VOX
The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York
voxjournal.co.uk Issue XIII- Autumn 2010
VOX
The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
voxjournal.co.uk
ISSUE XIII - AUTUMN 2010
thE pURSUIT OF HAPPINESS ESSAYS
PAGE
HAPPINESS, PLATO AND EDUCATION Dr Robin Barrow
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DOES POLICY DESIGNED TO INCREASE GDP ALSO INCREASE HAPPINESS? Claire E. Sherwin
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HAPPINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY Professor Emeritus Lord Richard Layard
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MILL, LIBERTY AND HAPPINESS Dan Iley-Williamson
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THE UNHAPPINESS OF SUSTAINABILITY Luke Smalley
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ARISTOTLE AND THE ENDS OF LIFE James Hodgson
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POST-MODERNISM: THE PATH TO LISTLESSNESS Clement Wee
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The Club of PEP
VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).
VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as other universities world-wide.
“Happiness is like a butterfly; the more you chase it, the more it will elude you, but if you turn your attention to other things, it will come and sit softly on your shoulder� Henry David Thoreau
VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
EDITORIAL
W
HAT IS HAPPINESS? SOME PEOPLE CLAIM IT IS THE MUTUAL AFFECTION AND SUPPORT WE FIND IN OTHERS, WHILE others say it is financial
security and the fulfilment of our physical needs. This issue of Vox is an exploration of the pursuit of happiness: what we think will make us happy and how- or whether- we can achieve it. This issue has articles by students and professional academics, exploring the various aspects of the pursuit of happiness. We have articles discussing the role of education in creating happy people in society (5), as well as whether public policy should focus on economic development and increases in GDP, or whether we need to focus on the personal development of the individual within public policy (9, 12). Authors consider the role of environmental management in ensuring the wellbeing of human society (18). Discussions of Postmodernist philosophy explore whether it can lead to genuine freedom and happiness within society, or simply imprison us with unattainable ideals (27). We have an article on Mill, reconciling his strong defence of freedom as necessary to happiness with his utilitarian ethics (15). Finally we have an article on the Aristotelian conception of happiness as the highest good which humans can possess (23). This will be the first issue of Vox for the first years, so we hope that you will enjoy it, and that you might even be inspired to get involved with us either by writing for the next issue or by becoming involved with the production side of Vox. If you are interested in becoming a part of the Vox team, please don’t hesitate to email us at vox@clubofpep.org. Details of how to contribute to our next issue are on the back cover. Elena Villarreal Editor
EDITORIAL TEAM
Editor: Elena Villarreal Co-Editor: Adam Czopp Layout Editor: Emily Coward External Liaisons Officer: Fay Farstad
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Sub-Editors: Dan Iley-Williamson Firdaus Koder Ieuan Ferrer Mira Wolf-Bauwens Stephanie Pansar Clement Wee
Peer Reviewers and Proofreaders: Cameron Dwyer Claire Sherwin Riccardo Mastini Risga Carson Abir Ahmmed Lorna Brankley Frances Croft-Wang Alexa Mitterhuber Luke Smalley
Issue XII - Summer
HAPPINESS, PLATO AND EDUCATION SOME PERSONAL RETHINKING
By Dr Robin Barrow
I
N 1975 I PUBLISHED A BOOK ENTITLED PLATO, UTILITARIANISM, AND Education, in which I argued
broadly that Plato’s political and educational system in the Republic was designed in a utilitarian spirit to secure the greatest happiness possible for the community as a whole. In 2010 it was reprinted, at more or less the same time as coincidentally I published a new book on Plato in the Continuum Library of Educational Thought. Neither the word ‘utilitarian’ nor ‘happiness’ occurs in the index of the new volume (though ‘eudaimonia’, the Greek word conventionally translated ‘happiness’, is mentioned twice). I also published in 1975 Moral Philosophy for Education, which placed particular emphasis on utilitarianism as an ethical theory. In 1976 came Common Sense and the Curriculum which according to the dust-jacket blurb outlined a “principle… for the selection of worthwhile curriculum content… derived from utilitarianism”. In 1980 came Happiness and Schooling which, it was claimed, “concludes…by suggesting action which could be taken in schools in order to promote hap-
piness”; in 1982 Injustice, Inequality and Ethics, which looks at a number of issues, including education, from a utilitarian perspective; and in 1991 Utilitarianism: a Contemporary Statement. Yet, despite the fact that in 2003 Nel Noddings published Happiness and Education and that in the last ten years there has been a lot of explicit interest in happiness in relation to schooling and education, my 2007 Introduction to Moral Philosophy and Moral Education, though it mentions utilitarianism in passing, is not written from a utilitarian perspective nor does it particularly emphasise happiness. The questions that these bibliographical reflections raise for me are: why do I now play down utilitarianism in relation to both Plato and education? Why have I been so foolish as to fail to take advantage of the contemporary interest in happiness and education? Have I simply changed my mind on these issues? Well, yes and no. First, while I think that I was correct to argue that Plato was trying to create a society in which all could equally find happiness, it was not 5
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Individuals were judged to be happy on little more than their own assertion that they were, or on the grounds that they smiled, didn’t complain, etc. perhaps entirely plausible, and certainly not politic, to argue that he was a prototype utilitarian. In other words, on this issue I have changed my language for tactical reasons rather than changed my substantive position. It still seems to me quite clear that critics who see Plato as believing that some people are by nature superior to others tout court, and as such worthy of more consideration and ultimately more happiness than others, are simply wrong. Of course he believes that different people have different talents; but it is fairly clear that he subscribes to neither a simplistic “nature” nor “nurture’ view. What we become is partly a product of, as we would say, our genetic inheritance and partly of environmental (including educational) factors. That is Plato’s view, and that is a sensible view. His aim is to take advantage of the different talents that people variously come to possess in such a way as to ensure a cohesive and co-operative society that works in the interests and to the advantage of all. Secondly, researching and writing about happiness turned out to 6
be very important to my educational theorising generally in an indirect and unanticipated way, because it was my introduction to the dangers and shortcomings of much empirical research in the social sciences, especially education. Most academic work on happiness then, as still today, was empirical, and, as I discovered, it was mostly vitiated by conceptual inadequacy in that, by and large, it defined happiness either in terms of self reporting or of crude behavioural signs. Thus individuals were judged to be happy on little more than their own assertion that they were, or on the grounds that they smiled, didn’t complain, etc. There was also a common tendency to confuse matters of definition with empirical findings. For example, it might be claimed that “happy people have good relationships”. Well, of course they do. You wouldn’t call someone with bad relationships, which they recognized as such, happy, whatever else you did. The genuinely empirical question is: what about solitary people who don’t have any real relationships (or people who don’t recognise their relationships as being bad)? The suggestion that it has been demonstrated that they must be unhappy is very implausible. Add to these problems the astonishing tendency to confuse correlation with causation and it becomes evident that the claims of social scientists require careful scrutiny. Though I have not pursued my interest in research into happiness, I have applied the lesson I
