military Aeronautical Power

18

Even with just a 25 percent share of design, South Block policymakers consider the FGFA project an important step towards India’s emergence as a military aeronautical power. Developing 25 percent of this fighter is far better than just transferring technology to build it in India, as we did with the Su-30MKI,” points out a senior MoD official.

The HAL-UAC partnership, when functional, will mark a significant shift in the aeronautical relationship between India and Russia. For decades during the Soviet era, HAL was very much the kid brother to Moscow’s big brother. Even while developing experience in manufacturing high-quality aviation products, HAL continued for decades to play a technologically subordinate role, assembling and building fighters that Russia had designed. Now, forced to accept HAL as a design partner, the Russians have made it clear that they expect quality and Sukhoi will not let its aviation reputation be tarnished.

In June 2008, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, then Russia’s Ambassador to India and an expert on Russia’s defence industry, made it

clear that equity in work shares was secondary to ensuring a successful product.

Trubnikov gave an insight into Russian thinking when he said, “The (FGFA) brand is Indian-Russian… whether the aircraft is 30 percent Indian or 70 percent Indian. It is a joint product and we together are responsible for it. No one will say that Russians are excellent because their part of the aircraft is excellent. If the product is excellent, then our partnership in creating this product is excellent, independent of the percentage of our cooperation in terms of money value or technical characteristics. We should be equally demanding of each other… This is not just a show of our political friendship.”

Highlighting Russia’s scepticism about HAL’s credentials for designing a Gen5 fighter, Trubnikov pointed out, “I know perfectly well the Russian ability. But I don’t know what contribution the Indian side might make. So one must ask the question to the Indian designers, to HAL… what is their claim for building a fighter of the Fifth Generation type, either avionics or engine?

What might be India’s contribution? To be absolutely frank, I don’t know.”

On Russia’s contribution, though, there is no doubt in India. Ashok Baweja, who headed HAL until April 2009, frankly admitted: “India can only (develop a FGFA)

Pallam Raju, admits that the by partnering with Russia. They (Above) Minister of delay has been damaging. Raju have so much experience. It’s State for Defence points out that: “The longer not just the design… you must Pallam Raju. (Left) India waits to join the project; also have materials like merging Former Russian steel, titanium, composite alloys Ambassador to India the lesser will be our and the industrial base to Vyacheslav Trubnikov contribution. But we are not sitting idle. Through the MoD’s convert these into high-tech components like gyros, sensors and optics.” existing programmes (such as the Tejas India’s work share is also reduced by its LCA), we are building up our capabilities.”

The FGFA, says a senior MoD official, is late arrival in the FGFA development project. Russia’s UAC argues that Sukhoi unlikely to enter service with the IAF for at has already finished much of the work, with least another decade. In his estimation, “It 5,000 Sukhoi engineers having already will take another four to five years to worked for five years on the FGFA design. develop many of the FGFA’s systems. Then Such claims are hard to verify, but it is the aircraft will undergo at least 2,000 hours known that Sukhoi Design Bureau has of certification flying and, possibly, some about 8,000 engineers, distributed between reconfiguration.” Even by this optimistic estimation, the first single-seat FGFAs will many different programmes. start being produced around 2017. And India’s twin-seat fighter will take at least Not Sitting Idle Indian officials believe, though, that the another two years.

But whenever it is inducted into service, project is still at an early stage. Baweja in early 2009 assessed: “The FGFA’s first flight the FGFA is likely to be a clear notch above is just the beginning of the programme. My the aircraft that India is currently evaluating understanding is that the Russians are for its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft going ahead (with the test) to validate the purchase. Even the most advanced of FGFA’s “proof of concept” (conceptual these—the Dassault Rafale, the Gripen NG design). Whatever composite materials they and the Eurofighter—are Generation 4.5 have now, they’ll use. But, because the fighters. The FGFA and the MCA, composites will change, the FGFA will keep whenever the ADA produces that aircraft, are planned as the IAF’s backbone into the evolving for a fairly long time.”

India’s Minister of State for Defence, second half of this century.

19

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Indian and US Army officers shake hands at the start of a Indo-US Joint Exercise named Yudh Abhyas at Babina in Uttar Pradesh in October 2009

SYMBIOTIC

RELATIONSHIPS Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic action

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KEY POINTS n The degree of importance of defence cooperation with another power depends on the security environment and interests of two nations. n In today’s post-Cold War and globalised world, defence and foreign policy cooperation go together. n For India the purchase of 126 combat aircraft either from Russia or the US would indicate a major foreign policy initiative.

AFP

T

20

he foreign policy of any nation spans a range of interactions with other countries in the areas of politics, economics, culture, technology and defence. The degree of importance of defence cooperation with another power will depend on the security environment and security interests of the two interacting nations. To a large extent in respect of leaders of international alliances, such as the US and USSR during the Cold

21

War, it was influenced mostly by Cold War ideological politics though that factor is no longer operative. Since the end of the Cold War, there are other international systemic factors under operation which determine the scope of defence cooperation between nations and its nature. Defence cooperation may be considered as an indicator of the comfort level in the relationship between two nations.

As has it happened between the US and China it is possible for two nations to have one of the largest economic and trade relationships in the world and to have tens of thousands of students of one country studying in the other and yet not to have any meaningful defence cooperation in terms of sale of military hardware. There are exchanges of visits of defence leaderships at the highest level and even each other’s presence at military exercises in the two countries. But the US will not sell to China sophisticated, hightechnology military equipment. That is a truer indication of the systemic unease underlying the relationship between totalitarian China and democratic US than the Chinese being the largest exporter to the US and China holding more than $ 800 billion worth of US treasury bonds.

Similarly, there was a time when the US was supplying food grains on a large scale to support food shortage relief efforts in

Defence Cooperation.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 24/01/10 3:13 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

DEFENCE COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

DSI

Indian and US Army officers shake hands at the start of a Indo-US Joint Exercise named Yudh Abhyas at Babina in Uttar Pradesh in October 2009

SYMBIOTIC

RELATIONSHIPS Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives and diplomatic action

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KEY POINTS n The degree of importance of defence cooperation with another power depends on the security environment and interests of two nations. n In today’s post-Cold War and globalised world, defence and foreign policy cooperation go together. n For India the purchase of 126 combat aircraft either from Russia or the US would indicate a major foreign policy initiative.

AFP

T

20

he foreign policy of any nation spans a range of interactions with other countries in the areas of politics, economics, culture, technology and defence. The degree of importance of defence cooperation with another power will depend on the security environment and security interests of the two interacting nations. To a large extent in respect of leaders of international alliances, such as the US and USSR during the Cold

21

War, it was influenced mostly by Cold War ideological politics though that factor is no longer operative. Since the end of the Cold War, there are other international systemic factors under operation which determine the scope of defence cooperation between nations and its nature. Defence cooperation may be considered as an indicator of the comfort level in the relationship between two nations.

As has it happened between the US and China it is possible for two nations to have one of the largest economic and trade relationships in the world and to have tens of thousands of students of one country studying in the other and yet not to have any meaningful defence cooperation in terms of sale of military hardware. There are exchanges of visits of defence leaderships at the highest level and even each other’s presence at military exercises in the two countries. But the US will not sell to China sophisticated, hightechnology military equipment. That is a truer indication of the systemic unease underlying the relationship between totalitarian China and democratic US than the Chinese being the largest exporter to the US and China holding more than $ 800 billion worth of US treasury bonds.

Similarly, there was a time when the US was supplying food grains on a large scale to support food shortage relief efforts in

Defence Cooperation.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 24/01/10 3:13 PM Page 3

JANUARY 2010

DEFENCE COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

DSI

AFP

”

22

India and provided large economic aid.

But because of their military alliance relationship with Pakistan they would not supply India basic combat equipment.

That again was a clear indication of the quality of relationship between India and US till President Clinton’s visit to India in the year 2000.

India was able to rely on the Soviet Union for most of its defence equipment requirements during the Cold War period.

That relationship continues even after the end of the Cold War. India is able to get Russian help for building its nuclear submarine, lease out Russian nuclear submarines, obtain frontline Russian combat aircraft and has a joint R&D programme to develop the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft and the Brahmos missile.

This speaks volumes about the intimacy and quality of the relationship between the two countries. Russia does not help China in building nuclear vessels or collaborate in joint R&D programmes in aircraft or missile development though it is the primary supplier of defence equipment to China. That again indicates the quality of

AFP

In the light of such perceptions, US policy towards India underwent a major change from the beginning of the second term of President George W. Bush.The US signaled to India that it was dehyphenating India and Pakistan in its policies and was prepared to sell high technology equipment to India.

Even earlier in 2002 US had sold ANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radar till then denied to India.

US President Barack Obama shakes hands with Chinese President Hu Jintao after a joint press conference in Beijing in November 2009

their relationship. Yet Russia holds joint military exercises with China.

While no doubt defence cooperation is a salient component of a country’s foreign policy it is necessary to analyse the constituent aspects of defence cooperation to understand the nature and quality of the relationship between any two countries.

The US has been having and continues to have very close defence cooperation relationship with Pakistan going back to the mid-50s, with two breaks, one in the ’70s, following the Bangladesh war, and the second in the ’90s, following the invocation of the Pressler Amendment.

Today, the US is providing billions of dollars of military aid to Pakistan. The relationship between the countries is however, far from cordial.

The US drone aircraft are attacking targets in Pakistan with missiles and the US is pressing an unwilling Pakistan to take military action against various terrorist groups, some of which the Pakistani Army considers as its strategic assets. Therefore, it is difficult to have a straight correlation between defence cooperation and foreign policy relationship.

and Pakistan in its policies and Yet in today’s post-Cold War, Pakistani tribesmen was prepared to sell high and increasingly globalising offer funeral prayers technology equipment to India. world, by and large, defence for the victims of a Even earlier in 2002 US had sold and foreign policy cooperation US missile strike ANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radar go together. The former US attack in the main Secretary of State, Condeleezza town of Miranshah on till then denied to India. This itself followed the Indian-US Rice described the present day February 15, 2009 Defence Cooperation during the world and the security threats faced by the international community in the US operation, Enduring Freedom, launched following words. She wrote: “For the first against the Taliban in Afghanistan in time since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 October 2001. The Indian Navy escorted the the prospect of violent conflict between US supply vessels through the Malacca great powers is becoming ever more Straits against the active threat of Al Qaeda’s unthinkable. Major States are increasingly terrorism in Southeast Asia. competing in peace, not preparing for war. To On June 28, 2005 the Defence Minister advance this remarkable trend, the United of India and US Defence Secretary signed States is transforming our partnerships with the Defence Framework Agreement three nations, such as Japan and Russia, with the weeks in advance of the Indian Prime European Union and especially with China Minister’s State visit to Washington. and India.” She further defined weak and Though it was not a case of direct defence failing States, terrorism, pandemics, cooperation, the US commitment to work organised crime and weapons of mass to get the international nuclear nondestruction as the new threats to nations. proliferation regime to be modified to In the light of such perceptions, US policy enable India to get the waiver from the towards India underwent a major change Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines. from the beginning of the second term of Thus India became eligible for President George W. Bush. The US signaled international civil nuclear energy to India that it was dehyphenating India cooperation while retaining its nuclear

23

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DEFENCE COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

DSI

AFP

”

22

India and provided large economic aid.

