Life in Crisis by VOX Journal: The Student Journal of Philosophy, Economics and Politics

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF ssue XVII - Spring 2012 POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND IPHILOSOPHY

Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

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Issue XVII - Spring 2012

LIFE IN CRISIS

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Editorial

In Fathers and Sons, Turgenev’s notorious hero, Bazarov, a ‘new man’ out to shock Russia’s bourgeoisie, expounds sentiments that, whether self-consciously or not, seem to have managed to take a steely grip on worrying swathes of our thought and practice in the preceding century and a half. Bazarov asserts that ‘A good chemist’s twenty times more useful than a poet’, and later that ‘Nature’s not a temple but a workshop, and man’s the worker in it.’ Given the devastating cuts facing university departments deemed not ‘economically useful’ and the ever faltering attempts to combat environmental destruction, it is hard to escape the conclusion that something much like Bazarov’s self-styled nihilism has enslaved our collective imagination. In doing so, the aspirations of our endeavours are left sorely impoverished. It is with this melancholy introduction that VOX presents its latest issue, Life in Crisis. We begin with three essays on economic crisis; first Professor Bonefeld examines what it means for us to face an ‘economic crisis’, before Weiss turns attention to a previous crisis in order to better understand their nature, specifically to the late 1990s Asian financial crisis. Paton then argues that, contrary to received wisdom, it was the state’s overregulation of financial markets that caused, and continues to perpetuate, the on-going banking crisis. Next, Callingham explores what we might mean by ‘environmental crisis’, concluding that, in spite of a universe that, as Hume said, cares for us as much as it does an oyster, we can still find worth in the values and commitments we hold, and it is for this reason that an environmental crisis ought to worry us. The next theme taken up is that of authority, where I (Dan) side with a line of thought presented by Bazarov: in that, for better or worse, we cannot ‘accept a single principle on faith, no matter how much that principle may be surrounded by respect.’ Though this concludes Life in Crisis, we conclude the issue with extracts taken from our highly successful panel debate of autumn term, held with the Morrell Centre for Toleration. We would once again like to thank the tremendous speakers – Prof. Peter Jones, Prof. Sue Mendus and Prof. Matt Matravers. This is also our final issue as editors. We would like to thank all those who have helped over the past year, and we wish the new editors – Kathrin Eichinger and Madalina Secareanu – the very best of luck. As ever, if you would like to get involved with VOX, either in writing for it or in its production, email us at vox@clubofpep.org. Details of the next theme can be found at the end of this issue. Dan Iley-Williamson & Firdaus Kader Editorial Team Editors Editor: Dan Iley-Williamson Co-Editor: Firdaus Kader Layout Editors: Kathrin Eichinger & Tørris Rasmussen Events Coordinator: Tørris Rasmussen Webmaster: Clement Wee

Sub-Editors: Georgina Andrews Clementine Brooks Dominic Falcao Rohit Maini Matthew Mannix Katrina Wall Mira Wolf-Bauwens Tom Wyatt

Peer Reviewers and Proofreaders: Beth Donkin Philipp Dreyer Jamie Fisher Nikolay Iliev Aisana Nurusheua Vicnan K. Pannirselvam Peter Smith Jennie Warner

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

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ISSUE XVII - SPRING 2012

Life in Crisis ESSAYS

PAGE

WHAT IS AN ECONOMIC CRISIS? Professor Werner Bonefeld

CRISIS AS THE CATALYST? Judith Weiss

CRISIS WITHIN THE CORPORATIST FINANCIAL SYSTEM James Paton

GROUNDING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS Rupert Callingham

AUTHORITY, MYTH AND REFLECTION Dan Iley-Williamson

VOX PANEL LECTURE ON TOLERATION: AN EXTRACT Professor Peter Jones

VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP). The Club of

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VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as other universities world-wide.

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

“What characterises our time is less the struggle of one set of ideas against another than the mounting wave of hostility to all ideas as such.’’ Sir Isaiah Berlin

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What is an Economic Crisis? Some Notes without Conclusion By Professor Werner Bonefeld Given the situation that we find our- demand-management, and financial selves in, the question seems ridiculous. socialism, this holy trinity of contemHere we have a development in which porary economic governance, has had a great mass of accumulated wealth little effect on economic growth but it suddenly caved in, leaving the finan- has put a stop to the further economic cial system on the brink of collapse deterioration, at least for now. In the only to be rescued by political author- meantime, with rates of unemployity which in turn led to two connected ment not seen for many, many years, developments. On the labour marthe one hand we “Financial socialism is an ket is the fastest have a financial sogrowing market attempt at rescuing a financialism, which is also of essentially rereferred to as sover- cial system based on fictitious dundant labour. eign debt crisis, and wealth by restraining the sup- Still: what is an on the other we have crisis? ply of the means of subsistence, economic a politics of austerThe financial ity, which seeks to cheapening labour.” sector is being rebalance the books financed at great and which in its effect reinforces the social cost. The British government is shedding of labour and depresses the clear about this when it says that we purchasing power of the mass of the are witnessing the ‘deepest cuts to pubpopulation by redistributing wealth lic spending in living memory’; departfrom labour to capital. Financial so- mental budgets slashed by an average cialism is an attempt at rescuing a of 19% and prediction of job looses of financial system based on fictitious five hundred thousand public sector wealth by restraining the supply of the workers by 2014 (see: http://www.bbc. means of subsistence, cheapening la- co.uk/news/uk-politics-11579979). bour. Financial socialism also involved Whilst Margaret Thatcher pronounced the introduction of quantitative easing at the time of the stock market crash to facilitate the flow of credit to sustain in October 1987 that there is no such business activity, and there are calls, thing as society, her successor, Prime by the IMF in particular, to support Minister David Cameron, says that it economic recovery by the creation of is not only the case that society exists, demand. The combination of austerity, but that it also is a big society. This en5

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dorsement of the ‘big’ society is hardly surprising. Society is asked not only to adjust to the new economic climate but also to absorb the cost of the economic rescue. Clearly, a small society would not have the moral stamina to absorb the costs of financial socialism in a self-responsible and entirely entrepreneurial manner. What then is an economic crisis? Let’s put this question slightly differently: Why does this content take that form? The content of economy is the organisation of human subsistence. Economics thus describes a system of social reproduction, which organises our human metabolism with nature. In short, economy is the way in which we as a society organise our social labour to secure and sustain our existence, including the most basic requirement of human existence, that is, clothing, eating, housing, provision of heating and also importantly, human warmth and affection. Thus, why does this content of human existence take that form, and that is, the form of fictitious monetary wealth that is sustained by taking money out of the pockets of society to subsidise the illusion of fictitious wealth? The circumstance that this subsidy is in fact absolutely rational and necessary in existing soci6

ety to prevent its implosion, serves to reinforce the potency of the question why this content of human social reproduction takes the form. I have said that economics describes our system of social provisioning. By itself, economics has no discernible reality; its reality is fundamentally social. Friedrich Hayek was sceptical about the economists’ ability to make irrefutable predictions, and argued that economics amounted ultimately to a moral philosophy (cited by Sam Brittan, Financial Times, 19 December 2003). Nicholas Kaldor (1954, p. 67) suggested that economic science is quite unable to determine its object matter with any satisfactory degree of certainty. Daniel Bell concurred, pointing out that ‘economic theory is a convenient fiction, an “as if ”, against which to measure the habitual, irrational, logical, egoistic, self-interested, bigoted, altruistic actions of individuals, firms, or governments—but it is not a model of reality’ (1980, p. 70). But even as a fictional ideal, it is inherently problematic. Joan Robinson (1962) offered the hopeful view that it might be possible to establish economics as a science and that this would entail the elimination of its hitherto metaphysically con-

