Ideology by VOX Journal: The Student Journal of Philosophy, Economics and Politics

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF Issue XXI - Summer 2013 POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

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Issue XXI - Summer 2013

IDEOLOGY

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Editorial Ideologies play a central role in the study of Politics providing us with a framework for understanding the realignments in societies throughout history. Although often described as mere propaganda, they seem to capture, at least partly, the role of ideas in politics and our lives. The term ‘ideologies’ has been recently forecast to approach its dawn, especially after the experiences of the collapse of Soviet communism. However, as ideologies are intrinsic to many elements of human existence such as equality, liberty, political economy, environment and culture, their disappearance from political discourse seems unlikely. We begin our issue with Matthew Festenstein’s essay which considers whether we have managed to jump free of ideologies and return to ‘reason-based policymaking’. The series of student essays opens with Fullerton’s defence of the methodological competence of Rawls by emphasizing the role of the “reflective equilibrium” which allows for a “realist” interpretation of his theory. Paton’s essay offers a modernised interpretation of the Oakeshottian claim that ideology has no place within politics as it lacks the practical knowledge necessary for successful policy-making. Next, Tozer argues that the realist analysis of the Cold War bipolarity is deeply flawed and concludes that realism brings with it dangerous implications for the future of humanity. Ozyegin, in her review of Jason Brownlee’s “Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US – Egyptian Alliance”, underlines the fact that the change in authorities in the US does not shift the foreign policy as generations of presidents follow its core goals. Finally, we explore the understated role of ideology within Economics. We would like to thank the University of York’s economists John Bone and Andrew Pickering for participating in an interview which covered a wide range of topics such as environmental policy, teaching standards and the difference between methodologies and ideology. As this is the first issue of the new committee, we hope you will learn as much from it as we did. If you would like to share your thoughts and comments with us, e-mail vox@clubofpep.org. Details of the next theme, ‘Rising Powers and Global Norms’, can be found on the back cover of this issue.

Editorial Team Editors: Dagmara Chwalowska Manuel Holtmann Layout Editors: Widya Kumarasinghe Raphael Rueben 2

Dagmara Chwalowska and Manuel Holtmann Editors Sub-Editors: Viktor Rehart Lea Böergerding Phillip Jung Opemipo Akisanya

Reviewers: Thomas Tozer Oscar Stenbom Martin Kabrt

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

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ISSUE XXI - SUMMER 2013

IDEOLOGY ESSAYS

PAGE

The Same Old Dream Professor Matthew Festenstein

Is Rawls a Realist? Alex Fullerton

Reviving Oakeshott: The Case against Rationalism and Ideology James Paton

Realism: A Useful Theory or Dangerous Ideology? Thomas Tozer Arab Spring Ege Ozyegin

INTERVIEW

PAGE

Professor Andrew Pickering and Professor John Bone

VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on Yorkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s campus as well as other universities world-wide. VOX is available electronically on voxjournal.co.uk and the Apple iBookstore.

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the end of idoelogy By Professor Matthew Festenstein

1975 was the first year in which a James Bond film, Dr No, was shown on one of British television’s three channels. (Did it really once take thirteen years for films to reach TV? It did.) The eponymous villain is pithily post-ideological, sneering ‘East, West, just points of the compass, each as stupid as the other’. Bond, of course, has seen it all before, even if this was his first film outing. For him it’s immediately obvious what Dr No is after, unhampered by ideological belief: ‘World domination. The same old dream. Our asylums are full of people who think they’re Napoleon. Or God.’ Elsewhere that year, the dream of power was taking a different form. ‘We must have an ideology,’ the late Margaret Thatcher declared in 1975. ‘The other side have got an ideology . . . we must have one too.’ The key source for this quotation is a convicted perjurer and former Tory MP, so we may need to be cautious about the attribution. Nevertheless, the sentiment is a striking one. 4

