Defence and Security of India - Oct 2012 issue

NUCLEAR CBMs

NEED MORE INDIA, PAK NUKE TRUST The trust deficit between the two countries have to go for CBMs to succeed | G BALACHANDRAN INDIA’S SUBMARINE STORY

ENDEMIC SHORTAGES Like artillery procurement, Indian Navy’s sub woes continue | COMMODORE (RETD) ANIL JAI SINGH OCTOBER 2012

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • ` 250

RUSSIAN FGFA PAK FA TAKING OFF INDIA’S GIANT LEAP OF FAITH,THE FGFA WILL BE A QUANTUM JUMP INTECHNOLOGICALTERMS AIR VICE MARSHALL (RETD) KAPIL KAK DISCUSSES

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02/11/12 11:37 AM

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OCTOBER 2012

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

ussian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov visited Islamabad in October on a high profile visit that Pakistani media billed as a ‘reset’ mission of the bilateral relationship. Lavrov made the visit as a trip to assuage Pakistan’s temper for a cancelled visit of newly elected, Vladimir Putin, to take part in a four nation summit. The summit line-up included Tajikistan, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the Russian president did not keep his date. He cancelled the trip to Pakistan without giving much of a reason. The news of the trip had supposedly created a flutter in New Delhi, for India has always acted touché when Russia did some times look at Pakistan benevolently. The Putin cancellation naturally reassured India but was it really necessary that New Delhi should have gotten into a tizzy with Russo-Pak engagement? Russia has proven its loyalty to India umpteen times in situations of severe need. A restatement of that commitment obscured the more important issue of Lavrov’s visit to Islamabad. The visit must have flagged the date of 2014, in terms of the Afghan tangle. Russia must have planned a foray into Afghanistan through the Pakistan gateway. But Lavrov was said to be a key interlocutor in place of Putin who made it to Pakistan “on a two day notice”, as told to media by Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister. While that had been a salve for wounded Pakistan ego, an opportunity was missed for both Pakistan to look outside of the US template, while for Russians it could have mended a few fences with the Pashtuns that declare their loyalty to Islamabad. India in turn, behaved like an adolescent child who was desperate for attention from a patron, seeking fresh reassurances about the bilateral relationship and losing a multilateral opportunity of a strategic non-US move into Afghanistan. This is the zero-sum game in the South Asia that so disturbs the major powers while dealing with the twin perpetrators. Of course, Pakistan would surely have reacted the same way if top Chinese officials suddenly made a bee-line for New Delhi. This is the story of the sub-continent that never seems to change.

Russia has proven its loyalty to India umpteen times in situations of severe need. A restatement of that commitment obscured the more important issue of Lavrov’s visit to Islamabad. The visit must have flagged the date of 2014.

Pinaki Bhattacharya

01

LETTER FROM EDITOR.indd 1

02/11/12 11:20 AM

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 2012

COVER STORY 06

FGFA: SALIENCE FOR INDIAN AIR FORCE India’s partnership with the Russians for developing a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) is certainly ‘ambitious.’ But in strategic and operational terms it makes immense sense.

SUB STORY 32

INDIAN NAVAL SUBS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE BALLISTIC MD 14

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new.

India’s proven Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network is ready for a rollout in at least two metropolises – New Delhi and Mumbai. While limited in scope, its breakthrough technology showcased the capabilities of the country’s scientists and technologists.

LCC FOR MATERIÉL 38

LIFE CYCLE COSTING Life-cycle Costing was a concept first adopted by the Americans in the 1960s. The system of pricing products and services on the basis of their operations and maintenance cost.

FICV 22

NUKE SECURITY 28

NUCLEAR FUTURE CBMS AND RISK INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE REDUCTION India’s ‘Make’ project for developing indigenous infantry combat vehicles is ambitious. The contenders of this challenging task face a MoD that is looking at the private sector building these high technology and complex systems 02

contents 2nd.indd 2-3

DSI

CBMs between two antagonistic countries create trust and predictability. At the height of the Cold War, the two warring sides, the US and the NATO block, and then USSR and the Warsaw Pact block continued to engage each other in successive agreements.

CHINDIA 44

INDIA AND CHINA: PEER COMPETITORS In an environment of decline of the lone Superpower, China’s rise is being watched with unmatched intensity.

03

05/11/12 10:27 AM

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 2012

COVER STORY 06

FGFA: SALIENCE FOR INDIAN AIR FORCE India’s partnership with the Russians for developing a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) is certainly ‘ambitious.’ But in strategic and operational terms it makes immense sense.

SUB STORY 32

INDIAN NAVAL SUBS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE BALLISTIC MD 14

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new.

India’s proven Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network is ready for a rollout in at least two metropolises – New Delhi and Mumbai. While limited in scope, its breakthrough technology showcased the capabilities of the country’s scientists and technologists.

LCC FOR MATERIÉL 38

LIFE CYCLE COSTING Life-cycle Costing was a concept first adopted by the Americans in the 1960s. The system of pricing products and services on the basis of their operations and maintenance cost.

FICV 22

NUKE SECURITY 28

NUCLEAR FUTURE CBMS AND RISK INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE REDUCTION India’s ‘Make’ project for developing indigenous infantry combat vehicles is ambitious. The contenders of this challenging task face a MoD that is looking at the private sector building these high technology and complex systems 02

contents 2nd.indd 2-3

DSI

CBMs between two antagonistic countries create trust and predictability. At the height of the Cold War, the two warring sides, the US and the NATO block, and then USSR and the Warsaw Pact block continued to engage each other in successive agreements.

CHINDIA 44

INDIA AND CHINA: PEER COMPETITORS In an environment of decline of the lone Superpower, China’s rise is being watched with unmatched intensity.

03

05/11/12 10:27 AM

FIGHTER TECH

OCTOBER 2012

An F-35A taxis on the runway at Edwards AFB, Calif. with external weapons pylons installed for a test flight

thrust vectoring. This brings us to the point that super manoeuvrability/agility serves as a crucial determinant for FGFA success in air-to-air engagements. A related question of import here concerns the imperative of developing or having in place advanced technology power plants—a challenge with which all the engine designers and manufacturers for current FGFA, and those under development, continue to grapple.

The multifunction active electronicallyscanned array (AESA), as in fourthgeneration platforms, constitutes the heart of FGFA avionics and performs way beyond contemporary multi-mode radars.

Highly integrated avionics facilitate multiplatform multi-sensor data fusion for greatly enhanced situational awareness.

Such integration provides the ability to look up shoot up, look down shoot down and achieve what is claimed “first-look, firstshot, first-kill capability”. Nor are there any constraints on extensive employment of very high speed integrated circuit technology, shared modules and high speed data buses in its avionics package.

Evidently, FGFA on the anvil are

LOCKHEED MARTIN

LOCKHEED MARTIN

On July 19, 2012, the United Kingdom took delivery of its first F-35 Lightning II jet during a ceremony

primarily defined by software—where India has world-renowned expertise—and these use off-the-shelf commercial processors that directly control sensors to form a comprehensive view of the battle-space with onboard and networked sensors. This is unlike a fourth generation fighter which uses systems in which each sensor or pod presents its own readings to the pilot who combines in his mind a battle-space view.

FGFA can jam hostile data links, undertake real-beam ground mapping in the seeingthrough-cloud/rain synthetic aperture radar mode and indicate moving targets on the ground, with such targets at sea being a far easier pick. The flip side is the tendency to subject the single pilot, in F 22, F 35 and PAK-FA to excessive information overload—a situation that enhances the temptation for users to opt for two-seater variants. On the flip side, a two seat design has an adverse impact on stealth, unless carefully managed—a challenge that Indian designers would soon face. Broadly, and in essence, the FGFA concept and design helps achieve synergy of stealth, fusion, complete situational awareness and the ability to undertake its mission even in the

10

FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 2nd.indd 10-11

most sophisticated environment. But for air power strategy mavens, an environment of FGFA versus FGFA contestation poses a huge challenge in development of doctrines, operational philosophies, force design and architecture.

Strategic-Operational Mission Environment For India, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation and the related compulsion for war prevention constitute key elements of its national strategy. These objectives call for having in place credible conventional and nuclear deterrence in consonance with trends in nature of warfare and assessed military threats. Paradoxically, in the process of the rise of India’s comprehensive national development trajectory, and emergence as a power of consequence, its security environment—already characterised by uncertainty, fluidity and volatility—is likely to exacerbate. In such a complex and changing construct, building military capability especially combat air power in strategic, operational and technological terms under the variable of resource and funding support makes for a challenging task.

For India, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation and the related compulsion for war prevention constitute key elements of its national strategy. These objectives call for having in place credible conventional and nuclear deterrence.

IAF’s role and missions are primarily contextualised in India’s unique force application compulsions involving unresolved boundary disputes with a rising and, of late, assertive China, and its nuclear armed proxy, the highly unstable Pakistan. Aerospace missions would involve safeguarding India’s long borders, air spaces, coast line and EEZ. The related strategic missions could comprise force application

against infarction of energy security and trade flows; transportability projection at long ranges; strategic coercion; provision of net security to friendly countries, particularly within South Asia in need of the same; and, diaspora protection. In April 2012, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne has justifiably iterated IAF catering for a “multi-tiered zone of influence around an inner core ranging from Hindukush to Irrawady (Myanmar) and an outer tier from Suez to Shanghai.”

It is not rocket science to figure out that the FGFA would constitute a seminal value addition to the IAF in addressing security challenges that arise in the strategic neighbourhood and, in fact, shape it into the Indian national interest mould. In situations where political constraints limit induction of land forces, IAF’s advice and assistance to a friendly legitimate government can enable it to control its air space, assess the situation on the ground and respond with speed and ‘effect’ only air power can provide. Perception of India as a reliable ‘security partner’ would not only enhance its own access but also help edge out competitors and make a dent in their anti-access strategies.

In the aforementioned strategic-

DSI

operational scenario, induction of the FGFA is envisaged as part of the future force mix of AWACS, range-extending in flight refuelling, inter-theatre airlift and the upcoming IAF-dedicated satellites.

But is the IAF ready to face the awesome challenge from the PLAAF? Undeniably, there is a disjunction between the current wherewithal for its role and missions, and its existential operational capability. Reflecting this concern, Defence Minister AK Antony and Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne have reassured in the recent past the nation that IAF combat squadron strength would be increased to 42 squadrons [to include a few FGFA] by 2022.However,reports suggest that bulk of FGFA would only join the IAF in the 14th Plan Period (2022-2027).

The nub of the problem is to sustain IAF’s combat potential over the next three to four decades through planning to up-scale and up-number IAF combat potential to at least 50-55 combat squadrons by 2032 (when it celebrates its centenary).Because as India rises its conflict impulses are likely to exacerbate; winning the air power would be even more important than now. And it is not one-on-one equivalence that IAF requires to seek with the PLAAF (which would then have about 65 combat squadrons) but to ensure a deadly and robust air power centric deterrence potential.

The FGFA-Sukhoi 30 MKI combine would greatly facilitate IAF’s primary task of having to achieve full spectrum air dominance in designated sectors of the India-China boundary. Air dominance connotes unequal command, with full situational awareness of the adversary’s objectives, deployments and movements, supported by an effective gap-free layered air defence network in the designated area. Such air dominance would be a crucial prerequisite in a joint campaign.

This would apply equally for oceanic air space in maritime areas of concern, as the Navy’s substantially enhanced operational assets would be vulnerable to advanced hostile air power. In fact, prospective basing of FGFA in the Andaman and Nicobar islands would immensely enhance India’s geostrategic leverages. Forestalling PLAAF addressing Indian Army forward deployed forces and Vulnerable Areas/Points would

11

05/11/12 10:31 AM

FIGHTER TECH

OCTOBER 2012

An F-35A taxis on the runway at Edwards AFB, Calif. with external weapons pylons installed for a test flight

thrust vectoring. This brings us to the point that super manoeuvrability/agility serves as a crucial determinant for FGFA success in air-to-air engagements. A related question of import here concerns the imperative of developing or having in place advanced technology power plants—a challenge with which all the engine designers and manufacturers for current FGFA, and those under development, continue to grapple.

The multifunction active electronicallyscanned array (AESA), as in fourthgeneration platforms, constitutes the heart of FGFA avionics and performs way beyond contemporary multi-mode radars.

Highly integrated avionics facilitate multiplatform multi-sensor data fusion for greatly enhanced situational awareness.

Such integration provides the ability to look up shoot up, look down shoot down and achieve what is claimed “first-look, firstshot, first-kill capability”. Nor are there any constraints on extensive employment of very high speed integrated circuit technology, shared modules and high speed data buses in its avionics package.

Evidently, FGFA on the anvil are

LOCKHEED MARTIN

LOCKHEED MARTIN

On July 19, 2012, the United Kingdom took delivery of its first F-35 Lightning II jet during a ceremony

primarily defined by software—where India has world-renowned expertise—and these use off-the-shelf commercial processors that directly control sensors to form a comprehensive view of the battle-space with onboard and networked sensors. This is unlike a fourth generation fighter which uses systems in which each sensor or pod presents its own readings to the pilot who combines in his mind a battle-space view.

FGFA can jam hostile data links, undertake real-beam ground mapping in the seeingthrough-cloud/rain synthetic aperture radar mode and indicate moving targets on the ground, with such targets at sea being a far easier pick. The flip side is the tendency to subject the single pilot, in F 22, F 35 and PAK-FA to excessive information overload—a situation that enhances the temptation for users to opt for two-seater variants. On the flip side, a two seat design has an adverse impact on stealth, unless carefully managed—a challenge that Indian designers would soon face. Broadly, and in essence, the FGFA concept and design helps achieve synergy of stealth, fusion, complete situational awareness and the ability to undertake its mission even in the

10

FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 2nd.indd 10-11

most sophisticated environment. But for air power strategy mavens, an environment of FGFA versus FGFA contestation poses a huge challenge in development of doctrines, operational philosophies, force design and architecture.

Strategic-Operational Mission Environment For India, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation and the related compulsion for war prevention constitute key elements of its national strategy. These objectives call for having in place credible conventional and nuclear deterrence in consonance with trends in nature of warfare and assessed military threats. Paradoxically, in the process of the rise of India’s comprehensive national development trajectory, and emergence as a power of consequence, its security environment—already characterised by uncertainty, fluidity and volatility—is likely to exacerbate. In such a complex and changing construct, building military capability especially combat air power in strategic, operational and technological terms under the variable of resource and funding support makes for a challenging task.

For India, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation and the related compulsion for war prevention constitute key elements of its national strategy. These objectives call for having in place credible conventional and nuclear deterrence.

IAF’s role and missions are primarily contextualised in India’s unique force application compulsions involving unresolved boundary disputes with a rising and, of late, assertive China, and its nuclear armed proxy, the highly unstable Pakistan. Aerospace missions would involve safeguarding India’s long borders, air spaces, coast line and EEZ. The related strategic missions could comprise force application

against infarction of energy security and trade flows; transportability projection at long ranges; strategic coercion; provision of net security to friendly countries, particularly within South Asia in need of the same; and, diaspora protection. In April 2012, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne has justifiably iterated IAF catering for a “multi-tiered zone of influence around an inner core ranging from Hindukush to Irrawady (Myanmar) and an outer tier from Suez to Shanghai.”

It is not rocket science to figure out that the FGFA would constitute a seminal value addition to the IAF in addressing security challenges that arise in the strategic neighbourhood and, in fact, shape it into the Indian national interest mould. In situations where political constraints limit induction of land forces, IAF’s advice and assistance to a friendly legitimate government can enable it to control its air space, assess the situation on the ground and respond with speed and ‘effect’ only air power can provide. Perception of India as a reliable ‘security partner’ would not only enhance its own access but also help edge out competitors and make a dent in their anti-access strategies.

In the aforementioned strategic-

DSI

operational scenario, induction of the FGFA is envisaged as part of the future force mix of AWACS, range-extending in flight refuelling, inter-theatre airlift and the upcoming IAF-dedicated satellites.

But is the IAF ready to face the awesome challenge from the PLAAF? Undeniably, there is a disjunction between the current wherewithal for its role and missions, and its existential operational capability. Reflecting this concern, Defence Minister AK Antony and Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne have reassured in the recent past the nation that IAF combat squadron strength would be increased to 42 squadrons [to include a few FGFA] by 2022.However,reports suggest that bulk of FGFA would only join the IAF in the 14th Plan Period (2022-2027).

The nub of the problem is to sustain IAF’s combat potential over the next three to four decades through planning to up-scale and up-number IAF combat potential to at least 50-55 combat squadrons by 2032 (when it celebrates its centenary).Because as India rises its conflict impulses are likely to exacerbate; winning the air power would be even more important than now. And it is not one-on-one equivalence that IAF requires to seek with the PLAAF (which would then have about 65 combat squadrons) but to ensure a deadly and robust air power centric deterrence potential.

The FGFA-Sukhoi 30 MKI combine would greatly facilitate IAF’s primary task of having to achieve full spectrum air dominance in designated sectors of the India-China boundary. Air dominance connotes unequal command, with full situational awareness of the adversary’s objectives, deployments and movements, supported by an effective gap-free layered air defence network in the designated area. Such air dominance would be a crucial prerequisite in a joint campaign.

This would apply equally for oceanic air space in maritime areas of concern, as the Navy’s substantially enhanced operational assets would be vulnerable to advanced hostile air power. In fact, prospective basing of FGFA in the Andaman and Nicobar islands would immensely enhance India’s geostrategic leverages. Forestalling PLAAF addressing Indian Army forward deployed forces and Vulnerable Areas/Points would

11

05/11/12 10:31 AM

FIGHTER TECH

OCTOBER 2012

thus be another key objective. Furthermore, any Chinese army moves to threaten the territorial status quo would need to be thwarted by IAF’s interdiction of hostile front line formations and their difficulty-prone operational logistics lines. Significantly, PLAAF’s recent initiatives in stepping up its preparedness levels for India-centric ‘high altitude wars’ and what it terms ‘command of the air’, strategic strikes to cause paralysis and in developing anti-air space access/ denial capability should not lead to the

First flight of a second PAK FA

IAF getting heebie-jeebies. But developing countervailing capacities, into which the FGFA would get deeply embedded, needs to be actualised on a war footing.

It would be useful to underscore that dominance cannot be leveraged to its fundamental advantages without hostile air power capability severely weakened or substantially subdued. This is an intimidating challenge in a situation of air power balance that characterises the India-China equation and would persist even as FGFA begin to get inducted in the inventories on both sides of the Himalayan divide. This is quite in contrast to conflicts over the last two decades in which US/ Western air power prevailed decisively mainly because hostile air power was either non-existent or comparatively fatally weak.

India-Russia FGFA Collaboration This collaboration, reflecting the decades

long close India-Russia bilateral, would serve to transform India’s high-end air power, and provide it a measure of access to cutting-edge technology, within the constraints of a frozen FGFA airframe design, and its extremely limited expertise in fifth generation systems. Here is a classic case of mutuality of interest: Russia required FGFA for its industry to stay competitive with the Western systems, reduce development cost and guarantee an export customer; India saw it as a means to address the IAF-PLAAF imbalance and impart a measure of resonance to its combat aircraft development programmes.