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ceived foundational concepts, such as human need and social purpose. Schumpeter argued early in his career that economics as a science has to view its categories as categories of natural laws and that it therefore has to take care never to try to justify its social presuppositions. Later in his life, he appeared undecided whether economics could in fact be called a science—the question was still in the balance (1965, pp. 35, 37). Proudhon’s mockery seems as relevant now as it was then: ‘How might economics be a science? How can two economists look at each other without laughing? ... Economics has neither a principle nor a foundation ... it knows nothing; it explains nothing.’ (2008, pp. 105-6) Marx frequently refers to economic categories as ‘sensuous-supersensible things’, ‘crazy objects’, ‘perverted forms’, ‘theological quirks’, ‘obscure things’ and so on. These formulations are decisively ‘uneconomic’. Critically, these descriptions say that economic categories are in fact social categories that appear as economic categories. This appearance is real and what appears in appearance is a particular organisation of human social reproduction. As the great political economist William Robertson put

it: ‘in every inquiry concerning the operation of men when united together in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence’ (1834, p. 79). That is to say, the notion of an economic crisis entails more than a crisis of monetary wealth. It is a crisis of a particular mode of subsistence, which in its concept of social wealthy contains the pauper. Bibliography Bell, D. (1980) Sociological Journeys: Essays 1960-80 (London: Heinemann Eductional Publishers) Kaldor, N. (1954) ‘The Relation of Economic Growth and Cyclical Fluctuations’ in Economic Journal, 64. Proudhon, P. J. (2008) What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government (Teddington: The Echo Library) Robertson, W. (1834) A General History of North and South America (London: Mayhew, Isaac and Co.) Robinson, J. (1962) Economic Philosophy: An Essay on the progress of economic thought (New York: Adline Publishing) Schumpeter, J. (1965) Geschichte der ökonomischen Analyse (Göttingen:Vanderhoeck & Rubrecht)

_____________________________ Werner Bonefeld is a professor of Politics, specialising in Political Economy, at the University of York. 7

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Crisis as the Catalyst? By Judith Weiss The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 took a big toll on many of the East Asian countries – currencies lost their value, businesses and banks collapsed, unemployment and poverty spiked. Yet, it also presented an opportunity for citizens and business and political leaders to step back and re-evaluate the structure of their country’s political economy, which ultimately led to reform in both the socio-political and the economic spheres. In comparison, the ongoing global financial downturn has catalyzed political change all around the world on a noteworthy scale, but is lagging far behind the 1997 crisis with respect to change stimulated in the areas of international cooperation and economic-structural reform. Both crises had quite similar effects when regarding political change, in that they caused citizens to protest against long-term political and economic grievances. In the countries most severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis political change immediately occurred. In May 1998, President Suharto who had reigned over Indonesia for 32 years was forced to resign, following mass protests all across the country. His successor, B.J. Habibie released political prisoners, removed control over the media and went on to scheduling democratic 8

elections. Indonesia’s return to democracy is perhaps the greatest change that was facilitated by the Asian financial crisis. Likewise, Thailand experienced major political upheaval, evidence that a financial crisis will inadvertently bring about scrutiny of politicians and state apparatuses. In Thailand’s political arena, the crisis served to generate widespread support for constitutional reform that fundamentally altered the political economy of the country. The reform brought about far-reaching political changes, with the most important being the shift from impotent multiparty coalitions to a powerful majority government. ‘The crisis served to rally public support and constitutional reforms that were already on the table but would have otherwise faced strong opposition from entrenched political interests’ (Hicken 2009: 211). Similarly, the current financial crisis sparked the Occupy Movement – most known for its Wall Street Protests – which expressed political grievances and social issues that had caused resentment in America for a long time, such as the lack of a sufficient health care system, over-priced university education and economic disparities. But by adding more issues to the list and exacerbating those previously existing, the crisis brought millions of people onto the

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street in protest. On an even larger scale, revolutionary demonstrations spread throughout the Arab world, protesting against suppressive governments. One of the main triggers for the protests were the rising food prices throughout the world. The uprisings in the Arab world have led to the overthrow of the Libyan, the Tunisian and the Egyptian governments so far. But the phenomenon of crisiscaused political revision is not limited to non-democratic states. The ongoing Euro-crisis gave impetus to the resignation of Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, ending his controversial 17-year political career. Being charged with fraud, corruption and under-age sex did not lead to the loss of his political position, but the overwhelming number of problems the financial crisis brought onto him did (BBC 2011). Berlusconiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s example shows that crises can provide the final momentum for political turnover. The 1997 crisis played a cataclysmic role with respect to not only sociopolitical change but also economic policy revision, as it left the affected East Asian countries with a desire to reduce their vulnerability with respect to future crises. This led to bank restructuring and policy and institutional reforms. In many countries this entailed the denationalization of ownership of manufacturing and service industries along with the strengthening of pruPhoto by JoopDorresteijn via flickr on a Creative Commons license 9

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dential regulation of the financial system. These measures are closely related to the shift away from cronyism, which the IMF claimed to be one of the main causes of the Asian Financial Crisis (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). This revision of the relationship between the state and businesses significantly improved the East Asian economies, allowing them to emerge from the crisis with more solid financial systems. The current crisis is still at a point where immediate relief and damage control takes precedence over long-term systematic improvements, as most countries are struggling with urgent issues such as immense budget deficits. Whereas it remains to be seen whether the sovereign debt crisis will lead to closer European integration or disintegration, the Euro-crisis has illuminated the structural difficulties within the European Union and is likely to accelerate reform of these. Overall, very little has been done to reform the incentive structure that caused the crisis in the first place (Kapoor 2010; Besley & Ghatak 2011). However, substantial change in the financial world is likely to find its greatest support during, and in the direct aftermath of, a crisis. All change directly caused by the East Asia Crisis was initiated within three years after the crisis had started. The financial crisis 1997 and the current global meltdown differ in that Photo by UggBoy via flickr on a Creative Commons license 10