In part, it is striking because conservatism, particularly in Great Britain, has tended to be skeptical about, if not thoroughly allergic to, ideology. The following year, the conservative political philosopher Anthony Quinton gave the T. S. Eliot Memorial Lecture published as The Politics of Imperfection, in which he affirmed the doctrine’s ‘anti-theoretical tendency’ and its belief in ‘the dangerous unreliability of abstract theoretical constructions in human affairs’. Inspiration for this attitude could be found in David Hume and Edmund Burke, and it received its most mordant and sophisticated statement in the work of the foremost conservative political philosopher of the twentieth century, Michael Oakeshott, whose magnum opus, On Human Conduct, also appeared in 1975. For Oakeshott, the rationalist effort to impose an ideological blueprint on society was the key flaw in modern political thought. Conservatism itself, he thought, wasn’t even a set of ideas, but a disposition, to cherish the familiar and

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Photo by Rick Payette

near at hand. For this strand of conservativism, the victory of the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;New Rightâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; expressed a profoundly anticonservative radical belief in markets, dissolving traditional ties and institutions. Beyond this, Thatcherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s claim is striking because ideology is often thought of as the kind of thing we would want to be rid of. Not to infect our thinking. Like bad breath, ideology is something you detect in other people, not yourself. This negative view of ideology as a defective way of thinking is itself fed by several ideological tributaries. One has already been mentioned. The strand of conservatism that re-

jects ideology in favour of tradition and tacit understandings. Ideology for this group is produced by hotheads who have too much faith in their own cleverness. From another direction, ideology in classical Marxist doctrine is opposed to scientific socialism: ideology expresses the dominance of a particular social class since in any society the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class. Once class society is abolished - and historical progress assures us that this will indeed happen - there is no longer a need for ideology. Now there were strands of both these traditions that, like Thatcher, embraced and sought to develop ideology rather than to reject it. Here 5

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however I want to focus on a third source of skepticism about ideology, the so-called end of ideology thesis. Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, a collection of essays published in 1960, captured a mood also expressed in the same year by the political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset’s Political Man (and a couple of years before Joseph Wiseman’s Dr No briskly dismissed the Cold War’s ideological fault lines). For this group, ideologies essentially embody an attempt on the part of an intellectual elite to construct a dogmatic blueprint for the planning of social life and to impose it on the pluralism of social life. In part, ‘ideology’ was a code word for socialism for the end of ideology authors, some of whom (like Bell) had been Marxists in their youth and were now reflecting on the aftermath of a God that had failed them. Ideological politics was contrasted with a pragmatic and consensual politics. Yet what really rendered ideology redundant was the elimination of the underlying social and political tensions that had given rise to the great ideological traditions of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. From this perspective, socialism, for example, could be viewed as a re6

sponse to the traumatic dislocation of the peasantry as they were wrenched from traditional habitats and flowed into the cities and industry. Fascism could be seen as the panicked reaction of a lower middle class squeezed between big business and the threat of socialist labour. After the Second World War, however, these traumas had receded. The working class had achieved social and political citizenship, the conservatives had accepted this and the welfare state, and the left had recognized that state power carries with it dangers to freedom as well as opportunities to resolve economic problems. This is still a world of ‘democratic class struggle’, according to Lipset, since different parties and interest groups will fight for their interests. But this ‘will be a fight without ideologies, without red flags, without May Day parades’. Now the end of ideology writers were not so simple-minded as to think that ideologies in the sense of clusters of animating ideas were going to cease to play a role in politics. Rather the grand visionary narratives linking human nature and political economy were exhausted. Nevertheless the obituary came to seem premature as the following two decades witnessed both a crisis for the social compromise Lipset describes and the flourishing and revival of a host of

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ideologies – nationalism, feminism, environmentalism, as well as a resurgent and more radical left. Into this

“Influential political voices echo the analysis that ideology is old hat, and its residual forms are to be distrusted: Blair and now David Cameron emphasise that they don’t ‘do isms’” context of overtly ideological politics an explicitly ideological form of conservatism, the New Right, could assert itself: ‘The other side have got an ideology . . . we must have one too.’ Yet in the longer run the form of argument that the end-of-ideology authors used has enjoyed a robust afterlife. Tony Blair’s ideological guru Anthony Giddens revived it in order to explain why we were ‘beyond left and right’. For him too underlying social transformations – in particular, globalization and social complexity – have undermined the classical ideologies. Where ideology persists – in forms of religious fundamentalism or the paroxysms of the tea party, for example – it is essentially an anxious reaction to rapid and uncontrollable social change.

