DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - OCT 2010 ISSUE

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PAKISTAN

POLITICS OF FLOODS After the floods radical groups have dangerously substituted themselves for the State I AYESHA SIDDIQA MMRCA

FIGHTING CHANCE The landmark deal will set the template for future systems’ acquisitions I JASJIT SINGH OCTOBER 2010

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 3

ISSUE 2

Rs 250

THE TRAINING OF SNIPERS AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR WEAPONRY DOESN'T MEET NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS I RAHUL BEDI

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OCTOBER 2010

LETTER FROM THE

editor

T

he verb ‘to snipe’ originated in the 1770s among the soldiers of British India where a hunter skilled enough to kill the elusive bird, the snipe, was dubbed a “sniper”. Globally, the deployment of snipers is increasingly becoming common by armed forces and insurgent groups but unfortunately they are overlooked by India’s security establishment.

Unrecognised and unsung, the 3,000-4,000 snipers remain a low form of life in the formal hierarchy of the Indian Army and are used desultorily by the country’s paramilitary and the State police force. Ill-equipped and badly trained, this all important cog in the defence wheel, which can, potentially, change the course of war—during Kargil grenadier snipers more than proved their mettle—remain in the shadow of other more sophisticated weaponry. DSI weighs in by outlining the criticality of snipers becoming highly trained marksman, adept in the field and in infiltration, by mastering the knack of camouflage and armed with distinct high precision rifles.

Winter in India’s capital is always the season for high profile visits but the winter of 2010 promises to be more memorable than most in terms of dignitaries stepping on the red carpet in the wake of the Commonwealth Games. India’s VIP visitor’s list includes the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the President of America, Barack Obama. And while their agendas may differ there will be one common denominator on their all important things-to-discuss list. Each in his own way will be pushing for a stronger partnership and hoping that India signs up for the multi-billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal with their respective country. The landmark deal has been the subject of many debates and speculation but as the technical evaluation of six competing aircraft nears completion, DSI analyses how the final selection should evolve.

The summer monsoon that lashed Pakistan has not only left large parts of the country devastated but has threatened to change the fabric of the country’s politics. As the rain engorged the Indus River, the ensuing floods killed almost 2,000 people, impacted more than 20 million and completely ruined 1.4 million acres of crop land. The agricultural markets that have been wiped out by the floods are not known as breeding grounds for terrorism yet there is a growing fear that in the absence of strong support from the State these regions may well incubate radical thoughts and deeds.

As usual we look forward to your feedback. If you any have suggestions, comments or criticisms write to us at dsidelhi.feedback@gmail.com should you want to subscribe contact us at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing department will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

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DSI

Unrecognised and unsung, the 3,000-4,000 snipers remain a low form of life in the formal hierarchy of the Indian Army and are used desultorily by the country’s paramilitary and the State police force.

OCTOBER 2010

COVER STORY

06

OPERATIONAL DISADVANTAGE

The employment of snipers is being used increasingly by the Indian Army as force multipliers but they have not been given the importance they deserve by the defence establishment.

THE BIG PICTURE Although the United States of America and Israel are making inroads into India’s defence sector President Dimitry Medvedev’s visit in December will show that, Russian dominance over weapon’s supply to this region remains intact. Public attention may be focussed on large, competitive global tenders but still a huge volume of defence business flows unnoticed into India and Russia’s market share remains steady at 70 percent.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

24

50

POLITICS OF FLOOD RELIEF

Multi-layered requirements make battlefield management systems a complicated exercise in India and requires maximum commonality of structural frameworks across a range of operational environments, configured for every chain of command.

Lashed by devastating floods, the Pakistan State has been unable to provide adequate assistance to its people leading to interventions by radical groups and their dangerous growth. The floods are also being seen as an ideal opportunity by the Army to truncate the hold of the Pakistan People’s Party.

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As the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal draws to a close what is needed is to create a synergy between the concerns of the six contenders and Indian national interests.

PAKISTAN

SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

A FIGHTING CHANCE CHINA

44

HERE BE DRAGONS A recent report by the Penatagon asserts that China adds 100 missiles to its arsenal annually.

Indeed, China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interest and current foreign policy.

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DSI

INDO-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS 16

TECHNOLOGY

AFP

CONTENTS

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OCTOBER 2010

COVER STORY

06

OPERATIONAL DISADVANTAGE

The employment of snipers is being used increasingly by the Indian Army as force multipliers but they have not been given the importance they deserve by the defence establishment.

THE BIG PICTURE Although the United States of America and Israel are making inroads into India’s defence sector President Dimitry Medvedev’s visit in December will show that, Russian dominance over weapon’s supply to this region remains intact. Public attention may be focussed on large, competitive global tenders but still a huge volume of defence business flows unnoticed into India and Russia’s market share remains steady at 70 percent.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

24

50

POLITICS OF FLOOD RELIEF

Multi-layered requirements make battlefield management systems a complicated exercise in India and requires maximum commonality of structural frameworks across a range of operational environments, configured for every chain of command.

Lashed by devastating floods, the Pakistan State has been unable to provide adequate assistance to its people leading to interventions by radical groups and their dangerous growth. The floods are also being seen as an ideal opportunity by the Army to truncate the hold of the Pakistan People’s Party.

30

As the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal draws to a close what is needed is to create a synergy between the concerns of the six contenders and Indian national interests.

PAKISTAN

SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

A FIGHTING CHANCE CHINA

44

HERE BE DRAGONS A recent report by the Penatagon asserts that China adds 100 missiles to its arsenal annually.

Indeed, China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interest and current foreign policy.

2

DSI

INDO-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS 16

TECHNOLOGY

AFP

CONTENTS

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Contributors-final 2ND TIME.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 08/10/10 11:21 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA OCTOBER 2010 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

RAHUL BEDI

AJAI SHUKLA

SHANKAR ROYCHOWDHURY

JASJIT SINGH

C. UDAY BHASKAR

JAYADEV RANADE

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

General Shankar Roychowdhury (retd.) was commissioned into the Indian Army in June 1957 and held various positions. He participated in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak War and he has closely witnessed the beginning of the current stage of proxy wars between India and Pakistan. Appointed as Chief of the Army Staff in 1994, he retired in 1997.

Elected to the Rajya Sabha as an all-party consensus candidate from West Bengal in 1999, he has also authored two books: Kargil 1999 and Officially at Peace.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd.) served in the IAF for 34 years as a fighter pilot in key command and staff appointments, including as Director of Operations and has been decorated for gallantry. He was awarded with the Padma Bhushan for life-time contribution to national defence and security. He was Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for 14 years and since 2001 he has been heading the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years service. He is the Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters. He has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

Jayadev Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field.

His foreign assignments have included Bejing and Hong Kong and his last international posting was as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes regularly to leading publications. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Sandeep Sharma SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi

AYESHA SIDDIQA Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political and defense analyst currently based in Islamabad. She has a Ph.D. in War Studies and is the author of Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. She has served in Pakistan’s civil service and is a columist for the Pakistani newspaper Express Tribune.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

Contributors-final 2ND TIME.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 08/10/10 11:21 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

CONTRIBUTORS

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA OCTOBER 2010 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

RAHUL BEDI

AJAI SHUKLA

SHANKAR ROYCHOWDHURY

JASJIT SINGH

C. UDAY BHASKAR

JAYADEV RANADE

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

General Shankar Roychowdhury (retd.) was commissioned into the Indian Army in June 1957 and held various positions. He participated in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak War and he has closely witnessed the beginning of the current stage of proxy wars between India and Pakistan. Appointed as Chief of the Army Staff in 1994, he retired in 1997.

Elected to the Rajya Sabha as an all-party consensus candidate from West Bengal in 1999, he has also authored two books: Kargil 1999 and Officially at Peace.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd.) served in the IAF for 34 years as a fighter pilot in key command and staff appointments, including as Director of Operations and has been decorated for gallantry. He was awarded with the Padma Bhushan for life-time contribution to national defence and security. He was Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for 14 years and since 2001 he has been heading the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, currently Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi retired from the Indian Navy in early 2007 after 37 years service. He is the Contributing Editor, South Asia Monitor and a columnist for Reuters. He has contributed over 60 research articles to leading defence publications and edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues.

Jayadev Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with over 25 years experience in the field.

His foreign assignments have included Bejing and Hong Kong and his last international posting was as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

He contributes regularly to leading publications. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra CORRESPONDENT

Mangala Ramamoorthy CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Sandeep Sharma SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi

AYESHA SIDDIQA Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political and defense analyst currently based in Islamabad. She has a Ph.D. in War Studies and is the author of Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. She has served in Pakistan’s civil service and is a columist for the Pakistani newspaper Express Tribune.

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:30 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

WAY OFF TARGET?

Indian Army’s snipers desperately lack adequate training, suitable weaponry and specialised supplementary equipment

RAHUL BEDI

KEY POINTS

n The Army attaches little importance to snipers who can alter not only the course of battles and politics, but even history, by simply executing the one enemy who matters the most. n After the Mumbai terrorist attack the operational usefulness of sniping has gained credence among military, security and law enforcement agencies. n There is a new realisation that snipers are force multipliers and that their skillful employment can impose caution, cause attrition and demoralise the enemy.

S

Target practice by Indian Army snipers

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DSI

niping is a highly skilled, precision killing business, but one that has been employed desultorily by India’s Army and even more randomly by the country’s paramilitaries and rarely, if at all, by the State police forces.

Even though the Army inducted the 7.62x54mm, Soviet-designed semi-automatic Dragonov SVD sniping rifle into service in the mid-1980s, its employment was at best ‘ad hoc’; confined largely to picking off lowvalue targets along the Line of Control in Kashmir in a tit-for-tat competition that rages along the unresolved frontier between the neighbouring nuclear rivals.

India’s 3,500-4,000 Army snipers— around 10 per infantry battalion and some from the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s dedicated counter-insurgency (COIN) force and far fewer numbers in paramilitary and in a handful of specialist units—remain little better than amateurs compared to their Western and even Chinese counterparts.

They desperately lack adequate training, suitable weaponry and specialised supplementary paraphernalia like accurate

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:30 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

WAY OFF TARGET?

Indian Army’s snipers desperately lack adequate training, suitable weaponry and specialised supplementary equipment

RAHUL BEDI

KEY POINTS

n The Army attaches little importance to snipers who can alter not only the course of battles and politics, but even history, by simply executing the one enemy who matters the most. n After the Mumbai terrorist attack the operational usefulness of sniping has gained credence among military, security and law enforcement agencies. n There is a new realisation that snipers are force multipliers and that their skillful employment can impose caution, cause attrition and demoralise the enemy.

S

Target practice by Indian Army snipers

6

7

DSI

niping is a highly skilled, precision killing business, but one that has been employed desultorily by India’s Army and even more randomly by the country’s paramilitaries and rarely, if at all, by the State police forces.

Even though the Army inducted the 7.62x54mm, Soviet-designed semi-automatic Dragonov SVD sniping rifle into service in the mid-1980s, its employment was at best ‘ad hoc’; confined largely to picking off lowvalue targets along the Line of Control in Kashmir in a tit-for-tat competition that rages along the unresolved frontier between the neighbouring nuclear rivals.

India’s 3,500-4,000 Army snipers— around 10 per infantry battalion and some from the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s dedicated counter-insurgency (COIN) force and far fewer numbers in paramilitary and in a handful of specialist units—remain little better than amateurs compared to their Western and even Chinese counterparts.

They desperately lack adequate training, suitable weaponry and specialised supplementary paraphernalia like accurate

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:30 AM Page 3

WEAPONRY Though the snipers oneshot, one-kill code has a certain appealingly boastful resonance to it in many situations, it is the second or subsequent rounds that count.

Innumerable atmospheric, environmental and topographical variables come into play at the time of firing that can, and often do, adversely impinge on the first bullet’s flight.

”

imported Match ammunition, hand-held laser range finders, night sights and related hardware essential to accomplish this highly skilled and deathly mission. In fact, shooters are issued inefficient Ordnance Factory Board produced ammunition which experts say are ‘wholly inaccurate’, defeating the very purpose of sniping.

All that is required of the Army’s NonCommissioned Officer snipers is merely good marksmanship, a skill that gets them temporarily tasked with sniping in careers spanning variegated assignments. Not for them the kudos, fearful glamour or mystique attached to snipers in the US, Russian, British, French and other European armies or the espirit de corps of belonging to an elite band.

Limited Training Brief four-six weeks training capsules at the Infantry School at Mhow in Madhya Pradesh for two-man sniper teams, the shooter and his interchangeable buddy or ‘spotter’ are at best, elementary and inadequate. The spotter in foreign armies is an equally skilled marksman but also specialises in target and atmospheric observation, handling location, security and communications and actually directing artillery fire and close air support.

extent the Special Action This instruction includes a Typically, Indian Army combination of firing practice and snipers lack training and Group of the National Security Guard (NSG) and rudimentary attempts to mentally adequate equipment Special Groups of the attune the marksman and his partner to patiently await their quarry Special Frontier Force (SFF),” laments through aerobic, yoga and breathing retired Lt Gen P. C. Katoch, a former SF officer. Training of infantry snipers remains exercises to enhance concentration.

Professional snipers abroad train to rudimentary, he adds.

The Army also has no nucleus of sniper master the knack of camouflage and deception by learning to stop breathing and instructors, as none have been nurtured reduce their heartbeats to the barest since no foreign, friendly military was minimum while firing as even the minutest willing to instruct Indian soldiers in this unsynchronised twitch or movement can specialty. The handful of NSG shooters, who over recent years have undergone prove calamitous in obtaining their target.

“There has been no attempt at building sniping instruction abroad in countries like up the ethos of sniping in the Indian Army Israel, were too few in number to be able to or any of the other security agencies barring institutionally amplify this expertise in any select Special Forces (SF) units and to some meaningful manner.

8

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SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:37 AM Page 5

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

Rare Instance One rare instance of India’s security forces having effectively employed sniping involved NSG sharpshooters during Operation Black Thunder launched in May 1988 to lift the siege of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by Sikh terrorists.

Crouched atop buildings overlooking the Temple complex, NSG sharpshooters with their favoured 7.62X51mm German Heckler& Koch (H&K) gas-operated semiautomatic PSG1A1 sniper rifles, eliminated at least five of the besieging well-armed, trained and committed Sikh separatists successfully bringing the operation to fruition with no casualties to the commandoes. The PSG1A1s was employed once again during the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist siege relieved by the NSG. A special badge to boost the snipers’ image, similar to what prevails for designated marksmen in other armies around the world, was introduced in the late 1990s by Army Chief General S. Padmanabhan, but was withdrawn some years ago as it proved unworkable.

Earning the prestigious badge required three confirmed sniper kills. But senior officers said non-snipers, using assault and other rifles, frequently claimed the

designated scalps leading eventually to the insignia being discontinued. And with its abandonment went whatever fleeting support there had been from Army Headquarters in promoting the tactical efficaciousness of snipers and establishing a dedicated corps of professional marksmen.

Through history, snipers have been grudgingly, almost fearfully, glorified and in recent years their lethal calling has been the focus of several hauntingly successful Hollywood movies like the Deer Hunter in 1978, which ended up as a metaphor for the Vietnam war itself.

Renegade snipers from opposing sides dominated the civil war that wracked the break-up of former Yugoslavia and these shooters, in a sense, emerged as the deadly lietmotif of the bitter ethnic clash in Eastern Europe through the 1990s. And, closer home in something long forgotten many officers from the hapless expeditionary Indian Peace Keeping Force to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s were assassinated by Tamil Tiger snipers using assault rifles, some of them ironically instructed in firearms use by Indian security agencies.

More recently, however, after the Mumbai terrorist attack the operational usefulness of sniping has incrementally gained credence amongst the military, security and law enforcement agencies as they endlessly battle India’s unrelenting insurgencies and armed separatist movements.

The rapidly deteriorating internal security situation, with the proliferation of Naxalitespawned RedTerror, has triggered a rethink of tactics. The failure of the administration’s inchoate strategy of large scale paramilitary and police deployment against wily Naxalite cadres was gradually shifting tactical thinking in the direction of developing a surgical killing capacity.

A National Security Guard during the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks

”

Expanding Terror The rapidly deteriorating internal security situation, with the proliferation of Naxalitespawned Red Terror, has triggered a rethink of tactics in this seemingly unending and proliferating guerilla war. The failure of the administration’s inchoate strategy of large-scale paramilitary and police deployment against wily Naxalite cadres has gradually shifted tactical thinking in the direction of developing a surgical killing capacity via snipers.

The Naxal-favoured forest terrain of areas like Chattisgarh where their top leadership is reportedly secreted is a conflict zone ideally suited to snipers. If adequately trained and equipped and judiciously deployed, these sharpshooters can effectively depreciate the Maoist hierarchy, security planners say.

“There is a new realisation in the military and other security organisations that snipers are force multipliers and that their skillful employment can impose

10

AFP

The first two SF officers who after much negotiation and persuasion attended an intervention course in France in the late 1970s, with the intent of returning home on specialised appointment, were diverted to other assignments that did not require their newly acquired skills, leaving matters unchanged for the next three decades.

The US military, however, as part of its annual Iroquois series of continuing joint training exercises with India, has recently agreed to run a special four-week course for its snipers later this year during their bilateral manoeuvres.

But above all, the Indian Army attaches little worth to snipers—an 18th century term derived from the game bird, snipe, that is difficult to hunt as it efficiently uses camouflage to remain undetected—who potentially can alter not only the course of battles and politics, but even history by simply executing the one enemy who matters the most.

Concomitantly, it is also an inarguable maxim that one well aimed sniper round, particularly in an urban, law enforcement environment can end up saving many lives by relieving hijacks, hostage situations and even apocalyptic incidents like the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

caution, cause attrition and demoralise the enemy,” a senior infantry officer avers.

They are, he declares, incrementally finding acceptance amongst COIN planners as is the operational reality that a lone marksman, under particular circumstances, can be the most effective weapon or decisive smart-bomb on the battlefield. He can, further adds the officer, be equally valuable in a law enforcement role as a sniper is frugal in his logistics and precise in ways that many in the Indian military and security circles are unable to comprehend.

“The sub-conventional warfare that India faces mandates acquiring certain specialist skills,” former Lt Gen V. K. Kapur says, adding that snipers should constitute an essential part of this unconventional response. It is high time that the Indian Army awoke to this reality, the officer declared.

Accordingly, to augment its precision strike capacity, the Army is in the process of importing 900-1,000 sniper rifles for its SF and other specialised, clandestine units via the Fast Track Procedure (FTP).

A high level team from Army Headquarters including sharpshooters led

11

DSI

by a two-star officer is to visit Israel, Finland and the US in late October to evaluate three competing sniper rifles for outright purchase for an estimated $10-12 million. The procurement deadline for these weapons is December 2010, but frequent postponements that underscore all Indian defence purchases are expected to considerably delay the procurement.

The contending sniper rifles include Finland’s bolt action SAKO TRG-22/24, Israel Weapon Industries (IWIs) semiautomatic Galil 7.62x54mm sniper model and Sig Sauer of USA’s SSG 3000 bolt action, magazine-fed rifle.

Of these three rival models, the SF and the SFF—also known as Establishment 22—the Army’s shadowy paramilitary commando unit based at Chakrata near Dehra Dun and presently under the operational supervision of the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing who employ them for ‘special’ missions— have imported 130 Galil sniping rifles and some 450,000 rounds of ammunition in 2005 for around $1.4 million.

Security experts, however, lament that the growing realisation of sniper efficacy is in inverse proportion to awareness with regard to their management, immediate tactical advantage that they are capable of providing and their larger strategic significance. This is further compounded by near total ignorance regarding the mass of specialised weapons and associated equipment available worldwide to render sniping efficient.

As a result, framing qualitative requirements (QRs) for sniper rifles and correlated apparatus poses a grave problem for the Army. It is a lesser handicap for the paramilitaries and newly raised State Police commando units for which the NSG, with its relatively wider sniping experience, is the designated QR initiator and, in many instances, also the weapons tester.

The Army’s QRs, drawn up in support of its current sniper rifle requirement, appears to have been by framed by illinformed and tenderfoot infantry officers with seemingly no field experience.

Budget Debate Surprisingly, the QR mandates no accuracy standard for sniper rifles at a minimum strike range of 800 m—the fundamental requirement for such a weapon system—but absurdly requires them to be fitted with a bayonet.

It is incomprehensible as to why the QR, which requires the rifle for employment at

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:37 AM Page 5

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

Rare Instance One rare instance of India’s security forces having effectively employed sniping involved NSG sharpshooters during Operation Black Thunder launched in May 1988 to lift the siege of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by Sikh terrorists.

Crouched atop buildings overlooking the Temple complex, NSG sharpshooters with their favoured 7.62X51mm German Heckler& Koch (H&K) gas-operated semiautomatic PSG1A1 sniper rifles, eliminated at least five of the besieging well-armed, trained and committed Sikh separatists successfully bringing the operation to fruition with no casualties to the commandoes. The PSG1A1s was employed once again during the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist siege relieved by the NSG. A special badge to boost the snipers’ image, similar to what prevails for designated marksmen in other armies around the world, was introduced in the late 1990s by Army Chief General S. Padmanabhan, but was withdrawn some years ago as it proved unworkable.

Earning the prestigious badge required three confirmed sniper kills. But senior officers said non-snipers, using assault and other rifles, frequently claimed the

designated scalps leading eventually to the insignia being discontinued. And with its abandonment went whatever fleeting support there had been from Army Headquarters in promoting the tactical efficaciousness of snipers and establishing a dedicated corps of professional marksmen.

Through history, snipers have been grudgingly, almost fearfully, glorified and in recent years their lethal calling has been the focus of several hauntingly successful Hollywood movies like the Deer Hunter in 1978, which ended up as a metaphor for the Vietnam war itself.

Renegade snipers from opposing sides dominated the civil war that wracked the break-up of former Yugoslavia and these shooters, in a sense, emerged as the deadly lietmotif of the bitter ethnic clash in Eastern Europe through the 1990s. And, closer home in something long forgotten many officers from the hapless expeditionary Indian Peace Keeping Force to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s were assassinated by Tamil Tiger snipers using assault rifles, some of them ironically instructed in firearms use by Indian security agencies.

More recently, however, after the Mumbai terrorist attack the operational usefulness of sniping has incrementally gained credence amongst the military, security and law enforcement agencies as they endlessly battle India’s unrelenting insurgencies and armed separatist movements.

The rapidly deteriorating internal security situation, with the proliferation of Naxalitespawned RedTerror, has triggered a rethink of tactics. The failure of the administration’s inchoate strategy of large scale paramilitary and police deployment against wily Naxalite cadres was gradually shifting tactical thinking in the direction of developing a surgical killing capacity.

A National Security Guard during the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks

”

Expanding Terror The rapidly deteriorating internal security situation, with the proliferation of Naxalitespawned Red Terror, has triggered a rethink of tactics in this seemingly unending and proliferating guerilla war. The failure of the administration’s inchoate strategy of large-scale paramilitary and police deployment against wily Naxalite cadres has gradually shifted tactical thinking in the direction of developing a surgical killing capacity via snipers.

The Naxal-favoured forest terrain of areas like Chattisgarh where their top leadership is reportedly secreted is a conflict zone ideally suited to snipers. If adequately trained and equipped and judiciously deployed, these sharpshooters can effectively depreciate the Maoist hierarchy, security planners say.

“There is a new realisation in the military and other security organisations that snipers are force multipliers and that their skillful employment can impose

10

AFP

The first two SF officers who after much negotiation and persuasion attended an intervention course in France in the late 1970s, with the intent of returning home on specialised appointment, were diverted to other assignments that did not require their newly acquired skills, leaving matters unchanged for the next three decades.

The US military, however, as part of its annual Iroquois series of continuing joint training exercises with India, has recently agreed to run a special four-week course for its snipers later this year during their bilateral manoeuvres.

But above all, the Indian Army attaches little worth to snipers—an 18th century term derived from the game bird, snipe, that is difficult to hunt as it efficiently uses camouflage to remain undetected—who potentially can alter not only the course of battles and politics, but even history by simply executing the one enemy who matters the most.

Concomitantly, it is also an inarguable maxim that one well aimed sniper round, particularly in an urban, law enforcement environment can end up saving many lives by relieving hijacks, hostage situations and even apocalyptic incidents like the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

caution, cause attrition and demoralise the enemy,” a senior infantry officer avers.

They are, he declares, incrementally finding acceptance amongst COIN planners as is the operational reality that a lone marksman, under particular circumstances, can be the most effective weapon or decisive smart-bomb on the battlefield. He can, further adds the officer, be equally valuable in a law enforcement role as a sniper is frugal in his logistics and precise in ways that many in the Indian military and security circles are unable to comprehend.

“The sub-conventional warfare that India faces mandates acquiring certain specialist skills,” former Lt Gen V. K. Kapur says, adding that snipers should constitute an essential part of this unconventional response. It is high time that the Indian Army awoke to this reality, the officer declared.

Accordingly, to augment its precision strike capacity, the Army is in the process of importing 900-1,000 sniper rifles for its SF and other specialised, clandestine units via the Fast Track Procedure (FTP).

A high level team from Army Headquarters including sharpshooters led

11

DSI

by a two-star officer is to visit Israel, Finland and the US in late October to evaluate three competing sniper rifles for outright purchase for an estimated $10-12 million. The procurement deadline for these weapons is December 2010, but frequent postponements that underscore all Indian defence purchases are expected to considerably delay the procurement.

The contending sniper rifles include Finland’s bolt action SAKO TRG-22/24, Israel Weapon Industries (IWIs) semiautomatic Galil 7.62x54mm sniper model and Sig Sauer of USA’s SSG 3000 bolt action, magazine-fed rifle.

Of these three rival models, the SF and the SFF—also known as Establishment 22—the Army’s shadowy paramilitary commando unit based at Chakrata near Dehra Dun and presently under the operational supervision of the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing who employ them for ‘special’ missions— have imported 130 Galil sniping rifles and some 450,000 rounds of ammunition in 2005 for around $1.4 million.