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learnt there to a critical study of the claims of empirical research in education and sadly found a great deal of it embarrassingly wanting. (See, e.g., Giving Teaching Back to Teachers.) Thirdly, there is at least one respect in which I have indeed changed my mind, and that is with regard to the relevance of happiness to education. Here we need a preliminary distinction between schooling and education. I share, of course, the widespread view that ideally we would like children to be happy at school and that they should grow up to be well-adjusted and happy people. But it seems to me very dangerous to assume that education is in any sense directly about happiness. The education that matters, in my view, is the understanding of the world in which we live and our place in it; and education in this sense, I would argue, is worth having for its own sake, even if the knowledge does nothing for our happiness. As a matter of fact, I think it not unreasonable to hope that, by and large, well-educated people will both be better able to contribute to the happiness of society and to find happiness for themselves than poorly educated people; but that does not mean that we should judge the success or failure of our education system by the extent of human happiness. Related to this is a concern that, leaving aside conceptual distinctions that at some point need to be drawn between, e.g., contentment, ecstasy, self–esteem, well-being, happi-
ness, and so on, there is too great an emphasis in schooling today on selfesteem or the importance of feeling good about oneself. Of course, once again I share the widespread hope that people will feel good about themselves, but I want to add the qualification “provided they should feel good about themselves”, and in any case I want to argue that we should not judge our educational success by this criterion.
I think it not unreasonable to hope that, by and large, well-educated people will both be better able to contribute to the happiness of society and to find happiness for themselves An educated person has to get things right rather than feel that he has got them right. In short, I do not share the view that the happiness of students is a primary concern in education and I no longer hold the view I once did to the effect that the school system should be more concerned with contributing to the ultimate happiness of society than with educating individuals. Fourthly, I still think that Plato is well worth studying in relation to education. But today I would place my emphasis firmly on the theory of Ideas or Forms, the notion of differential education for different aptitudes, and the issue of moral education. The 7
VOX - The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy
theory of Forms, which seems to me at one level simply the outline of the kind of conceptual analysis which is at the heart of philosophy and which is a crucial part of any coherent thinking about the world, should inform both the work of educational theorists, which it all too seldom does, and the school curriculum itself. The issue of differential education has for too long been either ignored or treated in blatantly ideological ways; but it is surely an issue that now needs to be thought about from the beginning, and Plato has a lot to contribute to such a debate. Moral education remains for us, as it was for Plato, a matter both of fascination and practical importance.
Finally, a few stray thoughts: I would today show more interest in Aristotle’s views on ‘eudaimonia’, as many are currently doing. I would stand broadly by my analysis of happiness and, in so far as I have to adhere to any particular ethical viewpoint, I would remain of a utilitarian persuasion. But here I must mention another concern I have: the tendency for philosophy, particularly in North America, to be taught in terms of schools of thought and, worse still, for academics to define themselves in terms of being, e.g.. phenomenologists, Kantians, utilitarians. It seems to me that once you adopt and work within a framework you are merely doing a form of calculation, rather than engaging in real thinking. I would still defend the curriculum that I argued for in Common Sense and the Curriculum. It was not then and is not now a particularly unusual curriculum. But it does increasingly need to be defended in this day and age.
Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________ Dr Robin Barrow is a professor of philosophy of education at Simon Fraser University where he specialises in epistemology and moral philosophy. 8
Issue XIII - Autumn 2010
Does Policy Designed to Increase GDP also Increase Happiness? A Study Using the Easterlin Paradox
By Claire E. Sherwin
Y
OU’RE A 21 YEAR OLD, JUST GRADUATED FROM UNIVERSITY, BUT
you are not graduating alone. You have a crippling £20,000 weight on your shoulders which needs to be paid off. You don’t know if you can ever be happier than when you were a carefree student, making the most of your government subsidised loan. You have a choice to make: do you take a job that you are passionate about? It may not pay well, but you don’t dwell on this. There is a ‘set point’ of happiness from which, even if you deviate in the short term, you will always return to. On the other hand, do you take the highly paid graduate scheme? It doesn’t matter what your absolute income is, as your happiness is only contingent on your income in relation to your fellow graduates. These two options are the fundamental conclusions, in a graduate’s analogy, of the Easterlin paradox. This essay will explore which conclusion of the Easterlin paradox is most plausible: is directing policy towards increasing happiness pointless, due to the ‘set point’ which will inevitably dominate? Is the only happiness that income can create relative? Or must Easterlin’s analysis be pushed further to encompass more variables to com-
plete his paradox? In this paper I argue that what is missing from Easterlin’s paradox is an appreciation of social capital. I argue for cohesion between what was before a dichotomy in psychological and economical theory, which ends in showing the importance of social capital in people’s lives and, quantitatively speaking, their utility function. To make a qualified and quantitative judgement on a person’s happiness, one cannot simply rely on standard economic theory, based on utility and revealed preference data, as much as one cannot simply rely on psychoanalysis. What one needs to do is to ‘combine the techniques typically used by economists with those more commonly used by psychologists’ (Graham, 2005, p43). This new and increasing trend to measure welfare is not a replacement of the more traditional income-based measures of welfare, but can be used along-side them to create a complete picture of a person’s aggregate economic and social welfare. The increasing inclination towards this type of research has resulted in a fairly youthful branch of economics: The Economics of Happiness. 9
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Easterlin ‘analysed the relationship between real GDP per capita and self-declared happiness’ (Castriota, 2006, p3) in a seminal paper in 1974. He used standard measurements of GDP and set them against the answers to a generic question related to well-being: ‘On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?’ (Tella and MacCulloch, 2005, p3). The conclusions drawn from this paper (The Easterlin paradox) state that ‘within countries wealthier people are, on average, happier than poor ones’ as well as that, ‘studies across countries and over time find very little, if any, relationship between increases in per capita income and average happiness levels’ (Graham, 2005, p7). This paradox has been corroborated by more recent statistics. Although the standard of living in the industrialized nations has been steadily increasing over recent decades, reported levels of well-being have declined over the last quarter of a century in the US and have run approximately flat through time in Britain (Blanchflower, Oswald, p1). These