Russian estimates project the market for the joint FGFA at about 1,000 units, with Trade Minister Victor Khristenko going on record that “both countries would share benefits from selling the plane...in the markets of third countries.”The Indian version would be configured to its air staff

12

FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 2nd.indd 12-13

requirements, the IAF having reportedly sought 40-45 changes, including a 360 degree situational awareness in the NIIP Tikhomirov multi-function AESA radar. Like in all Russian fourth generation plus designs, its infrared scan and track system can identify engine heat and air friction of hostile aircraft. As to the NATO-like “Link 16” type secure data link system on offer, the jury is still out on whether India would seek it; perhaps not. Fitment of indigenous missiles (follow on Astra BVR?) is also on the cards.

Designed primarily for the air dominance role, FGFA carries the AA-11 (RVV-MD) short range air-to-air missile and its longer range variant AA-12 (RVV-SD). Option exists for the 1,500 kg ultra long range K-100-1 (RVV BD) AWACS-killer that can engage and destroy such targets at 400 km.

But the missile size may force the aircraft to carry it externally, creating problems in stealth. In the air-to-ground segment,

it carries two 30 mm (GSh-301) guns, two missiles ( Kh 38ME or Kh 58 USHK) in each weapon bay, with a maximum of 10 bombs. The Kh PD anti-radiation missile is also an option.

Impact on Indigenous Aeronautics Industry That a modern air force requires strong support of the indigenous aircraft industry and R&D would have been a no brainer to the IAF during decades of its persistent import dependence. India’s indigenous industry must now ride the MMRCA and FGFA programmes to determinedly absorb fourth generation plus/fifth generation design, development and manufacturing technologies, even in the face of intrinsic limitations. Doubtless India is unlikely to have access to core and sensitive aerospace technologies. But for sceptics to aver that it would be an “inconsequential partner” in

the FGFA reflects bias.

One of India’s early FGFA setbacks was its dithering, and eventual failure, to join the ‘co-development’ programme at its concept and design phase, and fritter away the opportunity to leverage Russian need for India’s key vulnerability: lack of expertise in design and development of advanced high-technology combat aircraft. Even today another opportunity beckons because FGFA prototypes have been powered by the progressively thrustimproved Saturn engines: AL31, AL41, 117S (AL41F) and 117 (AL41F1).

A new fifth generation, 360 degrees thrust vectoring and super-cruise enabling engine, under development to power the production aircraft, is due for delivery in 2015-16. It is not known whether the Russian offer for India to partner is still open. But if it is, this opportunity could be exploited on an emergency basis as it

SUKHOI

Designed primarily for the air dominance role, FGFA carries the AA-11 (RVV-MD) short range air-to-air missile and its longer range variant AA-12 (RVV-SD). Option exists for the 1,500 kg ultra long range K-1001 (RVV BD) AWACS-killer.

DSI

would build capacity for India to crack the code on expeditious development of its own fifth generation aero-engine. Else India would be compelled to do what it knows best: ever-complacently license produce the new FGFA engine, once it is fully developed by Russia.

DRDO and HAL have a wide-ranging and comprehensive mandate within their capacity limitations: Design of open architecture cockpit, and the avionics suite Redesign and development of the two-seat variant and flights tests of the prototypes Integration of a range of multiple systems Co-Development of the glass cockpit and MFD Access design and development data to facilitate trouble shooting System networking, software, electronics, navigation and cockpit displays Collaboration in composite materials as basis for industrial participation One matter of concern is that of cost.

The 166 single-seat and 48 twin-seat aircraft could cost India upwards of $ 25 billion. This would be in addition to the investments to be made in co-developing the system for which India and Russia have already promised $4-5 billion each initially. Reports quote a former Director, Design and Development, HAL claiming “Indian designers would contribute onethird of the total share of R&D, including all prototypes.” HAL would also get onehalf share of the Indian FGFA. There is a view that the many changes India seeks could be risk prone in technological, cost and delivery timelines.

But such risks are well-worth an advanced system that would be the mainstay of IAF combat power for at least fifty years, possibly with incremental upgrades. India also has pressed for a minimum of 1,000 certification flights. Many wrinkles would need to be resolved during what are sure to be prolonged negotiations. Meanwhile, reports seem to suggest that the final design/R&D phase contract for FGFA development would likely be inked during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in DSI November, 2012.

13

05/11/12 10:31 AM

FIGHTER TECH

OCTOBER 2012

thus be another key objective. Furthermore, any Chinese army moves to threaten the territorial status quo would need to be thwarted by IAF’s interdiction of hostile front line formations and their difficulty-prone operational logistics lines. Significantly, PLAAF’s recent initiatives in stepping up its preparedness levels for India-centric ‘high altitude wars’ and what it terms ‘command of the air’, strategic strikes to cause paralysis and in developing anti-air space access/ denial capability should not lead to the

First flight of a second PAK FA

IAF getting heebie-jeebies. But developing countervailing capacities, into which the FGFA would get deeply embedded, needs to be actualised on a war footing.

It would be useful to underscore that dominance cannot be leveraged to its fundamental advantages without hostile air power capability severely weakened or substantially subdued. This is an intimidating challenge in a situation of air power balance that characterises the India-China equation and would persist even as FGFA begin to get inducted in the inventories on both sides of the Himalayan divide. This is quite in contrast to conflicts over the last two decades in which US/ Western air power prevailed decisively mainly because hostile air power was either non-existent or comparatively fatally weak.

India-Russia FGFA Collaboration This collaboration, reflecting the decades

long close India-Russia bilateral, would serve to transform India’s high-end air power, and provide it a measure of access to cutting-edge technology, within the constraints of a frozen FGFA airframe design, and its extremely limited expertise in fifth generation systems. Here is a classic case of mutuality of interest: Russia required FGFA for its industry to stay competitive with the Western systems, reduce development cost and guarantee an export customer; India saw it as a means to address the IAF-PLAAF imbalance and impart a measure of resonance to its combat aircraft development programmes.

Russian estimates project the market for the joint FGFA at about 1,000 units, with Trade Minister Victor Khristenko going on record that “both countries would share benefits from selling the plane...in the markets of third countries.”The Indian version would be configured to its air staff

12

FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 2nd.indd 12-13

requirements, the IAF having reportedly sought 40-45 changes, including a 360 degree situational awareness in the NIIP Tikhomirov multi-function AESA radar. Like in all Russian fourth generation plus designs, its infrared scan and track system can identify engine heat and air friction of hostile aircraft. As to the NATO-like “Link 16” type secure data link system on offer, the jury is still out on whether India would seek it; perhaps not. Fitment of indigenous missiles (follow on Astra BVR?) is also on the cards.

Designed primarily for the air dominance role, FGFA carries the AA-11 (RVV-MD) short range air-to-air missile and its longer range variant AA-12 (RVV-SD). Option exists for the 1,500 kg ultra long range K-100-1 (RVV BD) AWACS-killer that can engage and destroy such targets at 400 km.

But the missile size may force the aircraft to carry it externally, creating problems in stealth. In the air-to-ground segment,

it carries two 30 mm (GSh-301) guns, two missiles ( Kh 38ME or Kh 58 USHK) in each weapon bay, with a maximum of 10 bombs. The Kh PD anti-radiation missile is also an option.

Impact on Indigenous Aeronautics Industry That a modern air force requires strong support of the indigenous aircraft industry and R&D would have been a no brainer to the IAF during decades of its persistent import dependence. India’s indigenous industry must now ride the MMRCA and FGFA programmes to determinedly absorb fourth generation plus/fifth generation design, development and manufacturing technologies, even in the face of intrinsic limitations. Doubtless India is unlikely to have access to core and sensitive aerospace technologies. But for sceptics to aver that it would be an “inconsequential partner” in

the FGFA reflects bias.

One of India’s early FGFA setbacks was its dithering, and eventual failure, to join the ‘co-development’ programme at its concept and design phase, and fritter away the opportunity to leverage Russian need for India’s key vulnerability: lack of expertise in design and development of advanced high-technology combat aircraft. Even today another opportunity beckons because FGFA prototypes have been powered by the progressively thrustimproved Saturn engines: AL31, AL41, 117S (AL41F) and 117 (AL41F1).

A new fifth generation, 360 degrees thrust vectoring and super-cruise enabling engine, under development to power the production aircraft, is due for delivery in 2015-16. It is not known whether the Russian offer for India to partner is still open. But if it is, this opportunity could be exploited on an emergency basis as it

SUKHOI

Designed primarily for the air dominance role, FGFA carries the AA-11 (RVV-MD) short range air-to-air missile and its longer range variant AA-12 (RVV-SD). Option exists for the 1,500 kg ultra long range K-1001 (RVV BD) AWACS-killer.

DSI

would build capacity for India to crack the code on expeditious development of its own fifth generation aero-engine. Else India would be compelled to do what it knows best: ever-complacently license produce the new FGFA engine, once it is fully developed by Russia.

DRDO and HAL have a wide-ranging and comprehensive mandate within their capacity limitations: Design of open architecture cockpit, and the avionics suite Redesign and development of the two-seat variant and flights tests of the prototypes Integration of a range of multiple systems Co-Development of the glass cockpit and MFD Access design and development data to facilitate trouble shooting System networking, software, electronics, navigation and cockpit displays Collaboration in composite materials as basis for industrial participation One matter of concern is that of cost.

The 166 single-seat and 48 twin-seat aircraft could cost India upwards of $ 25 billion. This would be in addition to the investments to be made in co-developing the system for which India and Russia have already promised $4-5 billion each initially. Reports quote a former Director, Design and Development, HAL claiming “Indian designers would contribute onethird of the total share of R&D, including all prototypes.” HAL would also get onehalf share of the Indian FGFA. There is a view that the many changes India seeks could be risk prone in technological, cost and delivery timelines.

But such risks are well-worth an advanced system that would be the mainstay of IAF combat power for at least fifty years, possibly with incremental upgrades. India also has pressed for a minimum of 1,000 certification flights. Many wrinkles would need to be resolved during what are sure to be prolonged negotiations. Meanwhile, reports seem to suggest that the final design/R&D phase contract for FGFA development would likely be inked during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in DSI November, 2012.

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05/11/12 10:31 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Brig Anil Sharma (Retd)

Anshu Paliwal

KEY POINTS

Indiaʼs proven Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network is ready for a roll-out in at least two metropolises – New Delhi and Mumbai. While limited in scope, its breakthrough technology showcased the capabilities of the countryʼs scientists and technologists

14

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 14-15

The country’s air defence systems have aged, and are mostly point defence mechanisms.

On the face of it, Pakistan’s surface to surface missile arsenal are growing along with its stockpile of nuclear warheads. China too is freshly targeting its missiles towards India.

India has been able to develop two sets of missile interceptors for both exogenous and endogenous operations.

DRDO

Indian PAD system of the Ballistic Missile Defence on a launch-pad

DSI

Introduction The first successful launch of PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) anti-missile was conducted on November 2006 in which PAD missile successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II Missile at an altitude of 50 km. The Prithvi-II Ballistic Missile was modified successfully to mimic the trajectory of Chinese M-11 missiles.

Recently validating its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, India successfully launched an interceptor missile to destroy an incoming target missile in a direct hit over the Bay of Bengal on 10 February 2012. The interceptor, called Advanced Air Defence (AAD-05), launched from a mobile launcher on Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast, and destroyed it in mid-flight at an altitude of 15 km over the Bay of Bengal. The AAD-05 used a longer range seeker to inch close to the intruder and “kill it in a direct hit”. The target missile mimicked an incoming enemy missile with a range of more than 2,000 km.

This was the seventh interceptor mission and the fifth endo-atmospheric interception.

Six of the tests to date have been successful, including the first three in a row. While the country is elated, there is a strategic unease in the region.

This paper aims to discuss salience of India’s developing anti-missile capabilities and its accretion to India’s strategic configuration of power (SCP).

Voids in Air Defence Forces The existing shortcomings of current air defence cover are summarized as follows; At present, surface to air missile (SAM) defences are confined to relatively shortrange defence of point targets. Area defence is exclusively the preserve of manned interceptors.

Many of the principal long-range 3-D (detecting range, bearing and height of airborne object) surveillance and ground control interception radars (GCI) are ageing. Most of the systems are of 1980s vintage and, despite being upgraded, would provide inadequate detection capabilities against stealthy cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

The AD surveillance, reporting and defence network is not fully extended nation- wide. Defences are concentrated at targets within aircraft range from Pakistan and China. These are ineffective around increased number of strategically and economically vital targets, deep within India's heartland and in the South.

India's surface to air missiles (SAMs) and also manned interceptor aircrafts lack meaningful capabilities against ballistic and cruise missiles, unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and attack helicopters.

15

05/11/12 10:36 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Brig Anil Sharma (Retd)

Anshu Paliwal

KEY POINTS

Indiaʼs proven Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network is ready for a roll-out in at least two metropolises – New Delhi and Mumbai. While limited in scope, its breakthrough technology showcased the capabilities of the countryʼs scientists and technologists

14

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 14-15

The country’s air defence systems have aged, and are mostly point defence mechanisms.

On the face of it, Pakistan’s surface to surface missile arsenal are growing along with its stockpile of nuclear warheads. China too is freshly targeting its missiles towards India.

India has been able to develop two sets of missile interceptors for both exogenous and endogenous operations.

DRDO

Indian PAD system of the Ballistic Missile Defence on a launch-pad

DSI

Introduction The first successful launch of PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) anti-missile was conducted on November 2006 in which PAD missile successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II Missile at an altitude of 50 km. The Prithvi-II Ballistic Missile was modified successfully to mimic the trajectory of Chinese M-11 missiles.

Recently validating its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, India successfully launched an interceptor missile to destroy an incoming target missile in a direct hit over the Bay of Bengal on 10 February 2012. The interceptor, called Advanced Air Defence (AAD-05), launched from a mobile launcher on Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast, and destroyed it in mid-flight at an altitude of 15 km over the Bay of Bengal. The AAD-05 used a longer range seeker to inch close to the intruder and “kill it in a direct hit”. The target missile mimicked an incoming enemy missile with a range of more than 2,000 km.

This was the seventh interceptor mission and the fifth endo-atmospheric interception.

Six of the tests to date have been successful, including the first three in a row. While the country is elated, there is a strategic unease in the region.

This paper aims to discuss salience of India’s developing anti-missile capabilities and its accretion to India’s strategic configuration of power (SCP).

Voids in Air Defence Forces The existing shortcomings of current air defence cover are summarized as follows; At present, surface to air missile (SAM) defences are confined to relatively shortrange defence of point targets. Area defence is exclusively the preserve of manned interceptors.

Many of the principal long-range 3-D (detecting range, bearing and height of airborne object) surveillance and ground control interception radars (GCI) are ageing. Most of the systems are of 1980s vintage and, despite being upgraded, would provide inadequate detection capabilities against stealthy cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

The AD surveillance, reporting and defence network is not fully extended nation- wide. Defences are concentrated at targets within aircraft range from Pakistan and China. These are ineffective around increased number of strategically and economically vital targets, deep within India's heartland and in the South.

India's surface to air missiles (SAMs) and also manned interceptor aircrafts lack meaningful capabilities against ballistic and cruise missiles, unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and attack helicopters.

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05/11/12 10:36 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

Pakistan’s Missile Capability With a reported total stockpile of 100 plus nuclear warheads, Pakistan is likely to be able to arm a significant proportion of its missile inventory with such weapons. The ranges of Pakistan's missiles in service and under development would put almost all of India within range. Pakistan's missiles are all land-based. Hence, their points of launch and trajectories are relatively easy to predict. However, because of the close proximity of launch sites to India, the warning time in the event of an attack could be as little as 5 minutes. This would demand an extremely rapid detection, tracking and engagement system. Pakistan has developed cruise missile Babur (Hatf-7), that may be nuclear-capable

In this handout photograph released by the Indian Defence Public Relations (DPR), an AGNI-I ballistic missile is launched from Wheeler island off the coast of the eastern India state of Odisha

weapon system. The DH-10, which can fly farther than 2,000 kilometers, apparently exists in both ground- and air-launched nuclear-capable versions that improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces. How many of the new cruise missiles might be nuclearcapable is unclear.

Evidently, China's forces are truly formidable in the South Asian context.

However, set against this must be the fact that China's ICBMs are intended primarily to deter the United States while some of its IRBMs might be diverted against Taiwan. In the ( as yet unlikely ) event that China chooses to enter into a confrontation with India, China's Indiaspecific nuclear weapons would centre around its IRBM/ MRBM forces of over 100 DF-3A, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles.

Added to these would be M-11/-9/-18 missiles aimed at targets closer to the Sino-Indian frontier. Moreover, China's submarine launch ballistic missiles (SLBMs) lend a completely new dimension to the potential threat to India. Capable of being launched from a wide variety of locations, it makes defensive preparations even more difficult. With a mix of elderly H-6 bombers and more modern strike aircraft, China could conceivably equip these with cruise missiles for deep strikes into Indian Territory. It is not impossible indeed it is likely - for China to eventually modify some of its C-601/-611/-801K airlaunch cruise missiles for nuclear warhead delivery. Therefore, India will have to contend with a Chinese nuclear threat encompassing several delivery methods.

This further complicates defensive plans for India.

Anti-Ballistic Missile, AAD, being test launched from the Integrated Test Range in Odisha

AFP

DRDO

China’s Missile Capability With over 600 ballistic missiles and approximately 240 reported nuclear warheads, China is a most formidable nuclear power with ambitions extending beyond South Asia. China also possesses a substantial inventory of air and sea launch cruise missiles, some capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

China’s air force is also undergoing modernization with increased capability of launching air to surface munitions including nuclear weapons. The trends are; Strengthen AD, Air superiority and power projection capability.

4th Generation MRCA (SU 30 MK 2, SU 27, JF-10, JF-17), advanced avionics and PGMS - beyond visual range air to air missiles (BVRAAM), anti air raid defence.

Satellite based C4 I2SR and Battle Management System.

Air Defence Capability based on concept of AWACS (IL 76 and Y 8).

Acquire S-400 and theater missile defence (TMD) systems (already possess 8 regiments of S-300 or equivalent systems) Air to Air Refueling.

Cruise Missiles It is believed that China’s nuclear-capable DH-10 land-attack cruise missile is now operational and China deploys 50–250 of the missiles - a range that reveals significant uncertainty about the status of the

16

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 16-17

DSI

Air/ Missile Threat Summary Though India will continue to face threat of attacks by aircrafts, the principal menace can come from short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles capability of Pakistan and China. In times to come, there will be greater threat from stealthy cruise missiles and India will not be immune to attack no matter how far the border or assailant is. India today faces following threat from airborne objects;

17

05/11/12 10:37 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

Pakistan’s Missile Capability With a reported total stockpile of 100 plus nuclear warheads, Pakistan is likely to be able to arm a significant proportion of its missile inventory with such weapons. The ranges of Pakistan's missiles in service and under development would put almost all of India within range. Pakistan's missiles are all land-based. Hence, their points of launch and trajectories are relatively easy to predict. However, because of the close proximity of launch sites to India, the warning time in the event of an attack could be as little as 5 minutes. This would demand an extremely rapid detection, tracking and engagement system. Pakistan has developed cruise missile Babur (Hatf-7), that may be nuclear-capable

In this handout photograph released by the Indian Defence Public Relations (DPR), an AGNI-I ballistic missile is launched from Wheeler island off the coast of the eastern India state of Odisha

weapon system. The DH-10, which can fly farther than 2,000 kilometers, apparently exists in both ground- and air-launched nuclear-capable versions that improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces. How many of the new cruise missiles might be nuclearcapable is unclear.

Evidently, China's forces are truly formidable in the South Asian context.

