Identities

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

IDENTITIES: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL 1

VOX | The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy

EDITORIAL

VOX

THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

voxjournal.co.uk

ISSUE XXVI - AUTUMN 2015

In recent years, the emergence of social media has brought about a change in the public perception of identity. With such a powerful medium to project one’s individual identity to the public, many can bring exposure to issues that are largely ignored by mainstream media and shine light on differing opinions.

While this change has promoted unity and empathy in many aspects, it has also served to provide a platform for negative and often dangerous ideas to flourish. This VOX issue will focus on the question of modern identity and how political, social and cultural ideas may impact individual as well as collective identities.

The first essay by Daniella Meehan begins by delving into the fundamental question of choices concerning personal identity. Although rejecting changes in appearance as equal to changes in identity, Meehan expresses that changes made to the mind could significantly affect one’s identity. Alex Tebble, on the other hand, centres his essay on a collective identity; Nationalism. Emphasising the distinction between Nationalism and Patriotism, Tebble proposes that the former presents a political threat. In the next essay, Angus Ryan rejects the notion that ‘One Nation under God’ demands the state’s law and governance to respect this fact, concluding that the state can remain secular. Finally, Simon Baron blames British difficulties to identify with Europe on a politically driven British perception of Europe as ‘others’ as well as a lack of a coherent European identity.

On the last page of this issue we have placed the information about our two new partners: Interstate from Aberwyswth University and Sir from the University of Oxford. Our partnership currently is mainly aimed at getting wider awareness for our respective publications, however there will be collaboration opportunities in the future, from guest pieces in VOX, Interstate or Sir, invitations and information about talks and resources such as podcasts, as well as being able to read their publications. This is an exciting time for VOX, and we would like to thank both Interstate and Sir for getting in touch about developing a partnership.

CONTENTS ESSAYS Are we born into our identity and do we have the ability to change it?

Daniella Meehan

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Nationalism: Identity Beyond Individuals Alex Tebble Can ‘One Nation Under God’ be Secular?

Angus Ryan

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Splendid Unpopularity? British Identity and European Integration from 17 the Second Half of the Twentieth Century Simon Baron

This is the first issue of the current committee, so we would like to welcome everyone who recently joined us. We hope you enjoy reading this issue and find it informative.

Ida Sjöberg and Nadia Setiabudi Editors-In -Chief

EDITORIAL TEAM Editors-In-Chief: Ida Sjöberg Nadia Setiabudi

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Content Editors: Hannah Bennett Uvin Dissanayake Eliza Gkritsi Sebastian Law Christopher Lubker

Katherine Tyler Miro Pluckebaum

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Web Officer: Jack Turner Front Cover - European Conference.org

VOX is an academic journal run by students that provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and offers insight into debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as other universities world-wide.

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ARE WE BORN INTO OUR IDENTITY AND DO WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO CHANGE IT? Daniella Meehan Daniella Meehan, University of York Philosophy undergraduate, discusses the factors that combine to create our identity.

Personal identity is a topic that many of us have pondered at some point in our lives, and we all have likely asked the question ‘Who am I?’ I think identity is the unity of character traits, memories and aspirations a person has. It is everything that makes us who we are. We tend to look to factors such as parental upbringing, religion, social class and appearance to decide what makes up our identity, but to what extent are we born into our identity and to what extent do we possess the freedom to change it? This article will address these two questions by examining three main issues relating to personal identity.

One line of thought about personal identity is that certain identity values are so deeply embedded in us from birth that they will always be a part of our identity. For example, from birth a large part of our identity is determined by gender, which has obvious implications for character traits. Another 4

example is social class, which affects employment opportunities; where we live; who we socialise with and even how we speak (i.e., our accent). No one would argue that these factors do not contribute to identity, and because social class (and gender) are more-or-less inherited from birth, it would appear that we have little choice over them.

A second view, assumed by Locke (1690), argued that identity must be continuous, and the only thing that meets a continuity criterion is consciousness. By consciousness, Locke meant a form of awareness in the ‘first person’ mind, in relation to past memories, present circumstances and future aspirations (see also Baars 1988, Dennett 1991, James 1890). It is the constant link between the homunculus in the mind and existence in a temporal continuum that Locke believed defined our identity. Thus, for Locke, consciousness was a necessary prerequisite for identity, and I agree

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with this analysis. However, Locke also believed that if our identity changes then we are no longer the same person, and on this point, I disagree.

identity is based on (or influenced by) the past. I will however argue that we can change our identity and that change demonstrates choice.