But because of their military alliance relationship with Pakistan they would not supply India basic combat equipment.

That again was a clear indication of the quality of relationship between India and US till President Clinton’s visit to India in the year 2000.

India was able to rely on the Soviet Union for most of its defence equipment requirements during the Cold War period.

That relationship continues even after the end of the Cold War. India is able to get Russian help for building its nuclear submarine, lease out Russian nuclear submarines, obtain frontline Russian combat aircraft and has a joint R&D programme to develop the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft and the Brahmos missile.

This speaks volumes about the intimacy and quality of the relationship between the two countries. Russia does not help China in building nuclear vessels or collaborate in joint R&D programmes in aircraft or missile development though it is the primary supplier of defence equipment to China. That again indicates the quality of

AFP

In the light of such perceptions, US policy towards India underwent a major change from the beginning of the second term of President George W. Bush.The US signaled to India that it was dehyphenating India and Pakistan in its policies and was prepared to sell high technology equipment to India.

Even earlier in 2002 US had sold ANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radar till then denied to India.

US President Barack Obama shakes hands with Chinese President Hu Jintao after a joint press conference in Beijing in November 2009

their relationship. Yet Russia holds joint military exercises with China.

While no doubt defence cooperation is a salient component of a country’s foreign policy it is necessary to analyse the constituent aspects of defence cooperation to understand the nature and quality of the relationship between any two countries.

The US has been having and continues to have very close defence cooperation relationship with Pakistan going back to the mid-50s, with two breaks, one in the ’70s, following the Bangladesh war, and the second in the ’90s, following the invocation of the Pressler Amendment.

Today, the US is providing billions of dollars of military aid to Pakistan. The relationship between the countries is however, far from cordial.

The US drone aircraft are attacking targets in Pakistan with missiles and the US is pressing an unwilling Pakistan to take military action against various terrorist groups, some of which the Pakistani Army considers as its strategic assets. Therefore, it is difficult to have a straight correlation between defence cooperation and foreign policy relationship.

and Pakistan in its policies and Yet in today’s post-Cold War, Pakistani tribesmen was prepared to sell high and increasingly globalising offer funeral prayers technology equipment to India. world, by and large, defence for the victims of a Even earlier in 2002 US had sold and foreign policy cooperation US missile strike ANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radar go together. The former US attack in the main Secretary of State, Condeleezza town of Miranshah on till then denied to India. This itself followed the Indian-US Rice described the present day February 15, 2009 Defence Cooperation during the world and the security threats faced by the international community in the US operation, Enduring Freedom, launched following words. She wrote: “For the first against the Taliban in Afghanistan in time since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 October 2001. The Indian Navy escorted the the prospect of violent conflict between US supply vessels through the Malacca great powers is becoming ever more Straits against the active threat of Al Qaeda’s unthinkable. Major States are increasingly terrorism in Southeast Asia. competing in peace, not preparing for war. To On June 28, 2005 the Defence Minister advance this remarkable trend, the United of India and US Defence Secretary signed States is transforming our partnerships with the Defence Framework Agreement three nations, such as Japan and Russia, with the weeks in advance of the Indian Prime European Union and especially with China Minister’s State visit to Washington. and India.” She further defined weak and Though it was not a case of direct defence failing States, terrorism, pandemics, cooperation, the US commitment to work organised crime and weapons of mass to get the international nuclear nondestruction as the new threats to nations. proliferation regime to be modified to In the light of such perceptions, US policy enable India to get the waiver from the towards India underwent a major change Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines. from the beginning of the second term of Thus India became eligible for President George W. Bush. The US signaled international civil nuclear energy to India that it was dehyphenating India cooperation while retaining its nuclear

23

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JANUARY 2010

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DSI

India was able to rely on the Soviet Union for most of its defence equipment requirements during the Cold War period. That relationship continues even after the end of the Cold War. This speaks volumes about the intimacy and quality of the relationship between the two countries.

AFP

”

weapons outside the framework of the NonProliferation Treaty. It is perhaps the strongest US signal on defence cooperation with India heralding a radical change in the US foreign policy and the emergence of an Indo-US strategic partnership.

This transformation was accompanied by the Indo-US air, sea and land joint exercises programmed on a regular periodic basis and the major purchases of defence equipment such as an amphibious landing ship, transport aircraft for special forces and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Recent reports also suggest that the likely acquisition of Light Weight 155 mm US Howitzers by India.

The recent State visit of Manmohan Singh to Washington and the conclusion of the ‘End Use Monitoring Agreement’ accommodating the Indian demands have further strengthened Indo-US defence ties.

The deal which the entire world is watching, one of the largest purchases in the history of the arms sales, is that of 126 Combat Aircraft. Two US companies, Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, have fielded their aircraft along with the French, the Swedish and Russian ones and the Euro fighters for competitive selection. Such a large aircraft purchase cannot be decided merely on the basis of a lowest-unit cost system. While the purchase of aircraft either from Sweden or the French or the European consortium could be considered

a commercial purchase, for India the purchase of aircraft either from Russia or US would mean a major foreign policy initiative. India certainly intends to make this purchase the foundation of the future aircraft development and production in the country.

For India, the potential security challenger is China. This aircraft purchase will create a strong defence partnership with the country of choice. If the Russian aircraft is chosen it will further cement the existing strategic partnership between India and Russia, the two Asian countries which have a mutuality of potential security challenge from a fast rising and an

24

increasingly assertive China.

If on the other hand the US aircraft were to be chosen it will reinforce the growing Indo-US strategic partnership.

China has emerged as the challenger of the US in its role as the preeminent power shaping the political, economic and cultural values of the international system.

While China is not democratic, the US and India are and they share an interest in ensuring that the 21st century world is shaped by democratic values. A large number of US firms, including defence firms, are already setting up R&D centres in India. While the Chinese are seen as aiming to exclude US from Asia and

Today, US, Russia and to emerge as an Asian (Above) Brahmos Missile a much lesser extent France hegemon, India has a stake was a result of a joint R&D are three centres of defence in keeping US engaged in programme between India technology generation Asia to countervail China. and Russia. (Left) Russian Therefore, the pattern of President Dmitry Medvedev while India and China are the two largest markets for defence cooperation that is and Indian Prime Minister defence equipment. India is likely to develop as a result Manmohan Singh at the in a position to develop joint of this aircraft deal is going Kremlin in Moscow on ventures with the defence to influence and shape the December 7, 2009 industries of any of the strategic relationships and foreign policies of India and other major three and contribute to R&D and cost powers. It will also mean very intensive reductions in the production of interaction between the emerging private subsystems. Except in the US, China, sector Indian defence industries and those Russia and India, the trend is towards of the US or Russia and development reduction of defence expenditures. India’s defence modernisation programme will be of joint ventures.

25

a sizeable one and an India growing at 9-10 percent, as is widely forecast, will be able to afford it unlike in the 20th century.

This modernisation can be done through strategic partnerships with one or two major powers or scattered over a number of countries as part of a lowest-bid purchase exercise on the basis of individual system decisions or an ad hoc basis. But that will not yield foreign policy dividends.

These are not to be considered as routine procurement decisions of the Ministry of Defence alone. These are national decisions to be taken on the basis of considerations of long-term national security and national interests.

Defence Cooperation 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:34 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

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DSI

India was able to rely on the Soviet Union for most of its defence equipment requirements during the Cold War period. That relationship continues even after the end of the Cold War. This speaks volumes about the intimacy and quality of the relationship between the two countries.

AFP

”

weapons outside the framework of the NonProliferation Treaty. It is perhaps the strongest US signal on defence cooperation with India heralding a radical change in the US foreign policy and the emergence of an Indo-US strategic partnership.

This transformation was accompanied by the Indo-US air, sea and land joint exercises programmed on a regular periodic basis and the major purchases of defence equipment such as an amphibious landing ship, transport aircraft for special forces and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Recent reports also suggest that the likely acquisition of Light Weight 155 mm US Howitzers by India.

The recent State visit of Manmohan Singh to Washington and the conclusion of the ‘End Use Monitoring Agreement’ accommodating the Indian demands have further strengthened Indo-US defence ties.

The deal which the entire world is watching, one of the largest purchases in the history of the arms sales, is that of 126 Combat Aircraft. Two US companies, Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, have fielded their aircraft along with the French, the Swedish and Russian ones and the Euro fighters for competitive selection. Such a large aircraft purchase cannot be decided merely on the basis of a lowest-unit cost system. While the purchase of aircraft either from Sweden or the French or the European consortium could be considered

a commercial purchase, for India the purchase of aircraft either from Russia or US would mean a major foreign policy initiative. India certainly intends to make this purchase the foundation of the future aircraft development and production in the country.

For India, the potential security challenger is China. This aircraft purchase will create a strong defence partnership with the country of choice. If the Russian aircraft is chosen it will further cement the existing strategic partnership between India and Russia, the two Asian countries which have a mutuality of potential security challenge from a fast rising and an

24

increasingly assertive China.

If on the other hand the US aircraft were to be chosen it will reinforce the growing Indo-US strategic partnership.

China has emerged as the challenger of the US in its role as the preeminent power shaping the political, economic and cultural values of the international system.

While China is not democratic, the US and India are and they share an interest in ensuring that the 21st century world is shaped by democratic values. A large number of US firms, including defence firms, are already setting up R&D centres in India. While the Chinese are seen as aiming to exclude US from Asia and

Today, US, Russia and to emerge as an Asian (Above) Brahmos Missile a much lesser extent France hegemon, India has a stake was a result of a joint R&D are three centres of defence in keeping US engaged in programme between India technology generation Asia to countervail China. and Russia. (Left) Russian Therefore, the pattern of President Dmitry Medvedev while India and China are the two largest markets for defence cooperation that is and Indian Prime Minister defence equipment. India is likely to develop as a result Manmohan Singh at the in a position to develop joint of this aircraft deal is going Kremlin in Moscow on ventures with the defence to influence and shape the December 7, 2009 industries of any of the strategic relationships and foreign policies of India and other major three and contribute to R&D and cost powers. It will also mean very intensive reductions in the production of interaction between the emerging private subsystems. Except in the US, China, sector Indian defence industries and those Russia and India, the trend is towards of the US or Russia and development reduction of defence expenditures. India’s defence modernisation programme will be of joint ventures.