However, set against this must be the fact that China's ICBMs are intended primarily to deter the United States while some of its IRBMs might be diverted against Taiwan. In the ( as yet unlikely ) event that China chooses to enter into a confrontation with India, China's Indiaspecific nuclear weapons would centre around its IRBM/ MRBM forces of over 100 DF-3A, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles.

Added to these would be M-11/-9/-18 missiles aimed at targets closer to the Sino-Indian frontier. Moreover, China's submarine launch ballistic missiles (SLBMs) lend a completely new dimension to the potential threat to India. Capable of being launched from a wide variety of locations, it makes defensive preparations even more difficult. With a mix of elderly H-6 bombers and more modern strike aircraft, China could conceivably equip these with cruise missiles for deep strikes into Indian Territory. It is not impossible indeed it is likely - for China to eventually modify some of its C-601/-611/-801K airlaunch cruise missiles for nuclear warhead delivery. Therefore, India will have to contend with a Chinese nuclear threat encompassing several delivery methods.

This further complicates defensive plans for India.

Anti-Ballistic Missile, AAD, being test launched from the Integrated Test Range in Odisha

AFP

DRDO

China’s Missile Capability With over 600 ballistic missiles and approximately 240 reported nuclear warheads, China is a most formidable nuclear power with ambitions extending beyond South Asia. China also possesses a substantial inventory of air and sea launch cruise missiles, some capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

China’s air force is also undergoing modernization with increased capability of launching air to surface munitions including nuclear weapons. The trends are; Strengthen AD, Air superiority and power projection capability.

4th Generation MRCA (SU 30 MK 2, SU 27, JF-10, JF-17), advanced avionics and PGMS - beyond visual range air to air missiles (BVRAAM), anti air raid defence.

Satellite based C4 I2SR and Battle Management System.

Air Defence Capability based on concept of AWACS (IL 76 and Y 8).

Acquire S-400 and theater missile defence (TMD) systems (already possess 8 regiments of S-300 or equivalent systems) Air to Air Refueling.

Cruise Missiles It is believed that China’s nuclear-capable DH-10 land-attack cruise missile is now operational and China deploys 50–250 of the missiles - a range that reveals significant uncertainty about the status of the

16

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 16-17

DSI

Air/ Missile Threat Summary Though India will continue to face threat of attacks by aircrafts, the principal menace can come from short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles capability of Pakistan and China. In times to come, there will be greater threat from stealthy cruise missiles and India will not be immune to attack no matter how far the border or assailant is. India today faces following threat from airborne objects;

17

05/11/12 10:37 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

Aircraft strikes from long ranges.

Short range rockets and missiles from 30 to 300 km range. These could also be employed by non state actors/ terrorists as was demonstrated by Hizbullah Mujahideen against Israel in 2006, using Iranian Zalzala rockets with 200 km range.

There could be some other innovative ideas. In August 2003, there were reports of Indian custom agents in Kandla port having intercepted North Korean freighter bound for Libya, with hidden assembly line of ballistic missiles in progress, on board.

Thus a missile could be launched from a merchant liner by a non- state actor duly sponsored by a rogue/ hostile nation state under cover of denial.

Short range ballistic missile threat from 300 to 1000 km.

Cruise missile (CM) threat (airborne, land attack and sea based).

Intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) threat from 1000 to 3000 km range.

Medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) threat from 3000 to 5000 km.

Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability of China.

India’s air/ missile capabilities in contemporary times need to provide assurance against coercion/ deterrence/ protection not only against threat of attack on homeland but should also facilitate securing if interests.

MRBMs with more than 3500 km range is termed upper layer interception (generally above 80 km altitude). In order to get an acceptable level of kill probability, BMD system attempts to engage incoming threat missile with minimum of two missiles at different ranges and altitudes.

This determines scale and pattern of deployment with early warning imperatives of a BMD system.

Project Air Defence It is a two tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for low altitude interception.

Development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) System began in 1999. Around 40 public and private Companies were involved in the development of ABM System.

China’s military shows off their latest missiles during the National Day in Beijing

– Less than 100 km range and speed – usually not more than 2 mach, mostly around 0.8 to 1.5 mach.

Cruise Missiles (CM) – From 300 to 2000 km range, flying at low trajectory much less than 0.5 km from the surface, hence very difficult to detect. Speed mostly less than 1 mach. New missiles are flying at speeds up to 2 mach.

Ballistic missile/air defence system for each of the above class of missiles will require different range of increasingly complex and hyper levels of technologies to enable desired interceptor missile speeds, altitude, maneuvering ( against gravity- g loads), navigation and homing systems, and type of warheads. Also required will be equally

18

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 18-19

real time and reliable command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities from satellites, airborne early warning, UAVs to series of ground based stations and also battle management command posts (BMCPs). India’s successful Moon Mission would imply that it has access to all type of technologies which are required to develop various types of ballistic missiles and also BMDs along with associated support systems.

A missile defence system has three main components; Interceptor system to include; interceptor missile, fire control radar, support launcher and indigenous BMCP.

BMD concept is very complex. Thus having PAD and AAD does not equal to the interception of entire range of BMs in the inventory. Range of a BM determines itsspeed of travel, altitude, trajectory and the technological sophistication.

Early warning sensor system.

BMCP / C4ISR network.

An oncoming missile can be intercepted during boost phase (30 to 300 seconds depending on range of missile), mid course (3 to 10 minutes) and terminal phase (10 to 20seconds). Boost phase interception is very difficult as it needs space/ airborne/ sea based platform and an early warning system to detect and engage the threat missile. Mid course interception usually takes place outside the earth’s atmosphere (above 30 km termed as exo-atmospheric interception). Terminal phase interception takes place after the threat missile’s reentry in to earth’s atmosphere (called endoatmospheric interception). Interception of

AFP

Complexity of BMD System BMD concept is very complex. Thus having PAD and AAD does not equal to the interception of entire range of BMs in the inventory.

Range of a BM determines its speed of travel, altitude, trajectory and the technological sophistication. Hence a broadly used classification is as follows; ICBM – Above 5000 km range, speed – 12 to 22 mach.

IRBM – From 3000 to 5000 km range and speed - 8 to 12 mach.

MRBM – From 1000 to 2000 km range and speed - 5 to 8 mach.

SRBM – From 300 to 1000 km range and speed 3 to 6 mach.

Tactical Missiles (TMs)/ Rockets/ Aircraft and Aircraft Launched Weapons

DSI

Description The System consists of the PAD, which will intercept missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50-80 km; and AAD Missile for interception at endo-atmospheric altitudes of up to 30 km. The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, radars; launch control centers (LCC) and Mission Control Center (MCC). All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network.

MCC is the software intensive system of the Ballistic Missile Defence. It receives information from various sources like Radars, Satellites etc which is then processed by ten computers running simultaneously. MCC is connected to all other elements of the system through a wide area network (WAN). MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability. MCC after performing all the functions assigns the target to Launch Control Center (LCC) of a battery.

Launch Control Center (LCC) starts computing the time to launch interceptor, based upon information received from the Radar. This is decided on the basis of data

19

05/11/12 10:37 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

Aircraft strikes from long ranges.

Short range rockets and missiles from 30 to 300 km range. These could also be employed by non state actors/ terrorists as was demonstrated by Hizbullah Mujahideen against Israel in 2006, using Iranian Zalzala rockets with 200 km range.

There could be some other innovative ideas. In August 2003, there were reports of Indian custom agents in Kandla port having intercepted North Korean freighter bound for Libya, with hidden assembly line of ballistic missiles in progress, on board.

Thus a missile could be launched from a merchant liner by a non- state actor duly sponsored by a rogue/ hostile nation state under cover of denial.

Short range ballistic missile threat from 300 to 1000 km.

Cruise missile (CM) threat (airborne, land attack and sea based).

Intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) threat from 1000 to 3000 km range.

Medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) threat from 3000 to 5000 km.

Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability of China.

India’s air/ missile capabilities in contemporary times need to provide assurance against coercion/ deterrence/ protection not only against threat of attack on homeland but should also facilitate securing if interests.

MRBMs with more than 3500 km range is termed upper layer interception (generally above 80 km altitude). In order to get an acceptable level of kill probability, BMD system attempts to engage incoming threat missile with minimum of two missiles at different ranges and altitudes.

This determines scale and pattern of deployment with early warning imperatives of a BMD system.

Project Air Defence It is a two tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for low altitude interception.

Development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) System began in 1999. Around 40 public and private Companies were involved in the development of ABM System.

China’s military shows off their latest missiles during the National Day in Beijing

– Less than 100 km range and speed – usually not more than 2 mach, mostly around 0.8 to 1.5 mach.

Cruise Missiles (CM) – From 300 to 2000 km range, flying at low trajectory much less than 0.5 km from the surface, hence very difficult to detect. Speed mostly less than 1 mach. New missiles are flying at speeds up to 2 mach.

Ballistic missile/air defence system for each of the above class of missiles will require different range of increasingly complex and hyper levels of technologies to enable desired interceptor missile speeds, altitude, maneuvering ( against gravity- g loads), navigation and homing systems, and type of warheads. Also required will be equally

18

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 18-19

real time and reliable command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities from satellites, airborne early warning, UAVs to series of ground based stations and also battle management command posts (BMCPs). India’s successful Moon Mission would imply that it has access to all type of technologies which are required to develop various types of ballistic missiles and also BMDs along with associated support systems.

A missile defence system has three main components; Interceptor system to include; interceptor missile, fire control radar, support launcher and indigenous BMCP.

BMD concept is very complex. Thus having PAD and AAD does not equal to the interception of entire range of BMs in the inventory. Range of a BM determines itsspeed of travel, altitude, trajectory and the technological sophistication.

Early warning sensor system.

BMCP / C4ISR network.

An oncoming missile can be intercepted during boost phase (30 to 300 seconds depending on range of missile), mid course (3 to 10 minutes) and terminal phase (10 to 20seconds). Boost phase interception is very difficult as it needs space/ airborne/ sea based platform and an early warning system to detect and engage the threat missile. Mid course interception usually takes place outside the earth’s atmosphere (above 30 km termed as exo-atmospheric interception). Terminal phase interception takes place after the threat missile’s reentry in to earth’s atmosphere (called endoatmospheric interception). Interception of

AFP

Complexity of BMD System BMD concept is very complex. Thus having PAD and AAD does not equal to the interception of entire range of BMs in the inventory.

Range of a BM determines its speed of travel, altitude, trajectory and the technological sophistication. Hence a broadly used classification is as follows; ICBM – Above 5000 km range, speed – 12 to 22 mach.

IRBM – From 3000 to 5000 km range and speed - 8 to 12 mach.

MRBM – From 1000 to 2000 km range and speed - 5 to 8 mach.

SRBM – From 300 to 1000 km range and speed 3 to 6 mach.

Tactical Missiles (TMs)/ Rockets/ Aircraft and Aircraft Launched Weapons

DSI

Description The System consists of the PAD, which will intercept missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50-80 km; and AAD Missile for interception at endo-atmospheric altitudes of up to 30 km. The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, radars; launch control centers (LCC) and Mission Control Center (MCC). All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network.

MCC is the software intensive system of the Ballistic Missile Defence. It receives information from various sources like Radars, Satellites etc which is then processed by ten computers running simultaneously. MCC is connected to all other elements of the system through a wide area network (WAN). MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability. MCC after performing all the functions assigns the target to Launch Control Center (LCC) of a battery.

Launch Control Center (LCC) starts computing the time to launch interceptor, based upon information received from the Radar. This is decided on the basis of data

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OCTOBER 2012

requires immediate attention.

Enabled capability and potential to indigenously develop integrated air defence system for the country are yet to be fielded.

Current capability can only take care of Pakistani challenge, as and when operated.

This handout photograph released

by Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) office shows a Hatf IX short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile launched from an undisclosed location in Pakistan on May 29, 2012.

AFP

AFP

Combination of Pakistan’s new medium range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf-V (Ghauri) test from an undisclosed location in northwestern part of the country

received from radar, on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time, carries out ground guidance computation. After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a data link.

When the Interceptors close on to the target ballistic missile, it activates the active radar seeker to search for target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability.

Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an anti-ballistic missile developed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles outside atmosphere (exoatmospheric). Based on the Prithvi missile, PAD is a two stage missile with a maximum interception altitude of 80 km. The first stage is a liquid fuelled motor that uses two propellants and oxidizers while second stage is solid fuelled. It diverts thrusters which can generate a lateral acceleration to more than 5 Gs at 50 km altitude.

Guidance is provided by inertial navigation system, mid-course updates from long range tracking radar (LRTR) and active radar homing in the terminal phase. PAD has capability to engage 300 to 2,000 km range class of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5.

Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) is the target acquisition and fire control Radar for PAD Missile. It is an active phased array radar having capability to track 200 targets at a range of 600 km. It is Israeli Green Pine radar.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an antiballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single staged, solid fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD; inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in terminal phase. It is 7.5 meters tall, weighs around 1.2 tones and a diameter of less than 0.5 meters.

It is claimed by DRDO that PAD and AAD missiles will work in tandem to

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INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 20-21

DSI

ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent.

Induction of the system into service is expected to be in 2013.

Capability Accretion The latest success means that India can destroy in mid-flight Hatf and Ghauri ballistic missiles coming from Pakistan.

India felt the requirement for a BMD shield in the late 1990s when Pakistan test-fired Ghauri missiles with ranges far enough to threaten Indian cities. It can also intercept Chinese DF-21 deployed in Tibet and Yunan province.

AD-1 and AD- 2 Systems.

Two more new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5000 km.

Feasibility of Long Range SAM. The current technology incorporated in PAD, had intercepted target at the range of 120 km. It is feasible to develop another long range SAM up to ranges of 100 to 200 km, thus providing an integrated air defence

system with medium range Akash, long range SAM and BMD system against entire range of missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. This capability will be indigenous.

India India justifies its acquisition of BMD by stating that the country has a ‘no first use’ (NFU) policy, therefore, it needs BMD to absorb the first strike, ensure its second strike capability and retaliate. This would add value to its deterrent capability. Indian BMD is theatre missile defence which cannot protect the entire Indian soil but can only give protection to its some land-based strategic locations. It has a nuclear powered submarine INS Arihant in development, which will be inducted in Indian Navy soon, and will protect the seas.

Pakistan for long has been using their ‘first use policy’ as a deterrent against India’s massive conventional superiority to protect itself after indulgence in state sponsored terrorism. India’s inability to strike back on the event of Parliament attack and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is an eye opener about how desperately India needs an effective BMD system

deployed to blunt the nuclear threat and state sponsored terrorist activities of the neighbour.

India perceives that its space assets are not secure and are threatened from China, as China possesses Anti-Satellite weapons.

Therefore, it has all the right to acquire ASAT which will ultimately enhance its security in space. Moreover, before a legal framework prohibiting the acquisition of Anti-Satellite weapons comes into being, India wants to be the part of the club of ‘ASAT haves’ rather than ‘have-nots’.

Deterrence credibility is no longer sufficient on punishment through massive retaliation.

U.S. sales pitch may have built indigenous constituency within India.

Chinese developments likely reinforce Indian desire.

India likely receives external assistance from Russia, France, and/or Israel.

Challenges of satellite coverage for tracking of target missile and also navigation of own interceptor missile and interoperable C4ISR footprint over areas of interest are yet to be overcome. This area

Pakistan and China The Indian pursuit of BMD and its goal to accommodate ASAT will have regional implications.

It has also provoked China to take required steps to have counter measures to overcome Indian BMD. As a result, China conducted successful BMD test in 2010 and is on the road to acquire effective BMD program in near future.

While Pakistan’s economy does not support it to acquire BMD program, it would feel insecure with its insufficient counter measure strike capability and it does not possess any assured second strike capability. It would ultimately engage in acquiring additional missiles and launchers to devise a much larger attacking force in hope of eluding the Indian interceptors, leading to triangular security dilemma in the region.

Moreover, Pakistan would have to improve its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively to instill a plausible nuclear threat in the theatre, as it considers the nuclear weapons an integral part of its defence system.

India’s Prithvi Air Defence System (PAD) in synergy with Arrow, PAC – 3 and S- 300 and Green Pine radar system can intercept Pakistani missile at boost stage into the exo–atmospheric level.

India’s Advanced Air Defence Missile (AAD) may intercept short range at reentry at endo- atmospheric stage (re-entry intercept at 20 miles).

Feeling safe from de-capacitating, India would be emboldened to launch preemptive strikes at Pakistani deployment sites.

India’s offensive military doctrines (Cold Start and the like) will be more likely/ feasible.

Pakistan will increase fissile and missile production, and engage in countervailing DSI strategies.

21

05/11/12 10:37 AM

BALLISTIC MD

OCTOBER 2012

requires immediate attention.

Enabled capability and potential to indigenously develop integrated air defence system for the country are yet to be fielded.

Current capability can only take care of Pakistani challenge, as and when operated.

This handout photograph released

by Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) office shows a Hatf IX short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile launched from an undisclosed location in Pakistan on May 29, 2012.

AFP

AFP

Combination of Pakistan’s new medium range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf-V (Ghauri) test from an undisclosed location in northwestern part of the country

received from radar, on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time, carries out ground guidance computation. After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a data link.

When the Interceptors close on to the target ballistic missile, it activates the active radar seeker to search for target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability.

Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an anti-ballistic missile developed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles outside atmosphere (exoatmospheric). Based on the Prithvi missile, PAD is a two stage missile with a maximum interception altitude of 80 km. The first stage is a liquid fuelled motor that uses two propellants and oxidizers while second stage is solid fuelled. It diverts thrusters which can generate a lateral acceleration to more than 5 Gs at 50 km altitude.

Guidance is provided by inertial navigation system, mid-course updates from long range tracking radar (LRTR) and active radar homing in the terminal phase. PAD has capability to engage 300 to 2,000 km range class of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5.

Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) is the target acquisition and fire control Radar for PAD Missile. It is an active phased array radar having capability to track 200 targets at a range of 600 km. It is Israeli Green Pine radar.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an antiballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single staged, solid fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD; inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in terminal phase. It is 7.5 meters tall, weighs around 1.2 tones and a diameter of less than 0.5 meters.

It is claimed by DRDO that PAD and AAD missiles will work in tandem to

20

INDIAN BMD 2nd.indd 20-21

DSI

ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent.

Induction of the system into service is expected to be in 2013.

Capability Accretion The latest success means that India can destroy in mid-flight Hatf and Ghauri ballistic missiles coming from Pakistan.

India felt the requirement for a BMD shield in the late 1990s when Pakistan test-fired Ghauri missiles with ranges far enough to threaten Indian cities. It can also intercept Chinese DF-21 deployed in Tibet and Yunan province.

AD-1 and AD- 2 Systems.

Two more new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5000 km.

Feasibility of Long Range SAM. The current technology incorporated in PAD, had intercepted target at the range of 120 km. It is feasible to develop another long range SAM up to ranges of 100 to 200 km, thus providing an integrated air defence

system with medium range Akash, long range SAM and BMD system against entire range of missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. This capability will be indigenous.

India India justifies its acquisition of BMD by stating that the country has a ‘no first use’ (NFU) policy, therefore, it needs BMD to absorb the first strike, ensure its second strike capability and retaliate. This would add value to its deterrent capability. Indian BMD is theatre missile defence which cannot protect the entire Indian soil but can only give protection to its some land-based strategic locations. It has a nuclear powered submarine INS Arihant in development, which will be inducted in Indian Navy soon, and will protect the seas.

