DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

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INSECURE MANDATE

BALLOT OVER BULLET Efficiency of the security system should be visible in the country’s fight against terrorism I AJAI SAHNI STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

THREAT FROM TALIBAN Indian needs to be a major player in the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan I AMITABH DUBEY JUNE 2009

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 1

ISSUE 6

Rs 250

COVER STORY

NEW CHIEF, OLD CHALLENGES Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik is faced with an ageing fleet, a depleting combat force, lax nuclear employment and hurdles in the way of modernisation I JASJIT SINGH

A REPORT ON PARIS AIR SHOW 2009

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LETTER FROM THE

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editor

EDITOR Defence & Security of India

or the first time in all these decades, Pakistan is at war and it is not with India.

Despite that India is not immune to the repercussions from that war. For India, it means the war with Taliban has moved next door and the threat of Taliban now, more than ever before, looms at the border. We at DSI look at what the threat from Taliban means for Pakistan and the implications of the war for New Delhi.

The Taliban has created a fragmented social response within Pakistan. One section of society is in agreement with the imposition of religious law in Swat, but the thinking in terms of fighting the Taliban resonates amongst the liberal elite, which looks at the threat in isolation and is not considering past and current linkages between the militants and the state. For such people, the military is the only method for fighting the incursion of the Taliban. Therefore, while opposing the military’s adventures in other parts of the country such as Baluchistan, the liberal elite is only too willing to push the use of force in the North West Frontier. Pakistan has always been a land of contradictions, but never more than now.

As Pakistani forces attempt to force back the Taliban from the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the challenge before Indian policymakers is to reconcile an apparent paradox: How to coerce or deter hostile elements in Pakistan without pushing them to the point either that they are too weak to confront the Taliban or provoking a nationalist backlash that facilitates an even greater radicalisation.

The gradual expansion of jihadist activities in Pakistan and steadily rising levels of violence, particularly in Pakistani Punjab, will hit India hard. Radicals in Pakistan could seek to strike at Indian targets—just as they did in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, for example—to provoke Indian retaliation and thereby ease the pressure on them as Pakistani forces divert to deal with the Indian threat.

As all this unfolds in India’s neighbourhood, India has just emerged from one of the most challenging internal security threats: a general election. The security agencies managed a successful operation but that does not mean India is now a more secure country. We look at why that is so.

There is a new government at the helm in New Delhi, DSI looks at some of the foreign policy issues that will continue to haunt the government for the next five years.

There is also a new air chief in the saddle in New Delhi and DSI explores the challenges and opportunities that lie before him.

Finally, to help us shape DSI into a periodical that meets your expectations, we continue to solicit the feedback of our readers. Write in at dsieditor@gmail.com. In case you are wondering how you can subscribe, all you need to do is to send an email to dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will handle the rest.

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The gradual expansion of jihadist activities in Pakistan and steadily rising levels of violence, particularly in Pakistani Punjab, will hit India hard

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PARIS AIR SHOW 2009

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SOARING PARISIAN HIGHS The pavilions were all there but the chalets were empty as the Paris Air Show at Le Bourget took off amid troubled economic skies although fast jets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continued to hog the limelight for everyone present there.

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

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THREAT FROM TALIBAN With so much at stake, India needs to be a major player in the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan. The key lies in realising that unless that is checked, the gradual expansion of jihadist activities in that country and steadily rising levels of violence, will hit India hard.

INSECURE MANDATE

COVER STORY

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NEW CHIEF OLD CHALLENGES An ageing fleet, a depleting combat force, lax nuclear employment and hurdles in the way of modernisation are the challenges facing the new Air Chief Marshal .

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BALLOT OVER BULLET Perversity of politics and an inadequate capacity make it difficult for the country to make efficient use of its security machinery to tackle terrorism and insurgency.

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE

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THE PAKISTAN PUZZLE Will Pakistan be able to survive the Taliban threat or will it pull in the reins at the right time denying them a greater control of the state?

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FUTURE FOCUS

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NEIGHBOUR’S ENVY India’s neighbourhood is in a state of flux, and the onus lies on us to pay much more attention to and devote much more resources in this area than the country has ever done in the last 20 years. The idea is to first identify and then address the issues facing us, and these issues are elementary.

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PARIS AIR SHOW 2009

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SOARING PARISIAN HIGHS The pavilions were all there but the chalets were empty as the Paris Air Show at Le Bourget took off amid troubled economic skies although fast jets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continued to hog the limelight for everyone present there.

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY

26

THREAT FROM TALIBAN With so much at stake, India needs to be a major player in the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan. The key lies in realising that unless that is checked, the gradual expansion of jihadist activities in that country and steadily rising levels of violence, will hit India hard.

INSECURE MANDATE

COVER STORY

6

NEW CHIEF OLD CHALLENGES An ageing fleet, a depleting combat force, lax nuclear employment and hurdles in the way of modernisation are the challenges facing the new Air Chief Marshal .

40

BALLOT OVER BULLET Perversity of politics and an inadequate capacity make it difficult for the country to make efficient use of its security machinery to tackle terrorism and insurgency.

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE

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THE PAKISTAN PUZZLE Will Pakistan be able to survive the Taliban threat or will it pull in the reins at the right time denying them a greater control of the state?

2

3

FUTURE FOCUS

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NEIGHBOUR’S ENVY India’s neighbourhood is in a state of flux, and the onus lies on us to pay much more attention to and devote much more resources in this area than the country has ever done in the last 20 years. The idea is to first identify and then address the issues facing us, and these issues are elementary.

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CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JUNE 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 6 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

ARUN SHOURIE

AJAI SAHNI

AMITABH DUBEY

ADAM BADDELEY

AYESHA SIDDIQA

JASJIT SINGH

A member of parliament, Arun Shourie has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

Ajai Sahni is Founding Member & Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management. He is also Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

He received a Ph.D. from Delhi University with his thesis on Democracy, Dissent & the Right to Information.

Amitabh Dubey is the Director of India Research at Trusted Sources, a Londonbased firm that provides emerging market research to financial institutions, central banks and hedge funds. He has degrees in economics and political science from Delhi University, University of Chicago and Columbia University.

Adam Baddeley is the Editor of Asian Military Review. He specialises in the area of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). He writes for over twenty defence and aerospace publications across the globe.

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political and defence analyst currently teaching at the University of Pennsylvania. She has a PhD in War Studies and is the author of Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy; and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. She has served in Pakistan’s civil service, and is a columnist for Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM VrC VM, recipient of the Padma Bhushan, is the founder Director of the Centre of Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is the author and editor of over three dozen books and has published extensively on strategic issues. He was the Convenor of the 3member Task Force to set up India’s National Security Conference in 1998 and part of the core team to prepare the nuclear doctrine in 1999.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Sonia Shukla ASSISTANT EDITOR

Lavanya Kumari ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Parveen Kumar Ajay Kumar BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

K-35, Green Park Main New Delhi 110016. India Ph: +91 11 26868775/26960926 Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi 110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40. For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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JUNE, 2009

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JUNE 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 6 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

ARUN SHOURIE

AJAI SAHNI

AMITABH DUBEY

ADAM BADDELEY

AYESHA SIDDIQA

JASJIT SINGH

A member of parliament, Arun Shourie has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

Ajai Sahni is Founding Member & Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management. He is also Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

He received a Ph.D. from Delhi University with his thesis on Democracy, Dissent & the Right to Information.

Amitabh Dubey is the Director of India Research at Trusted Sources, a Londonbased firm that provides emerging market research to financial institutions, central banks and hedge funds. He has degrees in economics and political science from Delhi University, University of Chicago and Columbia University.

Adam Baddeley is the Editor of Asian Military Review. He specialises in the area of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). He writes for over twenty defence and aerospace publications across the globe.

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political and defence analyst currently teaching at the University of Pennsylvania. She has a PhD in War Studies and is the author of Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy; and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. She has served in Pakistan’s civil service, and is a columnist for Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM VrC VM, recipient of the Padma Bhushan, is the founder Director of the Centre of Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is the author and editor of over three dozen books and has published extensively on strategic issues. He was the Convenor of the 3member Task Force to set up India’s National Security Conference in 1998 and part of the core team to prepare the nuclear doctrine in 1999.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Sonia Shukla ASSISTANT EDITOR

Lavanya Kumari ART DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Parveen Kumar Ajay Kumar BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey Ritesh Roy Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

K-35, Green Park Main New Delhi 110016. India Ph: +91 11 26868775/26960926 Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Charlton D’Silva, Australia Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan Clang Garcia, Philippines Alla Butova, Russia Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa Diane Obright, USA/Brazil Margie Brown, USA/Canada Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi 110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is published once in two months and can be obtained by subscription.

Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for 12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $ 40. For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

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An IAF Sukhoi Su-30 flies past the Indian national flag (L); India’s New Chief of Air Staff Pradeep Vasant Naik shakes hands with outgoing Air Chief F H Major (R)

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NEW CHIEF OLD CHALLENGES 6

JASJIT SINGH

The Air Chief Marshal has plans but he needs government support

ORD Trenchard, when told to set up an independent Air Force in the UK in 1918, sat down with a paper and pencil and after some doodling discovered that he would need a large number of professional aviators and technicians at the working level to fly aircrafts, maintain them, and carry out numerous administrative chores. But at the senior level, the numbers would have to keep shrinking to finally one man at the top to maintain command hierarchies. This naturally posed a greatest challenge of designing a new air force, which must remain highly motivated, youthful enough for offensive operations, and yet of the highest quality. This manpower planning challenge that is endemic to all air forces, has been haunting the Indian Air Force since the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Ironically, no real solution has been found as yet.

All we have concentrated on is to upgrade ranks through “cadre reviews�, to improve career prospects and enhance retiring ages making the fighting force older. In effect, this gives people an opportunity to get higher pays and they retire later. But the flip side is that the upgradation actually works out to downgradation of ranks as the status, authority and responsibility that earlier went with the ranks, are no longer available to the cadrebased administratively heightened ranks.

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Inevitably, tensions with the civil services have increased.

The obvious answer lies in delinking pay from the rank. Pay is the compensation disbursed by the government to maintain a certain standard of living and would have to keep increasing through the service by putting the individual through a promotion check. However, the rank is a symbol of authority, responsibility and accountability.

The numbers that can be accommodated in higher ranks in field and combat units are limited, therefore, the bulk of higher ranks get concentrated in headquarters with serious adverse implications for a fighting force. Also, with the proliferation of higher ranks that have to carry out jobs that most of them did when at a lower rank, additional (paper) work gets generated in the absence of meaningful tasks for all of them. On the other hand, there is a strange opposition towards the retirement of officers even after they have finished their active flying career and earned their pension. This opposition prevails despite the fact that it is a low-costoption for the government even after giving away retirement benefits. Manpower is the most vital asset in a fighting force and yet, one of the greatest challenges that Indian Air Force has been facing for decades is that of manpower planning, their training ,employment and finally rehabilitation. The latest CAG report has highlighted the shortage of pilots; and this has to be seen in

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An IAF Sukhoi Su-30 flies past the Indian national flag (L); India’s New Chief of Air Staff Pradeep Vasant Naik shakes hands with outgoing Air Chief F H Major (R)

L

NEW CHIEF OLD CHALLENGES 6

JASJIT SINGH

The Air Chief Marshal has plans but he needs government support

ORD Trenchard, when told to set up an independent Air Force in the UK in 1918, sat down with a paper and pencil and after some doodling discovered that he would need a large number of professional aviators and technicians at the working level to fly aircrafts, maintain them, and carry out numerous administrative chores. But at the senior level, the numbers would have to keep shrinking to finally one man at the top to maintain command hierarchies. This naturally posed a greatest challenge of designing a new air force, which must remain highly motivated, youthful enough for offensive operations, and yet of the highest quality. This manpower planning challenge that is endemic to all air forces, has been haunting the Indian Air Force since the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Ironically, no real solution has been found as yet.

All we have concentrated on is to upgrade ranks through “cadre reviews�, to improve career prospects and enhance retiring ages making the fighting force older. In effect, this gives people an opportunity to get higher pays and they retire later. But the flip side is that the upgradation actually works out to downgradation of ranks as the status, authority and responsibility that earlier went with the ranks, are no longer available to the cadrebased administratively heightened ranks.

7

Inevitably, tensions with the civil services have increased.

The obvious answer lies in delinking pay from the rank. Pay is the compensation disbursed by the government to maintain a certain standard of living and would have to keep increasing through the service by putting the individual through a promotion check. However, the rank is a symbol of authority, responsibility and accountability.

The numbers that can be accommodated in higher ranks in field and combat units are limited, therefore, the bulk of higher ranks get concentrated in headquarters with serious adverse implications for a fighting force. Also, with the proliferation of higher ranks that have to carry out jobs that most of them did when at a lower rank, additional (paper) work gets generated in the absence of meaningful tasks for all of them. On the other hand, there is a strange opposition towards the retirement of officers even after they have finished their active flying career and earned their pension. This opposition prevails despite the fact that it is a low-costoption for the government even after giving away retirement benefits. Manpower is the most vital asset in a fighting force and yet, one of the greatest challenges that Indian Air Force has been facing for decades is that of manpower planning, their training ,employment and finally rehabilitation. The latest CAG report has highlighted the shortage of pilots; and this has to be seen in

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the Kargil sector would be the context of the large Indian Defence numbers of Su-30 designed to Minister A. K. Antony minimal. Our failure of intelligence was so gross that the be a two-pilot aircraft entering (L); A formation of Army Commander assured the service in the coming years. MIG-21 fighter public and the defence minister The average age of combat aircrafts said that these “militants” from pilots has been going up. Air Chief Marshal PC Lal had quipped when across the Line of Control would be these issues were brought to his notice that ‘cleared’ in a couple of days!

Obviously, there is little that a chief can Mussolini’s air force had a majority of officers in the rank of Colonels! We may not do about a depleting combat force level, be far from that situation. But any change in except to press the government to expedite this area would pose difficulties in a caste- the acquisition of aircrafts and increase the driven psyche especially when ranks denote quantum of pilot training. At the operative moving up the ladder of military hierarchy. level, all that can be ensured is that quality of Perhaps, what the chief would have to training equips personnel to counter worry equally about is the rapid and adverse contingenies without looking unplanned decline in the combat force level around for the nuclear button to defend of the Air Force since the mid-2000s. The against a conventional threat.

This scenario may appear alarming or schedules of retirement of life-expired aircrafts are very much known since the over-stated to some. But, the reality is that mid-1980s. We did get a reprieve by the life China’s relentless military modernisation extension of the MiG-21s during the early where it has spent an average of more than 1990s but the problem still persists. It is not 12% of its GDP on its military for over 15 as if we did not have the money to buy years when the GDP was growing at an aircrafts. A budget of Rs. 40,000 crore average rate of around 9% per year has for capital acquisitions by the government provided it with a clear advantage in the air to strengthen our defence capability, power balance. Besides, it is well ahead of simply lapsed, especially after the 1999 India in space capabilities for military Kargil War. That war in itself was triggered purposes. An example of that was off by Pakistan on the assumption that demonstrated by its anti-satellite capability the Indian military capability had in January 2007, when it destroyed an old deteriorated, that its army was tired and satellite with a ground-launched missile.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has been involved largely in internal security matters and that its ability to fight at heights of furiously modernising and building up its

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air force with assistance from the United States on one side, and China on the other.

While any talk of a two-front war would appear to be unlikely, the collusion between the two must not be ignored.

The IAF combat force level has dropped from its authorised level of 39 combat squadrons to around 31 and may go down to as low as 29 (even with the manufacturing of Su-30 being stepped up). Even our AJT (argued as a back up for the combat force) seem to have run into trouble and it appears, we are getting ready to look for a different aircraft owing to the problems with the Hawk trainer. This has to be seen in the light of the fact that although the requirement was close to 160 aircrafts, the acquisition was pared down to 66. Probably, in the expectation that more would be ordered later. This denied us the economies of scale like it happened in the case of piecemeal acquisition of the Jaguar strike aircraft. Given the glacial pace at which the acquisition process for 126 MMRCA is going on, one isn’t too confident about its restoration to authorised levels before the year 2025. Meanwhile, vulnerability exists in the most crucial areas of conventional capability. A fast track acquisition of a ‘preused’ aircraft which would be easier to induct into the force (like the MiG-29 from Russia, the Mirage-2000 from France) or even 5-6 squadron worth of F-16C/D from the US appear to be the only option to plug

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the vulnerability window. The LCA remains a possible option, but it falls short of the performance criteria. Moreover, it has not been fully tested. A couple of squadrons may be inducted just like the HF-24 Marut aircraft four decades ago. But the redesigning and development of a Mk-2 LCA with a more powerful engine would take five-odd years and then another six to 10 years to build up a force of six-odd squadrons. So, the window of vulnerability in the air power balance that is already impinging on us, will remain for the next decade or more.

The third major challenge emerges from nuclear weapons and the strategy for their possible employment. For more than two decades, the IAF has been a primary instrument of nuclear deterrence for our defence. China had gone nuclear in 1964 and Pakistan formally crossed the threshold to become an overt nuclear weapon state in 1998 although it had, in the words of its own then-army chief, acquired the deterrent before 1989.

Having adopted the doctrine of no-firstuse and hence a strategy of assured retaliation (“leading to unacceptable damage”) to a nuclear attack on Indian Air Force India or its forces, pilots of the Surya the success of this Kiran Aerobatics Team (SKAT) display deterrence lies in an their skills during the effective counterstrike strategy. In Hawk Advanced Jet turn, survivability Trainer aircraft of the counter-strike induction ceremony capabilities would be a critical element in the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear defence. In other words, the adversary’s priority would be to target command, control and delivery forces. While the Strategic Forces Command would control all nuclear forces and responses, the bulk of this can be exercised only through Air Force channels and assets with the aircrafts being as critical as nuclear delivery systems.

In other words, Air Force bases, command and control centres and aircrafts would become a priority target for the enemy’s disarming first nuclear strike. This simple reality demands re-deployment of strike aircraft like Su-30s to air bases much deeper inside the country. Fortunately, we have sufficient strategic depth to enable such re-deployments and alter the basic paradigm of combat force deployment for greater security as compared to nearly 80% of the operational flying bases within 300kms or less from the international

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number of aspects have been border and hence, vulnerable to IAF officers and telescoped owing to a variety of even the conventional attacks by crew of the reasons. Transformation of an air hostile air forces. Similarly, Airborne Warning command and control centres of and Control System force is a major challenge that our Command HQs need to be (AWACS) aeroplane requires a clear vision and sustenable consistent policies to created in deep underground operation rooms to make them survivable achieve that vision. The vision has already against a nuclear strike. Incidentally, even in been articulated in terms of seeking strategic non-nuclear scenarios, there is a critical reach for strategic effect. But its translation need to ensure that large sized aircrafts like into practical capabilities can be achieved those used for aerial-refuelling and/or only over time. While induction of new AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and technology systems ranging from more Control Systems) should normally be kept capable combat aircrafts to combat support far away from potential attacks. This is also systems like aerial refuelling capabilities, one of the reasons why Pakistan has been AWACS—the first of which is scheduled to seeking “strategic depth” by controlling enter service this year, and UAVs Afghanistan with or without Taliban! (Unmanned Air Vehicles). The real Hence, the need to relocate them further transformation would take place when inside the large territory that we possess. maximum exploitation of new capabilities Such re-deployments would certainly and generating the synergy starts to impact demand a lot of resources; but the cost of the transformational processes, corresnot doing so would be much higher. ponding with a change of minds. The Especially, if Pakistan concludes that its incoming chief is one of the most combat pilots and disarming nuclear first strike would be able distinguished to make a major dent in the Indian nuclear commanders of the Air Force and we can be confident that he would place great deterrent capability.

The fourth major challenge concerns the emphasis on achieving this vision. The transformation of the Air Force where a question that will continue to haunt us is,

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would the government support this process with requisite resources and prompt decision making it compatible with the process and goals of transformation?