Influential political voices echo the analysis that ideology is old hat, and its residual forms are to be distrusted: Blair and now David Cameron emphasise that they don’t ‘do isms’, and that politics is less about ideology than project management. If a critic wants to attack public spending cuts there is no lower blow than to claim that these are ‘ideological’. At an analytical level, of course, scholars of conservatism, for instance, can still deploy the concept of ideology, in order to make sense of utterances, divisions and policies. But within the ideology itself, ideology is a marginal idea, as if the message of contemporary politics is that: ‘the other side don’t have an ideology; we mustn’t have one either’. Lady Thatcher is now positioned to turn in her grave. However, like those conservatives and socialists who sought to position themselves above the fray of ideology, this is an inherently precarious position. As with these other approaches, it relies on a claim to know what’s really going on and what to do about it that is itself untainted by ideology. This is not to suggest darkly that all our knowledge is corrupted by sectional interest and distortion, or that it is meaningless to call, as Daniel Stedman Jones does at the end of his book Masters of the 7

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Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, for a return to ‘reason-based policymaking’ grounded in the ‘mundane reality of incremental reform and regulation’. But it is to say that the belief that we have finally jumped free of ideology, are able to put the past behind us, roll up our sleeves, and get on with the practical business of politics, embodies a set of ideas with a specific history and complex political associations. It is part of that tangle of commitments that it imagines itself free from, and all the more entangled because it imagines itself free. Bibliography Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Harvard University Press, 1960) Colin Crouch, The Strange Death of Neo-Liberalism (Polity Press, 2011) Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Polity Press, 1994) Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Doubleday, 1960) Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford University Press, 1975) Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection (Faber, 1978) Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton University Press, 2013)

Prof. Festenstein is Head of the Department of Politics at the University of York

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Is rawls a realist? - on ideology and justification in political philosophy By Alex Fullerton In a more original moment of Philosophy and Real Politics, Raymond Geuss damningly describes the work of John Rawls as “ideological” (2008, p.90). His charge is based on the claim that “Rawls draws attention away from the phenomenon of power”. According to Geuss he fails to consider how power relations might shape our moral intuitions, providing false moral support to existing power structures in the process (Geuss, 2008, p.90). Geuss (2008) emphasises the need to examine moral judgements in the light of our historical and social circumstances, and sees Rawls’s A Theory of Justice as built on the unexamined intuition that justice has absolute priority in discussion of political institutions (Geuss, 2008, p.70). To the extent that Geuss argues Rawls’s Theory is based on unexamined intuition, I reply this fails to take seriously Rawls’s idea (1971, p.20) of “reflective equilibrium”: the state of affairs where our considered moral judgements and moral principles are in agreement, thus providing justification for both judgment and principle. However, given Rawls’s “non-foundationalist” approach to justification in ethics (Freeman, 2007, p.33), I ask whether Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is, or could be, sufficiently critical of the way historical and social

circumstances shape our moral intuitions to meet Geuss’s charge. In other words: “Is Rawls a Realist?” The essay will proceed in two parts for ease of understanding. In part 1, discussion focuses on Rawls’s method of justification in ethics. Whilst Geuss argues that A Theory of Justice is based upon supposedly self-evident intuitions, their proclaimed self-evidence thus ensuring attention is directed away from how power relations might have shaped them, I will show that Rawls’s theory is instead founded upon the concept of reflective equilibrium. In part 2, I present arguments for believing reflective equilibrium is sufficiently critical of how historical and social circumstances shape our moral intuitions, and hence argue Rawls’s Theory is not ideological. Part 1 First, it will be helpful to examine Geuss’s notion of “ideology”. Geuss (2008, p.52) defines the term as “a set of beliefs, attitudes, preferences that are distorted as a result of the operation of specific relations of power; the distortion will characteristically take the form of presenting these beliefs, desires etc., as inherently connected with some universal interest, when in