Pakistan for long has been using their ‘first use policy’ as a deterrent against India’s massive conventional superiority to protect itself after indulgence in state sponsored terrorism. India’s inability to strike back on the event of Parliament attack and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is an eye opener about how desperately India needs an effective BMD system

deployed to blunt the nuclear threat and state sponsored terrorist activities of the neighbour.

India perceives that its space assets are not secure and are threatened from China, as China possesses Anti-Satellite weapons.

Therefore, it has all the right to acquire ASAT which will ultimately enhance its security in space. Moreover, before a legal framework prohibiting the acquisition of Anti-Satellite weapons comes into being, India wants to be the part of the club of ‘ASAT haves’ rather than ‘have-nots’.

Deterrence credibility is no longer sufficient on punishment through massive retaliation.

U.S. sales pitch may have built indigenous constituency within India.

Chinese developments likely reinforce Indian desire.

India likely receives external assistance from Russia, France, and/or Israel.

Challenges of satellite coverage for tracking of target missile and also navigation of own interceptor missile and interoperable C4ISR footprint over areas of interest are yet to be overcome. This area

Pakistan and China The Indian pursuit of BMD and its goal to accommodate ASAT will have regional implications.

It has also provoked China to take required steps to have counter measures to overcome Indian BMD. As a result, China conducted successful BMD test in 2010 and is on the road to acquire effective BMD program in near future.

While Pakistan’s economy does not support it to acquire BMD program, it would feel insecure with its insufficient counter measure strike capability and it does not possess any assured second strike capability. It would ultimately engage in acquiring additional missiles and launchers to devise a much larger attacking force in hope of eluding the Indian interceptors, leading to triangular security dilemma in the region.

Moreover, Pakistan would have to improve its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively to instill a plausible nuclear threat in the theatre, as it considers the nuclear weapons an integral part of its defence system.

India’s Prithvi Air Defence System (PAD) in synergy with Arrow, PAC – 3 and S- 300 and Green Pine radar system can intercept Pakistani missile at boost stage into the exo–atmospheric level.

India’s Advanced Air Defence Missile (AAD) may intercept short range at reentry at endo- atmospheric stage (re-entry intercept at 20 miles).

Feeling safe from de-capacitating, India would be emboldened to launch preemptive strikes at Pakistani deployment sites.

India’s offensive military doctrines (Cold Start and the like) will be more likely/ feasible.

Pakistan will increase fissile and missile production, and engage in countervailing DSI strategies.

21

05/11/12 10:37 AM

DEFENCE BUILD

OCTOBER 2012

FICV: PRIVATE SECTOR’S BIG HOPE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION

DSI

An Indian United Nations peacekeeper sits atop an armoured infantry combat vehicle near Kibati, overlooking the outskirts of Goma in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on August 2, 2012

AFP

Indiaʼs ʻMakeʼ project for developing indigenous infantry combat vehicles is ambitious. The contenders of this challenging task face a MoD that is looking at the private sector building these high technology and complex systems

Ajai Shukla

KEY POINTS

The DGMF wants the Future ICV designed to operate “primarily in the plains, desert and semi-desert terrain”, i.e. along the Indo-Pakistan border.

Future ICV should perform three roles: mobility in battle for infantry; provide fire-support to the assaulting/ dismounted infantry; and finally it should hold its own on the mechanised battlefield Three prospective vendors Tata Motors, the Mahindra Group, Larsen & Toubro

A

fter the advent of the tank in World War I, theoreticians of mechanized warfare began searching for solutions that would allow infantry soldiers to move alongside fast

moving tank columns, providing the ability to hold the ground that the force overran and to provide protection in close terrain and at night. As automotive technology developed, this translated into the concept of “lorried infantry”. After World War II, infantry units mounted in half-tracked, and then tracked/ wheeled armoured vehicles called armoured personnel carriers, or APCs, became integral components of armoured brigades and divisions in most modern armies.

But mechanised infantry units equipped with APCs --- such as the ubiquitous American M113 and the Russian BTR series --- remained desperately vulnerable to enemy armour, and dependent for battlefield protection on their own tanks. The Soviet Union first provided mechanized infantry units with the ability to destroy enemy tanks, equipping its infantry carrier, the Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty or BMP, with anti-tank guided missiles. BMP

22

FICV 2nd.indd 22-23

translates into “infantry combat vehicle”; and so ICV became the name of a new genre of lightly armoured vehicles that could carry infantry and also take on tanks on advantageous terms.

As missile ranges increased, ICVs, such as the BMP-2, equipped with the Konkurs missile, became capable of destroying tanks out to ranges of four kilometres, beyond the main gun range of even the heaviest main battle tank (MBT). In the 1980s the Indian Army chief, General K Sundarji, made a rejuvenated mechanized infantry a key component of his drive to build India’s strike corps into a credible conventional deterrent.

Along with T-72 tanks and self-propelled air defence units, New Delhi bought the BMP-1 and then the BMP-2 from the Soviet Union.

Manufacture of these ICVs subsequently began in Ordnance Factory Medak, in Andhra Pradesh.

Konkurs missile, became capable of destroying tanks out to ranges of four kilometres, beyond the main gun range of even the heaviest main battle tank (MBT). In the 1980s the Indian Army chief, General K Sundarji, made a rejuvenated mechanized infantry a key component of his drive to build Indiaʼs strike corps.

Today, some four decades after the BMP entered army service; the defence ministry (MoD) has embarked upon the quest for a successor, so far referred to only as the Future Infantry Combat Vehicle, or Future ICV. Through an Expression of Interest (EoI) that was sent out in early 2010, the MoD asked four prospective vendors --Tata Motors, the Mahindra Group, Larsen & Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) --- to submit proposals for developing an FICV in the country with an indigenous content of at least 50%.

According to the EoI the Future ICV, which would remain in service from 20172057, would be operated by 3 crewmembers and carry a “stick” of 7 more infantrymen with full combat equipment. It would provide armour protection from weapons up to 14.5 millimetre calibre; be fully amphibious and air-transportable, which

would imply a maximum weight of 18-20 tonnes; and be armed with a cannon and anti-tank missiles.

The MoD has categorised the Future ICV project as a “Make” project under the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2008 (DPP – 2008). According to the DPP, the “Make” category covers the indigenous development of “high technology, complex systems” by Indian industry, in order to “ensure Indigenous Research, Design, Development and Production of capabilities sought by the Armed Forces in prescribed timeframe while optimally utilising the potential of Indian Industry (sic).”

In response to the EoI, the four vendors (the Tatas, L&T, Mahindras and OFB) submitted detailed proposals to the MoD by 25th Sept 2010. Then began the selection process; after evaluating the four proposals, the MoD was to short-list two “development

23

05/11/12 10:49 AM

DEFENCE BUILD

OCTOBER 2012

FICV: PRIVATE SECTOR’S BIG HOPE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION

DSI

An Indian United Nations peacekeeper sits atop an armoured infantry combat vehicle near Kibati, overlooking the outskirts of Goma in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on August 2, 2012

AFP

Indiaʼs ʻMakeʼ project for developing indigenous infantry combat vehicles is ambitious. The contenders of this challenging task face a MoD that is looking at the private sector building these high technology and complex systems

Ajai Shukla

KEY POINTS

The DGMF wants the Future ICV designed to operate “primarily in the plains, desert and semi-desert terrain”, i.e. along the Indo-Pakistan border.

Future ICV should perform three roles: mobility in battle for infantry; provide fire-support to the assaulting/ dismounted infantry; and finally it should hold its own on the mechanised battlefield Three prospective vendors Tata Motors, the Mahindra Group, Larsen & Toubro

A

fter the advent of the tank in World War I, theoreticians of mechanized warfare began searching for solutions that would allow infantry soldiers to move alongside fast

moving tank columns, providing the ability to hold the ground that the force overran and to provide protection in close terrain and at night. As automotive technology developed, this translated into the concept of “lorried infantry”. After World War II, infantry units mounted in half-tracked, and then tracked/ wheeled armoured vehicles called armoured personnel carriers, or APCs, became integral components of armoured brigades and divisions in most modern armies.

But mechanised infantry units equipped with APCs --- such as the ubiquitous American M113 and the Russian BTR series --- remained desperately vulnerable to enemy armour, and dependent for battlefield protection on their own tanks. The Soviet Union first provided mechanized infantry units with the ability to destroy enemy tanks, equipping its infantry carrier, the Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty or BMP, with anti-tank guided missiles. BMP

22

FICV 2nd.indd 22-23

translates into “infantry combat vehicle”; and so ICV became the name of a new genre of lightly armoured vehicles that could carry infantry and also take on tanks on advantageous terms.

As missile ranges increased, ICVs, such as the BMP-2, equipped with the Konkurs missile, became capable of destroying tanks out to ranges of four kilometres, beyond the main gun range of even the heaviest main battle tank (MBT). In the 1980s the Indian Army chief, General K Sundarji, made a rejuvenated mechanized infantry a key component of his drive to build India’s strike corps into a credible conventional deterrent.

Along with T-72 tanks and self-propelled air defence units, New Delhi bought the BMP-1 and then the BMP-2 from the Soviet Union.

Manufacture of these ICVs subsequently began in Ordnance Factory Medak, in Andhra Pradesh.

Konkurs missile, became capable of destroying tanks out to ranges of four kilometres, beyond the main gun range of even the heaviest main battle tank (MBT). In the 1980s the Indian Army chief, General K Sundarji, made a rejuvenated mechanized infantry a key component of his drive to build Indiaʼs strike corps.

Today, some four decades after the BMP entered army service; the defence ministry (MoD) has embarked upon the quest for a successor, so far referred to only as the Future Infantry Combat Vehicle, or Future ICV. Through an Expression of Interest (EoI) that was sent out in early 2010, the MoD asked four prospective vendors --Tata Motors, the Mahindra Group, Larsen & Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) --- to submit proposals for developing an FICV in the country with an indigenous content of at least 50%.

According to the EoI the Future ICV, which would remain in service from 20172057, would be operated by 3 crewmembers and carry a “stick” of 7 more infantrymen with full combat equipment. It would provide armour protection from weapons up to 14.5 millimetre calibre; be fully amphibious and air-transportable, which

would imply a maximum weight of 18-20 tonnes; and be armed with a cannon and anti-tank missiles.

The MoD has categorised the Future ICV project as a “Make” project under the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2008 (DPP – 2008). According to the DPP, the “Make” category covers the indigenous development of “high technology, complex systems” by Indian industry, in order to “ensure Indigenous Research, Design, Development and Production of capabilities sought by the Armed Forces in prescribed timeframe while optimally utilising the potential of Indian Industry (sic).”

In response to the EoI, the four vendors (the Tatas, L&T, Mahindras and OFB) submitted detailed proposals to the MoD by 25th Sept 2010. Then began the selection process; after evaluating the four proposals, the MoD was to short-list two “development

23

05/11/12 10:49 AM

DEFENCE BUILD

AFP

India’s new T-90 Tanks Bheeshma on display during a Republic Day grand parade

“directed energy weapons”, including high power lasers, high power microwave; and a range of “non-lethal weapons” that include pulsed chemical laser, electro magnetic pulse, infrasound and optical munitions.

This separation of the Future ICV’s performance parameters into two categories of “essential” and “desirable” is in line with MoD regulations. The DPP mandates that “essential parameters”, based on “proven State of the Art technology”, must be met from the very first prototype onwards.

Meanwhile, the “desirable parameters” could be met as the development process proceeds. This convenient arrangement, however, poses significant problems of technology engineering. Armoured vehicle designers, who deal with the continuous design challenge of enhance the available space, even while reducing the vehicle weight, point to the difficulty of retro-fitting high-technology systems like directed energy and non-lethal weapons, given that these require not just additional space, but

Not everyone is unhappy about the MoDʼs dithering over the Future ICV shortlist. A strong lobby within the MoD, which includes sections of the army, believe that India should just buy a BMP successor.

also additional electrical power, control gear, instrumentation, etc.

But the private sector remains upbeat, keen to get its foot in the door to demonstrate that it can design and build its first land system from ground up. Says MV Kotwal, who heads the defence business

of L&T: “We at L&T have a track record in designing and developing state-of the art prototype systems in close association with the DRDO. We are confident of translating indigenous design and architecture into a Future ICV, while also making use of globally available technologies in certain selected areas.”

Conclusion Not everyone is unhappy about the MoD’s dithering over the Future ICV shortlist.

A strong lobby within the MoD, which includes sections of the army, believe that India should just buy a BMP successor from Russia and build the ICV under licence in the Ordnance Factory, Medak, which has a wealth of experience in building the BMP-2.

So far, the MoD has come down on the side of indigenous development. It remains to be seen whether delay in finalising the shortlist is a mere procedural hiccup, or whether it is the first shot fired in a battle to scuttle the DSI Future ICV “Make” project.

26

FICV 2nd.indd 26

05/11/12 10:50 AM

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Rising pric security es and geopoli a global tical turb priority GENDER I SHYAM ulence make energy SARAN

TIME TO CHANGE

NEED MORE INDIA, PAK NUKE TRUST and

The trust deficit between the two countries have to go for CBMs to succeed | G BALACHANDRAN

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NUKE SECURITY

OCTOBER 2012

NUCLEAR CBMs AND RISK REDUCTION

DSI

A picture shows the Bugey nuclear power plant reflecting in the water on May 2, 2012 in Saint-Vulbas, after an activist flew into the grounds of the plant

CBMs between two antagonistic countries create trust and predictability. At the height of the Cold War, the two warring sides, the US and the NATO block, and then USSR and the Warsaw Pact block continued to engage each other in successive agreements

KEY POINTS

There are essentially four varieties of CBMs. A declaratory CBM like India’s ‘No First Use’ commitment, made unilaterally, is not fully trusted by Pakistan.

Track II efforts at increasing trust amongst two countries have proved to be a success rarely.

C

BMs (Confidence building measures) are those actions taken either unilaterally or bilaterally by two nations or groups of nations to reduce military tensions between them and hence reduce the chances of a war. Nuclear CBMs are the set of CBMs taken when these two nations or set of nations possess nuclear explosive capabilities. Although nuclear CBMs had their origin during the height of the Cold War between USA and USSR, when these two nations were engaged in bitter

nuclear arms race. In recent times most if not all, of the writings are in the context of a supposedly deadly nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and a bitter historical legacy that has left resulted in a continuing tension over border and territorial issues.

CBMs fall in a variety of categories: (i) Declaratory policies; (ii) Information exchanges; (iii) Observation and inspection measures, and, (iv) Restrictions on military operations.

Each one of these has both positive and negative features. Declaratory CBMs made unilaterally are intended to assure the other party of the intentions of party making the declaratory CBM and are solely dependent on that party’s evaluation of the pros and cons of such a CBM. On the other hand declaratory principles are non-binding, unenforceable and easily reversible. As a consequence declaratory principles are of questionable value in promoting confidence if the level of mistrust/distrust between the two parties is high. The Indian declaratory principle

28

Nuclear CBMs 2nd.indd 28-29

AFP

G Balachandran

of No First Use (NFU) is a case in point.

Notwithstanding India’s assurances of a NFU, Pakistan is extremely skeptical of the offer and has refused to accept it at face value.

Information exchanges CBMs require both parties to share information on some selective basis. These may involve, for example, prior notification of military activities such as large scale exercises, or missile launches or in case of India and Pakistan list of nuclear facilities not to be attacked by the other. Opening of hotlines between the two countries may accompany such CBMs though it is not a prerequisite.

Information exchanges do not include any provisions for the accuracy of the information provided. They are to be taken at face value.

As such information exchange CBMs too face some disadvantages. First, the Hotline and other forms of information exchange may be used to exchange misleading or false (but difficult to verify) information. It is also that prior notification about large exercises may conceal belligerent intentions and reduce warning tines.

Mutual observation and inspection CBMs, either of military exercises or military

holdings may be of some use especially if they are accompanied by provisions for onsite inspections.

CBMs designed to restrict military operations do have some potential to reduce tensions by either discouraging large scale surprise attacks or increasing the warning time. The Agreement between India and Pakistan on Prevention of Air Space violations and for permitting over flights and landings by Military aircraft signed in April 1991 in one example of such a CBM. This agreement, for example, among other things required that neither side will fly

within 10 kms of each other’s airspace including ADIZ (Air Defence Identification Zones) by any combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, jet military trainer and armed helicopters) Although CBMs by themselves are not unwelcome in the South Asian context, it is premature to contemplate any useful or effective nuclear CBMs for a variety of reasons. First of all the level of mistrust between the two countries is so intense, especially in matters concerning national security that one needs to discuss CBMs even to facilitate discussions on nuclear

29

05/11/12 10:54 AM

NUKE SECURITY

OCTOBER 2012

NUCLEAR CBMs AND RISK REDUCTION

DSI

A picture shows the Bugey nuclear power plant reflecting in the water on May 2, 2012 in Saint-Vulbas, after an activist flew into the grounds of the plant

CBMs between two antagonistic countries create trust and predictability. At the height of the Cold War, the two warring sides, the US and the NATO block, and then USSR and the Warsaw Pact block continued to engage each other in successive agreements

KEY POINTS

There are essentially four varieties of CBMs. A declaratory CBM like India’s ‘No First Use’ commitment, made unilaterally, is not fully trusted by Pakistan.

Track II efforts at increasing trust amongst two countries have proved to be a success rarely.

C

BMs (Confidence building measures) are those actions taken either unilaterally or bilaterally by two nations or groups of nations to reduce military tensions between them and hence reduce the chances of a war. Nuclear CBMs are the set of CBMs taken when these two nations or set of nations possess nuclear explosive capabilities. Although nuclear CBMs had their origin during the height of the Cold War between USA and USSR, when these two nations were engaged in bitter

nuclear arms race. In recent times most if not all, of the writings are in the context of a supposedly deadly nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and a bitter historical legacy that has left resulted in a continuing tension over border and territorial issues.

CBMs fall in a variety of categories: (i) Declaratory policies; (ii) Information exchanges; (iii) Observation and inspection measures, and, (iv) Restrictions on military operations.

Each one of these has both positive and negative features. Declaratory CBMs made unilaterally are intended to assure the other party of the intentions of party making the declaratory CBM and are solely dependent on that party’s evaluation of the pros and cons of such a CBM. On the other hand declaratory principles are non-binding, unenforceable and easily reversible. As a consequence declaratory principles are of questionable value in promoting confidence if the level of mistrust/distrust between the two parties is high. The Indian declaratory principle

28

Nuclear CBMs 2nd.indd 28-29

AFP

G Balachandran

of No First Use (NFU) is a case in point.

Notwithstanding India’s assurances of a NFU, Pakistan is extremely skeptical of the offer and has refused to accept it at face value.

Information exchanges CBMs require both parties to share information on some selective basis. These may involve, for example, prior notification of military activities such as large scale exercises, or missile launches or in case of India and Pakistan list of nuclear facilities not to be attacked by the other. Opening of hotlines between the two countries may accompany such CBMs though it is not a prerequisite.

Information exchanges do not include any provisions for the accuracy of the information provided. They are to be taken at face value.

As such information exchange CBMs too face some disadvantages. First, the Hotline and other forms of information exchange may be used to exchange misleading or false (but difficult to verify) information. It is also that prior notification about large exercises may conceal belligerent intentions and reduce warning tines.