25

a sizeable one and an India growing at 9-10 percent, as is widely forecast, will be able to afford it unlike in the 20th century.

This modernisation can be done through strategic partnerships with one or two major powers or scattered over a number of countries as part of a lowest-bid purchase exercise on the basis of individual system decisions or an ad hoc basis. But that will not yield foreign policy dividends.

These are not to be considered as routine procurement decisions of the Ministry of Defence alone. These are national decisions to be taken on the basis of considerations of long-term national security and national interests.

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:38 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

EXPANDING

HORIZONS Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India is an occasion to initiate a new thrust in India-Bangladesh relations

KEY POINTS

India has so far failed to find a policy mix to induce greater Bangladesh cooperation on national security issues. n It is important for both Bangladesh and India that the visit of Sheikh Hasina be seen as being successful. n Sheikh Hasina is friendly towards India, an asset especially now that she is politically more powerful than she was when she was last Prime Minister. n

T

he quality of our relations with Bangladesh has not matched the intrinsic importance of that country to us. It is geo-political, to begin with.

Bangladesh cuts us off from the northeastern part of our country. This is a region disturbed by insurgencies; its integration with the rest of India is weak; it has lagged behind in development. The difficulties we face there could have been considerably lessened with easier access to it through Bangladesh.

26

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina inspects an Indian Guard of Honour at the ceremonial reception during her three-day visit to New Delhi in January 2010 AFP

KANWAL SIBAL

Beyond that, promoting the economic linkages of this Indian region to Bangladesh and Myanmar could have benefitted all three countries. Gas from Myanmar could have been imported to India through a pipeline across Bangladesh territory, with earnings from transit fees for Bangladesh and establishment of firmer economic links of Myanmar with India.

The last has importance in terms of balancing in some measure China’s increasing penetration of Myanmar.

An open Bangladeshi approach to transit issues would have also fitted well into the concept of regional integration within the framework of BIMSTEC, that is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, not to mention Myanmar’s eventual membership of SAARC. But Bangladesh, aware of our vulnerabilities and wanting to retain a major leverage against us in bilateral relations, has spurned, until now, our requests for transit rights or has balked at projects that could promote more integration of the larger region under India’s lead. To what extent anti-India forces in Bangladesh have aligned their thinking with Chinese interests in this region needs closer examination.

Bangladesh has allowed its territory to be used as a safe haven for anti-Indian insurgent groups like the United Front Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). India has so far failed to find a policy mix to induce

27

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:38 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

EXPANDING

HORIZONS Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India is an occasion to initiate a new thrust in India-Bangladesh relations

KEY POINTS

India has so far failed to find a policy mix to induce greater Bangladesh cooperation on national security issues. n It is important for both Bangladesh and India that the visit of Sheikh Hasina be seen as being successful. n Sheikh Hasina is friendly towards India, an asset especially now that she is politically more powerful than she was when she was last Prime Minister. n

T

he quality of our relations with Bangladesh has not matched the intrinsic importance of that country to us. It is geo-political, to begin with.

Bangladesh cuts us off from the northeastern part of our country. This is a region disturbed by insurgencies; its integration with the rest of India is weak; it has lagged behind in development. The difficulties we face there could have been considerably lessened with easier access to it through Bangladesh.

26

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina inspects an Indian Guard of Honour at the ceremonial reception during her three-day visit to New Delhi in January 2010 AFP

KANWAL SIBAL

Beyond that, promoting the economic linkages of this Indian region to Bangladesh and Myanmar could have benefitted all three countries. Gas from Myanmar could have been imported to India through a pipeline across Bangladesh territory, with earnings from transit fees for Bangladesh and establishment of firmer economic links of Myanmar with India.

The last has importance in terms of balancing in some measure China’s increasing penetration of Myanmar.

An open Bangladeshi approach to transit issues would have also fitted well into the concept of regional integration within the framework of BIMSTEC, that is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, not to mention Myanmar’s eventual membership of SAARC. But Bangladesh, aware of our vulnerabilities and wanting to retain a major leverage against us in bilateral relations, has spurned, until now, our requests for transit rights or has balked at projects that could promote more integration of the larger region under India’s lead. To what extent anti-India forces in Bangladesh have aligned their thinking with Chinese interests in this region needs closer examination.

Bangladesh has allowed its territory to be used as a safe haven for anti-Indian insurgent groups like the United Front Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). India has so far failed to find a policy mix to induce

27

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:42 PM Page 3

Indian Border Security Forces and Bangladeshi Rifles conduct a joint foot patrol on the India-Bangladesh border at Narshing Garh, near Agartala in July 2009

greater Bangladesh cooperation on this issue of national security. Repeated attempts in the past to persuade the Bangladesh Government to flush out these insurgents has elicited obfuscatory responses. Such safe havens in foreign territories for insurgencies makes it exceedingly difficult to stamp them out, as the world has learnt in the case of safe havens in Pakistan for the Afghan Taliban that are now wreaking havoc in Afghanistan.

Erosion of Secularism Elements in Bangladesh are also responsible for exposing us to terrorist threat from its soil. To extend the terrorist threat to us geographically and open new infiltration routes, Pakistan has successfully linked up with Islamist forces in Bangladesh, traditionally hostile to India. These forces, represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami, have risen alarmingly in Bangladesh in the wake of its turbulent politics. The steady erosion

It was important for Sheikh Hasina’s political position in Bangladesh, and the growth of our ties, that her visit to be seen as successful both in Bangladesh and in India.

The most problematic bilateral issues have been those of connectivity, security, balance of trade and water resources.

”

28

of secularism in Bangladesh, unmindful of its Hindu minority, has been a frontal challenge to India’s regional weight. From our point of view, the consolidation of secular forces in Bangladesh represents an extension of our political philosophy in the region’s multi-religious context and a strong rebuff to the expanding extremist ideologies promoted by Pakistan and conservative Arab influence. A secular wedge between the two large Muslim countries of South Asia is politically important as, in our longer term interest, forces of moderation must be seen to be resisting radical Islam.

Beyond all this, Bangladesh is important keeping external factors like China in mind. Most of our neighbours, threatened by India’s overwhelming size and power, have sought to build countervailing ties with China. Political support against Indian hegemony, economic and military assistance, are

AFP

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216X276.indd 1

12/2/09 1:39:38 PM

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:44 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

DSI

PHOTOS: AFP

NEIGHBOURS

critical of our failure to amongst the tools China has Bangladesh Chief Adviser integrate the smaller used to undermine our Fakhruddin Ahmed (third economies of the region leadership role in South from left) and Prime into the much larger India Asia. China’s naval designs Minister Manmohan Singh, economy through a policy in the Indian Ocean include along with head of other of targetted concessions. a foothold on Bangladesh’s member countries, at the coast. Improved India- second BIMSTEC Summit in Such a strategy would have Bangladesh relations are New Delhi. (Right) Members yielded tangible rewards by improving political important for containing of the ULFA, Sashadhar relationships that, in turn, the space for China, backed Choudhury and Chitraban Hazarika, at the Guwahati would have limited the by its rapidly growing court in November 2009 scope for adversarial economic and military muscle, to spread its influence in our interests to fish in South Asia’s troubled waters. Bangladesh has constantly neighbourhood at our strategic expense.

India’s profile as a world economic complained about its trade imbalance with power is rising with its high growth rates, India, persistently demanding unilateral its entrepreneurial dynamism, human tariff concessions on items considered resource potential and scientific and sensitive by India. technological strength. Yet this global acknowledgement of India’s economic Regional Test Case stature, reflected in its G-20 membership, India’s relations with its neighbours have has not got translated into dividends been marred by territorial disputes, border locally in South Asia. Many in India are problems, illegal movement of people,

30

religious and ethnic factors, complaints about India’s selfishness, insensitivity and interference. All these elements have blighted our ties with Bangladesh although India brought the country into political existence and the two share exceptional cultural and linguistic bonds.

In many ways Bangladesh has been a test case of our ability to manage the challenges we face in our neighbourhood, but success has eluded us.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India from January 10 to13 was an occasion to “launch a new phase” in IndiaBangladesh relations as the joint communiqué on the visit affirms. Her decisive victory in the December 2008 elections (230 out of 300 seats on her own and 262 with allies) that saw the decimation of Begum Zia’s Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) does make her a much more credible partner than before in re-shaping our bilateral ties.

The revival of secular forces in Bangladesh, spurred by Sheikh Hasina’s own convictions, is welcome. Ground evidence of this is the revival of the prosecution of the killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman; the resumption of the trial of the 1971 war criminals; the decision to enact the Vested Property Return (amendment) Act 2009 that will enable the return of Hindu properties confiscated during the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict and efforts to ban religion based parties.

Sheikh Hasina has friendly sentiments for India—an asset in a situation in which she is politically more powerful than she was when she was last Prime Minister. This time, acting on her campaign promise that no one will be allowed to “carry out terrorism in India”, she took, prior to her visit to Delhi, the undoubtedly courageous act to hand over to India ULFA leaders, Arabinda Rajkhowa, Raja Baruah, Chitraban

India’s relations with its neighbours have been marred by territorial disputes, border problems, illegal movement of people, religious and ethnic factors, complaints about India’s selfishness, insensitivity and interference. All these elements have blighted our ties with Bangladesh.

31

”

Hazarika and Sasha Choudhury as well as well as two Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives provided sanctuary in Bangladesh.

It was important for Sheikh Hasina’s political position in Bangladesh, and the growth of our ties, for her visit to be seen as successful both in Bangladesh and in India.The most problematic bilateral issues have been those of connectivity, security, balance of trade and water resources. On connectivity, India has been accommodative; on transit to Nepal, though, its request for a railway link to Bhutan remains pending. In return, Bangladesh has agreed to allow the use of Mongla and Chittagong ports for movement of goods to and from India through road and rail. This facility will be extended to Nepal and Bhutan too, with the implication that India will eventually allow movement of goods to these two countries across its territory. These transit arrangements have been wisely put in a larger regional context to reduce

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:44 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

DSI

PHOTOS: AFP

NEIGHBOURS

critical of our failure to amongst the tools China has Bangladesh Chief Adviser integrate the smaller used to undermine our Fakhruddin Ahmed (third economies of the region leadership role in South from left) and Prime into the much larger India Asia. China’s naval designs Minister Manmohan Singh, economy through a policy in the Indian Ocean include along with head of other of targetted concessions. a foothold on Bangladesh’s member countries, at the coast. Improved India- second BIMSTEC Summit in Such a strategy would have Bangladesh relations are New Delhi. (Right) Members yielded tangible rewards by improving political important for containing of the ULFA, Sashadhar relationships that, in turn, the space for China, backed Choudhury and Chitraban Hazarika, at the Guwahati would have limited the by its rapidly growing court in November 2009 scope for adversarial economic and military muscle, to spread its influence in our interests to fish in South Asia’s troubled waters. Bangladesh has constantly neighbourhood at our strategic expense.