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM VrC VM, recipient of the Padma Bhushan for lifetime contribution to national defence, is the founder Director of the Centre of Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is a former fighter pilot and Director of Operations of the Indian Air Force and has headed India’s premier strategic studies think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi (1987-200). He is the author and editor of over three dozen books including Air Power in Modern Warfare (1985), Non-provocative Defence (1989), Nuclear India (1998); India's Defence Spending(2000), Defence From the Skies (2007), and the forthcoming The Icon: Biography of Marshal of the IAF Arjan Singh. He has published extensively on strategic issues. Visiting lecturer at defence and war colleges in India and abroad, he was the Convenor of the 3-member Task Force to set up India’s National Security Conference in 1998 and part of the core team to prepare the nuclear doctrine in 1999.

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Flightline view

SOARING PARISIAN HIGHS L

E Bourget was muted, partly due to the grey skies in Paris, partly due to the safety concerns after the recent Air France crash, but most of all due to the enduring impact of the credit crunch, prompting procurement delays and cancellations.

India’s presence was notable by its absence on the tarmac. An Indian Pavilion was shown on the organiser’s maps, but the space itself was empty. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) had no aircrafts on display, despite the recent export sales of its Dhruv helicopter to Ecuador. It nonetheless had a model of its new Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) in its chalet. A dedicated attack platform, the LCH is designed to destroy armoured forces by day or night and is powered by two Shakti engines. The LCH’s first flight is due by the end of the year.

In Paris, Dr. Sivathanu Pillai, chief

ADAM BADDELEY

Le Bourget takes its air show flight amid troubled economic skies

13

executive officer of the Brahmos IndoRussian joint venture, was quoted as saying that the Mach 3, 180km-range BrahMos anti-ship missile will enter service with the SU-30MKI in 2012; with up to 2000 missiles required. Moreover, plans for the BrahMos II missile are now underway.

The latest defence equipment is increasingly being offered to India. Thales Raytheon Systems is pursuing India’s ongoing low level transportable radar requirement, offering the Sentinel radar, which is in frontline service with the US to at least 2030. The company also expressed interest in Air Traffic Control opportunities in Calcutta and Chennai.

On show on the flightline was an example of the US MC-130 Hercules aircraft, an earlier version of the MC-130J aircraft ordered by India in 2008. These six Hercules will receive the FLIR Systems’ STAR Safire 3 nose-mounted surveillance

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turret. FLIR is now in discussions with HAL to maintain and service these systems and potentially integrate similar systems on the Dhruv and other aircraft.

A number of companies reported a growing presence in India. In October, Rockwell Collins opened its India Design Center supporting new avionics and navigation products and reported that the facility is working extremely well.

Indian firm Samtel, manufacturer of multifunctional displays, has a significant presence on a number of international platforms. Last year Samtel secured a deal with Thales to supply (Above) India’s colour avionics Minister of State displays for Airbus A330s and A340s. The for Defence Pallam Raju (right) with company’s displays French Defence are on India’s SU30 Minister Herve MKIs and other Morin (left). (R) military aircraft. The Hercules HC-130 company is partnered with Honeywell, supplying the US firm with colour avionics tubes for the global market.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) continue to be a significant feature at Paris.

Israeli UAVs are receiving increased interest from the US, with General Dynamics and Elbit partnering to offer the latter’s Hermes and Skylark UAVs to meet US requirements.

Elbit announced its latest UAV at the show, the Hermes 90, an 18-hour endurance, 20km-range platform which can be deployed by as few as two people. IAI unveiled its UAV-like Harop loitering munition at Le Bourget — staying in the air for six hours before hitting its target with a 23kg warhead. A $100m Harop contract was signed with the first customer, reported to be Turkey. To meet demand for UAV, Boeing is to stand up a new business unit specifically for this class of platform.

Fast jets are a staple of air shows. Indian interest in these aircraft is through the prism of the $12billion Multi-Role Combat Aircraft

Many defence companies are showing interest in expanding their business in India. A number of them are offering the latest defence equipment.

14

”

DSI

(MRCA) programme for 126 Dassault Rafale on 2 plans (RBE2) active radar in aircraft. It’s not the only activity. display at Paris Air 2012, should it select the Rafale aircraft. Saab’s Gripen, another The first of an initial 16 MiG- show 2009 contender, in the hands of the 29K/KUB carrier variants must be delivered to India by the end of the year. Czech air force, is now in thethe midst Sukhoi is to supply a further 34 Russian of providing air coverage to the Baltic built Su-30MKIs by the end of 2010 on top nations. The New Gripen (NG) has also of a total of 140 licence-produced aircraft, flown at Mach 1.6 in super cruise mode due to be completed in 2013-15. MiG is now and has flown with mock-ups of MBDA’s working towards starting up the advanced Meteor missile. production line on its latest MiG-35 aircraft with India as a target as a launch customer. Adam Baddeley is eitor of the Asian Boeing is offering its F-18 E/F aircraft for Military Review. He specialises in the area of India’s technology transfer requirement. C4ISR (Command, Control, CommDassault head Charles Edelstenne was unications, Computers, Intelligence, quoted at the show as saying that he Surveillance and Reconnaissance). He writes thought India would not be in line to for over twenty defence and aerospace receive the Radar à Balayage Electronique publications across the globe.

15

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turret. FLIR is now in discussions with HAL to maintain and service these systems and potentially integrate similar systems on the Dhruv and other aircraft.

A number of companies reported a growing presence in India. In October, Rockwell Collins opened its India Design Center supporting new avionics and navigation products and reported that the facility is working extremely well.

Indian firm Samtel, manufacturer of multifunctional displays, has a significant presence on a number of international platforms. Last year Samtel secured a deal with Thales to supply (Above) India’s colour avionics Minister of State displays for Airbus A330s and A340s. The for Defence Pallam Raju (right) with company’s displays French Defence are on India’s SU30 Minister Herve MKIs and other Morin (left). (R) military aircraft. The Hercules HC-130 company is partnered with Honeywell, supplying the US firm with colour avionics tubes for the global market.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) continue to be a significant feature at Paris.

Israeli UAVs are receiving increased interest from the US, with General Dynamics and Elbit partnering to offer the latter’s Hermes and Skylark UAVs to meet US requirements.

Elbit announced its latest UAV at the show, the Hermes 90, an 18-hour endurance, 20km-range platform which can be deployed by as few as two people. IAI unveiled its UAV-like Harop loitering munition at Le Bourget — staying in the air for six hours before hitting its target with a 23kg warhead. A $100m Harop contract was signed with the first customer, reported to be Turkey. To meet demand for UAV, Boeing is to stand up a new business unit specifically for this class of platform.

Fast jets are a staple of air shows. Indian interest in these aircraft is through the prism of the $12billion Multi-Role Combat Aircraft

Many defence companies are showing interest in expanding their business in India. A number of them are offering the latest defence equipment.

14

”

DSI

(MRCA) programme for 126 Dassault Rafale on 2 plans (RBE2) active radar in aircraft. It’s not the only activity. display at Paris Air 2012, should it select the Rafale aircraft. Saab’s Gripen, another The first of an initial 16 MiG- show 2009 contender, in the hands of the 29K/KUB carrier variants must be delivered to India by the end of the year. Czech air force, is now in thethe midst Sukhoi is to supply a further 34 Russian of providing air coverage to the Baltic built Su-30MKIs by the end of 2010 on top nations. The New Gripen (NG) has also of a total of 140 licence-produced aircraft, flown at Mach 1.6 in super cruise mode due to be completed in 2013-15. MiG is now and has flown with mock-ups of MBDA’s working towards starting up the advanced Meteor missile. production line on its latest MiG-35 aircraft with India as a target as a launch customer. Adam Baddeley is eitor of the Asian Boeing is offering its F-18 E/F aircraft for Military Review. He specialises in the area of India’s technology transfer requirement. C4ISR (Command, Control, CommDassault head Charles Edelstenne was unications, Computers, Intelligence, quoted at the show as saying that he Surveillance and Reconnaissance). He writes thought India would not be in line to for over twenty defence and aerospace receive the Radar à Balayage Electronique publications across the globe.

15

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NEIGHBOUR’S ENVY Foreign policy challenges in India’s neighbourhood for the new government

ARUN SHOURIE

I

NDIA’S neighbourhood is in flux. It is troubled. The flux will swirl at an even faster pace in the coming years. And the troubles within the countries around India, as well as the trouble they are liable to cause India too seem set to intensify. It isn’t just that several of its neighbours— China, Pakistan, Bangladesh—have definite agendas towards India, several of the steps that they are liable to take for meeting their own circumstances are sure to have major consequences for India.

Accordingly, one of the prominent features as we look 20 years ahead is that India will have to pay much more attention to, and devote much greater resources to its neighbours than it has been doing in the last 20 years.

Five general factors Before we consider specific developments in its neighbourhood that will affect India and how it should prepare to respond to them, we should note five general factors originating in, and concerned with its neighbours that are certain to impact India

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (right) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (left) at a press briefing

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DSI

NEIGHBOUR’S ENVY Foreign policy challenges in India’s neighbourhood for the new government

ARUN SHOURIE

I

NDIA’S neighbourhood is in flux. It is troubled. The flux will swirl at an even faster pace in the coming years. And the troubles within the countries around India, as well as the trouble they are liable to cause India too seem set to intensify. It isn’t just that several of its neighbours— China, Pakistan, Bangladesh—have definite agendas towards India, several of the steps that they are liable to take for meeting their own circumstances are sure to have major consequences for India.

Accordingly, one of the prominent features as we look 20 years ahead is that India will have to pay much more attention to, and devote much greater resources to its neighbours than it has been doing in the last 20 years.

Five general factors Before we consider specific developments in its neighbourhood that will affect India and how it should prepare to respond to them, we should note five general factors originating in, and concerned with its neighbours that are certain to impact India

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (right) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (left) at a press briefing

16

17

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FUTURE FOCUS in ways that are vital to its prospects.

Foremost among these is the impact that the pattern of development in its neighbours, as well as in India itself is liable to have on the ecology of and around India. For instance,

Denudation of eastern Tibet and intensified exploitation of mineral and other resources within Tibet by China will contribute to accelerating the pace at which Himalayan glaciers are already melting. As all the major rivers of north India except the Ganges originate in the Tibetan plateau, such acceleration will affect every aspect of life in the subcontinent.

India—in particular, eastern India—is already suffering severely from the consequences of illegal migration from Bangladesh: about 20 million Bangladeshis are estimated to have crossed into India; they have exacerbated social, ethnic and political tensions across eastern India. If, to the factors that have been hitherto causing and facilitating this influx, is added the effect of climate change—the rise of the sea level and the consequential submergence of large swaths of Bangladesh, in particular of the densely populated coastal areas— the movement of Bangladeshis into India will assume the proportions of a disaster.

Overexploitation of the Indus in its upper reaches has begun to cause extensive salination of the soil in Sindh, just as its reduced flow is beginning to cause ingress of the sea. Slower development in Pakistan as well as uncertainties that bedevil the country have already begun to cause migrants to cross over the Indian border: the 2000 Census revealed that villages had sprung up on the Indian side, in Rajasthan, that did not exist even 10 years earlier. If on top of these factors, ecological deterioration of this kind continues, India will be faced with an influx from the West to compound the problems that arise today from influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh.

The second feature that will have major consequences is the evolving demography of the region. Unemployment rates are already high in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. At current rates of growth, the numbers of unemployed are certain to increase. On top of these realities of the present, population in these States is continuing to grow at a rapid rate: Pakistan, with a population that already exceeds that of Russia, is expected to add another 70 million between 2000 and 2020 —almost half its total population in 2000; Nepal is expected to add 46 per cent to its 2000 population of 24 million; Bangladesh is

DSI

are becoming increasingly self-sufficient: they are able to raise resources through extortion—for instance, from contractors carrying out projects financed by the respective governments. These groups— secessionist groups like ULFA in the Northeast; the Naxalites from the border with Nepal to the edge of Karnataka; the Islamic terrorist groups—have linkages across countries of the region through arms dealers, through hawala operators, through smugglers’ networks. As a result, even apart from the consequences that befall it because of the singular aim of a country like Pakistan, India will have to contend with these ominous tumours that now extend across the region.

While encouraging people-to-people contacts or the peace process with Pakistan, India must be aware of their limitations: the crucial determinant is not this ruler or that, it is the nature of the State and society of Pakistan

Twelve general prescriptions

”

expected to add 53 million, over 40 per cent of its 2000 population of 130 million.

Third, at least three countries of the region have a definite and adversarial view of India. These are China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. First, they are by now well knit; in particular in regard to the steps they shall take vis-à-vis India. Second, while the principal cause of instability, violence, deaths within India is the continuing and pervasive power of the military-mullah complex within Pakistan, it is evident that the principal props of Pakistan are not going to move to restrain or deflect it in the foreseeable future.

Arming, equipping and standing by Pakistan are an important instrument of Chinese policy towards this region.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia will neither dilute its support for this important Sunni State nor use its influence to alter Pakistan’s policies towards India. The US has today the greatest influence as far as the governmental apparatus of Pakistan is concerned. But, as the double standards it has adopted in regard to the proliferation activities of Pakistani scientists like AQ Khan and the terrorist depredations that its agencies have continued to inflict show, the US feels itself to be so dependent on Pakistan that it will not use the influence it has to actually deflect Pakistan from its hostile actions against India.

Fourth, with the exception of Bhutan, each of India’s smaller neighbours harbours apprehensions that are common to small neighbours of large States. The population of

18

each of them—and of course, of Bangladesh and Pakistan too—has deep cultural and religious affinities with the population across the country’s border with India. All of them were part of the same British sphere of influence, and in the case of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, of the same British Empire in South Asia.

Moreover, a country like Nepal is economically dependent on India. Precisely because their populations are culturally and religiously akin to their neighbours in India, precisely because they have shared a common history till so recently, these countries are all the more anxious to affirm that they are different. Precisely because a country like Nepal is economically dependent on India, cooperating in any project with India is a major, and hitherto insuperable political issue within the

swaths of each of its country. Furthermore, to Pakistani security personnel neighbours, as in vast safeguard itself, India has inspect the bomb blast site in stretches of India itself, to aim to be strong enough Peshawar. It is difficult to governance has virtually to stand up to China—but anticipate relations with the more it does so, the Pakistan over the next 10 years evaporated. The writ of the State no longer runs in more apprehensive its smaller neighbours become of India. them—the writ of the local terrorist organiTwo consequences follow. First, these sation, of the smugglers’ network, of the neighbours will seek every opportunity to local don is what determines what will play China and India off against each other: happen: whether this be who shall get the it is no accident that all the countries of the contract for executing a government region, save Bhutan, moved to admit China “development project” or it be who shall into SAARC with an observer status. Hence prevail in a land dispute. Apart from the second consequence: India will have to the other consequences that this inflicts, devote enormous effort and very sub- the resulting vacuum clears space and stantial resources to assuage the anxieties of opportunity for non-State forces. Several terrorist groups operating in India have its smaller neighbours.

The fifth general development that will had State sponsorship—for instance, that impact India is the deterioration of of Pakistan’s Army and intelligence governance across the region. In several agencies. But, in addition, several groups

19

Each of these general features dictates imperatives for India, imperatives that will become evident as we review prospects and options vis-à-vis individual neighbours. Twelve general prescriptions, however, can be noted even at this stage: In spite of the difficulties that surround it, in a sense as one way to deal with them, India must grow rapidly, acquiring what the Chinese correctly characterise “Comprehensive National Strength’’. That growth may stimulate others who are today caught up in creating trouble for themselves and others to redirect their energies. It will give India the sinews to meet the challenges that it faces, including those from a neighbour like China. It will give India the opportunity to try and coopt some of its neighbours in growth so that their own prosperity gets intertwined with India’s continuing growth.

India will have to reverse the current pattern of its policies, a pattern marred by three features: 1. Half-hearted and hesitant: initiatives are begun, at the minuscule scale of pilot projects, and they remain at that scale; to make a dent, the policies will have to be robust and India’s initiatives and interventions will have to be of a qualitatively larger scale; 2. Piecemeal: contrast the way each ministry and state in India deals with multinationals with the coordination between all agencies and levels of Government that firms experience when they invest in China; 3. Here today and soon forgotten: to meet the challenges that it faces in its neighbourhood as well as to seize the opportunities that lie in the future, policies will have to be

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FUTURE FOCUS in ways that are vital to its prospects.

Foremost among these is the impact that the pattern of development in its neighbours, as well as in India itself is liable to have on the ecology of and around India. For instance,

Denudation of eastern Tibet and intensified exploitation of mineral and other resources within Tibet by China will contribute to accelerating the pace at which Himalayan glaciers are already melting. As all the major rivers of north India except the Ganges originate in the Tibetan plateau, such acceleration will affect every aspect of life in the subcontinent.

India—in particular, eastern India—is already suffering severely from the consequences of illegal migration from Bangladesh: about 20 million Bangladeshis are estimated to have crossed into India; they have exacerbated social, ethnic and political tensions across eastern India. If, to the factors that have been hitherto causing and facilitating this influx, is added the effect of climate change—the rise of the sea level and the consequential submergence of large swaths of Bangladesh, in particular of the densely populated coastal areas— the movement of Bangladeshis into India will assume the proportions of a disaster.

Overexploitation of the Indus in its upper reaches has begun to cause extensive salination of the soil in Sindh, just as its reduced flow is beginning to cause ingress of the sea. Slower development in Pakistan as well as uncertainties that bedevil the country have already begun to cause migrants to cross over the Indian border: the 2000 Census revealed that villages had sprung up on the Indian side, in Rajasthan, that did not exist even 10 years earlier. If on top of these factors, ecological deterioration of this kind continues, India will be faced with an influx from the West to compound the problems that arise today from influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh.

The second feature that will have major consequences is the evolving demography of the region. Unemployment rates are already high in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. At current rates of growth, the numbers of unemployed are certain to increase. On top of these realities of the present, population in these States is continuing to grow at a rapid rate: Pakistan, with a population that already exceeds that of Russia, is expected to add another 70 million between 2000 and 2020 —almost half its total population in 2000; Nepal is expected to add 46 per cent to its 2000 population of 24 million; Bangladesh is

DSI

are becoming increasingly self-sufficient: they are able to raise resources through extortion—for instance, from contractors carrying out projects financed by the respective governments. These groups— secessionist groups like ULFA in the Northeast; the Naxalites from the border with Nepal to the edge of Karnataka; the Islamic terrorist groups—have linkages across countries of the region through arms dealers, through hawala operators, through smugglers’ networks. As a result, even apart from the consequences that befall it because of the singular aim of a country like Pakistan, India will have to contend with these ominous tumours that now extend across the region.

While encouraging people-to-people contacts or the peace process with Pakistan, India must be aware of their limitations: the crucial determinant is not this ruler or that, it is the nature of the State and society of Pakistan

Twelve general prescriptions

”

expected to add 53 million, over 40 per cent of its 2000 population of 130 million.

Third, at least three countries of the region have a definite and adversarial view of India. These are China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. First, they are by now well knit; in particular in regard to the steps they shall take vis-à-vis India. Second, while the principal cause of instability, violence, deaths within India is the continuing and pervasive power of the military-mullah complex within Pakistan, it is evident that the principal props of Pakistan are not going to move to restrain or deflect it in the foreseeable future.

Arming, equipping and standing by Pakistan are an important instrument of Chinese policy towards this region.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia will neither dilute its support for this important Sunni State nor use its influence to alter Pakistan’s policies towards India. The US has today the greatest influence as far as the governmental apparatus of Pakistan is concerned. But, as the double standards it has adopted in regard to the proliferation activities of Pakistani scientists like AQ Khan and the terrorist depredations that its agencies have continued to inflict show, the US feels itself to be so dependent on Pakistan that it will not use the influence it has to actually deflect Pakistan from its hostile actions against India.