Security experts, however, lament that the growing realisation of sniper efficacy is in inverse proportion to awareness with regard to their management, immediate tactical advantage that they are capable of providing and their larger strategic significance. This is further compounded by near total ignorance regarding the mass of specialised weapons and associated equipment available worldwide to render sniping efficient.

As a result, framing qualitative requirements (QRs) for sniper rifles and correlated apparatus poses a grave problem for the Army. It is a lesser handicap for the paramilitaries and newly raised State Police commando units for which the NSG, with its relatively wider sniping experience, is the designated QR initiator and, in many instances, also the weapons tester.

The Army’s QRs, drawn up in support of its current sniper rifle requirement, appears to have been by framed by illinformed and tenderfoot infantry officers with seemingly no field experience.

Budget Debate Surprisingly, the QR mandates no accuracy standard for sniper rifles at a minimum strike range of 800 m—the fundamental requirement for such a weapon system—but absurdly requires them to be fitted with a bayonet.

It is incomprehensible as to why the QR, which requires the rifle for employment at

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:39 AM Page 7

WEAPONRY

of MAS France to name just a a distance of over 800 m, needs a Compared to their bayonet which is a close quarter Western counterparts few of the leading weapons combat weapon. Does the Infantry Indian military snipers employed by the world’s armies in conflict situations.

Directorate really anticipate a appear amateur However, to change comic situation in which a sniper these QRs will further delay the sniper rifle actually bayonet-charges the enemy?

Professional shooters contend that the purchase interminably as it necessitates the need for a bayonet will normally be found Defence Minister’s intervention, which only on a self-loading sniper rifle like the always takes time. Conversely, under hideGalil, which has been accurised or improved bound Defence Procurement Procedure for better accuracy, thereby raising serious regulations, not fitting a bayonet onto whichever rifle emerges as the best option doubts over the QR’s objectivity.

It is also possible that in framing the QR a can and in all probability will result in its conflict has been generated, doubtless by rejection for failing to comply with ignorance, over the difference between a mandated specifications.

“Ironically, the FTP route has the option sniper rifle and a designated marksman rifle.

The latter is less specialised than a military to delete or modify compliance to some sniper rifle, largely intended to extend the extent, but the Army’s weapons directorate has paid little heed to bidding for strike range of a group of soldiers.

Officials privately concede the complete competitive systems, severely comproludicrousness of the bayonet requirement, mising the snipers’ operational efficiency,” but grumble that shoddy planning has a mid-ranking SF officer says.

The August 2009 sniper rifles’ Request precluded the inclusion of a host of available sniper weapons like H&K’s PSG1A1 and for Proposal (RfP) also does not MSG90, UK Accuracy International’s AS50, differentiate between a bolt action or semiMcMillan of USA’s Tac-50, Barett’s various automatic model. Instead, it demands a M82 models also from the US and FR F1/F2 nebulous capability requiring the rifle to

12

fire either one or five rounds, a facility open to interpretation by vendors producing either of the two versions to suit their individual commercial interests.

With around 180 H&K PSG1A1 sniper rifles inducted soon after their raising in 1986, the NSG are the most proficient Indian sharp shooters and ones who regularly practice their marksmanship and related disciplines. However, they too are aiming to replace their entire sniping weapons stock by acquiring new PSG1A1’s for Rs 8-10 crore.

Alongside, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is to re-tender its requirement for 807 sniper rifles—433 bolt action and 374 semi-automatic models—as at least four vendors like Switzerland’s Brugger & Thomett, Russia’s Rosoboronexport, H&K and South Africa’s Travello were summarily rejected for specious reasons as the QRs were yet again amateurish.

The NSG has now been tasked by the Home Ministry with drawing up for the CRPF a fresh sniper rifle QR and a tender in support of this is expected to be dispatched soon. The Border Security

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SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:40 AM Page 9

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

Bolt action vs. the Rest Meanwhile, police forces in the border States of Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra and those in Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Orissa engaged in battling Maoists too are acquiring sniper rifles, albeit in smaller numbers but in a frenzied hurry.

So far they are placing scant emphasis on either sniper training or developing tactical doctrines of resourcefully employing them gainfully, in turn, in urban, jungle and even arid desert scenarios.

In professional sniping circles, the rivalry between a bolt action and a semiautomatic recoil or gas operated-sniper rifle has never been satisfactorily resolved and it is unlikely that it ever will.

Experts maintain that both types have operational advantages and disadvantages and that large numbers of each kind have been inducted for military and law enforcement tasks around the world.

However, one frequently repeated teaser surrounding this debate is that the bolt action sniper rifle gets more kills per shot than a semi-auto sniper rifle, but the semiauto gets more total kills. Or, as an anonymous shooter quips, “If you don’t have time to do it [snipe] right, will you have time to do it again?”

Users claim that the bolt action sniper rifle, considered by many shooters as the purists’ weapon, is easier to maintain, more reliable, accurate and lighter and having few moving parts in its mechanism, is easy to assemble. While firing, its only moving parts are the pin and spring greatly mitigating any chance of either a malfunction or any of its rounds being thrown off target.

Military snipers are often required to carry their rifles for long distances across difficult terrain and to become operational speedily, thus making lightness and ease of assembly important. The absence of an external magazine in a bolt action model too allows for relatively versatile positioning whilst firing and the absence of uncontrolled cartridge case ejection, like in a semi-automatic equivalent, helps conceal the shooter. In many instances, this can mean his very survival.

Semi-automatic sniping rifles on the other hand have gas tubes that redirect some of the propellant gases upwards

The NSG has now been tasked by the Home Ministry with drawing up, for the CRPF, a fresh sniper rifle QR and a tender in support of this is expected to be dispatched soon.The Border Security Force and Indo-Tibetan Border Police, for their part, have a cache of 100-150 Steyr Manlicher SSG69s, which they utilise sparingly and could soon be seeking replacements.

”

and rear-wards to retract the bolt and feed a new cartridge into the breech from the magazine.

Experts say that this not only reduces muzzle velocity, but the expulsion of propellant gases can contribute towards the element of ‘muzzle rise’ resulting, possibly in a miss. Pinpoint precision is vital to sniping where even a 1/10mm variation at the time of firing at a quarry 800-1000 m distant can result in the round missing its target by a wide margin.

But some Western, particularly US Army snipers, aver that semi-automatic sniping rifles have a definite tactical advantage over the bolt action model.

They reason that fundamentally with a semi-automatic rifle the shooter can keep his eye on the target through his telescope if a second shot is needed which he can immediately take.

And, though the snipers one-shot, onekill code has a certain appealingly boastful resonance to it in many situations, it is the second or subsequent rounds that counts.

Innumerable atmospheric, environmental and topographical variables come into play at the time of firing that can, and often do,

14

AFP

Force and Indo-Tibetan Border Police, for their part, have a cache of 100-150 Steyr Manlicher SSG69s, which they utilise sparingly and could soon be seeking replacements.

adversely impinge on the first bullet’s flight.

Successive rounds with changes effected following feedback from the first shot can, more often than not, be more effective.

In contrast, the bolt action shooter can do one of two things when he misses: chamber a new round into the breech taking his eye off his objective thus temporarily losing sight of it; or alternately, continue to observe his target and then cycle the bolt later, but once again crucially losing sight of it. Either way, the bolt action rifle marksman is unable to take a followup shot instantly with the necessary sight correction by which time his quarry —in all probability, alerted to the danger—shifts or worse, takes cover.

Specialists claim that because of this drawback many militaries and law

In a global RfP, enforcement agencies worldwide Indian paramilitary dispatched in February have switched to semi-automatic soldier guards against sniper rifles due largely to the Maoist rebel attacks as 2010, the Infantry School requires the simulator to rapidity of firing additional, follow- he patrols a forest in be capable of projecting up rounds without reloading. A Midnapore District in different terrain including police semi-automatic sniper rifle, West Bengal high altitude regions with for instance, can be used in situations requiring a single shooter to heights ranging from 9,000-19,000 feet, engage multiple targets in quick succession; urban and rural areas including deserts his military equivalent can be equally and jungles in which trainee snipers can effective using this model in a target- hone their kills under day and night conditions and bad weather including rich environment.

Another indicator of the Army’s rain, fog and snow.

The ruggedised, all-weather simulators consciousness regarding snipers and their functional employability is its endeavour to should also be able to provide snipers a acquire simulators to improve its sharp realistic feel whilst engaging stationary and shooters skills in varying terrain and moving targets at ranges between situations on the battlefield and for COIN 100-1,300 m. It must be able to train the sniper to operate in actual tactical and and urban terrorist operations.

15

DSI

combat situations with simultaneous multiple-target depiction to enable him to prioritise and effectively appoint his quarry.

The Infantry School is also conducting trials for Combat Training Simulator Systems of which it plans on acquiring 7, followed by an additional 20, to conduct live tactical exercises collectively involving around 1,500 troops, including snipers in an actual battlefield milieu.

Also under consideration is the eventual procurement of nearly 700 Infantry Weapon Training Simulator to facilitate marksmanship training and to exercise battle handling of various weapons by individuals and groups in conventional and unconventional tactical operations.

In conclusion, the mission of the shootand-scoot military sniper, who looks for targets of opportunity is different from that of his paramilitary or police equivalent tasked largely with neutralising specific objectives.

Operating in less than ideal conditions, at the mercy of the environment, taking shadows, wind speed, light patterns into account and highly dependent on improvisation and imagination, the military sniper takes his shot from a distance of 800 m or more.

A riveting 1944 German Army snipers training black-and-white film, stresses how the sharpshooter must evaluate the minutest details in his environment, developing primeval instincts of the hunter in the fatal battle of nerves with his victim.

He needs to be precise: for once he reveals his firing position, he is vulnerable and needs to either make a getaway or shift location swiftly as the enemy will be seeking him. In multiple-target situations, however, snipers can use relocation effectively not only to spawn chaos and confusion in enemy ranks, but also to eliminate the wind factor which may be more advantageous elsewhere.

The police or paramilitary sniper, on the other hand operating in a controlled environment tries to get as close to his quarry as is possible and fires normally from a comfortable or flat surface.

However, unlike the military sniper, the inherent disadvantage he operates under is that a miss can mean hostage deaths whereas a miss by a military sniper can go unnoticed, resulting in no immediate crisis except to the shooter.

In short, one man’s fate comes from another man’s wait.

SNIPER RIFLES.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:40 AM Page 9

OCTOBER 2010

WEAPONRY

Bolt action vs. the Rest Meanwhile, police forces in the border States of Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra and those in Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Orissa engaged in battling Maoists too are acquiring sniper rifles, albeit in smaller numbers but in a frenzied hurry.

So far they are placing scant emphasis on either sniper training or developing tactical doctrines of resourcefully employing them gainfully, in turn, in urban, jungle and even arid desert scenarios.

In professional sniping circles, the rivalry between a bolt action and a semiautomatic recoil or gas operated-sniper rifle has never been satisfactorily resolved and it is unlikely that it ever will.

Experts maintain that both types have operational advantages and disadvantages and that large numbers of each kind have been inducted for military and law enforcement tasks around the world.

However, one frequently repeated teaser surrounding this debate is that the bolt action sniper rifle gets more kills per shot than a semi-auto sniper rifle, but the semiauto gets more total kills. Or, as an anonymous shooter quips, “If you don’t have time to do it [snipe] right, will you have time to do it again?”

Users claim that the bolt action sniper rifle, considered by many shooters as the purists’ weapon, is easier to maintain, more reliable, accurate and lighter and having few moving parts in its mechanism, is easy to assemble. While firing, its only moving parts are the pin and spring greatly mitigating any chance of either a malfunction or any of its rounds being thrown off target.

Military snipers are often required to carry their rifles for long distances across difficult terrain and to become operational speedily, thus making lightness and ease of assembly important. The absence of an external magazine in a bolt action model too allows for relatively versatile positioning whilst firing and the absence of uncontrolled cartridge case ejection, like in a semi-automatic equivalent, helps conceal the shooter. In many instances, this can mean his very survival.

Semi-automatic sniping rifles on the other hand have gas tubes that redirect some of the propellant gases upwards

The NSG has now been tasked by the Home Ministry with drawing up, for the CRPF, a fresh sniper rifle QR and a tender in support of this is expected to be dispatched soon.The Border Security Force and Indo-Tibetan Border Police, for their part, have a cache of 100-150 Steyr Manlicher SSG69s, which they utilise sparingly and could soon be seeking replacements.

”

and rear-wards to retract the bolt and feed a new cartridge into the breech from the magazine.

Experts say that this not only reduces muzzle velocity, but the expulsion of propellant gases can contribute towards the element of ‘muzzle rise’ resulting, possibly in a miss. Pinpoint precision is vital to sniping where even a 1/10mm variation at the time of firing at a quarry 800-1000 m distant can result in the round missing its target by a wide margin.

But some Western, particularly US Army snipers, aver that semi-automatic sniping rifles have a definite tactical advantage over the bolt action model.

They reason that fundamentally with a semi-automatic rifle the shooter can keep his eye on the target through his telescope if a second shot is needed which he can immediately take.

And, though the snipers one-shot, onekill code has a certain appealingly boastful resonance to it in many situations, it is the second or subsequent rounds that counts.

Innumerable atmospheric, environmental and topographical variables come into play at the time of firing that can, and often do,

14

AFP

Force and Indo-Tibetan Border Police, for their part, have a cache of 100-150 Steyr Manlicher SSG69s, which they utilise sparingly and could soon be seeking replacements.

adversely impinge on the first bullet’s flight.

Successive rounds with changes effected following feedback from the first shot can, more often than not, be more effective.

In contrast, the bolt action shooter can do one of two things when he misses: chamber a new round into the breech taking his eye off his objective thus temporarily losing sight of it; or alternately, continue to observe his target and then cycle the bolt later, but once again crucially losing sight of it. Either way, the bolt action rifle marksman is unable to take a followup shot instantly with the necessary sight correction by which time his quarry —in all probability, alerted to the danger—shifts or worse, takes cover.

Specialists claim that because of this drawback many militaries and law

In a global RfP, enforcement agencies worldwide Indian paramilitary dispatched in February have switched to semi-automatic soldier guards against sniper rifles due largely to the Maoist rebel attacks as 2010, the Infantry School requires the simulator to rapidity of firing additional, follow- he patrols a forest in be capable of projecting up rounds without reloading. A Midnapore District in different terrain including police semi-automatic sniper rifle, West Bengal high altitude regions with for instance, can be used in situations requiring a single shooter to heights ranging from 9,000-19,000 feet, engage multiple targets in quick succession; urban and rural areas including deserts his military equivalent can be equally and jungles in which trainee snipers can effective using this model in a target- hone their kills under day and night conditions and bad weather including rich environment.

Another indicator of the Army’s rain, fog and snow.

The ruggedised, all-weather simulators consciousness regarding snipers and their functional employability is its endeavour to should also be able to provide snipers a acquire simulators to improve its sharp realistic feel whilst engaging stationary and shooters skills in varying terrain and moving targets at ranges between situations on the battlefield and for COIN 100-1,300 m. It must be able to train the sniper to operate in actual tactical and and urban terrorist operations.

15

DSI

combat situations with simultaneous multiple-target depiction to enable him to prioritise and effectively appoint his quarry.

The Infantry School is also conducting trials for Combat Training Simulator Systems of which it plans on acquiring 7, followed by an additional 20, to conduct live tactical exercises collectively involving around 1,500 troops, including snipers in an actual battlefield milieu.

Also under consideration is the eventual procurement of nearly 700 Infantry Weapon Training Simulator to facilitate marksmanship training and to exercise battle handling of various weapons by individuals and groups in conventional and unconventional tactical operations.

In conclusion, the mission of the shootand-scoot military sniper, who looks for targets of opportunity is different from that of his paramilitary or police equivalent tasked largely with neutralising specific objectives.

Operating in less than ideal conditions, at the mercy of the environment, taking shadows, wind speed, light patterns into account and highly dependent on improvisation and imagination, the military sniper takes his shot from a distance of 800 m or more.

A riveting 1944 German Army snipers training black-and-white film, stresses how the sharpshooter must evaluate the minutest details in his environment, developing primeval instincts of the hunter in the fatal battle of nerves with his victim.

He needs to be precise: for once he reveals his firing position, he is vulnerable and needs to either make a getaway or shift location swiftly as the enemy will be seeking him. In multiple-target situations, however, snipers can use relocation effectively not only to spawn chaos and confusion in enemy ranks, but also to eliminate the wind factor which may be more advantageous elsewhere.

The police or paramilitary sniper, on the other hand operating in a controlled environment tries to get as close to his quarry as is possible and fires normally from a comfortable or flat surface.

However, unlike the military sniper, the inherent disadvantage he operates under is that a miss can mean hostage deaths whereas a miss by a military sniper can go unnoticed, resulting in no immediate crisis except to the shooter.

In short, one man’s fate comes from another man’s wait.

INDO-RUSSIA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:43 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS

THE BIG

DSI

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh meets Russian President Dmitry Medvedev during the BRIC Summit in Brazil

PICTURE

Although the US and Israel are making inroads into India’s defence sector, as President Dimitry Medvedev’s visit will show, Russia’s dominance remains intact

KEY POINTS

n Four pillars hold up the India-Russia relationship: defence, space, energy and cooperation in science and technology. n The multi-faceted Russia-India defence relationship is underpinned by history, strategic convergence, many technical complementarities, interdependence and trust. n Moscow’s greatest advantage in New Delhi remains its willingness to share strategic, even dual-use, nuclear-related technologies with India.

T

he new outlines of the India-Russia defence relationship swam hazily into view on September 9, when the design chiefs of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Sukhoi Company signed off on a $600 million joint venture to co-develop a 15-20 tonne payload, 2,500-km range Multi-Role Transport Aircraft, which will replace the Indian Air Force’s venerable AN-32 at the end of the next decade.

The new contours of this partnership— founded on technology co-development, rather than the patrimonial, buyer-seller arrangement of old—will become even more visible this December, when Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev visits India. In a ceremony that is likely to be the highlight of Medvedev’s visit, India and Russia will each pledge US $6 billion to co-develop the world’s premier fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), a match for the US Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, which currently flies high over its contemporaries.

This new relationship has been in the making since New Year’s day of 2000, when Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin took over the Russian presidency. The new president inherited an India relationship in the doldrums after a decade of neglect

by Boris Yeltsin, who believed that Russia’s future lay with the United States, Europe and China. Putin, an old Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security (KGB) hand with a strong grounding in strategic affairs, quickly ordered a foreign policy reorientation that would

16

AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

restore India as a lynchpin of Russia’s Asian strategy.

“If India and Russia are once again coordinating closely in the defence and strategic spheres, Vladimir Putin is the leader who has almost single-handedly driven it from Moscow,” explains Sergey Karmalito, Senior Counsellor at the Russian Embassy in New Delhi. “His generation has a deep personal conviction

about the India-Russia relationship.

Everyone from that time grew up with the idea that India is a friend.”

In his typically decisive style, Putin travelled to India in his first year in office, signed a landmark strategic agreement with New Delhi, took his wife to the Taj Mahal and things were back on track.

Today, Moscow and Delhi are quietly confident that they have successfully

recalibrated the relationship in a dramatically changed global environment, adjusting for the collapse of the Soviet Union; the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Russian successor State, India’s growing capabilities and the rise of new global challenges like terrorism; climate change; and energy and food security.

The foundation of the friendship is a Declaration on Strategic Partnership

17

between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation which Putin and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed on Octber 3, 2000. This supplanted an earlier framework, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which Moscow and Delhi signed on August 9, 1971, on the eve of war with Pakistan. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, as this came to be called, included a mutual defence clause, which

INDO-RUSSIA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:43 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS

THE BIG

DSI

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh meets Russian President Dmitry Medvedev during the BRIC Summit in Brazil

PICTURE

Although the US and Israel are making inroads into India’s defence sector, as President Dimitry Medvedev’s visit will show, Russia’s dominance remains intact

KEY POINTS

n Four pillars hold up the India-Russia relationship: defence, space, energy and cooperation in science and technology. n The multi-faceted Russia-India defence relationship is underpinned by history, strategic convergence, many technical complementarities, interdependence and trust. n Moscow’s greatest advantage in New Delhi remains its willingness to share strategic, even dual-use, nuclear-related technologies with India.

T

he new outlines of the India-Russia defence relationship swam hazily into view on September 9, when the design chiefs of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Sukhoi Company signed off on a $600 million joint venture to co-develop a 15-20 tonne payload, 2,500-km range Multi-Role Transport Aircraft, which will replace the Indian Air Force’s venerable AN-32 at the end of the next decade.

The new contours of this partnership— founded on technology co-development, rather than the patrimonial, buyer-seller arrangement of old—will become even more visible this December, when Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev visits India. In a ceremony that is likely to be the highlight of Medvedev’s visit, India and Russia will each pledge US $6 billion to co-develop the world’s premier fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), a match for the US Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, which currently flies high over its contemporaries.

This new relationship has been in the making since New Year’s day of 2000, when Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin took over the Russian presidency. The new president inherited an India relationship in the doldrums after a decade of neglect

by Boris Yeltsin, who believed that Russia’s future lay with the United States, Europe and China. Putin, an old Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security (KGB) hand with a strong grounding in strategic affairs, quickly ordered a foreign policy reorientation that would

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AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

restore India as a lynchpin of Russia’s Asian strategy.

“If India and Russia are once again coordinating closely in the defence and strategic spheres, Vladimir Putin is the leader who has almost single-handedly driven it from Moscow,” explains Sergey Karmalito, Senior Counsellor at the Russian Embassy in New Delhi. “His generation has a deep personal conviction

about the India-Russia relationship.

Everyone from that time grew up with the idea that India is a friend.”

In his typically decisive style, Putin travelled to India in his first year in office, signed a landmark strategic agreement with New Delhi, took his wife to the Taj Mahal and things were back on track.

Today, Moscow and Delhi are quietly confident that they have successfully

recalibrated the relationship in a dramatically changed global environment, adjusting for the collapse of the Soviet Union; the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Russian successor State, India’s growing capabilities and the rise of new global challenges like terrorism; climate change; and energy and food security.

The foundation of the friendship is a Declaration on Strategic Partnership

17

between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation which Putin and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed on Octber 3, 2000. This supplanted an earlier framework, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which Moscow and Delhi signed on August 9, 1971, on the eve of war with Pakistan. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, as this came to be called, included a mutual defence clause, which

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INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS

2000, which superseded the provided India with Soviet Joint venture to 1993 treaty. insurance against US or co-develop the Multi“The Strategic Declaration of Chinese interference during Role Transport Aircraft the liberation of Bangladesh. being signed and (right) 2000 redefined the whole This mutual defence an artist’s impression of partnership but its most farsighted aspect was to article has been New Delhi’s the Fifth Generation institutionalise an annual lone departure from its high- Fighter Aircraft summit meeting between profile Non-Alignment.

Article IX of the 1971 Treaty, read: “Each Russia’s President and India’s Prime high contracting party undertakes to Minister,” says a senior Indian diplomat. abstain from providing any assistance to “They have met every year, without fail. any third party that engages in armed President Medvedev’s visit to India in conflict with the other party. In the event of December is a continuation of this.”

This top-level interaction has ensured a either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties decade of well-coordinated policy. “In shall immediately enter into mutual evaluating the relationship, we tend to consultations in order to remove such focus on defence sales, while taking the threat and to take appropriate effective strategic relationship for granted,” points measures to ensure peace and the security out Kanwal Sibal, former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to Moscow from of their countries.”

When this 20-year treaty lapsed in 1991, 2004-2007. “But, consider this: Russia has the Soviet Union was collapsing like a house never interfered in our neighbourhood, of cards. India, itself in deep economic denied us technologies or imposed political crisis, was preoccupied with economic costs on us. In contrast, the US, despite the restructuring. Eventually, on January 28, growing US-India relationship, imposes 1993, a new Treaty of Friendship and heavy costs on us by arming Pakistan, withCooperation between the Republic of India holding technology and by placing Indian and the Russian Federation was signed, companies on banned lists. We have our dispensing with Article IX. Nor was this issues with Moscow, certainly; but Russia reintroduced in the Strategic Declaration of never imposes costs on us.”

18

President Medvedev has continued Putin’s approach to India after taking over the top job in May 2008. Russia has allocated functions between the President and the Prime Minister: Medvedev looks after strategic affairs, diplomacy and defence; while Putin handles economic affairs. In 2008, when India complained to the new President about Russian production delays in programmes like the Admiral Gorshkov and about hitches in the supply of military spares, Medvedev responded by assuming personal supervision of the defence partnership. Meanwhile, Putin remains a powerful presence in Russian policy with whom New Delhi continues to engage with.

Four Strong Pillars Diplomats from both countries agree that four pillars hold up the India-Russia relationship: defence, space, energy (both nuclear and hydrocarbon) and cooperation in science and technology.

Space cooperation has always been close and Russia’s space scientists claim a measure of credit for India’s growing profile in the international satellite launch market. Moscow has offered to assist in analysing the partial failure of the Chandrayan-1 moon mission and to play

a role in Chandrayan-2. In Russia’s GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) project, which enables accurate satellite-assisted navigation by military forces, the two sides are negotiating for producing equipment in India. Intellectual Property Rights issues have been resolved, two documents have been signed and a third is almost ready.

On the energy front, obtaining access to Russian hydrocarbon energy, especially the Sakhalin oil blocks, is an important component of India’s energy security strategy. Here, progress has been limited: ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) bought a 20 percent stake in the lucrative Sakhalin-I field for $2.8 billion and last year paid $2.1 billion for UK-registered Imperial Energy, which operates in Siberia. Now, with bidding imminent for oil blocks in Sakhalin-3, OVL plans to partner a Russian company, Rosneft or Gazprom.