A third view on identity choice relates to freewill and whether apparent changes to identity are really implemented by us or whether they are due to uncontrollable factors. If the latter, then individuals have little choice over identity. If we go against freewill and instead take a more deterministic view, then everything we perceive to have choice over is merely an illusion (Glover 1988). Strawson (2011), for example, argued against freewill, and that any changes to identity are in fact determined by the initial self, as any action of wanting to change is determined by the initial state. Therefore, Strawson not only argues that we have no choice over identity, he also assumes that our identity is predetermined by the past, which would link back to birth. If a theist makes a choice to become an atheist, then Strawson would argue that this change is not freely made, rather it is dependent on the original theist self. The theist could not become an atheist, if they were not a theist first. Therefore, Strawson argues that change is predetermined by the ‘self prior’.

The first point proposed that certain identity traits are pre-determined at birth (e.g. social class). Before arguing that people can change their social class, I note that social class itself does not constitute identity, but directly influences identity variables, including ones mentioned above. An obvious argument for social class change is university enrolment, which is currently at record highs1. Moreover, an ever increasing number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds are accepted into university (Archer et al. 2005), which gives individuals access to higher paying jobs and the potential to increase social standing. Even gender, perhaps the most fundamental identity trait, can change. I am not referring to hormones or surgery to change secondary sexual characteristics, but instead, of people choosing to identify with the opposite gender from that determined by genes. Again, I think that not only do people have choice over these factors, but also with greater sensitivity and awareness, that that choice has in-

These three views have that change to identity is sible, and the underlying all three concerns how

suggested not postheme of (current)

1 From 2013 to 2014, there was a 3% increase in university enrolment, which was in part due to the removal of government implemented caps.

Moreover, students from areas, which have low entry rates to higher education, have seen the largest increase percentage wise, whereas students from more well-off areas have seen a slight dip (The Guardian, 2014).

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to things, yet still hold the view they are the same object. Conversely, if you claim that the new ship is the same as the old ship, then you must answer ‘what is the same?’ It would not look the same, and it would not have undergone the same journeys, and thus, none of the same experiences.

Image: Huffingtonpost.com

creased over time (Halberstam 2005).

The second point related to ideas proposed by Locke, specifically to consciousness and memory. Locke’s ideas are appealing as many psychologists believe that memories and experiences make us who we are (e.g. Conway et al. 2000, 2004, Tulving 1985), and these in turn, ultimately decide identity.2 No one would argue that an individual with anterograde amnesia is same person as the one prior to the insult. However, Locke’s argument is flawed because it does not comply with logical transitivity and what is known about the incompleteness and fallibility of human memory (Baddeley 1999, Roediger 1996, Roediger and McDermott 2000). If you forget 2 These ideas have led to a great deal of theorizing in psychology concerning the relationship between autobiographical memory and consciousness, and when consciousness actually begins (Conway et al. 2000). Similar arguments apply at the end of life (e.g. in dementia and Alzheimer’s disease) and when personal identity ceases to exist (Perry 1978).

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an important memory, then according to Locke, you would no longer be the same person. Forgetting would cause a break in the processes used to construct and interpret your identity, and that would violate the continuity criterion that was essential for Locke’s argument (Reid 1764, 1785).

The final point related to Strawson’s views on freewill. The topic of freewill is beyond the scope of this short treatise. However, a point is worth noting, just because identity change may be linked to who we were in the past does not mean that changes are determined by the past. Strawson raises an interesting issue in whether identity changes completely, or whether we make subtle changes to existing identity. This issue is related to the paradox of ‘The Ship of Theseus’, in which a boat is plankby-plank replaced with new wood. At what point does the boat cease being the old boat and become a new one?

We often make repairs and upgrades

This thought experiment can be linked to identity change in humans: If we change our appearance, do we have a new identity? People can have ‘makeovers’, yet we are wary of stating they have a new identity. These are the same questions that arose with the ship, what remains if a person has a makeover?

These questions all have bearing on the claim that we can choose our identity. However, throughout this paper I have not yet distinguished between internal-mental factors and externalappearance factors, and with regard to the ship paradox, what might be distinct for animate (living) things vs. inanimate objects. If a person gets a new wardrobe or a ship gets a new sail, then I do not think they have a new identity. In contrast, if a person suffers a traumatic brain injury that results in a loss of memory, then arguably they would have a different identity. In my view, it is the mind/brain that determines identity. Locke believed it was memory and consciousness and Strawson a pre-existing self, and I agree with both on these points. However both philosophers concluded that change to

identity is not possible. This is what I disagree with, as a change to internal identity, I think demonstrates choice.