Fourth, with the exception of Bhutan, each of India’s smaller neighbours harbours apprehensions that are common to small neighbours of large States. The population of

18

each of them—and of course, of Bangladesh and Pakistan too—has deep cultural and religious affinities with the population across the country’s border with India. All of them were part of the same British sphere of influence, and in the case of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, of the same British Empire in South Asia.

Moreover, a country like Nepal is economically dependent on India. Precisely because their populations are culturally and religiously akin to their neighbours in India, precisely because they have shared a common history till so recently, these countries are all the more anxious to affirm that they are different. Precisely because a country like Nepal is economically dependent on India, cooperating in any project with India is a major, and hitherto insuperable political issue within the

swaths of each of its country. Furthermore, to Pakistani security personnel neighbours, as in vast safeguard itself, India has inspect the bomb blast site in stretches of India itself, to aim to be strong enough Peshawar. It is difficult to governance has virtually to stand up to China—but anticipate relations with the more it does so, the Pakistan over the next 10 years evaporated. The writ of the State no longer runs in more apprehensive its smaller neighbours become of India. them—the writ of the local terrorist organiTwo consequences follow. First, these sation, of the smugglers’ network, of the neighbours will seek every opportunity to local don is what determines what will play China and India off against each other: happen: whether this be who shall get the it is no accident that all the countries of the contract for executing a government region, save Bhutan, moved to admit China “development project” or it be who shall into SAARC with an observer status. Hence prevail in a land dispute. Apart from the second consequence: India will have to the other consequences that this inflicts, devote enormous effort and very sub- the resulting vacuum clears space and stantial resources to assuage the anxieties of opportunity for non-State forces. Several terrorist groups operating in India have its smaller neighbours.

The fifth general development that will had State sponsorship—for instance, that impact India is the deterioration of of Pakistan’s Army and intelligence governance across the region. In several agencies. But, in addition, several groups

19

Each of these general features dictates imperatives for India, imperatives that will become evident as we review prospects and options vis-à-vis individual neighbours. Twelve general prescriptions, however, can be noted even at this stage: In spite of the difficulties that surround it, in a sense as one way to deal with them, India must grow rapidly, acquiring what the Chinese correctly characterise “Comprehensive National Strength’’. That growth may stimulate others who are today caught up in creating trouble for themselves and others to redirect their energies. It will give India the sinews to meet the challenges that it faces, including those from a neighbour like China. It will give India the opportunity to try and coopt some of its neighbours in growth so that their own prosperity gets intertwined with India’s continuing growth.

India will have to reverse the current pattern of its policies, a pattern marred by three features: 1. Half-hearted and hesitant: initiatives are begun, at the minuscule scale of pilot projects, and they remain at that scale; to make a dent, the policies will have to be robust and India’s initiatives and interventions will have to be of a qualitatively larger scale; 2. Piecemeal: contrast the way each ministry and state in India deals with multinationals with the coordination between all agencies and levels of Government that firms experience when they invest in China; 3. Here today and soon forgotten: to meet the challenges that it faces in its neighbourhood as well as to seize the opportunities that lie in the future, policies will have to be

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FUTURE FOCUS pursued for decades at a stretch.

India’s policies will have to be omnidirectional: challenges will come from, opportunities will lie, in all quarters—it will have to deal with and harness all of them.

India must differentiate its neighbours into four groups. China as a class in itself; Pakistan and Bangladesh; the smaller neighbours adjacent to India; and countries in its extended security horizon—countries in the Middle East and Central Asia in one direction and those in Southeast and East Asia in the other. As we shall see, India will have to devise differing approaches to each group.

In particular, in regard to the small countries adjacent to it, India must be as accommodating and as generous as any country can possibly be, and then some more—offering them assistance on a scale and on terms that will allay their apprehensions. As cooperating in projects originating from, in projects some part of the benefits from which will go to India meets with considerable resistance within each of these countries, India should invite organisations like the Asian Development Bank to devise and champion projects which India and its smaller neighbours can undertake together.

Where regional issues make interventions unavoidable—whether these concern Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Maoists in Nepal—India will have to act much more energetically. And it must do so in the certain knowledge that its initiatives in such matters will meet initially with stiff resistance—witness what Pakistan has been doing to thwart even its development work in Afghanistan; witness how it has prohibited even humanitarian supplies from India being sent across to Afghanistan via the land route.

Develop the capacities to mete out, and by its record establish that it is a country that will mete out severe retribution on the country and group that breaches its security and sovereignty.

Devote effort to partner with countries in its extended security horizon: developing close partnerships with countries such as Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics will be one way to deal with Pakistan, and balance China; partnering with Myanmar in developing its northern ports and building the road from Sittwe to Mizoram will be one way to convince Bangladesh that routes through it are not the only ways to India’s Northeast, partnering with Myanmar in exploiting its

natural gas will be one way to make Bangladesh see that its dog-in-the-manger policies in regard to its own gas reserves end up hurting Bangladesh alone.

Join every effort to strengthen international regimes on climate change, as well as on the rights of riparian States.

Develop alliance systems for dealing with Islamic terrorism, for dealing with China.

Engage intensely with the international community in regard to each of its neighbours: How is Pakistan to be kept from continuing as the pivot of terrorism and disruption? What measures will keep Islamic Fundamentalism from commandeering Bangladesh? What can all do together to shore up States in the region that have failed, that are failing, those that are flailing?

Indeed, to keep in the coming 20 years from aggravating problems the way they have been aggravated during the last 20, education of an even more elementary degree is required—both for India and for the West. Have they not shut their eyes to what those who control Pakistan Tamil protestors have been doing, demonstrate outside and instead relied Parliament in on “hope as central London after policy’’?

Have their dream of an they not been independent homeland giving in to appeared crushed blackmail? Have they not ever so often rewarded criminality? Is the “core issue” Kashmir?

Is it even terrorism? Or is it the nature of the State and society of Pakistan?

Confusion, wishful thinking and downright refusal to face facts on these matters have cost India dearly in the last two decades. To face the next two, it must clarify its mind on them, and then engage intensely with the world on each of them.

Use its advantages, its “soft power” much more, and much more creatively: the lure that audiences in the Middle East and Central Asia have for its films; the goodwill it would earn if only it were to set out to so expand and improve its medical facilities that it would become the surgeon of choice for all neighbours; if only it were to so improve and expand its facilities for higher and technical education that, instead of its youth going abroad for study, youth from all these countries would come to India as the educator of choice.

China In the long run, the most formidable challenge. Several aspects of China’s

20

In regard to the small countries adjacent to it, India must be as accommodating and as generous as any country can possibly be, and then some more—offering them assistance on a scale and on terms that will allay their apprehensions

”

rise, and several plans that it has already set in motion will come to impinge heavily on India’s prospects in the coming decades. There is place here to mention just one of them.

As we noted in passing above, according to Chinese authorities 600 cities and towns of China face water shortage; in 200 of them, the scarcity of water has reached “critical” proportions. Moreover, most of China’s rivers have by now come to suffer from substantial pollution. Chinese authorities have also expressed concern at the fact that the flow of the Yellow River is getting depleted while meeting the demands of development in western China. Since engineers conceived it in 1989, the South-North Water Project has come to be looked upon as the magic bullet. Work on it has already begun, and major works in it are certain to have been executed within the period covered by this study.

The essential objective—developed at length in the book by engineers and other officers, Tibet’s Waters Will Save China —is to divert waters of the Tibetan plateau to the north and northwest. The project has been endorsed at several levels, including, it is reported, by the President, Hu Jintao, himself a hydrologist and former Martial Law Administrator of Tibet. Engineering work and surveys have been extensively reported to have commenced. As have parts that will eventually compose the project in its entirety: after building two dams upstream, China is now reported to

21

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be aiming to build three more dams across the Mekong; it has also commenced work on a complex of tunnels—reported to traverse over 300 kms eventually—that will be used for diverting the rivers that flow into India, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia.

And water is just one resource for which China and India will be in competition just as the Tibetan plateau is just one theatre in which India will have to compete with China for resources.

Pakistan We can only hope that things will change in the future but at present two facts stare at all who are concerned about the region: Pakistan is the singular and major source of instability, violence and terrorism in India and beyond; second, it seems set on becoming the source of even greater trouble in the foreseeable future.

It is difficult to anticipate what relations with Pakistan will be over the next 10 years, and what the options are for a country situated next to it because it is difficult to settle on one forecast about the future of Pakistan. At present about 40 per cent of the territory of Pakistan has been wrenched out of the reach of Islamabad: FATA and parts of the NWFP are now areas in which the Taliban and local extremist groups rule; these groups have driven Government forces even out of the Swat Valley, an area just 100 miles from Islamabad; the groups have shown that they can now strike in Lahore, in Islamabad—that is, in the heart of Pakistan, and the strongholds of the Pakistan Army itself; an insurgency has been raging in Baluchistan for the last several years; Karachi itself continues to be a tinder box.

Will Pakistan’s leaders, both civilian and military, have the acumen, statesmanship and vision to pull it out of the current morass? Or will the country continue on the perilous course down which it has been hurtling, and implode?

While encouraging people-to-people contacts or the peace process, India must be aware of their limitations: the crucial determinant is not this ruler or that, it is the nature of the State and society of Pakistan—a State in which the Army and intelligence agencies have a role that is more pervasive and triggers apprehensions of an order that outsiders can scarcely imagine; a society in which extremist notions have percolated far and wide. Given the deep and pervasive power of the Army and of extremist groups and indeed of the ideology on which Pakistan

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FUTURE FOCUS pursued for decades at a stretch.

India’s policies will have to be omnidirectional: challenges will come from, opportunities will lie, in all quarters—it will have to deal with and harness all of them.

India must differentiate its neighbours into four groups. China as a class in itself; Pakistan and Bangladesh; the smaller neighbours adjacent to India; and countries in its extended security horizon—countries in the Middle East and Central Asia in one direction and those in Southeast and East Asia in the other. As we shall see, India will have to devise differing approaches to each group.

In particular, in regard to the small countries adjacent to it, India must be as accommodating and as generous as any country can possibly be, and then some more—offering them assistance on a scale and on terms that will allay their apprehensions. As cooperating in projects originating from, in projects some part of the benefits from which will go to India meets with considerable resistance within each of these countries, India should invite organisations like the Asian Development Bank to devise and champion projects which India and its smaller neighbours can undertake together.

Where regional issues make interventions unavoidable—whether these concern Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Maoists in Nepal—India will have to act much more energetically. And it must do so in the certain knowledge that its initiatives in such matters will meet initially with stiff resistance—witness what Pakistan has been doing to thwart even its development work in Afghanistan; witness how it has prohibited even humanitarian supplies from India being sent across to Afghanistan via the land route.

Develop the capacities to mete out, and by its record establish that it is a country that will mete out severe retribution on the country and group that breaches its security and sovereignty.

Devote effort to partner with countries in its extended security horizon: developing close partnerships with countries such as Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics will be one way to deal with Pakistan, and balance China; partnering with Myanmar in developing its northern ports and building the road from Sittwe to Mizoram will be one way to convince Bangladesh that routes through it are not the only ways to India’s Northeast, partnering with Myanmar in exploiting its

natural gas will be one way to make Bangladesh see that its dog-in-the-manger policies in regard to its own gas reserves end up hurting Bangladesh alone.

Join every effort to strengthen international regimes on climate change, as well as on the rights of riparian States.

Develop alliance systems for dealing with Islamic terrorism, for dealing with China.

Engage intensely with the international community in regard to each of its neighbours: How is Pakistan to be kept from continuing as the pivot of terrorism and disruption? What measures will keep Islamic Fundamentalism from commandeering Bangladesh? What can all do together to shore up States in the region that have failed, that are failing, those that are flailing?

Indeed, to keep in the coming 20 years from aggravating problems the way they have been aggravated during the last 20, education of an even more elementary degree is required—both for India and for the West. Have they not shut their eyes to what those who control Pakistan Tamil protestors have been doing, demonstrate outside and instead relied Parliament in on “hope as central London after policy’’?

Have their dream of an they not been independent homeland giving in to appeared crushed blackmail? Have they not ever so often rewarded criminality? Is the “core issue” Kashmir?

Is it even terrorism? Or is it the nature of the State and society of Pakistan?

Confusion, wishful thinking and downright refusal to face facts on these matters have cost India dearly in the last two decades. To face the next two, it must clarify its mind on them, and then engage intensely with the world on each of them.

Use its advantages, its “soft power” much more, and much more creatively: the lure that audiences in the Middle East and Central Asia have for its films; the goodwill it would earn if only it were to set out to so expand and improve its medical facilities that it would become the surgeon of choice for all neighbours; if only it were to so improve and expand its facilities for higher and technical education that, instead of its youth going abroad for study, youth from all these countries would come to India as the educator of choice.

China In the long run, the most formidable challenge. Several aspects of China’s

20

In regard to the small countries adjacent to it, India must be as accommodating and as generous as any country can possibly be, and then some more—offering them assistance on a scale and on terms that will allay their apprehensions

”

rise, and several plans that it has already set in motion will come to impinge heavily on India’s prospects in the coming decades. There is place here to mention just one of them.

As we noted in passing above, according to Chinese authorities 600 cities and towns of China face water shortage; in 200 of them, the scarcity of water has reached “critical” proportions. Moreover, most of China’s rivers have by now come to suffer from substantial pollution. Chinese authorities have also expressed concern at the fact that the flow of the Yellow River is getting depleted while meeting the demands of development in western China. Since engineers conceived it in 1989, the South-North Water Project has come to be looked upon as the magic bullet. Work on it has already begun, and major works in it are certain to have been executed within the period covered by this study.

The essential objective—developed at length in the book by engineers and other officers, Tibet’s Waters Will Save China —is to divert waters of the Tibetan plateau to the north and northwest. The project has been endorsed at several levels, including, it is reported, by the President, Hu Jintao, himself a hydrologist and former Martial Law Administrator of Tibet. Engineering work and surveys have been extensively reported to have commenced. As have parts that will eventually compose the project in its entirety: after building two dams upstream, China is now reported to

21

DSI

be aiming to build three more dams across the Mekong; it has also commenced work on a complex of tunnels—reported to traverse over 300 kms eventually—that will be used for diverting the rivers that flow into India, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia.

And water is just one resource for which China and India will be in competition just as the Tibetan plateau is just one theatre in which India will have to compete with China for resources.

Pakistan We can only hope that things will change in the future but at present two facts stare at all who are concerned about the region: Pakistan is the singular and major source of instability, violence and terrorism in India and beyond; second, it seems set on becoming the source of even greater trouble in the foreseeable future.

It is difficult to anticipate what relations with Pakistan will be over the next 10 years, and what the options are for a country situated next to it because it is difficult to settle on one forecast about the future of Pakistan. At present about 40 per cent of the territory of Pakistan has been wrenched out of the reach of Islamabad: FATA and parts of the NWFP are now areas in which the Taliban and local extremist groups rule; these groups have driven Government forces even out of the Swat Valley, an area just 100 miles from Islamabad; the groups have shown that they can now strike in Lahore, in Islamabad—that is, in the heart of Pakistan, and the strongholds of the Pakistan Army itself; an insurgency has been raging in Baluchistan for the last several years; Karachi itself continues to be a tinder box.

Will Pakistan’s leaders, both civilian and military, have the acumen, statesmanship and vision to pull it out of the current morass? Or will the country continue on the perilous course down which it has been hurtling, and implode?

While encouraging people-to-people contacts or the peace process, India must be aware of their limitations: the crucial determinant is not this ruler or that, it is the nature of the State and society of Pakistan—a State in which the Army and intelligence agencies have a role that is more pervasive and triggers apprehensions of an order that outsiders can scarcely imagine; a society in which extremist notions have percolated far and wide. Given the deep and pervasive power of the Army and of extremist groups and indeed of the ideology on which Pakistan

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FUTURE FOCUS has been weaned, when it comes to India, all Pakistani institutions and non-state actors take their lead from the elements whose power and position depend on perpetuating hatred towards India. Until the nature of the Pakistani State and society changes, efforts to normalise relations will continue to follow a stopand-go course.

With the exception of Bhutan, each of India’s smaller neighbours harbours apprehensions.

With deep cultural and religious affinities with the population across borders with India, these countries are all the more anxious to affirm that they are different

Bangladesh Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh, is more stable —it has held an election that has restored democratic governance and ended two years of military rule. But the country has been showing worrying trends towards Islamic extremism—that the most overtly “religious” of parties lost almost all the seats it contested cannot provide lasting comfort: any more than the fact that the “religious” parties in Pakistan never got more than 4 per cent of the vote in national elections should have been a ground for concluding that extremism was getting contained in that country.

Over the next decade, there will be a seesaw battle within Bangladesh between democratic forces and Islamisation.

India’s interests and options vis-à-vis Bangladesh over the next 10-15 years would be to

Ensure that the influx of illegal Bangladeshis into India is halted; Ensure that Islamisation trends from Bangladesh do not enter India, especially via Assam; Prevent jihadi terrorists, encouraged by Pakistan, from entering India through Bangladesh; Prevent sanctuary being given to Indian insurgent groups like ULFA in Bangladesh as well as to prevent the supply of illegal weapons to them through Bangladesh;

Negotiate land transit through Bangladesh that will reduce the distance and cost of supplying the Northeast;

Ensure that China does not gain overbearing influence, that it does not come to use Bangladesh to hobble India as it has been using Pakistan;

As a hangover from East Pakistan, influential elements within Bangladesh still look upon the Northeast as an area which must come under it as part of a larger Bangladesh. These revanchist notions have been the rationale for justifying illegal migration into Assam, as they have been the rationale for giving sanctuary to terrorist and secessionist groups like ULFA. These notions have to be scotched lest they fester and grow into

DSI

governments in Bangladesh the sort of problem that the A partial view of the have hitherto not been able ideology of hatred that has Bhutanese capital to surmount, two approaches taken hold in Pakistan Thimphu. All countries are possible. One is to invite constitutes for India today. of the region, save It would, of course, be Bhutan, moved to admit an agency like the Asian Development Bank to take an ideal outcome if India China into SAARC with the matter in hand. The other and Bangladesh could join an observer status is to intensify cooperation hands to ensure development. That there are a host of with Myanmar—both to develop its opportunities around which such gas reserves and to secure access to cooperative endeavour can be organised is India’s Northeast. evident—the development of oil and gas reserves, the production of fertilisers and Nepal other downstream products based on Nepal has been through an architectonic these is just one of several opportunities. transformation. As recent events show, As cooperation with India in projects of matters are far from settled: the Maoists are this kind seems to encounter obstacles that using the interregnum to place their cadre

22

into the apparatus of governance; they have steadfastly refused to hand over their arms; they have also kept others uncertain about how they plan to “integrate” their 25,000 strong guerrilla force; and they have begun usurping the properties and possessions of those who they decide oppose them. The objective they are striving to attain is that, once they win on their own, the Maoists will snuff out all other political entities.

Apart from the fact that, what with open borders, an unsettled neighbour can spell trouble, three factors require close attention:

Leftwing violence has come to affect almost a third of the districts within India

itself. The victory of Maoists in Nepal naturally has boosted the morale of Naxalites in India. India must ensure that ideological affinity does not induce the Nepalese Government to allow Naxalites from India to secure sanctuary in Nepal.

Over the past 15 years, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies established substantial footholds in Nepal from which they commenced anti-Indian activities—a symptom of these footholds was the sudden mushrooming of mosques and madrasas right across the Indo-Nepalese border even though there is little Muslim population in the areas. Were this to be allowed to grow, it will become a very substantial problem.

23

”

That Nepal is now in the hands of Maoists naturally gives China a great opportunity to extend its influence to the southern slopes of the Himalayas.

The ferment in Nepal, therefore, will require India to pay close attention to and devote very substantial resources to Nepal.