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findings can be seen supporting two main theses. The first, purported by many, states that it is not in fact absolute income which determines the happiness of people, but income relative to those surrounding them. There is also the idea that there is a specific point of happiness that one always returns to. For example if you unexpectedly inherit a large sum of money, or are made redundant, in time you will acclimatise to your new financial situation and return to the set happiness level. Thus policy making, with the direct incentive to increase happiness, is futile. If we take the idea that ‘riches do bring you happiness, provided you are richer than other people’ (Layard, 1980, p737) it would naturally follow that the economists’ utility function should be adjusted. An accurate utility function would be one that included relative income, not absolute income. However, those who believe that the paradox proves a ‘set point’ of happiness would argue that what was truly missing from the utility function was a
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host of psychological and natural variables, such as stress levels, pollution levels and working hours, that could reduce utility in a standard model. The main variables, I believe, that need to be added into a person’s utility function, are the level and the value of their social capital. Social capital is manifest in family ties, relationships and friendships. Psychological research has proved that the need for social capital is an innate need which can be inferred by ‘the infant’s non-verbal demand for care and nourishment’ (Pugno, 2008, p8). This goes against many popular doctrines, centred in seventeenth and eighteenth century thought, that had us born into isolation, and the necessity for social capital only emerged when we chanced upon societal bonds (Rousseau, 1762). However, as we are now a civilisation with strong societal bonds, we are obliged to take the necessity of psychological research as given, even if we don’t think these bonds are innate. The necessity for social capital then becomes fundamental to our human happiness, and thus should be factored into our utility function. This variable is positively correlated with a higher relative income being necessary for happiness. This is because, as people’s social capital flourishes, their need to compete materially with their neighbours is decreased. Conversely, as social capital is in decline due to marriages breaking up, and so family and friendship ties breaking
down, the need for material goods increases. This is shown by data from Pugno’s paper, where ‘Americans who regard it as important to earn much more money than the average rose from 45% in 1975 to 60% in 1991’ and simultaneously, ‘the deterioration of family cohesion... documented by specific studies on marriages’ has also been seen (Pugno, 2008, p6). For this argument to hold true we are making the assumption that the accumulation of income does not correlate with the accumulation of social capital, which I believe to be a plausible assumption given the innate property I believe social capital to stem from.
Relative income, along with relative social capital, is the most accurate measurement of happiness we can hope to gain. In conclusion, I believe that relative income, along with relative social capital, is the most accurate measurement of happiness we can hope to gain. The idea of a ‘set point’ of happiness seems to work if you are to take individual periods of time, or even a time series up until recently. However, the data collected over the past few decades indicates a consistency, and in some areas a decline in well-being, which discredits the ‘set point’ theory, or at least necessitates that the ‘set point’ within the theory must be constantly changing, having accounted for 11
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a host of different factors, one major one being social capital. The conclusion of the Easterlin paradox, that happiness is relative to surrounding people, seems to be more solid. However, Easterlin is lacking statistics and analysis; predominantly statistics containing information on non-monetary capital. Therefore, we must advise our 21 year old case study to make sure that they not only aggregate an income that ensures their happiness, but also the social capital that may achieve the same end; and that happiness cannot be purchased, as true social capital
is accumulated through other means. Therefore, psychology and economics must combine. Policy that focuses on creating societal bonds must be used alongside policy to increase GDP if the policy aim is the increase in happiness. Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk
____________________________________
Claire E. Sherwin is a third year
undergraduate reading Politics, Philosophy and Economics at The University of York.
HAPPINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY By Professor Emeritus Lord Richard Layard
H
APPINESS IS NOW ON THE AGENDA, AND ABOUT TIME TOO.
But is this just a trendy fad, or should there be a permanent change in the way we think about the purposes of politics? I think there has to be a permanent change. It is not, of course, new to say that the aim of government is to enable people to lead happier lives. In the eighteenth century enlightenment it was standard to believe that the best society is where the people are happiest, and the best policy is what produces the greatest 12
happiness. These admirable views did much to inspire the social reforms of the century that followed. But in many cases it was difficult to apply the principle because so little was known about what makes people happy. However the last thirty years have seen a major scientific revolution, and we now know much more about what causes happiness – using the results of psychology and neuroscience. The first thing we know is that in the last fifty years average happiness has not increased at all in Britain nor in the USA – despite massive increases in
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living standards. This is because above an average income of about £10,000 per head richer societies are no happier than poorer societies. Richer people are of course on average happier than poorer people in the same society, but this is largely because people compare their incomes with other people. If everyone gets richer, they feel no better off. In rich societies like ours what really affects happiness is the quality of personal relationships. Always top comes the quality of family life, or other close personal relationships. Then comes work – having it (if you want it) and enjoying the meaning and comradeship it can bring. And then comes relationships with friends and strangers in the street. Some societies are much happier than others – and Scandinavian countries always come out near the top. This is largely because people trust each other more there than in other countries. In Britain and the US the number of people who believe that “most other people can be trusted” has halved in the last fifty years, and this reflects the growth of an individualism which makes personal success more important than almost anything else. These facts call for a revolution in how we think about ourselves and about how the government can help us to flourish. It becomes clear that faster economic growth is not the most important objective for a soci-
ety. We should not sacrifice human relationships or peace of mind for the sake of higher living standards, which will be growing anyway.