India’s profile as a world economic complained about its trade imbalance with power is rising with its high growth rates, India, persistently demanding unilateral its entrepreneurial dynamism, human tariff concessions on items considered resource potential and scientific and sensitive by India. technological strength. Yet this global acknowledgement of India’s economic Regional Test Case stature, reflected in its G-20 membership, India’s relations with its neighbours have has not got translated into dividends been marred by territorial disputes, border locally in South Asia. Many in India are problems, illegal movement of people,

30

religious and ethnic factors, complaints about India’s selfishness, insensitivity and interference. All these elements have blighted our ties with Bangladesh although India brought the country into political existence and the two share exceptional cultural and linguistic bonds.

In many ways Bangladesh has been a test case of our ability to manage the challenges we face in our neighbourhood, but success has eluded us.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India from January 10 to13 was an occasion to “launch a new phase” in IndiaBangladesh relations as the joint communiqué on the visit affirms. Her decisive victory in the December 2008 elections (230 out of 300 seats on her own and 262 with allies) that saw the decimation of Begum Zia’s Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) does make her a much more credible partner than before in re-shaping our bilateral ties.

The revival of secular forces in Bangladesh, spurred by Sheikh Hasina’s own convictions, is welcome. Ground evidence of this is the revival of the prosecution of the killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman; the resumption of the trial of the 1971 war criminals; the decision to enact the Vested Property Return (amendment) Act 2009 that will enable the return of Hindu properties confiscated during the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict and efforts to ban religion based parties.

Sheikh Hasina has friendly sentiments for India—an asset in a situation in which she is politically more powerful than she was when she was last Prime Minister. This time, acting on her campaign promise that no one will be allowed to “carry out terrorism in India”, she took, prior to her visit to Delhi, the undoubtedly courageous act to hand over to India ULFA leaders, Arabinda Rajkhowa, Raja Baruah, Chitraban

India’s relations with its neighbours have been marred by territorial disputes, border problems, illegal movement of people, religious and ethnic factors, complaints about India’s selfishness, insensitivity and interference. All these elements have blighted our ties with Bangladesh.

31

”

Hazarika and Sasha Choudhury as well as well as two Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives provided sanctuary in Bangladesh.

It was important for Sheikh Hasina’s political position in Bangladesh, and the growth of our ties, for her visit to be seen as successful both in Bangladesh and in India.The most problematic bilateral issues have been those of connectivity, security, balance of trade and water resources. On connectivity, India has been accommodative; on transit to Nepal, though, its request for a railway link to Bhutan remains pending. In return, Bangladesh has agreed to allow the use of Mongla and Chittagong ports for movement of goods to and from India through road and rail. This facility will be extended to Nepal and Bhutan too, with the implication that India will eventually allow movement of goods to these two countries across its territory. These transit arrangements have been wisely put in a larger regional context to reduce

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:49 PM Page 7

NEIGHBOURS

AFP

A view of Mongla Port in Bangladesh

domestic political resistance in Bangladesh.

Significantly, an Indian grant for the construction of the proposed AkhauraAgartala railway link has been accepted, implying improved connectivity to the Northeast for us.

On security issues, there is a mutual assurance that the territory of either will not be used for training or sanctuary by foreign or domestic terrorist, militant and insurgent organisations. Agreements on combating terrorism, mutual legal assistance on criminal matters and transfer of sentenced persons were signed. It was agreed to conclude discussions expeditiously on sharing of Teesta waters. On the Tipaimukh project, India has promised not to take steps that would adversely impact Bangladesh.

On trade matters, India will allow duty free access to SAARC LDCs (least developed countries) to the Indian market and it has reduced the number of items from India’s negative list of direct interest to Bangladesh.

India will supply 250 MWs of electricity to Bangladesh, and inter-grid connectivity will be considered.

A major gesture by India is the announcement of a credit line of $1 billion for a range of projects. Bangladesh’s decision to support India’s candidature for the permanent membership of the

Implementing agreements expeditiously will be a challenging task as bureaucratic resistance can be expected.The politics of Bangladesh might have changed, but whether the bureaucracy has changed equally in its thinking and attitudes remains to be seen.

”

Security Council should be lauded.

All in all, Sheikh Hasina’s visit should, hopefully, “launch a new phase” in IndiaBangladesh relations. The start has been sound, even though many difficult issues that remain, such as the demarcation of the maritime boundary and sharing of waters.

On all these issues the modalities for

32

moving forward have been agreed upon, but the actual outcomes will need time, patience and a realistic give-andtake.

Implementing agreements expeditiously will be a challenging task as bureaucratic resistance can be expected.

The politics of Bangladesh might have changed, but whether the bureaucracy has changed equally in its thinking and attitudes remains to be seen.

The Opposition in Bangladesh, with its anti-India mindset, has ruled the country for most of its independent life, and its capacity to generate resistance should not be underestimated. Already it is crying that Sheikh Hasina has surrendered Bangladesh’s national interests to India, with the BNP Secretary General Khandekar Delawar calling the visit a “total failure”. On her return the Prime Minister, flanked by senior party and alliance leaders, in response to a threat of agitation by a combined Opposition, has spiritedly defended the results of her visit to India, emphasising the advances made in trade, connectivity, water sharing and power.

It is to be hoped that the “historic opportunity to write a new chapter’ in the India-Bangladesh relationship that the joint communiqué mentions will not be lost this time.

In association with

15th - 16th April, Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi

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216X276.indd 1

1/24/10 5:43:09 PM

Climate Change.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 10:11 AM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

CLIMATE CHANGE

KEY POINTS

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

n While climate change is a global security challenge, its impact on different countries and communities will vary. n Climate change alone may not cause wars, but could accentuate existing inter-State tensions which could result in conflicts. n Defence forces will need to prepare themselves for adapting to a changed operational environment and to deal with new sources of conflicts and large scale humanitarian disasters.

Changing global climate will impact geopolitics, national security and human security

C

AFP

NARENDRA SISODIA

34

DSI

35

limate change is likely to pose grave challenges for human society and security.

Nation-States and communities are likely to encounter serious food and water scarcity, destructive natural disasters and widespread diseases. In the near future, there does not appear to be any prospect of a solution, political or technological, which can prevent the impact of climate change.

That climate change is a reality is no longer disputed. There may be debates about its scope, timing and impacts.

However, the consensus after the Fourth Assessment Report of Inter-Governmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) is that the phenomenon is real. The IPCC Report paints six green-house gas emission scenarios for global Villagers walk warming and sea-level against a rise till the end of backdrop of Twenty First Century. cyclone clouds in According to the Bhubaneswar. The mildest scenario, the cyclone last year best estimate for mean left at least temperature is 1.8 300,000 people degrees Centigrade as marooned in India compared to 4 degrees and Bangladesh Centigrade for the most severe scenario (likely range–2.4 to 6.4 degrees Centigrade). The mean sea level rise in the mildest case is expected to be in the range of 0.18-0.38 metres and for the most severe scenario in the range of 0.26-0.59 metres.

Climate change will be a pervasive and global phenomenon. It will impact geopolitics, national security and most importantly, human security. While the phenomenon will be global, its impact will differ from region to region and from country to country. Some countries may even benefit from climate change initially, while others may face an existential threat due to sea level rise. Even within a country,

Climate Change.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 10:11 AM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

CLIMATE CHANGE

KEY POINTS

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

n While climate change is a global security challenge, its impact on different countries and communities will vary. n Climate change alone may not cause wars, but could accentuate existing inter-State tensions which could result in conflicts. n Defence forces will need to prepare themselves for adapting to a changed operational environment and to deal with new sources of conflicts and large scale humanitarian disasters.

Changing global climate will impact geopolitics, national security and human security

C

AFP

NARENDRA SISODIA

34

DSI

35

limate change is likely to pose grave challenges for human society and security.

Nation-States and communities are likely to encounter serious food and water scarcity, destructive natural disasters and widespread diseases. In the near future, there does not appear to be any prospect of a solution, political or technological, which can prevent the impact of climate change.

That climate change is a reality is no longer disputed. There may be debates about its scope, timing and impacts.

However, the consensus after the Fourth Assessment Report of Inter-Governmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) is that the phenomenon is real. The IPCC Report paints six green-house gas emission scenarios for global Villagers walk warming and sea-level against a rise till the end of backdrop of Twenty First Century. cyclone clouds in According to the Bhubaneswar. The mildest scenario, the cyclone last year best estimate for mean left at least temperature is 1.8 300,000 people degrees Centigrade as marooned in India compared to 4 degrees and Bangladesh Centigrade for the most severe scenario (likely range–2.4 to 6.4 degrees Centigrade). The mean sea level rise in the mildest case is expected to be in the range of 0.18-0.38 metres and for the most severe scenario in the range of 0.26-0.59 metres.

Climate change will be a pervasive and global phenomenon. It will impact geopolitics, national security and most importantly, human security. While the phenomenon will be global, its impact will differ from region to region and from country to country. Some countries may even benefit from climate change initially, while others may face an existential threat due to sea level rise. Even within a country,

Climate Change.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 10:12 AM Page 3

CLIMATE CHANGE

AFP

Flood-affected villagers being rescued by the Indian Army in Golapganj in the eastern state of Bihar.

Over 600,000 people were evacuated in September, 2008

those in the coastal region or living in high altitude mountains may face different challenges. Developed countries with strong institutions and high per capita income levels, may have a greater resilience in facing consequences of climate change, whereas poorer countries with weak institutional structures may become far more vulnerable. Thus, while climate change is a global security challenge, its impact on different countries and communities will vary.

Geo-Political Consequences Climate change is likely to have unpredictable geo-political consequences.