“Unfortunately, since 2005, China has marginalised us in obtaining Russia’s oil and gas blocks,” says an Indian official ruefully. “Beijing sunk $25 billion into Russia’s far east, building a pipeline to pump oil directly from Siberia to China.

Given that spending power, Russia prefers to do business with them.”

The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft co-development will place India-Russia defence cooperation in a league of its own. No country has ever codeveloped a fifthgeneration fighter with another. In developing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Washington has not permitted even their closest strategic partner, the UK, to participate in technology development.

19

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DSI

In the fields of science and technology, Russia has been a constant partner; assisting India in mastering the technologies required for building a nuclear submarine and underwater launched ballistic missiles.

Moscow knows the value of this for India. Tellingly, President Putin, in India last March, was dismissive about the US-India partnership. “Your friends,” he said bluntly, waving his hands in the gesture of inverted commas, “will never, ever share with you the technologies that we do.”

But defence equipment sales and development partnerships remain bread and butter issues for Russia, particularly after oil prices plummeted down from their historic highs in 2008. Defence sales to India, the world’s biggest buyer, are important for Russia’s military-industrial complex.

Moscow’s need is not as dire as in the 1990s, when New Delhi’s orders—for Sukhoi-30 fighters, the MiG-21 BISON upgrade, the MiG-29K development, Talwar-class frigates, Uran-E and Klub missiles and others—kept alive Russian design bureaus that would otherwise have shut down.

Today, the sheer cost of developing advanced weapons platforms has reached such levels that Russia finds it essential to share the burden, both

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INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS

2000, which superseded the provided India with Soviet Joint venture to 1993 treaty. insurance against US or co-develop the Multi“The Strategic Declaration of Chinese interference during Role Transport Aircraft the liberation of Bangladesh. being signed and (right) 2000 redefined the whole This mutual defence an artist’s impression of partnership but its most farsighted aspect was to article has been New Delhi’s the Fifth Generation institutionalise an annual lone departure from its high- Fighter Aircraft summit meeting between profile Non-Alignment.

Article IX of the 1971 Treaty, read: “Each Russia’s President and India’s Prime high contracting party undertakes to Minister,” says a senior Indian diplomat. abstain from providing any assistance to “They have met every year, without fail. any third party that engages in armed President Medvedev’s visit to India in conflict with the other party. In the event of December is a continuation of this.”

This top-level interaction has ensured a either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties decade of well-coordinated policy. “In shall immediately enter into mutual evaluating the relationship, we tend to consultations in order to remove such focus on defence sales, while taking the threat and to take appropriate effective strategic relationship for granted,” points measures to ensure peace and the security out Kanwal Sibal, former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to Moscow from of their countries.”

When this 20-year treaty lapsed in 1991, 2004-2007. “But, consider this: Russia has the Soviet Union was collapsing like a house never interfered in our neighbourhood, of cards. India, itself in deep economic denied us technologies or imposed political crisis, was preoccupied with economic costs on us. In contrast, the US, despite the restructuring. Eventually, on January 28, growing US-India relationship, imposes 1993, a new Treaty of Friendship and heavy costs on us by arming Pakistan, withCooperation between the Republic of India holding technology and by placing Indian and the Russian Federation was signed, companies on banned lists. We have our dispensing with Article IX. Nor was this issues with Moscow, certainly; but Russia reintroduced in the Strategic Declaration of never imposes costs on us.”

18

President Medvedev has continued Putin’s approach to India after taking over the top job in May 2008. Russia has allocated functions between the President and the Prime Minister: Medvedev looks after strategic affairs, diplomacy and defence; while Putin handles economic affairs. In 2008, when India complained to the new President about Russian production delays in programmes like the Admiral Gorshkov and about hitches in the supply of military spares, Medvedev responded by assuming personal supervision of the defence partnership. Meanwhile, Putin remains a powerful presence in Russian policy with whom New Delhi continues to engage with.

Four Strong Pillars Diplomats from both countries agree that four pillars hold up the India-Russia relationship: defence, space, energy (both nuclear and hydrocarbon) and cooperation in science and technology.

Space cooperation has always been close and Russia’s space scientists claim a measure of credit for India’s growing profile in the international satellite launch market. Moscow has offered to assist in analysing the partial failure of the Chandrayan-1 moon mission and to play

a role in Chandrayan-2. In Russia’s GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) project, which enables accurate satellite-assisted navigation by military forces, the two sides are negotiating for producing equipment in India. Intellectual Property Rights issues have been resolved, two documents have been signed and a third is almost ready.

On the energy front, obtaining access to Russian hydrocarbon energy, especially the Sakhalin oil blocks, is an important component of India’s energy security strategy. Here, progress has been limited: ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) bought a 20 percent stake in the lucrative Sakhalin-I field for $2.8 billion and last year paid $2.1 billion for UK-registered Imperial Energy, which operates in Siberia. Now, with bidding imminent for oil blocks in Sakhalin-3, OVL plans to partner a Russian company, Rosneft or Gazprom.

“Unfortunately, since 2005, China has marginalised us in obtaining Russia’s oil and gas blocks,” says an Indian official ruefully. “Beijing sunk $25 billion into Russia’s far east, building a pipeline to pump oil directly from Siberia to China.

Given that spending power, Russia prefers to do business with them.”

The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft co-development will place India-Russia defence cooperation in a league of its own. No country has ever codeveloped a fifthgeneration fighter with another. In developing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Washington has not permitted even their closest strategic partner, the UK, to participate in technology development.

19

”

DSI

In the fields of science and technology, Russia has been a constant partner; assisting India in mastering the technologies required for building a nuclear submarine and underwater launched ballistic missiles.

Moscow knows the value of this for India. Tellingly, President Putin, in India last March, was dismissive about the US-India partnership. “Your friends,” he said bluntly, waving his hands in the gesture of inverted commas, “will never, ever share with you the technologies that we do.”

But defence equipment sales and development partnerships remain bread and butter issues for Russia, particularly after oil prices plummeted down from their historic highs in 2008. Defence sales to India, the world’s biggest buyer, are important for Russia’s military-industrial complex.

Moscow’s need is not as dire as in the 1990s, when New Delhi’s orders—for Sukhoi-30 fighters, the MiG-21 BISON upgrade, the MiG-29K development, Talwar-class frigates, Uran-E and Klub missiles and others—kept alive Russian design bureaus that would otherwise have shut down.

Today, the sheer cost of developing advanced weapons platforms has reached such levels that Russia finds it essential to share the burden, both

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OCTOBER 2010

INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS financial and developmental, with a reliable partner.

More than anywhere else, Moscow’s needs New Delhi in developing the FGFA. If Moscow needed any reminding about the inescapability of burden sharing in such risky, high-tech programmes, it was done by the Pentagon last year, which decided that it could no longer afford to continue the F-22 Raptor programme. It was Washington’s decision that the F-22’s technologies were crucial to America’s technological lead in aerospace, which led to the fighter being developed and built entirely within the US. Consequently, its prohibitive cost—$340 million per fighter, inclusive of development costs—forced the Pentagon to cap the programme at 187 F-22s, just half of what it planned to buy in 2006.

DSI

India has procured MiG-29K fighters for its naval carrier operations

Israeli and US Competition

Russian President Vladimir Putin gestures on his arrival in India during an official visit AFP

Over the last five-seven years, defence analysts have been predicting that India’s growing US partnership and major inroads

by Israeli companies, will drastically curtail Russia’s near monopoly as an arms supplier to India. The Russian dominance over weapons supply to India, however, remains intact, with their market share still at 70 percent. While public attention is focussed largely on competitive global tenders (e.g. Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), trainer aircraft or 155 millimetre artillery guns) and on singlesource procurements from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme (e.g. C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft), a huge volume of business flows unnoticed to Russia.

This includes multi-billion dollar procurements like the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov), 45 MiG-29K fighters for naval carrier operations, the leasing of the Akula II nuclear-propelled attack submarine, 230 Sukhoi-30MKI fighters, Mi-17 helicopters and 1,657 T-90 tanks. Additionally, a host of smaller procurements stem from India’s Russian military equipment profile.

With the Indian military already having completed the procurement of Russian tanks, warships and aircraft, placing supplementary contracts is far easier than initiating an entirely new procurement process, especially for a military bureaucracy as procedure-fatigued as India’s. When India needs more fighters, the quickest option is to place a supplementary order for 40 more Su30MKIs (2007) or 29 more MiG-29Ks (2010).

20

Similarly, when the Navy needed more frigates, the Ministry of Defence piggybacked on an earlier order of three Talwar-class frigates to order another three from Russia (2006). And, when the Indian Army needed more tanks in 2008, it simply ordered 347 T-90s to supplement the earlier procurement of 1,310 T-90s.

But Russia’s greatest advantage in New Delhi remains its willingness to share strategic, even dual-use, nuclear-related technologies with India. Add to this, the comfort level of the government in dealing with Russia, where a word from the highest levels opens all gates. Sergey Karmalito points out, “The Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation will be meeting on the October 7. The Russian Air Force Chief has already said that Moscow will give India the best weaponry it needs for the Su30MKI fighter. No other country can help India to the extent that Russia can. The relationship is unique.”

For these reasons and perhaps because Israel is not yet a serious rival in the core area of basic military platforms, Moscow shrugs off talk of Tel Aviv as a rival military supplier.

“Russian suppliers cannot be jealous about Israel’s entry into the Indian defence market if Israeli companies are providing advanced, high-quality equipment at competitive prices,” reasons Karmalito. “Furthermore, if Israeli companies are working on several Russian defence platforms like the electronics of the Phalcon AWA&CS, modernising the

The only serious disruption to this arrangement would be a broad shift away from Russia in India’s military equipment profile. For this reason Moscow is deeply concerned about the possibility of aWestern rival winning India’s $10 billion global tender for a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. South Block has been told in unambiguous terms how important this contract is for Moscow and especially for the RSK MiG, the survival of which depends on the flow of spares for so much of the IAF’s fleet.

21

”

T-72 tank; and upgrading IAF fighters, the net result will be that India’s military will be using more Russian equipment.”

This is sophisticated thinking from a new generation of pragmatic Russian technical managers: that Russian weapons platforms become more attractive by enhancing them with advanced Israeli electronics skills. And the final package, they reason, becomes common intellectual capital.

The only serious disruption to this arrangement would be a broad shift away from Russia in India’s military equipment profile. For this reason Moscow is deeply concerned about the possibility of a Western rival winning India’s $10 billion global tender for a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). South Block has been told in unambiguous terms how important this contract is for Moscow and especially for the RSK MiG, the survival of which depends on the flow of spares for so much of the IAF’s fleet.

Meanwhile both New Delhi and Washington continue to spar over India’s reluctance to sign up on two ‘enabling’ agreements—the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (AGC or BECA)— which the US insists will allow the Indian military to derive the full capabilities of American equipment in the pipeline.

Last March, Washington had sent two ‘non-papers’ to South Block,

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OCTOBER 2010

INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS financial and developmental, with a reliable partner.

More than anywhere else, Moscow’s needs New Delhi in developing the FGFA. If Moscow needed any reminding about the inescapability of burden sharing in such risky, high-tech programmes, it was done by the Pentagon last year, which decided that it could no longer afford to continue the F-22 Raptor programme. It was Washington’s decision that the F-22’s technologies were crucial to America’s technological lead in aerospace, which led to the fighter being developed and built entirely within the US. Consequently, its prohibitive cost—$340 million per fighter, inclusive of development costs—forced the Pentagon to cap the programme at 187 F-22s, just half of what it planned to buy in 2006.

DSI

India has procured MiG-29K fighters for its naval carrier operations

Israeli and US Competition

Russian President Vladimir Putin gestures on his arrival in India during an official visit AFP

Over the last five-seven years, defence analysts have been predicting that India’s growing US partnership and major inroads

by Israeli companies, will drastically curtail Russia’s near monopoly as an arms supplier to India. The Russian dominance over weapons supply to India, however, remains intact, with their market share still at 70 percent. While public attention is focussed largely on competitive global tenders (e.g. Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), trainer aircraft or 155 millimetre artillery guns) and on singlesource procurements from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme (e.g. C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft), a huge volume of business flows unnoticed to Russia.

This includes multi-billion dollar procurements like the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov), 45 MiG-29K fighters for naval carrier operations, the leasing of the Akula II nuclear-propelled attack submarine, 230 Sukhoi-30MKI fighters, Mi-17 helicopters and 1,657 T-90 tanks. Additionally, a host of smaller procurements stem from India’s Russian military equipment profile.

With the Indian military already having completed the procurement of Russian tanks, warships and aircraft, placing supplementary contracts is far easier than initiating an entirely new procurement process, especially for a military bureaucracy as procedure-fatigued as India’s. When India needs more fighters, the quickest option is to place a supplementary order for 40 more Su30MKIs (2007) or 29 more MiG-29Ks (2010).

20

Similarly, when the Navy needed more frigates, the Ministry of Defence piggybacked on an earlier order of three Talwar-class frigates to order another three from Russia (2006). And, when the Indian Army needed more tanks in 2008, it simply ordered 347 T-90s to supplement the earlier procurement of 1,310 T-90s.

But Russia’s greatest advantage in New Delhi remains its willingness to share strategic, even dual-use, nuclear-related technologies with India. Add to this, the comfort level of the government in dealing with Russia, where a word from the highest levels opens all gates. Sergey Karmalito points out, “The Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation will be meeting on the October 7. The Russian Air Force Chief has already said that Moscow will give India the best weaponry it needs for the Su30MKI fighter. No other country can help India to the extent that Russia can. The relationship is unique.”

For these reasons and perhaps because Israel is not yet a serious rival in the core area of basic military platforms, Moscow shrugs off talk of Tel Aviv as a rival military supplier.

“Russian suppliers cannot be jealous about Israel’s entry into the Indian defence market if Israeli companies are providing advanced, high-quality equipment at competitive prices,” reasons Karmalito. “Furthermore, if Israeli companies are working on several Russian defence platforms like the electronics of the Phalcon AWA&CS, modernising the

The only serious disruption to this arrangement would be a broad shift away from Russia in India’s military equipment profile. For this reason Moscow is deeply concerned about the possibility of aWestern rival winning India’s $10 billion global tender for a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. South Block has been told in unambiguous terms how important this contract is for Moscow and especially for the RSK MiG, the survival of which depends on the flow of spares for so much of the IAF’s fleet.

21

”

T-72 tank; and upgrading IAF fighters, the net result will be that India’s military will be using more Russian equipment.”

This is sophisticated thinking from a new generation of pragmatic Russian technical managers: that Russian weapons platforms become more attractive by enhancing them with advanced Israeli electronics skills. And the final package, they reason, becomes common intellectual capital.

The only serious disruption to this arrangement would be a broad shift away from Russia in India’s military equipment profile. For this reason Moscow is deeply concerned about the possibility of a Western rival winning India’s $10 billion global tender for a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). South Block has been told in unambiguous terms how important this contract is for Moscow and especially for the RSK MiG, the survival of which depends on the flow of spares for so much of the IAF’s fleet.

Meanwhile both New Delhi and Washington continue to spar over India’s reluctance to sign up on two ‘enabling’ agreements—the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (AGC or BECA)— which the US insists will allow the Indian military to derive the full capabilities of American equipment in the pipeline.

Last March, Washington had sent two ‘non-papers’ to South Block,

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INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE RELATIONS Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft fighter

enumerating the benefits that India’s military would obtain from signing what the US insists are merely safeguards for the high technology in the electronics and communications that the US puts into its equipment. But this ongoing tussle, which appears unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, casts a shadow over US defence supplies to India. So, too, does New Delhi’s steadfast refusal to enter into a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) with Washington.

Issues around the sharing of high technology have also dogged agreements with Russia. Eight years of tortuous negotiations have gone into the impending contract on the FGFA. All that is needed now is a nod from India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), after which the Indian sign will be ready—in all likelihood during President Medvedev’s visit—for the Preliminary Design Contract (PDC) that allows Indian and Russian designers to begin work on the aircraft. Says HAL chairman, Ashok Nayak: “We will finish the design in about 18 months. Developing and building the FGFA could take 8-10 years.”

The FGFA co-development will place India-Russia defence cooperation in a

With India already having completed the procurement of Russian tanks, warships and aircraft, placing supplementary contracts is far easier than initiating a new procurement process.

When India needs more fighters, the quickest option is to place a supplementary order for 40 more Su-30MKIs(2007) or 29 more Mig-29Ks(2010).

22

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league of its own. No country has ever codeveloped a fifth-generation fighter with another. In developing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Washington has not permitted even their closest strategic partner, the UK, to participate in technology development.

Countries proposing to buy the F-35—the UK, Italy, Holland, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway and Denmark—have contributed towards the estimated $40 billion development cost, but Washington has made it clear that it will not share key technologies or source codes with any of them.

The India-Russia defence relationship has a solid underpinning: history, strategic convergence, technical complementarities, interdependence and trust.

This is likely to ensure that Russia dominates Indian overseas procurement over the coming decade.

Inevitably, as India diversifies its options and develops capabilities of its own, the Russian presence will decline. But Moscow and New Delhi have shown their ability to adapt the relationship and realistically tailor their expectations in accordance with the changing circumstances of both countries.

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1/13/10 11:18 AM

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Varied requirements make battlefield management complicated in India and require commonality of structural frameworks

An Indian Air Force Il-76 AWACS aircraft lands at Jamnagar Airbase

SHANKAR ROYCHOWDHURY

KEY POINTS

Wars in the new era are visualised as a synergistic integration of information, sensing technologies, precision targeting and weapons delivery systems into ‘sensor- shooter networks’. n Technology alone cannot resolve issues of integrated battle management unless supported by matching organisational structures. n Battle management in the Indian context cannot be fully implemented unless tri-service structures of higher command and control are revived. n

SYSTEM OF S YSTEMS 24

25

AFP

T

he contemporary operational environment in India is complex. An active scenario of an asymmetric proxy war overlaps with a potential threat matrix of middle and high intensity conventional warfare, the whole situated against a backdrop of nascent nuclear threat.

Additionally, there is also an awareness of the future in terms of War in the Information Age with an operational philosophy of Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) that evolved from the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), based on quantum advances in information technology.

The emergence of NCW as a philosophy of war and the development of its associated high technology grew from the massive surge of military research and development during the Second World War, which continued aggressively thereafter during the Cold War. The principles of NCW are constant and remain applicable under all conditions of warfare, whatever the local variations.

In resource-abundant environments of certain countries, NCW can be developed to its fullest capabilities but in environments

BATTLEFIELD MANAGEMENT.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 2:03 PM Page 1

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TECHNOLOGY

DSI

Varied requirements make battlefield management complicated in India and require commonality of structural frameworks

An Indian Air Force Il-76 AWACS aircraft lands at Jamnagar Airbase

SHANKAR ROYCHOWDHURY

KEY POINTS

Wars in the new era are visualised as a synergistic integration of information, sensing technologies, precision targeting and weapons delivery systems into ‘sensor- shooter networks’. n Technology alone cannot resolve issues of integrated battle management unless supported by matching organisational structures. n Battle management in the Indian context cannot be fully implemented unless tri-service structures of higher command and control are revived. n

SYSTEM OF S YSTEMS 24

25

AFP

T

he contemporary operational environment in India is complex. An active scenario of an asymmetric proxy war overlaps with a potential threat matrix of middle and high intensity conventional warfare, the whole situated against a backdrop of nascent nuclear threat.

Additionally, there is also an awareness of the future in terms of War in the Information Age with an operational philosophy of Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) that evolved from the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), based on quantum advances in information technology.

The emergence of NCW as a philosophy of war and the development of its associated high technology grew from the massive surge of military research and development during the Second World War, which continued aggressively thereafter during the Cold War. The principles of NCW are constant and remain applicable under all conditions of warfare, whatever the local variations.

In resource-abundant environments of certain countries, NCW can be developed to its fullest capabilities but in environments

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OCTOBER 2010

TECHNOLOGY

”

with more restricted resources, the focus will perforce be on the development of the essential key abilities and systems based on relative priorities. India is obviously in the latter category and must fashion its policies accordingly.

Synergistic Integration

War fighting in the new era is visualised as a synergistic integration of information, sensing technologies, precision targeting and weapons delivery systems into ‘sensor shooter networks’ within a concept of a system of systems. Such multi-layered requirements make battlefield management a complex exercise in the Indian scenario and requires maximum commonality of structural frameworks across a range of operational environments, configured for every level of the chain of command and customised to military specifications.

Battle Management Systems (BMS) are designed to assist the process of war fighting by facilitating the planning and conduct of operations. These are integrated command, control and information management systems based on hightechnology sensors, interlinked by secure communication grids and designed to support the decision making process at all levels of command through a spectrum of C4ISR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, along with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). However, the full range of capabilities may be redundant for battle

AFP

BMS have generated extraordinary expectations of enhanced operational synergy and force multiplication. But ultimately commanders constitute the decision making human element and are required to exercise their intellectual faculties to arrive at logical decisions, often under intensely stressful conditions.

management at lower levels of An Indian Army technical sensors and sources that remain activated under all conditions. intensity, as in asymmetric soldier gets These range from the extremely warfare, and BMS have to ready to fire at primitive to extremely sophisticated, designed accordingly. enemy targets BMS have generated extraor- during the 1999 from human intelligence like the first reports of infiltrators at Kargil in dinary expectations of Kargil battle 1999 provided by local shepherds to enhanced operational synergy gathered by and force multiplication. But ultimately technical intelligence reconnaissance aircraft, commanders constitute the decision making satellites, human element and are required to exercise unmanned aerial vehicles, radar, sonar and their intellectual faculties to arrive at logical infra-red systems, an inflowing torrent that decisions, often under intensely stressful can lead to information overload and blackout within the human cortex, unless conditions in the fog of war.

The natural psychological chain of processed, integrated fused and presented human reaction follows the so-called by information systems to the decision Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop making authorities in a cohesive real time of decision making, which BMS seek to manner. Users at every level will therefore support and facilitate by providing accurate require access to the latest updated and updated situational awareness to the informational inputs from across the entire human cognitive process. It is necessary to BMS system, demanding wide and almost reiterate at the very outset that regardless of instant interconnectivity at the manthe technology available or fielded, the machine interface. cognitive act of exercising military command remains the exclusive domain of Matching Oganisational Structures the human intellect and will always But technology alone cannot resolve issues continue to remain so. of integrated battle management unless Information is a prime force multiplier in supported by matching organisational military armouries. It requires to be structures. Amongst the latter, foremost is processed from the raw material of data and the need to calibrate higher defence intelligence and is the basic ingredient organisations to receive optimal inputs of battlefield management. Intelligence from technological systems. gathering is accepted as an activity in In the Indian context, the priority perpetual motion, regardless of war or is rejuvenation and enhanced empowpeace, with inputs flowing in erment of the Integrated Defence Staff, a unsynchronised and often disjointed system already in existence under a Vice sequences from a variety of human and Chief of Integrated Defence Staff but

rendered relatively non-functional by lack of support from the Services themselves due to short-sighted, inter-Service differences that continue to persist despite frustrations of the past. The capstone appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff raises anxieties amongst the political class and is unlikely to fructify in the practicable future, so inter-Service co-operation within the existing collegiate system of the Chiefs of Staff Committee will have to be revived and redesigned, if necessary, utilising the existing structures of higher defence.

But the great abyss in India in the organisation of higher defence and net-centric applications of battlefield management lies at a level that remains unexplored so far—that of integrated triservice theatre commands which are the critical operational level for the conduct of integrated net-centric warfare in the information age. The recently constituted Andamans and Nicobar Command indicates the correct way ahead and there is a requirement to push the process further by

establishing more such entities. The topic requires a separate discussion and will not be further addressed here, except to repeat that battle management in the Indian context cannot be fully implemented unless tri-service structures of higher command and control are revived.

Different Operating Environments Their respective operating environments facilitate adoption of net-centric principles by some Services more than others. Due to the nature of the tasks carried out by each service and the medium in which they operate, there is a requirement to examine and assess the applicability of fully netcentric communications in the Indian environment, where the Indian Navy and Airforce are more technology intensive while the Indian Army has to operate in a more manpower intensive mode.

Nevertheless, on dispassionate assessment, the Indian armed forces are really not too badly placed in terms of technological assets available for integration into BMS. A major

DSI

asset here is the extensive secure communication systems in each service deployed as wide area networks for secure intra-Service communications. There is a lack of structured inter-Service connectivity but this is being rectified by projects like the Defence Communication Network now under development.

For the present, the existing communication resources of each Service can be adapted for inter-Service communications by engineering communications gateways or portals as established protocols, a critical area that requires to be addressed expeditiously. It should not be particularly difficult task to establish interconnectivity between these separate communications systems of the three Services.

Satellite inputs are another major component of Battle Management Systems and India is fortunate to be one of the few with a developed space programme. The national satellite series, the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) consisting of 11 satellites carrying 199

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26

BATTLEFIELD MANAGEMENT.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:49 AM Page 3

OCTOBER 2010

TECHNOLOGY

”

with more restricted resources, the focus will perforce be on the development of the essential key abilities and systems based on relative priorities. India is obviously in the latter category and must fashion its policies accordingly.

Synergistic Integration

War fighting in the new era is visualised as a synergistic integration of information, sensing technologies, precision targeting and weapons delivery systems into ‘sensor shooter networks’ within a concept of a system of systems. Such multi-layered requirements make battlefield management a complex exercise in the Indian scenario and requires maximum commonality of structural frameworks across a range of operational environments, configured for every level of the chain of command and customised to military specifications.