People can change their hair colour or wardrobe, just like a ship can change its planks, but these changes are not ones that make identity, just appearance.

Changes made to the mind are possible and more significant, and often have a large impact on identity, including attitudes and aspirations (Rogers 2004)3.

As mentioned previously, I believe that people currently have far more choice over identity than ever before.

This can be observed in increased access to higher education, various civil rights movements (e.g. women, race, sexual orientation, transgender, etc.), and the increasing want for diversity in society (e.g. Athena SWAN 2005, Equality Act 2010). Another modern avenue for identity change is technology. Social media, for example, allows people to create “internet” identities that are vastly different from who they are in real life (Brown 2000).

The main outcome of these things is that people have more freedom with respect to their identity than they did in the past. Thus, certain arguments from the 19th century (e.g. Locke and 3 Modern cognitive neuroscience has begun to elucidate the mechanisms associated with these kinds of changes (Gazzaniga 2004, Kandel 2000). For example, learning to play an instrument or studying for a degree creates functional and structural changes in the brain (see longterm potentiation, morphological changes to dendritic spines, synaptic connectivity, etc.).

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Descartes) are no longer applicable.

To summarize my views, I think small changes to identity are sufficient to demonstrate choice of identity, and that identity is primarily based on consciousness and memory (i.e., the internal mental stuff accrued through experience and encoded into neurons in the brain). Identity is comprised of many different factors, and each one of them is influenced by many things. Yet this does not mean that we do not have choice over identity. We become the person we want to be, and we make conscious changes to our identity.

These seemingly happen most often in middle adulthood, as young children do not have sufficient experience or opportunity for change, and older adults are often unwilling change. Even in the face of philosophical paradoxes, we can still argue for our ability to change our identity, and change is what allows us to have control over who we are.

Although the question ‘Who am I?’ may not yet be answered, I think that the answer lies within each person, as we have choice over our identity.

Bibliography: Archer, L. et al. (2005) Higher Education and Social Class Issues of exclusion and inclusion. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Brown, R. (2000) Social identity theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges [Online] Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/10990992(200011/12)30:6%3C745::AIDEJSP24%3E3.0.CO;2-O/pdf Glover, J. (1988) The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity.

Penguin.

Halberstam, J. (2005). In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. New York: NYU Press.

Locke, J. (2014). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

Wordsworth Edition Limited.

Rogers, C. (2004). On Becoming a Person. Constable.

Rousseau, J. J. (1968). The Social Contract. Penguin Classics.

Strawson, G. (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility [Online] Available at: http://www.jstor.org/ [Accessed 2nd June 2015].

Tulving, E. (1985). Abstract Elements of Episodic Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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NATIONALISM: IDENTITY BEYOND INDIVIDUALS Alex Tebble Alex Tebble, University of York, Political Theory postgraduate, analyses the differences between Patriotism and Nationalism, and which is preferable as a national identity.

The dawn of the 21st century is all too aware of the dangers of Nationalism. Yet in the shadow of atrocities, a fundamental confusion has arisen: What is a national identity as opposed to a nationalist identity?

Patriotism as opposed to Nationalism?

Bigots, fascists and racists hide behind an argument of freely expressing one’s national identity patriotically, while those freely expressing their national identity patriotically are labelled bigots, fascists and racists. Out of this confusion, nationalist parties and groups have reared their heads as an expression of those who have felt their national identity to be under threat. The purpose of this essay is to first distinguish between Patriotism and Nationalism, the distinction of which lies in the form and manifestation of their identities. Secondly, it is the form of Nationalism’s identity which poses a serious political threat as it exists uncontrollably beyond the individual, seeking to cleanse others.

Thirdly, it is essential to recognise that Nationalism still poses a threat and that tackling the issue requires attacking the nationalist form of identity,

without succumbing to it.

One does not have to look very far into history to find support for the following train of thought: Identity - Patriotism - Nationalism - Xenophobia - Cleansing - Extermination. The choice examples are often authoritarian regimes, but even democracy has its dark side (Mann, 1999). Atrocities are committed in the name of an identity, be it democratic, liberal, authoritarian or otherwise. Of course, there may not necessarily be a slippery slope toward extermination, but political identities, nonetheless, have an historic record of exclusion. Regardless of political form, then, the starting point is the question of identity.

I cannot hope to scratch the surface of the meaning of the term ‘identity’ and its metaphysical, sociological and political origins in this short space.