The melting of the Arctic ice is opening the north-west passage linking Europe with Asia and North America. This will provide new shipping and trading route. The melting of the Arctic ice is also likely to make large areas in the region accessible for exploitation of natural resources like oil, natural gas and other minerals. The Russians have already claimed part of this area. Other countries of the region are also

Large-scale migrations from countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal would alter the demographic balance in parts of India. Migration to large cities could severely impact infrastructure, public services like health, sanitation, water supply and transport, leading to bigger slums, crime, intercommunity tensions, unrest and violence.

�

36

increasing their presence to lay claim to parts of the region. Experts feel that such growing rivalry could lead to tensions and even armed conflicts. Similarly, the melting of the perma-frost on the Tibetan plateau would have adverse consequences for countries of the region.

While melting of the perma-frost could provide more arable land to China, it will further encourage Han migration to Tibet, changing its demographic balance and accentuating the existing tensions in Tibet.

Climate change is likely to lead to largescale migrations causing instability in the affected regions. There were 191 million migrants in the world in the year 2005. It is estimated that there would be about 50 million more migrants due to environmental factors alone. The inadequate capacity to deal with climate change is likely to lead to scarcity of foods, water and resources, in turn adding to the flow of migrants and leading to tensions in countries to which they migrate. The South Asian region will be particularly vulnerable to climate change. It is

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1/24/10 5:44:20 PM

Climate Change.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 10:12 AM Page 5

CLIMATE CHANGE One important adjustment needed by the armed forces will be to prepare for alternative fuels, which may be necessary due to a decline in hydro-carbon resources. Extreme weather and climatic conditions will also demand a reassessment of greater wear and tear of military equipment.

likely to make the monsoon pattern erratic like a decline in the winter rains. Some Himalayan glaciers could melt or fragment in the near future impacting on lean season flows. There is a likelihood of more frequent floods, droughts, desertification and extreme weather events. Rising sea level will inundate coastal regions of Bangladesh and India and islands like Maldives may even sub-merge. Temperature and monsoon variations, soil-erosion due to floods and sea level rise are likely to lead to food and water scarcity. Chronic hunger, water shortage, health problems coupled with lowadaptation capacity could create a conducive climate for violence, organised crime and militancy.

Large-scale migrations from neighboring countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal would alter the demographic balance in parts of India. Migration to large cities could severely impact infrastructure, public services like health, sanitation water supply and transport, lead to bigger slums, crime, inter-community tensions, unrest and widespread violence. Disputes regarding water sharing in a scarcity scenario could lead to tensions between India and China, India and Bangladesh and India and Pakistan.

One consequence of climate change would be the more frequent occurrence of extreme weather events and disasters like hurricanes, floods and famines. Large-scale

AFP

A view of the Lirung Glacier in the Lantang Valley, some 60 km northwest of Kathmandu.

The glacier has retreated at least two kilometres in recent decades, an effect of global warming that is worrying local residents.

disasters place great demand on security forces to manage disaster and provide humanitarian relief.

Implications for Armed Forces Climate change could also have important implications for the armed forces and war fighting. While making precise predictions is risky, such scenarios should be anticipated to prepare for all kinds of contingencies. For instance, a rapid meltdown of glaciers can disrupt communications and lead to flash-floods.

In case of melting and flash-floods, existing defence works and communication infrastructure may be affected; and artillery guns mounted on ice pillars may have to be deployed on different platforms. Unanticipated melting may make movement of troops dangerous.

One important adjustment needed by the armed forces will be to prepare for alternative fuels, which may be necessary due to the decline in hydro-carbon resources. Extreme weather and climatic conditions will demand a reassessment of greater wear and tears of military equipment.

The climate change and sea level rise is likely to have important implications for the operational environment of the navies. As the Tsunami disaster of 2004 demonstrated, navies may be required for well-coordinated and massive humanitarian missions.

Climate change alone may not cause

38

”

wars, but could accentuate existing interstate tensions which could result in conflicts. It will also have grave implications for human security. These will vary among States and communities, depending both on the severity of impact and the capacity of their institutions to deal with climate change.

Defence forces will need to prepare themselves for adapting to a changed operational environment; new sources of inter-state tensions and conflicts and to deal with large-scale humanitarian disasters.

In an article, ‘The Security Implications of Climate Change’, published in Washington Quarterly, John Podesta and Peter Ogden have pointed out another danger – the danger of desensitisation. The authors believe that with progress of information and communication technologies people will become much more aware of the adverse impact of climate change, as well as the growing gap between the privileged and the deprived people. However, the messages and pictures that lead to action could also eventually desensitise people to stories of famine, conflict, disaster, death and destruction. The authors believe that the threat of desensitisation could prove to be the most serious of all threats, as desensitisation is likely to accentuate the victims’ miseries and prevent cooperative action needed to deal with the global challenge of climate change.

12

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Tel : +603 4041 0311 Fax : +603 4043 7241 E-mail : enquiry@dsaexhibition.com WORLDWIDE AGENT: DEFENCE WORLDWIDE ASSOCIATES (DWA) 12th Floor, Westminster Tower, 3 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SP, United Kingdom.

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2/6/2009 3:30:03 PM

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:52 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

ACTION NOT T AKEN

DALJEET SINGH

The office of a Chief of Defence Staff should be introduced only if it will be a major force multiplier and prove to be an effective value addition KEY POINTS

Each nation has evolved and designed its own command and control structure and introduced the office of the Chief of Defence Staff according its security needs. n Operationally, there is little requirement for an empowered CDS. As a system, armed forces are just not prepared for absorbing the proposed concept, which in itself demands major changes. n

T

he Standing Committee on Defence, in its report tabled in the Parliament recently, criticised the Government and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for soft peddling the issue of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The need for this office had been outlined in the Government report following the Kargil Review Committee findings way back in 2001; nine years later, the Government is being accused of inaction.

The post of CDS described then as being critical for national security was expected to take charge of and Soldiers from manage the nation’s the Indian Army nuclear arsenal and also march during bring about a level of the Republic Day synergy among the Parade rehearsal Army, the Navy and the in New Delhi in Air Force by resolving January 2010 inter-service doctrinal, planning, operational and procurement issues. It has also been pointed out that this appointment has been successfully introduced in 67 countries.

In its detail, the Indian proposal has envisaged an all-encompassing control in the hands of the CDS over the armed forces in times of peace and war. Vested with the authority to coordinate and resolve

40

DSI

41

issues mentioned above including the procurement (read modernisation of the forces), the CDS is also meant to control the capital expenditure of the defence forces. In theory, the Chiefs of the three services will need to get clearance from the CDS before deploying their combat power.

Such sweeping authority in the hands of one office is, however, not necessarily the system being followed in countries which have adopted the concept of the CDS. The appointment has different connotations in different nations. Each nation has evolved and designed its own command and control structure, according to its specific security needs. And keeping this in mind, India too needs to assess what is the best option to follow.

The present system has a Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) at the top of the pyramid. Indeed, India has undertaken several military operations since Independence with varying degrees of success, using this structure. In 1948, there was an exceedingly well-fought operation in which the cooperation between the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) was exemplary. And though the 1962 war with China was a major fiasco and a huge embarrassment to the nation, the 1971 war with Pakistan was a major success and a perfect example of effective joint-manship amongst the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Our operations in Sri Lanka did not go well, while our intervention in Maldives in support of the incumbent Government was planned and executed at the tri-service level in a most effective manner. In the ongoing counter-insurgency operations, the IAF (Indian Air Force) was exceedingly sensitive to the needs of the land forces and many pilots risked their lives in executing seemingly impossible missions.

Clearly then, India’s defence forces

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:52 PM Page 1

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

ACTION NOT T AKEN

DALJEET SINGH

The office of a Chief of Defence Staff should be introduced only if it will be a major force multiplier and prove to be an effective value addition KEY POINTS

Each nation has evolved and designed its own command and control structure and introduced the office of the Chief of Defence Staff according its security needs. n Operationally, there is little requirement for an empowered CDS. As a system, armed forces are just not prepared for absorbing the proposed concept, which in itself demands major changes. n

T

he Standing Committee on Defence, in its report tabled in the Parliament recently, criticised the Government and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for soft peddling the issue of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The need for this office had been outlined in the Government report following the Kargil Review Committee findings way back in 2001; nine years later, the Government is being accused of inaction.

The post of CDS described then as being critical for national security was expected to take charge of and Soldiers from manage the nation’s the Indian Army nuclear arsenal and also march during bring about a level of the Republic Day synergy among the Parade rehearsal Army, the Navy and the in New Delhi in Air Force by resolving January 2010 inter-service doctrinal, planning, operational and procurement issues. It has also been pointed out that this appointment has been successfully introduced in 67 countries.

In its detail, the Indian proposal has envisaged an all-encompassing control in the hands of the CDS over the armed forces in times of peace and war. Vested with the authority to coordinate and resolve

40

DSI

41

issues mentioned above including the procurement (read modernisation of the forces), the CDS is also meant to control the capital expenditure of the defence forces. In theory, the Chiefs of the three services will need to get clearance from the CDS before deploying their combat power.

Such sweeping authority in the hands of one office is, however, not necessarily the system being followed in countries which have adopted the concept of the CDS. The appointment has different connotations in different nations. Each nation has evolved and designed its own command and control structure, according to its specific security needs. And keeping this in mind, India too needs to assess what is the best option to follow.

The present system has a Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) at the top of the pyramid. Indeed, India has undertaken several military operations since Independence with varying degrees of success, using this structure. In 1948, there was an exceedingly well-fought operation in which the cooperation between the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) was exemplary. And though the 1962 war with China was a major fiasco and a huge embarrassment to the nation, the 1971 war with Pakistan was a major success and a perfect example of effective joint-manship amongst the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Our operations in Sri Lanka did not go well, while our intervention in Maldives in support of the incumbent Government was planned and executed at the tri-service level in a most effective manner. In the ongoing counter-insurgency operations, the IAF (Indian Air Force) was exceedingly sensitive to the needs of the land forces and many pilots risked their lives in executing seemingly impossible missions.

Clearly then, India’s defence forces

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 12:05 PM Page 3

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

DSI

have achieved great success and also faced serious failures using the same system, which has evolved and matured over six decades. Thanks to this process a delicate but effective balance between the three services has been established. And the system has been responsive and has delivered on many occasions.

A major deciding factor in determining the outcome of our military operations has been the level of preparation, the organisational and structural ability of the armed forces and the leadership at a given point in time. Would the outcome have been any different had the CDS system been in place? Most probably not.

In the process of changing this system we must be convinced that the change will indeed be a major force multiplier in the way security forces undertake their business and at the same time be a great value addition. Will the introduction of CDS make the forces more responsive to emerging challenges to national security?

Will it improve the combat power of the security forces? Will our deterrence power become more effective? These are some questions we need to answer.