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the former is regional whilst the latter has spread to virtually every country across the globe. But whereas the Asian Financial Crisis caused the affected states to engage in closer cooperation and the establishment of inter-state institutions, the current crisis has served as a catalyst for international cooperation to a much lesser extent. Being confronted with the same challenges fostered a stronger sense of community in East Asia, despite the divergence of political systems and economic development among these countries. The crisis resulted in the emergence of more inter-Asian ties and a more institutionalized regionalism than had existed pre-crisis. In the wake of the crisis, China took on a leading role in creating ASEAN +3, a regional forum consisting of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as China, South Korea and Japan. This represented a drastic shift in Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, as it had previously vehemently resisted the formalized regional organizations. Also the Chiang Mai Initiative, which established a network of bilateral currency swaps to assist in the case of short-term liquidity crises and in the long-run set out to establish an Asian monetary fund, highlights the deepened level of financial cooperation the crisis inspired. By changing the political leaders approach to collaborating with each other, the crisis served to catalyze the process of regional finan-

cial cooperation to a large extent. After the Asian Financial Crisis had spread from Thailand across Southeast Asia in less than a month, awareness rose of how closely linked the economic fate of the countries with in the region were, and governments initiated closer regional financial and economic cooperation to address the issue and secure the future stability of their countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; economies. Equivalently, the alarming velocity with which the current financial crisis spread revealed the level of interdependency and interconnectedness that defines the current global economy. This has led to the creation of a number of large-scale cooperative institutions. In 2009, the Financial Stability Board was established at the G20 London Summit and has since served to increase transparency, heighten policy dialogue and work towards closer regulation of banks, hedge funds and credit rating agencies (CRS Report 2009). But the increase in cooperative measures was far less steep than in 1997, which might partly be due to the fact that cooperative institutions are already in place. The consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis reached well beyond economic policy change. It created a platform for new debates and the opportunity to implement profound changes in the financial, institutional and social fields of the political economy. â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Severe economic downturns frequently destroy existing equilibria, opening up space for alternative ideas 11

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and allowing new battles to be fought’. (MacIntyre et al. 2009: 3). Whereas these effects are certainly to be noticed in the current socio-economic and political debate, far-reaching change in international institutions, constitutional and business structure reforms have occurred to a much lesser extent than they did in 1997. This is particularly striking when considering the larger scale and longer duration of the current crisis and the existence of the general recognition that systematic change is urgently needed. Bibliography BBC (2011) Italy crisis: Silvio Berlusconi resigns as PM. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-15708729 [Accessed 5 January 2012] Besley, T. & Ghatak, M. (2011) Taxation and

regulation of bonus pay (London: Economic Organization and Public Programme Publications) Congressional Research Service (2009) The global financial crisis: Analysis and policy implications Hicken, A. (2009) ‘Politics of recovery in Thailand and the Philippines’ in MacIntyre, A., Pempel, T. and Ravenhill, J. (2009) Crisis as catalyst – Asia’s dynamic political economy (Itahaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 206-230 Kapoor, S. (2010) The financial crisis – causes and cures (Brussels: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung) MacIntyre, A., Pempel, T. and Ravenhill, J. (2009) Crisis as catalyst – Asia’s dynamic political economy (Itahaca: Cornell University Press) Radelet, S. & Sachs, J. (2000) ‘The onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ in Krugman, P. (ed.) Currency crises (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 105- 162. ____________________________________

Judith Weiss is a second year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

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Crisis within the Corporatist Banking and Monetary System By James Paton ‘The essence of the contemporary banking system is the creation of money out of nothing, by private banks’ often foolishly lending’ – Martin Wolf (2010) Introduction: In the eyes of the public, responsibility and banking are antonyms of each other after the fallout from the Great Recession. Reckless lending by private banks to economic agents led to a liquidity trap with banks holding assets that were illiquid and toxic. Bailouts for institutions that were ‘too big to fail’ were required to avoid economic collapse and as a result, top executives were rewarded for their failure at the taxpayer’s expense.

“Banks were well aware that the state and central bank would bail them out because of their size and importance to the economy. The corporatist infrastructure is therefore the cause of the problem.” The favoured narrative of the banking crisis is that the laissez-faire market and the lack of regulation, to stop bankers from making reckless de-

cisions, have led us into this abyss. In this paper, I will argue against this view and instead contend that the near failure of the financial system is because of corporatism. First I will define how the banking and monetary system is corporatist and explain how it operates. Second, I will argue that the combination of a central bank, government licensing and guarantees allowed private banks to expand their balance sheets to colossal levels. These arrangements created a vacuum of responsibility; private banks were aware of this safety net and acted in a high-risk manner. If these risks did not pay off, banks were well aware that the state and central bank would bail them out because of their size and importance to the economy. The corporatist infrastructure is therefore the cause of the problem. I will provide an alternative model by arguing for a free market banking and monetary structure. Free banking will prevent a similar crisis from happening as the absence of government intervention in the market will incentivise banks to act responsibly in order to guarantee its clients stability and trust. Market forces encourage self-discipline and provide a sound infrastructure for individuals to conduct their monetary affairs. 13

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The Corporatist Banking System: Corporatism is the agreement between the state, firms and other institutions such as a regulator or interest groups. It grants special privileges to firms that operate within the market through licensing, subsidizing or guaranteeing its securities. The banking system fits into this definition perfectly. The central bank is the monopoly issuer of currency (fiat money) and acts as lender of last resort, private banks must hold a license to practise in the market, government regulates the firms through the Financial Services Authority and guarantees individual depositors £85,000 per bank (BBC, 2011). The central bank has the monopoly on currency and is protected through legal tender laws. It has the power to

control the money supply and set interest rates. The central bank loans its money to private banks. Banks then loan this money to the public, charge an interest rate above the central bank rate and make a profit. With the presence of a central bank, private banks have little incentive to hold 100% of deposits, and instead hold a fraction in their accounts (De Soto, 1995: pp. 32-33; Rothbard, 2008: p. 94). This is fractional reserve banking and increases the amount of credit on banks’ balance sheets. Via this method of banking, they lend out liabilities greater than their deposits. The extent of money creation by private banks depends on the deposit requirement. If the ratio is 20%, and the central bank injects £1 million into the economy through