Rather, my starting point is that as individuals we often identify as something that another individual could be classed as. This may of course be the often used categories of religion, race, geography, gender, class etc. but 9

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this can quite easily extend to political stances and social preferences: Communists, Carlsberg drinkers and Coleridge enthusiasts1. Any form in which we express ourselves in relation to other individuals may be regarded as a form of social identity.

Once our identity has become organised and collectivised to a degree, with a recognisable history, these identities become cultural, political and national in form. The terms Patriotism and Nationalism become relevant at this heightened level2. Orwell (1945) notes that Patriotism and Nationalism are, unfortunately, often used interchangeably, but one can certainly see differences. Patriotism is a particular enjoyment and pride in one’s social identity or cultural way of life, whereas Nationalism is inexorably linked to power and the political relations of identities; ‘The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality’ (Orwell, 1945).

1 Of course, these final two are somewhat facetious, but it is not unfathomable for a social preference to take a fundamental role in a collection of individuals’ essential identities.

2 These terms have constricting and overlapping uses, but there are no other words which can be used on this topic. Patriotism and Nationalism are often evoked with reference to the nation-state, race and territory, but I aim to use these terms with the widest possible conception to include political, cultural and social identities.

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The two also have slightly different extremes, which enables us to see the differences from a magnified perspective. An extreme of Patriotism is cultural elitism and if politicised, a policy of imperialism. The extreme of Nationalism is a politicised xenophobia; the identification of the ‘other’, which leads to cleansing - often violent - when the nationalist identity feels threatened or undermined (Schwarzmantel, 2011). I believe this distinction to be fairly uncontroversial, despite there being obvious overlaps in historical application. The significance of this is to separate those who merely take pride in their social/ national identity and those whose identity poses a nationalist political threat. The blurring of these two has led to the alienation of the former and camouflage of the latter. If one wishes to tackle Nationalism, one ought not take aim at Patriotism3.

The significant issue, then, is how identity manifests itself in Nationalism and what makes it a more significant threat than Patriotism.

What seems to be the predominant feature of Nationalism, in terms of 3 One may object that Patriotism has always been close to Nationalism and thus must be tackled with equal importance. Whilst I would agree with this remark regarding extremes and violent outbursts of Patriotism, I believe a separation is essential in order to distinguish what is politically harmful in contemporary society.

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individuals’ identity, is that it is an identity that transcends the immediate existence of individuals into some overarching and consuming power. It becomes a God-like gluttony, a cult of culture, a political papacy4. But this is not merely linked to religious nationstates, it is any social identity which has become organised, collectivised, politicised and seems beyond the individuals’ immediate identity; yet the individual finds this social identity essential to their identity. Not only this, but it is often fuelled by patriotic fever to be portrayed and pursued as an image of perfection. It is from this image that the ‘other’ is judged by and consequently cleansed when these grand identities politically collide.

This is not simply an individual’s creation, but a perpetuated movement in which individuals sink their identities: ‘the demand for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct of weakness which, to be sure does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds but-consolidates them’ (Nietzsche, 1974 para.347).

As a result, this grand identity seems to wield power beyond the instant existence of individuals - often acting as an excuse, due to the lack of an obvious perpetrator.

4 This religious language is by no means an attack on religious belief, it is that there is no other comparable language. See Marx (1969) for an indirect influence regarding this thought.

Consequently, it can be seen that whilst Patriotism has its own issues, which must be tackled, it is the toxic seed of Nationalism which poses a pertinent threat: The heyday of western imperialism and cultural elitism has passed, though its crusade and legacy remains hushed, while the dangers of Nationalism linger. Modest patriotic identity poses little threat because the identity exists within the individual’s immediate existence, whereas Nationalism becomes a great uncontrollable beast.

This is not only a characteristic of Nationalists, however, it can be found in those apparently opposing Nationalism. On the surface, those against Nationalism criticise its arbitrary focus on race, territory and its ties to authoritarian and totalitarian governments. Yet, the ideals and identities of these critics (be it Liberal, Democrat, Socialist, Christian, Tory, Humanist5 etc.) are sometimes appealed to in a startlingly similar way to the nationalist transcendent identity.

These ideals and identities can be appealed to as something politically perfect beyond the individual’s immediate existence and consequently have the identification of an ‘other’, 5 I am not suggesting that any of these identities are intrinsically nationalistic, rather, it is the way that some individuals use them that is nationalistic in form when they cling to a transcendent ideal identity. Furthermore, any politicised social identity is hypothetically in danger of this.