Battle Management Systems (BMS) are designed to assist the process of war fighting by facilitating the planning and conduct of operations. These are integrated command, control and information management systems based on hightechnology sensors, interlinked by secure communication grids and designed to support the decision making process at all levels of command through a spectrum of C4ISR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, along with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). However, the full range of capabilities may be redundant for battle

AFP

BMS have generated extraordinary expectations of enhanced operational synergy and force multiplication. But ultimately commanders constitute the decision making human element and are required to exercise their intellectual faculties to arrive at logical decisions, often under intensely stressful conditions.

management at lower levels of An Indian Army technical sensors and sources that remain activated under all conditions. intensity, as in asymmetric soldier gets These range from the extremely warfare, and BMS have to ready to fire at primitive to extremely sophisticated, designed accordingly. enemy targets BMS have generated extraor- during the 1999 from human intelligence like the first reports of infiltrators at Kargil in dinary expectations of Kargil battle 1999 provided by local shepherds to enhanced operational synergy gathered by and force multiplication. But ultimately technical intelligence reconnaissance aircraft, commanders constitute the decision making satellites, human element and are required to exercise unmanned aerial vehicles, radar, sonar and their intellectual faculties to arrive at logical infra-red systems, an inflowing torrent that decisions, often under intensely stressful can lead to information overload and blackout within the human cortex, unless conditions in the fog of war.

The natural psychological chain of processed, integrated fused and presented human reaction follows the so-called by information systems to the decision Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop making authorities in a cohesive real time of decision making, which BMS seek to manner. Users at every level will therefore support and facilitate by providing accurate require access to the latest updated and updated situational awareness to the informational inputs from across the entire human cognitive process. It is necessary to BMS system, demanding wide and almost reiterate at the very outset that regardless of instant interconnectivity at the manthe technology available or fielded, the machine interface. cognitive act of exercising military command remains the exclusive domain of Matching Oganisational Structures the human intellect and will always But technology alone cannot resolve issues continue to remain so. of integrated battle management unless Information is a prime force multiplier in supported by matching organisational military armouries. It requires to be structures. Amongst the latter, foremost is processed from the raw material of data and the need to calibrate higher defence intelligence and is the basic ingredient organisations to receive optimal inputs of battlefield management. Intelligence from technological systems. gathering is accepted as an activity in In the Indian context, the priority perpetual motion, regardless of war or is rejuvenation and enhanced empowpeace, with inputs flowing in erment of the Integrated Defence Staff, a unsynchronised and often disjointed system already in existence under a Vice sequences from a variety of human and Chief of Integrated Defence Staff but

rendered relatively non-functional by lack of support from the Services themselves due to short-sighted, inter-Service differences that continue to persist despite frustrations of the past. The capstone appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff raises anxieties amongst the political class and is unlikely to fructify in the practicable future, so inter-Service co-operation within the existing collegiate system of the Chiefs of Staff Committee will have to be revived and redesigned, if necessary, utilising the existing structures of higher defence.

But the great abyss in India in the organisation of higher defence and net-centric applications of battlefield management lies at a level that remains unexplored so far—that of integrated triservice theatre commands which are the critical operational level for the conduct of integrated net-centric warfare in the information age. The recently constituted Andamans and Nicobar Command indicates the correct way ahead and there is a requirement to push the process further by

establishing more such entities. The topic requires a separate discussion and will not be further addressed here, except to repeat that battle management in the Indian context cannot be fully implemented unless tri-service structures of higher command and control are revived.

Different Operating Environments Their respective operating environments facilitate adoption of net-centric principles by some Services more than others. Due to the nature of the tasks carried out by each service and the medium in which they operate, there is a requirement to examine and assess the applicability of fully netcentric communications in the Indian environment, where the Indian Navy and Airforce are more technology intensive while the Indian Army has to operate in a more manpower intensive mode.

Nevertheless, on dispassionate assessment, the Indian armed forces are really not too badly placed in terms of technological assets available for integration into BMS. A major

DSI

asset here is the extensive secure communication systems in each service deployed as wide area networks for secure intra-Service communications. There is a lack of structured inter-Service connectivity but this is being rectified by projects like the Defence Communication Network now under development.

For the present, the existing communication resources of each Service can be adapted for inter-Service communications by engineering communications gateways or portals as established protocols, a critical area that requires to be addressed expeditiously. It should not be particularly difficult task to establish interconnectivity between these separate communications systems of the three Services.

Satellite inputs are another major component of Battle Management Systems and India is fortunate to be one of the few with a developed space programme. The national satellite series, the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) consisting of 11 satellites carrying 199

DEFENDER® Armor Safeguards against Lethal Threats Ceradyne DEFENDER® armor protects warfighters against the most dangerous ballistic threats. With vertically integrated manufacturing, state-of-the-art materials and progressive engineering, Ceradyne has been the leader in advanced lifesaving technology for more than forty years.

- Rugged lightweight individual combatant protection - Vehicle crew survivability armor application - Lightweight aircraft armor protection systems - Custom vehicle armor defense systems - Naval vessel modular composite armor

Defending Warfighters around the World

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India Telefax: 011-26493333 Email: rmohan19@hotmail.com www.ceradyne.com

26

BATTLEFIELD MANAGEMENT.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:50 AM Page 5

TECHNOLOGY The tactical communication network Akash, based on the frequency-hopping StarsV radio series, is coming into service in a phased manner.

Bharat Electronics Limited was awarded the contract in 2004 to develop an Artillery Combat Command and Control System Shakti for the Indian Army, to be implemented by 2015.

Akash, the tactical communication network

transponder in various wave bands providing facilities for civilian services.

INSAT was launched by the Indian Space Research Organisation and was not designed for military usage, but nevertheless its output constitutes a national common-user resource accessible for communications networks and nonmilitary imagery.

The Indian Air Force is well placed with an extensive battlefield management network of airborne sensors, radar stations and ground control operations centers, besides the recently acquired Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), based on a hybrid of Russian platforms and Israeli sensors and control systems, all interlinked by the Air Defence Ground Environment System as the backbone communication network.

The Indian Navy is developing its own network centric communication network based on Indian communications satellites, which will incorporate its surface, aerial and undersea sensor systems mounted on ships, aircraft and submarines.

The Indian Army, on its part, uses the Army Static Communications Network and the Army Engineering Network AREN for mobile communications, both of which are being upgraded for assimilation of next generation technology.

The tactical communication network Akash, based on the frequency-hopping

Stars V radio series, is coming into service in a phased manner. Bharat Electronics Limited was awarded the contract in 2004 to develop an Artillery Combat Command and Control System Shakti for the Indian Army to be implemented by 2015. India also has a relatively well developed network of laboratories and production units for research, development and production of defence equipment.

The extensive Defence Research and Development Organisation is the premier agency, with a network of 50 laboratories for military research and development, while the Ordnance Factories Board operates 40 defence production units of various types and the defence public sector another eight. The private sector too, hitherto a minor player in the defence sector, is gaining in strength.

The American experience with NCW and BMS is a case in point, where the initial programmes that focussed on what was to evolve into NCW and battle management were initiated in the 1950s and 1960s, after the end of the Second World War and the Korean War. Initial efforts were limited to programmes of computer-assisted communications and it was only around the 80s (i.e. after three decades) that a socalled “third generation� prototype BMS could be evolved.

After further refinements and experimentation, a fifth generation system

28

�

known as the Army Tactical Command Control System was fielded in time for the First Gulf War in 1990 (i.e. after another additional decade had elapsed). Even these encountered a large number of problems, to overcome which the US Army undertook a major exercise in force restructuring known as Force XXI, finally organising the first digitally networked division by 2000 and the first digitally networked corps-level formation in 2004, by which time a total time period of over 50 years had elapsed, a factor Indian planners in the field require to take note of.

Induction of technology for large-scale transformations of armed forces in the netcentric environment is a resource intensive process and is naturally dependent on the availability of funds, which may limit its implementation in the classic theoretical connotation of fully networked forces. The approach will then require to be modified, shifting the focus to incremental development of key components and the integration of existing systems already in service into the desired battle management networks. Further modernisation can be planned accordingly.

Battle management is an intensely holistic process, requiring an attitudinal transformation in the Armed Forces, emphasising joint-Service functioning above all else, implemented technologically, organisationally and culturally.

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MMRCA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:52 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

A FIGHTING C HANCE The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal must go beyond simple purchase and even license manufacture to the infusion of various levels of technology

DSI

JASJIT SINGH

KEY POINTS

n A synergy needs to be created between the legitimate concerns of the Original Equipment Manufacturers and Indian interests that will be mutually acceptable. n The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft will set the model for future military and civil terms of system acquisitions and technology transfer and, therefore, become potentially the mother of all deals.

W

hen competing aerospace manufacturers and eminent organisations like the US-India Business Council, the US Aerospace Industries Association, the UK ADS, French GIFAS, German BDLI, Canadian, Israeli and Russian industries come together, in a show of solidarity, to write to the Defence Minister A.K. Antony asking for a series of changes to be made to the core issues concerning the complex Medium MultiRole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, their views must be given due attention.

These are major influential institutions dealing with aerospace manufacturing sectors in the Western world and their recommendations deserve due consideration even though all the main issues have been under discussion and public debate for many years. What we need to do is create a synergy between the legitimate concerns of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and Indian interests that will be mutually acceptable. As much as the final selection of the aircraft and the terms of their sale will be decided taking geopolitical factors into account, so should some of the proposals of the OEMs. For example, since the MMRCA deal requires 50 percent offsets, it is be reasonable to raise the equity level to 49 percent. But, in other cases, it could be placed on a scale between 26-49 percent depending upon the extent of the deal, nature of the equipment, level of offsets and the extent and quality of technology being transferred.

The central point is that each acquisition is

Boeing’s F/A-18E/F

30

31

MMRCA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:52 AM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

A FIGHTING C HANCE The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal must go beyond simple purchase and even license manufacture to the infusion of various levels of technology

DSI

JASJIT SINGH

KEY POINTS

n A synergy needs to be created between the legitimate concerns of the Original Equipment Manufacturers and Indian interests that will be mutually acceptable. n The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft will set the model for future military and civil terms of system acquisitions and technology transfer and, therefore, become potentially the mother of all deals.

W

hen competing aerospace manufacturers and eminent organisations like the US-India Business Council, the US Aerospace Industries Association, the UK ADS, French GIFAS, German BDLI, Canadian, Israeli and Russian industries come together, in a show of solidarity, to write to the Defence Minister A.K. Antony asking for a series of changes to be made to the core issues concerning the complex Medium MultiRole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, their views must be given due attention.

These are major influential institutions dealing with aerospace manufacturing sectors in the Western world and their recommendations deserve due consideration even though all the main issues have been under discussion and public debate for many years. What we need to do is create a synergy between the legitimate concerns of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and Indian interests that will be mutually acceptable. As much as the final selection of the aircraft and the terms of their sale will be decided taking geopolitical factors into account, so should some of the proposals of the OEMs. For example, since the MMRCA deal requires 50 percent offsets, it is be reasonable to raise the equity level to 49 percent. But, in other cases, it could be placed on a scale between 26-49 percent depending upon the extent of the deal, nature of the equipment, level of offsets and the extent and quality of technology being transferred.

The central point is that each acquisition is

Boeing’s F/A-18E/F

30

31

MMRCA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:52 AM Page 3

COMBAT AIRCRAFT Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen NG aircraft fighter

unique in many ways and must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis within a broad policy framework. New Delhi needs to shed the Bofors Syndrome to evolve such a framework of policy with clear objectives and defined goals making them public.

Unfortunately, the timing of the arms associations recommendation carries a strong risk of being misunderstood and this must be avoided. At this stage, when the technical evaluation of the six aircraft in the run for the MMRCA deal has been completed and price negotiations are expected to follow, the approach taken by the foreign companies is bound to be seen as arm-twisting, especially since President Barack Obama, President Nicolas Sarkozy and other heads of State with a vested interest in the Indian MMRCA decision are due to travel to New Delhi in the coming months.

From the Indian perspective, we need to be clear about the central policy goals of arms acquisition.

Foreign Direct Investment is important, although we have adequate reserves, but that should not be the driving factor of the deals. What is vital

is that the MMRCA deal must go well beyond a simple purchase and even license manufacture to infusion of technology, high-end as well as lower, which will further enable designing systems in India.

We were lulled in the past into the belief that transfer of technology was taking place in licence manufacture while the reality was that it was production technology that was transferred and not the design data and technology. This is why we had to go back to Moscow to upgrade even the comparatively less sophisticated aircraft like the MiG-21. We have the Sukhoi-30 being manufactured under licence, though we don’t know how much design data is being transferred.

Sound Principles It is imperative that the deal is based on sound principles. Compared to earlier times, the design life of modern weapons systems like combat aircraft has increased substantively, with the MMRCA’s lifespan being close to 30-40 years. But technology keeps marching forward. Hence, it is inevitable that the aircraft acquired will

32

require a mid-life upgrade, 10-15 years after it enters service and another one a decade later.

This will provide a benchmark criterion for offsets to establish the ability to design and undertake these upgrades of systems, sub-systems and components in India.

This can be expected only if the prime manufacturers establish the necessary design, development and manufacture facilities in India and the first upgrade (at a higher level of technology) is undertaken jointly with the ratio of Indian design contribution increasing to 70 percent for the second upgrade. This implies that the replacement aircraft will be designed in India with close cooperation from the prime manufacturer which becomes a partner today.

But there are other Indian concerns also. The first is the issue of technology controls that still impact any acquisition of arms by India. It is important that these must be wound down if mutually beneficial military-technical cooperation is to be built, consistent with the realities of the 21st century.

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MMRCA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:53 AM Page 5

OCTOBER 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT President Obama, specifically, will need to give serious thought to this issue and work out policy solutions to make necessary modifications, if not elimination, to their application to India. It will be helpful if Western companies and their associations also convey this and other issues from the Indian side to their government at this stage and, like their current demands to the Indian government, make recommendations to their governments transparent to India.

Second, the MMRCA is a landmark deal, not because of its cost or size (the Su30MKI is much bigger), but because it goes past the six-decade-old paradigm in India. Times have changed and we need to understand that India, in general, and this government in particular, is doing everything in its power to ensure a sustained high economic growth. But we have a long way to go.

Having maintained this even through the last few years of global economic meltdown has raised our confidence for the future.

This requires substantive infusion of modern military, dual-use and even civil technology along with robust industrial and energy growth.

The MMRCA will set the model for future military and civil terms of system acquisitions and technology transfer and, therefore, becomes potentially the mother of all deals; hence the need to get it right and do it as early as possible.

The above must be seen from the fact that the Chinese and their ‘all weather’ friendly-client, Pakistan, have been furiously modernising and expanding their air force with fourth generation aircraft, force multipliers and nuclear weapons/missiles. The fact that Pakistan is getting them at low prices from both China and the United States is not lost on India.

China has also been showing signs of increasing assertiveness and has even adopted a position on Kashmir that goes against the framework of the Transfer of Power by the British and the India-Pakistan Shimla Agreement of July 1972, besides the UN-brokered Indus Waters Treaty.

The third factor is the rapid modernisation of China’s military and its new doctrine and strategy of winning future wars through ‘command of the air’ as it spelt out in its defence white paper of December 2004.

Chinese Air Force commanders have been stating in public that they have moved from territorial defence to long range precision strikes beyond the borders and its capability acquisition supports that

DSI

We were lulled in the past into the belief that a transfer of technology was taking place in licence manufacture, while the reality was that it was production technology that was transferred and not the design data and technology.This is why we had to go back to Moscow to upgrade even the comparatively less sophisticated aircraft like the MiG-21.

Dassault’s Rafale

posture. China, in particular, has not only acquired a large number of Fourth Generation Aircraft like the Russian Su-27 and Su30MKK (now nearly 300 plus and building), but has been able to modernise its aircraft industry with Russian assistance, which supplied a range of high technology arms and technology after 1992.

According to the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, China posses 18 AEW&C/AWACS and aerial refuelling aircraft which will make it possible for its air force to operate from even beyond Tibet. It has built more than nine runways on the Tibetan plateau with length and facilities to operate modern fighters with full fuel and armament load.

At the same time, Pakistan is acquiring a large number of F-16 (Block 50) from the

34

United States, 40 J-10 and around 250 of the joint-venture JF-17 powered by a MiG-29 engine from China, besides nearly 10 AEW&C/AWACS from China and Sweden. China has an extensive and modern expanding space programme and it demonstrated its ASAT (anti-satellite) capability by shooting down its old satellite in January 2007. Put simply, the aerospace balance has been shifting against India now for the past decade and in favour of China and Pakistan, individually and collectively.

Window of Vulnerability What India faces is a window of vulnerability for the coming decade. The Indian Air Force (IAF) requires combat aircraft urgently. In 1963, the Cabinet had authorised a force level of 64 squadron

(including 50 combat squadrons). But the actual force level was never built up to that level for a variety of reasons including the fact that the Chinese Air Force, in spite of its 6,000 aircraft, had obsolete technology and the cultural revolution had severely degraded its human and operational capability.

Hence in India, an interim force level of 35 combat squadrons continued till the late 1980s when with the induction of two squadrons each of Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 the force level increased to 39 squadrons in consonance with the Chinese military modernisation. After that the IAF was not able to modernise even the existing force level due to the government cutting back even on budgeted funds for modernisation.

The delay in the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft’s (LCA) entry into service has made matters worse. In a replay of the early 1960s, there is an urgent need for expeditious foreign assistance to bring the LCAs into service. The result has been that the IAF force level has come down from the authorised of 39.5 combat squadrons to around 30 in an unplanned manner.

A simple calculation indicates that this is grossly inadequate against China and Pakistan, individually and collectively. The IAF already has a heavy fighter, the Su30MKI which is in service, and the quantity of local production has been enhanced in view of the delay in the selection of the MMRCA let alone its induction.

If the MMRCA deal flounders, India’s choice will fall on equipping itself with two

35

”

types of Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (instead of the current approach to have three types, heavy, medium and light): the Sukhoi’s Su-30MKI being already built in the country and a large force (reverting to the original figure of 450 aircraft) of indigenous LCA Mk.1, followed quickly by its Mark.II version.

The government must look seriously at this fall back option while negotiating the MMRCA deal since the prototype fifth generation fighter being developed by Russia and India is already flying. Perhaps forming an Apex Committee may be useful at this stage, especially to look at the technoeconomic impact of the two options.

The most crucial issue next to policy and priorities of technological growth in the country is the management of the process, especially the offsets clauses. A suggestion has been made to establish an Offsets Management Authority. This is a sound proposal. But establishing it under the Ministry of Commerce will lead to serious problems in the future.

The logical approach will be to set it up as an autonomous high-powered body under the Prime Minister’s Chief Technology Adviser, along with a Working Group under the Scientific Adviser to the Chief of Air Staff composed of eminent scientists and IAF personnel.

MMRCA.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:53 AM Page 5

OCTOBER 2010

COMBAT AIRCRAFT President Obama, specifically, will need to give serious thought to this issue and work out policy solutions to make necessary modifications, if not elimination, to their application to India. It will be helpful if Western companies and their associations also convey this and other issues from the Indian side to their government at this stage and, like their current demands to the Indian government, make recommendations to their governments transparent to India.

Second, the MMRCA is a landmark deal, not because of its cost or size (the Su30MKI is much bigger), but because it goes past the six-decade-old paradigm in India. Times have changed and we need to understand that India, in general, and this government in particular, is doing everything in its power to ensure a sustained high economic growth. But we have a long way to go.

Having maintained this even through the last few years of global economic meltdown has raised our confidence for the future.

This requires substantive infusion of modern military, dual-use and even civil technology along with robust industrial and energy growth.

The MMRCA will set the model for future military and civil terms of system acquisitions and technology transfer and, therefore, becomes potentially the mother of all deals; hence the need to get it right and do it as early as possible.

The above must be seen from the fact that the Chinese and their ‘all weather’ friendly-client, Pakistan, have been furiously modernising and expanding their air force with fourth generation aircraft, force multipliers and nuclear weapons/missiles. The fact that Pakistan is getting them at low prices from both China and the United States is not lost on India.

China has also been showing signs of increasing assertiveness and has even adopted a position on Kashmir that goes against the framework of the Transfer of Power by the British and the India-Pakistan Shimla Agreement of July 1972, besides the UN-brokered Indus Waters Treaty.

The third factor is the rapid modernisation of China’s military and its new doctrine and strategy of winning future wars through ‘command of the air’ as it spelt out in its defence white paper of December 2004.

Chinese Air Force commanders have been stating in public that they have moved from territorial defence to long range precision strikes beyond the borders and its capability acquisition supports that

DSI

We were lulled in the past into the belief that a transfer of technology was taking place in licence manufacture, while the reality was that it was production technology that was transferred and not the design data and technology.This is why we had to go back to Moscow to upgrade even the comparatively less sophisticated aircraft like the MiG-21.

Dassault’s Rafale

posture. China, in particular, has not only acquired a large number of Fourth Generation Aircraft like the Russian Su-27 and Su30MKK (now nearly 300 plus and building), but has been able to modernise its aircraft industry with Russian assistance, which supplied a range of high technology arms and technology after 1992.

According to the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, China posses 18 AEW&C/AWACS and aerial refuelling aircraft which will make it possible for its air force to operate from even beyond Tibet. It has built more than nine runways on the Tibetan plateau with length and facilities to operate modern fighters with full fuel and armament load.

At the same time, Pakistan is acquiring a large number of F-16 (Block 50) from the

34

United States, 40 J-10 and around 250 of the joint-venture JF-17 powered by a MiG-29 engine from China, besides nearly 10 AEW&C/AWACS from China and Sweden. China has an extensive and modern expanding space programme and it demonstrated its ASAT (anti-satellite) capability by shooting down its old satellite in January 2007. Put simply, the aerospace balance has been shifting against India now for the past decade and in favour of China and Pakistan, individually and collectively.

Window of Vulnerability What India faces is a window of vulnerability for the coming decade. The Indian Air Force (IAF) requires combat aircraft urgently. In 1963, the Cabinet had authorised a force level of 64 squadron

(including 50 combat squadrons). But the actual force level was never built up to that level for a variety of reasons including the fact that the Chinese Air Force, in spite of its 6,000 aircraft, had obsolete technology and the cultural revolution had severely degraded its human and operational capability.

Hence in India, an interim force level of 35 combat squadrons continued till the late 1980s when with the induction of two squadrons each of Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 the force level increased to 39 squadrons in consonance with the Chinese military modernisation. After that the IAF was not able to modernise even the existing force level due to the government cutting back even on budgeted funds for modernisation.

The delay in the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft’s (LCA) entry into service has made matters worse. In a replay of the early 1960s, there is an urgent need for expeditious foreign assistance to bring the LCAs into service. The result has been that the IAF force level has come down from the authorised of 39.5 combat squadrons to around 30 in an unplanned manner.

A simple calculation indicates that this is grossly inadequate against China and Pakistan, individually and collectively. The IAF already has a heavy fighter, the Su30MKI which is in service, and the quantity of local production has been enhanced in view of the delay in the selection of the MMRCA let alone its induction.

If the MMRCA deal flounders, India’s choice will fall on equipping itself with two

35

”

types of Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (instead of the current approach to have three types, heavy, medium and light): the Sukhoi’s Su-30MKI being already built in the country and a large force (reverting to the original figure of 450 aircraft) of indigenous LCA Mk.1, followed quickly by its Mark.II version.

The government must look seriously at this fall back option while negotiating the MMRCA deal since the prototype fifth generation fighter being developed by Russia and India is already flying. Perhaps forming an Apex Committee may be useful at this stage, especially to look at the technoeconomic impact of the two options.

The most crucial issue next to policy and priorities of technological growth in the country is the management of the process, especially the offsets clauses. A suggestion has been made to establish an Offsets Management Authority. This is a sound proposal. But establishing it under the Ministry of Commerce will lead to serious problems in the future.

The logical approach will be to set it up as an autonomous high-powered body under the Prime Minister’s Chief Technology Adviser, along with a Working Group under the Scientific Adviser to the Chief of Air Staff composed of eminent scientists and IAF personnel.

ANTI PIRACY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:00 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

SECURITY

DSI

Addressing the malignancy of piracy in the Indian Ocean Region calls for much greater regional cooperation

INS Delhi, a guided missile destroyer

C. UDAY BHASKAR

KEY POINTS

n India is emerging as a credible maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean which is plagued by piracy on the high seas and related crimes. n To effectively quarantine and then eliminate piracy, the real and complex action has to be on land. n It is important to arrive at consensually accepted operational protocols at sea, so that appropriate deterrent is levied on the pirates when brought ashore.

AFP

I

PERIL IN THE SEAS 36

n mid-September, the Indian Navy’s (IN) cynosure, the guided missile destroyer, INS Delhi, foiled a fourth attempt of piracy off the Yemeni coast when it intercepted and disarmed a dhow that was seeking to approach a convoy of six merchant ships. The action was swift as the IN’s marine commandos boarded the dhow and recovered ammunition and small arms that could have been used to hijack an unarmed merchant ship.

And for the record, since the IN began its anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008, the silent-service has escorted more than 1,200 ships belonging to different nations through the International Recommended Transit Corridor in the south western Indian Ocean. In short, India is emerging as a credible maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean which is plagued by low intensity conflict that includes piracy on the high seas and related crimes while merchant ships are entering and leaving congested ports.

India’s effort in combating piracy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been consistently commendable and the most celebrated case is that of the MV Alondra Rainbow in October 1999. The Japaneseowned merchant vessel flying a Panamanian flag was enroute from

37

Indonesia to Japan with a cargo of 7,000 tonnes of high-value aluminium ingots when it was hijacked in the South China Sea and diverted. Very soon, the vessel was sighted off Kochi and ships and aircraft of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) supported by the IN were able to board and apprehend the hijacked vessel and capture the pirates.

The global maritime community applauded the Indian initiative and the then Director General of ICG, Vice Admiral John D’Silva recalls how the incident positively impacted the perception about India—particularly in Japan—which at the time was incensed by India’s nuclear tests of May 1998.

In the intervening decade, piracy has again reared its head in a visible manner and while the challenge has been kept under some degree of consensual control in the Malacca-South China Sea corridor, the Somali piracy threat has compelled major naval powers to evolve a collective response that manifested itself in the Indian Navy’s Gulf of Aden October 2008 initiative. It is pertinent to note that China has also joined this effort and, since end 2008, the PLA Navy has been maintaining a presence off the Somali coast to deal with the piracy menace. This development is strategically significant as China has deployed its naval ships in the Indian Ocean for the first time since the People’s Republic of China was formed in 1949 and this is being projected as part of a multi-national anti-piracy effort.