Mutual observation and inspection CBMs, either of military exercises or military

holdings may be of some use especially if they are accompanied by provisions for onsite inspections.

CBMs designed to restrict military operations do have some potential to reduce tensions by either discouraging large scale surprise attacks or increasing the warning time. The Agreement between India and Pakistan on Prevention of Air Space violations and for permitting over flights and landings by Military aircraft signed in April 1991 in one example of such a CBM. This agreement, for example, among other things required that neither side will fly

within 10 kms of each other’s airspace including ADIZ (Air Defence Identification Zones) by any combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, jet military trainer and armed helicopters) Although CBMs by themselves are not unwelcome in the South Asian context, it is premature to contemplate any useful or effective nuclear CBMs for a variety of reasons. First of all the level of mistrust between the two countries is so intense, especially in matters concerning national security that one needs to discuss CBMs even to facilitate discussions on nuclear

29

05/11/12 10:54 AM

NUKE SECURITY

India and Pakistan signed an agreement to allow regular contact between Indiaʼs Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and Pakistanʼs state-run Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS).

AFP

Quantity’ (SQ) is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. A nuclear explosive device would have, therefore, fissile material equivalent to a SQ or more.

Strictly speaking, therefore, this agreement if faithfully and properly implemented, assures and guarantees each other of the availability and survivability of their second strike capabilities.

Therefore, it is not surprising, to find that no such CBM exists between any other two nuclear weapon states.

A second agreement that was signed between the two countries was the “Agreement Between India And Pakistan On Pre-Notification Of Flight Testing Of Ballistic Missiles” that was signed on October 5, 2005 and which has been extended once since then. According to this agreement

30

Nuclear CBMs 2nd.indd 30-31

Bay of Bengal it would hardly seem that the Indian missile tests are in the direction of the other party.

The last agreement was the Agreement between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. This agreement requires that “The Parties shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident relating to nuclear weapons, under their respective jurisdiction or control, which could create the risk of a radioactive fallout, with adverse

UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters

“

CBMs. Secondly, the absence of any real research in both countries on the constituents of meaningful nuclear CBMs between the two countries precludes any meaningful CBMs. That has not, however, stopped initiatives being undertaken at both official and unofficial levels.

At the official level, the two countries have been holding expert level talks on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures since June 2004 and have held six such meetings till now. Not much has come out of these meetings except for some symbolic actions without much significance. One of the earliest of such CBM was done in 1988 when the two countries signed an Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities which came into force in end 1990. According to this agreement “Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.

The term "nuclear installation or facility" includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.

Each contracting party shall inform the other on 1st January of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there is any change” The two countries have been regularly exchanging such lists the last one being exchanged on 1 January, 2012. The lists exchanged by the two countries are secret and not made public. However it is very unlikely that the lists contain any nuclear facility other than those identified either in the national public documents or other identified by international agencies. This agreement is unlike any nuclear CBM either signed or even contemplated anywhere else.

According to the standard definition of nuclear terms the term “Significant

OCTOBER 2012

“Each party shall provide to the other party, advance notification of the flight test that it intends to undertake of any land or sea launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles” This agreement is very similar to the two agreements on missile test notification that were signed between USA and USSR. The first one -the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement required each Party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches extended beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party. The second agreement “on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles” that was signed between USA and USSR in May 1988 required that “Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").”

India and Pakistan differs from these in two significant respects. The first one, is that while the USA-USSR agreement was only in respect of ICBMs and SLBMs, in case the India-Pakistan the agreement included all types of surface-to-surface missiles.

The second significant difference was that the earlier USA-USSR agreement was in respect of missile tests extending beyond the national territory in the direction of the other, whereas in the South Asian context again it was in respect of all tests.

Considering that the Indian missile tests are conducted on the Indian eastern seaboard and directed eastwards in the direction of

consequences for both sides, or create the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries” and also provides that “The obligation of a Party to notify shall be in respect of only such accidents which may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance or have security implication for the other Party” This agreement is similar to the International Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident which, however, is only in respect of nuclear facilities and material not related to nuclear weapons. That convention requires a State party to the Convention- which India is – “to forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), those States which are or may be physically affected as specified in article 1 and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact

DSI

location where appropriate;” while the India-Pakistan Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons seems to require India to notify only Pakistan.

While the intention of this agreement is to reduce the chances of Pakistan misreading the nuclear accident as a potentially hostile action, it is inconceivable that India would not inform all states that may be adversely affected by radiological release from the weapon accident, even in the absence of any specific convention or agreement relating to weapon accidents.

It is very unlikely that any more nuclear CBM will be negotiated between India and Pakistan since they seem to have exhausted all the weak versions of the earlier declaratory nuclear CBMs between USA and USSR. It is not to be supposed, however, that efforts in that direction are not attempted by the innumerable so-called Track II talks between professional Track II participants from these two countries. Almost all of these Track II discussions are financed by third country agencies with the discussions being held in third/fourth country locations, often with the agenda set up by the funding agencies.

Not surprisingly not much of any substance or use has come out of these regularly held meetings. There are many reasons for the failure. The first is the distrust between the two countries that makes even holding of such track II bilateral meetings in either of these countries with no foreign funding difficult.

In reality there is such a huge trust deficit between the two countries that even holding of any bilateral Track II security related discussions or exchange of researchers extremely difficult to achieve. For instance, in February 2008, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to allow regular contact between India's Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and Pakistan's state-run Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS). The purpose was to build channels of communication at the level of scholars.

More than four years have passed since that agreement but there has been no exchange of scholars and there are no indications that such exchanges are ever likely to take place in DSI the near future.

31

05/11/12 10:54 AM

NUKE SECURITY

India and Pakistan signed an agreement to allow regular contact between Indiaʼs Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and Pakistanʼs state-run Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS).

AFP

Quantity’ (SQ) is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. A nuclear explosive device would have, therefore, fissile material equivalent to a SQ or more.

Strictly speaking, therefore, this agreement if faithfully and properly implemented, assures and guarantees each other of the availability and survivability of their second strike capabilities.

Therefore, it is not surprising, to find that no such CBM exists between any other two nuclear weapon states.

A second agreement that was signed between the two countries was the “Agreement Between India And Pakistan On Pre-Notification Of Flight Testing Of Ballistic Missiles” that was signed on October 5, 2005 and which has been extended once since then. According to this agreement

30

Nuclear CBMs 2nd.indd 30-31

Bay of Bengal it would hardly seem that the Indian missile tests are in the direction of the other party.

The last agreement was the Agreement between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. This agreement requires that “The Parties shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident relating to nuclear weapons, under their respective jurisdiction or control, which could create the risk of a radioactive fallout, with adverse

UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters

“

CBMs. Secondly, the absence of any real research in both countries on the constituents of meaningful nuclear CBMs between the two countries precludes any meaningful CBMs. That has not, however, stopped initiatives being undertaken at both official and unofficial levels.

At the official level, the two countries have been holding expert level talks on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures since June 2004 and have held six such meetings till now. Not much has come out of these meetings except for some symbolic actions without much significance. One of the earliest of such CBM was done in 1988 when the two countries signed an Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities which came into force in end 1990. According to this agreement “Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.

The term "nuclear installation or facility" includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.

Each contracting party shall inform the other on 1st January of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there is any change” The two countries have been regularly exchanging such lists the last one being exchanged on 1 January, 2012. The lists exchanged by the two countries are secret and not made public. However it is very unlikely that the lists contain any nuclear facility other than those identified either in the national public documents or other identified by international agencies. This agreement is unlike any nuclear CBM either signed or even contemplated anywhere else.

According to the standard definition of nuclear terms the term “Significant

OCTOBER 2012

“Each party shall provide to the other party, advance notification of the flight test that it intends to undertake of any land or sea launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles” This agreement is very similar to the two agreements on missile test notification that were signed between USA and USSR. The first one -the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement required each Party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches extended beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party. The second agreement “on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles” that was signed between USA and USSR in May 1988 required that “Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").”

India and Pakistan differs from these in two significant respects. The first one, is that while the USA-USSR agreement was only in respect of ICBMs and SLBMs, in case the India-Pakistan the agreement included all types of surface-to-surface missiles.

The second significant difference was that the earlier USA-USSR agreement was in respect of missile tests extending beyond the national territory in the direction of the other, whereas in the South Asian context again it was in respect of all tests.

Considering that the Indian missile tests are conducted on the Indian eastern seaboard and directed eastwards in the direction of

consequences for both sides, or create the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries” and also provides that “The obligation of a Party to notify shall be in respect of only such accidents which may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance or have security implication for the other Party” This agreement is similar to the International Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident which, however, is only in respect of nuclear facilities and material not related to nuclear weapons. That convention requires a State party to the Convention- which India is – “to forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), those States which are or may be physically affected as specified in article 1 and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact

DSI

location where appropriate;” while the India-Pakistan Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons seems to require India to notify only Pakistan.

While the intention of this agreement is to reduce the chances of Pakistan misreading the nuclear accident as a potentially hostile action, it is inconceivable that India would not inform all states that may be adversely affected by radiological release from the weapon accident, even in the absence of any specific convention or agreement relating to weapon accidents.

It is very unlikely that any more nuclear CBM will be negotiated between India and Pakistan since they seem to have exhausted all the weak versions of the earlier declaratory nuclear CBMs between USA and USSR. It is not to be supposed, however, that efforts in that direction are not attempted by the innumerable so-called Track II talks between professional Track II participants from these two countries. Almost all of these Track II discussions are financed by third country agencies with the discussions being held in third/fourth country locations, often with the agenda set up by the funding agencies.

Not surprisingly not much of any substance or use has come out of these regularly held meetings. There are many reasons for the failure. The first is the distrust between the two countries that makes even holding of such track II bilateral meetings in either of these countries with no foreign funding difficult.

In reality there is such a huge trust deficit between the two countries that even holding of any bilateral Track II security related discussions or exchange of researchers extremely difficult to achieve. For instance, in February 2008, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to allow regular contact between India's Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and Pakistan's state-run Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS). The purpose was to build channels of communication at the level of scholars.

More than four years have passed since that agreement but there has been no exchange of scholars and there are no indications that such exchanges are ever likely to take place in DSI the near future.

31

05/11/12 10:54 AM

SUB STORY

OCTOBER 2012

A Russian-built, Kilo-class diesel submarine

DSI

INDIAN NAVAL SUBS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new. Then followed the controversies about procurement of some of them. The stink reached the top – then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. However, the HDW (named Shishumar class) subs that came from Germany were top of the line

KEY POINTS

The tube launched missile function of the submarines makes them capable of attacking ships from stand-off range.

A 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan was cleared by the Union Cabinet of Ministers in late 1990s.

Acquiring the lease of a Russian Akula class SSN by the Indian Navy and impending sea trials of the Arihant, the indigenously built SSBN is considered a shot in the arm for the force.

AFP

Commodore Anil Jai Singh (Retd)

T

he undersea dimension forms an integral element of every maritime nation’s security landscape. The extent of its commitment may vary depending on its strategic perspective, geopolitical imperatives, threat perception, and to a large extent its economic and military strength. Undersea capability can range from the non-glamorous and low-cost, albeit effective mine warfare to the other extreme of large ballistic missile submarines lurking in the ocean depths with an arsenal, capable of annihilating the world several times over. In addition, the elements required to counter these threats and the underwater battle space

32

Submarine 2nd.indd 32-33

encompasses all the five dimensions viz., sub-surface, surface, air and increasingly, space and cyberspace.

The year 2012 has been a landmark year for the submarine arm and indeed, the Indian Navy. An Akula II class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), leased from Russia for 10 years, and has been commissioned as INS Chakra. The indigenously built strategic missile submarine, the Arihant is expected to be put to sea shortly for sea trials. The arrival of both these types could not have come a moment too soon and will provide the navy with a capability commensurate with the national interests.

Historical Perspective The importance of the submarine was recognized with a force of four being part of the blueprint drawn up for the development of the navy soon after independence. However a combination of factors including financial constraints, a developmental agenda, and a foreign policy steeped in moralpolitik which perceived submarines as an offensive platform and an emphasis on acquisition of ships and aircraft delayed the inevitable.

The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR).

Within two years, three more similar

submarines followed. These four boats underwent a baptism by fire as they played a significant role in India’s decisive rout of Pakistan in December 1971.Four more Foxtrot class submarines were acquired between 1972 and 1974. These were designated the Vela class named after the lead submarine.

INS Vela was finally decommissioned in June 2010 after a stellar commission of 38 years. The last of the Foxtrots, INS Vagli soon followed drawing to a close a chapter that shaped the firm foundation of the navy’s submarine arm.

Consolidation 1975-85 A long hiatus followed and no submarines

were acquired for over a decade. This period was utilized to consolidate the skills learnt by the pioneering crews who received top class submarine training at HMS Dolphin in the UK and subsequently in the USSR. The benefits of this soon became evident across the entire gamut of submarine activity, be it operations, maintenance or training. At sea, the professionalism and confidence of the crew led to the operational envelope being continuously stretched and innovative tactical scenarios were exercised and validated.

The submarine training school INS Satavahana was commissioned in 1974, complete with an escape training facility.

33

05/11/12 10:57 AM

SUB STORY

OCTOBER 2012

A Russian-built, Kilo-class diesel submarine

DSI

INDIAN NAVAL SUBS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new. Then followed the controversies about procurement of some of them. The stink reached the top – then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. However, the HDW (named Shishumar class) subs that came from Germany were top of the line

KEY POINTS

The tube launched missile function of the submarines makes them capable of attacking ships from stand-off range.

A 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan was cleared by the Union Cabinet of Ministers in late 1990s.

Acquiring the lease of a Russian Akula class SSN by the Indian Navy and impending sea trials of the Arihant, the indigenously built SSBN is considered a shot in the arm for the force.

AFP

Commodore Anil Jai Singh (Retd)

T

he undersea dimension forms an integral element of every maritime nation’s security landscape. The extent of its commitment may vary depending on its strategic perspective, geopolitical imperatives, threat perception, and to a large extent its economic and military strength. Undersea capability can range from the non-glamorous and low-cost, albeit effective mine warfare to the other extreme of large ballistic missile submarines lurking in the ocean depths with an arsenal, capable of annihilating the world several times over. In addition, the elements required to counter these threats and the underwater battle space

32

Submarine 2nd.indd 32-33

encompasses all the five dimensions viz., sub-surface, surface, air and increasingly, space and cyberspace.

The year 2012 has been a landmark year for the submarine arm and indeed, the Indian Navy. An Akula II class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), leased from Russia for 10 years, and has been commissioned as INS Chakra. The indigenously built strategic missile submarine, the Arihant is expected to be put to sea shortly for sea trials. The arrival of both these types could not have come a moment too soon and will provide the navy with a capability commensurate with the national interests.

Historical Perspective The importance of the submarine was recognized with a force of four being part of the blueprint drawn up for the development of the navy soon after independence. However a combination of factors including financial constraints, a developmental agenda, and a foreign policy steeped in moralpolitik which perceived submarines as an offensive platform and an emphasis on acquisition of ships and aircraft delayed the inevitable.

The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR).

Within two years, three more similar

submarines followed. These four boats underwent a baptism by fire as they played a significant role in India’s decisive rout of Pakistan in December 1971.Four more Foxtrot class submarines were acquired between 1972 and 1974. These were designated the Vela class named after the lead submarine.

INS Vela was finally decommissioned in June 2010 after a stellar commission of 38 years. The last of the Foxtrots, INS Vagli soon followed drawing to a close a chapter that shaped the firm foundation of the navy’s submarine arm.

Consolidation 1975-85 A long hiatus followed and no submarines

were acquired for over a decade. This period was utilized to consolidate the skills learnt by the pioneering crews who received top class submarine training at HMS Dolphin in the UK and subsequently in the USSR. The benefits of this soon became evident across the entire gamut of submarine activity, be it operations, maintenance or training. At sea, the professionalism and confidence of the crew led to the operational envelope being continuously stretched and innovative tactical scenarios were exercised and validated.

The submarine training school INS Satavahana was commissioned in 1974, complete with an escape training facility.

33

05/11/12 10:57 AM

SUB STORY

Resurgence of the Arm 1986-1995 By the late 70’s the need to augment and modernize the submarine force had become evident. After a great deal of deliberation interspersed by political considerations, a contract was inked with M/s HDW Germany for a 1500 ton bespoke variant of the Type 209 design. In agreement with the avowed aim of developing an indigenous capability, this project for four conventional submarines (SSK) included the outright purchase of two from the OEM and the licensed production of two at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), Mumbai. The first two submarines of the Shishumar class, as it was called, were commissioned within months of each other in 1986. These stateof-the-art submarines offered the best SSK technology the West had to offer. While the first two submarines were being built at Kiel in Germany, personnel from MDL Mumbai were being trained simultaneously to undertake indigenous construction. This entire project was extremely well conceived and was to be the springboard to launch India’s nascent shipbuilding industry into the complex and exclusive club of submarine construction. This transfer of technology arrangement should have led to a series production of submarines. However due to narrow political considerations including allegations of bribes having been paid, HDW was blacklisted and no further submarines were constructed.

A colossal investment in resources, manpower and money was wasted at the altar of political ambition and the country

The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum.

was that much the poorer. Ironically though, nobody in India was indicted for receiving a bribe.

Almost simultaneously, a contract was concluded with the Soviet Union to acquire eight Kilo class submarines. These were the latest SSKs in the Soviet inventory and India received the first export variant. These eight submarines known as the Sindhughosh class (named after the lead submarine) was commissioned in quick succession between 1986 and 1991.

In 1992, with the commissioning of INS Shalki, India joined a select group of nations possessing a submarine construction capability. INS Shankul, the fourth of the Shishumar class and the second indigenously built submarine joined the ranks in 1994.

The IN’s submarine force level stood at an all-time high of twenty although the earlier Foxtrots had begun getting long in the teeth.

The institutional strength of the young submarine arm was evident in the rapidity

34

Submarine 2nd.indd 34-35

by American SSNs highlighted the efficacy of underwater capability in achieving joint effect and shaping the outcome on land.

In the decade since, the underwater battle space has assumed even greater strategic, operational and tactical significance. Bilateral and multilateral flashpoints continue to flare up and delineation of maritime boundaries has become increasingly contentious. More navies are now investing in submarines.

This region is home to six of the world’s ten

Picture taken 07 April 2003 shows a U31 submarine made by the world’s leading maker of nonnuclear submarines German HDW (Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft) in Kiel, northern Germany

AFP

This included a 30 metre tower called the “Tower of Confidence” to train submariners in effecting an escape from a sunken submarine. Soon, all submarine training was being conducted in India and became the benchmark for training excellence in the Indian Navy.

Maintenance was accorded due priority and the Naval dockyards in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam soon set up facilities to take up various levels of submarine refits including medium refits. Capacity constraints, however, at the dockyards that necessitated submarines being sent to USSR for their medium refits.

OCTOBER 2012

by which training and maintenance facilities for these new classes were established while new landmarks were being achieved at sea.

Long deployments became de-rigeur and logistic hiccups were overcome with the elan born of professional skill and maturity.

Underway on Nuclear Power The late 1980s saw an epochal event occur in the Navy’s history. In perhaps a global first, a Charlie I (NATO designation) class SSN was leased from the erstwhile Soviet Union for three years. Commissioned in the Navy as INS Chakra, the submarine was operated extensively till her return in 1991 and provided a valuable insight into the complexities of nuclear submarining. The Transfer also underscored the depth of the strategic relationship between the erstwhile Soviet Union and India.