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which require cleansing. Even some of those attempting to remove the barriers of modern society under a Humanist guise do so with the spur of the nationalist form of identity. It is this hypocrisy which has clouded debate, along with the confusion of Patriotism and Nationalism, with no obvious solution.

To conclude, my purpose has been to highlight the issue at hand and provide some clarity. I believe there to be a significant difference between Patriotism and Nationalism and it is the latter which poses a current threat.

When Patriotism has been attacked as bigotry, it has counterproductively caused Patriots to retreat in to the hands of Nationalists. One must avoid attacking Patriotism in a muddled effort against Nationalism. It is often necessary to attack Patriotism when it becomes an extreme and bounded up with Nationalism, but attacking an expression of pride in one’s identity is not the immediate target. In order to tackle Nationalism one must attack the nationalistic transcendent form of political identity and expose its brutal cleansing of the ‘other’. How one does this exactly is an open question, but crucially, one must remember to not fall to the nationalist form of identity: be clean of any cleansing. If this threat cannot be resolved within our current confinements, without the hypocrisy that I have highlighted, then we must obliterate all existing forms of identity 12

and reconstruct ourselves: ‘a last intense effort to overcome metaphysics’ (Nietzsche, 1984 para.20).

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CAN ‘ONE NATION UNDER GOD’ BE SECULAR? Angus Ryan Angus Ryan, University of York, Philosophy undergraduate looks at secularity and religions interplay in government and state.

Bibliography: Mann, M. (1999) ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The modern tradition of ethnic and political cleansing’. New Left Review, 1(235), 18-45.

Marx, K. (1969) Theses on Feuerbach Marx/Engels Selected Works Vol. 1, trans.

W. Lough pp.13-15. Moscow: Progress.

Nietzsche, F. (1974) The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Random House.

Nietzsche, F. (1984) Human, All Too Human, trans. M. Faber. London: Penguin.

Orwell, G. (1945) ‘Notes on National ism’. England, Your England and Other Essays (1953) [Online]. London: Secker & Warburg. Available at: http://orwell.ru/ library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat Schwarzmantel, J. J. (2011) Democracy and Political Violence. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

In this essay I will argue that ‘One Nation under God’ can be a secular nation. I will make the point that in accepting that your nation is ‘One Nation under God’, you are not bound to beliefs that violate the core tenets of secularism. This is an argument based on the logical implications of the statement. It is not about the likelihood or practical possibility of said nation becoming secular but whether it is logically possible. After I have argued that the statement does not entail a rejection of secularity I will examine and deny the response that the statement demands a rejection of secularity.

Secularity in political life is defined as the state and its laws being separate from religion or a particular religion and individuals of differing religious beliefs are equal in the eyes of the law

(National Secular Society, 2015). Religion does not enter into operations of the state. With this understanding of secularity, it would appear incompatible with the statement ‘one nation under god’. I would argue however in accepting that your state is ‘One Nation under God’, you do not commit yourself to any claims that reject secularity. All you must accept is that a god exists, they are more powerful than the state and therefore the state is weaker than god. The ‘under’ element merely suggests a hierarchy, in which god is above us in some sense.

What you do not need to do however is then accept the existence and power of god should factor into how you run or organise the state. You can use the statement to justify such an inference but you do not need to and that is enough. The question is

“Nothing about the existence of god or the state’s power relation to god, demand placing god or a belief in god in law.“ 15

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Photographer - Reuters

whether secularity is possible in such a nation and it is because we do not have to make such an inference. Nothing about the existence of god or the state’s power relation to god, demand placing god or a belief in god in law.

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The first response to this is that in recognising the existence of a god who is infinitely more powerful than the state, we must recognise that god’s authority over us. That god can control and determine our government. The god seems to have authority over us and this seems to threaten the existence of our secular state.

cepting the existence of this powerful god does not demand we respect their existence in our government. To make this demand, the religious will need to make an argument around either power being the basis for political or moral authority, which is a difficult position that has been critiqued by philosophers from Plato to Popper.

The other way would be a detailed religious argument that explains why god has the authority, but that requires arguments that are too large for this essay. I do not deny that those arguments can be made, but there simply is not room to engage with them here.

This can be countered however, by pointing out the problems of assuming power entails authority. It may be true that the god could destroy our state but that does not mean that god has the political right to do so. Secularity demands that we keep government and religion separate and merely ac-

What this means is that we still have the ability to argue that accepting ‘One Nation under God’ does not demand a rejection of secularity, as we do not have to accept that god has authority to determine our state and therefore we do not need to take the resulting religious views into special consideration.