Enhancing Efficacy The IN operates off the west coast of Africa along with other navies, including NATO forces, the EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces) as well as through interaction with some other navies that operate independently like the IN. Soon after it began operations off east Africa, in November 2008, an Indian warship, INS Tabar, neutralised a piracy attempt with clinical precision. This response is held up in the naval fraternity as the Tabar benchmark to emulate. To

ANTI PIRACY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:00 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

SECURITY

DSI

Addressing the malignancy of piracy in the Indian Ocean Region calls for much greater regional cooperation

INS Delhi, a guided missile destroyer

C. UDAY BHASKAR

KEY POINTS

n India is emerging as a credible maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean which is plagued by piracy on the high seas and related crimes. n To effectively quarantine and then eliminate piracy, the real and complex action has to be on land. n It is important to arrive at consensually accepted operational protocols at sea, so that appropriate deterrent is levied on the pirates when brought ashore.

AFP

I

PERIL IN THE SEAS 36

n mid-September, the Indian Navy’s (IN) cynosure, the guided missile destroyer, INS Delhi, foiled a fourth attempt of piracy off the Yemeni coast when it intercepted and disarmed a dhow that was seeking to approach a convoy of six merchant ships. The action was swift as the IN’s marine commandos boarded the dhow and recovered ammunition and small arms that could have been used to hijack an unarmed merchant ship.

And for the record, since the IN began its anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008, the silent-service has escorted more than 1,200 ships belonging to different nations through the International Recommended Transit Corridor in the south western Indian Ocean. In short, India is emerging as a credible maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean which is plagued by low intensity conflict that includes piracy on the high seas and related crimes while merchant ships are entering and leaving congested ports.

India’s effort in combating piracy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been consistently commendable and the most celebrated case is that of the MV Alondra Rainbow in October 1999. The Japaneseowned merchant vessel flying a Panamanian flag was enroute from

37

Indonesia to Japan with a cargo of 7,000 tonnes of high-value aluminium ingots when it was hijacked in the South China Sea and diverted. Very soon, the vessel was sighted off Kochi and ships and aircraft of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) supported by the IN were able to board and apprehend the hijacked vessel and capture the pirates.

The global maritime community applauded the Indian initiative and the then Director General of ICG, Vice Admiral John D’Silva recalls how the incident positively impacted the perception about India—particularly in Japan—which at the time was incensed by India’s nuclear tests of May 1998.

In the intervening decade, piracy has again reared its head in a visible manner and while the challenge has been kept under some degree of consensual control in the Malacca-South China Sea corridor, the Somali piracy threat has compelled major naval powers to evolve a collective response that manifested itself in the Indian Navy’s Gulf of Aden October 2008 initiative. It is pertinent to note that China has also joined this effort and, since end 2008, the PLA Navy has been maintaining a presence off the Somali coast to deal with the piracy menace. This development is strategically significant as China has deployed its naval ships in the Indian Ocean for the first time since the People’s Republic of China was formed in 1949 and this is being projected as part of a multi-national anti-piracy effort.

Enhancing Efficacy The IN operates off the west coast of Africa along with other navies, including NATO forces, the EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces) as well as through interaction with some other navies that operate independently like the IN. Soon after it began operations off east Africa, in November 2008, an Indian warship, INS Tabar, neutralised a piracy attempt with clinical precision. This response is held up in the naval fraternity as the Tabar benchmark to emulate. To

ANTI PIRACY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:09 PM Page 3

OCTOBER 2010

SECURITY

DSI

so effete as to border on the piracy effort. It is a truism An alleged pirate vessel that to effectively quarantine burns after being hit during absurd and comical.

The Alondra Rainbow and then eliminate piracy, anti-piracy operations at the real and complex action sea in the Gulf of Aden incident is a case in point. has to be on land and In late 1999, the global Somalia is a case in point. While one may community showered praise on the ICG for applaud the IN’s ability to respond its valiant rescue effort. The appre-hended decisively, as very soon the 2,000-escorted pirates were then brought to Indian courts ship benchmark will be crossed, the virus for trial and this is where the lacunae in the of piracy remains unchecked along the anti-piracy effort become so starkly visible, Somalia-Yemen coast. Local conditions are revealing its many inadequacies. The far from stable and the economy, once Indian judicial process took almost four dependent on traditional fishing and years to arrive at a determination and, in coastal shipping, has almost disappeared. 2003, the pirates were found guilty and Political instability, lawlessness, low food sentenced only to be released two years availability and the spread of radical later, in 2005, on the orders of the Bombay ideologies has taken its toll in different parts High Court. Much the same pattern obtains of the IOR littoral and most assessments with the apprehended pirates off Somalia agree that the Somali piracy cannot be and Yemen and there is no consensus on effectively and equitably redressed by swift how to deal with these criminal elements. and repeated naval/coast guard action Many littoral countries do not want them alone. The politico-military and socio- brought ashore and navies that intercept economic conditions on land must be pirate craft have unwritten norms not to conducive to legitimate economic activity arrest the pirates and detain them on board so that piracy does not become a low- their ships. The legal wrangle that follows risk/high-return activity, more so when the with its attendant human rights focus is too action taken against apprehended pirates is complex and time-consuming for a naval

38

AFP

”

facilitate greater coordination, information exchange through the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction, (SHADE) mechanism has been instituted to enhance the efficacy of the patrols. The US Navy supported by its allies is the major presence in this quadrant of the Indian Ocean to complement its military operations in the Af-Pak theatre as also in Iraq.

However, navies are potent instruments of trans-border national power and expensive to sustain as many nations including the UK (its Royal Navy was the unchallenged power in the IOR for over 100 years) are acknowledging. Antipiracy operations are one aspect of the constabulary role that navies perform and it would be misleading to infer from the current piracy interest-index that navies are only meant to address this challenge at sea. Yet the problem must be addressed, lest the failed-State syndrome extend to sea.

While it is commendable that the IN— ably complemented by the ICG—have risen to the challenge of piracy across the IOR, this is only one part of the total anti-

AFP

The strategic linkage is that the current incidence of piracy is deemed low intensity and below the median of macro violence or consequence, but, if left unchecked, this could encourage the acceptance of increasing banditry and piracy in certain large bodies of water that would embolden the non-State entity who would then exploit this domain to advance its own agenda.

an uneasy status quo till the ship to handle. This is where the Pirates who hijacked next incident. comic-cum-absurd pattern the Japanese-owned If left unchecked, this could unfolds, wherein pirates are MV Alondra Rainbow encourage the acceptance of disarmed, perhaps given a cuff being inspected by increasing banditry/piracy in or two and then allowed to sail Indian Coast certain large bodies of water scot-free, only to return the next Guard officials that will embolden the nontime. The piracy underworld has some wry tales to relate about which State entity who will exploit this domain to navies are to be avoided and who provides advance their own agenda. The worst case the best food and entertainment to captives. scenario is the 9/11 variation in a major container port or the Weapons of Mass Destruction threat from sea. These Regional Cooperation Addressing the piracy malignancy in the exigencies may be low probability but in IOR calls for much greater regional the event they do occur, the consequences cooperation than has been evidenced so and attendant disruption would be very far for one compelling reason. The high and hence pre-emption is imperative.

India has made some encouraging moves strategic linkage is that the current incidence of piracy is deemed low on the regional canvas and has mooted the intensity and below the median of macro the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium that violence or consequence, that is a few seeks to bring IOR navies together. In the last merchant ships get hijacked, the media meeting held in Abu Dhabi, a strong case focusses on this event briefly, military was made by India for greater regional intervention is deemed imprudent or not deliberations on the piracy issue and various cost-effective, a ransom is demanded and proposals were mooted. India is already very soon the matter is resolved through party to Regional Cooperation Agreement the equivalent of cheque-book diplomacy on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery and all the principal actors soon revert to against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) whose

39

objective is information sharing, capacity building, mutual legal assistance and cooperative arrangements in the field of piracy and armed robbery. The ICG is the nodal point in India for this initiative and the Director-General of ICG is the designated Indian Governor.

The need to arrive at consensually accepted operational protocols at sea and then taking the pirates ashore wherein the appropriate deterrent is levied is the need of the hour. This cannot be done if the politico-bureaucratic will does not exist across the IOR. Just as the global community became more sensitised to the enormity of State support to religious radicalism inspired terrorism after the tragedy of 9/11, when India became more aware of its maritime vulnerabilities after the November 2008 Mumbai attack, the potential virulence of piracy in the IOR cannot be underestimated.

The dramatic rescue of the Alondra Rainbow or the exploits of the INS Tabar cannot be seen in isolation from the much larger problem that lurks in the Indian Ocean and the complacency ashore.

ANTI PIRACY.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:09 PM Page 3

OCTOBER 2010

SECURITY

DSI

so effete as to border on the piracy effort. It is a truism An alleged pirate vessel that to effectively quarantine burns after being hit during absurd and comical.

The Alondra Rainbow and then eliminate piracy, anti-piracy operations at the real and complex action sea in the Gulf of Aden incident is a case in point. has to be on land and In late 1999, the global Somalia is a case in point. While one may community showered praise on the ICG for applaud the IN’s ability to respond its valiant rescue effort. The appre-hended decisively, as very soon the 2,000-escorted pirates were then brought to Indian courts ship benchmark will be crossed, the virus for trial and this is where the lacunae in the of piracy remains unchecked along the anti-piracy effort become so starkly visible, Somalia-Yemen coast. Local conditions are revealing its many inadequacies. The far from stable and the economy, once Indian judicial process took almost four dependent on traditional fishing and years to arrive at a determination and, in coastal shipping, has almost disappeared. 2003, the pirates were found guilty and Political instability, lawlessness, low food sentenced only to be released two years availability and the spread of radical later, in 2005, on the orders of the Bombay ideologies has taken its toll in different parts High Court. Much the same pattern obtains of the IOR littoral and most assessments with the apprehended pirates off Somalia agree that the Somali piracy cannot be and Yemen and there is no consensus on effectively and equitably redressed by swift how to deal with these criminal elements. and repeated naval/coast guard action Many littoral countries do not want them alone. The politico-military and socio- brought ashore and navies that intercept economic conditions on land must be pirate craft have unwritten norms not to conducive to legitimate economic activity arrest the pirates and detain them on board so that piracy does not become a low- their ships. The legal wrangle that follows risk/high-return activity, more so when the with its attendant human rights focus is too action taken against apprehended pirates is complex and time-consuming for a naval

38

AFP

”

facilitate greater coordination, information exchange through the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction, (SHADE) mechanism has been instituted to enhance the efficacy of the patrols. The US Navy supported by its allies is the major presence in this quadrant of the Indian Ocean to complement its military operations in the Af-Pak theatre as also in Iraq.

However, navies are potent instruments of trans-border national power and expensive to sustain as many nations including the UK (its Royal Navy was the unchallenged power in the IOR for over 100 years) are acknowledging. Antipiracy operations are one aspect of the constabulary role that navies perform and it would be misleading to infer from the current piracy interest-index that navies are only meant to address this challenge at sea. Yet the problem must be addressed, lest the failed-State syndrome extend to sea.

While it is commendable that the IN— ably complemented by the ICG—have risen to the challenge of piracy across the IOR, this is only one part of the total anti-

AFP

The strategic linkage is that the current incidence of piracy is deemed low intensity and below the median of macro violence or consequence, but, if left unchecked, this could encourage the acceptance of increasing banditry and piracy in certain large bodies of water that would embolden the non-State entity who would then exploit this domain to advance its own agenda.

an uneasy status quo till the ship to handle. This is where the Pirates who hijacked next incident. comic-cum-absurd pattern the Japanese-owned If left unchecked, this could unfolds, wherein pirates are MV Alondra Rainbow encourage the acceptance of disarmed, perhaps given a cuff being inspected by increasing banditry/piracy in or two and then allowed to sail Indian Coast certain large bodies of water scot-free, only to return the next Guard officials that will embolden the nontime. The piracy underworld has some wry tales to relate about which State entity who will exploit this domain to navies are to be avoided and who provides advance their own agenda. The worst case the best food and entertainment to captives. scenario is the 9/11 variation in a major container port or the Weapons of Mass Destruction threat from sea. These Regional Cooperation Addressing the piracy malignancy in the exigencies may be low probability but in IOR calls for much greater regional the event they do occur, the consequences cooperation than has been evidenced so and attendant disruption would be very far for one compelling reason. The high and hence pre-emption is imperative.

India has made some encouraging moves strategic linkage is that the current incidence of piracy is deemed low on the regional canvas and has mooted the intensity and below the median of macro the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium that violence or consequence, that is a few seeks to bring IOR navies together. In the last merchant ships get hijacked, the media meeting held in Abu Dhabi, a strong case focusses on this event briefly, military was made by India for greater regional intervention is deemed imprudent or not deliberations on the piracy issue and various cost-effective, a ransom is demanded and proposals were mooted. India is already very soon the matter is resolved through party to Regional Cooperation Agreement the equivalent of cheque-book diplomacy on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery and all the principal actors soon revert to against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) whose

39

objective is information sharing, capacity building, mutual legal assistance and cooperative arrangements in the field of piracy and armed robbery. The ICG is the nodal point in India for this initiative and the Director-General of ICG is the designated Indian Governor.

The need to arrive at consensually accepted operational protocols at sea and then taking the pirates ashore wherein the appropriate deterrent is levied is the need of the hour. This cannot be done if the politico-bureaucratic will does not exist across the IOR. Just as the global community became more sensitised to the enormity of State support to religious radicalism inspired terrorism after the tragedy of 9/11, when India became more aware of its maritime vulnerabilities after the November 2008 Mumbai attack, the potential virulence of piracy in the IOR cannot be underestimated.

The dramatic rescue of the Alondra Rainbow or the exploits of the INS Tabar cannot be seen in isolation from the much larger problem that lurks in the Indian Ocean and the complacency ashore.

Rosoborn2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 1:57 PM Page 2

ROSOBORONEXPORT

Russian Helicopters for India:

Mi-26T - amazing the whole world

reliability and quality proven by time ndia is a long-standing and dependable partner of Russia. Military technical cooperation between our countries started in November 1964 when the first agreement on delivery to India of a batch of the MiG-21 aircraft was signed, shortly followed by agreements on delivery of light tanks and helicopters. For a long period of time India has been absorbing nearly one third of Russia's total arms exports. As a result, Indian armed forces have their arsenal completed by 70 percent with Soviet/Russian weaponry, whereas Russia's overall arms exports during the whole period of cooperation between the two countries has amounted to 50 billion US dollars.

From the very beginning the strategic partnership of both countries has been constantly strengthened, and new forms and lines of mutually advantageous cooperation have been explored. Even though India seeks to diversify arms procurement sources, it still remains Russia's most important and trusted partner.

Chief of the Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Pradeep V. Naik made a statement underpinning the two countries' activities in the military technical cooperation area. In the last days of this August both Indian and international media quoted him as saying that India intended to procure another 59 Russian

I

Mi-17 helicopters in addition to already ordered 80 such craft.

BEST EQUIPMENT FOR CLOSE PARTNERS Russia has been long considered a leader in helicopter production. The world’s helicopter production output since 1950 has amounted to 65,000 helicopters. Our country has produced 26,000 helicopters, and exported 6,000 of them.

Bright prospects opening now for Russia would allow it, according to estimates of analysts, to secure nearly eight percent of the world's helicopter market by 2015.

There are plans to build over 200 helicopters this year, whereas in general Russian helicopter production grows by 20-30 percent annually.

Nowadays Russian-made helicopters are operated in great numbers in Asian Pacific countries.

Meanwhile Rosoboronexport is expanding into other new markets. In accordance with the signed contracts Venezuela has taken delivery of large batches of the Mi-17 type helicopters from Russia, similar type helicopters are planned for delivery to Egypt and other countries, while the Mi-35M helicopters are being delivered to Brazil. In July 2010 Peru signed a contract for purchase of the Mi-171Sh and

DSI Marketing Promotion

Mi-26T - transportation of Tu-134 aircraft in April 2009

Mi-35P helicopters. Officials from the Peruvian Ministry of Defence emphasized their long time familiarity with Russian combat systems. Russian helicopters have acquired an excellent reputation in that country. They have proved themselves as enduring and robust air systems reliably operating in harsh climatic conditions, and what’s most important they are armed with powerful armaments. In addition, the helicopters have a vast upgrading potential.

Here are some news of last weeks. At the end of this August a contract for delivery of the Mi-171E military transport helicopters for the Ministry of Defence of Argentine has been signed, which is the first such document in the newest history of the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the Argentine Republic.

Deliveries of the helicopters are scheduled to start in 2010 and will be finished in 2011.

Nonetheless Russian designers and manufacturers are not going to rest on the laurels. At present two types of combat helicopters - Mi-29N and Ka-52 Alligator are in series production. The new Mi-38 transport helicopter approaches its final development stage. In the meanwhile Russian designers have started working on two entirely new high speed helicopter designs of the latest generation the Ka-92 and M-X1, which are expected to be successfully competing with the US Sikorsky X1 and X2 rotorcraft.

Russian exporters represented by Rosoboronexport in the world helicopter market are prepared to deliver large batches of modern helicopters as well as to organise their co-design and co-production together with foreign companies, including Indian ones, of such popular rotarywing

aircraft as multi purpose helicopters with a 10 tonne payload capacity.

Cooperation with Indian partners is burgeoning in other areas as well. For instance, Rosoboronexport together with Sukhoi Company and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), India have started a joint programme for the development of the fifth generation fighter. Russia and India are also teamed up in a joint programme for the development of the multipurpose transport aircraft (MTA) with an up to 20 tonne payload capacity. Russia is the only country which agrees to transfer to India engineering technologies, thus opening to its strategic partner new horizons in design and production of both up-to-date and unique prospective weapon systems and military equipment.

Experts of Rosoboronexport see substantial additional prospects for furthering our cooperation in case that Russia wins in the tender for delivery to India of 126 fighters within the framework of the MMRCA programme. According to flight evaluations the Russian MiG-35 fighter stands a good chance to win. The Russian

Ka-226T can effectively operate in confined spaces, such as urban environment

aircraft is a leading contender which outperforms other competitors as regards operational capabilities and, especially, cost effectiveness.

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN INDIAN HELICOPTER TENDERS There are several helicopter tenders held in India for the benefit of the national armed forces. Russia is taking part in them with good chances of winning.

Thus, in the tender for delivery of 22 attack helicopters Rosoboronexport promotes the Mi-28NE combat helicopter fitted with a new generation integrated avionic suite. The Mi-28NE helicopter is capable of carrying out assigned missions day and night under any weather conditions. Thanks to solid armour protection of the cockpit and vital units as well as redundancy of major systems, the Mi-28NE helicopter can effectively operate under intensive enemy countermeasures.

The helicopter design realises the principle of unit cross-screening and protection of critical structure components with less important ones. The Mi-28NE carries powerful armament mix allowing it to render effective fire support to ground forces in the battlefield by defeating enemy armoured materiel, manpower, hardened facilities as well as above water and lowspeed air targets.

Russia also participates in the tender for delivery of 15 heavy lift helicopters with its Mi-26T2 contender, a new modification of the world renowned Mi-26T. The Mi-26T2 heavy lift helicopter is designed to transport military personnel and cargoes, to carry out medical evacuation of casualties as well as to fight fires, to mount large-size equipment, and to assist in construction of

Rosoborn2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 1:57 PM Page 2

ROSOBORONEXPORT

Russian Helicopters for India:

Mi-26T - amazing the whole world

reliability and quality proven by time ndia is a long-standing and dependable partner of Russia. Military technical cooperation between our countries started in November 1964 when the first agreement on delivery to India of a batch of the MiG-21 aircraft was signed, shortly followed by agreements on delivery of light tanks and helicopters. For a long period of time India has been absorbing nearly one third of Russia's total arms exports. As a result, Indian armed forces have their arsenal completed by 70 percent with Soviet/Russian weaponry, whereas Russia's overall arms exports during the whole period of cooperation between the two countries has amounted to 50 billion US dollars.

From the very beginning the strategic partnership of both countries has been constantly strengthened, and new forms and lines of mutually advantageous cooperation have been explored. Even though India seeks to diversify arms procurement sources, it still remains Russia's most important and trusted partner.

Chief of the Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Pradeep V. Naik made a statement underpinning the two countries' activities in the military technical cooperation area. In the last days of this August both Indian and international media quoted him as saying that India intended to procure another 59 Russian

I

Mi-17 helicopters in addition to already ordered 80 such craft.

BEST EQUIPMENT FOR CLOSE PARTNERS Russia has been long considered a leader in helicopter production. The world’s helicopter production output since 1950 has amounted to 65,000 helicopters. Our country has produced 26,000 helicopters, and exported 6,000 of them.

Bright prospects opening now for Russia would allow it, according to estimates of analysts, to secure nearly eight percent of the world's helicopter market by 2015.

There are plans to build over 200 helicopters this year, whereas in general Russian helicopter production grows by 20-30 percent annually.

Nowadays Russian-made helicopters are operated in great numbers in Asian Pacific countries.

Meanwhile Rosoboronexport is expanding into other new markets. In accordance with the signed contracts Venezuela has taken delivery of large batches of the Mi-17 type helicopters from Russia, similar type helicopters are planned for delivery to Egypt and other countries, while the Mi-35M helicopters are being delivered to Brazil. In July 2010 Peru signed a contract for purchase of the Mi-171Sh and

DSI Marketing Promotion

Mi-26T - transportation of Tu-134 aircraft in April 2009

Mi-35P helicopters. Officials from the Peruvian Ministry of Defence emphasized their long time familiarity with Russian combat systems. Russian helicopters have acquired an excellent reputation in that country. They have proved themselves as enduring and robust air systems reliably operating in harsh climatic conditions, and what’s most important they are armed with powerful armaments. In addition, the helicopters have a vast upgrading potential.

Here are some news of last weeks. At the end of this August a contract for delivery of the Mi-171E military transport helicopters for the Ministry of Defence of Argentine has been signed, which is the first such document in the newest history of the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the Argentine Republic.

Deliveries of the helicopters are scheduled to start in 2010 and will be finished in 2011.

Nonetheless Russian designers and manufacturers are not going to rest on the laurels. At present two types of combat helicopters - Mi-29N and Ka-52 Alligator are in series production. The new Mi-38 transport helicopter approaches its final development stage. In the meanwhile Russian designers have started working on two entirely new high speed helicopter designs of the latest generation the Ka-92 and M-X1, which are expected to be successfully competing with the US Sikorsky X1 and X2 rotorcraft.

Russian exporters represented by Rosoboronexport in the world helicopter market are prepared to deliver large batches of modern helicopters as well as to organise their co-design and co-production together with foreign companies, including Indian ones, of such popular rotarywing

aircraft as multi purpose helicopters with a 10 tonne payload capacity.

Cooperation with Indian partners is burgeoning in other areas as well. For instance, Rosoboronexport together with Sukhoi Company and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), India have started a joint programme for the development of the fifth generation fighter. Russia and India are also teamed up in a joint programme for the development of the multipurpose transport aircraft (MTA) with an up to 20 tonne payload capacity. Russia is the only country which agrees to transfer to India engineering technologies, thus opening to its strategic partner new horizons in design and production of both up-to-date and unique prospective weapon systems and military equipment.

Experts of Rosoboronexport see substantial additional prospects for furthering our cooperation in case that Russia wins in the tender for delivery to India of 126 fighters within the framework of the MMRCA programme. According to flight evaluations the Russian MiG-35 fighter stands a good chance to win. The Russian

Ka-226T can effectively operate in confined spaces, such as urban environment

aircraft is a leading contender which outperforms other competitors as regards operational capabilities and, especially, cost effectiveness.

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN INDIAN HELICOPTER TENDERS There are several helicopter tenders held in India for the benefit of the national armed forces. Russia is taking part in them with good chances of winning.

Thus, in the tender for delivery of 22 attack helicopters Rosoboronexport promotes the Mi-28NE combat helicopter fitted with a new generation integrated avionic suite. The Mi-28NE helicopter is capable of carrying out assigned missions day and night under any weather conditions. Thanks to solid armour protection of the cockpit and vital units as well as redundancy of major systems, the Mi-28NE helicopter can effectively operate under intensive enemy countermeasures.

The helicopter design realises the principle of unit cross-screening and protection of critical structure components with less important ones. The Mi-28NE carries powerful armament mix allowing it to render effective fire support to ground forces in the battlefield by defeating enemy armoured materiel, manpower, hardened facilities as well as above water and lowspeed air targets.

Russia also participates in the tender for delivery of 15 heavy lift helicopters with its Mi-26T2 contender, a new modification of the world renowned Mi-26T. The Mi-26T2 heavy lift helicopter is designed to transport military personnel and cargoes, to carry out medical evacuation of casualties as well as to fight fires, to mount large-size equipment, and to assist in construction of

Rosoborn2.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 1:58 PM Page 4

Mi-28NE at the HeliRussia-2010 Expo in Moscow

Mi-28NE - day and night, under any weather conditions

bridges, high voltage transmission lines, derricks, and so on. A refuelling modification of the helicopter accommodates in its cargo compartment a set of refuelling equipment with two modules of fuel tanks allowing transportation of 15,000 litres of fuels and lubricants. The Mi-26T2 helicopter can also carry cargoes weighing up to 20 tonnes both inside its cargo compartment and on the external sling large-size, up to 82 persons on seats, or up to 60 patients on stretchers. It is the world's heaviest lift transport helicopter comparable in efficiency with the US C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft.

The Mi-26T2 helicopter is fitted with an advanced integrated avionic suite enabling its operation day and night in fair and restricted weather conditions. At the same time its crew is reduced in size from five (standard for the Mi-26T) to two persons.