The iconic visual of Indian Army soldiers firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling during the 1999 Kargil war. (Right) Indian Navy guest-troops march down the Champs Elysees avenue in Paris during rehearsal for the Bastille Day parade

42

A nation’s security structure is driven by present and future security challenges, which have to be met and managed through the collective effort of all the instruments of national power. From within the consequent national strategy, military strategy is deduced and pertinent doctrine and concepts defined. To meet the demands of such evaluation, the contours and profiles of force structure, weapon, equipment and support systems are conditioned in fiscal and time possibilities and converted into templates and organisational structures, which make the security forces pertinent to the demands of national security.

India is faced with an unstable nuclear arc, extending from Pakistan through Iran to China. While facing this threat, it has also to strengthen its conventional capability to secure its frontiers, particularly against China. Considering the huge gap between security forces of the two countries, India is likely to remain in catch-up mode for some time. In the interim, it has to rapidly put in place an effective conventional deterrence against China. Besides being flanked by the world’s largest drug-producing area, the Golden Triangle to the east and the Golden Crescent to the west, India is surrounded by the world’s most unstable nations and has

AFP

Present and Future Security Challenges several thousand kilometres of border that is not recognised internationally.

Future conventional war is most likely to be triggered somewhere along the LoC and may spill over into the plains, and in all probability remain limited to specific areas; falling short of an all-out war. Our security forces have to be prepared to rapidly engage in and win such battles in a limited space of time. It is also imperative that India makes the shift from a defensive centric force structure (a limiting concept in itself) to that of a regional capability, which can undertake and win regional wars.

At home, security forces have to be prepared to continue fighting insurgency and be prepared to meet the asymmetric (terrorist type) threats. India has the highest number of homegrown insurgencies in the world and has suffered more than any other nation at the hands of the terrorists and forces inimical to the well being of the nation.

Along a coastline of over 7,600 km, they have to guard its shores to prevent non-State threats from manifesting inland. Besides they have to guard and secure the nation’s economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. Analyses of the instrumentalities required to meet and neutralise such

The notion of a CDS is a concept and a foundation on which the entire force structure is built. It is not a standalone definition as it is being made out to be.The Indian armed forces are organised into watertight service structures with little inter-service activity or training.

”

challenges will indicate whether there is a need to shift to the CDS system.

The creation and operationalisation of a credible nuclear deterrence is a national imperative. The setting up of the Strategic Forces Command has gone a long way in

43

putting a pertinent deterrence in place. The command is headed by a three star Air Marshal or General or Admiral and is manned by a tri-service staff. The entire nuclear arsenal, including the infrastructure and resources, should be placed under this organisation and its commander must report directly to the highest authority of the nation. Probably, this is the case even now. The organisation has matured over the few years of its existence and little change in the responsibility or the span of its control is expected in the near future.

Autonomous Organisation The organisation needs to be strengthened by making it more autonomous. In the nuclear arena, the command and control needs to be based on a sharp and short chain, which incorporates inbuilt security dimensions and involves minimum personalities. The super imposition of a CDS on the system will only serve to add one more chain, making the organisation top heavy, inducing duplication and bringing in a larger number of people into the loop. At the individual level, there is no difference in the experience and capability of the commander of the Strategic Forces

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 12:05 PM Page 3

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

DSI

have achieved great success and also faced serious failures using the same system, which has evolved and matured over six decades. Thanks to this process a delicate but effective balance between the three services has been established. And the system has been responsive and has delivered on many occasions.

A major deciding factor in determining the outcome of our military operations has been the level of preparation, the organisational and structural ability of the armed forces and the leadership at a given point in time. Would the outcome have been any different had the CDS system been in place? Most probably not.

In the process of changing this system we must be convinced that the change will indeed be a major force multiplier in the way security forces undertake their business and at the same time be a great value addition. Will the introduction of CDS make the forces more responsive to emerging challenges to national security?

Will it improve the combat power of the security forces? Will our deterrence power become more effective? These are some questions we need to answer.

The iconic visual of Indian Army soldiers firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling during the 1999 Kargil war. (Right) Indian Navy guest-troops march down the Champs Elysees avenue in Paris during rehearsal for the Bastille Day parade

42

A nation’s security structure is driven by present and future security challenges, which have to be met and managed through the collective effort of all the instruments of national power. From within the consequent national strategy, military strategy is deduced and pertinent doctrine and concepts defined. To meet the demands of such evaluation, the contours and profiles of force structure, weapon, equipment and support systems are conditioned in fiscal and time possibilities and converted into templates and organisational structures, which make the security forces pertinent to the demands of national security.

India is faced with an unstable nuclear arc, extending from Pakistan through Iran to China. While facing this threat, it has also to strengthen its conventional capability to secure its frontiers, particularly against China. Considering the huge gap between security forces of the two countries, India is likely to remain in catch-up mode for some time. In the interim, it has to rapidly put in place an effective conventional deterrence against China. Besides being flanked by the world’s largest drug-producing area, the Golden Triangle to the east and the Golden Crescent to the west, India is surrounded by the world’s most unstable nations and has

AFP

Present and Future Security Challenges several thousand kilometres of border that is not recognised internationally.

Future conventional war is most likely to be triggered somewhere along the LoC and may spill over into the plains, and in all probability remain limited to specific areas; falling short of an all-out war. Our security forces have to be prepared to rapidly engage in and win such battles in a limited space of time. It is also imperative that India makes the shift from a defensive centric force structure (a limiting concept in itself) to that of a regional capability, which can undertake and win regional wars.

At home, security forces have to be prepared to continue fighting insurgency and be prepared to meet the asymmetric (terrorist type) threats. India has the highest number of homegrown insurgencies in the world and has suffered more than any other nation at the hands of the terrorists and forces inimical to the well being of the nation.

Along a coastline of over 7,600 km, they have to guard its shores to prevent non-State threats from manifesting inland. Besides they have to guard and secure the nation’s economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. Analyses of the instrumentalities required to meet and neutralise such

The notion of a CDS is a concept and a foundation on which the entire force structure is built. It is not a standalone definition as it is being made out to be.The Indian armed forces are organised into watertight service structures with little inter-service activity or training.

”

challenges will indicate whether there is a need to shift to the CDS system.

The creation and operationalisation of a credible nuclear deterrence is a national imperative. The setting up of the Strategic Forces Command has gone a long way in

43

putting a pertinent deterrence in place. The command is headed by a three star Air Marshal or General or Admiral and is manned by a tri-service staff. The entire nuclear arsenal, including the infrastructure and resources, should be placed under this organisation and its commander must report directly to the highest authority of the nation. Probably, this is the case even now. The organisation has matured over the few years of its existence and little change in the responsibility or the span of its control is expected in the near future.

Autonomous Organisation The organisation needs to be strengthened by making it more autonomous. In the nuclear arena, the command and control needs to be based on a sharp and short chain, which incorporates inbuilt security dimensions and involves minimum personalities. The super imposition of a CDS on the system will only serve to add one more chain, making the organisation top heavy, inducing duplication and bringing in a larger number of people into the loop. At the individual level, there is no difference in the experience and capability of the commander of the Strategic Forces

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 12:10 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY and the proposed CDS with equal service, raised through the same process and conditioned by equal exposure. The present system is therefore appropriate and the super imposition of a CDS is likely to be counterproductive.

The Army has to be prepared to fight the asymmetric threat, ensure security of national institutions and more importantly the people. Even today, the security forces are fighting several insurgencies at home, which are going to continue to demand a huge involvement of the Army. In manning our unrecognised borders, our soldiers are deployed in an eyeball focus with the other side in hundreds of posts in most inhospitable terrain and weather conditions. These operations are mainly Army responsibilities. The role of the Air Force has been and will continue to impart tactical mobility and logistic support to the troops. Significant and critical to the success of the operations the participation of the Air Force is at the regional level. The super imposition of a CDS will have no impact on these operations.

The 26/11 attcks notwithstanding, India does not face a conventional threat from the sea. The IN has to control the coastal areas, secure territorial waters, protect the Exclusive Economic Zone and safeguard India’s economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. It has to deter, detect and obviate any attempt at sea-bound terrorist strikes inland. Aerial surveillance has great utility in this context. This capability should become an organic component of the Navy. Leaving it under the Air Force and expecting a CDS to affect coordination is likely to fall short of the requirement.

Briefly, then the security challenges facing India are vast and varied. From nuclear level to terrorist strikes, each of these demands a different force configuration in response. India cannot afford this and therefore the answer is to have highly modernised and flexible forces that are enabled to meet any of the envisaged threats. As a nation, we attempt to raise and build a new force each time we are faced with an adversity and hope that this will solve our problems. Equally, we have the tendency to impose organisations at the very top. This may look good from a political and media point of view, but if we are serious about security of the nation we need to move away from such tendencies and strengthen our existing capability at a cutting-edge level.

AFP

Asymmetric Threats

The notion of a CDS is a concept and a foundation on which the entire force structure is built. It is not a standalone definition as it is being made out to be. The Indian armed forces are organised into watertight service structures with little inter-service activity or training. It is possible for a Navy officer to rise to the level of Chief of Naval Staff without seeing an Army unit or having visited an Air Force base. The same is true of an Air Force and an Army officer. Expecting him to coordinate operational concepts and resolve doctrinal issues is asking for disaster. He will depend more and more on his advisers. Do we want that?

Our training institutions are dedicated to the respective service and inter-service training is exceedingly limited. Even in triservice institutions, the inter-service content in limited. We will need to change this and restructure our training concepts and move towards joint-manship training. A desirable shift, but one which will take time. Before this happens and takes roots, we should not even think of a CDS system.

Based on the nation’s security imperatives each service is divided into regional commands, composed and structured to meet such challenges. Each of these service commands are differently configured and their geographical areas of

44

We need to first consolidate and restructure the defence forces at the regional command level with all resources of the Army, Navy and Air Force within a geographically defined area under one commander before the CDS system begins to become relevant and effective

”

responsibility are completely different and varied. Given these atmospherics, how will a CDS exercise control over the field forces? The lesson is clear; we need to first consolidate and restructure the defence forces at the regional command level with all resources of the Army, Navy and Air Force within a geographically defined area under one commander Indian sailors before the CDS system perform a drill begins to become on board the relevant and effective.

Indian Navy ship From a historical INS Vidyut perspective, too, the (K48) during an present system with the exercise in the COSC at the head has Arabian Sea in matured and does not December 2009 indicate any need for a change. Operationally, there is little requirement for an empowered CDS. As a system, armed forces are just not prepared for absorbing the proposed concept, which in itself demands major changes.