Specifically, it will have to strive to Ensure that linkages do not strengthen between the Maoists of Nepal and the Maoist insurgency in India; Ensure a fair deal for the mahdesis or people of India origin; Persuade the Government of Nepal not to allow Pakistani agencies to use Nepal as platform for activities hostile to India, in particular to guard against the mushrooming of mosques and madrasas on the Indo-Nepal border; Forestall the ingress of jihadi ideology and jihadis from the porous border;

Implement a system of border documentation checks, if not passports and visas;

As the government of Nepal will play China off against India, match Chinese efforts and resources.

As vital to India’s interests is the opportunity to work with Nepal to ensure the growth and prosperity of that country.

Little can repay its efforts and resources as much as partnering with Nepal to develop its hydro resources. At present the total annual budget of the Government in Kathmandu is not much more than $ 1.5 billion. Were India to undertake to finance

Arun Shourie 9 page.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/18/09

2:58 PM

Page 7

JUNE 2009

FUTURE FOCUS has been weaned, when it comes to India, all Pakistani institutions and non-state actors take their lead from the elements whose power and position depend on perpetuating hatred towards India. Until the nature of the Pakistani State and society changes, efforts to normalise relations will continue to follow a stopand-go course.

With the exception of Bhutan, each of India’s smaller neighbours harbours apprehensions.

With deep cultural and religious affinities with the population across borders with India, these countries are all the more anxious to affirm that they are different

Bangladesh Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh, is more stable —it has held an election that has restored democratic governance and ended two years of military rule. But the country has been showing worrying trends towards Islamic extremism—that the most overtly “religious” of parties lost almost all the seats it contested cannot provide lasting comfort: any more than the fact that the “religious” parties in Pakistan never got more than 4 per cent of the vote in national elections should have been a ground for concluding that extremism was getting contained in that country.

Over the next decade, there will be a seesaw battle within Bangladesh between democratic forces and Islamisation.

India’s interests and options vis-à-vis Bangladesh over the next 10-15 years would be to

Ensure that the influx of illegal Bangladeshis into India is halted; Ensure that Islamisation trends from Bangladesh do not enter India, especially via Assam; Prevent jihadi terrorists, encouraged by Pakistan, from entering India through Bangladesh; Prevent sanctuary being given to Indian insurgent groups like ULFA in Bangladesh as well as to prevent the supply of illegal weapons to them through Bangladesh;

Negotiate land transit through Bangladesh that will reduce the distance and cost of supplying the Northeast;

Ensure that China does not gain overbearing influence, that it does not come to use Bangladesh to hobble India as it has been using Pakistan;

As a hangover from East Pakistan, influential elements within Bangladesh still look upon the Northeast as an area which must come under it as part of a larger Bangladesh. These revanchist notions have been the rationale for justifying illegal migration into Assam, as they have been the rationale for giving sanctuary to terrorist and secessionist groups like ULFA. These notions have to be scotched lest they fester and grow into

DSI

governments in Bangladesh the sort of problem that the A partial view of the have hitherto not been able ideology of hatred that has Bhutanese capital to surmount, two approaches taken hold in Pakistan Thimphu. All countries are possible. One is to invite constitutes for India today. of the region, save It would, of course, be Bhutan, moved to admit an agency like the Asian Development Bank to take an ideal outcome if India China into SAARC with the matter in hand. The other and Bangladesh could join an observer status is to intensify cooperation hands to ensure development. That there are a host of with Myanmar—both to develop its opportunities around which such gas reserves and to secure access to cooperative endeavour can be organised is India’s Northeast. evident—the development of oil and gas reserves, the production of fertilisers and Nepal other downstream products based on Nepal has been through an architectonic these is just one of several opportunities. transformation. As recent events show, As cooperation with India in projects of matters are far from settled: the Maoists are this kind seems to encounter obstacles that using the interregnum to place their cadre

22

into the apparatus of governance; they have steadfastly refused to hand over their arms; they have also kept others uncertain about how they plan to “integrate” their 25,000 strong guerrilla force; and they have begun usurping the properties and possessions of those who they decide oppose them. The objective they are striving to attain is that, once they win on their own, the Maoists will snuff out all other political entities.

Apart from the fact that, what with open borders, an unsettled neighbour can spell trouble, three factors require close attention:

Leftwing violence has come to affect almost a third of the districts within India

itself. The victory of Maoists in Nepal naturally has boosted the morale of Naxalites in India. India must ensure that ideological affinity does not induce the Nepalese Government to allow Naxalites from India to secure sanctuary in Nepal.

Over the past 15 years, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies established substantial footholds in Nepal from which they commenced anti-Indian activities—a symptom of these footholds was the sudden mushrooming of mosques and madrasas right across the Indo-Nepalese border even though there is little Muslim population in the areas. Were this to be allowed to grow, it will become a very substantial problem.

23

”

That Nepal is now in the hands of Maoists naturally gives China a great opportunity to extend its influence to the southern slopes of the Himalayas.

The ferment in Nepal, therefore, will require India to pay close attention to and devote very substantial resources to Nepal.

Specifically, it will have to strive to Ensure that linkages do not strengthen between the Maoists of Nepal and the Maoist insurgency in India; Ensure a fair deal for the mahdesis or people of India origin; Persuade the Government of Nepal not to allow Pakistani agencies to use Nepal as platform for activities hostile to India, in particular to guard against the mushrooming of mosques and madrasas on the Indo-Nepal border; Forestall the ingress of jihadi ideology and jihadis from the porous border;

Implement a system of border documentation checks, if not passports and visas;

As the government of Nepal will play China off against India, match Chinese efforts and resources.

As vital to India’s interests is the opportunity to work with Nepal to ensure the growth and prosperity of that country.

Little can repay its efforts and resources as much as partnering with Nepal to develop its hydro resources. At present the total annual budget of the Government in Kathmandu is not much more than $ 1.5 billion. Were India to undertake to finance

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FUTURE FOCUS

that the US and NATO forces the entire budget for 30 years, United Communist and, in addition, to finance the Party of Nepal (Maoist) retreat in defeat from Afghanistan. Apart from once entire cost of the hydro- supporters arrive for a again extending the hold of electric projects of common mass demonstration Pakistan to an area that can be interest, and earmark the against Nepalese used to incubate terrorists, such quantum of electricity that President Ram Baran retreat will give a huge boost to Nepal would need for its own Yadav in Kathmandu Islamic fundamentalism. The use, the cost at which it would ensure power for itself would almost victory will at once multiply the chances of certainly be less than the cost at which Pakistan itself falling to the fundamentalists. power would be available to it as a result Every step that India can take to shore up a of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. In non-extremist regime in Afghanistan will be addition, the benefits that would accrue in in its interest.

For the same kind of reasons, and terms of controlling floods that now regularly devastate large parts of UP and also because of India’s dependence on Bihar would be enormous. Both from a imported oil and gas, the Middle East will geo-strategic point of view, therefore, and continue to require attention. from the economic point of view, assuring Nepal of the most generous terms in General observations projects that it may agree to undertake Four general observations deserve to be with India would greatly be in India’s repeated as we conclude: interest. This is where India would be wellFirst, India will have to pay much advised to seek the help of agencies like the greater attention, devote much greater Asian Development Bank. resources to foreign affairs than it has hitherto. Along with deploying resources, India will have to learn to harness all limbs The extended neighbourhood South Asia, and, therefore, India will also of policy—from granting facilities to be greatly impacted by what happens in foreign firms to set up operations in India to the ASEAN countries to the east and by the stance it takes in trade negotiations to what happens in Afghanistan, Iran, and the strategic partnerships it enters into— towards common objectives.

Central Asian republics in the west.

Second, the tasks are of such an order, The one development from which the severest consequences can befall India is the problems are so intertwined, that no

24

DSI

country can address all of them on its own.

Like other countries, India will have to forge alliances for each of them.

And different issues will call for different associates. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia, the US for dealing with China. China, Japan—a major donor to the country—Russia, the US, Saudi Arabia to exchange possibilities regarding Pakistan, all these along with Israel and Turkey for exhuming and uprooting fundamentalist ideology. Iran and Russia in regard to Central Asia.

Third, India’s immediate neighbours present many opportunities as well as challenges. To approach them, India must, among other things, deepen its relations with countries beyond them—with the Central Asian republics on the one hand and those in ASEAN on the other.

But all this is contingent on one overriding imperative, the sine qua non. India has to do well at home. In all spheres. At all levels. It has to acquire “Comprehensive National Strength’’.

Arun Shourie is a Member of Parliament.

He has been minister in the Union Cabinet in the NDA government. He is a prominent journalist and an author. He has also been an economist with the World Bank, a consultant to the Planning Commission, India and Editor of The Indian Express.

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THREAT FROM

TALIBAN With so much at stake, India needs to be major player in the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan.

AMITABH DUBEY

A

S Pakistani forces attempt to force back the Taliban from the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Indian policymakers need to reconcile an apparent paradox: How to coerce or deter hostile elements in Pakistan without pushing them to the point where they are either too weak to confront the Taliban or provoking a nationalist backlash that facilitates an even greater radicalisation. A policy of engagement has the converse risk: Actions that strengthen Pakistan’s ability to beat back the anti-government jihadist threat could undermine India’s interests.

These interests are to put pressure on the Pakistani government to rein in its sarkari jihadists and to take action against forces—whether inside or outside the government—that are keen to strike repeatedly at India.

In this article, I propose an answer to this dilemma that integrates two realities into Indian policymaking. One is that antagonism towards India varies from interest group to interest group in Pakistan. The second is that the willingness of Pakistani decision-makers to confront

the Taliban threat is in part a function of these groups’ perception of threat from India. The idea here is to argue for a policy framework that is sensitive to Pakistan’s domestic politics and lies between two extremes: either to leave it all to the Americans or to argue for an uncompromising and ultimately counterproductive attitude towards Pakistan.

The ball is in India’s court.

There is little doubt that events in Pakistan could prove costly to India. At its worst, state collapse and civil war would be calamitous and could drag India in militarily—whether to deal with refugee inflows interspersed with militant movements or to shore up moderate forces in Pakistan. The nuclear dimension would likely result in US intervention given that India on its own lacks the capacity to deal with a Pakistani collapse.

Even if it isn’t a collapse, the gradual expansion of jihadist activities in Pakistan and steadily rising levels of violence, particularly in Pakistani Punjab, will hit India hard. Radicals in Pakistan could seek to strike at Indian targets—the November 2008 Mumbai attacks for example—to provoke Indian retaliation, and thereby ease the pressure on them as Pakistani forces divert to deal with the Indian threat.

These groups would seek to exploit a “rally ‘round the flag” effect in Pakistan as well as the naivete of those who view the jihadists as wayward but loyal nationalists rather than the existential threat that

26

they in fact pose to the Pakistani state.

A domestic politics-oriented approach needs to be placed at the centre of any Indian effort to forestall these dire outcomes. As this statement by a senior Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official demonstrates, there is clearly recognition of this fact in policy circles: “We need a different Pakistan policy for the government; a different Pakistan policy for the army; different policies for the political parties, for business, for civil society.” (Ajai Shukla, Business Standard, 11 March 2009). In a similar vein, an unnamed official has been quoted as saying that India is in for 10 to 15 years of what he termed “flexible containment”, which involved “engaging, for example,

civil society and the business Rallies in the streets more, this willingness is closely community, while hardening of Karachi protesting tied—among other factors—to ourselves to deal with the the government’s perceptions of the threat from kind of threats emanating actions have become India. This fact is recognised by from the anarchic situation commonplace elements fighting the Pakistani there” (Siddharth Varadarajan, state given their repeated The Hindu, 5 March 2009). attempts to provoke tensions with India.

“Flexible containment” makes sense Therefore any Indian policy directed at given the varied preferences among Pakistani domestic audiences and interest different interest groups in Pakistan, many groups also needs to account for its impact of which are not fundamentally hostile on the expanding civil war in Pakistan.

What is clear is that such an approach towards India. But this insight needs to be taken one step further. The success of cannot be implemented simple-mindedly Pakistan’s battle against Islamic extremism because it could backfire. Transparent is also a function of its domestic balance of Indian support for this or that group power, and the willingness of various would inevitably rile many Pakistanis and parties and organisations to repel the discredit whichever group is being march of the Taliban varies greatly. What is strengthened. The idea instead is to make

27

policies sensitive to the domestic political complexities in Pakistan and perhaps to exploit those interdependencies.

To sum up, our actions must be tuned to forestalling the jihadist conquest of Pakistan, our goal must be to weaken hostile interest groups and strengthening moderate forces in that country, we should also start putting in place capabilities to hedge against the probability of state failure in Pakistan.

India is a central player I have no doubt that India is a central actor in the Afghanistan-Pakistan context.

Pakistan will be reluctant to commit all its energies to the counterinsurgent campaign

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THREAT FROM

TALIBAN With so much at stake, India needs to be major player in the de-Talibanisation of Pakistan.

AMITABH DUBEY

A

S Pakistani forces attempt to force back the Taliban from the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Indian policymakers need to reconcile an apparent paradox: How to coerce or deter hostile elements in Pakistan without pushing them to the point where they are either too weak to confront the Taliban or provoking a nationalist backlash that facilitates an even greater radicalisation. A policy of engagement has the converse risk: Actions that strengthen Pakistan’s ability to beat back the anti-government jihadist threat could undermine India’s interests.

These interests are to put pressure on the Pakistani government to rein in its sarkari jihadists and to take action against forces—whether inside or outside the government—that are keen to strike repeatedly at India.

In this article, I propose an answer to this dilemma that integrates two realities into Indian policymaking. One is that antagonism towards India varies from interest group to interest group in Pakistan. The second is that the willingness of Pakistani decision-makers to confront

the Taliban threat is in part a function of these groups’ perception of threat from India. The idea here is to argue for a policy framework that is sensitive to Pakistan’s domestic politics and lies between two extremes: either to leave it all to the Americans or to argue for an uncompromising and ultimately counterproductive attitude towards Pakistan.

The ball is in India’s court.

There is little doubt that events in Pakistan could prove costly to India. At its worst, state collapse and civil war would be calamitous and could drag India in militarily—whether to deal with refugee inflows interspersed with militant movements or to shore up moderate forces in Pakistan. The nuclear dimension would likely result in US intervention given that India on its own lacks the capacity to deal with a Pakistani collapse.

Even if it isn’t a collapse, the gradual expansion of jihadist activities in Pakistan and steadily rising levels of violence, particularly in Pakistani Punjab, will hit India hard. Radicals in Pakistan could seek to strike at Indian targets—the November 2008 Mumbai attacks for example—to provoke Indian retaliation, and thereby ease the pressure on them as Pakistani forces divert to deal with the Indian threat.

These groups would seek to exploit a “rally ‘round the flag” effect in Pakistan as well as the naivete of those who view the jihadists as wayward but loyal nationalists rather than the existential threat that

26

they in fact pose to the Pakistani state.

A domestic politics-oriented approach needs to be placed at the centre of any Indian effort to forestall these dire outcomes. As this statement by a senior Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official demonstrates, there is clearly recognition of this fact in policy circles: “We need a different Pakistan policy for the government; a different Pakistan policy for the army; different policies for the political parties, for business, for civil society.” (Ajai Shukla, Business Standard, 11 March 2009). In a similar vein, an unnamed official has been quoted as saying that India is in for 10 to 15 years of what he termed “flexible containment”, which involved “engaging, for example,

civil society and the business Rallies in the streets more, this willingness is closely community, while hardening of Karachi protesting tied—among other factors—to ourselves to deal with the the government’s perceptions of the threat from kind of threats emanating actions have become India. This fact is recognised by from the anarchic situation commonplace elements fighting the Pakistani there” (Siddharth Varadarajan, state given their repeated The Hindu, 5 March 2009). attempts to provoke tensions with India.

“Flexible containment” makes sense Therefore any Indian policy directed at given the varied preferences among Pakistani domestic audiences and interest different interest groups in Pakistan, many groups also needs to account for its impact of which are not fundamentally hostile on the expanding civil war in Pakistan.

What is clear is that such an approach towards India. But this insight needs to be taken one step further. The success of cannot be implemented simple-mindedly Pakistan’s battle against Islamic extremism because it could backfire. Transparent is also a function of its domestic balance of Indian support for this or that group power, and the willingness of various would inevitably rile many Pakistanis and parties and organisations to repel the discredit whichever group is being march of the Taliban varies greatly. What is strengthened. The idea instead is to make

27

policies sensitive to the domestic political complexities in Pakistan and perhaps to exploit those interdependencies.

To sum up, our actions must be tuned to forestalling the jihadist conquest of Pakistan, our goal must be to weaken hostile interest groups and strengthening moderate forces in that country, we should also start putting in place capabilities to hedge against the probability of state failure in Pakistan.

India is a central player I have no doubt that India is a central actor in the Afghanistan-Pakistan context.

Pakistan will be reluctant to commit all its energies to the counterinsurgent campaign

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

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3:08 PM

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JUNE 2009

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Pakistan’s threat perception. More importantly, US decision-makers are beginning to factor this into their policies.

How to think about Pakistan

record, various influential so long as it perceives a threat Presidents Karzai (L) think tanks have pointed to from India. Former President and Zardari (R) with Pervez Musharraf sum- Obama (C) for an Af-Pak this connection. A February 2009 report on US-Pakistan marised the Pakistan Army’s policy meeting at the relations by the Washington point of view in a 16 May White House DC-based Atlantic Council CNN interview when he Washington, DC, on describes tensions between rejected the argument that May 6, 2009.

India and Pakistan as “the Pakistan’s India obsession is irrational, pointing out that the bulk of most urgent crisis at this point” and says India’s army divisions are concentrated that “the most important role the US can against Pakistan. He said: “Being a force play in assisting Pakistan is to encourage commander what would you do when this progressive reconciliation between these huge force is there ready to attack you and two old rivals”. An April 2009 Asia when they are saying that are going to Society report suggests that the US “should come and attack Pakistan and when the undertake to relieve Pakistan’s anxiety public and the media is demanding that about the Indian consulates in Pakistan should be punished” for the Afghanistan” and help restart peace talks between the two countries to “normalise Mumbai attacks.

This view is shared in Washington DC. their relations and to address the most Although US officials are reluctant to go on difficult issues dividing them, including

28

Kashmir”. The former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, takes this argument even further when he writes that “when Islamists rule again in Kabul, they should send New Delhi a hearty thank you note” because India’s strategic manoeuvres in Afghanistan are feeding Pakistani paranoia and facilitating cooperation between the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

No doubt many Indians will take umbrage at these views and point out that Pakistan’s support for factions of the Taliban has deep organisational and ideological roots, and that India provides a convenient scapegoat for various Pakistani interest groups seeking to enhance their domestic standing and influence. Even so, India is clearly central to

The core of the Af-Pak strategy is favourable towards Indian goals including strengthening and expansion of Afghan security forces. A strong Afghan army could align US and Indian interests in Pakistan

”

This analysis makes some basic assumptions.

One, that India wishes for stability along its western border. This is most likely to happen with a moderate, unitary state.

Some would argue that it would be preferable to seek a Pakistan so divided along ethnic lines that its various components are too preoccupied with each others’ machinations to concentrate on India, but this option also brings in greater risks when seen in the context of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the ability of jihadist advances.

Two, that there is little danger of an imminent Pakistani collapse. Although it has been tough going for the authorities in the Swat-Malakand area, the 550,000strong Pakistan Army shows no signs of giving up the fight. The idea is of ‘Pakistan is under pressure but is far from dying’.

Pakistanis have repeatedly rejected fundamentalist parties in national elections and show no desire to live in a Taliban-like state. Political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have strong roots in society and are capable of mobilising millions of supporters across the country. Civil society organisations remain strong: the lawyers’ movement in 2007-08 helped bring down Musharraf and strengthened judicial independence, proving that there is more to Pakistan than military might.

Ethnicity and geography also place limits on the Taliban’s expansion.