When cargoes are carried on the external sling an operator is added to the crew.

This rotary-wing craft demonstrated its superior performance qualities proper to this class during disaster relief

Mi-28NE - effective fire support to ground forces

operations in the aftermath of the fatal earthquake in Sichuan Province in China where more than 60,000 persons perished. The Mi-26T2 helicopters were used to evacuate victims of the disaster, wounded people, to deliver foodstuffs, medical goods and bulky civil engineering equipment.

Last October this prominent Russian rotary wing heavyweight again amazed the whole world. It retrieved the US CH-47 military heavy-lift helicopter weighing more than 12 tonnes downed in Afghanistan, and carried it suspended on the external sling at a range of 110 km. Its crew received a personal commendation for the mission performance from the President of the United States of America. Russia participates in the tender for delivery of 197 light surveil-lance / reconnaissance (scout) helicopters, promoting its Ka-226T multi-purpose helicopter.

The Ka-226T scout helicopter is designed to carry out various missions, such as day and night reconnaissance and surveillance, artillery fire adjustment, target reconnaissance and designation in

DSI Marketing Promotion

cooperation with attack helicopters, delivery of rapid deployment troops and cargoes, evacuation of casualties, air patrolling and column escorting.

The Ka-226T helicopter features a co-axial rotor system providing high flight characteristics surpassing those of other helicopters, especially in highland operations. Owing to its small diameter main rotors and high rated powerplant, the helicopter can effectively operate in confined spaces, such as urban environment. Small dimensions of the helicopter facilitate its transportation at a long range by car and by rail, as well as by air in military transport aircraft.

The helicopter has modular design which allows its fast retrofit for specific missions. It takes just 20-30 minutes at the most for two persons to replace modules in aerodrome/field conditions.

In particular, the passenger module is designed to transport six persons with high level of comfort, or eight persons with more compact seat arrangement.

The cargo module enables transportation of up to 1,000 kg cargo.

The helicopter can carry up to 1,300 kg cargo on the external sling. The emergency rescue module is fitted with a searchlight and a loudspeaker, while the medevac module with double bunk stretchers for transportation of wounded personnel and medical attendants. The external cargo suspension system can be mounted allowing the helicopter to ship bulky cargoes by air and perform erection works.

The Ka-226T helicopter is distinguished by simplicity, convenience and comfortable conditions for transportation of passengers and cargoes. The helicopter is flown by one pilot, but there is an additional workplace provided for the second pilot.

Rosoboronexport also competes to win tenders for upgrading 108 Mi-17 type medium multi role helicopters and 11 Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopters.

Together with delivery of Russianmade helicopters, the federal state unitary enterprise "Rosoboronexport" proposes to set up modern after-sale servicing systems, which provides for such activities as establishment and equipment of corresponding technical support centres, organisation of repairs, provision of training facilities and simulators, supply of a wide nomenclature of spare parts, training of helicopter flight and ground personnel as well as helicopter upgrading.

DSI-Subscription-FA 2010:cover-feb3.qxd 04/06/10 4:29 PM Page 1

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CHINA 2ND TIME CORR.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:10 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

CHINA

HERE BE DRAGONS

DSI

Chinese DF-15B missile vehicles seen in a military parade in Beijing

Described as ‘divine swords’ by China’s strategic force, missiles form an increasingly important role in the country’s defence armour

AFP

JAYADEV RANADE

KEY POINTS n China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interests and current foreign policy. n Pentagon’s 2009 Report asserts that “China has the most active ballistic missile programme in the world” adding 100 missiles each year. n India’s extensive missile programme is adequately developed to allow it to deploy short and medium-range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles against enemy forces.

I

n the remote and high-altitude mountainous terrain that constitutes the frontier between India and China in the Northeast and, for that matter, elsewhere in the West, conflicts between the armed forces would have been conventionally bloody and protracted. In today’s environment, these are unaffordable.

Indeed, China’s current war doctrine anticipates involvement in armed conflict along its periphery and directs the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for ‘winning short-duration local wars under high-tech informatised conditions’.

The guidelines for the PLA, formulated when Jiang Zemin was Chairman of the Central Military Commission, tasked it, inter alia, to be in readiness for: l Fighting a war which is of short duration but decisive in strategic outcome. l High-intensity operations characterised by mobility, speed and force projection. l Fighting a war employing hightech weapons that cause high levels of destruction. l Fighting a war where success is dependent on the ability to inflict untold damage on the enemy.

Thus China’s war doctrine’s declared intention is to inflict heavy damage on its opponent using awesome firepower in a bid to weaken and disintegrate political

44

and national resolve. This is not possible with its ground forces or the air force. The latter is presently handicapped by altitude and range, though the recent addition of mid-air refuelling capability has begun to address the problem.

China’s military leadership, therefore, decided upon missiles as the weapon of choice.

This direction has caused some concern in South Asia especially since some reports suggest that China has moved its long range CSS-5 missiles down to its border with India. It bears noting that China disputes long stretches of the border with India and has laid claim to vast tracts of the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast and large areas in northern Kashmir, a major portion of which is already under China’s occupation. The terrain in these areas is difficult and though Chinese armed forces are deployed well forward, they will have to contend with fierce Indian opposition.

Active Missile Programme China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interests and current foreign policy. It dates back to June 1958 when Mao Zedong viewed the US and Soviet Union as threats and asserted that China must have nuclear weapons to avoid possible nuclear blackmail. After the end of the Cold War, China’s strategic missile programme was reoriented. The leadership, though, remained wary of a missile race with the West. Missiles additionally offered advantages like precision-strike capability at a much lower cost than developing a modern air force, low maintenance costs, suitability for strikes against land and seabased targets and, in an extended ideological confrontation, reduced political damage from defection, like from disgruntled pilots.

The personnel of China’s secretive strategic force, the Second Artillery, refer to missiles in their defence inventory as ‘divine swords’. The appellation echoes the rationale for the development of the

concept of asymmetric warfare and the ‘Assassin’s Mace’.

Founded in July 1966, the Second Artillery is prized as a cost-effective option for influencing US policy towards China without military confrontation. To ensure survivability to enable China to deliver a nuclear second-strike, the Second Artillery initiated numerous measures that improved the mobility of missiles, their stealth during launch and flight, and their accuracy and ability to penetrate strategic defenses.

The Second Artillery demonstrated its preparedness in a series of exercises. In late 1994, it exhibited its ability to strike successfully from an underground facility hours after a nuclear attack. Then PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff, Xiong Guangkai, confirmed acquisition of this capability when he told US officials in 1996, “…if you hit us now, we can hit back…. In the end, you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.”

45

More recently in 2005 and buttressing China’s leadership’s view of the US as its main threat, Major General Zhu Chenghu, then Dean of China’s National Defence University, threatened nuclear retaliation in the event of US military intervention in favour of Taiwan. He added that China, “will prepare itself for the destruction of all the cities east of X’ian. Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed”.

China’s national interests, however, was focussed on dealing with local wars namely, wars to defend the unity of the motherland and to recover lost territories.

The latter is underscored in the rapid upgradation of missile deployments in Tibet and adjoining areas. Missiles deployed in Tibet are being replaced by modern solid-fuel missiles, which take less time to ready and launch. Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and InterContinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been added to the deployment in and

CHINA 2ND TIME CORR.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:10 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

CHINA

HERE BE DRAGONS

DSI

Chinese DF-15B missile vehicles seen in a military parade in Beijing

Described as ‘divine swords’ by China’s strategic force, missiles form an increasingly important role in the country’s defence armour

AFP

JAYADEV RANADE

KEY POINTS n China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interests and current foreign policy. n Pentagon’s 2009 Report asserts that “China has the most active ballistic missile programme in the world” adding 100 missiles each year. n India’s extensive missile programme is adequately developed to allow it to deploy short and medium-range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles against enemy forces.

I

n the remote and high-altitude mountainous terrain that constitutes the frontier between India and China in the Northeast and, for that matter, elsewhere in the West, conflicts between the armed forces would have been conventionally bloody and protracted. In today’s environment, these are unaffordable.

Indeed, China’s current war doctrine anticipates involvement in armed conflict along its periphery and directs the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for ‘winning short-duration local wars under high-tech informatised conditions’.

The guidelines for the PLA, formulated when Jiang Zemin was Chairman of the Central Military Commission, tasked it, inter alia, to be in readiness for: l Fighting a war which is of short duration but decisive in strategic outcome. l High-intensity operations characterised by mobility, speed and force projection. l Fighting a war employing hightech weapons that cause high levels of destruction. l Fighting a war where success is dependent on the ability to inflict untold damage on the enemy.

Thus China’s war doctrine’s declared intention is to inflict heavy damage on its opponent using awesome firepower in a bid to weaken and disintegrate political

44

and national resolve. This is not possible with its ground forces or the air force. The latter is presently handicapped by altitude and range, though the recent addition of mid-air refuelling capability has begun to address the problem.

China’s military leadership, therefore, decided upon missiles as the weapon of choice.

This direction has caused some concern in South Asia especially since some reports suggest that China has moved its long range CSS-5 missiles down to its border with India. It bears noting that China disputes long stretches of the border with India and has laid claim to vast tracts of the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast and large areas in northern Kashmir, a major portion of which is already under China’s occupation. The terrain in these areas is difficult and though Chinese armed forces are deployed well forward, they will have to contend with fierce Indian opposition.

Active Missile Programme China’s strategic missile programme reflects the country’s security interests and current foreign policy. It dates back to June 1958 when Mao Zedong viewed the US and Soviet Union as threats and asserted that China must have nuclear weapons to avoid possible nuclear blackmail. After the end of the Cold War, China’s strategic missile programme was reoriented. The leadership, though, remained wary of a missile race with the West. Missiles additionally offered advantages like precision-strike capability at a much lower cost than developing a modern air force, low maintenance costs, suitability for strikes against land and seabased targets and, in an extended ideological confrontation, reduced political damage from defection, like from disgruntled pilots.

The personnel of China’s secretive strategic force, the Second Artillery, refer to missiles in their defence inventory as ‘divine swords’. The appellation echoes the rationale for the development of the

concept of asymmetric warfare and the ‘Assassin’s Mace’.

Founded in July 1966, the Second Artillery is prized as a cost-effective option for influencing US policy towards China without military confrontation. To ensure survivability to enable China to deliver a nuclear second-strike, the Second Artillery initiated numerous measures that improved the mobility of missiles, their stealth during launch and flight, and their accuracy and ability to penetrate strategic defenses.

The Second Artillery demonstrated its preparedness in a series of exercises. In late 1994, it exhibited its ability to strike successfully from an underground facility hours after a nuclear attack. Then PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff, Xiong Guangkai, confirmed acquisition of this capability when he told US officials in 1996, “…if you hit us now, we can hit back…. In the end, you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.”

45

More recently in 2005 and buttressing China’s leadership’s view of the US as its main threat, Major General Zhu Chenghu, then Dean of China’s National Defence University, threatened nuclear retaliation in the event of US military intervention in favour of Taiwan. He added that China, “will prepare itself for the destruction of all the cities east of X’ian. Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed”.

China’s national interests, however, was focussed on dealing with local wars namely, wars to defend the unity of the motherland and to recover lost territories.

The latter is underscored in the rapid upgradation of missile deployments in Tibet and adjoining areas. Missiles deployed in Tibet are being replaced by modern solid-fuel missiles, which take less time to ready and launch. Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and InterContinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been added to the deployment in and

CHINA 2ND TIME CORR.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:31 PM Page 3

OCTOBER 2010

CHINA

DSI

Agni Missile displayed during the Army Day parade held in Delhi

AFP

China’s Dong Feng-21 missile

around Tibet and these, like the Dong Feng21, which has a range of 2,150km, can strike major centres of strategic importance anywhere in India. The DF-21 missiles are located at the Delingha site in Tibet, approximately 2,000km from Delhi. There are other missile sites at Tsaidam-che and Amdo in Sichuan. Together, these are estimated to have over 60 launch pads. In addition, there are over 90 medium range and intermediate range sites and at least eight ICBM sites in Tibet. The Second Artillery also has bases in provinces neighbouring Tibet.

An added dimension accentuating the military threat to India is the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway, which now links Delingha with Lhasa. China’s Vice Minister of Railways Sun Yongfu declared well before the completion of the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway that the project was to ‘promote the economic development of the Tibet Autonomous Region and to strengthen national defence.’ After the railway’s extension to Shigatse, Yatung and Linzhi by 2015, the missiles can easily be transported to areas across Nepal and Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, or what the Chinese call ‘southern Tibet’. The Chinese, acutely conscious of the need to ensure a retaliatory second strike capability and conceal their missiles sites, have developed rail and road mobile-capable missiles. The DF-21 can now be launched from around or south

of Lhasa and reach Chennai. Other missiles such as the DF-15, a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a 200-600km range, can similarly be deployed in a short time.

The past few decades have seen a major effort to improve the accuracy, mobility, range and warheads of missiles. The Pentagon’s 2009 Report asserted that “China has the most active ballistic missile programme in the world” and adds 100 missiles each year. China currently has seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and is supplementing these with MRBMs, LACMs, ICBMs and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). The number of solidfuelled nuclear missiles, estimated at approximately 55 percent, will increase as ageing missiles are replaced. SRBMs and MRBMs are being improved.

Considerable progress has also been made in the development of Multiple Independently-Targetable Vehicles(MIRV) and Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV). The long range strategic ballistic missiles recently developed include the 8,000km range DF-31, DF-31A and DF-41 with ranges of up to 12,000km and DF-5A ICBMs. Tests of the DF-5 ICBM and DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3) with MIRV warheads have been successful. A priority is the Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) which enables the Second Artillery to undertake long-range precision-guided tactical strikes.

46

A few years ago, it was decided that China’s Military Regions would have charge of missiles with a range of 300km or less. This has increased the firepower available to them. It includes missiles such as the DF-15, a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a 200-600km range, which can be deployed in a short time and launched from trains or trucks.

The Second Artillery retains charge of missiles with a range of 500km or more, but its mission has been expanded to include conventional strikes against high-value targets. While most missiles held by the Second Artillery have nuclear warheads, it has simultaneously been improving conventional warheads. It has developed a range of sub-munition warheads, including energy-concentrated warheads, which can damage airfields rendering them unserviceable and cause collateral damage to ground forces. The Second Artillery’s research and development efforts have been aided by a network of 53 specialised research facilities and factories spread across China.

Many new versions of conventional missiles have been successfully tested in recent years including the DF-21A, DF21B, DF-21C, DF-21D, DF-15A, DF-15B and DF-11A. All were tested with MaRVs. Their launch ceilings have been raised to augment missile range and the SRBMs can now also be launched from mountainous terrain.

For India, the arc of threat has expanded with China’s enhanced engagement with Pakistan. Construction of the railway through the Khunjerab Pass along the Karakoram Highway, though for commercial purposes, will have military utility. It will facilitate movement of troops and military hardware to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

”

For India, the arc of threat has expanded with China’s considerably enhanced engagement with Pakistan. Construction of the railway through the Khunjerab Pass along the Karakoram Highway, though for commercial purposes, will have military utility. It will facilitate movement of troops

and military hardware to Afghanistan and Pakistan and of rail mobile missiles that could target India’s western border. This will be an additional complication for India, which will be compelled to factor in the possible presence of two-tiered, two nation-owned missile arrays in the western sector deep inside Pakistan.

India’s Preparedness To counter the threat from Pakistan and China, India has developed its own indigenous nuclear and missile programme.

Its strategic missile programme is adequately developed to allow New Delhi to deploy short and medium-range nucleartipped ballistic missiles against Pakistan and China. Over four decades of missile-related design, development and manufacturing have made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes.

India has successfully tested and inducted the Prithvi series and Agni I, II, III and IV missiles into the Army. The 3,0003,500km range Agni-III ballistic missile was tested in April 2007 and May 2008 and the K-15 (Sagarika) submarine-launched ballistic missile in February and November 2008. The 5,500km range Agni V missile, which is under development, effectively brings Beijing within range.

India has also inducted the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Development of a

47

series of missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads, including MIRVs and MaRVs, continues and development of a missile defence system is in its advanced stages. To ensure survivability of strategic assets and a second strike capability, India is developing advanced sea and air launched missiles, some of which have been deployed.

The development of the theatre missile defence system, begun in 1999, is a necessity.

In 2007, India announced a technological breakthrough in the indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield when a ballistic missile was intercepted at a height of 50km.

It is claimed that by 2011-12 India will have developed the BMD capability to neutralise incoming missiles with ranges of around 2,000km and it will soon be able to field systems capable of thwarting threats from missiles with ranges of up to 5,000km. Other systems to reinforce the BMD, like the Akash series of missiles, are under development.

In view of the tough terrain along the India-China border, India will have to deploy adequate numbers of missiles along the borders together with a configuration of ‘over-the-horizon’ and other types of radars. These will require to be reinforced by air force, missile and air defence systems. India, however, continues to view its missile programme, including that of the cruise missile, essentially as a deterrent to Pakistan and China.

CHINA 2ND TIME CORR.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:31 PM Page 3

OCTOBER 2010

CHINA

DSI

Agni Missile displayed during the Army Day parade held in Delhi

AFP

China’s Dong Feng-21 missile

around Tibet and these, like the Dong Feng21, which has a range of 2,150km, can strike major centres of strategic importance anywhere in India. The DF-21 missiles are located at the Delingha site in Tibet, approximately 2,000km from Delhi. There are other missile sites at Tsaidam-che and Amdo in Sichuan. Together, these are estimated to have over 60 launch pads. In addition, there are over 90 medium range and intermediate range sites and at least eight ICBM sites in Tibet. The Second Artillery also has bases in provinces neighbouring Tibet.

An added dimension accentuating the military threat to India is the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway, which now links Delingha with Lhasa. China’s Vice Minister of Railways Sun Yongfu declared well before the completion of the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway that the project was to ‘promote the economic development of the Tibet Autonomous Region and to strengthen national defence.’ After the railway’s extension to Shigatse, Yatung and Linzhi by 2015, the missiles can easily be transported to areas across Nepal and Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, or what the Chinese call ‘southern Tibet’. The Chinese, acutely conscious of the need to ensure a retaliatory second strike capability and conceal their missiles sites, have developed rail and road mobile-capable missiles. The DF-21 can now be launched from around or south

of Lhasa and reach Chennai. Other missiles such as the DF-15, a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a 200-600km range, can similarly be deployed in a short time.

The past few decades have seen a major effort to improve the accuracy, mobility, range and warheads of missiles. The Pentagon’s 2009 Report asserted that “China has the most active ballistic missile programme in the world” and adds 100 missiles each year. China currently has seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and is supplementing these with MRBMs, LACMs, ICBMs and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). The number of solidfuelled nuclear missiles, estimated at approximately 55 percent, will increase as ageing missiles are replaced. SRBMs and MRBMs are being improved.

Considerable progress has also been made in the development of Multiple Independently-Targetable Vehicles(MIRV) and Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV). The long range strategic ballistic missiles recently developed include the 8,000km range DF-31, DF-31A and DF-41 with ranges of up to 12,000km and DF-5A ICBMs. Tests of the DF-5 ICBM and DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3) with MIRV warheads have been successful. A priority is the Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) which enables the Second Artillery to undertake long-range precision-guided tactical strikes.

46

A few years ago, it was decided that China’s Military Regions would have charge of missiles with a range of 300km or less. This has increased the firepower available to them. It includes missiles such as the DF-15, a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a 200-600km range, which can be deployed in a short time and launched from trains or trucks.

The Second Artillery retains charge of missiles with a range of 500km or more, but its mission has been expanded to include conventional strikes against high-value targets. While most missiles held by the Second Artillery have nuclear warheads, it has simultaneously been improving conventional warheads. It has developed a range of sub-munition warheads, including energy-concentrated warheads, which can damage airfields rendering them unserviceable and cause collateral damage to ground forces. The Second Artillery’s research and development efforts have been aided by a network of 53 specialised research facilities and factories spread across China.

Many new versions of conventional missiles have been successfully tested in recent years including the DF-21A, DF21B, DF-21C, DF-21D, DF-15A, DF-15B and DF-11A. All were tested with MaRVs. Their launch ceilings have been raised to augment missile range and the SRBMs can now also be launched from mountainous terrain.

For India, the arc of threat has expanded with China’s enhanced engagement with Pakistan. Construction of the railway through the Khunjerab Pass along the Karakoram Highway, though for commercial purposes, will have military utility. It will facilitate movement of troops and military hardware to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

”

For India, the arc of threat has expanded with China’s considerably enhanced engagement with Pakistan. Construction of the railway through the Khunjerab Pass along the Karakoram Highway, though for commercial purposes, will have military utility. It will facilitate movement of troops

and military hardware to Afghanistan and Pakistan and of rail mobile missiles that could target India’s western border. This will be an additional complication for India, which will be compelled to factor in the possible presence of two-tiered, two nation-owned missile arrays in the western sector deep inside Pakistan.

India’s Preparedness To counter the threat from Pakistan and China, India has developed its own indigenous nuclear and missile programme.

Its strategic missile programme is adequately developed to allow New Delhi to deploy short and medium-range nucleartipped ballistic missiles against Pakistan and China. Over four decades of missile-related design, development and manufacturing have made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes.

India has successfully tested and inducted the Prithvi series and Agni I, II, III and IV missiles into the Army. The 3,0003,500km range Agni-III ballistic missile was tested in April 2007 and May 2008 and the K-15 (Sagarika) submarine-launched ballistic missile in February and November 2008. The 5,500km range Agni V missile, which is under development, effectively brings Beijing within range.

India has also inducted the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Development of a

47

series of missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads, including MIRVs and MaRVs, continues and development of a missile defence system is in its advanced stages. To ensure survivability of strategic assets and a second strike capability, India is developing advanced sea and air launched missiles, some of which have been deployed.

The development of the theatre missile defence system, begun in 1999, is a necessity.

In 2007, India announced a technological breakthrough in the indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield when a ballistic missile was intercepted at a height of 50km.

It is claimed that by 2011-12 India will have developed the BMD capability to neutralise incoming missiles with ranges of around 2,000km and it will soon be able to field systems capable of thwarting threats from missiles with ranges of up to 5,000km. Other systems to reinforce the BMD, like the Akash series of missiles, are under development.

In view of the tough terrain along the India-China border, India will have to deploy adequate numbers of missiles along the borders together with a configuration of ‘over-the-horizon’ and other types of radars. These will require to be reinforced by air force, missile and air defence systems. India, however, continues to view its missile programme, including that of the cruise missile, essentially as a deterrent to Pakistan and China.

Rosobornone FINAL:INDO-PAK.qxd 15/10/10 4:50 PM Page 2

ROSOBORONEXPORT Rosoboronexport, the sole Russian state arms trade company entitled to export the whole range of military and dual-purpose products, technologies and services, is currently marking its tenth anniversary. The Rosoboronexport Corporation was established by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation with the authority to conduct foreign trade operations with the whole export nomenclature of Russian arms and joint research and development works in cooperation with defence enterprises and research institutes both in Russia and abroad. Its status warrants state support for all its export/import operations. The Corporation accounts now for more than an 80 per cent share in Russia's foreign military sales.

Rosoboronexport focuses its business development strategy on forming, strengthening and developing long-term partnerships with foreign countries under the motto "Efficiency. Reliability. Quality".

We are publishing today an article by Anatoly Isaykin, Director General of the Rosoboronexport Corporation with an overview of its activities. ussia's military technical cooperation with foreign states has been practised for many a century. Rosoboronexport has inherited the best traditions of its predecessors in establishing lasting relations with foreign partners.

Military technical cooperation is not a pure "arms trade". It occupies a specific zone within the Russia's foreign economic activities where long-term mutually beneficial partnerships with foreign countries are built. It is only natural as procured arms will be in service for 20, 30 or even 50 years. When an importing country purchases our arms, it entrusts us with the most precious state issue - its security, and ultimately – its independence and territorial integrity. Such country becomes a long-time reliable ally of Russia in both military-political and economic areas.

Every year Rosoboronexport increases its foreign sales value by 500-700 million US dollars. As a result, the amount of foreign military sales carried out by Rosoboronexport has augmented for the last ten years almost by two and a half times.

Russian military-purpose products also have been delivered to much wider geographical destinations. At present Rosoboronexport maintains cooperation with some 70 countries. If previously India and China took up the main share of contracts (up to 80 per cent of sales value), they are now joined by other importers which have become major Russian arms recipients, such as Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and some other countries.

The Corporation is proactive in developing new markets. Latin American countries are a good example of such markets. In this region there are contracts signed with Peru, Columbia, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, that are being implemented. Prospects also exist for promotion of Russian arms to Chile, Uruguay, and Ecuador.

Military technical cooperation with

R

countries in South East Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa is continued on a mutually beneficial basis.

We maintain military technical cooperation with our close neighbours from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) within the guidelines of the Russia's state policy. Our partners are offered substantial preferences. This is also natural since armed forces of the CIS/CSTO countries are equipped with Soviet and Russian-made weapons. We are developing very dynamic mutually advantageous relations in this area with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other member-states.

The nomenclature of military-purpose products offered for export increases from year to year. Now it includes several thousand items that are equal in quality with the best world products and even surpass them in some respects. Russian combat systems are actively adapted to meet NATO standards and are in demand among member-states of this military political organisation. Russian weapons and military equipment are favourably distinguished from competing products by their permanent advantage in cost-effectiveness. All the above have allowed Russia to keep for many years the second place in the arms sales value.

When supplying weapon systems, Rosoboronexport observes all international conventions, does not violate the established force balance in the regions nor allows illegal proliferation of weapons around the world and their falling in the hands of terrorist organisations and rogue totalitarian states.