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fact they are subservient to particular interests”. Note however that Geuss does not think all political theories are ideological. Indeed Geuss (2008, p53) says “political philosophy could play a progressive role in combating ideological illusion” by exposing the dependence of certain beliefs on existing structures of power. Moreover, Geuss (2008, p.39) thinks moral evaluation of political structures is a plausible role of political philosophy, though he is clear it does not overrule other forms of evaluation. So it is not the case that all moral judgements are said to be ideological. To show that Rawls is guilty of propounding ideology, Geuss (2008, p.91) takes as evidence the fact that A Theory of Justice is based upon supposedly self-evident intuitions. According to Geuss (2008, p.70) Rawls begins with the following ungrounded intuition: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust … [T]ruth and justice are uncompromising” (Rawls, 1971, p.3-4). Geuss’s realist critique gives us a particular picture of Rawls’s ideas on justification in moral philosophy: Rawls appears to belong to the tradition of “philosophical intuitionism” found in Henry Sidgwick and others (Freeman, 2007, 10

p.32). That is to say Rawls considers certain abstract moral principles – the primacy of justice over other political virtues for instance – as self-evident and from here argues society should be constructed in such a way as to realise these principles. Turn the page however, and we find Rawls critiquing his opening remarks; for Rawls (1971, p.4, emphasis added) states “these propositions seem to express our intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice. No doubt they are expressed too strongly. In any event I wish to inquire whether these contentions or others similar to them are sound, and if so how they can be accounted for”. Clearly Rawls would disagree that his opening remarks play any part in the justification of his moral theory, for they themselves are to be analysed. Rawls would fervently disagree that his theory is based on unexamined intuition for this, as will be shown, is antithetical to the very idea of reflective equilibrium. Does Geuss therefore make a bizarre misreading of Rawls’s work? Certainly Geuss represents Rawls’s arguments poorly, but I think there’s a case to be made that reflective equilibrium, even if not based on self-evident intuitions, still fails to examine the social and historical circumstances giving rise to our moral beliefs. Onwards then to an examination of “reflective equilibrium”. Rawls (1971, p.20-21) supposes that a moral conception is justified when our moral

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principles and moral judgements “[fit] together into one coherent view”. Our moral judgements are formed from intuition; Rawls gives as an example our confidence that “religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust” (Rawls, 1971, p.19). Moral principles on the other hand are the outcome of a procedure of contractual construction (Freeman, 2007, p.38-39). This contractual construction is an agreement on moral principles defining a system of social cooperation, chosen by free and rational persons who are to live in this system. Where our considered judgements and moral princi-

hence parties in the original position are equal for “all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles” (Rawls, 1971, p.19). Secondly, through “the veil of ignorance” restrictions are placed on ways of reasoning inappropriate to moral theorizing (Rawls, 1971, p18); thus the veil of ignorance denies contractors knowledge of their contingent circumstances such as their class and race, and also their particular conceptions of the good life, for intuitively our contingent circumstances should have no bearing on our moral views.