Pakistan’s Taliban comprises ethnic Pashtuns inhabiting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the NWFP, and are still operating in their preferred mountainous environment among other Pashto speakers. As they move towards Islamabad and Lahore they will encounter the Punjabis—Pakistan’s largest linguistic group—who, backed by the army, will likely fight to preserve their dominance of the Pakistani state. It is interesting that Musharraf in his CNN interview scoffed at the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat and pointed to Punjabi-led jihadists as the real danger. This is of course a rich irony, but an interesting clue regarding the army’s threat perception. As recent attacks in Lahore and elsewhere demonstrate, the links between Punjabi

29

DSI

and FATA-based groups are already strong.

That said, not everyone in Pakistan is on board the government’s stated agenda.

Even as newspapers and television channels warn against the dangers of the Taliban, some officials and politicians grumble that Pakistan’s enemies are being propped up by the US, Russia and India. They protest that US policies in Afghanistan have stirred up Pashtun communities across the border and that Pakistan is paying the price for US folly by being forced to join in its “war on terror”. Some even argue that the Taliban are really good—if misguided—Muslims who would have no problem if Pakistan were not being forced to kowtow to the US. While each argument has elements of truth to it, the net impact is capitulationist.

The watered-down resolution of the “All Parties Conference” on Swat held on 18 May 2009 was illuminating: it was the product of a compromise between the mainstream parties and Barelvi clerics who support the Swat operations and the religious parties and Deobandi clerics who continue to oppose any such action. The resolution stuck to generalities about maintaining the writ of the state and condemning violent challenges to the state of Pakistan without specifically mentioning the anti-insurgent campaign.

PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif, who in a March 2009 opinion poll conducted for the International Republican Institute, received a 75% approval rating versus President Asif Ali Zardari’s 17%, has declared his support of the Swat operations even as his deputies play both sides of the divide.

Militant attacks in Punjab, Karachi and elsewhere are also likely to increase given the organisational links between local groups and their Pashtun brethren along the Afghan border. Indeed, ethnic tensions are already having an effect in Karachi, more than a thousand kilometres south of the Swat-Malakand region.

Clashes between activists of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)—the Karachi— based party that relies on the support of mohajirs, Urdu-speaking migrants from India—and Pashtun groups left scores dead in Karachi in early May. The MQM vocally opposed the Swat concessions and vowed to resist the spread of Talibanisation in Karachi—which some people fear translates into a broader anti-Pashtun agenda. There is surprisingly little public discussion of the ethnic dimension to the current civil war,

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

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JUNE 2009

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Pakistan’s threat perception. More importantly, US decision-makers are beginning to factor this into their policies.

How to think about Pakistan

record, various influential so long as it perceives a threat Presidents Karzai (L) think tanks have pointed to from India. Former President and Zardari (R) with Pervez Musharraf sum- Obama (C) for an Af-Pak this connection. A February 2009 report on US-Pakistan marised the Pakistan Army’s policy meeting at the relations by the Washington point of view in a 16 May White House DC-based Atlantic Council CNN interview when he Washington, DC, on describes tensions between rejected the argument that May 6, 2009.

India and Pakistan as “the Pakistan’s India obsession is irrational, pointing out that the bulk of most urgent crisis at this point” and says India’s army divisions are concentrated that “the most important role the US can against Pakistan. He said: “Being a force play in assisting Pakistan is to encourage commander what would you do when this progressive reconciliation between these huge force is there ready to attack you and two old rivals”. An April 2009 Asia when they are saying that are going to Society report suggests that the US “should come and attack Pakistan and when the undertake to relieve Pakistan’s anxiety public and the media is demanding that about the Indian consulates in Pakistan should be punished” for the Afghanistan” and help restart peace talks between the two countries to “normalise Mumbai attacks.

This view is shared in Washington DC. their relations and to address the most Although US officials are reluctant to go on difficult issues dividing them, including

28

Kashmir”. The former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, takes this argument even further when he writes that “when Islamists rule again in Kabul, they should send New Delhi a hearty thank you note” because India’s strategic manoeuvres in Afghanistan are feeding Pakistani paranoia and facilitating cooperation between the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

No doubt many Indians will take umbrage at these views and point out that Pakistan’s support for factions of the Taliban has deep organisational and ideological roots, and that India provides a convenient scapegoat for various Pakistani interest groups seeking to enhance their domestic standing and influence. Even so, India is clearly central to

The core of the Af-Pak strategy is favourable towards Indian goals including strengthening and expansion of Afghan security forces. A strong Afghan army could align US and Indian interests in Pakistan

”

This analysis makes some basic assumptions.

One, that India wishes for stability along its western border. This is most likely to happen with a moderate, unitary state.

Some would argue that it would be preferable to seek a Pakistan so divided along ethnic lines that its various components are too preoccupied with each others’ machinations to concentrate on India, but this option also brings in greater risks when seen in the context of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the ability of jihadist advances.

Two, that there is little danger of an imminent Pakistani collapse. Although it has been tough going for the authorities in the Swat-Malakand area, the 550,000strong Pakistan Army shows no signs of giving up the fight. The idea is of ‘Pakistan is under pressure but is far from dying’.

Pakistanis have repeatedly rejected fundamentalist parties in national elections and show no desire to live in a Taliban-like state. Political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have strong roots in society and are capable of mobilising millions of supporters across the country. Civil society organisations remain strong: the lawyers’ movement in 2007-08 helped bring down Musharraf and strengthened judicial independence, proving that there is more to Pakistan than military might.

Ethnicity and geography also place limits on the Taliban’s expansion.

Pakistan’s Taliban comprises ethnic Pashtuns inhabiting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the NWFP, and are still operating in their preferred mountainous environment among other Pashto speakers. As they move towards Islamabad and Lahore they will encounter the Punjabis—Pakistan’s largest linguistic group—who, backed by the army, will likely fight to preserve their dominance of the Pakistani state. It is interesting that Musharraf in his CNN interview scoffed at the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat and pointed to Punjabi-led jihadists as the real danger. This is of course a rich irony, but an interesting clue regarding the army’s threat perception. As recent attacks in Lahore and elsewhere demonstrate, the links between Punjabi

29

DSI

and FATA-based groups are already strong.

That said, not everyone in Pakistan is on board the government’s stated agenda.

Even as newspapers and television channels warn against the dangers of the Taliban, some officials and politicians grumble that Pakistan’s enemies are being propped up by the US, Russia and India. They protest that US policies in Afghanistan have stirred up Pashtun communities across the border and that Pakistan is paying the price for US folly by being forced to join in its “war on terror”. Some even argue that the Taliban are really good—if misguided—Muslims who would have no problem if Pakistan were not being forced to kowtow to the US. While each argument has elements of truth to it, the net impact is capitulationist.

The watered-down resolution of the “All Parties Conference” on Swat held on 18 May 2009 was illuminating: it was the product of a compromise between the mainstream parties and Barelvi clerics who support the Swat operations and the religious parties and Deobandi clerics who continue to oppose any such action. The resolution stuck to generalities about maintaining the writ of the state and condemning violent challenges to the state of Pakistan without specifically mentioning the anti-insurgent campaign.

PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif, who in a March 2009 opinion poll conducted for the International Republican Institute, received a 75% approval rating versus President Asif Ali Zardari’s 17%, has declared his support of the Swat operations even as his deputies play both sides of the divide.

Militant attacks in Punjab, Karachi and elsewhere are also likely to increase given the organisational links between local groups and their Pashtun brethren along the Afghan border. Indeed, ethnic tensions are already having an effect in Karachi, more than a thousand kilometres south of the Swat-Malakand region.

Clashes between activists of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)—the Karachi— based party that relies on the support of mohajirs, Urdu-speaking migrants from India—and Pashtun groups left scores dead in Karachi in early May. The MQM vocally opposed the Swat concessions and vowed to resist the spread of Talibanisation in Karachi—which some people fear translates into a broader anti-Pashtun agenda. There is surprisingly little public discussion of the ethnic dimension to the current civil war,

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

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STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY except through allegations that Indian agencies are supporting Baloch and—less convincingly— Taliban groups.

A third assumption is that the Pakistani state is not unitary in its strategic attitudes and the prioritisation of threats. Clearly the army establishment sees India as an important threat that needs to be balanced via support for insurgents in India and for compliant segments of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This arises from ideology, strategic thinking or in many cases both.

But civil society at large and swathes of Pakistan’s political parties do not see India as an existential threat and are quite open to an improvement in relations so long as the Kashmir issue is contained and India demonstrates a willingness to make progress on secondary issues and peopleto-people contact. It also includes the business community that seeks market access (although it might fear economic competition) and ethnic minorities who see India as a countervailing force to Punjabi domination.

At the same time, Indian policy should be proactive. The Obama administration appears very serious about its “Af-Pak” strategy. The core of that strategy is favourable towards Indian goals, such as the strengthening and expansion of Afghan security forces. A well-equipped Afghan National Army a quarter million soldiers strong could pose a serious problem for Pakistan and in this sense aligns US and Indian regional interests in a concrete manner. But talk in New Delhi is becoming typically negative, focussed on foiling US and Pakistani designs, with a large dollop of Bush administration nostalgia thrown in. What we actually need is a transformational, rather than a defensive mindset.

by the Interior Ministry rather than the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, is underway and the results of which will be an important test of Pakistan’s seriousness in the affair. The government’s handling of the event successfully undermined any effort to provoke an Indian attack to undermine moderate forces in Pakistan. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, ISI Director General, who defended Taliban activities on the grounds of “freedom of opinion” in a January 2009 Der Spiegel interview, was forced to acknowledge India’s strategy as “clever”— although he did not perhaps intend to be entirely complimentary.

The right policy mix

Inducements

I do not propose a retreat from the policy of putting pressure on Pakistan that followed the Mumbai attacks. Such pressure must be maintained by concerted international action, including the implicit threat that Pakistan’s fragile economy will not receive the funds that it needs, and has already had a positive diplomatic impact. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the most influential of sarkari jihadist groups, appears to have been forced to tone down its operational activities, and may have even “gone rogue” if Indian agencies are to be believed.

A cooperative investigative process, led interestingly enough on the Pakistani side

But India needs to look beyond the Mumbai attacks. The challenge, given our domestic politics-oriented view, is to offer the appropriate mix of threats and inducements to push events in our preferred direction. To repeat, the idea here would be to undermine the nationalist rallying together that so often results from perceptions of Indian hostility.

One set of possible inducements— other than liberalising people-to-people contact—includes movement on bilateral disputes such as Sir Creek or Siachen. A riskier strategy would be to push forward on a Kashmir agreement that reportedly made some progress during talks between

A second approach would be to offer inducements directly to our chief opponents within Pakistan—the military establishment. It might be possible to leverage Pakistani paranoia about Indian advances in Afghanistan to earn concessions on their India policy in a grand strategic bargain. In this scenario, India would offer concrete, measurable concessions in Afghanistan in return for similar assurances regarding anti-India jihadist networks based in Pakistan Firefighters attend to a fire as it burns at for example. There are serious issues Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel following about monitoring and credible coman armed siege on November 29, 2008 mitment that would need to be resolved in Mumbai, India. and it does assume the existence of a unified security establishment—an assumption that is increasingly being called into question.

However, the point is that the basic principle is worthy of consideration, especially because US policies in Afghanistan—viz. the creation of a powerful Afghan security apparatus—is in any case favourable to Indian interests.

India needs to look beyond the Mumbai attacks.The challenge is to offer an appropriate mix of threats and inducements to push events in our preferred direction.The idea is to undermine the nationalist rallying together that results from perceiving India as hostile

”

30

DSI

Threats

Indian and Pakistani envoys. It would be risky because real movement could provoke spoilers on both sides to act to forestall the process, and could leave Prime Minister Manmohan Singh open to domestic criticism including from within his party. However it would strengthen the more accommodative forces in Pakistan.

Another potential inducement would be the kind of troop withdrawals that Nitin Pai and Sushant K. Singh called for in their 20 May column in the news daily Mint.

The movement of strike formations—as opposed to infantry and paramilitary units that are required to block militant infiltration—could contribute to a favourable domestic dynamic in Pakistan

that facilitates increased cooperation on the Mumbai issue. Given that Indian strike formations are in any case based far from the border, this could turn out to be a mostly symbolic but still useful step.

Such gestures are not entirely risk-free in the political sense. The politics of such actions could be complicated since concessions during a period of confrontation are likely to cause domestic turmoil in India, especially if any concessions are followed by further terror attacks. There could also be unintended consequences such as heightened militant attacks aimed to derail any positive momentum—which could raise tensions even higher than the current status quo.

My intention is not to advocate one policy over another, but to suggest that a prime policy objective should be to break the “rally ‘round the flag” effect in Pakistan that arose from India’s tough rhetoric following the Mumbai attacks. India’s diplomatic, as opposed to military, approach in the wake of the attacks has already contributed to the ebbing of anti-India sentiments in Pakistan, but there is a lot more to be done. Pakistanis often urge Indians to make disproportionate concessions as a “big brother”. Without being naïve about it, there is something to be said for a well thought-out series of actions that derails the anti-India dynamic in that country.

31

The crux is still that Pakistan has not yet acted to permanently close down jihadist networks including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and instead continues to prevaricate and to signal that it might be forced to release high-level militants for lack of evidence— notwithstanding the complete lack of any concern for due process when it comes to dealing with Baloch or Al Qaeda militants.

The establishment in Pakistan continues to perceive terror attacks against Indian targets as a legitimate policy tool, as demonstrated by the July 2008 attack against the Indian Embassy in Kabul. This means that coercive tools will also need to be placed on the table for use against hostile interest groups in Pakistan.

We need to consider alternative means of coercion given the grave risk of military strikes in a nuclear weapons environment and the negative political fallout in Pakistan of such actions. Pakistan’s power to inflict costs on India comes essentially from its ability to channel Islamist fervour.

India’s power arises from certain vulnerabilities in Pakistan—such as the ethnic divide—and its relative economic and financial strength.

Judging from statements made by Pakistani decision-makers such as Interior

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/17/09

3:08 PM

Page 5

JUNE 2009

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY except through allegations that Indian agencies are supporting Baloch and—less convincingly— Taliban groups.

A third assumption is that the Pakistani state is not unitary in its strategic attitudes and the prioritisation of threats. Clearly the army establishment sees India as an important threat that needs to be balanced via support for insurgents in India and for compliant segments of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This arises from ideology, strategic thinking or in many cases both.

But civil society at large and swathes of Pakistan’s political parties do not see India as an existential threat and are quite open to an improvement in relations so long as the Kashmir issue is contained and India demonstrates a willingness to make progress on secondary issues and peopleto-people contact. It also includes the business community that seeks market access (although it might fear economic competition) and ethnic minorities who see India as a countervailing force to Punjabi domination.

At the same time, Indian policy should be proactive. The Obama administration appears very serious about its “Af-Pak” strategy. The core of that strategy is favourable towards Indian goals, such as the strengthening and expansion of Afghan security forces. A well-equipped Afghan National Army a quarter million soldiers strong could pose a serious problem for Pakistan and in this sense aligns US and Indian regional interests in a concrete manner. But talk in New Delhi is becoming typically negative, focussed on foiling US and Pakistani designs, with a large dollop of Bush administration nostalgia thrown in. What we actually need is a transformational, rather than a defensive mindset.

by the Interior Ministry rather than the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, is underway and the results of which will be an important test of Pakistan’s seriousness in the affair. The government’s handling of the event successfully undermined any effort to provoke an Indian attack to undermine moderate forces in Pakistan. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, ISI Director General, who defended Taliban activities on the grounds of “freedom of opinion” in a January 2009 Der Spiegel interview, was forced to acknowledge India’s strategy as “clever”— although he did not perhaps intend to be entirely complimentary.

The right policy mix

Inducements

I do not propose a retreat from the policy of putting pressure on Pakistan that followed the Mumbai attacks. Such pressure must be maintained by concerted international action, including the implicit threat that Pakistan’s fragile economy will not receive the funds that it needs, and has already had a positive diplomatic impact. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the most influential of sarkari jihadist groups, appears to have been forced to tone down its operational activities, and may have even “gone rogue” if Indian agencies are to be believed.

A cooperative investigative process, led interestingly enough on the Pakistani side

But India needs to look beyond the Mumbai attacks. The challenge, given our domestic politics-oriented view, is to offer the appropriate mix of threats and inducements to push events in our preferred direction. To repeat, the idea here would be to undermine the nationalist rallying together that so often results from perceptions of Indian hostility.

One set of possible inducements— other than liberalising people-to-people contact—includes movement on bilateral disputes such as Sir Creek or Siachen. A riskier strategy would be to push forward on a Kashmir agreement that reportedly made some progress during talks between

A second approach would be to offer inducements directly to our chief opponents within Pakistan—the military establishment. It might be possible to leverage Pakistani paranoia about Indian advances in Afghanistan to earn concessions on their India policy in a grand strategic bargain. In this scenario, India would offer concrete, measurable concessions in Afghanistan in return for similar assurances regarding anti-India jihadist networks based in Pakistan Firefighters attend to a fire as it burns at for example. There are serious issues Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel following about monitoring and credible coman armed siege on November 29, 2008 mitment that would need to be resolved in Mumbai, India. and it does assume the existence of a unified security establishment—an assumption that is increasingly being called into question.

However, the point is that the basic principle is worthy of consideration, especially because US policies in Afghanistan—viz. the creation of a powerful Afghan security apparatus—is in any case favourable to Indian interests.

India needs to look beyond the Mumbai attacks.The challenge is to offer an appropriate mix of threats and inducements to push events in our preferred direction.The idea is to undermine the nationalist rallying together that results from perceiving India as hostile

”

30

DSI

Threats

Indian and Pakistani envoys. It would be risky because real movement could provoke spoilers on both sides to act to forestall the process, and could leave Prime Minister Manmohan Singh open to domestic criticism including from within his party. However it would strengthen the more accommodative forces in Pakistan.

Another potential inducement would be the kind of troop withdrawals that Nitin Pai and Sushant K. Singh called for in their 20 May column in the news daily Mint.

The movement of strike formations—as opposed to infantry and paramilitary units that are required to block militant infiltration—could contribute to a favourable domestic dynamic in Pakistan

that facilitates increased cooperation on the Mumbai issue. Given that Indian strike formations are in any case based far from the border, this could turn out to be a mostly symbolic but still useful step.

Such gestures are not entirely risk-free in the political sense. The politics of such actions could be complicated since concessions during a period of confrontation are likely to cause domestic turmoil in India, especially if any concessions are followed by further terror attacks. There could also be unintended consequences such as heightened militant attacks aimed to derail any positive momentum—which could raise tensions even higher than the current status quo.

My intention is not to advocate one policy over another, but to suggest that a prime policy objective should be to break the “rally ‘round the flag” effect in Pakistan that arose from India’s tough rhetoric following the Mumbai attacks. India’s diplomatic, as opposed to military, approach in the wake of the attacks has already contributed to the ebbing of anti-India sentiments in Pakistan, but there is a lot more to be done. Pakistanis often urge Indians to make disproportionate concessions as a “big brother”. Without being naïve about it, there is something to be said for a well thought-out series of actions that derails the anti-India dynamic in that country.

31

The crux is still that Pakistan has not yet acted to permanently close down jihadist networks including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and instead continues to prevaricate and to signal that it might be forced to release high-level militants for lack of evidence— notwithstanding the complete lack of any concern for due process when it comes to dealing with Baloch or Al Qaeda militants.

The establishment in Pakistan continues to perceive terror attacks against Indian targets as a legitimate policy tool, as demonstrated by the July 2008 attack against the Indian Embassy in Kabul. This means that coercive tools will also need to be placed on the table for use against hostile interest groups in Pakistan.

We need to consider alternative means of coercion given the grave risk of military strikes in a nuclear weapons environment and the negative political fallout in Pakistan of such actions. Pakistan’s power to inflict costs on India comes essentially from its ability to channel Islamist fervour.