Photo by Gonçalo Valverde via flickr on a Creative Commons license

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open market operations, the multiplier will be £5 million (See De Soto, 2009: p. 220). Within the economy, there are now numerous claims on money that has no formal backing. The weakness of such as system is that if the demand for deposits is greater than the reserves held at a given time, there is a bank run meaning the bank will collapse. The government through the use of licenses regulates who can legally practise as a bank. Licensing limits competition within the sector and deprives individuals of choice. The five firm concentration ratio in 2004 was 75% (BOE, 2004: p. 132); with a lack of competition banks are deprived of self-discipline and are able to control large parts of the market. The existence of the central bank allows for fractional reserve banking meaning that there exist large banks that hold huge liabilities on their balance sheets and in some cases larger than sovereign countries’ GDP. In 2010, the combined total of UK banking liabilities for RBS, Barclays and HSBC was 337% of GDP (Zerohedge, 2010). The structure of the system incentivises banks to recklessly lend to the market. The central bank that exists as a lender of last resort combined with state guarantees on deposits is a signal to banks that if they find themselves insolvent, there exists a safety net. This is why they have taken high risks in loans such as the sub-prime mortgage market, where banks lent to individuals who had no income. The US hous-

ing bubble1 collapsed when individuals could not service their debt. Banks foreclosed these mortgages, sold the assets below the amount of the liability, and wrote-off outstanding debt. Confidence within these institutions fell and depositors, scared of losing their money, withdrew their deposits. The prospect of insolvency led to quantitative easing programmes by central banks buying these illiquid assets, as well as the huge bailouts of up to $700 billion in the US provided by taxpayers (Brookings Institute, 2009). Banks have become ‘too big to fail’ because of government supporting a corporatist banking system. It is an instrument propped up by the state that allows banks to not be held responsible for their actions. A capitalist infrastructure that is absent of government intervention will prevent such a crisis, as it will fill the void of responsibility that is currently lacking in the system. Free Market Banking: A free market is one that has little or no government intervention. Firms (or capitalists) interact in this environment with consumers. They are responsible only for themselves and must act responsibly in order to stay competitive. If a firm is not responsible, it will fail. In the current system, governments manipulate the money supply and regulate the sector heavily. 1 This issue is related to the problems of central banking through the expansion of credit. However this is not a matter for this paper.

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Corporatism has protected the special issued to an individual demanding interests of the banks and the govern- a loan. For those who are borrowing ment (who in return can fund projects money, banks will issue interest rates by issuing bonds through the creation depending on time preference and risk of money by the central bank, as well (De Soto, 2009: pp. 284-291). Someas erode nominal debt with inflation). one who is in demand for money in A free market banking system the short term will have high interest would not have a central bank, no le- rates as they will forgo the cost of holdgal tender laws and ing money in the most importantly, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Corporatism has protect- future for the preno licensure of the ed the special interests of the sent. An individual banking system. who has a poor The medium of ex- banks and the government...â&#x20AC;? credit history will change to deposit be likely to receive in banks is up to the choice of indi- a high interest rate from all institutions viduals. It will be commodity money, and will not be able to afford such a most likely gold and silver. Through- loan. out human civilization, gold and silver The banks will issue a paper note has been used as money due to scarcity, claiming a price to the value of gold meaning that it is valuable; it is easy and so there would be a number of to divide into different dominations notes from different banks in circulaand does not erode. This tackles the tion (Rothbard, 2008: p. 104). For problem of inflation, as the supply of example, if I bank with Barclays, I money grows at the rate of gold extrac- will hold Barclays notes. In addition tion which is very slow and expensive banks would be less likely to fractional (De Soto, 2009: p. 742; Rothbard, reserve because there is no lender of 2008: p125). last resort that will give support if the Firms are free to enter the market bank struggled to meet withdrawal and act as a financial intermediary. demands. More importantly however, This allows for competition within the where individuals have choice in the market, giving consumers a choice. As note that they hold, banks must proin the past, individuals will deposit vide trust and stability for users of their gold within banks, and they will their currency. If a note bearer wishes be competing for deposits on interest to withdraw gold, the bank must prorates. Depositors will demand an inter- vide it. Fractional reserve banks cannot est rate that will be determined by the do this, and so are not incentivised to market. They will deposit their money hold 100% of reserves (De Soto, 2009, into a savings account, receive a bond p. 736; Rothbard, 2008: p. 112). certificate and that money would be A bankâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s portfolio of loans is there16

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fore very important and other market mechanisms will determine the risk to depositors. Depositors will demand deposit insurance and banks will have to be transparent because of the competitive environment for deposits; insurance firms will assess liabilities and the price mechanism would tell the market whether a bank is a risk taker or risk adverse. If individuals do not trust the bank, they would have the choice not to deposit within that bank. As well, where there is a plurality of notes in circulation, individuals have the choice whether to hold those notes or not. Confidence within a bank is

a central component of free banking; a bank must be sound to conduct its business and deliver to its clients. Summary/Comparison: The lack of responsibility within the corporatist banking structure should be no surprise to politicians and the public. Government intervention in the market creates extreme moral hazard and large banks do not have second thoughts on their lending practices. One argument is that banks were not regulated enough. The government could have done more to stop this from happening. However, I have 17

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three objections to this claim. The first is that a regulator must exist. Regulators are people and normally have worked within banks, so they have close links to them. Regulatory capture is a problem where the banks dictate the terms to the regulator and conspire against the public. So the question to ask, who is to regulate the regulator? Secondly, it is difficult and costly to regulate firms that conduct thousands of transactions a day. It is impossible to regulate each transaction. And third, there is an alternative banking system that is available to the public. Free banking objects to the principle of a safety net. Free markets regulate themselves by competition enforcing self-discipline onto firms. Without licensing, central banking and hence large scale fractional reserve banking, this will stop large firms from dominating the market and becoming too big. A bank will have to compete on trust and integrity to maintain the confidence of the depositor and the users of the note by issuing sound loans to the market. Other market institutions will assess the risk to depositors and holders of the currency. Banks are therefore limited by free market forces and act accordingly. They will act more conservatively than their current counterparts. The corporatist banking and monetary system is in crisis and cannot be defended. Laissez-faire markets are the alternatives to our big problem. 18

Bibliography Bank of England (BOE) (2004) Banking Concentration in the UK BBC (2011) Are my savings safe?, http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/business-12099592 [Accessed on 9th December 2011] Brookings Institute (2009) Measuring the Cost of TARP De Soto, J. H. (1995) ‘A critical analysis of Central Banks and Fractional-Reserve Free Banking from the Austrian School Perspective’ in The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 8, Number 2 De Soto, J. H. (2009) Money, Bank Credit and Business Cycles, 2nd edition (Auburn, Alabama: Von Mises Institute) Rothbard, M. (2008) The Mystery of Banking, 2nd edition (Auburn, Alabama: Von Mises Institute) Wolf, M. (2010) ‘The Fed is right to turn on the tap’ in The Financial Times, 9th November Zero Hedge (2010) Presenting Total Bank Assets to percentage of GDP http://www.zerohedge. com/article/presenting-total-bank-assetspercentage-host-countries-gdp [Accessed 9th December 2011] ____________________________________

James Paton is a second year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

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Grounding an Environmental Crisis: The Case of Human Extinction By Rupert Callingham While many people assume that there is such thing as an environmental crisis, few appear to give this idea the careful treatment it requires. Like other terms that have entered popular parlance, the readiness with which it is sometimes used has served only to mask a great deal of complexity. Typically, characterisations appear merely to cite specific forms of change, damage or destruction, brought upon the natural environment by human beings. It may well be that factors including global warming, ozone layer depletion, resource depletion, and toxic pollution warrant this kind of language; but, we need to ask why exactly this might be so. To determine whether our situation-with respect to the environmentmight reasonably be termed a crisis, we need to be clear on what is at stake here, and why it is this matters.