Onwards to the New Millenium In the closing years of the last millennium,

the submarine arm got a tremendous two fold boost which set the stage for the 21st century. The first was the induction of a Tube Launched Missile (TLM) on INS Sindhushastra, the tenth Kilo (Sindhughosh) class submarine. This was a very potent force multiplier and greatly enhanced SSK’s tactical options by providing a lethal attack capability at stand-off ranges. The second was the Cabinet approval for a 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan which was the blueprint for a potent and contemporary SSK capability in the first half of the 21st century.

The New Millenium The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum as the Global War on Terror was unleashed by the US led alliance. Tomahawk missiles delivered

overt and covert nuclear powers. Of these, at least four view nuclear weapons as an existential necessity and some of these have an unhealthy non-proliferation record thus aiding and abetting this alarming state of affairs. Development of nuclear weapon capability will necessitate the presence of effective delivery platforms of which submarines remain the most potent. The submarine is and will also remain the most effective second strike platform of the nuclear triad.

At the operational and tactical level, with the focus of operations shifting towards the littoral, sea denial will become the raison d’etre of many regional navies who do not aspire or cannot afford a sea control capability. The modern SSK submarine is a very sophisticated platform with its standoff weapons, advanced sensors and technological advancements such as Air Independent Propulsion. It is an extremely effective force multiplier and perhaps delivers

DSI

the most optimum ‘bang for the buck’ and as a deterrent to even a vastly superior force in the littoral maritime battle space.

The retro fitment of the TLM with a land attack capability on a number of Sindhughosh class submarines has greatly boosted the Navy’ firepower and littoral warfare capability and the ability to deliver lethal attacks from standoff ranges.

Doctrinal aspects of Submarines in the Maritime Battlespace The Indian Maritime Doctrine and the strategy document of 2009 broadly outline the contours of the future navy given our maritime interests and geostrategic imperatives. The importance of the submarine is highlighted in the three dimensional battle space in developing a non-provocative strategic capability and also mentions the suitability of submarines in littoral warfare with their ability to hit the enemy deep inland and thus influence the overall outcome of battle.

The classic concepts of sea control and sea denial are mutually complementary and a potent sub surface element is integral to them. Submarines also provide a certain threshold of capability to make the cost of aggression sufficiently high for a superior aggressor thus providing a degree of deterrence, aided by their relative invulnerability to detection.

Future Force Development The Indian Navy’s force development is aimed towards an optimum force capable of delivering maximum effect across the entire spectrum of conflict. Submarine capability would therefore include the following:-.

High Speed & Long Endurance at sea.

Ability to deliver ordnance at stand off ranges.

Effective shallow water operations Second Strike ISR capable Clandestine and Special Operations Effective maritime manoeuvre and speedy redeployment Over-the-Horizon Targeting The 30 Year Plan In 1999, a comprehensive 30 Year Plan

35

05/11/12 10:57 AM

SUB STORY

Resurgence of the Arm 1986-1995 By the late 70’s the need to augment and modernize the submarine force had become evident. After a great deal of deliberation interspersed by political considerations, a contract was inked with M/s HDW Germany for a 1500 ton bespoke variant of the Type 209 design. In agreement with the avowed aim of developing an indigenous capability, this project for four conventional submarines (SSK) included the outright purchase of two from the OEM and the licensed production of two at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), Mumbai. The first two submarines of the Shishumar class, as it was called, were commissioned within months of each other in 1986. These stateof-the-art submarines offered the best SSK technology the West had to offer. While the first two submarines were being built at Kiel in Germany, personnel from MDL Mumbai were being trained simultaneously to undertake indigenous construction. This entire project was extremely well conceived and was to be the springboard to launch India’s nascent shipbuilding industry into the complex and exclusive club of submarine construction. This transfer of technology arrangement should have led to a series production of submarines. However due to narrow political considerations including allegations of bribes having been paid, HDW was blacklisted and no further submarines were constructed.

A colossal investment in resources, manpower and money was wasted at the altar of political ambition and the country

The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum.

was that much the poorer. Ironically though, nobody in India was indicted for receiving a bribe.

Almost simultaneously, a contract was concluded with the Soviet Union to acquire eight Kilo class submarines. These were the latest SSKs in the Soviet inventory and India received the first export variant. These eight submarines known as the Sindhughosh class (named after the lead submarine) was commissioned in quick succession between 1986 and 1991.

In 1992, with the commissioning of INS Shalki, India joined a select group of nations possessing a submarine construction capability. INS Shankul, the fourth of the Shishumar class and the second indigenously built submarine joined the ranks in 1994.

The IN’s submarine force level stood at an all-time high of twenty although the earlier Foxtrots had begun getting long in the teeth.

The institutional strength of the young submarine arm was evident in the rapidity

34

Submarine 2nd.indd 34-35

by American SSNs highlighted the efficacy of underwater capability in achieving joint effect and shaping the outcome on land.

In the decade since, the underwater battle space has assumed even greater strategic, operational and tactical significance. Bilateral and multilateral flashpoints continue to flare up and delineation of maritime boundaries has become increasingly contentious. More navies are now investing in submarines.

This region is home to six of the world’s ten

Picture taken 07 April 2003 shows a U31 submarine made by the world’s leading maker of nonnuclear submarines German HDW (Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft) in Kiel, northern Germany

AFP

This included a 30 metre tower called the “Tower of Confidence” to train submariners in effecting an escape from a sunken submarine. Soon, all submarine training was being conducted in India and became the benchmark for training excellence in the Indian Navy.

Maintenance was accorded due priority and the Naval dockyards in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam soon set up facilities to take up various levels of submarine refits including medium refits. Capacity constraints, however, at the dockyards that necessitated submarines being sent to USSR for their medium refits.

OCTOBER 2012

by which training and maintenance facilities for these new classes were established while new landmarks were being achieved at sea.

Long deployments became de-rigeur and logistic hiccups were overcome with the elan born of professional skill and maturity.

Underway on Nuclear Power The late 1980s saw an epochal event occur in the Navy’s history. In perhaps a global first, a Charlie I (NATO designation) class SSN was leased from the erstwhile Soviet Union for three years. Commissioned in the Navy as INS Chakra, the submarine was operated extensively till her return in 1991 and provided a valuable insight into the complexities of nuclear submarining. The Transfer also underscored the depth of the strategic relationship between the erstwhile Soviet Union and India.

Onwards to the New Millenium In the closing years of the last millennium,

the submarine arm got a tremendous two fold boost which set the stage for the 21st century. The first was the induction of a Tube Launched Missile (TLM) on INS Sindhushastra, the tenth Kilo (Sindhughosh) class submarine. This was a very potent force multiplier and greatly enhanced SSK’s tactical options by providing a lethal attack capability at stand-off ranges. The second was the Cabinet approval for a 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan which was the blueprint for a potent and contemporary SSK capability in the first half of the 21st century.

The New Millenium The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum as the Global War on Terror was unleashed by the US led alliance. Tomahawk missiles delivered

overt and covert nuclear powers. Of these, at least four view nuclear weapons as an existential necessity and some of these have an unhealthy non-proliferation record thus aiding and abetting this alarming state of affairs. Development of nuclear weapon capability will necessitate the presence of effective delivery platforms of which submarines remain the most potent. The submarine is and will also remain the most effective second strike platform of the nuclear triad.

At the operational and tactical level, with the focus of operations shifting towards the littoral, sea denial will become the raison d’etre of many regional navies who do not aspire or cannot afford a sea control capability. The modern SSK submarine is a very sophisticated platform with its standoff weapons, advanced sensors and technological advancements such as Air Independent Propulsion. It is an extremely effective force multiplier and perhaps delivers

DSI

the most optimum ‘bang for the buck’ and as a deterrent to even a vastly superior force in the littoral maritime battle space.

The retro fitment of the TLM with a land attack capability on a number of Sindhughosh class submarines has greatly boosted the Navy’ firepower and littoral warfare capability and the ability to deliver lethal attacks from standoff ranges.

Doctrinal aspects of Submarines in the Maritime Battlespace The Indian Maritime Doctrine and the strategy document of 2009 broadly outline the contours of the future navy given our maritime interests and geostrategic imperatives. The importance of the submarine is highlighted in the three dimensional battle space in developing a non-provocative strategic capability and also mentions the suitability of submarines in littoral warfare with their ability to hit the enemy deep inland and thus influence the overall outcome of battle.

The classic concepts of sea control and sea denial are mutually complementary and a potent sub surface element is integral to them. Submarines also provide a certain threshold of capability to make the cost of aggression sufficiently high for a superior aggressor thus providing a degree of deterrence, aided by their relative invulnerability to detection.

Future Force Development The Indian Navy’s force development is aimed towards an optimum force capable of delivering maximum effect across the entire spectrum of conflict. Submarine capability would therefore include the following:-.

High Speed & Long Endurance at sea.

Ability to deliver ordnance at stand off ranges.

Effective shallow water operations Second Strike ISR capable Clandestine and Special Operations Effective maritime manoeuvre and speedy redeployment Over-the-Horizon Targeting The 30 Year Plan In 1999, a comprehensive 30 Year Plan

35

05/11/12 10:57 AM

SUB STORY

OCTOBER 2012

for Indigenous Submarine Construction was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (the country’s apex decision making body on security matters). This plan envisaged the development of two production lines on which six submarines apiece would be built in collaboration with a foreign submarine builder while the navy would, in the meantime, develop an indigenous submarine design. This would then be built on these two production lines so that by 2030, the Navy would have about 20 or so modern conventional submarines and would be able to maintain this desired force level for the foreseeable future.

AFP

The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR). Within two years, three more similar submarines followed.

as INS Chakra, is important because it not only provides the much needed SSN capability but is also invaluable in understanding the operational, maintenance and logistic complexities of operating such a technologically sophisticated platform. It is likely that its deployment would have to conform to various international restrictive regimes in force but would still add a

36

Submarine 2nd.indd 36-37

An Indian Kilo class submarine is anchored off the shore of the Gateway of India.

AFP

Whither the Arm Notwithstanding the excitement generated by the Arihant and the Chakra and the current decade promising to provide a considerable capability enhancement in the navy’s subsurface capability reminiscent of the expansion in the 1980s, the current state of the submarine arm is a major cause for concern.

In the next few years the navy would operationalize its nuclear submarine force which is an absolute necessity given the prevailing and emerging regional geopolitical environment. The Arihant will form the strategic vanguard as the seaborneleg of the nuclear triad and provide an invulnerable second strike capability which in our case is essential given our commitment to ‘No-First-Use’. Media reports indicate that up to at least two more of these submarines are already on the anvil and ideally another two should follow to achieve continuous deterrence at sea.However, far too much hype has been generated around the Arihant.

We are already claiming membership of the exclusive nuclear submarine club based on a leased SSN and a SSBN that is yet to go to sea.Building a nuclear submarine is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement, but as the first ever submarine of its kind built in India, she will take a while to overcome her teething troubles which are inevitable and it would take at least three years for her to be deployed as a credible strategic deterrent after she puts to sea for the first time.

The leasing of the Akula II, commissioned

substantial punch to the navy’s muscle.

However, even if we were to lease more such submarines, it would not address our requirement of a fully operational SSN force for which indigenous construction would be a pre-requisite. It is also unlikely that leasing of such sophisticated technology from another nation would come without any strings attached. There is no capability within the country to build SSNs and needs to be expeditiously developed. It therefore seems unlikely that any more indigenous SSBNs or SSNs will be added in this decade and we should therefore be a little circumspect in evaluating our own capability.

German sailors stand to attention during the inauguration of the type 212 U-33 submarine at the HDW shipyard in Kiel.

HDW is the first shipyard in the world to offer a fuel cell propulsion system ready for series production.

Conventional Submarines.

Notwithstanding the induction of SSNs and SSBNs, it is the SSK which will continue to be the navy’s most effective weapon platform against a host of likely operational and tactical scenarios in our area of interest in the foreseeable future.

The present force level of 14 submarines is getting older by the day and is a cause for grave concern. Even though the submarines have undergone extensive mid-life updates and a fair number have been retrofitted with the TLM, thus packing a powerful punch, it will become increasingly difficult to keep them fit for frontline deployment in adequate numbers. Submarine acquisition in India has always been in fits-and-starts which have led to issues with maintenance, refits, manning and operations.

To obviate this and to ensure a phased replacement and augmentation programme, the 30 Year Plan was promulgated and though still quoted, the extent to which it is being followed both in letter and spirit is debatable. The first part of the plan, designated Project 75 is currently underway with six submarines of the French Scorpene class under construction at MDL, Mumbai. The first of these is likely to be commissioned in 2015 with each of the remaining five following about one year apart. Therefore by the time the Project 75 programme is completed in 2020 ( an optimistic assessment), ten of the older submarines would be over 30 years old and even the last of the present lot over 20 years old. The effect of this on our undersea

DSI

warfare capability in the emerging regional maritime scenario should ring a bell across the country’s security establishment.

While the delay in Project 75 was perhaps unavoidable due to a host of reasons, the delay in progressing the second phase of the 30 Year plan viz., Project 75(I) should be of utmost concern to the navy. A delay of over two years in issuing the RFP is baffling to say the very least. Considering that there are only four classes of submarines to choose from and the capabilities of all are known, selecting the right one for our requirements surely cannot be all that difficult. Even if the RFP is issued by the end of 2012, it would take at least ten years for the first submarine to enter service leading to a cascading effect on our depleting force levels. In the interim, to arrest the depletion in force levels and augment capability, outright purchase of two of these six submarines is also being considered which would alleviate the situation marginally.

The final phase of the plan, which envisages construction of an indigenous design on each of these two production lines, is in the design phase at present but is unlikely to commence before the end of this decade or till the Project 75(I) is well underway. The 30 year plan is already running at least seven years behind schedule and slipping further by the day. Naval acquisitions are capital-intensive, take time to build and integrate fully with existing platforms in a fully worked-up combat environment. It is thus important that a holistic view is taken of submarine force development to ensure a credible number of modern, well armed, state-of-the-art submarines at all times.

Conclusion The Indian Navy, by virtue of its size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean is going is going to play an increasingly important role. The maritime posture will be a major determinant in the national security construct.

This will necessitate a robust Indian naval presence, of which submarines will constitute a significant element. The Indian Navy has articulated a force level of 160 ships including three aircraft carriers and a proportional number of major surface combatants. DSI

37

05/11/12 10:57 AM

SUB STORY

OCTOBER 2012

for Indigenous Submarine Construction was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (the country’s apex decision making body on security matters). This plan envisaged the development of two production lines on which six submarines apiece would be built in collaboration with a foreign submarine builder while the navy would, in the meantime, develop an indigenous submarine design. This would then be built on these two production lines so that by 2030, the Navy would have about 20 or so modern conventional submarines and would be able to maintain this desired force level for the foreseeable future.

AFP

The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR). Within two years, three more similar submarines followed.

as INS Chakra, is important because it not only provides the much needed SSN capability but is also invaluable in understanding the operational, maintenance and logistic complexities of operating such a technologically sophisticated platform. It is likely that its deployment would have to conform to various international restrictive regimes in force but would still add a

36

Submarine 2nd.indd 36-37

An Indian Kilo class submarine is anchored off the shore of the Gateway of India.

AFP

Whither the Arm Notwithstanding the excitement generated by the Arihant and the Chakra and the current decade promising to provide a considerable capability enhancement in the navy’s subsurface capability reminiscent of the expansion in the 1980s, the current state of the submarine arm is a major cause for concern.

In the next few years the navy would operationalize its nuclear submarine force which is an absolute necessity given the prevailing and emerging regional geopolitical environment. The Arihant will form the strategic vanguard as the seaborneleg of the nuclear triad and provide an invulnerable second strike capability which in our case is essential given our commitment to ‘No-First-Use’. Media reports indicate that up to at least two more of these submarines are already on the anvil and ideally another two should follow to achieve continuous deterrence at sea.However, far too much hype has been generated around the Arihant.

We are already claiming membership of the exclusive nuclear submarine club based on a leased SSN and a SSBN that is yet to go to sea.Building a nuclear submarine is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement, but as the first ever submarine of its kind built in India, she will take a while to overcome her teething troubles which are inevitable and it would take at least three years for her to be deployed as a credible strategic deterrent after she puts to sea for the first time.

The leasing of the Akula II, commissioned

substantial punch to the navy’s muscle.

However, even if we were to lease more such submarines, it would not address our requirement of a fully operational SSN force for which indigenous construction would be a pre-requisite. It is also unlikely that leasing of such sophisticated technology from another nation would come without any strings attached. There is no capability within the country to build SSNs and needs to be expeditiously developed. It therefore seems unlikely that any more indigenous SSBNs or SSNs will be added in this decade and we should therefore be a little circumspect in evaluating our own capability.

German sailors stand to attention during the inauguration of the type 212 U-33 submarine at the HDW shipyard in Kiel.

HDW is the first shipyard in the world to offer a fuel cell propulsion system ready for series production.

Conventional Submarines.

Notwithstanding the induction of SSNs and SSBNs, it is the SSK which will continue to be the navy’s most effective weapon platform against a host of likely operational and tactical scenarios in our area of interest in the foreseeable future.

The present force level of 14 submarines is getting older by the day and is a cause for grave concern. Even though the submarines have undergone extensive mid-life updates and a fair number have been retrofitted with the TLM, thus packing a powerful punch, it will become increasingly difficult to keep them fit for frontline deployment in adequate numbers. Submarine acquisition in India has always been in fits-and-starts which have led to issues with maintenance, refits, manning and operations.

To obviate this and to ensure a phased replacement and augmentation programme, the 30 Year Plan was promulgated and though still quoted, the extent to which it is being followed both in letter and spirit is debatable. The first part of the plan, designated Project 75 is currently underway with six submarines of the French Scorpene class under construction at MDL, Mumbai. The first of these is likely to be commissioned in 2015 with each of the remaining five following about one year apart. Therefore by the time the Project 75 programme is completed in 2020 ( an optimistic assessment), ten of the older submarines would be over 30 years old and even the last of the present lot over 20 years old. The effect of this on our undersea

DSI

warfare capability in the emerging regional maritime scenario should ring a bell across the country’s security establishment.

While the delay in Project 75 was perhaps unavoidable due to a host of reasons, the delay in progressing the second phase of the 30 Year plan viz., Project 75(I) should be of utmost concern to the navy. A delay of over two years in issuing the RFP is baffling to say the very least. Considering that there are only four classes of submarines to choose from and the capabilities of all are known, selecting the right one for our requirements surely cannot be all that difficult. Even if the RFP is issued by the end of 2012, it would take at least ten years for the first submarine to enter service leading to a cascading effect on our depleting force levels. In the interim, to arrest the depletion in force levels and augment capability, outright purchase of two of these six submarines is also being considered which would alleviate the situation marginally.

The final phase of the plan, which envisages construction of an indigenous design on each of these two production lines, is in the design phase at present but is unlikely to commence before the end of this decade or till the Project 75(I) is well underway. The 30 year plan is already running at least seven years behind schedule and slipping further by the day. Naval acquisitions are capital-intensive, take time to build and integrate fully with existing platforms in a fully worked-up combat environment. It is thus important that a holistic view is taken of submarine force development to ensure a credible number of modern, well armed, state-of-the-art submarines at all times.

Conclusion The Indian Navy, by virtue of its size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean is going is going to play an increasingly important role. The maritime posture will be a major determinant in the national security construct.