India’s power arises from certain vulnerabilities in Pakistan—such as the ethnic divide—and its relative economic and financial strength.

Judging from statements made by Pakistani decision-makers such as Interior

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/17/09

3:09 PM

Page 7

JUNE 2009

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Minister Rehman Malik, there is circumstantial evidence that India’s support for Baloch activists has increased since the Mumbai attacks. If the spectre of Talibanisation continues to rise in Pakistan, ethnic minorities in Sindh, Balochistan and elsewhere will become more receptive to Indian influence. This is not to suggest that they will abandon the idea of Pakistan overnight or attempt to secede from the union, but that they will inevitably come to view India as a counterweight to regional radicalism. This is partly a function of whether the army-led establishment allows Pakistan’s mainstream parties to reach out to dissenting groups—one has to be sceptical judging from the experience in Balo- Rioters staged violent demonstrations in chistan where the August, 2006 in army vetoed every Quetta after tribal sensible political leader Nawab Bugti proposal to reach died in a clash with out to Baloch nationalists. This Pakistani army troops dyn-amic gives India a great deal of leverage over Pakistan which, if used intelligently, could become a lever on Pakistani policy rather than simply a crude tool to weaken that country.

India also has huge financial resources in comparison to Pakistan’s weak economy that is dependent on funding by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is clearly one avenue to put pressure on Pakistan and indeed appears to have been used in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks to coerce Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces are also financially dependent on a network of foundations and associated companies. Pakistani military leaders rely on such networks to buy internal loyalty and to maintain financial autonomy from the civilian sector, which is a key component of their power. A strategy that targets this financial autonomy by manipulating specific markets or financial flows could offer another means to pressurise Pakistani decision-makers. Such pressure could be complemented by information warfare operations, another area of comparative advantage for India.

The benefit of some of these tactics is that they are more subtle than hamhanded steps such as military mobilisation or cross-border attacks of any kind. They offer means of coercion that can be reversed or halted if required without a heavy domestic political cost or loss of

national reputation. They will also help maintain the ultimate credibility of the military option without forcing its premature exercise.

Finally, India needs to put in place capabilities to deal with a catastrophic collapse in Pakistan which results either in a jihadist takeover of the state or political fragmentation. A jihadist takeover would inevitable bring in the United States and India could easily find itself on the frontlines of a multinational campaign to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, for example. Clearly, military exercises between India and various Western militaries over the past decade have been carried out with an eye on such a contingency. Other possible scenarios include having to deal with cross-border refugee flows or military operations to shore up friendly forces in Pakistan, which

32

could include the Pakistan Army.

It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the details of such contingency planning. India’s reinforcement of its ability to conduct cross-border operations will not reassure many Pakistanis, especially the army, of its benign intentions. On the other hand, much of the work could be doctrinal and/or consistent with existing programmes and thus raise fewer red flags across the border. This is probably an unavoidable bind.

Finally, there has to be further progress in Jammu and Kashmir towards internal reconciliation. Despite heated allegations of Indian support for ethnic insurgents in Pakistan, militant infiltration into Kashmir remains low by historic standards, suggesting that the Pakistani state has not yet chosen to escalate in that theatre. It is of course possible that this is because of

between the Pakistani state and A rising spectre of the tensions Punjabi jihadists, but it does give India Taliban in Pakistan could room for manoeuvre. This in turn provides opportunity once again to bring make ethnic minorities in an separatist forces into the political Sindh and Balochistan more mainstream or alternatively to convince disenchanted Kashmiris to embrace receptive to Indian influence. unionist politics, however reluctantly.

The Pakistani army has Conclusion vetoed every sensible The challenge that confronts Indian is complex. How can they political proposal to reach policymakers deal with a fragmenting decision-making out to Baloch nationalists apparatus that contains both hostile and

”

conciliatory elements? How can they avoid falling into simple traps such as a military response to cross-border terror strikes that undermine the basic objective of strengthening moderates in Pakistan?

India’s “flexible containment” strategy needs to accommodate this possibility, and

33

DSI

India’s centrality to Pakistani decisions in its emerging civil war, and to develop a mix of threats and inducements that averts such an outcome.

The great danger is that extremist forces continue to gain traction as a result, among various factors, of continuing US drone attacks in Pakistani territory and the excessive use of force by Pakistani security forces. The rise of the Taliban under a combined Pashtun nationalist and Punjabi banner is not inevitable. There are many political divides that could forestall this, such as a Punjabi nationalist reaction against the jihadisas well as various linguistic and ethnic minorities in Pakistan.

There are also organic moderate nationalist forces within the Pashtun and Punjabi communities broadly speaking that are unwilling to accommodate Talibanisation and towards whose empowerment Indian policy must be directed. Finally, US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan will play an important role.

Indian decision-makers will have to be careful in implementing any domesticpolitics oriented policy. The open embrace of this or that group is a sure-fire guarantee of undermining its stature in Pakistan. For example, the image of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari standing by Barack Obama’s side in Washington announcing a new “Af-Pak” approach surely did as much to undermine them as any policy programme could. Policy measures need not be applied in a linear fashion, but they should be oriented towards ultimately shifting the balance of power in Pakistan towards conciliatory forces, whenever possible.

To pretend that India has no leverage, or to give in to the temptation of being reactive instead of proactive in the face of US and Pakistani policy changes, is no longer a serious option.

Amitabh Dubey is the Director of India Research at Trusted Sources, a London-based firm that provides emerging market research to financial institutions, central banks and hedge funds. Trusted Sources focusses on the interaction of economics and public policy, and adopts a “top down” approach looking at the impact of macroeconomics, politics and security on economies and sectors. Dubey has previously worked at Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consultancy, and has been a business journalist in India. He has degrees in economics and political science from Delhi University, University of Chicago and Columbia University.

Amitabh Dubey.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

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STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Minister Rehman Malik, there is circumstantial evidence that India’s support for Baloch activists has increased since the Mumbai attacks. If the spectre of Talibanisation continues to rise in Pakistan, ethnic minorities in Sindh, Balochistan and elsewhere will become more receptive to Indian influence. This is not to suggest that they will abandon the idea of Pakistan overnight or attempt to secede from the union, but that they will inevitably come to view India as a counterweight to regional radicalism. This is partly a function of whether the army-led establishment allows Pakistan’s mainstream parties to reach out to dissenting groups—one has to be sceptical judging from the experience in Balo- Rioters staged violent demonstrations in chistan where the August, 2006 in army vetoed every Quetta after tribal sensible political leader Nawab Bugti proposal to reach died in a clash with out to Baloch nationalists. This Pakistani army troops dyn-amic gives India a great deal of leverage over Pakistan which, if used intelligently, could become a lever on Pakistani policy rather than simply a crude tool to weaken that country.

India also has huge financial resources in comparison to Pakistan’s weak economy that is dependent on funding by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is clearly one avenue to put pressure on Pakistan and indeed appears to have been used in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks to coerce Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces are also financially dependent on a network of foundations and associated companies. Pakistani military leaders rely on such networks to buy internal loyalty and to maintain financial autonomy from the civilian sector, which is a key component of their power. A strategy that targets this financial autonomy by manipulating specific markets or financial flows could offer another means to pressurise Pakistani decision-makers. Such pressure could be complemented by information warfare operations, another area of comparative advantage for India.

The benefit of some of these tactics is that they are more subtle than hamhanded steps such as military mobilisation or cross-border attacks of any kind. They offer means of coercion that can be reversed or halted if required without a heavy domestic political cost or loss of

national reputation. They will also help maintain the ultimate credibility of the military option without forcing its premature exercise.

Finally, India needs to put in place capabilities to deal with a catastrophic collapse in Pakistan which results either in a jihadist takeover of the state or political fragmentation. A jihadist takeover would inevitable bring in the United States and India could easily find itself on the frontlines of a multinational campaign to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, for example. Clearly, military exercises between India and various Western militaries over the past decade have been carried out with an eye on such a contingency. Other possible scenarios include having to deal with cross-border refugee flows or military operations to shore up friendly forces in Pakistan, which

32

could include the Pakistan Army.

It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the details of such contingency planning. India’s reinforcement of its ability to conduct cross-border operations will not reassure many Pakistanis, especially the army, of its benign intentions. On the other hand, much of the work could be doctrinal and/or consistent with existing programmes and thus raise fewer red flags across the border. This is probably an unavoidable bind.

Finally, there has to be further progress in Jammu and Kashmir towards internal reconciliation. Despite heated allegations of Indian support for ethnic insurgents in Pakistan, militant infiltration into Kashmir remains low by historic standards, suggesting that the Pakistani state has not yet chosen to escalate in that theatre. It is of course possible that this is because of

between the Pakistani state and A rising spectre of the tensions Punjabi jihadists, but it does give India Taliban in Pakistan could room for manoeuvre. This in turn provides opportunity once again to bring make ethnic minorities in an separatist forces into the political Sindh and Balochistan more mainstream or alternatively to convince disenchanted Kashmiris to embrace receptive to Indian influence. unionist politics, however reluctantly.

The Pakistani army has Conclusion vetoed every sensible The challenge that confronts Indian is complex. How can they political proposal to reach policymakers deal with a fragmenting decision-making out to Baloch nationalists apparatus that contains both hostile and

”

conciliatory elements? How can they avoid falling into simple traps such as a military response to cross-border terror strikes that undermine the basic objective of strengthening moderates in Pakistan?

India’s “flexible containment” strategy needs to accommodate this possibility, and

33

DSI

India’s centrality to Pakistani decisions in its emerging civil war, and to develop a mix of threats and inducements that averts such an outcome.

The great danger is that extremist forces continue to gain traction as a result, among various factors, of continuing US drone attacks in Pakistani territory and the excessive use of force by Pakistani security forces. The rise of the Taliban under a combined Pashtun nationalist and Punjabi banner is not inevitable. There are many political divides that could forestall this, such as a Punjabi nationalist reaction against the jihadisas well as various linguistic and ethnic minorities in Pakistan.

There are also organic moderate nationalist forces within the Pashtun and Punjabi communities broadly speaking that are unwilling to accommodate Talibanisation and towards whose empowerment Indian policy must be directed. Finally, US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan will play an important role.

Indian decision-makers will have to be careful in implementing any domesticpolitics oriented policy. The open embrace of this or that group is a sure-fire guarantee of undermining its stature in Pakistan. For example, the image of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari standing by Barack Obama’s side in Washington announcing a new “Af-Pak” approach surely did as much to undermine them as any policy programme could. Policy measures need not be applied in a linear fashion, but they should be oriented towards ultimately shifting the balance of power in Pakistan towards conciliatory forces, whenever possible.

To pretend that India has no leverage, or to give in to the temptation of being reactive instead of proactive in the face of US and Pakistani policy changes, is no longer a serious option.

Amitabh Dubey is the Director of India Research at Trusted Sources, a London-based firm that provides emerging market research to financial institutions, central banks and hedge funds. Trusted Sources focusses on the interaction of economics and public policy, and adopts a “top down” approach looking at the impact of macroeconomics, politics and security on economies and sectors. Dubey has previously worked at Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consultancy, and has been a business journalist in India. He has degrees in economics and political science from Delhi University, University of Chicago and Columbia University.

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DSI

AYESHA SIDDIQA

The Taliban will continue to operate in Pakistan but they will never actually control the state

I

THE PAKISTAN PUZZLE 34

F anyone likes solving puzzles then they must enjoy solving the mystery of what will happen to Pakistan in the coming months and years. A question that most people ask inside and outside the country is, will Pakistan survive? This is linked to another question, whether the state will be taken over by the Taliban?

And it is a daring project to solve the puzzle intellectually.

The country is abundant in conspiracy theorists who will very confidently refer to the maps produced by some American think-tanks in which Baluchistan or Frontier provinces are no longer part of Troops carry the coffin of Pakistan's Pakistan. So, you might even get a army Major Abid Majeed Malik killed definitive answer from such theorists in Swat region claiming that the decision to break Pakistan was taken in Washington many years ago. Furthermore, the threat of Talibanisation or the Baluch insurgency is nothing but an extension of a foreign plan. Since numerous foreign players want a strong Muslim state to disintegrate, the Taliban or others are being paid off to create chaos and violence in the society. What is even more tragic is the fact that everyone seems to be loudly uttering this theory, sometimes actually believing it.

Whether the conspiracy theory is true or false depends on available evidence.

35

However, what is certainly true is that such a mindset denotes the hidden social and psychological restlessness in society.

After years of bad governance and political instability several chasms have appeared amongst various societal stakeholders.

And these divisions express themselves at several levels. There is, for example, complete confusion about the nature of the state: whether it is theocratic or a state founded for the Muslims of the Subcontinent. This question is very old but the answer feeds into the state’s capacity to deal with the Taliban or other groups of militants.

Contrary to the thinking of the founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was specific in categorising Pakistan as a country where people from all religions will live freely and follow their independent religious beliefs without fear of coercion, there are many in today’s Pakistan who view sharia or imposition of religious law very lightly. The fact that Jinnah did not want to make the state Islamic is clear from his decision to make a scheduled caste Hindu Joginder Nath Mandal the Chairman of the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

Surely, he didn’t desire an Islamic theocracy by making a non-Muslim Chairman to draft the first constitution of the Islamic republic?

Sadly, the above details and Jinnah’s desire are a secondary issue. A number of

Ayesha Siddiqa.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/17/09

9:01 AM

Page 1

JUNE 2009

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE

DSI

AYESHA SIDDIQA

The Taliban will continue to operate in Pakistan but they will never actually control the state

I

THE PAKISTAN PUZZLE 34

F anyone likes solving puzzles then they must enjoy solving the mystery of what will happen to Pakistan in the coming months and years. A question that most people ask inside and outside the country is, will Pakistan survive? This is linked to another question, whether the state will be taken over by the Taliban?

And it is a daring project to solve the puzzle intellectually.

The country is abundant in conspiracy theorists who will very confidently refer to the maps produced by some American think-tanks in which Baluchistan or Frontier provinces are no longer part of Troops carry the coffin of Pakistan's Pakistan. So, you might even get a army Major Abid Majeed Malik killed definitive answer from such theorists in Swat region claiming that the decision to break Pakistan was taken in Washington many years ago. Furthermore, the threat of Talibanisation or the Baluch insurgency is nothing but an extension of a foreign plan. Since numerous foreign players want a strong Muslim state to disintegrate, the Taliban or others are being paid off to create chaos and violence in the society. What is even more tragic is the fact that everyone seems to be loudly uttering this theory, sometimes actually believing it.

Whether the conspiracy theory is true or false depends on available evidence.

35

However, what is certainly true is that such a mindset denotes the hidden social and psychological restlessness in society.

After years of bad governance and political instability several chasms have appeared amongst various societal stakeholders.

And these divisions express themselves at several levels. There is, for example, complete confusion about the nature of the state: whether it is theocratic or a state founded for the Muslims of the Subcontinent. This question is very old but the answer feeds into the state’s capacity to deal with the Taliban or other groups of militants.

Contrary to the thinking of the founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was specific in categorising Pakistan as a country where people from all religions will live freely and follow their independent religious beliefs without fear of coercion, there are many in today’s Pakistan who view sharia or imposition of religious law very lightly. The fact that Jinnah did not want to make the state Islamic is clear from his decision to make a scheduled caste Hindu Joginder Nath Mandal the Chairman of the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

Surely, he didn’t desire an Islamic theocracy by making a non-Muslim Chairman to draft the first constitution of the Islamic republic?

Sadly, the above details and Jinnah’s desire are a secondary issue. A number of

Ayesha Siddiqa.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/17/09

9:01 AM

Page 3

JUNE 2009

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE people do not feel hesitancy with the Taliban demanding the imposition of sharia in Swat almost pretending as if this is something natural to the Pakistani state.

Although an argument regarding the implementation of the religious law in the rest of Pakistan has not been made, the fact that people are willing to accept sharia in one part of the country is quite telling.

Religious law in Swat, which followed after Islamabad signed the notorious Malakand Agreeement with Sufi Mohammad of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), is justified on the basis that this was a law prevalent in that area until 1969 and was demanded by the people of Swat. The reality, nonetheless, is very different. The people of Swat may have had traditional affinity for this law but they did not really demand it until forced by the TNSM. It is not even argued that the Swatis had voted for the ANP, a liberal secular party, instead of the Taliban. It is unfortunate that their elected leaders abandoned the people.

Moreover, fewer questions are being asked about the nature of the sharia law which is basically the arbitrary imposition of the will of Sufi Mohammad, Maulana Fazlullah and their brutal clan. The government is not making any distinction between a genuine sympathy for the Taliban amongst the ordinary people and the disgust for the military operation that does not seem to eliminate the Taliban but target the ordinary folk.

The only party, which has challenged this questionable law, is the MQM. However, the ethnic party of the migrants seems driven less by its love for democracy, rule of law, liberalism and secular values than by its fear of being outnumbered by the Pushtoons who are fast moving into the urban areas of Sindh.

Being outnumbered means losing politically in the future because then the party won’t have the advantage of numbers. Since the ruckus in the Frontier province, a lot of Pathans have migrated to Karachi where they monopolise some of the businesses such as local transport.

Interestingly, the party’s sloganeering against the Taliban has made the liberal Left in Pakistan forget the atrocities carried out by the MQM. The party was known for torturing people and keeping them in private jails. In fact, sources believe that if the demographic shift is not stopped the MQM might even initiate a blood bath in Karachi which it is capable of doing given the huge cache of weapons that it

The perception is that little is being said about Taliban in other areas like Punjab and that the war has been brought on the Pathans from outside.

What is worse is that now they are being targeted and pushed out from other parts of the country

36

holds. It is also argued that the MQM currently has more weapons than even the government of Sindh.

The MQM reaction adds to the sense of deprivation of the Pathans who are feeling extremely bitter over, what they claim, being targeted by the Pakistani state. The perception is that little is being said about Taliban in other areas such as Punjab and that the war has been brought on them from outside. What is worse is that now they are being targeted and pushed out from other parts of the country including Punjab where the government seems to be bothering lower class Pathans and pushing them to leave the province. Intriguingly, the Punjab government does not appear too keen to ask questions about the Punjabi militants that are getting powerful by the day and joining their kind in the tribal areas to fight the Pakistani state.

According to Pakistani author and

expert on Taliban, Ahmed Rasheed, about 40 militant groups in Punjab are coalescing with the Taliban in tribal areas.

Most of the major militant outfits based in Punjab such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) have links with groups in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan. The PML-N dominated Punjab government considers the two attacks in Lahore (on the Sri Lankan cricket team and at the police training camp at Manawan) as some foreign intelligence plan to thrust Pushtoon Taliban on Punjab with the intention of breaking the province.

So, the response to the Taliban attack is largely in the form of greater subnationalism that is invoked by the different groups for their own protection and to compensate for a lack of strategy by the central government. The national level

DSI

protect their rights rather thinking in terms of fighting Internally displaced the Taliban resonates mainly Pakistanis queue up at a than depend on the liberal elements in other parts of the amongst the liberal elite camp in Jalzoi area; which looks at the threat in a Pakistani President Asif country who are completely engrossed in their concern linear fashion and is not Ali Zardari (left) regarding the state’s survival willing to consider past and current linkages between the militants and from the Taliban.

Although unforgivable, the attitude of the state. For such people, the military is the only method for fighting the incursion the liberal elite could be understood also of the Taliban. Therefore, while opposing from the perspective that this group seems the military’s adventures in other parts of to have lesser numerical strength as the country such as Baluchistan, the liberal opposed to the larger number of elite is not too willing to push the state conservative elements in the society. A forcefully against the use of force, as it is large part of the media, in particular, their only guarantee against the militants. appears supportive of the Taliban. In this, In any case, given the control of they are joined by some segments of the information about Baluchistan, there is old Left as well, out of the belief that the little possibility of a movement in war fought by the militants is actually other parts of the country demanding meant to corner the American and retard greater rights for the people of that their invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, most province. This means that the Baluch are of the stakeholders are looking very left to invoke their own sub-nationalism to carelessly at the war on terror or

37

Ayesha Siddiqa.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd

6/17/09

9:01 AM

Page 3

JUNE 2009

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE people do not feel hesitancy with the Taliban demanding the imposition of sharia in Swat almost pretending as if this is something natural to the Pakistani state.