“On this account, it appears that crises may exist by virtue of states of affairs which have not yet come to pass...” A necessary feature of any crisis is presumably some sort of extreme problem, or a set of extreme problems. Difficulties arise, though, when

we ask ourselves what it is that makes a problem extreme. This is ultimately a normative question that is dependent upon one’s values. Some of us extend ethical concern to all realms of the biosphere, viewing anthropogenic environmental destruction as a severe problem in itself. Many others, though, ground environmental problems firmly on human interests. It only makes sense to speak in terms of an environmental crisis, the thought here goes, if our species is threatened in some way by our treatment of the natural world. On this account, it appears that crises may exist by virtue of states of affairs which have not yet come to pass, so that the perception of problems need not be restricted to things as they are now. Here, we might assume, estimations regarding the likelihood of problems occurring and the timeframe in which this might happen will need to be taken into account. One particular anthropocentric conception suggests that an environmental crisis might suitably be framed in terms the danger that humanity could eventually become extinct as a result of our environmental depredations (Gould, 1994). Most assessments of a claim like this will ordinarily focus on the positive or empirical compo19

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nent: namely the question of whether such a danger actually exists, and to what extent it exists. Here, however, I want to deal predominantly with the normative component. I want to assess the idea that human extinction, if brought about by our relationship with the environment, is a severe enough problem for us to at least begin thinking about our current state of affairs as a crisis.1 To some, this enterprise might appear trivial. Indeed, anthropocentric sympathisers might well wonder what could possibly be more catastrophic than the obliteration of our species. Grounding an environmental crisis securely on the danger of manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s extinction is a task less straightforward than it might seem, however, raising questions important and troubling. Unlike other potential causes of human extinction, such as nuclear war, an asteroid collision or the spread of a super-virus, we can be sure that our treatment of the environment will not wipe out our own generation. The threat of extinction appears a problem, then, because most of us claim to care about future generations. Indeed, it is sometimes posited that we have duties 1 Only after such a treatment of the norma-

tive claim could considerations of likelihood then inform a comprehensive assessment of whether or not a crisis exists now; presumably the severity of the problem in question would have to be weighed up against the probability of its becoming actualised, along with the potential timeframe involved. It is not my purpose to deal with these (highly problematic) matters of risk measurement in this article, however.

to prevent our own activities from having adverse intergenerational effects. It might be assumed, therefore, that such a duty to posterity grounds our concern for the preservation of the species, so that the prospect of extinction becomes a matter of justice. A comparison with a related but distinct possible consequence of anthropogenic environmental degradation2 brings out the difficulty with this suggestion. To some extent, human suffering resulting from such environmental degradation is perceptible today. It is feared, however, that in the relatively near future it could become widespread. The likely effects of man-made global warming, for instance, include a greater unreliability in food and water supplies, increased flooding in low-lying areas, more extreme weather events, and an upturn in the spread of many infectious diseases. Resource depletion too, in an obvious way, will limit the planetâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s capacity to provide the sorts of energy and minerals upon which current ways of living depend. Survival might well be a major long-term concern, then, but for many the pressing issue of today relates to the prospect of diminishing living standards. Here, it seems we can readily conceive of agents who might be the objects of that suffering, towards which 2 I use this term to encompass the specific

forms of change, damage and destruction brought upon the natural environment by human beings, the consequences of which, in part, significantly harm human interests either directly or indirectly.

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our duties or obligations might be directed. However, there is no clear set of analogous agents who are the objects of extinction. Though there might be a temptation for us to consider all those ‘people’ who would be prevented from existing as a result of our environmental depredations, this would be to tread on very dangerous ground metaphysically. As Dworkin puts it, “unless we think that in some very crowded mystical space people are waiting to be conceived and born,” (1993, p77), it seems absurd to argue that the prevention of life violates the rights or interests of anybody. In a very real sense, then, it appears that no one would be affected by the death of humanity as a whole.

Dworkin’s line of thought, though, even seems to deny that our concern for future human suffering can be grounded on rights and duties. He observes that, like much else, the decisions we make now about conservation and the environment “will affect, in ways we cannot understand, let alone anticipate, not only what resources our descendants will have but which people they will be” (1993, p77-78). Any concern for posterity can’t be a matter of justice, he assumes, because there are no specific people towards which our duties can be directed. It seems to me, however, that there persists a real difference between acknowledging that people in the future will have rights, even if we cannot recognise them as in21

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dividuals, and believing that we might have duties towards people who by definition will never exist. If we accept Dworkin’s considerations on the relationship between suffering and extinction, we might reach the rather strange conclusion that the prospect of the former provides a stronger moral imperative for reducing environmental degradation than the prospect of the latter. Indeed, if violating duties or obligations is what constitutes a severe problem, then on this basis at least, characterisations of a crisis invoking the danger of human extinction may well be misplaced. The concept of intergenerational justice might go some way in illuminating the significance of suffering in the futurebut it cannot seem to make sense of complete annihilation. Another challenge to the “survivalist” reading of our environmental situation, faced by any form of anthropocentrism, focuses on the transience of

human existence. Whatever happens in relation to climate change, resource depletion, and everything else, mankind’s time here will represent what is really a tiny chapter in the Earth’s history - one which will certainly not be its last. Rhetoric about “saving the planet” sometimes suggests that our influence on the Earth could bring about its destruction, but all we are really capable of destroying are various forms of life, and most notably for many, human life (Jamieson, 2008). So besides the question of whether we are wrong to privilege the value of our existence over that of other organisms, there is the suggestion that the significance and impact of our time on Earth must be placed in perspective. Having endured meteorite impacts, ice ages, and five major waves of extinction, we might say that our planet has seen it all before; for us to believe that our predicament somehow amounts to anything more than a moment in

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geological history is to engage in gross self-indulgence. While we might perish as a result of environmental degradation, the biosphere will persist: “On geological scales, our planet will take good care of itself and let time clear the impact of any human malfeasance,” (Gould, 1994, p38). There seems to be an implication within this line of thought that we are wrong to divorce ourselves from nature and all its contingencies. We are merely a small part of a world which is both indifferent and subject to continual change. The idea, then, that an “environmental crisis” might be grounded upon our interests just shows how guilty we are of parochialism. Something appears to have gone quite wrong here, however. As Bernard Williams noted, it is a paradox that even those environmentalists who claim to reject traditional pictures of human beings as discontinuous from nature, nevertheless acknowledge a unique ability and obligation to detach our-

selves from any natural determination, exercised whenever we think about nature morally (1995). The very fact that we ask ourselves whether our situation might appropriately be characterised as a crisis is dependent upon a moral transcendence of nature. The dangers that we face as a result of environmental degradation, then, are in no way natural. It just makes no sense for us to place the prospect of our own extinction alongside other non-human catastrophic occurrences, and then suggest that neither really matters because the biosphere or the planet lives on. Earlier I suggested that the extinction of our species could not meaningfully be said to affect anyone. Yet, we might well say that the idea of extinction affects us here today. A crisis, after all, is a state of mind, dependent upon perception and values. The thought that we, in this era, could hold a significant burden of responsibility for causing such an outcome – in a sense, ending mankind’s existence prema-