This will necessitate a robust Indian naval presence, of which submarines will constitute a significant element. The Indian Navy has articulated a force level of 160 ships including three aircraft carriers and a proportional number of major surface combatants. DSI

37

05/11/12 10:57 AM

LCC FOR MATERIÉL

OCTOBER 2012

DSI

India recently contracted for Pilatus trainer was the first contract under the Life Cycle costing system

Amit Cowshish

KEY POINTS

Life-Cycle Costing (LCC) is not a new phenomenon, being prevalent since 1960s, though adopted in India only recently.

Calculating LCC is a collaborative exercise between the buyer and the seller.

The real test the Indian procurers will face when a seller’s base price will be higher than others, though in terms of LCC, the price will prove to be the lowest.

LIFE CYCLE COSTING OF DEFENCE MATERIAL 38

Lifecycle Costing 2nd.indd 38-39

Life-cycle Costing was a concept first adopted by the Americans in the 1960s. The system of pricing products and services on the basis of their operations and maintenance cost can be adapted across the board; in terms of a hospital or a school or even street-lighting, as has been shown by the author of this article

PILATUS

L

ife-cycle Costing (LCC) is the technique used for estimating the total cost of acquiring, maintaining and operating an asset over its entire lifetime. It is also variously referred as the whole-life cost, total cost of ownership, or simply, cradle to grave or womb to tomb cost. The cost incurred on operation and maintenance of an asset can be several times more than the cost of acquiring or developing it. According to the Life Cycle Costing Guideline of the New South Wales Treasury, the operating costs of a hospital consume an equivalent of the capital cost every two to three years and can continue to do so for forty years or more.

Similarly, the operating costs of a school can consume the equivalent of its capital cost every four years and remain in service for a century. The military assets, ranging from tanks, aircrafts, ships and submarines to missiles and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems are no different. As it is, the initial cost of acquisition of these assets is huge but the cost of operating and maintaining them could be substantially higher over their entire life-cycle, generally ranging from thirty to forty years, with or without midlife upgrades. This signifies its impact on

39

05/11/12 11:02 AM

LCC FOR MATERIÉL

OCTOBER 2012

DSI

India recently contracted for Pilatus trainer was the first contract under the Life Cycle costing system

Amit Cowshish

KEY POINTS

Life-Cycle Costing (LCC) is not a new phenomenon, being prevalent since 1960s, though adopted in India only recently.

Calculating LCC is a collaborative exercise between the buyer and the seller.

The real test the Indian procurers will face when a seller’s base price will be higher than others, though in terms of LCC, the price will prove to be the lowest.

LIFE CYCLE COSTING OF DEFENCE MATERIAL 38

Lifecycle Costing 2nd.indd 38-39

Life-cycle Costing was a concept first adopted by the Americans in the 1960s. The system of pricing products and services on the basis of their operations and maintenance cost can be adapted across the board; in terms of a hospital or a school or even street-lighting, as has been shown by the author of this article

PILATUS

L

ife-cycle Costing (LCC) is the technique used for estimating the total cost of acquiring, maintaining and operating an asset over its entire lifetime. It is also variously referred as the whole-life cost, total cost of ownership, or simply, cradle to grave or womb to tomb cost. The cost incurred on operation and maintenance of an asset can be several times more than the cost of acquiring or developing it. According to the Life Cycle Costing Guideline of the New South Wales Treasury, the operating costs of a hospital consume an equivalent of the capital cost every two to three years and can continue to do so for forty years or more.

Similarly, the operating costs of a school can consume the equivalent of its capital cost every four years and remain in service for a century. The military assets, ranging from tanks, aircrafts, ships and submarines to missiles and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems are no different. As it is, the initial cost of acquisition of these assets is huge but the cost of operating and maintaining them could be substantially higher over their entire life-cycle, generally ranging from thirty to forty years, with or without midlife upgrades. This signifies its impact on

39

05/11/12 11:02 AM

LCC FOR MATERIÉL of acquiring or developing an asset. In some LCC models, the salvage value is subtracted from the sum of direct and indirect costs to arrive at the life-cycle cost. Direct cost of acquisition is, but not limited to, the capital cost of the asset.

If an asset is to be bought from a foreign source, the country buying the asset may also like to acquire the manufacturing and maintenance technologies along with related documentation and set up the repair facility so that it does not continue to be dependent on the foreign source. It may decide to train its personnel initially by sending them to the seller’s premises and then within the country through simulators. Normally, spares are also procured for two to five years along with induction of a asset based on the recommendation of the manufacturer.

The cost of all these elements also forms a part of the direct cost. The composition of the direct cost could vary from one case to another, depending on the nature of the asset and the requirement of the buyer.

The indirect costs include the cost of energy required for operating the asset, spares that would be required in future for repairs and periodic overhauls, as also any other cost attributing to the acquisition. The cost of manpower required for operating an asset is also an important consideration because if it requires lesser manpower to operate it would obviously be more economical than an asset which requires more manpower.

The direct and indirect cost components enumerated above are only indicative. The basic principle is that all those deliverable elements for which the contract is to be signed immediately after forms a part of the direct cost, while all other expenditure, attributable to the acquisition, but likely to be incurred in future while exploiting the asset forms part of the indirect cost. Incidentally, all indirect costs may not be payable to the successful bidder. The manpower cost and the cost of energy consumed by the asset would fall in this category.

Adding up the direct and indirect costs sounds simple but in practice working out the life-cycle cost at each stage presents a different set of complexities. A report prepared by the Auditor General of Australia in 1997-98 revealed that while

40

Lifecycle Costing 2nd.indd 40-41

A giant billboard of a Swedish Saab JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft display at the biennial aero show 2011, Bengaluru

AFP

present and future budgetary support by the government. For optimal use of the scarce financial resources, it makes sense to decide about the acquisition or development of asset with a view the life-cycle cost.

The LCC techniques could be applied in diverse fields, ranging from power generation to construction of schools and hospitals. In the German city of Hamburg, for example, substitution of two old incandescent bulbs with one energy efficient bulb in 300 public buildings reduced the annual electricity consumption by approximately 4.5 million KWh, which is equivalent of approximately 2,700 tonnes of CO2 emissions and an annual saving of Euro 225,000 in electricity bills, assuming a price of 5 cents per KWh. This is a simple example of the application of LCC in a nondefence area. While the potential of LCC as a tool for making cost-effective choices in a wide variety of areas is undeniable, its application in the field of defence purchases has been somewhat limited.

The idea originated in the US Department of Defence in 1960s and has since then been adopted by various countries, such as the UK and Australia. The NATO has a Code of Practice for Life Cycle Costing which is a guide for using the life-cycle costing methods and models. Though in existence for close to half-a-century with inexorable laws and universally applicable methodology, LCC has not developed into a science. Consequently, innumerable LCC models have been developed over the years to meet the specific requirements, mainly in countries like Australia, UK and the USA. What is common among all these models is the objective of estimating the total cost of ownership of the assets over their entire life-cycle. The life of an asset could broadly be divided into three stages: the conceptual stage, acquisition or developmental stage and the in-service management stage. It requires more than a cursory interest in the subject and nodding acquaintance with statistics and analytical methods to understand how LCC techniques are applied to work out the total cost of ownership at these different stages.

In a broad sense, life-cycle cost is the sum total of the direct and indirect costs

OCTOBER 2012

In a broad sense, lifecycle cost is the sum total of the direct and indirect costs of acquiring or developing an asset. In some LCC models, the salvage value is subtracted from the sum of direct and indirect costs

the policy on LCC had been in existence for quite some time, there was little top-level enforcement or encouragement for the use of LCC throughout the acquisition life-cycle.

The report also said that LCC had been used mostly in relation to tender-selection and not at other stages. The report may be dated

but it continues to reflect the present day reality. However, it is perhaps not the lack of enforcement or encouragement from the top level but the complexity of LCC that has prevented the technique from being used as widely as it should have been.

Let us look at some of the complexities that could arise while applying LCC technique for comparison of commercial offers and selection of the most costeffective offer. In this case, the first step would be to develop a life-cycle model, convert it into a format for eliciting the requisite information and data and include the format in the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the bidders to quote separately for each cost component that would go into working out of the total life-cycle cost of their product after the tenders are opened.

This is a complex exercise. It has to be ensured by those responsible for drawing up the format that no cost component is left out. An error committed at this stage may cause insurmountable difficulty

while calculating the life-cycle cost after the tenders are opened as no additional information or commercial offer can be sought from the bidders at that stage.

The second complexity could arise if the vendors do not provide full information or provide it in a different manner from the one in which it was sought. For example, if fifty air crafts are to be bought, it cannot be delivered in one year. So the delivery of the aircrafts would be staggered over several years. In this case, the bidders could be asked to quote one firm and fixed figure for each aircraft, irrespective of the date of delivery. Therefore, the bidder will have to anticipate the escalation in the cost of the air crafts because of increase in labour and material cost, and other overheads, over the entire delivery period to work out an average unit price valid for each aircraft, irrespective of when it is delivered. The bidder may also have to anticipate the taxes and duties levied on him in his own country during the entire period of the contract if the

DSI

buyer does not undertake the responsibility of reimbursing these expenses. For a buyer this would naturally be the ideal mode of seeking the commercial offer because it would be fixed, but for the seller this is a risky proposition as the actual escalation in costs and taxes may be more than what he had anticipated while working out the per unit price. Therefore, even when the bidder is asked to quote a price, he may choose to hedge his bets and respond by quoting a base price and indicating inflation indices that would be used to determine the cost of air crafts at the time of delivery. This would shift the responsibility of working out the total cost of air crafts on the buyer, who will have to work out the price of each aircraft as per the delivery schedule and then discount the cost so arrived at to determine the total net present value of all the air crafts and other deliveries for the purpose of comparison with other offers. This exercise may have to be carried out in respect of all other cost components, in respect of which only the base price is quoted by the bidder.

Since data related to inflation is available for the past period, the future inflationary trend would need to be extrapolated by taking the average. How far back one should go and what method should be used to work out the averages? These are hard decisions, which add to the complexity of life-cycle costing.

The use of inflation creates an uncertainty in life-cycle costing where the payments, staggered over several years, are related to the escalation formula. These indices are subject to change in regard to the base year, grouping of items and the importance assigned to each item in a group. Since the bidders are from different countries, such changes by one country could upset the entire calculus of the life-cycle cost.

There are complexities related to the indirect costs also. Take, for example, the cost of fuel consumption of an aircraft or periodic overhaul of its engines. The bidders cannot quote the actual cost of fuel consumption over the entire life of the aircraft. At best, they could quote the rate of consumption of fuel. They cannot also quote the actual cost of overhauling the engines during its entire life-cycle.

So, they would indicate in their response

41

05/11/12 11:02 AM

LCC FOR MATERIÉL of acquiring or developing an asset. In some LCC models, the salvage value is subtracted from the sum of direct and indirect costs to arrive at the life-cycle cost. Direct cost of acquisition is, but not limited to, the capital cost of the asset.

If an asset is to be bought from a foreign source, the country buying the asset may also like to acquire the manufacturing and maintenance technologies along with related documentation and set up the repair facility so that it does not continue to be dependent on the foreign source. It may decide to train its personnel initially by sending them to the seller’s premises and then within the country through simulators. Normally, spares are also procured for two to five years along with induction of a asset based on the recommendation of the manufacturer.

The cost of all these elements also forms a part of the direct cost. The composition of the direct cost could vary from one case to another, depending on the nature of the asset and the requirement of the buyer.

The indirect costs include the cost of energy required for operating the asset, spares that would be required in future for repairs and periodic overhauls, as also any other cost attributing to the acquisition. The cost of manpower required for operating an asset is also an important consideration because if it requires lesser manpower to operate it would obviously be more economical than an asset which requires more manpower.

The direct and indirect cost components enumerated above are only indicative. The basic principle is that all those deliverable elements for which the contract is to be signed immediately after forms a part of the direct cost, while all other expenditure, attributable to the acquisition, but likely to be incurred in future while exploiting the asset forms part of the indirect cost. Incidentally, all indirect costs may not be payable to the successful bidder. The manpower cost and the cost of energy consumed by the asset would fall in this category.

Adding up the direct and indirect costs sounds simple but in practice working out the life-cycle cost at each stage presents a different set of complexities. A report prepared by the Auditor General of Australia in 1997-98 revealed that while

40

Lifecycle Costing 2nd.indd 40-41

A giant billboard of a Swedish Saab JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft display at the biennial aero show 2011, Bengaluru

AFP

present and future budgetary support by the government. For optimal use of the scarce financial resources, it makes sense to decide about the acquisition or development of asset with a view the life-cycle cost.

The LCC techniques could be applied in diverse fields, ranging from power generation to construction of schools and hospitals. In the German city of Hamburg, for example, substitution of two old incandescent bulbs with one energy efficient bulb in 300 public buildings reduced the annual electricity consumption by approximately 4.5 million KWh, which is equivalent of approximately 2,700 tonnes of CO2 emissions and an annual saving of Euro 225,000 in electricity bills, assuming a price of 5 cents per KWh. This is a simple example of the application of LCC in a nondefence area. While the potential of LCC as a tool for making cost-effective choices in a wide variety of areas is undeniable, its application in the field of defence purchases has been somewhat limited.

The idea originated in the US Department of Defence in 1960s and has since then been adopted by various countries, such as the UK and Australia. The NATO has a Code of Practice for Life Cycle Costing which is a guide for using the life-cycle costing methods and models. Though in existence for close to half-a-century with inexorable laws and universally applicable methodology, LCC has not developed into a science. Consequently, innumerable LCC models have been developed over the years to meet the specific requirements, mainly in countries like Australia, UK and the USA. What is common among all these models is the objective of estimating the total cost of ownership of the assets over their entire life-cycle. The life of an asset could broadly be divided into three stages: the conceptual stage, acquisition or developmental stage and the in-service management stage. It requires more than a cursory interest in the subject and nodding acquaintance with statistics and analytical methods to understand how LCC techniques are applied to work out the total cost of ownership at these different stages.

In a broad sense, life-cycle cost is the sum total of the direct and indirect costs

OCTOBER 2012

In a broad sense, lifecycle cost is the sum total of the direct and indirect costs of acquiring or developing an asset. In some LCC models, the salvage value is subtracted from the sum of direct and indirect costs

the policy on LCC had been in existence for quite some time, there was little top-level enforcement or encouragement for the use of LCC throughout the acquisition life-cycle.

The report also said that LCC had been used mostly in relation to tender-selection and not at other stages. The report may be dated

but it continues to reflect the present day reality. However, it is perhaps not the lack of enforcement or encouragement from the top level but the complexity of LCC that has prevented the technique from being used as widely as it should have been.

Let us look at some of the complexities that could arise while applying LCC technique for comparison of commercial offers and selection of the most costeffective offer. In this case, the first step would be to develop a life-cycle model, convert it into a format for eliciting the requisite information and data and include the format in the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the bidders to quote separately for each cost component that would go into working out of the total life-cycle cost of their product after the tenders are opened.

This is a complex exercise. It has to be ensured by those responsible for drawing up the format that no cost component is left out. An error committed at this stage may cause insurmountable difficulty

while calculating the life-cycle cost after the tenders are opened as no additional information or commercial offer can be sought from the bidders at that stage.

The second complexity could arise if the vendors do not provide full information or provide it in a different manner from the one in which it was sought. For example, if fifty air crafts are to be bought, it cannot be delivered in one year. So the delivery of the aircrafts would be staggered over several years. In this case, the bidders could be asked to quote one firm and fixed figure for each aircraft, irrespective of the date of delivery. Therefore, the bidder will have to anticipate the escalation in the cost of the air crafts because of increase in labour and material cost, and other overheads, over the entire delivery period to work out an average unit price valid for each aircraft, irrespective of when it is delivered. The bidder may also have to anticipate the taxes and duties levied on him in his own country during the entire period of the contract if the

DSI

buyer does not undertake the responsibility of reimbursing these expenses. For a buyer this would naturally be the ideal mode of seeking the commercial offer because it would be fixed, but for the seller this is a risky proposition as the actual escalation in costs and taxes may be more than what he had anticipated while working out the per unit price. Therefore, even when the bidder is asked to quote a price, he may choose to hedge his bets and respond by quoting a base price and indicating inflation indices that would be used to determine the cost of air crafts at the time of delivery. This would shift the responsibility of working out the total cost of air crafts on the buyer, who will have to work out the price of each aircraft as per the delivery schedule and then discount the cost so arrived at to determine the total net present value of all the air crafts and other deliveries for the purpose of comparison with other offers. This exercise may have to be carried out in respect of all other cost components, in respect of which only the base price is quoted by the bidder.

Since data related to inflation is available for the past period, the future inflationary trend would need to be extrapolated by taking the average. How far back one should go and what method should be used to work out the averages? These are hard decisions, which add to the complexity of life-cycle costing.

The use of inflation creates an uncertainty in life-cycle costing where the payments, staggered over several years, are related to the escalation formula. These indices are subject to change in regard to the base year, grouping of items and the importance assigned to each item in a group. Since the bidders are from different countries, such changes by one country could upset the entire calculus of the life-cycle cost.

There are complexities related to the indirect costs also. Take, for example, the cost of fuel consumption of an aircraft or periodic overhaul of its engines. The bidders cannot quote the actual cost of fuel consumption over the entire life of the aircraft. At best, they could quote the rate of consumption of fuel. They cannot also quote the actual cost of overhauling the engines during its entire life-cycle.

So, they would indicate in their response

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LCC FOR MATERIÉL

how often the engines would need to be overhauled. They would also indicate what would be the life of various sub-assemblies and other components, after which they would need to be replaced. All this has to be translated into money terms to arrive at the total indirect cost. The accuracy of the life-cycle cost would depend on the claims of the bidder regarding meantime between overhauls of the equipment and other data furnished by him.

The biggest problem associated with life-cycle costing is that the assertions of the manufacturers relating to the total technical life of the asset, its performance, and other LCC parameters, such as the frequency of overhauls and replacement of sub-assemblies, that have a bearing on the indirect costs, are not legally enforceable because these are non-deliverables. For example, the engine of an aircraft may have to be overhauled, repaired or replaced more frequently than what was taken into account while working out the life-cycle cost. Similarly, the requirement of spares in next ten to fifteen years, or the rate of consumption of energy, may turn out to be higher than what was taken into account.

These uncertainties cannot be covered through contracts, which is why there is now a shift towards performance based logistics.

To sum up, those responsible for life-cycle costing have to overcome the complexities mentioned above, which are only indicative, and convert the responses from the bidders

AFP

A Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft taking off with afterburner

into single figures in absolute terms. While doing so they may have to make assumptions or adopt methodologies not even indicated in the RFP. For example, if a bidder has not quoted a price against any particular item, they may have to assume that the cost of that item is subsumed in some other item for which the price has been quoted in the response to the RFP and hope that this assumption is correct. Thus, there are serious limitations in arriving at a reasonably accurate estimate of the life-

The use of inflation creates an uncertainty in life-cycle costing where the payments, staggered over several years, are related to the escalation formula.

These indices are subject to change in regard to the base year.

cycle cost that could sway the procurement decision. These limitations are further compounded by the inadequacy and quality of data required for LCC analysis. The inadequacy of expertise available in the departments that need to apply the LCC techniques is an important contributing factor. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are hardly any known instances of the procurement choice being made entirely on the basis of the total cost of ownership.