In rich societies like ours what really affects happiness is the quality of personal relationships. We need a fundamental rethink of our policy priorities, which (as David Cameron has argued) would give higher priority to family life and the way people support each other in communities and at work. This debate is only just beginning. In my book Happiness: Lessons from a New Science I make a few illustrative proposals. 1. The most important thing we can affect is the values which our children acquire. Schools should teach them systematically that the secret of a happy life is in giving to other people. Evidence-based programmes exist for doing this, and should become a part of our core curriculum. Topics covered should also include the responsibilities of parenthood and the art of effective parenting. 2. The least happy people in our society are people with a record of mental illness. Three-quarters of people with depression or hyper-anxiety receive no treatment, although psychological therapies exist which can cure over half of these terrible cases. Such 13
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therapies should be available free on the NHS. 3. Advertising makes people feel they need more and thus makes them less happy with what they have. As in Sweden, we should ban advertising aimed at children under 12. 4. We should stop apologising about taxes: they discourage us from working even harder and sacrificing further our relationships with family and friends. We should also persist with income redistribution, since an extra £1 gives more happiness to poor people than to rich. That argument also implies redistribution to the Third World. And so on. Our living standards are not threatened by China or India. In fact we are in a new situation for mankind where further wealth-creation is now unnecessary for survival. If we want to become still happier, we need a new strategy from the one pursued over the last fifty years – we need to put human relationships first.
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This is not a dangerous form of utopianism which will lead to an over-active nanny state. One thing happiness research shows is that regulation as such causes irritation and unhappiness. So we should stop regulating things which have minimal effects on human happiness, while in other areas the state should be more pro-active (including the support of creative leisure, sport and exercise.) Unless we find new priorities, our happiness will remain where it has been for the last fifty years. But we can do better than this. We have conquered absolute poverty and the issue now is how to improve our human relationships. Let the debate go forward. Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
Richard Layard is the Emeritus Professor of Economics at The LSE and Founder of the Centre for Economic Performance.
Issue XIII - Autumn 2010
Mill, Liberty, and Happiness Reconciling Mill’s On Liberty with his utilitarianism
By Dan Iley-Williamson
J
. S. MILL’S CLASSIC LIBERAL TEXT ON LIBERTY PROVIDES A VIGOROUS
defence of freedom from the dangers of state coercion and ‘the despotism of custom’ (Mill, 1991, p78). Yet Mill is also one of the great advocates of utilitarianism, as he sets out in his other classic, Utilitarianism. In its traditional Benthamite form, utilitarianism holds that everything, besides happiness, is of mere instrumental value. This potentially causes tension in Mill’s work, as it often appears that the pursuit of happiness is obstructed by liberty, and vice versa. In this article I shall examine the extent of this problem, and, crucially, determine the foundations of Mill’s liberty principle. I shall conclude by arguing that, in spite of the supposed appearance of undermining tensions, Mill’s arguments for liberty and utilitarian
“Individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth” (Mill, 1991, p63)
ism can be reconciled into a coherent single body of thought. The variant of liberty Mill presents is, in Berlin’s terms, ‘negative’ as it advocates freedom from constraint, either by the state or society (Berlin, 1969). He sets out his notoriously difficult ‘harm principle’ by arguing that power can only be rightfully exercised over an individual to “prevent harm to others” (Mill, 1991, p14). What constitutes ‘harm’ shall not be considered here, but instead how uncompromising this principle is: the individual’s ‘independence is, of right, absolute.’ (Mill, 1991, p14). He goes on to say that ‘individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth’ (Mill, 1991, p63). Here he implies individuality does have intrinsic value, contradicting the utilitarian belief that, in his own words, ‘pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends’ (Mill, 1987, p278). Because the utilitarian believes ‘the good’ is found through maximising happiness and minimising pain, notions of liberty are only given instrumental value (i.e. to what extent 15
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liberty furthers happiness). As such, it might seem that Mill is being inconsistent, for can the apparently flexible position of utilitarianism support the rigidity of his liberty principle? He does, however, explicitly state that his foundation for liberty is utility: ‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions’ (Mill, 1991, p15).
Hence the question may seem like a done-deal, with Mill unequivocally justifying his theory on utility, but as one commentator has said of Mill’s argument: “if it is genuinely utilitarian, [it] doesn’t work, or if it does work, then it isn’t genuinely utilitarian” (Arneson, 1997, p83). This is thought because many feel no form of utilitarianism can uphold Mill’s highly demanding liberty principle, for it rejects typical utilitarian policies, such as paternalism. A key thinker who believes Mill abandons utilitarianism is Berlin. He argues that because Mill departs so thoroughly from the Benthamite conception of utilitarianism (where “push-pin is as good as poetry” (Mill, 16
1987, p174)), to call On Liberty a utilitarian thesis would be mistaken. This is thought because, Berlin supposes, if Bentham had been offered the chance to drug humanity in a manner where ultimate contentment was found, and pain eliminated, he would have readily accepted it, assuming “the largest possible number of men receive lasting happiness”, yet Mill would have determinedly refused (Berlin, 1969, pp177-178). Hence, Berlin thinks that although Mill “is officially committed to the exclusive pursuit of happiness… his voice is most his own when he describes the glories of individual freedom” (Berlin, 1969, p178). Consequently, he argues that Mill’s utilitarianism no longer resembles its traditional meaning, thus rendering the term vacuous. Instead Mill’s highest values are ‘individual liberty, variety, and justice’ (Berlin, 1969, p181). Therefore, by this interpretation, On Liberty should not be read as a utilitarian essay; instead liberty and diversity are given intrinsic value. In contrast to Berlin’s interpretation, there are those who argue that Mill can base his principle of liberty on utilitarianism. This would make a simpler reading of On Liberty since in his Autobiography he says he never ‘wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life’ (Mill, 1989, p117). So, how can Mill’s heartfelt utilitarianism be reconciled with his equally emphatic demands for lib-
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erty? The answer lies in his particular form of utilitarianism. He argues for ‘utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being’ (Mill, 1991, p15), and it is this that provides the foundations for his liberty. This is so because Mill’s utility amounts to a form of ‘indirect utilitarianism’ (Gray, 1996, p14) that recognises the power of liberty to advance man’s chief concerns. For his liberty principle is consistent with his utilitarianism, but it is not the hedonistic utility that he was indoctrinated into. Instead, Mill has a resolute picture of what the ‘good life’ entails, and his utilitarianism rests on this conception. The ‘good life’, in Mill’s view, is found through following the path one chooses for oneself, not giving into a simple, banal ‘quiet life’ that the ‘despotism of custom’ (Mill, 1991, p78) dictates. He believes that when the mentally engaged way of life is followed the ‘higher faculties’ are active, and the pleasure found through their working is of a better quality because the active mind is better than the sedated – ‘it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’ (Mill, 1987, p280-281). This explains Mill’s rejection of Bentham’s utilitarianism, for Mill distinguishes between the quality of pleasure, hence why he believes poetry is superior to push-pin – poetry, engages with the higher faculties (and consequently is
a higher pleasure), while push-pin (an early equivalent to billiards) merely engages with the base, simplistic faculties (and therefore is a lower pleasure).