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turely – must be enough for us to begin thinking in these terms. For it surely matters a great deal if we utterly destroy our own moment on Earth, even if it is only a moment on geological scales (Foster, 1998). We may be unable to call upon justice to anchor our convictions, and the planet and universe may be indifferent towards our fate; yet we feel that without humanity the cosmos would somehow be a less valuable place. We are not nihilists, but human beings: moral agents and creators of value. Though there may well be other reasonable approaches, less squarely centred on human interests, at least in one important sense an environmental crisis might legitimately be grounded upon a raw concern for the continuation of our kind. To deny this, to deny the tragedy of human extinction, would really be to deny an es-

sential anthropocentrism that is natural if anything is. Bibliography

Dworkin, R. (1993) ‘What is Sacred?’ in Dworkin, R. (ed.) Life’s Dominion (New York: Knopf ) Foster, J. (1998) ‘The Scale of Our Ecological Crisis’ in Monthly Review, 49:11. Gould, S. (1994) ‘The Golden Rule – A Proper Scale for Our Environmental Crisis’ in Gruen, L. & Jamieson, D. (eds.) Reflecting on Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Jamieson, D. (2008) Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Williams, B. (1995) ‘Must a Concern for the Environment Be Centred on Human Beings?’ in Williams, B. (ed.) Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) ____________________________________

Rupert Callingham is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

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Authority, Myth and Reflection By Dan Iley-Williamson ‘Nothing appears more surprising,’ David Hume remarked, ‘to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few… Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion’ (1987, p. 32). It is through the concept of authority that subjects ‘resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rules’, yet it is an elusive concept, one that, for some, we are no longer in contact with, and for others, it has experienced such conceptual shift that it has either gone from obscurity masking power to the harmony of rational agreement, or from a shared sense of tradition to reckless individualism (Arendt 2006, p. 92 and Stanton 2011, p. 162). Either way, it is the Enlightenment’s motto – sapere aude! – that has done the work, whether benignly or perniciously. In this essay, I will assess the idea of authority and its standing in the modern world. The story I hope to tell begins with Robert Filmer’s absolutism and ends with the Scottish Enlightenment. I will argue that we are left without a legitimate grounding of authority, given that it cannot be established by either Filmerian absolutism or Lockean rational consent. This will be to contradict three of the main protagonists of this essay: Hobbes,

Hume, and Adam Smith. In spite of their greater subtlety of thought, and more nuanced understanding of the realities of politics, they try to retain that which they cannot. They reveal the artifice that authority necessarily operates under, yet once the artifice is recognised for what it is, it ceases to have the necessary power. Without the idea of authority, it may seem like we are left in state of crisis. I For Robert Filmer, authority rests on the divine right of kings. They have been bequeathed this authority thanks to their being descendants of Adam, giving them moral superiority and a direct connection to God. These attributes mean that men (let alone women) are not equal; the dictates of kings are to be followed as divinely ordained. To the modern reader, it does not need argument to cast doubt on this understanding of authority. It was, however, taken sufficiently seriously by Locke for him to dedicate his First Treatise to discredit it. Instead of authority resting on the divine right of kings, for Locke, it rests on consent (1998, p. 331). Individuals, naturally both free and equal under God, unite to create a political society and augment it with authority so long as it adheres to their 25

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wills. It shall be assumed for the sake of convenience that this argument also fails. The essay’s focus is not on whether such arguments work, but rather, what the fallout is of them not working. That is whether authority can be maintained on the grounds set out by Hobbes, Hume, and Smith. II The problem of politics, as Hobbes saw it, was how to ensure self-interested, short-sighted and power hungry individuals can live civilly, avoiding the ‘solitary, nasty, poore, brutish, and short’ life ‘of every man, against every man’ (1996, pp. 88-9). In order to achieve this, individuals must ‘conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will… [A]nd therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgement,’ (Hobbes 1996, p. 120). In doing this, they create the sovereign: a ‘Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence.’ Civil society is therefore formed by its members uniting to create a single body, one who is to be held in ‘awe.’ The frontispiece to Leviathan clearly depicts this idea: the people make up the Leviathan, but they are simultaneously awestruck by it. It is by treating the sovereign as a ‘Mortall God’ that the problem of politics can be solved: 26

all equally become subjects before the sovereign, who is given the power to ensure peace, thus allowing for a civilised communal life. What is crucial is that in thinking that the sovereign is a mortal God, the sovereign thereby becomes a mortal God: ‘Reputation of power, is power’ (Hobbes 1996, p.62. Emphasis added). Further, subjects are to understand their position as one in which they did all agree to have the sovereign rule over them. It is by these means that Hobbes intends to solve the problem of authority. Subjects are to think of the sovereign’s authority as if they had consented to it (Stanton 2011, p. 165). Therefore, in spite of the truth that Hobbes is aware of, and that Hume uses to forcefully argue against Locke, that individuals do not choose to live in subjection, for civil life to operate we must think of our subjection as if we had agreed to it. This is not, it should be noted, idealised hypothetical contract theory of a Rawlsian variety. Instead, in the words of one commentator, it is ‘showing that the only way sovereignty can be sustained is if real individuals all think of themselves as having covenanted on these terms’ (Stanton 2011, p. 165f. Emphasis in original.). Authority is the result of individuals thinking of sovereignty in a certain way: firstly, as the result of agreed consent, and secondly as a power deserving deference, which is, it being a mortal God. Civil society is therefore maintained by a collective act of imagination. This interpretation

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of Hobbes shall be accepted without further analysis. Later in the essay I shall argue that Hobbes’ doublethink – the recognition that sovereignty is not brought into existence by rational agreement, but the need to think of it as if it had – fails. Once it is realised that authority is not the product of a covenant, we cannot truly recall the illusion that is it. I shall argue this after having given an account of authority according to the two leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hume and Smith. Political society, according to

Hume, is necessary for human affairs to be conducted in peace, safety and to mutual advantage (1987, p. 37). These benefits are found when society is governed according to the rules of justice, that is, when laws and opinion hold the rules of property in a stable manner (Hume 1978, pp. 490-1). Although justice is to the people’s benefit generally, it is often the case that a transgression of the rules will be of benefit to an individual. To prevent this from being corrosive to the whole enterprise, ‘obedience is a new duty which must be invented to support 27