How are we going to select the CDS? Will it be a merit-based consideration or are we going to go the safest path of appointing the CDS from each service in turn. What will be his tenure? Considering all this, we must

PACIFIC2010 International Maritime and Naval Exposition will be a unique marketing, promotional and networking forum.

PACIFIC2010 will be a comprehensive showcase of the latest developments in naval, underwater and commercial maritime technology.

DSI

modernise our armed forces by improving their capability with better technologies and weapon systems, enhancing their strength in numbers and enabling them in a manner to achieve the critical mass to transit to modern armed forces.

The reluctance of the MoD in implementing the concept of the CDS has nothing to do with keeping the armed forces in place. It has more to do with ground realities and the needs of national security, which is probably the motivating force behind such reluctance. Let us for a change look at the lowest level, the level consisting of our gallant soldiers, sailors and airmen and not ask for more Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals each time there is a call for modernisation. Our present system is good and yes we must improve on it.

The members of the COSC are not competing with each other and are the senior-most officers of the three services.

Of course a little inter-service competition is good. And history has shown us that the three services have and will close ranks whenever the nation is faced with a military challenge—CDS or no CDS.

PACIFIC2010 will also feature a number of timely and highly informative industry conferences and seminars.

PACIFIC2010 will be the most comprehensive industry event of its type ever staged in the Asia Pacific region and will provide a focused and informed business environment.

CONTACT - Maritime Australia Limited PO Box 4095 Geelong, Victoria 3220 Australia E: expo@amda.com.au T: +61 (0)3 5282 0500 F: +61 (0)3 5282 4455

www.pacific2010.com.au

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 12:10 PM Page 5

JANUARY 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY and the proposed CDS with equal service, raised through the same process and conditioned by equal exposure. The present system is therefore appropriate and the super imposition of a CDS is likely to be counterproductive.

The Army has to be prepared to fight the asymmetric threat, ensure security of national institutions and more importantly the people. Even today, the security forces are fighting several insurgencies at home, which are going to continue to demand a huge involvement of the Army. In manning our unrecognised borders, our soldiers are deployed in an eyeball focus with the other side in hundreds of posts in most inhospitable terrain and weather conditions. These operations are mainly Army responsibilities. The role of the Air Force has been and will continue to impart tactical mobility and logistic support to the troops. Significant and critical to the success of the operations the participation of the Air Force is at the regional level. The super imposition of a CDS will have no impact on these operations.

The 26/11 attcks notwithstanding, India does not face a conventional threat from the sea. The IN has to control the coastal areas, secure territorial waters, protect the Exclusive Economic Zone and safeguard India’s economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. It has to deter, detect and obviate any attempt at sea-bound terrorist strikes inland. Aerial surveillance has great utility in this context. This capability should become an organic component of the Navy. Leaving it under the Air Force and expecting a CDS to affect coordination is likely to fall short of the requirement.

Briefly, then the security challenges facing India are vast and varied. From nuclear level to terrorist strikes, each of these demands a different force configuration in response. India cannot afford this and therefore the answer is to have highly modernised and flexible forces that are enabled to meet any of the envisaged threats. As a nation, we attempt to raise and build a new force each time we are faced with an adversity and hope that this will solve our problems. Equally, we have the tendency to impose organisations at the very top. This may look good from a political and media point of view, but if we are serious about security of the nation we need to move away from such tendencies and strengthen our existing capability at a cutting-edge level.

AFP

Asymmetric Threats

The notion of a CDS is a concept and a foundation on which the entire force structure is built. It is not a standalone definition as it is being made out to be. The Indian armed forces are organised into watertight service structures with little inter-service activity or training. It is possible for a Navy officer to rise to the level of Chief of Naval Staff without seeing an Army unit or having visited an Air Force base. The same is true of an Air Force and an Army officer. Expecting him to coordinate operational concepts and resolve doctrinal issues is asking for disaster. He will depend more and more on his advisers. Do we want that?

Our training institutions are dedicated to the respective service and inter-service training is exceedingly limited. Even in triservice institutions, the inter-service content in limited. We will need to change this and restructure our training concepts and move towards joint-manship training. A desirable shift, but one which will take time. Before this happens and takes roots, we should not even think of a CDS system.

Based on the nation’s security imperatives each service is divided into regional commands, composed and structured to meet such challenges. Each of these service commands are differently configured and their geographical areas of

44

We need to first consolidate and restructure the defence forces at the regional command level with all resources of the Army, Navy and Air Force within a geographically defined area under one commander before the CDS system begins to become relevant and effective

”

responsibility are completely different and varied. Given these atmospherics, how will a CDS exercise control over the field forces? The lesson is clear; we need to first consolidate and restructure the defence forces at the regional command level with all resources of the Army, Navy and Air Force within a geographically defined area under one commander Indian sailors before the CDS system perform a drill begins to become on board the relevant and effective.

Indian Navy ship From a historical INS Vidyut perspective, too, the (K48) during an present system with the exercise in the COSC at the head has Arabian Sea in matured and does not December 2009 indicate any need for a change. Operationally, there is little requirement for an empowered CDS. As a system, armed forces are just not prepared for absorbing the proposed concept, which in itself demands major changes.

How are we going to select the CDS? Will it be a merit-based consideration or are we going to go the safest path of appointing the CDS from each service in turn. What will be his tenure? Considering all this, we must

PACIFIC2010 International Maritime and Naval Exposition will be a unique marketing, promotional and networking forum.

PACIFIC2010 will be a comprehensive showcase of the latest developments in naval, underwater and commercial maritime technology.

DSI

modernise our armed forces by improving their capability with better technologies and weapon systems, enhancing their strength in numbers and enabling them in a manner to achieve the critical mass to transit to modern armed forces.

The reluctance of the MoD in implementing the concept of the CDS has nothing to do with keeping the armed forces in place. It has more to do with ground realities and the needs of national security, which is probably the motivating force behind such reluctance. Let us for a change look at the lowest level, the level consisting of our gallant soldiers, sailors and airmen and not ask for more Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals each time there is a call for modernisation. Our present system is good and yes we must improve on it.

The members of the COSC are not competing with each other and are the senior-most officers of the three services.

Of course a little inter-service competition is good. And history has shown us that the three services have and will close ranks whenever the nation is faced with a military challenge—CDS or no CDS.

PACIFIC2010 will also feature a number of timely and highly informative industry conferences and seminars.

PACIFIC2010 will be the most comprehensive industry event of its type ever staged in the Asia Pacific region and will provide a focused and informed business environment.

CONTACT - Maritime Australia Limited PO Box 4095 Geelong, Victoria 3220 Australia E: expo@amda.com.au T: +61 (0)3 5282 0500 F: +61 (0)3 5282 4455

www.pacific2010.com.au

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 25/01/10 1:50 PM Page 1

DSI

JANUARY, 2010

a n

u p d a t e

o n

d e f e n c e

c o m m e r c i a l

n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

The HSA 316B Chetak helicopters need replacement

Some Things Never Change THERE’S an old French adage that says, ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’, which means more the things change, the more they remain the same.

The saying fittingly applies to the state of affairs in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) looking at the long-delayed and desperately-needed modernisation of country’s military set up to meet the growing challenges in a turbulent neighbourhood.

Complex and constantly changing procurement policies, announced under the guise of greater efficiency and transparency, alongside recurring corruption scandals are blocking the country’s much-required materiel acquisition and renovation.

Even Union Minister of Defence A.K. Antony resignedly declared recently that despite the Government earmarking a huge budget for his Ministry regularly, the allocations don’t fully reflect in the defence modernisation efforts.

The MoD’s inability to take timely decisions has resulted in the capital outlay of Rs 42.17 billion for the financial year 2007-08 earmarked for purchases, upgrades and modernisation being returned unspent to the federal fund. Earlier, Rs 183 billion was similarly returned unused in the period from 2002 to 2007 as tenders were issued and then withdrawn, and again re-issued contributing to overall delays resulting in operational shortcomings.

Service officers admit that the operational

46

competence of its nearly 1.5 million-strong armed forces is being ‘compromised’ by equipment deficiencies and long-stalled modernisation programmes.

“Increased budgetary support each year makes little or no difference to military capacity building as procurement procedures are complex, bureaucratic and riddled with delays,” said former Lt Gen V.K. Kapoor. To be effective, the entire procedure for expending the capital account needs an overhaul, he declared, adding that the gap between the desired and existing military capability was rapidly widening.

Military planners say that all these adverse factors impinged negatively on the military’s overall aim of becoming network-enabled by last year and network-centric in 2010. The outstanding equipment shortfall list is embarrassingly long and nowhere near acquisition. It includes 197 Light Utility Helicopters (LUHs) for Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) to replace the obsolete HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetah helicopters. The shortfall also includes some 3,000-3,600 varied 155mm light weight, towed, wheeled and tracked howitzers for around 180 of the Army’s 220 artillery regiments, in accordance with the long-pending modernisation drive under the Filed Artillery Rationalisation Programme. The

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Army has acquired no new artillery after 1987 when the import of 410 Bofors FH 77B 155mm howitzers triggered one of India’s most celebrated defence scandals that still rumbles on. Many of the FH 77B guns are now being cannibalised to keep the remainder in service leaving a vital operational gap in the Army’s firepower.

The procurement, development and upgrade of the Army’s Main Battle Tank (MBT)–like theT-90s, locally designed Arjun and theT-72M1s–for the Army’s 59 armoured regiments remain horribly delayed. For instance, the majority of the 1,800 T-72M1 MBTs, currently blind in the dark, still await night sights after years of tendering and trials, the latest round ending inconclusively last year.

The bulk of the Army’s air defence guns, like Bofors L-70s and the Soviet Zu-23-2s and ZSU-23-4s, and missiles like the Russian OSA-AK and Kradvats, date back to 30-40 years, they need urgent replacement. Also, the ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme to upgrade 465 infantry and ‘dedicated’ paramilitary battalions by 2020 has also been deferred.

The Indian Air Force (IAF), for its part, is preoccupied with restoring its depleting assets, which will shortly decrease from the existing 30-odd combat squadrons to around 26. A large number of Soviet and Russian MiG 21 variants, MiG 23s and around 100-110 MiG 27 fighters, which are not under upgrade, will retire. The IAF has repeatedly warned the Central Government to either implement corrective measures to acquire additional fighters or lose air superiority over nuclear-rival Pakistan but to little avail.

The IAF’s air-defence ground environment systems, that go back to 1970-71, too were woefully inadequate for effective surveillance, despite significant changes in the security scenario, technology and growing magnitude of sophisticated aerial threats.