Utility must be found in man’s ability to flourish for himself, and to live up to his progressive potential. With this weight given to the higher faculties, it can be seen why Mill places such importance on liberty, for it is through liberty, through the freedom to question and argue, to choose the ends of one’s life for oneself, that one’s mind is forced to fully engage, rather than being confined to the doldrums of conformity. The tragic tale of Socrates shows that where liberty is restrained, and intellectual questioning is forbidden, those that delve furthest into the ‘higher faculties’ are suppressed and bound. Because of this, the greatest pleasures can only be maximised through granting liberty, hence why Mill advocates ‘indirect utilitarianism’, not the crude hedonism of Bentham. As can now be seen, Mill’s liberty principle is founded on utilitarianism. But as Berlin noticed, yet incorrectly defined, it is utility of a radically different form to Bentham’s. It argues that ‘experiments of living’ (Mill, 1991, p63) are necessary for man to discover the plurality of ways that best suit indi17
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vidual flourishing; without liberty man is confined to a stagnant and intellectually sedated existence. Consequently, happiness is only truly achieved when the individual uses his ‘higher faculties’ to choose his ends, thus making liberty a necessary, although not a sufficient condition, to man leading the ‘good life’. For not only must man be given the room to develop his ‘higher facilities’, that is to say, he must be given liberty, but he must use it, and this is Mill’s great positive message – to engage ful-
ly with life, not to merely use the ‘apelike [faculty] of imitation’(Mill, 1991, p65), but to be one’s true, and full, self. Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
Dan Iley Williamson is a second year undergraduate reading Politics, Philosophy and Economics at The University of York.
The Unhappiness of Sustainability By Luke Smalley
B
ERTRAND RUSSELL ONCE ASKED WHAT THE POINT WAS OF
making everyone wealthy if the rich themselves were unhappy. Russell’s question captures a theme in contemporary reactionary politics: that economic development and material abundance are not guarantors of human happiness. Indeed, taken to its extreme, the argument claims that they are intrinsically opposed to any development of human happiness. This theme grounds itself in the politics of ‘sustainability’, a movement that seeks to halt further industrial development and reverse the process in the already developed world. Such a movement, it will be claimed, is intrinsically opposed 18
to human happiness, but this opposition hides behind economic and scientific claims that are false. This article will uncover the political and moral claims behind the scientific ‘fig leaf ’ that the sustainability agenda uses to hide them. At its core, sustainability is an ideological doctrine against furthering human development. Johnathan Porritt, a leading advocate of ‘sustainability’, believes ‘that quantitative demand must be reduced, not expanded’ (Porritt, 1984). The sustainability movement’s avocation of reducing consumption habits stems from a belief about limits to ‘growth’. The ‘limits to
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growth’ thesis has two central claims. Firstly, that continued consumption is impossible at increasing levels, because of the finite productive limits of the Earth; that is, our attempts to increase our consumption habits will be curtailed, either by ourselves or by nature. Secondly, it argues that a society of reduced consumption will be a more fulfilling place than the current world we live in today. A society that lives ‘closer’ to nature, it is argued, will be more spiritually fulfilling than a life dominated by material goods. This type of argument is often backed up by ‘happiness studies’, which allege to show no correlation between the raw wealth of society and the happiness of its citizens (Layard, 2006). Oxfam argues that ‘Africa should make more use of the skills of its nomadic peoples to help combat the challenges of climate change’(BBC News, 2008). Here, lifestyles that are ‘close to nature’ are glorified for their sustainability and social values. It is claimed that the developed world should follow the example of these societies, adopting a symbiotic relationship with nature, both economically and socially, which will allow human beings to pursue social and spiritual happiness far removed from the inhuman realm of modern industrial society. It is therefore argued that societal wealth does not guarantee human fulfilment, and that measures of wealth such as GDP are very poor indicators of human well-being. In this sense, sustainability has two faces.
Firstly, it makes a scientific and economic claim that there are ecological limits to how much human beings can develop, and secondly it makes a moral and political claim that living ‘closer’ to nature improves human well-being.
Freedom is often seen as a prerequisite for human happiness... Sustainability makes economic and scientific claims that target industrialism, rather than capitalism. For example, Porritt paints both capitalism and socialism with the same brush, deriding their ‘adherence to the belief that human needs can only be met through the permanent expansion of the process of production and consumption’ (Goldsmith et al., 1986). In attacking industrialism, rather than capitalism, sustainability departs from the traditional Left critique (which argues that poverty is a product of social relations governed by capitalism). It makes a new argument, that industrialism degrades nature, and that this degradation causes poverty. Such a claim is made apparent in the Environmental Justice movement in the USA, which claims that environmental degradation is suffered most acutely the poor. Andrew Dobson uses the example of Hurricane Katrina, which affected poor people more than wealthy ones, not because poorer areas were affected more severely, but because people with money where more easily able to flee 19
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the city. Advocates of sustainability conclude that it is the degradation of the environment (i.e. natural disasters caused by climate change) that causes human misery (Dobson, 2007, p18). Dobson seems to miss the contradiction in his argument. By arguing that natural disasters harm the poor more severely, he gives an example of how living ‘closer’ to nature proves detrimental to human well-being. By observing that material wealth in fact allowed individuals to better deal with a natural disaster, we could argue that further industrial development, such as the construction of better levees, cheaper and more efficient transport and more resilient building materials, would have produced a social good, despite its consequent environmental degradation. Sustainability simply cannot argue that industrial development, and resultant environmental degradation, is a primary factor in the impoverishment of millions of human beings. Whatever arguments we may posit against the capitalist economic system (and capitalism is arguably a very bad way of achieving equitable distribution of development), it cannot be denied that capitalism has achieved levels of material satisfaction in the West that those who were alive during the industrial revolution could only have dreamed of. It cannot be argued that labour-saving devices such as trains, cars, centralised electricity generation and the Internet, have no use value to society, and it is simply a 20
fallacy to argue that economic development has run in parallel to lower living standards and declining indicators of social development, because exactly the opposite is the case. Because of this fact, environmentalism must posit a limit to development in the future, which brings us to the environmentalist’s conception of economic resources and the ‘limits to growth’ thesis. The starting point for thinking about ‘sustainable societies’ is the notion of ‘limits to growth’; that is, ‘that aspirations of ever-increasing growth and consumption cannot be fulfilled because resources are finite’ (ibid., p609). But this misconceives resources as having only a material basis, rather than a combination of both material and intellectual factors that involve both scientific and political grounding.