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that of justice, and the ties of equity must be corroborated by those of allegiance’ (Hume 1987, p. 38). Obedience, Adam Smith went on, is founded upon two principles, the principle of authority and the principle of utility (Smith 1978, p. 401). Together, they ‘induce men to enter into a civil society,’ ensuring they accept their subjection. The principle of authority is the deference individuals feel to those taken to be their superiors, whether due to wealth or historical significance. From this feeling, individuals succumb to their position, not complaining of their relative lack of power. Yet this feeling, as Hume and Smith knew, was a non-rational feeling hardened into habit. The authority given to rulers, and to the system of rules more generally, depended a continuation of this habit being thought to be more than just habit. For the rules of justice to be maintained, the masses must think of their authority as more than just ‘how things are done,’ else they would not receive the compliance necessary for maintaining stability. III What Hume and Smith do, therefore, is like what Hobbes does: they show us the situation as it really is – where rules and practices are somewhat arbitrary results of a mishmash of history – but ask us not to see it like that. We are asked to view authority as if it were solid and rationally justifiable, while 28

knowing it is not. In Nineteen EightyFour, Orwell describes doublethink in the following manner: ‘To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them’ (1989, p. 37). This is what Hobbes, Hume and Smith ask us to do: they draw our attention to the distance reality is from our thought, but ask us to forget this distance. This is not something we can easily do: as Bernard Williams said ‘there is no route back from reflectiveness’ (1985, p. 163). And this is the situation we find ourselves in: once Hobbes, Hume and Smith have revealed the truths of authority to us, we cannot consciously take ourselves back to a state of ignorance. The philosopher C. I. Lewis once observed that ‘There is no reason for supposing that, when the truth is found, it will prove interesting’ (quoted in Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska 2006, p. 135), and equally it might be said that there is no reason to suppose that truth, when found, will prove encouraging. It is reflection that reveals this, and it is reflection’s corrosive power that may lead one to think that though it might be the case that the unexamined life is not worth living, a man’s examined life can sometimes make him wish he were dead.1 As it is true of an individual life, so it is true of collective life. 1 As Saul Bellow somewhere remarked.

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Michael Oakeshott once said that ‘we are apt to think of a civilisation as something solid and external, but at bottom it is a collective dream… And the substance of this dream is a myth, an imaginative interpretation of human existence’ (1975, p. 150). Hobbes, Oakeshott thought, sustained this collective myth, lulling us further into the dream. But this is wrong. What Hobbes, and Hume and Smith do is to clearly see that civilisation is a collective dream, but then urge us not to see it like that. They wake us from our dream, but tell us to relive

the dream. But as it is when dreaming, once aware of the dream, the dream quickly ends. There is, as Williams said, no route back. The liberal contractualists of a Rawlsian ilk are in that state of consciousness when the dream continues, but the dreamer is awake. Once it is realised that that cannot be sustained, the myth will have vanished, leaving us not only ‘awake in a profound darkness, but a dreadful insomnia would settle upon mankind, not less intolerable for being only a nightmare’ (Oakeshott 1975, p. 151).

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Bibliography

Arendt, H. (2006) Between Past and Future (London: Penguin) Berlin, I. and Polanowska-Sygulska, B. (2006) Unfinished Dialogue (New York: Prometheus Books) Hobbes, T. (1996) Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Hume, D. (1987) Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund) Locke, J. (1988) Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Oakeshott, M. (1975) Hobbes on Civil Association (Bungay: The Chaucer Press) Orwell, G. (1989) Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin) Smith, A. (1978) Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Stanton, T. (2011) ‘Hobbes and Schmitt’ in History of European Ideas, 37, 2, pp. 160-67 Williams, B. (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Routledge)

_____________________________ Dan Iley-Williamson is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

VOX Panel Lecture on ‘Toleration’: An Extract By Professor Peter Jones On Wednesday 7th December, VOX hosted a panel lecture on ‘Toleration’ in conjunction with the Morrell Centre for Toleration. The panel consisted of Professor Matt Matravers and Professor Sue Mendus, both of the University of York, and Professor Peter Jones, of the University of Newcastle. We would once again like to thank all three panelists, and Peter in particular for allowing the following, slightly revised, part of his talk to be printed. A full recording of the talk can be found on our website, www.voxjournal.co.uk. We tolerate when we do not prevent something, even though we find it objectionable and even though we could prevent it if we chose. If we do not find it objectionable, we have no occasion to tolerate it. Similarly if we can do nothing to prevent it, we are in no position either to tolerate or not tolerate it. The prevention from which the tolerant person abstains can be quite minor, such as casting a negative vote in an election, but if he is incapable of doing anything that might make a difference, he is in no position to tolerate. 30

Consider hunting with dogs. I tolerate that sort of hunting only if I disapprove of it; I cannot ‘tolerate’ hunting if I take no exception to it. Likewise, I tolerate hunting only if I can do something to prevent it but choose not to; toleration is an option only if intolerance is too. As well as tolerating what we disapprove of, we can tolerate what we dislike. For example, I tolerate a noisy neighbour if I resolve to endure her irritating and intrusive noise without complaint, perhaps because I wish to maintain good relations with her.

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The idea of toleration throws up two questions. First, why should we tolerate? It is not obvious that we should. Toleration entails not preventing (what we reckon to be) a preventable wrong. Normally, if something is wrong and we can prevent it, we think we should. So how can it be good, how can it be right, not to prevent a preventable wrong? That is what has been called ‘the paradox of toleration’. It is not a paradox strictly speaking, but it does indicate the need to explain why toleration is the right or the best option. All sorts of justifications have been offered for toleration and I shall not catalogue them here, but I will mention a couple of examples. Sometimes the case for toleration can be simply pragmatic, such as securing peace, which is a good in itself and a precondition for very many other goods. As you will know, religion has historically been a great source of conflict and oppression, and one thing that persuaded people of the merits of religious toleration was their tiring of the killing and bloodshed that intolerance entailed. They became persuaded that, on balance, live and let live was a better option. So I may think your beliefs are heretical and you may think my beliefs are heretical, but I may tolerate your beliefs and you may tolerate mine simply because the price of intolerance is too great for either of us. Nowadays, people often prefer more principled reasons for toleration and an example of such a reason is the idea of respect

for persons. When we conceive people as persons, we recognise them as having moral status and as possessing capacities such as the ability to think for themselves, to make their own choices and to have their own goals in life. We also think that we are duty-bound to respect their personhood and so to allow them to live their preferred form of life. Thus, even though I may disapprove of your form of life, my duty to respect you as a person requires me not to prevent your living your preferred form. I am duty-bound to tolerate the way you live. The second question thrown up by the idea of toleration is: how much toleration should there be? What should be the limits of toleration? ‘Tolerant’ and ‘tolerance’ are generally commendatory terms; they are ‘hooray’ words. It is good to be tolerant. Similarly, ‘intolerant’ and ‘intolerance’ are pejorative words, ‘boo’ words. It is bad to be intolerant. But we should not be misled by that. There are a great many things of which we are rightly intolerant – murder, rape, fraud, discrimination, child abuse, and so on. So at some point it becomes bad rather than good not to prevent a preventable wrong. There are uncontroversial cases on either side of the dividing line, but also many controversial cases concerning, for example, the treatment of children and animals, the consumption of drugs, tobacco and alcohol, and foreign governments’ treatment of their populations. 31