The Indian Navy’s (IN) six French Scorpene submarines under construction at Mazagaon Dockyard Limited since 2006 face a massive cost escalation over the original Rs 187.98 billion contract inked in October 2005. Consequently, their delivery dates between 2012 and 2017 also stand postponed as inconclusive talks, wracked by accusations and counter-accusations, continue over the price hike.

The Navy’s woes over the three-fold price increase from $974 million to nearly $3 billion of INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov)—the 44,700 tonne Russian aircraft carrier whose arrival has been

delayed by four years to 2012-13, too awaits resolution.

The IN faces a grave shortage of combat aircraft to operate off the deck of its sole, recently retrofitted aircraft carrier, INS Viraat.

Its anti-submarine warfare helicopters are well beyond their retirement age. It also faces the prospect by 2012 of deploying less than half its already deficient submarine fleet numbering 18, when 63 percent of it would be up for retirement.

In Troubled Waters THE combat aircraft-strapped India Navy (IN) has dispatched a Request for Information (RFI) to overseas manufacturers for a newer generation of fighter planes to operate from aircraft carriers, which it plans to induct into service by 2015 and beyond. The RFI sent to Boeing of US, Dassault of France and

RAC-MiG of Russia for an alternate deck-based aircraft last November, though of a generic nature, could result in an initial order for 16 fighters and will be followed-up by a procurement of up to 40 aircrafts.

The proposed aircraft could end up constituting the air arm of Project 71, the 37,500-tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier-I (IAC-I) currently being built at Cochin Shipyard Limited, and at least one, if not two, follow-on carriers the IN plans to construct.

Meanwhile, with the development of the naval version of the locally designed Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in difficulty, the IN is seeking alternate fighter options for both IAC-I and IAC-II. So far, the IN has acquired 16 MiG-29K/KuB fighters—four of which arrived early December—for INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), in northern Russia under a deal inked in January 2004. They would operate from the Navy’s

Navy faces a severe shortage of fighters to operate the recently retrofitted INS Viraat

48

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EADS-built Airbus Military A-330 MRTT was the preferred choice of the Indian Air Force shore-based facility at Goa on the west coast till the INS Vikramaditya arrives in 2013-14.

Presently, the Navy faces a severe shortage of fighters to operate off the deck of INS Viraat. Merely eight single-seat Sea Harrier Mk 51s and three twin-seat Sea Harrier Mk 60s of the original 30 BAE Services naval fighters inducted into the IN from 1984 onwards remain operational, with the majority lost in accidents.

Multi-Role Tanker Transports THE Ministry of Defence (MoD) has summarily cancelled the $ 1.06 billion tender for six Multi-RoleTankerTransports (MRTTs) for the IAF—the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)-built Airbus Military A-330 MRTT was the preferred choice—further delaying the induction of crucial equipment and further reducing India’s credibility as a reliable customer with overseas vendors on whom it remains hopelessly dependent.

Last year, the Indian Air Force (IAF) recommended the A-330 MRTT over the rival Russian Ilyushin IL-78, of which it had acquired six in 2004 for Rs 8 billion. But ignoring its evaluation, following over two years of extended trials, the MoD dispatched a cryptic letter to EADS in New Delhi on January 4, 2010, withdrawing the contract on the verge of closure.

MoD sources said the MRTT requirement

would now be re-tendered globally resulting in interminable delays. The request for proposal is to be sent not only to EADS and Russia but also to Boeing. “It will now take many more years to shortlist another MRTT unless the MoD insists we acquire the IL-78’s against our better judgment,” an IAF officer said, declining to be identified.

The terminated tender required Airbus to deliver the first A-330 MRTT to the IAF within three years of inking the deal and the remaining five within 15 months thereafter.

Defence industry sources said ‘vested interests’ had influenced the Cabinet meeting held on December 29, 2009, that decided to cancel the acquisition of the badly-needed MRTTs. They claimed that Defence Minister A.K. Antony, despite entreaties by the IAF, cancelled the MRTT purchase following objections over the A-330’s high cost.

Under the Defence Procurement Procedures or DPP only the lowest bid—or L1—is acceptable, but IAF officials said that the equipment’s life cycle cost had not been taken into account to make it more competitive in the long run. Official sources said that the MoD’s decision had ‘severely angered’ the IAF which desperately needs mid-air refuellers for its enhanced regional role and for out-of-area operations, a requirement that was slated to increase as it acquired 200-300 additional fighters over the next decade.

“The A-330 MRTT scores above the IL-78 but the final decision will be taken by the Government,“ former Air Chief Marshal Fali

50

H. Major said in May 2009, before he retired.

He also declared that the IL-78 had failed to meet the IAF’s requirements.

The IAF also believed the A-330 MRTT’s were not only technologically superior to the IL-78’s but also more fuel efficient and that many of its systems could be overhauled locally as several airlines in the country operated various Airbus models, thereby reducing its overall cost.

By opting for the A-330 MRTTs the IAF was also expressing its long-standing discontent with Russian equipment and attempting to diversify its predominantly Soviet and Russian platforms. Successive IAF chiefs had criticised Moscow for its after sales service, inadequate spare supplies and extended delivery time lines for varied materiel essential for operational preparedness.

Coastal Security AFTER the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, India committed itself to spending $10 billion on augmenting its homeland security by 2016, particularly its coastal defence. But once again persistent bureaucratic vacillation, turf wars and an overall sense of ennui have enveloped the national security establishment into achieving little or nothing.

At the heart of the impasse lies a jurisdiction battle between the Home Ministry and the Indian Navy (IN) that has been accorded the lead role to co-ordinate

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DSI

JANUARY, 2010

the functioning of several agencies for have yet been inked. Another major coastal and off-shore security like the Indian institutional drawback is that there are a Coast Guard (ICG) and the respective multiplicity of at least a dozen agencies provincial maritime police forces to secure following their own procedures, a handicap the country’s vast coastline. the IN hopes to overcome through advanced In the unresolved standoff, the Home information systems and procedures that Ministry wants the Maritime Security Adviser, await closure. a three-star IN officer, to operate under the Proposals also include the development Navy, and on the other hand, requires that he of intelligence networks amongst fishing report to the National Security Adviser. IN communities and issuing identity cards to chief Admiral Nirmal Verma put it all fishermen and other residents of diplomatically when he stated at an annual coastal villages. press conference ahead of Navy Day in The additional procurement of maritime December 2009 that the delay was because patrol aviation assets, including unmanned “one agency feels they should have a much aerial vehicles for both the IN and the ICG, is larger role to play and they should head it.” under discussion, with the IN negotiating to The maritime security plan envisages the acquire five Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI)creation of a 1,000-strong IN-led force known built EL/M-2083 aerostat programmable as the Sagar Prahari Bal (Seaward Defence Force), equipped with 80 fast interceptor craft.

Furthermore, the proposal envisages the State marine police forces with jurisdiction extending 5km from the shore and spread over 10 coastal opening, 73 police stations, 97 checkpoints, 58 outposts and 30 operational barracks.To augment their capability, the Government plans to procure a total of 204 interceptor craft, a mix of 5-tonne Invader and 12-tonne Hellraiser rigid-hull inflatable boats, 10 of which have been acquired outright from Motomarine of Greece.

Deliveries of the interceptors to coastal police stations began Naval Chief Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma in his incrementally in April 2009, with the Defence Ministry office arrival of the boats from Greece, and were due to be completed by end-2010. But radar to plug vital surveillance gaps in its their delivery deadline has been extended coastal security. because of delays in construction of 194 The proposed APR, which the IN would crafts that are being built under licence by be operating for the first time, in addition to Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers in ground-based radar, surveillance aircraft Kolkata and Goa Shipyard Ltd. and unmanned aerial vehicles would Also under discussion is a national C3I significantly enhance the IN’s ability to network for real time maritime domain ‘seamlessly’ monitor vital portions of its awareness that links IN and ICG operation 7,600km-long coastline. rooms, a multi-agency static coastal radar and The erection of an Integrated Harbour Automatic Identification System (AIS) chain Defence System to secure the IN’s assets at 46 sites.This includes the provision for AIS against any sea-borne attack that would transponders and installation of a Vessel and include diver detection sonar and high Air Traffic Management System for all resolution radar, which are capable of offshore development areas. Some radar and picking up all movement up to a distance of 70 AIS sites have already been identified, but the km, is also envisaged.This scheme includes equipment is yet to be acquired. Nine the installation of electronic sea fences fixed additional ICG stations have been approved on the ocean bed close to harbours to on paper, but their existence remains prevent any diver or a boat from swimming or circumscribed by the lack of adequate training sailing through. It is only when a warship or facilities and material paucity. boat exits or enters any IN harbour would the Further, tenders for 80 interceptor boats ‘electronic net’ be lifted to permit the vessel were issued in mid-2009, but no contracts to pass through.

52

And as for Mainland Security...

Homeland security proposals also include upgrading the federal intelligence agencies and Central Paramilitary Force (CPF), all of which received a 25 percent increase in their budget spending for 2009-10.

The over one-million-strong CPF under the Home Ministry has been allocated Rs 126.34 billion for 2009-10, a massive increase over its previous years’ allocation. Overall, numbers in CPF have also been enhanced by the addition of 80 battalions (around 70,000-80,000 personnel) who need equipping.

The immediate CPF acquisitions include some 80 anti-landmine vehicles, 10,000 lighter bullet-proof jackets and an equal number of helmets, in addition to better weaponry like assault rifles and carbines. Led by the MoD, the security agencies also plan on erecting a network-centric grid linking the country’s information and intelligence gathering systems.

The newly established unified technical intelligence gathering centre, the autonomous National Technical Research Organisation, which manages all technical inputs from multiple sources, including the military, is also being upgraded.

Priority, however, is being accorded to the Special Forces (SF) National Security Guard (NSG) whose capabilities were found severely wanting during its engagement with the terrorists in Mumbai.

The NSG’s acquisition list includes body-worn video and audio bugs to capture and transmit real-time live images and sounds during operations and X-ray viewing systems to facilitate real-time measurement of objects located behind obstructions like walls and similar barriers.

They are also seeking Mini-Remotely Operated Vehicles (MROV) that can be launched for surveillance inside buildings and installations, aircraft, trains and ships, passenger terminals and under vehicles.

The NSG is seeking MROVs with the capability to climb stairs and gradients of up to 45 degrees, in addition to possessing colour video cameras, night-vision capability and modular weapon mounting systems, say SF sources. Improved communication is also a priority but sadly all this equipment is yet to be inducted, despite the hysteria on upgrading the NSG’s firepower and communication systems after the 26/11 fiasco.

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