It is simply a fallacy to argue that economic development has run in parallel to lower living standards and declining indicators of social development... Our dependence on Earth’s resources is unsustainable not simply because they are materially finite. If this were the case, society’s ‘sustainable’ dependence on solar, wind and tidal power would also be unsustainable, because these are also materially finite. This is
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an argument drawn from the sustainability movement itself, because the movement insists that governments must invest huge amounts of capital into renewable energy development. The sustainability argument is therefore predicated on the need for the transformation of a relationship with a material, and the continued development of technology in order to realise this. A further aspect of the ‘limits to growth’ thesis is the idea that technological advancement must eventually hit a brick wall. The sustainability movement possess an extreme pessimism about the ability of science to continually provide solutions to problems generated by industrial development. But such a claim denies the ability of society to make more efficient use of resources and space as technological advances occur. Famines and droughts are often used as examples that food production and water pro-
vision have reached their limits, but these problems aren’t problems of substance, they are problems of technology and politics. It is now widely argued that famines occurring today are a result of government mismanagement, rather than a shortage of food (Sen, 1983). Furthermore, there is a huge abundance of water on the planet, but the problem is that most of it is undrinkable. This is a problem of technology, rather than of substance (Grimond, 2010). Sustainability simultaneously highlights problems, and forbids our ability to solve them. This type of argument isn’t grounded in science or economics, as has been shown, but finds itself in the moral and political doctrine which lies behind the science. Sustainability, then, is not ‘common sense’, nor is it economic or scientific ‘fact’. Instead, it is part of the political and moral doctrine made by the environmental movement itself. Sustainability, by labelling in-
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dustrial development as ‘bad’, attacks many of the things that actually liberate human beings and improve their well being. Freedom is often seen as a prerequisite for human happiness, and included within this is the idea of freedom of movement. Developments in transportation have allowed human beings access to new opportunities, resources, and ideas. The growth of the railroad globally during the 1840s and 50s shows just what an incredible force freedom of movement can be. By claiming that such expansion of movement is ‘bad’, the sustainability movement cuts right at the heart of human freedom. Human satisfaction is no longer at the heart of social decision making. Instead, government policy, construction projects, global sporting events and the like must be judged on their environmental impact, rather than their ability to satisfy human desires. Sustainability necessarily leads to questions of population control, because more people require more resources to consume. David Attenborough claims he has “never seen a problem that wouldn’t be easier to solve with fewer people, or harder, and ultimately impossible, with more” (BBC News 2009). But claims such as these are intrinsically opposed to questions of human freedom. Liberal society is built upon the idea that individuals are the best judges of what is in their best interest. ‘Nobody’ claims Ludwig von Mises, ‘is in a position to 22
decree what should make a fellow man happier’ (Mises, 1966). But population control necessarily implies that others should have a say in how individuals lead their lives. The fact that most people find the idea of population control abhorrent might explain why the sustainability movement uses science and economics to hide its views. Furthermore, development raises people out of poverty and allows them greater choice in their lives. John Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1975), makes a distinction between free and reflexive behaviours. Here Locke claims action should be distinguished from ‘behaviour’ by its intentionality. He writes that individuals have a power to choose whether to pursue certain desires over all others, with the power to suspend certain desires. He claims that this is the source of all liberty. A situation of poverty is characterised by behaviours which are unintentional. Those living in poverty are coerced into behaviours they must commit in order to survive. The human being has little choice over what her actions are to be; she must spend the vast proportion of her existence scratching out a living from nature. Development liberates human beings from this natural existence, allowing them to produce the means of subsistence in a fraction of the time it would take if they were to rely on ‘natural processes’ to deliver them. This has a twofold effect on human happiness. Firstly, by producing a great
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abundance in the necessities of life, human beings are no longer primarily motivated by their impulsive desires. Once the longing for food, water and warmth have been satisfied, human beings can make rational choices. Secondly, by reducing the amount of time needed to produce the means of subsistence, human beings unlock vast amounts of time in which to achieve their goals and ambitions. By arguing against development, the sustainability movement directly opposes raising people out of these unfree situations. In doing so, they posit an anti-human agenda, which is passed off as having scientific and economic grounding. Once it is realised that such claims are
not ‘fact’, they can be criticised as political and moral claims and shown to be highly unpopular with the majority of people who value their freedom. Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
Luke Smalley is a graduate student reading International Political Economy at The University of York.