What then is the benefit of the LCC

analysis? Apart from the most obvious advantage in regard to selection of the most cost effective commercial offer, however nebulous it might be. A more realistic advantage of adopting the LCC approach is that it provides invaluable insight into future operational costs and budgetary requirements. If applied at the stage of developing a procurement proposal, LCC could help in deciding the most cost-effective options for design, operation and maintenance of the asset. It could even force a review of the qualitative requirements of the asset to be developed or procured. If applied at the in-service stage, it could result in substantial savings in operation and maintenance costs. How can this really happen in respect of a highly complex development or acquisition project or in-service management of assets is a moot question.

India started adopting LCC approach in defence only recently. The Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was perhaps the first RFP to invite offers on the LCC basis, though the distinction of the first deal finalized after due consideration of the LCC goes to the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA). A major handicap one faces while trying to understand the Indian approach to LCC in defence is the absence of a policy document or guidelines. The ministry of defence would do well to evolve policy guidelines on LCC. This will ensure that all those responsible for applying LCC are on the same page while processing a procurement proposal.

Be that as it may, it is encouraging that a beginning has been made by signing the BTA contract after taking into account the life-cycle cost. Fortuitously, in the case of the BTA, the Swiss company was lower, both in respect of the direct acquisition cost and the total cost of ownership, making it easier to take the final call. The real test of efficacy of the LCC approach would arise only when the decision makers are faced with a situation where the LCC considerations sway the odds in favour of a company which is not the lowest bidder with regard to the direct capital cost of DSI acquisition of the asset.

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13473_Armada & DSI_276x216_FAP.ai

1

10/30/12

8:18 PM

CHINDIA

OCTOBER 2012

DSI

INDIA AND CHINA : PEER COMPETITORS In an environment of decline of the lone Superpower. Chinaʼs rise is being watched with an unmatched intensity. The liberal democracies that consider the rest of the world almost uncivilised, want India to be the foil of the Chinese. Both are developing countries with thousands of year of civilisational history; both with the declared intent of lifting its millions of poor

Pinaki Bhattacharya

KEY POINTS

India and China has a current relationship of competition and cooperation The 1962 border war between the two countries kept the relationship frozen for almost two decades, till Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping broke the ice The iron tight control on the public discourse has loosened in China.

The people are increasingly voicing their opinion in public fora. They are also becoming determinants of China’s foreign policy

O

Chinese trooper at the Line of Actual Control

cooperative development of the Central Asian countries, to the platform of some developing country muscle-flexing through organisations like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

At the bilateral level, China is India’s largest trading partner, having displaced the USA a few years ago. A large number of joint working groups (JWG) operate on various issues of political and economic relationships. The most important is of course the JWG on boundaries dividing the two countries.

44

India and China 2nd.indd 44-45

AFP

n the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian border war – the lowest point of the bilateral relationship – when one tries to take a stock of the relationship, since 1962, the issue that emerges as prime is the effort of both countries to leave behind the acrimony and move ahead on issues of mutual interest.

Despite this engagement for the past 50 years, when the existing tension between the two countries have only progressively lessened, large sections of the population in India still believe that they cannot trust the Chinese. However, at the level of the government, the leadership in New Delhi considers China as a “peer competitor.”

That catches the reality in a concise expression of policy. The theme, when expanded, translates into a twin track of competition and cooperation. Small wonder, the two countries – now considered the current flavours of economic expansion – are members of various politicoeconomic groupings, which carry weight in the global discourse.

These joint memberships range from the initiatives like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), geared towards

The nettlesome problem of the McMahon Line, which China does not accept as a fair border demarcated by the British, is being dealt with almost by inches. There have been various occasions during the past two decades when the two countries have been on the edges of exchanging maps, they have eventually backed off from such positions.

So, the leaderships of the two countries have taken a path of pragmatism: let the JWG keep searching for common ground on the boundary issue, but the two countries will engage themselves on other issues of

common concern without waiting for a resolution of the vexing border issue.

A process of normalization, that had begun with the late Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing and his famous meeting with China’s then supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, and consolidated later by a visit in 1990s of then prime minister, PV Narasimha Rao, is continuing without too many glitches.

Though, there are occasional blips on the radar when the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) of China crosses what India considers to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC);

while the Indian Army too making their own forays across what the Chinese consider to be their territory.

But these conflicting notions about the respective boundaries are quickly resolved through border meetings at the local level, seldom requiring the intervention of the apex level.

Still, the USA and the Western block consider they can hedge against China by entangling India into various security-related arrangements: of note, is the latest US ‘pivot’ in the Asia-Pacific region where Washington

sees a role for India, thus ‘containing’ China’s rising influence in the region.

While, for India, the Asia-Pacific region does not fall in their area of strategic interest, as has been defined by many of the leaders, including that of successive Indian Navy chiefs. The recently retired navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma had marked it out to stretch from the Malacca Strait in the south-east to the Horn of Africa, in the west on the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. For China, Malacca Strait is crucial

45

05/11/12 11:04 AM

CHINDIA

OCTOBER 2012

DSI

INDIA AND CHINA : PEER COMPETITORS In an environment of decline of the lone Superpower. Chinaʼs rise is being watched with an unmatched intensity. The liberal democracies that consider the rest of the world almost uncivilised, want India to be the foil of the Chinese. Both are developing countries with thousands of year of civilisational history; both with the declared intent of lifting its millions of poor

Pinaki Bhattacharya

KEY POINTS

India and China has a current relationship of competition and cooperation The 1962 border war between the two countries kept the relationship frozen for almost two decades, till Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping broke the ice The iron tight control on the public discourse has loosened in China.

The people are increasingly voicing their opinion in public fora. They are also becoming determinants of China’s foreign policy

O

Chinese trooper at the Line of Actual Control

cooperative development of the Central Asian countries, to the platform of some developing country muscle-flexing through organisations like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

At the bilateral level, China is India’s largest trading partner, having displaced the USA a few years ago. A large number of joint working groups (JWG) operate on various issues of political and economic relationships. The most important is of course the JWG on boundaries dividing the two countries.

44

India and China 2nd.indd 44-45

AFP

n the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian border war – the lowest point of the bilateral relationship – when one tries to take a stock of the relationship, since 1962, the issue that emerges as prime is the effort of both countries to leave behind the acrimony and move ahead on issues of mutual interest.

Despite this engagement for the past 50 years, when the existing tension between the two countries have only progressively lessened, large sections of the population in India still believe that they cannot trust the Chinese. However, at the level of the government, the leadership in New Delhi considers China as a “peer competitor.”

That catches the reality in a concise expression of policy. The theme, when expanded, translates into a twin track of competition and cooperation. Small wonder, the two countries – now considered the current flavours of economic expansion – are members of various politicoeconomic groupings, which carry weight in the global discourse.

These joint memberships range from the initiatives like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), geared towards

The nettlesome problem of the McMahon Line, which China does not accept as a fair border demarcated by the British, is being dealt with almost by inches. There have been various occasions during the past two decades when the two countries have been on the edges of exchanging maps, they have eventually backed off from such positions.

So, the leaderships of the two countries have taken a path of pragmatism: let the JWG keep searching for common ground on the boundary issue, but the two countries will engage themselves on other issues of

common concern without waiting for a resolution of the vexing border issue.

A process of normalization, that had begun with the late Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing and his famous meeting with China’s then supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, and consolidated later by a visit in 1990s of then prime minister, PV Narasimha Rao, is continuing without too many glitches.

Though, there are occasional blips on the radar when the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) of China crosses what India considers to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC);

while the Indian Army too making their own forays across what the Chinese consider to be their territory.

But these conflicting notions about the respective boundaries are quickly resolved through border meetings at the local level, seldom requiring the intervention of the apex level.

Still, the USA and the Western block consider they can hedge against China by entangling India into various security-related arrangements: of note, is the latest US ‘pivot’ in the Asia-Pacific region where Washington

sees a role for India, thus ‘containing’ China’s rising influence in the region.

While, for India, the Asia-Pacific region does not fall in their area of strategic interest, as has been defined by many of the leaders, including that of successive Indian Navy chiefs. The recently retired navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma had marked it out to stretch from the Malacca Strait in the south-east to the Horn of Africa, in the west on the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. For China, Malacca Strait is crucial

45

05/11/12 11:04 AM

CHINDIA While, for India, the Asia-Pacific region does not fall in its area of strategic interest, as has been defined by many of the leaders, including that of successive Indian Navy chiefs

because through this narrow channel, 80 per cent of oil it imports pass through.

For the first time, PLAN (PLA-Navy) has ventured beyond the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and deployed in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations.

Chinese newspapers like the Global Times have declared that India should not consider the Indian Ocean to be its private waterbody, because the ocean carries its name.

But for India too, the heightened China competition, should make it imperative for New Delhi to study the changing internal dynamics of the Chinese socio-political scene.

Changes in the Chinese Political Discourse: A comparatively weaker regime of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao has given rise to a new phenomenon within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Central Government.

Two factions have emerged in the CCP, one comprised the elitists and the other, that of populists. During the rule of the Hu

AFP

Chinese President, Hu Jintao with Prime MInister. Dr Manmoihan Singh

government that is coming to an end, the former president and general secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin led the elitist group.

Hu himself with all his effort to harmonise the Chinese economic growth for reducing the income differentials and promote more equal distribution of wealth had been the vanguard of the socalled ‘populist’ faction. The premier of his government, Wen Jiabao, led a liberal charge for bringing in more democratic change in the polity. He advocated that line both inside, within the party forum and also outside, in the public space.

On the other hand, the Jiang elitists were against any kind of voting even within the party. They wanted the old system of nominations to remain in place.

Now with the impending 18th Party Congress, scheduled to be held in November, the Chinese topmost government and party hierarchy is slated to undergo virtually a complete overhaul. In the apex, Standing Committee of the Polit Bureau, seven to nine members are to be changed by new faces; in

the main Polit Bureau most of the 21 members will be retiring to be replaced by newer faces.

The politics of all these changes lie in the choices made by the CCP during its Fourth Plenum of the 17th Congress in 2009. The mantle of the new president and the general secretary of the government and the party respectively have devolved on Xi Jinping, called a ‘princeling’ because his father was a high functionary of the party during Mao Zhedong’s regime.

The premier of the government will be Li Keqiang, a former leading light of the Communist Youth League, which as an organisation is a party constituency of Hu Jintao. Li is also considered a protégé of the present president.

Now, both Xi and Li lead separate factions of the party that has led to the saying of ‘One Party, Two coalitions” – a sort of bipartisan politics that has a whiff of democratic norms seeping in a party and State that has been long dominated by individual strongmen.

Though not much is known about what the policies of the two will be; Xi being known as more a leftist than Li. The CCP is at the moment on a cusp of time when it could lead to its own dissolution or it could gain strength and continue to be a practitioner of ‘resilient authoritarianism.’

Cheng Li, the famous US-based Brookings Institution scholar has recently written that the control of the party on the people and institutions has become loose.

The growth of a Chinese middle class, non-existent even at the time of the Tienanmen Square massacre, have now grown into a sizable number by which they

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Chinese policeman and a tourist out side the main gate of Zhongnanhai

are asserting their rights. Those rights also include the ones about ‘free expression.’

Restrictions on that, on top of the prevalent corruption, within the Chinese governance structures, have congealed as issues for the new middle class to be militated about.

The increasing autonomy of the media is a sign of the times. David Shambaugh, director of the China policy programme of the George Washington University, even major sections of the PLA are demanding that they no longer wish to be a ‘party-army’ but ‘national army.’

This is a crucial development that needs to be handled deftly.

On top of this, are the issues of slowing economic growth, growing income disparities, and corruption. The latter is increasingly becoming the bane of governance in China. The totalitarian Chinese government is based on a notion of an efficient government that did not discriminate between its people.

But the case of Bo Xilai, who was at the edge of becoming a Standing Committee of the Polit Bureau member, the apex of decision-making pyramid, was caught along with his businesswoman wife, and charged.

While Bo was charged with corruption accusations, his wife was slapped with

Both Xi and Li lead separate factions of the party that has led to the saying of ʻOne Party, Two coalitions” – a sort of bipartisan politics that has a whiff of democratic norms seeping in a party and State which has been long dominated by individual strongmen.

the charge of murdering an English businessman, who was a close family friend and a business associate.

The case has the potential of opening the Pandora’s box of corruption at high places. Coming as it did just before the 18th Congress, where Bo would have been elected to the Standing Committee, could become

AFP

CHINDIA

an inquisition for those who transgressed the party’s line on the issue of corruption.

All these factors constitute a changing social discourse that was kept sterile for a long time by the party. But now, without an iconic leader, the social dialogues have emerged out of the closets and have become reflection of realities that exist. Hence, one can now find in China academics, criticising government politics, complaining about governmental corruption and issues of social order with significant freedom. This cuts very fine and close to the party’s biggest worry: mass scale social disorder.

The party government, in turn, seek to channelise the politics of the social elements into wide ranging ‘nationalism,’ that often target foreign entitities, which are considered inimical to Chinese interests. But with commercial media boom and the internet access to social media sites are making the middle and upper class Chinese a lot more activistic in their expressions of frustration.

This socio-political and economic milieu of China needs to be appreciated by the Indian decision-makers. The strategies of a China engagement should be formed, stemming from the subtle changes the East DSI Asian giant is undergoing.

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AF_An_LAAD_2013_21,6x27,6cm_INGLES_DSI.pdf 1 25/09/2012 11:55:51

DEFENCE BUZZ

DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

Electric propulsion for ‘green’ navy vessels The world's navies are going green: There is an increasing trend to warships and support vessels which are operationally dependable, financially efficient and which respect the environment in terms of emissions and fuel economy. To achieve these objectives naval ship designers rely more and more on integrated full electric propulsion and increasingly on hybrid propulsion systems built on a variety of prime movers such as diesel engines and gas turbines.

US E3 Sentry to be fitted with new IFF Telephonics Corporation’s, AN/UPX-40 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator, 40 in number, has been ordered by the US Air Force, to be integrated with E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System aircrafts, including installation kits, installation, and sustainment support.

The manufacturers of the IFF equipment, Griffon Corporation announced recently that it has been awarded a $60 million multi-year contract from the US Air Force Life Cycle Management Command (AFLCMC), Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

The Telephonics’ Family of Interrogators is the only IFF interrogators to achieve the US

AFP

Chem O2 for troop in combat A chemical O2PAK Oxygen Generator, made by the Combat Critical Care Corporation, provides armed forces the capability to provide oxygen, immediately at the point of contact, to battlefield casualties within seconds of injury, thereby increasing chances of survival and recovery in cases of life-threatening injury.

The O2PAK is a compact, lightweight, hand-held unit (9 inches/ 23 centimeter high, for 2.8 pounds/ 1.3 kilogram) and is small enough to be carried by every soldier in a standard military backpack. It is activated within seconds, delivering 99% pure oxygen at a flow-rate of 4 to 8 LPM for 20-25 minutes in any position (vertical, horizontal). The O2PAK TM is a single-use/disposable source of oxygen that can be very rapidly deployed and activated in the most challenging or stressful situations.

The O2PAK has been specifically designed to address field requirements and is qualified for use in hostile and inaccessible environments (extreme high/ low temperatures, pressure, humidity) as well as high altitudes (up 12 000 m/40,000 ft).

Extensive scientific research and development and testing has been done under a wide variety of operational conditions to prove safety and efficacy - these include medical, ballistic, blast and fire tests. The O2PAK™ has been cleared by the US FDA.

Department of Defence certification in all modes including MARK XII, Mode 5, Mode S, and Multi-channel ADS-B. The AN/UPX-40 provides the USAF AWACS aircraft with an unprecedented air surveillance capability in support of the integrated command and control battle management capability. The real-time air surveillance picture provides situational awareness of friendly, neutral and hostile activity, command and control of an area of responsibility, battle management of theater forces, all-altitude and all-weather surveillance of the battle space, and early warning of enemy actions during joint, allied, and coalition operations, a Telephonics spokesperson said.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

A radar manufacturer to showcase multi-mission and AESA radars RADA - specializing in avionics upgrades, data recording and management systems, inertial navigation, and radar solutions - will showcase its full range of Multi-Mission, AESA Radars which are software-defined and can assume numerous operational missions and enable advanced force and border protection. RADA’s CHR (Compact Hemispheric Radar) systems are designed for use on combat vehicles and short-range protection applications. The family includes the RPS-10 –radar sensor for Active Protection Systems (APS), and the RPS-15 – hostile fire management radar system for combat vehicles. MHR (Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radar) is a family of stationary and mobile radars designed for force and border protection applications. The family includes the RPS-40 radar system for hostile fire detection and management, the RPS42 for close air surveillance, and the RHS-44 for border intrusion management.

Day and night imagers keep vigil both at the national borders and within it Seraphim Optronics, a leader in electro-optic surveillance and security equipment, will present two new solutions.

The UGF (Ultimate Gap Filler), which includes the MUGI - Mini Unattended Ground Imager - integrated with a state-ofthe-art tactical Radar, provides the ultimate solution for geographical coverage gaps in border protection. The next generation Chameleon 2, with enhanced capabilities in communications and day-and-night camera, is an unattended persistent urban reconnaissance covert surveillance system blending in perfectly in a variety of urban environments. It gathers real-time visual Intelligence by remotely monitoring hostile target movements and supplying early warnings to troops, the company stated.

Danish Co. to supply additional radar systems for French frigates A Danish company, Terma, has been contracted to supply an additional eight SCANTER 2001 radar systems for the FREMM (French Fregate Europeenne Multi-Missions Program) frigates program.

In 2007-08, Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and DCNS selected Terma to supply the SCANTER 2001 Navigation and Surveillance Radar to be fitted on the frigates Beginning in early 2008, Terma had delivered two SCANTER 2001 radar systems in the newest version with 7' antennas and SCANTER Tracking Unit for the initial seven vessels of the FREMM Program. A follow-on contract was signed in July 2012 for the following four vessels.

One of the radar systems will be utilised primarily for navigation and surveillance, whereas the purpose with the other radar system is to guide helicopters, specifically when landing on the frigates

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AFP

AFP

DEFENCE BUZZ

Russian def min looked for excuses on delay in Gorshkov delivery The Russian Defence Minister, AE Serdyukov, came visiting New Delhi and signed protocols for co-development of various projects.

The minister also reassured AK Antony, the defence minister that all resources are being deployed to repair the Admiral Gorshkov, the accident-prone aircraft carrier being fabricated in the country. They also discussed the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft programme that is supposed to be co-developed by Russia and India.

Panetta sing paeans to US’s network building U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said 25 October the United States has a national security asset unique in the world: its defense alliances and security partnerships.

During a Pentagon press briefing with Joint Chiefs Chairman Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the secretary said those partner nations are essential to meeting the challenge of projecting power and maintaining presence in an era of decreasing resources, reported US American Forces News Service. “… A vital pillar of the new defense strategy that we released this year is the important work of developing and deepening ties to other nations,” he said. “… This is one of the keys to the defense force that we're trying to build for the 21st century.”

IAF have an acquisition list of Rs 1.5 lakh crores The 80th anniversary of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was celebrated with traditional fan-fare and Air Chief Marshall NAK Browne declared that the force he commands has a strategic reach that takes it into the league of a handful of major countries who could afford to have similar force profile. The air chief also informed that by the end of the 13th plan, i.e. 2022, IAF would have modernised to the extent of 75 per cent of the total force. It also has a acquisition list totaling Rs 1.5 lakh crores.

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