Rosoboronexport continues to improve its exports business concept in collaboration with foreign partners. If previously military equipment was sold as it was, now it is offered with a set of services intended to support the procured weapons during their life cycle, including: maintenance, upgrading, repairs, and even disposal when the service life has been ended. Many customer states set up their own repair bases and servicing centres, DSI Marketing Promotion

and organise upgrading works and training of combat crews and technical personnel. In India, for example, the joint venture "Rosoboronservice" has been established to provide after-sale servicing of ships, aircraft and helicopters. Preparations are done for opening similar centres in other regions. In India also functions the T-90S main battle tank licence production plant.

Rosoboronexport always tries to help its partners expertly and smoothly integrate new Russian-made equipment into existing defence structures, making the whole system operate efficiently, quickly, harmoniously and reliably.

Such approach enhances operational effectiveness of systems and sets of equipment and reduces their cost as well as funds required for building and maintaining a corresponding infrastructure for them.

Rosoboronexport maintains business connections with more than 700 defence enterprises in 56 regions of Russia. Many of these enterprises have been provided with foreign orders for several years to come.

The Rosoboronexport Corporation is actively participating in charitable and sponsor activities. During the last ten years it has taken part in more than 300 such actions. Only this year Rosoboronexport has carried out more than 40 charitable and sponsor actions. They are mainly casework assistance rendered to orphaned children (lodged in boarding schools and orphanages) and disabled children (cured in hospitals) in Russia. We have also rendered assistance in restoring a Russian-language school in Peru. The Corporation provides an active support to veteran organisations, or helps to complete library stocks in leading Moscow colleges which prepare young specialists for Rosoboronexport.

These days when we celebrate the anniversary I wish our partners every success in business, prosperity and wellbeing, constructive and mutually advantageous cooperation with Rosoboronexport for the benefit of our countries and peoples.

216X276.indd 1

10/13/10 12:30:00 PM

ITBP.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:08 AM Page 1

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE A force par excellence ndo-Tibetan Border Police Force( ITBPF), which was raised on 24th Oct, 1962 after the Indo-China conflict, to guard the northern boaders of the country, has completed 48th years of its dedicated service to the nation. It will celebrate its Golden Jublee on 24th october2010.

Incredible though it may appear, ITBP literally took off as a micro outfit with just 4 battalions. Now, after 47 years of its inception, the Force has grown to gigantic proportions with 45 service Bns and 4 specialized Bns. The raison d’être of the ITBP Police is axiomatic, viz, guarding and policing the IndoTibet border, providing a sense of security to the border populace, VIP Security and Internal Security duties, disaster management etc.

A solid 3488 km of staggering mountains with an astounding variety of shaky heights ranging between 9000 to 18700 feet from MSL, chilly locales where mercury plummets to 45 degree C below zero, bottomless gorges, enchanting ravines, tempestuous rivers, perfidious glaciers, craggy steeps, lurking natural hazards -that is the typical theatre of operations ITBP men and officers spend a lion share of their service career in. It extends from Karakoram pass) old trade route to Tibet in J&K to Diphu La in Arunachal Pradesh.

ITBP has made an epoch making entry into the North-East as it was assigned the responsibility of the Eastern Sector of IndoChina border in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, in 2003, in pursuance to GOM’s recommendation, ie. ‘One Border, One Force.’

The border guarding duties in the Eastern Sector is more challenging and harsh than in the western and middle due to scanty road connectivity. Apart from border guarding, the Force is also performing Internal Security duties in the North Eastern states.

ITBP has its forward posts much ahead of the other Forces, in higher altitudes. Men have to constantly fight against blizzards, avalanches, and land-slides which, though test them with brutality, yet succeeds over with determination, survival instincts, stamina and determination- a net gain without doubt, though expensively purchased.

I

para-troopers, and guarded vital installations.

In the 1971 war, two of its battalions performed the special tasks of sealing certain areas/gaps, detection and destruction of infiltrators’ bases in the Srinagar valley and Poonch sector- a maiden mission which earned plaudits.

National imperatives in 1978 redefined the Force’s role and what followed was a change in its basic nature. Multifarious tasks were handed over to it making it a multi dimensional Force.

ITBP protects the IB in its Area of Responsibility, joins them in controlling transborder crime and intelligence collection, interrogates smugglers and infiltrators, and conducts joint patrolling along the international border/LAC. ITBPF functions in close synchronization with army in sensitive areas. It attunes and gears itself professionally, in peace time, to meet the real challenges as and when they are put to face.

To provide a “sense of security” to the border population and win their hearts and minds, ITBPF construct/repairs roads and bridges in remote border areas, help them at times of natural disaster and run medical and veterinary camps. Throughout its place of deployment ITBPF maintains a cordial relationship with the local, a benevolent Force to the border populace.

TRAINING THE ROLE OF THE FORCE The Force saw action in the Indo-Pak conflict (1965). It fought the enemy away from the designated theatre of war, conducted combing operations to annihilate Pak infiltrators and

By virtue of the role assigned to this Force at initial stages, the area of its activities remained in the wild and vertical world of the Himalayas where mighty forces of the nature rule supreme. Though policing the frontier against DSI MARKETING PROMOTION

the hostile elements from across the border was not much of the problem with adequate training to the personnel, but the most challenging task was to survive in such inhospitable places. The only method to do so was to understand them, discover them and to adapt to the conditions.

Accordingly, before deployment to the higher reaches of Himalayas, the Force personnel are given extensive training in rock climbing, mountaineering and mountain warfare with more thrust towards guerilla operations to make them highly proficient soldiers. The training is specifically aimed at making ITBP one of the finest mountain Forces for which extensive programmes for moulding every member of the Force into veritable mountain soldier has been designed. Rock climbing, conventional and unconventional warfare techniques are a must for all the personnel of the Force during their basic training, followed by advanced training/courses on same subjects and various new subjects such as skiing, high altitude survival, warfare and snow craft.

Till 1982, this Force kept its activities confined to the Himalayas, but sensing the pulse of the time and setting the sights high, the personnel of this Force were also trained and suitably equipped to take on other challenges as well. The ITBPF performed the most delicate yet high risk security duties during the ASIAD 1982 wherein its personnel were engaged in providing fool proof security cover to the various stadia, contingents of different countries as well as Games village Complex and to various Heads of participating states from Asian Countries besides the VIPs/VVIPs of our country. Again ITBPF personnel were entrusted with similar duties during the International conferences like NAM (Non aligned Summit) and CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet ).

Noticing that ITBP Jawans are highly disciplined and dedicated as well as trained in counter insurgency operations, the Force became the natural choice to guard the Nationalised Banks in terror stricken state of Punjab in the year 1988. It is highly complementary that not a single instance of bank robbery happened where the personnel of ITBPF were positioned.

ITBP is guarding Rastrapati Bhawan, Vice President House and many other vital installations.

A WELFARE FACE Spending better part of their service career in intractable Himalayan heights at the mercy of stark elements, and away from family takes its toll. The Force shares the concerns of the jawans and ensures they do not lose their sleep over them. Battalions are rotated from hard to soft medical check-ups, speedy evacuation and a good tide-up with Army hospitals helps. Jawans families can avail medical aid from nearby ITBP Units.

SPORTS ITBP is a byword for international mountaineering. It has hoisted the Indian tricolour atop more than 165 world class mountains including Everest (5 times) and Kanchenjunga, India’s highest peak, Nanda Devi, Mount Kamet in the Himalayas and those in the Alps, Iran and USA. Crowning glory was achieved by the Force when it created history by putting 8 climbers including one lady Police officer atop Mount Everest on 10 and 12th May 1992. The first police-women “double Everester” of the world, Mrs. Santosh Yadav, Arjuna Awardee, was a member of thi force. A typical jawan of the ITBP is a mountaineer, a skier and a river rafter. Our mountaineers have successfully unfurled the national flag at the first peak of Mount Pancha chuli on August 30, 2004.

Skiing is its forte. National Champions for years, it recorded the first ever ski-down from Kamet peak in 1981. Earlier ITBP skiers had skied down from Trushul (23360 ft) in May 1997 and Kedar Dome (24410 ft.) in April 1978. Reigning National Champions in Skiing, ITBP has defended the title several times and has represented India twice in the Winter Olympics Games and Asian Winter Games.

ITBP skiers had represented India in the world Police winter Games at Tento, Italy, and at the

skiing carnival at Chameonix, France.

River rafting is yet another field where ITBPeans have made their singular mark.

They have negotiated a 1100 km long stretch of the ferocious white waters of the turbulent and mighty river Brahmputra in 1991 from Gelling in Arunachal Pradesh upto the border of Bangladesh. None had dared to achieve such a feat in the last 200 years. In aug. 94 Army selected ITBPeans to navigate river Indus covering 327 kms in the sub. Zero cold desert of Ladakh. Another record was made in sailing down the Alaknanda from Vishnu Pyaryag to Rishikesh, spanning 265 kms in May 1995, A White Water RiverRafting expedition in river Indus in Ladakh Sector from Demochok to Chimathang was conducted in September, 2003. This year a joint River Rafting Expedition namely ‘Panch-Prayag’ was conducted successfully from March 21st to 27th from Vishnu Pryag (Joshimath) to Shivpuri (Rishikesh) in the rivers Alaknanda and Ganges. ITBP Rafting team participated in the first asian River Rafting Competition held at Shivpuri to Rishikesh from 8-9 October, 2003.

Total 05 teams from India and 03 from other countries participated in this competition. The ITBP ‘A’ Team won a gold medal in 16mks Marathon Event and a silver medal in 2kms Sprint Event. ITBP “B” Team won bronze medal in 16 kms. Marathon Event.

Himveer White Water River Rafting and Kayaking Expedition 2004 was conducted from Tapovan (Joshimath) to Muni Ki Reti (Rishikesh) in the month of May 2004 in which himveers negotiated 275 kms in the foamy, gurgling rapids of rivers Alaknanda, Dholiganga and Ganges.

Its personnel also hold rare distinction of being part of Scientific Expedition to Antarctica. Each year,ITBP trains members of all Scientific Expedition to Antarctica.

WHAT MAKES ITBP A DISTINCTIVE FORCE?

Its ethos, of course, succinctly expressed in its logo: i.e. Chivalry, Steadfastness, Commitment. An ITBPean it true to his salt, steadfast in duty, and undeterred by adverse conditions, man-made, or nature-made. His creed: improvisation and maximum utilization of resources at hand.

Kalpana Devi of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has created history by winning bronze medal in World Cup (women) Judo2010 organized at Tashkent(Uzbekistan) from

25th -26th September,2010.She defeated Nazaraova Shokhida of Uzbekistan in .She became the first Indian women judoka to win a medal in World Cup.

BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Indo Tibetan Border Police is mostly deployed on higher Himalayas. The people living in border areas have various problems due to difficult and inhospitable terrain and difficult living conditions. ITBP has launched a massive programme to develop villages in the remote and inaccessible areas of the IndoChina border for undertaking essential development activities and extending basic medical amenities. ITBP is involved in diverse areas such as public hygiene and sanitation, adult and child education, setting up of periodic medical camps, addressing problems of drinking water, electrification and building basic structure with ‘Sharamdan’ and support of the local official.

ITBP IN CYBER SPACE ITBP has its own web page on the Internet and now all informations about this Force that has helped India in hours of crisis can be obtained worldwide from its Web site. ITBP has opened many rural telephone exchanges in Ladakh and many of its forwards posts are interconnected with satellite telephones. The ITBP personnel as well as the local population of the area can avail this facility at nominal rates.

ITBP.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 11:08 AM Page 1

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE A force par excellence ndo-Tibetan Border Police Force( ITBPF), which was raised on 24th Oct, 1962 after the Indo-China conflict, to guard the northern boaders of the country, has completed 48th years of its dedicated service to the nation. It will celebrate its Golden Jublee on 24th october2010.

Incredible though it may appear, ITBP literally took off as a micro outfit with just 4 battalions. Now, after 47 years of its inception, the Force has grown to gigantic proportions with 45 service Bns and 4 specialized Bns. The raison d’être of the ITBP Police is axiomatic, viz, guarding and policing the IndoTibet border, providing a sense of security to the border populace, VIP Security and Internal Security duties, disaster management etc.

A solid 3488 km of staggering mountains with an astounding variety of shaky heights ranging between 9000 to 18700 feet from MSL, chilly locales where mercury plummets to 45 degree C below zero, bottomless gorges, enchanting ravines, tempestuous rivers, perfidious glaciers, craggy steeps, lurking natural hazards -that is the typical theatre of operations ITBP men and officers spend a lion share of their service career in. It extends from Karakoram pass) old trade route to Tibet in J&K to Diphu La in Arunachal Pradesh.

ITBP has made an epoch making entry into the North-East as it was assigned the responsibility of the Eastern Sector of IndoChina border in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, in 2003, in pursuance to GOM’s recommendation, ie. ‘One Border, One Force.’

The border guarding duties in the Eastern Sector is more challenging and harsh than in the western and middle due to scanty road connectivity. Apart from border guarding, the Force is also performing Internal Security duties in the North Eastern states.

ITBP has its forward posts much ahead of the other Forces, in higher altitudes. Men have to constantly fight against blizzards, avalanches, and land-slides which, though test them with brutality, yet succeeds over with determination, survival instincts, stamina and determination- a net gain without doubt, though expensively purchased.

I

para-troopers, and guarded vital installations.

In the 1971 war, two of its battalions performed the special tasks of sealing certain areas/gaps, detection and destruction of infiltrators’ bases in the Srinagar valley and Poonch sector- a maiden mission which earned plaudits.

National imperatives in 1978 redefined the Force’s role and what followed was a change in its basic nature. Multifarious tasks were handed over to it making it a multi dimensional Force.

ITBP protects the IB in its Area of Responsibility, joins them in controlling transborder crime and intelligence collection, interrogates smugglers and infiltrators, and conducts joint patrolling along the international border/LAC. ITBPF functions in close synchronization with army in sensitive areas. It attunes and gears itself professionally, in peace time, to meet the real challenges as and when they are put to face.

To provide a “sense of security” to the border population and win their hearts and minds, ITBPF construct/repairs roads and bridges in remote border areas, help them at times of natural disaster and run medical and veterinary camps. Throughout its place of deployment ITBPF maintains a cordial relationship with the local, a benevolent Force to the border populace.

TRAINING THE ROLE OF THE FORCE The Force saw action in the Indo-Pak conflict (1965). It fought the enemy away from the designated theatre of war, conducted combing operations to annihilate Pak infiltrators and

By virtue of the role assigned to this Force at initial stages, the area of its activities remained in the wild and vertical world of the Himalayas where mighty forces of the nature rule supreme. Though policing the frontier against DSI MARKETING PROMOTION

the hostile elements from across the border was not much of the problem with adequate training to the personnel, but the most challenging task was to survive in such inhospitable places. The only method to do so was to understand them, discover them and to adapt to the conditions.

Accordingly, before deployment to the higher reaches of Himalayas, the Force personnel are given extensive training in rock climbing, mountaineering and mountain warfare with more thrust towards guerilla operations to make them highly proficient soldiers. The training is specifically aimed at making ITBP one of the finest mountain Forces for which extensive programmes for moulding every member of the Force into veritable mountain soldier has been designed. Rock climbing, conventional and unconventional warfare techniques are a must for all the personnel of the Force during their basic training, followed by advanced training/courses on same subjects and various new subjects such as skiing, high altitude survival, warfare and snow craft.

Till 1982, this Force kept its activities confined to the Himalayas, but sensing the pulse of the time and setting the sights high, the personnel of this Force were also trained and suitably equipped to take on other challenges as well. The ITBPF performed the most delicate yet high risk security duties during the ASIAD 1982 wherein its personnel were engaged in providing fool proof security cover to the various stadia, contingents of different countries as well as Games village Complex and to various Heads of participating states from Asian Countries besides the VIPs/VVIPs of our country. Again ITBPF personnel were entrusted with similar duties during the International conferences like NAM (Non aligned Summit) and CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet ).

Noticing that ITBP Jawans are highly disciplined and dedicated as well as trained in counter insurgency operations, the Force became the natural choice to guard the Nationalised Banks in terror stricken state of Punjab in the year 1988. It is highly complementary that not a single instance of bank robbery happened where the personnel of ITBPF were positioned.

ITBP is guarding Rastrapati Bhawan, Vice President House and many other vital installations.

A WELFARE FACE Spending better part of their service career in intractable Himalayan heights at the mercy of stark elements, and away from family takes its toll. The Force shares the concerns of the jawans and ensures they do not lose their sleep over them. Battalions are rotated from hard to soft medical check-ups, speedy evacuation and a good tide-up with Army hospitals helps. Jawans families can avail medical aid from nearby ITBP Units.

SPORTS ITBP is a byword for international mountaineering. It has hoisted the Indian tricolour atop more than 165 world class mountains including Everest (5 times) and Kanchenjunga, India’s highest peak, Nanda Devi, Mount Kamet in the Himalayas and those in the Alps, Iran and USA. Crowning glory was achieved by the Force when it created history by putting 8 climbers including one lady Police officer atop Mount Everest on 10 and 12th May 1992. The first police-women “double Everester” of the world, Mrs. Santosh Yadav, Arjuna Awardee, was a member of thi force. A typical jawan of the ITBP is a mountaineer, a skier and a river rafter. Our mountaineers have successfully unfurled the national flag at the first peak of Mount Pancha chuli on August 30, 2004.

Skiing is its forte. National Champions for years, it recorded the first ever ski-down from Kamet peak in 1981. Earlier ITBP skiers had skied down from Trushul (23360 ft) in May 1997 and Kedar Dome (24410 ft.) in April 1978. Reigning National Champions in Skiing, ITBP has defended the title several times and has represented India twice in the Winter Olympics Games and Asian Winter Games.

ITBP skiers had represented India in the world Police winter Games at Tento, Italy, and at the

skiing carnival at Chameonix, France.

River rafting is yet another field where ITBPeans have made their singular mark.

They have negotiated a 1100 km long stretch of the ferocious white waters of the turbulent and mighty river Brahmputra in 1991 from Gelling in Arunachal Pradesh upto the border of Bangladesh. None had dared to achieve such a feat in the last 200 years. In aug. 94 Army selected ITBPeans to navigate river Indus covering 327 kms in the sub. Zero cold desert of Ladakh. Another record was made in sailing down the Alaknanda from Vishnu Pyaryag to Rishikesh, spanning 265 kms in May 1995, A White Water RiverRafting expedition in river Indus in Ladakh Sector from Demochok to Chimathang was conducted in September, 2003. This year a joint River Rafting Expedition namely ‘Panch-Prayag’ was conducted successfully from March 21st to 27th from Vishnu Pryag (Joshimath) to Shivpuri (Rishikesh) in the rivers Alaknanda and Ganges. ITBP Rafting team participated in the first asian River Rafting Competition held at Shivpuri to Rishikesh from 8-9 October, 2003.

Total 05 teams from India and 03 from other countries participated in this competition. The ITBP ‘A’ Team won a gold medal in 16mks Marathon Event and a silver medal in 2kms Sprint Event. ITBP “B” Team won bronze medal in 16 kms. Marathon Event.

Himveer White Water River Rafting and Kayaking Expedition 2004 was conducted from Tapovan (Joshimath) to Muni Ki Reti (Rishikesh) in the month of May 2004 in which himveers negotiated 275 kms in the foamy, gurgling rapids of rivers Alaknanda, Dholiganga and Ganges.

Its personnel also hold rare distinction of being part of Scientific Expedition to Antarctica. Each year,ITBP trains members of all Scientific Expedition to Antarctica.

WHAT MAKES ITBP A DISTINCTIVE FORCE?

Its ethos, of course, succinctly expressed in its logo: i.e. Chivalry, Steadfastness, Commitment. An ITBPean it true to his salt, steadfast in duty, and undeterred by adverse conditions, man-made, or nature-made. His creed: improvisation and maximum utilization of resources at hand.

Kalpana Devi of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has created history by winning bronze medal in World Cup (women) Judo2010 organized at Tashkent(Uzbekistan) from

25th -26th September,2010.She defeated Nazaraova Shokhida of Uzbekistan in .She became the first Indian women judoka to win a medal in World Cup.

BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Indo Tibetan Border Police is mostly deployed on higher Himalayas. The people living in border areas have various problems due to difficult and inhospitable terrain and difficult living conditions. ITBP has launched a massive programme to develop villages in the remote and inaccessible areas of the IndoChina border for undertaking essential development activities and extending basic medical amenities. ITBP is involved in diverse areas such as public hygiene and sanitation, adult and child education, setting up of periodic medical camps, addressing problems of drinking water, electrification and building basic structure with ‘Sharamdan’ and support of the local official.

ITBP IN CYBER SPACE ITBP has its own web page on the Internet and now all informations about this Force that has helped India in hours of crisis can be obtained worldwide from its Web site. ITBP has opened many rural telephone exchanges in Ladakh and many of its forwards posts are interconnected with satellite telephones. The ITBP personnel as well as the local population of the area can avail this facility at nominal rates.

PAKISTAN FLOOD 2ND TIME CORR.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:32 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

THE POLITICS O F FLOOD RELIEF

The floods have provided an opportunity to destabilise the civilian government allowing for its displacement by the military and the militants in devasted areas

AYESHA SIDDIQA

KEY POINTS n Various stakeholders in power politics are using flood relief to change the power balance at the top. n There are many who believe that the floods are basically a God-sent opportunity for the military to eventually push President Asif Zardari out of the government and truncate the PPP. n Radical forces, unfortunately, will develop more clout as the government moves from relief to the rehabilitation phase.

T

AFP

Flood victims scramble for food rations, dropped by Pakistan Army soldiers during relief operations near the village of Goza in Dadu District in Sindh

52

he 2010 monsoons have caused phenomenal devastation in Pakistan.

Many describe it as a slow tsunami due to the lower number of lives lost.

Approximately 2,000 people have died and 3,000 have been injured which is a lesser number than the human loss incurred during the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean basin and the recent earthquake in Haiti. However, the death toll is bound to rise later as a result of the outbreak of epidemics in flood-affected areas.

But the overall damage surpasses the tsunami or other calamities as the floods in Pakistan have created havoc in all parts of the country and rendered 21 million people homeless or effected them in some shape or form. The impact was felt in all the five provinces in an area covering approximately 135,000 sq km.

53

The State and flood relief infrastructure was simply just not sufficient to cater to the recent tragedy.

Broadly, the havoc can be categorised into infrastructure losses and damage to people’s lives and livelihood. Given Pakistan’s current economic conditions and political chaos, it will take years to reconstruct what was lost in the floods. For instance, approximately 657km road was damaged, out of which the maximum, which is 260 sq km, is in KhyberPakhtunkhwa, followed by 150 sq km in Gilgit-Baltistan, 139 sq km in Sindh and 88 sq km in Punjab. The country has also lost 37 bridges. The loss to the railways is estimated to be about Rs 1.4 billion.

So far, the international community has pledged about US $1.3 billion, most of which is yet to be received. The government has also raised a loan of US $900 million from the Asian Development Bank but this is just to cater for relief.

Rehabilitation, which is a far more difficult process, will follow after the floods are over. The British and American governments are assisting Islamabad in building some roads and bridges.

However, the cost of reconstruction will pose problems for the State, which is already feeling the pinch of a lack of resources. Very recently, the government reduced allocation to the higher education commission by reducing the budget of public universities by half on the pretext that money was required for relief activities.

PAKISTAN FLOOD 2ND TIME CORR.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 08/10/10 12:32 PM Page 1

OCTOBER 2010

NEIGHBOURS

DSI

THE POLITICS O F FLOOD RELIEF

The floods have provided an opportunity to destabilise the civilian government allowing for its displacement by the military and the militants in devasted areas

AYESHA SIDDIQA

KEY POINTS n Various stakeholders in power politics are using flood relief to change the power balance at the top. n There are many who believe that the floods are basically a God-sent opportunity for the military to eventually push President Asif Zardari out of the government and truncate the PPP. n Radical forces, unfortunately, will develop more clout as the government moves from relief to the rehabilitation phase.

T

AFP

Flood victims scramble for food rations, dropped by Pakistan Army soldiers during relief operations near the village of Goza in Dadu District in Sindh

52

he 2010 monsoons have caused phenomenal devastation in Pakistan.

Many describe it as a slow tsunami due to the lower number of lives lost.

Approximately 2,000 people have died and 3,000 have been injured which is a lesser number than the human loss incurred during the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean basin and the recent earthquake in Haiti. However, the death toll is bound to rise later as a result of the outbreak of epidemics in flood-affected areas.

But the overall damage surpasses the tsunami or other calamities as the floods in Pakistan have created havoc in all parts of the country and rendered 21 million people homeless or effected them in some shape or form. The impact was felt in all the five provinces in an area covering approximately 135,000 sq km.

53

The State and flood relief infrastructure was simply just not sufficient to cater to the recent tragedy.

Broadly, the havoc can be categorised into infrastructure losses and damage to people’s lives and livelihood. Given Pakistan’s current economic conditions and political chaos, it will take years to reconstruct what was lost in the floods. For instance, approximately 657km road was damaged, out of which the maximum, which is 260 sq km, is in KhyberPakhtunkhwa, followed by 150 sq km in Gilgit-Baltistan, 139 sq km in Sindh and 88 sq km in Punjab. The country has also lost 37 bridges. The loss to the railways is estimated to be about Rs 1.4 billion.

So far, the international community has pledged about US $1.3 billion, most of which is yet to be received. The government has also raised a loan of US $900 million from the Asian Development Bank but this is just to cater for relief.

Rehabilitation, which is a far more difficult process, will follow after the floods are over. The British and American governments are assisting Islamabad in building some roads and bridges.

However, the cost of reconstruction will pose problems for the State, which is already feeling the pinch of a lack of resources. Very recently, the government reduced allocation to the higher education commission by reducing the budget of public universities by half on the pretext that money was required for relief activities.

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Perhaps, this is the time that the region must help Pakistan stand on its feet.

A weakened Pakistan is to no one’s advantage.

While the responsibility of keeping society alive rests with the people, a hand of friendship by the regional and international community can save Pakistan from slipping into a catastrophic situation.