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Even if we accept, however, that we do not need to take god into account when we form laws, it can be argued that the fact that they can destroy the state at any time, gives them de facto political power. God inevitably governs the state because they can alter the state at any time. Our laws exist only on the basis of god’s agreement and therefore have a religious essence.

For all intents and purposes, god determines our laws. Even if we produce laws that are secular in content, they exist only because god allows them to. In accepting ‘One Nation under God’ we have to accept our laws are applications of said god’s will; that seems a sound rejection of secularism.

To counter this however, it must be pointed out that we do not need to take god’s approval into account when we form our laws. We recognize that god has power over our state but we do not need to fear, respect or acquiesce to that power. If god does not agree with our laws, they may destroy the state but that does not mean we have to respect their decrees; we can choose to be destroyed. To recognise the power of god is simply to recognise that we must choose between obedience and independence in the face of that power. We can still choose to have a secular government even if we accept the existence of this powerful deity.

If god threatens to kill us if we do not follow their laws or abandon ours,

we have a choice. Fight for our freedom or obedience. Underneath this hyperbole is the fact that simply accepting our position under god, does not entail the need for our laws to be based on or around god. We still have a choice to be or aim for secularity.

One may question whether this is a practical solution. The choice to destroy oneself is rarely taken in life. One can respond firstly that this is hardly a practical debate; I have focused on the logical entailment of the claim ‘One Nation under God’ rather than the practical issues surrounding it.

Secondly many have laid down their lives in the name of political systems, secularity should be no different.

A final objection revolves around the fact a belief in god is essential to the state’s existence. In making a declaration that god exists and framing the belief within the state’s existence, we inevitably fail to be secular because the state’s existence is bound up to a religious belief.

It would appear that only religious believers could be citizens of that state and therefore the state’s political apparatus must inevitably be non-secular.

To be a ‘citizen’ of said state, you would be forced to believe in god and so the legal rights of a ‘citizen’ appear to be bound to this particular religious belief.

The first response to this is that members of that state can fight against 15

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The foundation of the state may be in a religious context, but as long as the laws of the state in the present do not demand religious beliefs or preferential religious treatment, secularity can emerge in both de jure and de facto terms. The non-religious can rationally identify themselves as citizens and respected as such, whilst also accepting the birth of the state in a religious context, as long as the state does not then enshrine this religious founding in such a way that it demands belief in a particular religion, for existing and present citizens. To believe oneself to be a citizen of this state does not demand a respect of any religion or belief of any religion; the individual can understand ‘One Nation under God’ in a manner that is compatible with being a secularist or non-religion citizen.

In conclusion I have attempted to show that ‘a nation under god’ can be 16

secular. This is because accepting that the state is ‘One Nation under God’ does not entail that the state’s laws must respect this fact. The organization of the state does not need to respect this fact through law or governance and can therefore remain secular.

God does not need to have any political authority in such a state and there need be no demands on individual citizens to believe or respect god; they can reject the conception of the state or simply ignore it. While it may not be easy for such a state to be secular, there is nothing to truly prevent it. It may be the case that the religious use the phrase ‘One Nation under God’ to argue against a secular state and while it is possible to do this, the statement does not have to be used that way.

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BRITISH IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Photographer - Left Foot Forward

such a declaration of the state. They can campaign to remove this claim from the state’s constitution or governmental principals. They are not bound to simply accept this notion of the state. Secondly, even if they accept the phrase ‘One Nation under God’ is key to the state’s founding; they do not need to enshrine this belief into law or even rationality. An atheist can accept that this state was founded as ‘one nation under god’ but understand this as an anachronism; a phrase with deep and inalienable historical context.

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Simon Baron, University of York, History undergraduate writes about the distinction between Britain and the rest of Europe: the ‘others’.

Introduction

Bibliography National Secular Society (2015).

What is Secularism? [Online].

Available at: http://www.secularism.org.uk/what-is-secularism. html [Accessed 28 July 2015].

Even before joining the European Economic Community (EEC), Britain was considered as an exception in Europe1 for having chosen not to participate in the first steps of European integration. This essay will explore European unpopularity among the British public, considering the key notion of British identity. Identity 1 For clarity purposes, the term ‘Europe’ will be used in this article to refer to the European Economic Community (EEC) which became European Union (EU) in 1993 when processes described extend beyond the chronological borders of one of these organisations.

is understood here in the context of collective identity, the definition of a political entity as a whole with its particular culture and tradition, but also an individual’s sense of belonging to this entity. In this essay I argue that British difficulties to identify with Europe stem from the way Europe has been described to Britons, but also from the lack of a coherent European identity. Indeed, while the British political elite failed to contradict popular views of Europe as British identity’s ‘other’, European identity has also been manipulated in political discourses, all in all blurring the understanding of the European project to the wider

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British public, thus undermining support for European integration.