Aristotle and the Ends of Life By James Hodgson
I
N THE TEXTS WHICH HAVE BEEN PASSED DOWN TO US AS THE
Ethica Nicomachea, Aristotle sets out to find the highest good which a human being can possess. At the very beginning of his treatise, he declares that “every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” (Aristotle, 1998, p1). The atten-
tive reader might say this isn’t a very promising start as Aristotle has seemingly already committed a gross logical error: he has taken the idea that everything aims at some good to entail that there is one good at which all action aims. It is as if, having declared that everyone has a mother, Aristotle has then inferred that there must be someone that is the mother of everyone. Despite this shaky start, what Aristotle has to say about the proper ends
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of a human being’s life can be made coherent, and is still worthy of close attention. Never one to be deterred by these things, Aristotle continues his investigation in characteristic fashion, canvassing the general opinions of the many and the wise, and seeing which beliefs are more basic and irreducible than others. When he returns from his survey, he notes that “verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy”. However, “with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise” (ibid., p5). Some people insist on associating happiness with wealth; some say that happiness is synonymous with pleasure; others claim that being happy
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means attaining honours; and others still observe that one cannot be called happy without one’s health (although this only seems to register with people when they fall ill). What then can we say about the content of happiness? Simply agreeing to disagree isn’t very satisfying, and Aristotle doesn’t take the general confusion lying down. In the course of his investigations, he notes that goods may be thought of in two ways: they are either thought of as good in themselves; or as good for achieving some purpose which is external to themselves. Therefore, a good has intrinsic value if it is wanted for its own sake – that is, even if nothing resulted from our owning it, we would still find it desirable. Now, it seems likely that the chief good would be a good of this sort, since it wouldn’t be wanted only for the sake of something else. Neither, however, would it be wanted for the sake of anything else at all – the end of all action would have to be just that. Finally, Aristotle thinks that the chief good would be self-sufficient, in the sense that nothing could be added to it to make it better. So far, the candidacy of happiness for the status of chief good seems to meet all three conditions. But we still aren’t much clearer over the form that happiness takes, or what gives it content. A clearer account might be given, says Aristotle, “if we could first ascertain the function of
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man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function” (ibid., ,pp12-13). This naturalism is probably the most puzzling aspect of Aristotle’s theory for a modern audience. He appears to be saying that what is best for us depends on what it means to be human, and therefore happiness takes the same form for everyone. While this may seem a strange idea to us, it is not very far from what we would normally accept as obvious. For example, we may say human rights exist in virtue of someone’s status as a human being. But we could go further and say that they are rights to be human – that is, rights to a certain kind of life which it is right for a human being to live.
What counts as best for human beings is to exercise excellently the faculties of reason and to order one’s emotions under the guidance of reason. What Aristotle is talking about then, isn’t so far removed from our everyday moral ideas that we can’t take him seriously. He continues his investigations by noting that, if humans do have a function, it would probably
relate to that which is peculiar to them. So we can exclude simple nutrition and growth, because we have that in common with plants. Likewise, we can exclude sense-perception, because we share that with animals. What is peculiar to humans, then, is “an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought” (ibid., p13). Therefore, what counts as best for human beings is to exercise excellently the faculties of reason and to order one’s emotions under the guidance of reason. So we have discovered what is best for human beings, where happiness takes the form of the exercise of reason to an excellent degree. But we are still left with our problem from the beginning: Aristotle seems to commit a logical fallacy in his investigative procedures. One way to rectify this problem is through an ‘inclusive’ reading of the text – that happiness as described by Aristotle is not simply another intrinsic good, but is a third species of good. That is, happiness encompasses all those goods which are valued for their own sakes, which reason tells us are worthy of our desire. It is by their status as good for their own sakes that they form ingredients of happiness, and in this way happiness is given form. This also chimes with Aristotle’s criterion of self-sufficiency – happiness must include all those goods 25
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which are in themselves, because otherwise some other good may be added to happiness and so make it even better.
“One swallow does not make a summer … and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy” However, simply spelling out the content of happiness is not enough. We also need to attain those ‘external’ goods through which we can achieve those which are valuable for themselves. Without them, achieving happiness will be either impossible or very difficult, says Aristotle. “There are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness – good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance
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or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or had lost good children or friends by death” (ibid., p17). And we should add that these goods should be spread over a complete life, because “one swallow does not make a summer … and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy” (ibid., p14). Happiness is therefore not to be confused with momentary pleasure, or the pursuit of one’s existing desires. It is the life-long project of the fulfilment of our basic nature.
Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
James Hodgson is a graduate student reading Political Philosophy (The Idea of Toleration) at The University of York.
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Postmodernism: The Path to Listlessness By Clement Wee
H
ERE IS A RIDDLE: WHAT ARE YOU IF YOU FIGHT OPPRESSION AND
still feel unhappy at the end of it? Here is the answer: a postmodernist. It seems unintuitive to suggest that unhappiness could ever result from fighting oppression, since freedom is supposed to bring about happiness. There is, however, one way in which such an outcome might occur. If the fight against oppression becomes oppressive in itself, continued fighting will result in unhappiness. It is like an addiction that requires increasing amounts of the stimulant to satisfy. In this article, I shall be arguing that this is precisely the case with the last great philosophy of Western society – postmodernism – and all its adjuncts. I shall argue that postmodernism’s desire to see the End of History has finally led to its own end, and briefly present a view of what is coming up next. The Picture of Postmodernism Postmodernism is the philosophy that concentrates on the disassembly of dominant ideologies in order to achieve freedom. Like all philosophies,
postmodernism has its differing subvarieties and different mannerisms of philosophers. However, due to the lack of space, this article shall focus on Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrilliard, and Jacques Deridda who I argue to be the foundational writers of postmodernism. Each adopts a particular niche for his philosophy: Focault’s is sexuality, Baudrilliard’s is industry, and Deridda’s is literature. However, they share a common argument: Modernism has imposed oppressive structures that need to be destroyed as quickly as possible. Structures in this context refer to conventionalized social relationships, as well as ossified belief-patterns that permeate individual, and group,
If the fight against oppression becomes oppressive in itself, continued fighting will result in unhappiness. consciousness. Foucault (1965) argues that the oppression was in heterosexuality; Baudrilliard (1981) argues 27