Although an argument regarding the implementation of the religious law in the rest of Pakistan has not been made, the fact that people are willing to accept sharia in one part of the country is quite telling.

Religious law in Swat, which followed after Islamabad signed the notorious Malakand Agreeement with Sufi Mohammad of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), is justified on the basis that this was a law prevalent in that area until 1969 and was demanded by the people of Swat. The reality, nonetheless, is very different. The people of Swat may have had traditional affinity for this law but they did not really demand it until forced by the TNSM. It is not even argued that the Swatis had voted for the ANP, a liberal secular party, instead of the Taliban. It is unfortunate that their elected leaders abandoned the people.

Moreover, fewer questions are being asked about the nature of the sharia law which is basically the arbitrary imposition of the will of Sufi Mohammad, Maulana Fazlullah and their brutal clan. The government is not making any distinction between a genuine sympathy for the Taliban amongst the ordinary people and the disgust for the military operation that does not seem to eliminate the Taliban but target the ordinary folk.

The only party, which has challenged this questionable law, is the MQM. However, the ethnic party of the migrants seems driven less by its love for democracy, rule of law, liberalism and secular values than by its fear of being outnumbered by the Pushtoons who are fast moving into the urban areas of Sindh.

Being outnumbered means losing politically in the future because then the party won’t have the advantage of numbers. Since the ruckus in the Frontier province, a lot of Pathans have migrated to Karachi where they monopolise some of the businesses such as local transport.

Interestingly, the party’s sloganeering against the Taliban has made the liberal Left in Pakistan forget the atrocities carried out by the MQM. The party was known for torturing people and keeping them in private jails. In fact, sources believe that if the demographic shift is not stopped the MQM might even initiate a blood bath in Karachi which it is capable of doing given the huge cache of weapons that it

The perception is that little is being said about Taliban in other areas like Punjab and that the war has been brought on the Pathans from outside.

What is worse is that now they are being targeted and pushed out from other parts of the country

36

holds. It is also argued that the MQM currently has more weapons than even the government of Sindh.

The MQM reaction adds to the sense of deprivation of the Pathans who are feeling extremely bitter over, what they claim, being targeted by the Pakistani state. The perception is that little is being said about Taliban in other areas such as Punjab and that the war has been brought on them from outside. What is worse is that now they are being targeted and pushed out from other parts of the country including Punjab where the government seems to be bothering lower class Pathans and pushing them to leave the province. Intriguingly, the Punjab government does not appear too keen to ask questions about the Punjabi militants that are getting powerful by the day and joining their kind in the tribal areas to fight the Pakistani state.

According to Pakistani author and

expert on Taliban, Ahmed Rasheed, about 40 militant groups in Punjab are coalescing with the Taliban in tribal areas.

Most of the major militant outfits based in Punjab such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) have links with groups in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan. The PML-N dominated Punjab government considers the two attacks in Lahore (on the Sri Lankan cricket team and at the police training camp at Manawan) as some foreign intelligence plan to thrust Pushtoon Taliban on Punjab with the intention of breaking the province.

So, the response to the Taliban attack is largely in the form of greater subnationalism that is invoked by the different groups for their own protection and to compensate for a lack of strategy by the central government. The national level

DSI

protect their rights rather thinking in terms of fighting Internally displaced the Taliban resonates mainly Pakistanis queue up at a than depend on the liberal elements in other parts of the amongst the liberal elite camp in Jalzoi area; which looks at the threat in a Pakistani President Asif country who are completely engrossed in their concern linear fashion and is not Ali Zardari (left) regarding the state’s survival willing to consider past and current linkages between the militants and from the Taliban.

Although unforgivable, the attitude of the state. For such people, the military is the only method for fighting the incursion the liberal elite could be understood also of the Taliban. Therefore, while opposing from the perspective that this group seems the military’s adventures in other parts of to have lesser numerical strength as the country such as Baluchistan, the liberal opposed to the larger number of elite is not too willing to push the state conservative elements in the society. A forcefully against the use of force, as it is large part of the media, in particular, their only guarantee against the militants. appears supportive of the Taliban. In this, In any case, given the control of they are joined by some segments of the information about Baluchistan, there is old Left as well, out of the belief that the little possibility of a movement in war fought by the militants is actually other parts of the country demanding meant to corner the American and retard greater rights for the people of that their invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, most province. This means that the Baluch are of the stakeholders are looking very left to invoke their own sub-nationalism to carelessly at the war on terror or

37

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TALIBAN OFFENSIVE

considering it from their narrow prism.

The resultant developments are two fold. First, the military establishment with its brand of nationalism has grown stronger. This is because the end result of what both seemingly opposing groups desire brings greater conservatism to the society. While desiring the elimination of the Taliban strengthens the military, the opposite wish also benefits the military state as it brings greater social conservatism, even radicalism, amongst the people.

Second, the lines between the liberal and the conservative, or the Left, Centre and Right have become very blurred.

Ideologically, this means that positions, which different groups or people take, are not distinct any more. This is not unlike other parts of the world where the difference between the Left and the Right has narrowed. Consequently, it is difficult to guess the ideological position of a group from the issue they are supporting. For instance, the lawyer’s movement, which is aimed at fighting a military dictator and then opposing a civilian leader with similar characteristics (Asif Zardari), included the Jamaat-i-Islami and Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf that is as conservative as the JI. The PPP, on the other hand, known for being a liberal party, was

DSI

opposed to the movement PTI chairman Imran corrupt politicians that is as once it got into power. Khan, (right) Jamaat- easily brought into power as Furthermore, the PPP and the e-Islami chief Qazi removed. The problem with ANP, two liberal parties, Hussain Ahmad this, nonetheless, is that it signed the controversial increases dependency on the agreement in Swat to protect their power. militants, which is a recipe for further However, the action further confused weakening of the state. those that continue to think on the lines of The greatest tragedy is that the people ideological divide. do not have a full view of these different The larger problem is that the blurring chasms mentioned above. The lack of a full of ideological distinction has added to the picture means that people do not see the growing conservatism of the state main cause of the issues and revert to and society, and there seems to be no conspiracy theories, which, in turn, means force to pull the society away from that little will be done to correct the internal the direction it has taken. More imbalances to strengthen the state from importantly, while the different societal within. Under the circumstances, the state groups battle each other, the and the society will tread on one cosmetic establishment persists with its depen- change after the other. The military and its dency on the militants. The military’s concept of the national security state will position vis-à-vis the militants adds to the continue to be the hallmark of the Pakistani several existing layers of confusion state in the foreseeable future. regarding the security of the state. Thus, many are fearful that Islamabad might be Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political overrun by the Taliban. However, there is and defence analyst currently teaching at a fine line between dependency on the the University of Pennsylvania. She has a militants and allowing them a greater PhD in War Studies and is the author of control of the state. This means that Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and while they would continue to operate Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a inside the territory, the Taliban will Policy; and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s actually never be allowed to control the Military Economy. She has served in state. These elements are much harder to Pakistan’s civil service, and is a columnist for negotiate with than the existing bunch of Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

38

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Indian government can ensure secure elections but not a secure country

AJAI SAHNI

I

NDIA has variously been described as a ‘flailing state’, a ‘functioning anarchy’, a ‘dysfunctional democracy’… and these assessments are not without rational basis. But this very system, under a clear mandate, has demonstrated–again and again–the capacities to deliver the most astonishing results. The startlingly unambiguous electoral mandate to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was not the Indian Central Reserve Police Force only remarkable outpersonnel run along come in the General Elections of Aprila deserted street May 2009; the elecfollowing a blast in toral exercise itself Baramulla, some was a tribute to the 55km northwest abiding institutional of Srinagar strengths and vibrancy of democracy, and to the security forces which provide protective cover to this vast undertaking.

A handful of violent incidents, particularly in the first of the five phases of the election, have coloured perceptions, with some commentators jumping to sweeping, hasty and ill-informed judgments about the “unprecedented use of armed force in a bid to subvert the constitutionally ordained democratic process” and the dubious “fact that the security forces have had to lay down their lives in increasing numbers” (R.S.N. Singh, ‘National Elections 2009: India’s Fragile Internal Security Exposed’, Centre for Land

Warfare Studies, April 27, 2009).

Before any assessment of the threat and reality of violence during the electoral process, and of security responses, is attempted, it is useful to take a bird’s eye view of the enormity of what has been executed. The Indian general elections are, by far, the largest and most complex democratic exercise in the world, involving, on the present occasion, arrangements for as many as 713.77 million voters to cast their votes. This is in excess of the combined population of North and South America (710 million), and just short of the total population of Europe (730 million). This involved the setting up of 8,34,000 polling stations, and the coordination of the activities of 2,046 election observers, 1,40,000 ‘microobservers’ and 46,90,000 polling staff deployed in polling stations, and an ‘equal number of staff and officers’ used in various ‘election related capacities’. 8,070 candidates were contesting the 543 Parliamentary constituencies, even as another 473 Assembly constituencies went to the polls in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Sikkim. With a 57 per cent voter turnout in the Parliamentary elections, nearly 407 million voters actually cast their ballots, across the most extraordinarily diverse–and often difficult–geographical, cultural and security terrain. 12 election personnel, for instance, trekked 45 kilometers through knee-deep snow to reach two polling stations, serving

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Indian government can ensure secure elections but not a secure country

AJAI SAHNI

I

NDIA has variously been described as a ‘flailing state’, a ‘functioning anarchy’, a ‘dysfunctional democracy’… and these assessments are not without rational basis. But this very system, under a clear mandate, has demonstrated–again and again–the capacities to deliver the most astonishing results. The startlingly unambiguous electoral mandate to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was not the Indian Central Reserve Police Force only remarkable outpersonnel run along come in the General Elections of Aprila deserted street May 2009; the elecfollowing a blast in toral exercise itself Baramulla, some was a tribute to the 55km northwest abiding institutional of Srinagar strengths and vibrancy of democracy, and to the security forces which provide protective cover to this vast undertaking.

A handful of violent incidents, particularly in the first of the five phases of the election, have coloured perceptions, with some commentators jumping to sweeping, hasty and ill-informed judgments about the “unprecedented use of armed force in a bid to subvert the constitutionally ordained democratic process” and the dubious “fact that the security forces have had to lay down their lives in increasing numbers” (R.S.N. Singh, ‘National Elections 2009: India’s Fragile Internal Security Exposed’, Centre for Land

Warfare Studies, April 27, 2009).

Before any assessment of the threat and reality of violence during the electoral process, and of security responses, is attempted, it is useful to take a bird’s eye view of the enormity of what has been executed. The Indian general elections are, by far, the largest and most complex democratic exercise in the world, involving, on the present occasion, arrangements for as many as 713.77 million voters to cast their votes. This is in excess of the combined population of North and South America (710 million), and just short of the total population of Europe (730 million). This involved the setting up of 8,34,000 polling stations, and the coordination of the activities of 2,046 election observers, 1,40,000 ‘microobservers’ and 46,90,000 polling staff deployed in polling stations, and an ‘equal number of staff and officers’ used in various ‘election related capacities’. 8,070 candidates were contesting the 543 Parliamentary constituencies, even as another 473 Assembly constituencies went to the polls in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Sikkim. With a 57 per cent voter turnout in the Parliamentary elections, nearly 407 million voters actually cast their ballots, across the most extraordinarily diverse–and often difficult–geographical, cultural and security terrain. 12 election personnel, for instance, trekked 45 kilometers through knee-deep snow to reach two polling stations, serving

BALLOT OVER BULLET 40

41

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INSECURE MANDATE just 37 voters, at a height of 13,700 feet in the Zanskar sub-division of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

This was an election, moreover, that was held under an enveloping atmosphere of threat. After the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, and the intervening months of persistent reports of heightened infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control in J&K, the possibility of escalating Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist violence was high in intelligence assessments. This was intensified further by a call for the boycott of elections from the ‘hardline’ faction of the separatist Hurriyat The chief of Indian Conference led by administered Syed Ali Shah Kashmir’s ruling Geelani, as well as by Peoples Democratic the Pakistan-based Party Mehbooba and backed United Mufti (L) and senior Jihad Council (UJC), ministers and PDP which enumerates leaders in Uri, virtually all major some 100km north Islamist terrorist of Srinagar groups operating in J&K (and across the country) among its members. The UJC chief, who also heads the Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen, issued the call for the boycott and threatened that “anyone who casts a ballot will be considered a traitor.”

At the same time, the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-Maoist, aka the Naxalites) also issued a call for a poll boycott across areas of their influence and activity, threatening political leaders, workers and voters with reprisals if they failed to comply. The Maoist Information Bulletin of April 10, 2009, thus quoted Party Spokesman ‘Azad’ as declaring an “active boycott where we prevent the candidates from carrying out their campaigns in the villages and smaller urban centres in our areas. We warn the parties not to venture out into our areas and when they do not heed our warnings, we stop their campaign, beat them up if they are notorious elements, burn their vehicles, conduct people’s courts… We also carry out counter-offensive actions against the police and central forces who are used by the reactionary rulers to enforce elections at gun-point.”

In India’s troubled Northeast, however, most insurgent groups remained silent on the election issue this time around, though the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland did declare that it had “nothing to do with the Indian elections”.

In India’s troubled Northeast, however, most insurgent groups remained silent on the election issue this time around, though the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–IsakMuivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland did declare that it had “nothing to do with the Indian elections”

”

Nevertheless, Assam had witnessed a succession of explo- sions in the months preceding the elections, including the Guwahati blasts on April 6, which killed 10 people. Unrelenting violence in Manipur, afflicted by multiple insurgencies, accounted for as many as 196 fatalities between January and May 11, 2009.

The run-up to the elections saw a number of dramatic incidents of violence in the Maoist ‘red corridor’ areas, prominently including the ambush of a Central Reserve Police Force and State police party at Minpa in District Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, by a group of several hundred Naxalites on April 10, 2009. 10 SF personnel were killed in the attack. The bodies of three Maoist cadres were also recovered, while several others

42

are believed to have been removed by the comrades in retreat. Again, on April 12, several hundred Maoists attacked an explosives store at NALCO at Damanjodi, District Koraput, Orissa, killing 10 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel, while the bodies of four Maoist cadres were recovered.

In a ‘vulnerability mapping’ exercise carried out by the Election Commission, in association with the Ministry of Home Affairs and concerned security agencies, a total of 86,782 villages/hamlets were identified as sensitive. Crucially, as many as 373,861 persons were ‘booked’ under various preventive laws prior to elections.

79 Parliamentary constituencies were identified as Naxalite affected, and 118,604 sensitive polling stations were provided

with augmented SF cover. The areas worst affected by Maoist activity were all clubbed together in the first phase of the election, preceded by ‘area stabilisation’ exercises before the polling date. The polling time was changed to between 7 am and 3 pm in 15 Parliamentary and 66 Assembly segments in Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar and Maharashtra, “to enable daylight evacuation of the polling personnel and poll materials.” 47 polling stations in Bihar and 88 in Chhattisgarh were relocated to ‘safer areas’ because of the perceived threat of Maoist violence. An estimated 75,000 personnel of the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) were assigned to a rolling deployment across different constituencies over the five phases of the election.

There were, of course, some apparent missteps, particularly in the first phase.

The ‘area stabilisation’ objective in Maoistaffected areas could only have been met by a massive saturation of force, and there is some evidence that this was lacking. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, an additional 160 companies of CPMFs were deployed during the current elections, as compared to as many as 300 companies during the Assembly Elections of November 2008.

In Jharkhand, as against a State Government demand for 220 companies, just 96 were deployed. In Bihar, against a requisition for 260 companies, 130 were made available. These allocations are, of course, in addition to the State Police and State Armed Police contingents that were allocated for election duties.

Violence in the first phase, across the Maoist belt, was, perhaps consequently, significant. A total of 19 persons (9 civilians and 10 SF personnel) were killed, even as violent incidents were recorded in 86 polling stations. The worst incidents included a landmine blast at Chatra in Jharkhand, which killed seven Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and two civilians; and another explosion in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, in which six persons, including five members of a reserve poll

43

DSI

party, travelling without security, were killed (the Maoists subsequently claimed to have mistaken them for a security contingent). But just 71 polling stations of the 76,000 identified as vulnerable were, in fact, affected by any measure of Maoist violence in Phase I. There was a clear corrective applied in subsequent phases. Phase II in West Bengal, for instance, saw the deployment of 220 companies of CPMFs – the highest for any state. Specifically, about 81 CPMF companies and some 10,000 state policemen were deployed in West Midnapore alone, where the Maoist bastion of Lalgarh is located. Similarly, 45 companies were deployed in the troubled Kandhamal District of Orissa, which had seen protracted Maoist and communal violence in 2008. In any event, Phase II saw eight fatalities (six SF and two civilians); in Phase III, three civilians were killed; in Phase IV, five civilians; and in Phase V, two civilians. Many of these fatalities resulted from political violence or personal vendettas unrelated to the enduring insurgencies in the country.

The levels of violence were, by no means, ‘unprecedented’ or ‘increasing‘.

Indeed, only the complete absence of historical memory can explain such assessments. A total of 37 persons were killed through the five phases of elections in 2009, 23 of them by Maoists or in police firing. The remaining were killed in accidents or individual incidents. In the 2004 elections, as many as 48 persons had been killed during the elections. The runup to the 2004 elections had also seen several incidents of extremist violence, prominently including the attack on an election rally being addressed by Mehbooba Mufti in J&K, which killed 11; and the landmine attack by the then Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in the West Singhbhum District of Jharkhand, which killed 26 policemen.

And the 2004 elections were not exceptionally bloody by Indian standards.

The terror in Punjab has now largely receded from public memory, but when the feckless Chandrashekhar Government tried to force the terrorwracked State to join the 1991 General Elections and simultaneously hold elections to its Assembly, the terrorists, enormously encouraged by months of preceding appeasement, exploded into violence. The campaign of liquidation that followed claimed the lives of as many as 27 candidates, and in the June 7,

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INSECURE MANDATE just 37 voters, at a height of 13,700 feet in the Zanskar sub-division of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

This was an election, moreover, that was held under an enveloping atmosphere of threat. After the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, and the intervening months of persistent reports of heightened infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control in J&K, the possibility of escalating Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist violence was high in intelligence assessments. This was intensified further by a call for the boycott of elections from the ‘hardline’ faction of the separatist Hurriyat The chief of Indian Conference led by administered Syed Ali Shah Kashmir’s ruling Geelani, as well as by Peoples Democratic the Pakistan-based Party Mehbooba and backed United Mufti (L) and senior Jihad Council (UJC), ministers and PDP which enumerates leaders in Uri, virtually all major some 100km north Islamist terrorist of Srinagar groups operating in J&K (and across the country) among its members. The UJC chief, who also heads the Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen, issued the call for the boycott and threatened that “anyone who casts a ballot will be considered a traitor.”

At the same time, the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-Maoist, aka the Naxalites) also issued a call for a poll boycott across areas of their influence and activity, threatening political leaders, workers and voters with reprisals if they failed to comply. The Maoist Information Bulletin of April 10, 2009, thus quoted Party Spokesman ‘Azad’ as declaring an “active boycott where we prevent the candidates from carrying out their campaigns in the villages and smaller urban centres in our areas. We warn the parties not to venture out into our areas and when they do not heed our warnings, we stop their campaign, beat them up if they are notorious elements, burn their vehicles, conduct people’s courts… We also carry out counter-offensive actions against the police and central forces who are used by the reactionary rulers to enforce elections at gun-point.”