A British exception?

Popular history and a number of studies about British integration into Europe put the emphasis on a narrative of British decline following the Second World War, presenting Britain’s decision to enter the EEC as an economic necessity. Bernard Porter (1987, pp.124-128), for example, considers that Britain turned its back at the Commonwealth because EEC membership had become a necessity for Britain in order to compete economically at a world level. This discourse is often associated with a view of Britain as an exception in the European project.

This view of Britain as unique is only true to a certain extent: as John W. Young (2000, pp.191-195), among others, pointed out, the EEC was not in line with Britain’s traditional defence policy based on naval power, or with British traditional commercial and financial policy which was in contradiction to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, British exceptionality should not be overestimated as parallels can be drawn between its economic and political situation and the continent’s: after the Second World War, nationalisation, industrial reform, or the welfare state were common features to both sides of the Channel. Therefore, the economic factor alone fails to provide a satisfy18

ing explanation for British attitude towards its continental neighbours.

National and European identities This is why it is necessary to consider British identity in order to understand British difficulties with European integration. The notion of national identity is part of the wider concept of collective identity. While there is a consensus among academics on the fact that individuals hold multiple identities, the relative importance of national identity compared to other identities is still a debated issue. One model, for example, suggests that regional identity is nested within national identity, which is itself nested into European identity. However, this view must be criticised as it implies a hierarchy placing European identity above national identity. A more satisfying approach is the ‘marble-cake’ model described

by Thomas Risse (2003, pp.490491), which illustrates the fact that identities are not necessarily strictly separated, but rather blend into each other: this model respects the ‘national identity first, Europe second’ point of view Risse observes in his empirical study of the 2002 Eurobarometer.

This Eurobarometer collected data from members of the European Union (EU), and brought out contrasts between different countries’ attitudes to the Euro. For example, while Italy strongly supported the Euro and the EU as a whole as they were consid-

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ered as potential solutions to political problems at home, Germany was much more divided especially due to the Deutsche Mark, symbol of stability and integral part of post-war German identity (Risse, 2003, pp.497-499).

Strong opposition to the Euro was met in the United Kingdom, whereas Britain would have fitted in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) model, given the latter’s neoliberal outlook, its investment opportunities and the fact that the British deficit could easily be kept under 3% of its GDP as imposed by the European Central Bank (Risse et al., 1999, pp.159-163). Thus Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knope and Klaus Roscher (1999) argue that identity-thinking prevailed in the British decision not to adopt the Euro, because the latter was seen as a potential threat to a key aspect of British identity: the Pound Sterling and its glorious imperial past.

Europe as the ‘other’ In order to understand British reluctance to engage fully in the European project, the process of ‘othering’ of Europe must be considered. Stuart Ward (2001, pp.4-5) insists on British imperial past to explain this process, as the Empire played a key role in British differentiation from other European countries. Linda Colley (1992, pp.324-326), in her long-term study of Britishness and ‘otherness’, also considers the British Empire as a

key aspect of British identity in that it brought together British people with the common goal of shaping a greater Britain, while the competition for power enhanced hostility towards other European countries. Colley (1992, pp.328-329) thus explains British attitude to the Continent as a result of the rooted idea that Europe was the ‘other’.

Nevertheless, a counter-argument could be suggested: decolonisation was a common issue to European countries after the Second World War, despite local specificities, and it could have been used as an argument in favour of European integration, given the fact that it gave European countries something in common. However, successive British governments chose to keep the point of view of Europe as the ‘other’, or at least failed to suggest the alternative view that imperial past could be a common European

“In order to understand British reluctance to engage fully in the European project, the process of ‘othering’ Europe must be considered.” experience. This highlights the major influence of political discourse in the forging of collective identity, and thus brings out the responsibility of the political elite in British attitudes towards European integration.

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An elite-driven Europe The way in which British politicians chose to ‘sell’ Europe to Britons, I argue, was a mistake which led to the British lack of enthusiasm regarding European integration. The gap between the political elite and mass opinion regarding Europe was clearly brought out in January 1973 when the British government organised national celebrations as Britain officially became a member of the EEC. As Richard Weight (2002, pp.498-503) pointed out, these celebrations failed to capture popular imagination, and three quarters of the British people were against their taking place. This was the consequence of the way the EEC had been depicted to Britons.