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that the oppression was in advertising, which creates a “hyper-real” simulation; Deridda (1966) argues that oppression was inherent in discourse, in the idea of forcing a structure onto a discourse that is naturally without structure. They also share a common convergence: to the idea that structure itself is oppressive. Foucault (1977) argues that the enforcement of heterosexuality extended to every corner of culture in order to preserve the power of Church and State; Baudrilliard (1981) stresses that the whole of society was “hyper-real”; Deridda (1976) famously argues that the “phonocentrism” of discourse is “phallogocentric” and calls for a “project of Deconstruction” to be carried out, even in the University (Derrida, 2001). For these philosophers and, more importantly, their adherents, there is only one solution: get rid of all structures entirely. The rationale given is that structures are an artefact of modernism, and modernism is way past its prime. Amongst all the structures present, the most oppressive are cultural structures called metanarratives, which seek to confine people’s perceptions of their environment. Such metanarratives include religious myths, the Enlightenment Cult of Reason and the Capitalist Myth of Progress (Eagleton, 1996). The aim of postmodernists is thus to demolish all metanarratives and prevent new ones from rising in their place, in order to achieve freedom and 28
happiness for all, including those who believe in those narratives. The difference between these three philosophers is not as much in principle as in approach. Foucault emphasizes political action, and is a central figure in inspiring the Gay Movement, whilst Baudrilliard emphasizes changing personal psychology and Derrida emphasizes adopting a mode of cultural analysis. In the end, the three approaches meld together in one programmatic chain: change the way you think, analyze culture based on your new way of thinking, and then challenge conventions based on the results of your analysis. The Weakness of Postmodernism At each stage of the program, a problem that demonstrates the weaknesses of postmodernism surfaces. In the first stage – changing one’s worldview - postmodernism begins by imposing an obstacle to beginning to think in the first place. At the second stage, it fails to provide a grounding for analysis, and at the final stage it de-fangs you totally by removing all grounding from life. In this way, one travels on a path from hope to listlessness, thus indicating the self-contradiction inherent in the postmodernist programme. As pointed out above, postmodernism eschews structures entirely. Deridda (1966) exemplifies this when he argues that culture is a field of “play”, since structure has been “ruptured”. For a postmodern-
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ist, structures themselves are results of oppression, and must be at least avoided at all costs. However, concepts themselves are structures, being, as they are, ordered arrangements of acquired and expected mental experience , so if one were to operate totally without structures, one would not be able to use concepts. In principle, that would include even Cartesian primitive concepts. In effect, postmodernism renders thinking impossible. The fundamental precondition of being able to think is the ability to appreciate where you are coming from. That requires a map of some sort, and a map itself is a form of structure. Postmodernism destroys that from the outset. Ellis (1989) observes that this first difficulty is often side-stepped by postmodernists who aim to have their cake and eat it i.e. destroy structures and then use what they destroy. The
culprit for this is the notion of the discontinuous subject, an entity which alters its identity consistently. The discontinuous subject thus lacks a “centre” unlike other subjects oppressed by “centres” which comprise essential qualities. (Eagleton, 1996) As Eagleton (1996) observes wryly, however, absolute “de-centredness” is unsustainable in the long-run because that would lead to total loss of identity; every identity presumes a centre. It would lead to the absurd situation whereby children failed to recognize their parents every single week. If one chooses to ignore the problems with the first step, the second step faces a similar problem of lack of grounding. Postmodernism supplants metanarratives with micronarratives, that is, narratives that are only applicable in particular periodic and cultural contexts. Eagleton (1996)
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contends that this reduces postmodernism to only being able to critique postmodernists, which is of no use to postmodernism, or to anyone else for that matter. The relativist approach of postmodernism imprisons the postmodernist in the present, unable to make commentary on the past, or sketch a vision of the future, as the postmodernist narrative may only apply, strictly speaking, to the current era in which the postmodernists are ascendant. Postmodernists are reduced to the equivalent of navel-gazing, since one can ultimately be “postmodernist about postmodernism” (Eagleton, 1996).
The relativist approach of postmodernism imprisons the postmodernist in the present, unable to make commentary on the past, or sketch a vision of the future If one chooses to ignore the implications yet again, the problems of the final step, the implementation step will be plain in view. This is what Reisman (1995) identifies as a defective view of freedom. Freedom cannot exist outside a structure, because a structure sets up boundaries that provide individuals space to exercise their freedom (ibid.). However, postmodernists aim to destroy structure to the core, 30
even just raw prioritising. As such, they fall victim to what the political writer Alan Toffler (1971) calls the “tyranny of over-choice”: overwhelmed by the number of choices which there are, having lost a means by which to select the most appropriate choice. The freedom that such a dazzling array of choices has on offer is – borrowing a postmodern term – “hyper-real”; that is, illusory. The worst of it is that the choices that the postmodernist faces are choices about identity (a la the discontinuous self). Because postmodernism’s vague notion of “otherness” is insufficient to generate a coherent identity for the postmodernist, the postmodernist is stuck trudging a pool of micronarratives, unable to universalize any one of them. In the end, all that the postmodernist is left with is a frustration indicating a freedom that should have been found but is still left wanting because of the way postmodernists have perceived it; deconstruction has turned into an infinite regress. This is not happiness, but listlessness. The End of History is the end of life. After Postmodernism Is there a way out of this gloomy prospect? Cultural critic Alan Kirby seems to think so. Kirby (2009) argues that society at large is gradually moving beyond post-modernism. Instead, society is embracing what Kirby calls “Digi-modernism” which, in his char-
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acterization, is Reisman’s (1995) capitalism charged with the steroids of the internet. He criticises the authors of Wikinomics for an excessively business-like vision of the world to come. However, in doing so, Kirby neglects to notice that both of them agree on at least one point, that “Digimodernism” involves individuals building a new order out of the various pieces of culture postmodernism has ejected from society, a way to once again start building the Yellow Brick Road. Kirby (2009) argues that we have come full-circle: from modernism to post-modernism, then back to modernism.
I rather think that society is heading towards Eagleton’s (1996) idea of a union and melding between modernism and postmodernism. Such a union produces a variegated, yet unified identity and such an identity is the best guarantor of freedom, and thus, our ultimate goal as humans, happiness.
Bibliography available online at www.voxjournal.co.uk _____________________________
Clement Wee is a second year undergraduate reading Politics, Philosophy and Economics at The University of York.
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VOX Call For Papers VOX - the Student Journal for Politics Economics and Philosophy is calling for articles to be submitted for the Spring Issue 2011, with the broad theme “Rights and Duties”. Articles should be between 1,000 and 1,250 words in length. If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your article to vox@clubofpep.org by the 20th December. You may wish to write on a topic from the list below: • • • • • • • •
Human Rights: “Nonsense on stilts”? Are moral imperatives categorical or hypothetical? The moral status of non-humans (Personhood and issues in bioethics) Taxation and redistribution: what do we owe to each other? Are political institutions dignified institutions? Does social choice theory leave any scope for altruism? Could Pareto efficiency ever reflect our moral rights and duties? ____________ (Your own idea)
(Undergraduates, Graduates and Academics Welcome)