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Another feature of toleration is that it can be both personal (private) and political (public). Few of us wield political power of any significance, but we all have personal relationships and that means that most us have more opportunity to be tolerant or intolerant in our private lives than in public life. I can tolerate my wife’s smoking and she can tolerate my over-sensitive nature, while both of us can tolerate (or not) the behaviour of our children. That sort of person-to-person toleration can provide a model for political toleration. For modern Europe, the issue of religious toleration has its origins in the Reformation of the sixteenth century when Christians became divided between Catholics and Protestants, and Protestants were further divided amongst themselves. At that time, the prevailing form of government was monarchy, often ‘absolute’ monarchy, and that gave rise to toleration or to intolerance of a simple sort. If I was a Catholic monarch, I would of course make Catholicism the official religion of my society. If some of my subjects were Protestants, I then faced a choice between tolerance and intolerance: I might allow

them to worship God in their own way or I might not. Mutatis mutandis, the same applied to Protestant monarchs. So religious toleration during the early modern era was largely toleration extended (if it was extended) by rulers to subjects and was ‘vertical’ in form. When we move into our own age, that model of political toleration is no longer satisfactory. An elected government does not stand in the same relation to its population as a monarch does to his subjects. A king is master of his subjects and it is for the king to decide whether and what he tolerates of his subjects. A democratic government stands – or should stand – in the opposite relation to its population: the people are the masters and their government is their servant. A democratic government has no business tolerating or not tolerating its population. In a democratic society, it is more appropriate to conceive of toleration as an issue that arises amongst citizens: what should citizens tolerate in respect of one another? Political toleration therefore becomes ‘horizontal’ in form. Toleration might still, of course, assume a lop-sided form in which a majority tolerates, or fails to tolerate, a minor-

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ity. But the ideas of democratic equality and liberal democracy are more consonant with an ideal of toleration as mutual and with rules and arrangements that secure toleration equally for all citizens. How much does toleration matter nowadays and how tolerant are we? It is sometimes said that, in the West, we are not as religiously tolerant as we like to think, since most of us have ceased to care about religion in the way that we once did. We are easy-going about religion not because we are tolerant but because we regard it with indifference. There is some truth in that but not, I think, the whole truth. Many people still care very deeply about religion, including those, like Richard Dawkins, who are strongly opposed to it. Rather I think religious toleration has become so ingrained in our political culture, that we take it for granted; we have come to think that religious toleration is just obviously right. But it would be perverse to hold that we have ceased to be religiously tolerant just because we have become so convinced of the rightness of religious toleration that it comes easily to us. Toleration can sometimes be painful, but it does not have to be. People also often say that issues of religious toleration are now dead, or they did until recently. Given 9/11 and its aftermath, and the role played by religion in conflicts in Nigeria, Sudan, the Philippines and many other

societies, we cannot yet remove religious toleration from the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political agenda. Real issues of religious toleration are also current in Britain, arising in part from Britainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s becoming a multi-faith society. Consider, for example, the arguments surrounding whether Sikhs should be able to carry knives (kirpans) in public as their faith requires, or whether Jews and Muslims should be able to practise ritual slaughter, or whether religious organisations and individuals who believe homosexual conduct to be wrong should be prevented by discrimination law from dissociating themselves from homosexuals. Having spoken up for the continued salience of religious toleration, I now want to turn the tables and cast doubt on how keen we are on toleration in other respects. Our normal mode of argument simply invokes right and wrong, so that, if something is right, we think it should be maintained or promoted and, if it is wrong, we think it should be stopped or discouraged. Consider the way people argue about abortion or hunting with dogs or the use of animals in research. Typically, one side argues that the practice is unobjectionable or justified and therefore should be permitted, while the other says the opposite and insists that it should be banned. It is much rarer to hear someone say that a practice is wrong but should be tolerated even so. Moreover, the dominant mode of 33

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argument often precludes toleration. Suppose you are pro-life and I am pro-choice and I seek to persuade you to switch to the pro-choice position. I am most likely to do that by trying to persuade you that your objections to abortion are misplaced. But, in that case, I am not trying to persuade you to tolerate abortion; I am trying to persuade you that abortion is unobjectionable so that you will not need to tolerate it. An argument for toleration would leave your objections to abortion in place but offer you reason to permit abortion even so. In sum, toleration may be universally applauded in our world, but we often seem less keen to opt for toleration than that applause might suggest. There is one other thing that can make toleration an unpopular option. I began by saying that toleration necessarily entails disapproval or dislike; if we find something unobjectionable, we have no occasion to tolerate it. It is unsurprising therefore that people should take exception to being tolerated. They do not want to be found objectionable; they want to be accepted, and to be accepted on terms equal with others. Homosexuality provides a good example. In Britain, not very long ago, homosexual acts between consenting adults were criminal offences punishable by imprisonment; now homosexuality enjoys a formal public status equal with that of heterosexuality. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the movement for the decrimi34

nalisation of homosexuality was under way, the main argument for decriminalisation was an argument for toleration. It went like this: ‘You may think that homosexual acts are disgusting, wrong and depraved, and you may well be right to think that. But homosexual acts between consenting adults do not harm anyone. They are victimless. Therefore there is no good reason why they should not be tolerated.’ That argument did nothing to remove the stigma and disapproval that surrounded homosexuality. The argument was not, ‘you should regard homosexuality as unexceptionable’, but ‘even though homosexuality may be objectionable, it should be tolerated’. Homosexuals could hardly rest content with that view of themselves and the aim of the Gay Liberation movement has been to erase stigma from homosexuality and to move beyond toleration. It has demanded ‘recognition’ rather than toleration – recognition of gays as equals and recognition of the equal worth of homosexual and heterosexual relations and all that that entails, including gay marriage and gay adoption. We now live in a world in which people set great store by their ‘identities’ – sexual, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, etc – and what they increasingly demand for their identities is recognition rather than toleration. _____________________________ Peter Jones is Emeritus Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Newcastle.

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VOX Call for Papers VOX - the Student Journal for Politics, Economics and Philosophy - is calling for essays to be submitted for the Summer Issue 2012, with the broad theme ‘The Information Age’. Essays should be between 1,000 and 1,500 words in length, and fully-referenced using the Harvard style. If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your essay to vox@clubofpep.org by the 1st April 2012. You may wish to write on a topic from the list below: • Is there a limit to how far knowledge should be spread? (WikiLeaks etc.) • What information is ‘in the public interest’? (The limits to privacy.) • Democracy in the digital age - online voting and direct democracy. • Intellectual property - right or wrong? • The Internet - connecting or isolating? • What would a ‘market of ideas’ look like? A ‘free market’? • Does knowledge liberate? • Must our thought be distanced from reality? (Might some knowledge harm?) • Business models in the digital age. (Internet booms and bubbles.) • ____________ (your own idea) Undergraduates, graduates and academics all welcome. All undergraduate submissions will be considered for the 2012 VOX Essay Award. Back issues are available at: www.voxjournal.co.uk.

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