In India’s troubled Northeast, however, most insurgent groups remained silent on the election issue this time around, though the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland did declare that it had “nothing to do with the Indian elections”.

In India’s troubled Northeast, however, most insurgent groups remained silent on the election issue this time around, though the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–IsakMuivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland did declare that it had “nothing to do with the Indian elections”

”

Nevertheless, Assam had witnessed a succession of explo- sions in the months preceding the elections, including the Guwahati blasts on April 6, which killed 10 people. Unrelenting violence in Manipur, afflicted by multiple insurgencies, accounted for as many as 196 fatalities between January and May 11, 2009.

The run-up to the elections saw a number of dramatic incidents of violence in the Maoist ‘red corridor’ areas, prominently including the ambush of a Central Reserve Police Force and State police party at Minpa in District Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, by a group of several hundred Naxalites on April 10, 2009. 10 SF personnel were killed in the attack. The bodies of three Maoist cadres were also recovered, while several others

42

are believed to have been removed by the comrades in retreat. Again, on April 12, several hundred Maoists attacked an explosives store at NALCO at Damanjodi, District Koraput, Orissa, killing 10 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel, while the bodies of four Maoist cadres were recovered.

In a ‘vulnerability mapping’ exercise carried out by the Election Commission, in association with the Ministry of Home Affairs and concerned security agencies, a total of 86,782 villages/hamlets were identified as sensitive. Crucially, as many as 373,861 persons were ‘booked’ under various preventive laws prior to elections.

79 Parliamentary constituencies were identified as Naxalite affected, and 118,604 sensitive polling stations were provided

with augmented SF cover. The areas worst affected by Maoist activity were all clubbed together in the first phase of the election, preceded by ‘area stabilisation’ exercises before the polling date. The polling time was changed to between 7 am and 3 pm in 15 Parliamentary and 66 Assembly segments in Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar and Maharashtra, “to enable daylight evacuation of the polling personnel and poll materials.” 47 polling stations in Bihar and 88 in Chhattisgarh were relocated to ‘safer areas’ because of the perceived threat of Maoist violence. An estimated 75,000 personnel of the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) were assigned to a rolling deployment across different constituencies over the five phases of the election.

There were, of course, some apparent missteps, particularly in the first phase.

The ‘area stabilisation’ objective in Maoistaffected areas could only have been met by a massive saturation of force, and there is some evidence that this was lacking. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, an additional 160 companies of CPMFs were deployed during the current elections, as compared to as many as 300 companies during the Assembly Elections of November 2008.

In Jharkhand, as against a State Government demand for 220 companies, just 96 were deployed. In Bihar, against a requisition for 260 companies, 130 were made available. These allocations are, of course, in addition to the State Police and State Armed Police contingents that were allocated for election duties.

Violence in the first phase, across the Maoist belt, was, perhaps consequently, significant. A total of 19 persons (9 civilians and 10 SF personnel) were killed, even as violent incidents were recorded in 86 polling stations. The worst incidents included a landmine blast at Chatra in Jharkhand, which killed seven Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and two civilians; and another explosion in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, in which six persons, including five members of a reserve poll

43

DSI

party, travelling without security, were killed (the Maoists subsequently claimed to have mistaken them for a security contingent). But just 71 polling stations of the 76,000 identified as vulnerable were, in fact, affected by any measure of Maoist violence in Phase I. There was a clear corrective applied in subsequent phases. Phase II in West Bengal, for instance, saw the deployment of 220 companies of CPMFs – the highest for any state. Specifically, about 81 CPMF companies and some 10,000 state policemen were deployed in West Midnapore alone, where the Maoist bastion of Lalgarh is located. Similarly, 45 companies were deployed in the troubled Kandhamal District of Orissa, which had seen protracted Maoist and communal violence in 2008. In any event, Phase II saw eight fatalities (six SF and two civilians); in Phase III, three civilians were killed; in Phase IV, five civilians; and in Phase V, two civilians. Many of these fatalities resulted from political violence or personal vendettas unrelated to the enduring insurgencies in the country.

The levels of violence were, by no means, ‘unprecedented’ or ‘increasing‘.

Indeed, only the complete absence of historical memory can explain such assessments. A total of 37 persons were killed through the five phases of elections in 2009, 23 of them by Maoists or in police firing. The remaining were killed in accidents or individual incidents. In the 2004 elections, as many as 48 persons had been killed during the elections. The runup to the 2004 elections had also seen several incidents of extremist violence, prominently including the attack on an election rally being addressed by Mehbooba Mufti in J&K, which killed 11; and the landmine attack by the then Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in the West Singhbhum District of Jharkhand, which killed 26 policemen.

And the 2004 elections were not exceptionally bloody by Indian standards.

The terror in Punjab has now largely receded from public memory, but when the feckless Chandrashekhar Government tried to force the terrorwracked State to join the 1991 General Elections and simultaneously hold elections to its Assembly, the terrorists, enormously encouraged by months of preceding appeasement, exploded into violence. The campaign of liquidation that followed claimed the lives of as many as 27 candidates, and in the June 7,

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accompanied by one local 1991, train massacre, 74 A paramilitary policeman, started from Bijapur passengers were slaughtered. soldier checks to go through forests to reach a Unrelenting violence through voters’ identity place called Sundra, to prepare a pre-election phase eventually cards at a polling resulted in the elections station in Amritsar helipad so that electoral officials and materials could be brought being aborted on June 21, 2009.

The sheer intensity of the election in. This short journey was to be completed experience in the remote and disturbed in two stages, with an overnight stop at areas of the country is difficult for most Sagmeta. They moved from Bijapur at 7am, to imagine. K.P.S. Gill provides a and by 10am they were in the thick of the particularly evocative account of an forest. They were greeted by as many as 19 electoral exercise in the Chhattisgarh landmine blasts, coupled with heavy firing.

Parliamentary Elections, 2004, that was ‘far The commandos retaliated and used area from unique’ (K.P.S. Gill, ‘A Prime Minister weapons–2-inch mortars, GF rifles Speaks: Finally, a clear voice on terror‘, (grenade launchers), Light Machine Guns South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 3, No. and ALRs. They found that all the existing forest trails were mined, so they marched 40, April 18, 2005): Few in India have recognized or even cross country, cutting a path through the understood the enormous effort and forest and reached Sagmeta, just 15 sacrifice that has gone into the preservation kilometres from Bijapur, at 5pm, comof the ‘symbols and gestures’ of pleting the journey in over 10 hours. At Constitutional Demo- cracy… A con- Sagmeta, from 11pm to 5am the next tingent of the Punjab Police (PP) was morning, there was a pitched battle deployed in Chattisgarh for 22 days on between the police party and the Naxalites polling duties, with a large proportion of who were surrounding them from all sides. these in the Bastar area, including four of They then received information that the the areas worst affected by Naxalite route to Sundra was heavily mined. The violence: Jagdalpur, Kanker, Bijapur and party consequently stayed on at Sagmeta Dantewada. One party of 50 PP personnel, for another day. Firing on the party started

44

again at 10pm and continued till 5am the next morning. A helicopter was eventually pressed into service, and lifted one party–about half a platoon–which secured the ground at Sundra. The remaining policemen were then airlifted to create and secure the helipad. They came under heavy fire from the Naxalites through the night at Sundra as well. For those who have not faced fire, it is difficult to understand the enormous courage and character that it would have taken this small contingent, as they confronted a faceless enemy, although unused to the terrain, being in the area for the first time… despite the fact that they took casualties, they managed to set up the polling station, and polling did take place… After polling was over, the party returned, once again under heavy fire throughout the night…

India’s General Elections are an exercise of continental proportions, and a security and administrative system that can conduct these regularly and–absent exceptional political incompetence or mischief–with relatively low levels of violence, given the enormously troubled conditions that prevail across wide areas of the country, has undoubted muscle to it. How, then,

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officials and candidates–and do these sinews fail to work A policeman sits in a this protection is required only against the protracted ‘small van loaded with till the election process ends at wars’ that have disrupted electronic voting governance and life across machines in Dhanbad a particular location; anything that happens thereafter has no a multiplicity of theatres across the country? Why can the efficiency of significant bearing on the integrity of the security operations during elections not be election process. It is, con-sequently, replicated in the country’s fight against possible– though not easy–to organize a moving carnival of security personnel terrorism and insurgency?

The answer lies, partly, in the perversity from one area to another to secure the of politics, and partly in the insufficiency necessary saturation of force from phase to of capacities to do always what it is possible phase. It is, indeed, the imperative of securing such transient saturation with to do occasionally.

The first of these is too well known limited availability of force that has to demand significant repetition here. resulted in a progressive pro- traction of For decades, policing and security have been the election process over the decades– political footballs, kicked about with culminating in the five-phase month-long little concern for consequence or national election of 2009.

The same levels of saturation and interest. The result has been a sustained perversion of security systems, compoun- alert cannot, however, be maintained for ded by enduring neglect. This brings long, and cannot be extended to all us to the second issue: the impact potential targets of terrorism, insurgency has been the cumulative diminution of or sub-conventional warfare–certainly capacities relative to rising demands of a within the current capacities and growing and restive population, of external configurations of the Indian internal mischief, and of the increasing technical, security apparatus. Intelligence assets, technological and tactical sophistication of moreover, are spread too thin–in terms of material and human resources, as well anti-state groupings.

Despite the endemic capacity deficits, as technical and technological aids–to during an election, it is possible to protect ensure the prior identification of identifiable locations for a short duration. all potential locations of terrorist or These locations are clearly defined– insurgent threat or attack. Vast areas of the principally, the polling stations, polling country, to put it simply, are located

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in security blackholes, and come to be dominated by disruptive, insurgent and terrorist elements.

The experience of security management during the current elections clearly demonstrates the capabilities of India’s security apparatus, under appropriate mandate, and with clear objectives. The challenge of policy, now, is to determine and establish the mandate, the objectives, and, crucially, the capacities that are necessary to secure the same measure of effectiveness at all times, and across the country.

Ajai Sahni is Founding Member & Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management. He is also Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution.

He is Member, State Police Commission, Uttarakhand; and Member, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific India. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia, and has participated in advisory projects undertaken for various National or State Governments. Jointly edited (with K.P.S. Gill) Terror & Containment: Perspectives on India’s Internal Security; and the Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkage. He received a Ph.D. from Delhi University with his thesis on Democracy, Dissent & the Right to Information.

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defencetalk

An update on military policy

A show to sea THE Fourth International Maritime Defence Show (IMDS-2009) will take place on the 24-28 of June, 2009 in St.Petersburg, Russia. Held under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Federal Service of Military and Technical Cooperation, the Government of St. Petersburg and FSUE Rosoboronexport, the show is being organised by the Ministry of Industry andTrading of the Russian Federation.

The maritime show is a bi-annual event and has been previously held in 2003, 2005 and 2007. The IMDS covers all stages of shipbuilding and marine equipment construction: naval architecture, electric-power units, weapon and armament, naval aviation, navigation and monitoring systems, support structure, new materials and technologies.

Participation in the huge event has been confirmed by the Russian Navy, FSB, Emergency Control Ministry of the Russian Federation, who will display their prowess in the seas with their ships. Also on display would be the air display teams from the Russian Air Force and Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. The Rzhevka artillery range

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will play host to various weapon models and military equipment.

The showcasing of special frigates and carriers will be done at the quay.The ships that can be seen are the Corvette pr. 20380 Steregushii, Frigate pr.

11540 Jaroslav Mudrii, a missile boat pr. 12411 and the air cushion landing ship pr. 12322 Mordovia.

Foreign participation is expected in the form of ships, namely the frigate St.Albans from England, mine countermeasures shipTuria from Spain, and two minesweepers Sagittaire and Pegase from France. More than 15 waterborne vehicles of different assignments will be put on show at the quay.

The artillery firing and small-arms systems demonstrations for foreign official delegations will take place at the range Rzhevka.

Viewers will be treated to an exhibition of flying skills by two aerobatics teams that will display their dexterity over the waters of the Gulf of Finland.

The exhibition organisers have made arrangements for four international scientific and practical conferences within the IMDS. Besides, business events will be held in the exhibition complex territory, in the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute. The event, which promises to be an extravaganza of maritime military might, will be open to the residents of St. Petersburg.

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The

Defence

Government

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Services

Security Event

19 - 22 APRIL 2010 KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA A Member Of:

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Tel : +65 6233 6777 Fax : +65 6233 6768 E-mail : gerald@iemallworld.com Ref : DSI

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JUNE 2009

defencetalk MEA shoots down Defence Ministry’s helicopter export India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has turned down a Bolivian request for a line of credit to buy seven Dhruvs from Bangalore-based manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

India’s defence exports languish at about Rs 300-400 crore per year, barely 1 per cent of the Rs 30,000 crore spent annually on importing weaponry. The export of seven Dhruvs, each worth Rs 44 crore, would have effectively doubled defence exports.

MoD sources said the MEA turned down Bolivia’s request for a line of credit on the grounds that it was for military equipment.

in cracking America’s domination of the South American helicopter market, which HAL was targeting aggressively. As more Dhruv ALHs flew in South American skies, HAL planned to set up major support infrastructure to pull in even more customers.

HAL’s Chairman and Managing Director, Ashok Nayak, refuses to talk about the MEA’s decision, but explains, “We have already delivered the five Dhruv helicopters ordered by Ecuador. Our pilots are training the Ecuadorian Air Force; we have posted 15 HAL maintenance personnel in Ecuador for backup support, along with a substantial inventory of spares. We are steadily gaining experience in supporting the operations of Dhruv ALHs in South America.That is bound to pay off soon.”

Helicopters are a vital part of the Bolivian

Dhruv Advanced Light helicopter (code J4042) of the Sarang Helicopter Display Team of IAF The MEA did not responded to an emailed questionnaire from Business Standard on the subject.

Dhruv ALHs, in fact, have civilian as well as military uses. Of five Dhruvs delivered to Ecuador this year, one was kitted out as aVIP transport for the Ecuadorian president. India has also supplied Dhruvs to Nepal and to Mauritius on easy credit, even as gifts.

Says a senior MoD official, “Frankly speaking, I was surprised by the MEA’s decision. I can only surmise that this decision was taken by someone at the lower level, without realising the implications on India’s defence exports.”

Bolivia barely registers on the MEA’s radar. That country does not have an embassy in New Delhi; an Honorary Consul represents India in La Paz, Bolivia’s capital. But for the MoD, the sale of Dhruvs to Bolivia would be a vital step

Air Force, since anti-drug operations are its main focus. Without a single fixed-wing fighter aircraft, the Bolivian Air Force currently relies on the venerable American UH-1H Huey helicopter, which is approaching the end of its service life. With the Dhruv providing a state-of-the-art alternative at a price 25 per cent cheaper than its alternatives, Bolivia remains a potential buyer.

Business Standard

India floats tender for combat, heavy lift helicopters TO replace its ageing helicopter fleet, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has released the much-awaited tenders for 22 combat and 15 heavy lift choppers to US, European and

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Chinook HC2 (ZA677) of the RAF on display at Kemble airfield, Gloucestershire, England Russian manufacturers.

The tenders, or Request for Proposals (RfPs), had been pending for some time and needed clearance from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which actually acquires weapon systems on behalf of the services.

But due to the elections, political clearance was on hold till now.

The three services have been pressing the government for several years to speed up the process to replace and augment their mostly Soviet-vintage inventory. Precision and real time engagement is the key demand, and requirement, for the three services now.

IAF Chief of Staff Air Chief Marshal FH Major said the services expected the government to clear many files which had been pending for long.

Defence Minister A.K. Antony has expressed that he shares the concern of the armed forces about the lack of modern equipment and initiated action on day one of his second innings in the ministry.

The RfP for the 22 combat helicopters had actually been released just before the Berlin Air Show in May 2008 to six contenders—Sikorsky for Black Hawk, Boeing for Apache AH 64D, Bell for Super Cobra (all three from US), Eurocopter for Tiger, Russian Mil for Mi 35, and Augusta Westland for Mangusta.

The US companies could not compete due to what they said were time constraints and procedural bottlenecks within their country. IAF felt that some of the best technologies in combat machines were not on the platter, and accordingly a re-tender was requested.

The IAF had acquired a few Mi 26 in the mid-1980s. They are old, short of spares and need replacement. Both the IAF and the Indian Army want heavy lift capability.

TheTimes of India

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defencetalk HAL’s intermediate jet trainer makes maiden flight with Russian engine OVERCOMING numerous integration issues, the indigenous intermediate jet trainer (IJT) Hindustan Jet Trainer-36 (HJT-36) presently under development at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has crossed a major milestone making its maiden flight with the Russian AL-551 engine.

The flight is of significance since it marks the beginning of the final phase of development of the trainer, which has been under development for a decade.Though two HJT-36 prototypes have so far taken to the skies they are powered by the proven French-made Snecma Larzac 04H20 engine.

However HAL, in conjunction with the

Hindustan Jet Trainer-36 Sitara S3474 aircraft at Farnborough, England IAF’s air staff requirements, had opted for a new and more powerful engine choosing the Russian aircraft engine designer/ manufacturer NPO-Saturn, which in turn developed the AL-551 engine.

Around 225 HJT-36s are to be eventually produced, serving the IAF, the Navy, as well as the Air Force’s Surya Kiran aerobatic team.

The Hindu

Rafale allowed to take part in aircraft bid FRENCH fighter aircraft Rafale has been allowed to take part in the Indian Air Force’s bid to acquire 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft.

The decision was taken at a meeting of the Defence Procurement Board, sources in the

Executive Branch of the Indian Navy. During his service spanning nearly 39 years, he has served in a variety of Command, Staff and Instructional appointments.

Indian Air Force drops Russia from $1 billion deal

French firm Rafale is in the race for IAF’s bid of medium multi-role combat aircraft Defence Ministry said.

Rafale, made by Dassault, was earlier declared out of the race after technical evaluations. Sources in the Ministry said the Technical Evaluation Committee had made the recommendation, as Dassault did not provide information on some equipment and add-ons that the IAF wanted to be in the aircraft. However, the Defence Procurement Board, which met under the chair- manship of Defence Secretary Vijay Singh, decided not to accept the recommendation. The Board felt the French firm should also get a look-in when the Indian Air Force conducted field trials over the next few months, the sources said.

F/A18, F-16, MiG-35 and Eurofighter Typhoon took part in the Bangalore Aero India Show this February, but Rafale and Gripen did not participate in the live display.

The Hindu

Vice Admiral NK Verma India’s next Navy Chief ON June 6, 2009, the Indian Government appointed Vice Admiral Nirmal KumarVerma as the next Indian Navy chief.

Verma, the chief of the Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam, NK Verma will take over from Admiral Sureesh Mehta on August 31 when the latter retires from service. Verma was commissioned on 1 July 1970 into the

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RUSSIA is set to lose a billion dollar (Rs 48,000 crore) defence deal for mid-air refuellers, signalling a break in its over 50-year-old monopoly as India’s preferred military supplier.

The former communist giant has clearly lost favour with the Indian military, as the air force has decided not to field any more Russian Ilyushin-78 refuellers to keep fighter jets airborne for consi- derably longer periods by tanking them up during flight.

After operating Il-78 tankers for almost six years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has said the

The IAF has decided not to field Russian refuellers after the Ilyushin-78 tankers Russian platform does not meet its requirements and it wants to deploy the Airbus A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) offered by European aerospace corporation, EADS. The Il-78 and Airbus 330 MRTT were competing for the $1 billion global tender floated three years ago by the defence ministry for six mid-air refuellers to extend the operating radiuses of Indian fighter jets.

Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major said, “We have finished all evaluations and selected the A330 MRTT. The deal will come up for final approval by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) very soon. The Russian platform did not meet certain requirements.”

The A330 MRTT is a military derivative of the Airbus A330 airliner.

The Hindustan Times

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