Although stating that British people were never told about the real nature of the European contract (Young, 1999, p.2) is arguably too extreme, the British government did use propaganda in order to get support for the EEC, but chose the wrong arguments.

Indeed, joining the EEC was presented to Britons as a pragmatic economic opportunity, as if Britain was a member out of necessity rather than ideals, in order to avoid putting too much emphasis on other aspects such as political integration (Weight, 2002, pp.510511; Young, 2000, pp.197-201). One of the challenges consisted in convincing the public that membership of the EEC did not necessarily mean the 20

abandonment of the Commonwealth, as the latter still generated popular

“The British government did use propaganda in order to get support for the EEC, but chose the wrong arguments” enthusiasm (Ward, 2001, pp.6-7). Another key issue was the threat to national sovereignty: pamphlets such as Europe and You were published in order to reassure people about Britishness, and the government even asked Elizabeth II’s public support, even though the Queen was in reality doubtful regarding the European project (Weight, 2002, pp.478-483). It is not surprising, therefore, that Britain showed a very limited support for further European integration: on the one hand, Britain joined the EEC after the boom years, and the economic promises were not fulfilled, and on the other hand, Britons remained hostile to political integration because the latter had been avoided in political discourses since Britain’s very beginnings in the EEC. The lack of a genuine European identity British political failure to make European integration appealing is, nonetheless, not the only factor explaining the British lack of enthusiasm as regards the European Union. The blame is to

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be shared, I argue, with other European leaders who failed to provide a satisfying and coherent European identity to relate to. The case study of the introduction of the Euro is extremely telling when considering this issue. Besides its economic objectives, one of the Euro’s main aims was to make the EU more ‘real’ by reaching European citizens’ everyday life. Risse (2003, pp.489490) uses Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined community’ to explain this phenomenon: using the same currency enabled European citizens to feel a sense of belonging to the European community. However, German insistence on a strong and stable currency turned the Euro into a Europeanised Deutsch Mark: instead of promoting a new, intrinsically European point of view, the Euro became an imitation of a German national symbol.

A similar point can be made about French visions of European identity (Risse et al., 1999, pp.169-175): both left-wing and right-wing visions were mere extensions of French Republican values and ideals, the Socialist party (PS) drawing on traditions of French ‘mission civilisatrice’ and the Rassemblement pour la République party (RPR) on the notion of ‘European Gaullism’. In both cases, European identity was merely understood as an extension of a particular member’s national identity, making it all the more difficult for Britons and other European citizens to identify with Europe.

Thus, the lack of a genuine European

identity undermined the project of European integration as it prevented European citizens to feel a sense of belonging to the European community.

Conclusion In this essay I have sought to explore the link between Britain’s renowned lack of popular enthusiasm for the European project and the concept of British identity. It has been established that the notion of British identity was crucial in order to understand Britain’s relations with Europe. Indeed, European integration has been considered as the ‘other’ threatening British identity, and British political discourses only insisted on economic aspects of the European project and thus failed to provide an alternative view to the one opposing British identity to European integration. Nevertheless, other European leaders share the responsibility for Europe’s unpopularity among the British population, as they failed to propose a genuine European identity Britons could have related to.

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Bibliography Carey, S. (2002). ‘Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?’ European Union Politics, 3(4), 387-413.

Colley, L. (1992). ‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’. Journal of British Studies, 31(4), 309-329.

Gilroy, P. (2004). The Negative Dialectics of Conviviality. In After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?

London: Routledge, pp. 133-168.

Porter, B. (1987). Revolution, 1945-86.

In Britain, Europe, and the World, 18501986: Delusions of Grandeur. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 111-140.

Porter, B. (1996). ‘The Empire Strikes Back’. History Today, 46(9), 11-13.

Risse, T. (2003). ‘The Euro between National and European Identity’. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), 487-505.

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Risse, T., et al. (1999). ‘To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union’. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), 147-187.

Ward, S. (2001). Introduction. In British Culture and the End of Empire. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 1-20.

Weight, R. (2002). Sceptics. In Patriots: National Identity in Britain 19402000. London: Macmillan, pp. 473-516.

Wilkes, G. (1997). The First Failure to Steer Britain into the European Communities: An Introduction. In Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community, 1961-63: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic, and Commonwealth Relations. London: Frank Cass, pp. 1-32.

Young, H. (1999). Introduction: The Plot. In This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. London: Papermac, pp. 1-3.

Young, J. W. (2000). Conclusions. In Britain and European Uni-

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