The more colossal damage, however, is of the second category that cannot even be completely assessed at the moment. It’s the impact on the private lives of citizens which will have deep consequences for society and politics. According to estimates, till end of August 2010, about 1.8 million households have been damaged and US $2.9 billion worth of agricultural produce destroyed including crops and livestock. Apparently, it will take another eighteen months for people’s lives to get back to normal. But then, normalcy itself needs to be redefined in a situation where hundreds and thousands of people have lost their assets. The floods have turned thousands of lower-middle class people in rural areas and small towns into the new poor.

Sadly, the State machinery is quite inapt and may be unable to deal with the present catastrophe. For instance, millions of people

have lost their identity cards or any form of documentation to prove their citizenship or ownership of land. The situation is probably comparable to the mayhem of 1947 when people had struggled for years to prove their claims or their ownership of property.

People are, in fact, keeping whatever remains of their moveable assets close to their chest so they can use them to bribe revenue officials at some future date.

A Pakistani analyst and development sector expert, Musharraf Zaidi, sees feuds over land ownership, greater social conflict and violence emerging in the future. Since revenue records, which indicate ownership of land are not computerised, revenue officials are bound to make a killing from the situation. Naturally, crime and violence will also increase since people may try to sort out the conflicts personally rather than resort to the already overburdened legal system.

54

Political Impact Politically and socially, the situation means strengthening of the patronage system of politics. Public attention during the floods was partly distracted due to the verbal rift between the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader Altaf Hussain and the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The exiled MQM leader called people towards revolution and challenged the historical control of the landed gentry over the country’s politics.

Subsequently, the former Army dictator General Pervez Musharraf has also launched a campaign to return to Pakistan and displace the existing political establishment. Notwithstanding the other reasons behind their bold claims, the fact remains that the post-flood situation is likely to strengthen his existing power base rather than weaken it.

AFP

AFP

An aerial view of submerged buildings near the flood-affected area of Khairpur Nathan Shah

The New Poor

”

making is likely to determine the flow of resources. Since Pakistan does not have the financial capital to rebuild the country, it will seek help from the international community. The publicity of the military is also meant to posit the institution as a more credible recipient of foreign aid.

the military estab-lishment, a This does not mean that the A Pakistani soldier fact that was used advanvarious other stakeholders in provides water to tageously to undermine the Pakistan’s power politics will displaced flood-affected government elected in 2008 not use this opportunity to people at a makeshift elections, especially after it change the power balance at camp in Sehwan town annoyed the Army as a result the top. The country’s Army, for instance, which is extremely unhappy of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The amendment in with the present government is working the US foreign assistance bill to Pakistan consistently to turn this tragedy into an drew the battlelines between the PPP-led opportunity to improve its image vis-à-vis government and the General Headquarters the key political parties, that is, the PPP (GHQ), which saw conditions being and the PML-N. In any case, rumors were imposed by the US as a joint Islamabadrife in Islamabad even before the floods Washington conspiracy to weaken the about a civilian coup of sorts which could Army. Since then, the Army has used its enable the installation of a national influence to malign the new government.

The floods provide yet another government comprising of some political opportunity to destabilise the civilian players and technocrats.

The Army has used the ‘free media’ government and build the narrative of the effectively to propagate the ‘civilian military being above board in comparison government’s inefficiencies and highlight with other players. Gaining greater socioits own capabilities. Indeed the country’s political influence is also critical for the media has turned into a stronger partner of Army as its standing in the State’s decision

55

Role of Military

But more importantly, there are many who believe that the floods are basically a Godsent opportunity for the military to eventually push President Asif Zardari out of the government and break the PPP into smaller pieces. The GHQ will possibly be happier with a political arrangement in which technocrats run the affairs of the State and political legitimacy is provided by collecting together and making a cocktail of political forces. The PMLQuaid-e-Azam, PML-Functional, parts of MQM, PPP and PML-N brought together are much more suited to the GHQ than the dominance of a single party.

Contrary to the popular belief that PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif is the future of the country’s politics, the GHQ will probably not allow the PML-N to dominate the elections even in the larger province of Punjab. In any case, the younger Sharif brother, along with some of the PML-N hawks, is more acceptable to the Army than even the party head Nawaz Sharif. The

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DSI

Perhaps, this is the time that the region must help Pakistan stand on its feet.

A weakened Pakistan is to no one’s advantage.

While the responsibility of keeping society alive rests with the people, a hand of friendship by the regional and international community can save Pakistan from slipping into a catastrophic situation.

The more colossal damage, however, is of the second category that cannot even be completely assessed at the moment. It’s the impact on the private lives of citizens which will have deep consequences for society and politics. According to estimates, till end of August 2010, about 1.8 million households have been damaged and US $2.9 billion worth of agricultural produce destroyed including crops and livestock. Apparently, it will take another eighteen months for people’s lives to get back to normal. But then, normalcy itself needs to be redefined in a situation where hundreds and thousands of people have lost their assets. The floods have turned thousands of lower-middle class people in rural areas and small towns into the new poor.

Sadly, the State machinery is quite inapt and may be unable to deal with the present catastrophe. For instance, millions of people

have lost their identity cards or any form of documentation to prove their citizenship or ownership of land. The situation is probably comparable to the mayhem of 1947 when people had struggled for years to prove their claims or their ownership of property.

People are, in fact, keeping whatever remains of their moveable assets close to their chest so they can use them to bribe revenue officials at some future date.

A Pakistani analyst and development sector expert, Musharraf Zaidi, sees feuds over land ownership, greater social conflict and violence emerging in the future. Since revenue records, which indicate ownership of land are not computerised, revenue officials are bound to make a killing from the situation. Naturally, crime and violence will also increase since people may try to sort out the conflicts personally rather than resort to the already overburdened legal system.

54

Political Impact Politically and socially, the situation means strengthening of the patronage system of politics. Public attention during the floods was partly distracted due to the verbal rift between the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader Altaf Hussain and the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The exiled MQM leader called people towards revolution and challenged the historical control of the landed gentry over the country’s politics.

Subsequently, the former Army dictator General Pervez Musharraf has also launched a campaign to return to Pakistan and displace the existing political establishment. Notwithstanding the other reasons behind their bold claims, the fact remains that the post-flood situation is likely to strengthen his existing power base rather than weaken it.

AFP

AFP

An aerial view of submerged buildings near the flood-affected area of Khairpur Nathan Shah

The New Poor

”

making is likely to determine the flow of resources. Since Pakistan does not have the financial capital to rebuild the country, it will seek help from the international community. The publicity of the military is also meant to posit the institution as a more credible recipient of foreign aid.

the military estab-lishment, a This does not mean that the A Pakistani soldier fact that was used advanvarious other stakeholders in provides water to tageously to undermine the Pakistan’s power politics will displaced flood-affected government elected in 2008 not use this opportunity to people at a makeshift elections, especially after it change the power balance at camp in Sehwan town annoyed the Army as a result the top. The country’s Army, for instance, which is extremely unhappy of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The amendment in with the present government is working the US foreign assistance bill to Pakistan consistently to turn this tragedy into an drew the battlelines between the PPP-led opportunity to improve its image vis-à-vis government and the General Headquarters the key political parties, that is, the PPP (GHQ), which saw conditions being and the PML-N. In any case, rumors were imposed by the US as a joint Islamabadrife in Islamabad even before the floods Washington conspiracy to weaken the about a civilian coup of sorts which could Army. Since then, the Army has used its enable the installation of a national influence to malign the new government.

The floods provide yet another government comprising of some political opportunity to destabilise the civilian players and technocrats.

The Army has used the ‘free media’ government and build the narrative of the effectively to propagate the ‘civilian military being above board in comparison government’s inefficiencies and highlight with other players. Gaining greater socioits own capabilities. Indeed the country’s political influence is also critical for the media has turned into a stronger partner of Army as its standing in the State’s decision

55

Role of Military

But more importantly, there are many who believe that the floods are basically a Godsent opportunity for the military to eventually push President Asif Zardari out of the government and break the PPP into smaller pieces. The GHQ will possibly be happier with a political arrangement in which technocrats run the affairs of the State and political legitimacy is provided by collecting together and making a cocktail of political forces. The PMLQuaid-e-Azam, PML-Functional, parts of MQM, PPP and PML-N brought together are much more suited to the GHQ than the dominance of a single party.

Contrary to the popular belief that PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif is the future of the country’s politics, the GHQ will probably not allow the PML-N to dominate the elections even in the larger province of Punjab. In any case, the younger Sharif brother, along with some of the PML-N hawks, is more acceptable to the Army than even the party head Nawaz Sharif. The

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AFP

NEIGHBOURS

Although there was no way news of the different political NGO activists protest in to determine the veracity of movements to divide Punjab Lahore against the new their claims, it is noteworthy and making newer provinces loan that the IMF is seems to be motivated by the giving to help the country that they see the floods as an opportunity to expand their Army and its agencies the recover from the floods ideological membership, if objective being weakening of nothing else. the hold of PML-N over Punjab.

Ordinary people right now are not The dearth of a politically, independent liberal movement cannot be observed, not concerned about ideological issues. Their even as a result of the present conditions. It main concern is finding food, shelter and is no secret that the different militant clean drinking water. Many involved in the outfits have been playing a major role in relief work argue that it is impossible for distributing relief to the people. The the government or the armed forces to military and militants are the only two reject help from these militants. It is quite forces which have braved through difficult possible that these organisations may even begin to work without a name, but what is terrain to get relief to people.

According to a Lahore-based journalist, important to understand is that it is Mubashir Bokhari, he saw the Pakistan difficult to separate the banned outfits Navy’s relief camps distributing relief from contributing to the relief activities goods from Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) since they are the ones with the maximum workers using Army’s boats. The JuD is grassroots’ presence.

Over the past few decades, the friction operating under the name Falahe Insaniyat (Goodness of Mankind) along between the Army and political parties with the Al-Rasheed Trust, which is has resulted in the absence of a good system of local government and a fair banned by the UN. Moreover, Lashkar-e-Taiba , Lashkar-e- amount of de-politicisation of local Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others government politics. This, in turn, means are providing relief in Sindh and an evaporation of the grassroot-level South Punjab. Initially, the Tehrik-i- network of various political parties.

Radical forces, unfortunately, will Taliban Pakistan had told the government to refuse American assistance promising that develop more clout as the government the Taliban would provide US $20 million. moves from relief to the rehabilitation phase.

56

Given the lack of resources and truncated vision of political forces, Islamabad might not be able to invest its resources where they are most wanted such as health, education and infrastructure development.

This could also mean that poor parents, including those who have recently become improvished, may be tempted to send their children to madrassas where they will acquire a singular perspective of the world.

Depletion of primary and secondary education standards will happen in a resource-constrained environment that does not bode well for social growth.

This is not to suggest that the entire population or the majority will turn towards militancy. However, one cannot rule out the growing importance of religious radicalism and militancy in society.

Greater violence and socio-political instability is definitely on the cards. This is likely to pose greater challenges for the State and the South Asian region.

Perhaps, this is the time that the region must help Pakistan stand on its feet. A weakened Pakistan is to no one’s advantage. While the responsibility of keeping society alive rests with the people, a hand of friendship by the regional and international community can save Pakistan from slipping into a catastrophic situation.

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defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

BAE’s FH77 B05 L52 howitzer gun

Artillery’s Procurement Problems THE Indian Army’s artillery procurement woes seem endless. It would have been comical if the entire issue was not such a deadly serious business that can impinge adversely on the force’s operational preparedness in a highly turbulent and volatile environment.

Within a few weeks of field trials involving two rival 155mm/52 calibre-towed howitzers being called off in July and a new Request for Information being issued globally for similar weapon systems shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has received bids from the same competing vendors whose participation was summarily rescinded a few weeks earlier.

SingaporeTechnologies Kinetics (STK) and BAE have re-submitted their bids for their respective FH-2000 and the FH77 B05 L52 guns in support of the Army’s Rs 80 billion worth procurement of 400 howitzers as part of its long-delayed Artillery Rationalisation Plan formulated in the 1990s.

Another 1,180 of one of the two selected howitzers will be built locally under licence.

The abandoned trials were to have been the fifth for BAE Systems’ FH77 B05 L52 gun since 2001, with the earlier four being abandoned without adequate explanation by the Artillery Directorate.

These four rounds—the last in 2006—also featured South Africa’s Denel Ordnance G5/2000 gun and Soltam’sTIG 2002 for the first three and just

58

the BAE Systems and Israeli howitzer in the final round.

However, in early July 2010, the MoD cancelled the face-off between the SKT and BAE platforms because of the FH-2000s’ “non-appearance” at Pokhran for the trials.

But SKT personnel insisted that the howitzers had, indeed, arrived at Pokhran in April and claimed that they were never officially informed about the trials’ cancellation. They maintained the trial team, comprising former Indian Army gunners, needed suitable time to calibrate the howitzer, something that was denied them and inexplicably led to the MoD taking the extreme step of calling off the shoot-out.

The Army, for its part, maintains that SKT had demanded ‘several weeks’ of artillery range time at Pokhran to calibrate its gun with locally-made ordnance which it was not willing to provide, resulting in the trials’ termination.

The MoD, however, did not refer to the blacklisting of ST Kinetics in June 2009 on allegations of corruption or the letter purportedly dispatched to it recently by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiring into the case that is believed to have reiterated the ban on the Singapore armament manufacturers alongside six other defence companies.

Earlier, keeping the Army’s urgent howitzer requirement in mind, the MoD waived the

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DEFENCE BUZZ blacklisting of STK in December 2009, allowing it to participate in the 155mm howitzer trials subject to final CBI clearance, if it emerged the frontrunner. Similar codicils were attached to other STK equipment undergoing trials by the Army. STK has consistently denied any wrongdoing in the corruption case.

The ban on STK has, meanwhile, led to the MoD opting for the purchase of 145 BAE Systems M777 155 mm/39-cal lightweight howitzers (LWH) and Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $647 million through the US Foreign Military Sales route as STK’s rival Pegasus 155mm/39 cal LWH was blacklisted.

Other than SKT, the MoD has also blacklisted six other defence companies including Israeli Military Industries (IMI), Media Architects Pvt Ltd of Singapore, BVT Poland and three local firms—T.S. Kishan of Delhi, R.K. MachineTools from Ludhiana and HYT Engineering of Pune.

The CBI claimed that Sudipto Ghosh as Head of Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) from May 2007 to April 2009 and three of his associates were allegedly responsible for favouring these seven overseas and local companies in several contracts in return for “huge” illegal gratification. Legal proceedings in these corruption cases have begun in Kolkata where the OFB is headquartered, but in India’s notoriously overburdened courts, the cases are likely to drag on for years.

Under its Artillery Rationalisation Plan, the Army, which presently operates six different calibres, aims on acquiring by 2020-25 a mix of around 3,600 155mm/39 cal light weight and 155mm/52 cal towed, wheeled and tracked guns for some 180 of its 220 artillery regiments for around $5-7 billion.

Senior Army officers said the cascading delay in the towed howitzers trials (not expected to take place before 2011-12) will impinge negatively on the artillery’s modernisation efforts with inductions taking place not before 2020 and possibly even beyond, as it would take 8-10 years to indigenously build the howitzers.

STK is partnering Punj Lloyd, a local private sector company, which is providing the logistics and technical support for the trials. In the event of securing the contract it will be responsible for building significant parts of the FH-2000 at its facility at Gwalior.

BAE Systems has a similar agreement with Mahindra Defence Systems, one of India’s larger private defence contractors, with which it recently formed a joint venture focussed on armoured vehicles with Rs 1 billion equity on a 26:74 basis favouring the latter.

DSI

Raytheon-Lockheed Martin-designed Javelin anti-tank guided missile

More US Materiel INDIA is set to acquire more US materiel via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme.

The Raytheon-Lockheed Martin-designed Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system will be procured to make up for the keen shortfall of such munitions, alongside inordinate delays in inducting the locally designed Nag ATGM. Officials said the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is in the process of issuing a Letter of Request (LoR) to the US Government to route the third generation Javelin ATGM with a 2.5 km range along with transfer of technology.

Under the LoR, the Army will acquire a proportion of the Javelin’s off-the-shelf while the remainder will be built locally under licence in collaboration with State-owned missile makers Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL).

Capable of adopting a top-attack flight profile against armoured vehicles, the Javelin can also be employed in direct attack mode against buildings and fortifications, especially in urban counter terrorist operations. It is also capable of engaging helicopters.

And while it is unclear how many Javelin systems are being procured, Army sources say the force has a shortfall of around 44,000 varied ATGMs. India has been in negotiations with the US for Javelins after they were showcased during joint Army exercises held at Babina last year.The Indian Army is also in talks with Lockheed Martin to supply some 8,000-12,000

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rounds of Hellfire II modular missile systems for its aerial and ground-based platforms to meet urgent requirements.

The import of ATGMs has become imperative as the Army has only partially accepted Nag with a three-five km range designed to operate from vehicles and helicopters. It ordered 443 Nags and 13 accompanying tracked Namica carriers for around Rs 3.35 billion that were scheduled for induction around 2011-12.

In January 2009, the MoD inked a deal with MBDA of France to transfer technology to BDL for building 4,000 advanced Milan 2T ATGMs over the next three years for $14,000 each. BDL, which has produced Milan ATGMs since 1983, was also given the contract last year for some 4,000 Russian Konkurs ATGMs with a 4km range.

Alongside, the Indian Air Force is acquiring 24 Boeing-designed Harpoon Block II missiles for an estimated $170 million for its fleet of Jaguar IM combat aircraft to bolster its maritime warfare capability.

The agreement secured in August, also via the FMS route, has been under negotiation for over two years.The 4.6 m-long Harpoon Block II missile is an all-weather, over-the-horizon missile capable of striking land-based targets and ships in littoral environments. It can also discriminate target ships from islands and other nearby land masses.

Since 2002, India has either received or is awaiting varied US materiel estimated at $12 billion to $13 billion via the FMS route.

Equipment worth a larger amount is currently under evaluation, tender or both.

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The four FICV proposals will be appraised by the MoD, which will shortlist two contractors who will then develop their respective prototypes over the next three-four years. Following competitive trials thereafter, the Army will make its choice after which the MoD will apportion the larger number of FICVs to the winner to produce the series.

Industry officials say the FICV project will be a “test case” of the MoD’s seriousness in involving the private sector in the design and manufacture of significant weapon platforms as till now it has largely been a component and sub-assembly provider mostly to public sector and OFB programmes.

Additional Hawk AJTs Soviet-designed BMP-I Is

Defence Goes Private AFTER decades of lip service, the Ministry of Defence is finally readying itself to involve private companies in the State-dominated military-industrial sector in developing a major platform for the military.

The MoD is to receive proposals from three private sector corporations and one public sector company to locally design and eventually construct a Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) for the Army by 2017 to replace the ageing fleet of over 2,500 Soviet-designed BMP-IIs. Armament industry sources estimate the programme to be worth around Rs 500 billion, making it India’s most expensive indigenous weapon development project.

Mahindra Defence Systems, Larsen & Toubro and Tata Motors and Ordnance Factory Board will submit propositions to the MoD for a FICV prototype to be developed by 2014-15. The competing manufacturers will contribute 20 percent of the developmental costs while the remainder will be picked up by the MoD in keeping with the revised 2009 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP).

The winning designer, permitted by the DPP to enter into technical collaboration with overseas expertise especially in the field of engine making and transmission systems for which limited expertise is locally available, will be contracted to build around three quarters of the FICVs while the runner-up will construct the balance vehicles for the same price.

The proposed FICV, which is required to remain operational till mid-21st century, will also be expected to include an indigenous

content of at least 50 percent in overall project cost value in keeping with DPP guidelines.

With a combat weight of less than 20 tonnes, the FICVs will need it to be operated by a three-man crew and carry seven infantrymen. The amphibious, airtransportable FICV will also need to be armed with fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles alongside other hit-tech offensive weaponry.

It will need to be protected against kinetic and chemical energy strikes, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, mines and top-attack weaponry and equipped with an advanced communications suite and a battle field management system.

BAE Systems’ Hawk 312 advanced jet trainers

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INDIA signed yet another deal for 57 additional BAE Systems Hawk 312 advanced jet trainers (AJT) for an estimated $779 million during British Pime Minister David Cameron’s two-day official visit to the country in July. The supplementary Hawks—40 for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and 17 for the Indian Navy are to be licence-built

by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore.

The deal under contentious negotiation for several years follows the $1.2 billion contract in 2003 for 66 Hawk AJTs, 42 of which were to be built by HAL. So far only 12 of the locally built trainers have been handed over to the IAF, seriously jeopardising its already wrecked fighter pilot training schedules.

In early 2009, HAL had threatened to call off negotiations with BAE Systems for the

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OCTOBER 2010

DEFENCE BUZZ 57 AJTs following technical differences over delays in licence assembling the Hawk 132s.

Consequently, it has dispatched a Request for Information to six rival manufacturers to submit details of their trainers in support of supplying the IAF 57 AJTs. HAL has also claimed $10 million as compensation from BAE Systems for problems it faced in ‘reworking’ several tools and equipment supplied by BAE Systems to construct the AJTs, a demand that was rejected outright on grounds that all contractual obligations had been met. But IAF aviation industry officials said the ‘commonality’ factor of having earlier acquired Hawk AJTs eventually prevailed, resulting in the add-on order for another 57 aircraft.

Basic Trainer Trials THE Indian Air Force (IAF) began field trials in late September of at least six vendors in support of its desperate requirement for basic trainers at one of its fighter base at Jamnagar.

EADS’s PZL Warszawa-Okecie (with its PZL-130 Orlik TC-II), Brazil’s Embraer (EMB 312 SuperTucano), Germany’s Grob Aircraft (G 120 TP), Italy’s Finmeccanica (M-311), Korea Aerospace Industries (KT-1) and Switzerland’s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (PC-21) are lining up for the IAF’s tender for the outright purchase of 75 trainers.

An additional 106 aircraft will be licence-built by HAL to replace the IAF’s fleet of 180-200 locally-constructed Hindustan PistonTrainer (HPT)-32 initial trainer aircraft

grounded in July 2009 following a series of fatal accidents. The selected vendor will be required to supply the first 12 of 75 trainers to the IAF within 24 months of the contract being confirmed and the remaining deliveries completed within 48 months.

To mitigate the crisis afflicting IAFs’ pilot training schedules, the service is also actively considering fitting around 100-120 of the faulty HPT-32s with parachute recovery systems (PRS) to bolster pilot confidence and enhance survivability during an emergency.

The move to equip the HAL-designed and built HPT-32 trainers with PRS is to tide over pilot training timetables till the new basic trainers arrive. Once the supplier from amongst two competing PRS vendors is selected, the HPT-32’s airframes will be strengthened to support it. This will bring down the trainer slowly to the ground with the crew in the event of an engine cut off. HAL, which will be the prime contractor for integrating the PRS onto the HPT-32s, estimates it will take 18-24 months for the fitments to begin.

The IAF grounded 180-200 Stage-1 propeller-driven HPT-32s after 10 crashed between 1999 and 2009. In May 2008, a female IAF cadet died after fuel leaked into the HPT-32’s engine and it crashed, confirming the Comptroller and Auditor General’s assessment that the training aircraft was “technologically outdated and beset by flight safety hazards”.

“In spite of the loss of 11 pilots and 15 aircraft, it (HPT-32) continues to be used

Italian defence manufacturer Finmeccanica’s M-311 basic trainer aircraft

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DSI

today. Further, HPT-32 does not aid in the smooth transition of trainees to the next stage of training,” the government watchdog agency declared in its 2008 audit.

The reliability of the HPT-32s, which came into operation in 1984, has long been questionable following technical problems caused by the integration between its air frame and the Avco Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5 engine, officers say. This ‘faulty mating’ resulted in some 90 ‘engine cut outs’ in mid-air and given the HPT-32s limited gliding power, fatalities were frequent, they add.

Upgrading Su-30MKI THE Indian Air Force (IAF) is to upgrade a significant number of its Su-30MKI fighter fleet for Rs 109.20 billion by equipping the combat aircraft with advanced avionics and radar. India’s Defence Minister A. K. Antony told Parliament in August that the aircraft will be retrofitted in a phased manner from 2012 onwards.

Official sources say the airframe of the 50-odd SU-30MKIs slated for the upgrade too will be strengthened as part of the retrofit to enable them to carry air-launched versions of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile developed jointly by Russia and India’s DRDO. Flight tests of Brahmos configured on Russia’s 3M55 Oniks/Yakhont anti-ship missile system with a 292km range were expected to begin next year with the IAF inducting BrahMos-armed Su-30MKIs a year later.

At present, Russia’s Irkut Corporation is modifying some Su-30MKIs to fit the BrahMos under its belly and integrate it with its fire control system. It is also strengthening the Su 30 MKIs’ wings so that two additional cruise missiles can be fitted on its flanks.

The induction of Sukhoi fighters into the IAF began in the late 1990s with 50 fighters acquired for $1.46 billion of which 18 were Su 30s—later upgraded to Su-30MKI standard. Thereafter, Su-30MKI numbers continued to increase with the MoD agreeing in 2000 for the State-run HAL to licence produce 140 of them.

An additional 40 fighters were added to the contract soon after, of which HAL has so far handed over around 74 to the IAF. And, more recently in July 2010, the government cleared the purchase of 42 additional Su-30MKIs for Rs 150 billion in a bid to bolster the IAF’s fast depleting fighter squadrons as its Soviet MiG 21 variants were retired. With this additional acquisition, the total number of Su-30MKIs in the IAF will eventually be 272, making it the single largest type of fighter in the force.

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By selecting the F/A-18IN as its next-generation fighter, India is assured of advanced capability and proven value, mission after mission. Supported by Boeing’s award-winning performance-based logistics program, already in place with the U.S. Navy, India can also count on the Super Hornet to deliver outstanding readiness and superior life-cycle savings—real value now and for years to come.

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9/22/10 1:47:10 PM