“Whereas Geuss asks which moral judgments are distorted by existing power relations, Rawls asks us which moral judgments we would hold in the absence of any power relations” ples do not “fit” we can either revise our judgements or change the exact circumstances of our contractual procedure until the two coincide (Rawls, 1971, p.19-20). At this point we have reached reflective equilibrium. Thus reflective equilibrium is both a process of examining moral intuitions and justifying a whole moral worldview by proving its internal coherence. Rawls’s favoured contractual procedure is that of the Original Position. The procedure itself has been tailored to reflect our following considered moral judgements. Firstly, it takes into our account our considered conviction that human beings are moral equals;

Part 2 Geuss (2008,p.90) would argue that this does not save Rawls’s theory from being ideological. Given that Rawls’s process of reflective equilibrium requires the founding principles of any society to be decided solely in light of moral deliberation, this excludes discussion of how existing power structures might distort our moral judgements, for we are not examining these views in light of our historical and social circumstances. Hence Rawls’s theory is still based on the ungrounded assumption that morality has absolute priority over other 11

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considerations, such as efficiency. This is how I believe we should interpret Geussâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s claim that A Theory of Justice is based on self-evident intuitions. In response, first note that the reason we want to examine whether or not existing power structures have distorted our moral judgments is because we think the existing power structure is morally irrelevant. When we discover that a particular moral judgment is thus distorted, we abandon this moral belief. Secondly, note

that Rawlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s choice of contractual procedure, argument from the Original Position, requires, through the veil of ignorance, that we place restrictions on ways of reasoning inappropriate to moral theorizing. Thus morally irrelevant factors like the existing power structure, social and historical circumstances cannot be used to argue for the choice of certain principles. Whereas Geuss asks which moral judgments are distorted by existing power relations, Rawls asks us which moral judgments

Photo by Dietmut 12

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we would hold in the absence of any power relations. It may be countered that because we, and not contractors in the Original Position, design the contractual procedure, ideological beliefs may influence its design – it may, for instance, privilege the contractors with a certain misconception of the self which in turn would affect their rationality and hence their conclusions. Hence the requirement that we contrast the resulting moral principles with our considered moral judgments, revising both principle and judgement until we achieve a perfect fit – reflective equilibrium. Through this process we thus seriously consider whether factors effecting the design of the contractual procedure are truly in keeping with our other moral beliefs, or whether they exist only to serve “particular interests” (Geuss, 2008, p.52). In conclusion, the key difference between Geuss and Rawls is that Geuss favours a negative approach to combating ideology whereas Rawls prefers a positive approach. Geuss aims to remove ideological beliefs one at a time by showing where such beliefs have been distorted by historical and social circumstance. On the contrary Rawls asks which moral principles and judgements we would hold when we reason without the distorting effects of knowledge of historical and social circumstance. I hope I have shown that the concept of reflective equilibrium is

sufficient to produce such moral principles and judgements. So, finally, is Rawls a realist? No less than Geuss Bibliography John Rawls, 1971. A Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts Samuel Freeman, 2007. Rawls. Routledge, London Raymond Geuss, 2008. Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton University Press, Oxfordshire.

Alex Fullerton is a second-year Undergraduate studying PPE at the University of York

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Reviving oakeshott - the curse of political rationalism and ideology By James Paton Most of us hold a particular set of beliefs about how the world should be, and believe the political process should be used to promote the given end of an ideology. In this essay, I dispute whether ideology has a place within politics. In the first section, I outline Michael Oakeshott’s theoretical critique of ideology set out in his essay “Rationalism in Politics”. In the second, I present a number of cases of where ideology has failed and caused many problems within society. In the third section I present a number of rejoinders to Oakeshott’s argument which I argue do not pose a challenge to his critique. Finally, I briefly outline Oakeshott’s conservative alternative to ideological politics. The flaws of ideology Oakeshott defined ideology as “the formalised abridgment of the supposed substratum of the rational truth contained in the tradition.” (Oakeshott, 1947: 8-9) In more informal words, ideology is a belief system founded upon abstract principles and thought-experiments. What motivates the ideologue is the belief of creating a “better” world. An ideology is written persuasively as it seeks to attract to bring about a given end. After being 14

persuaded to a particular viewpoint, the ideologue seeks to promote it through the political process (ibid: p. 9). Take for example the libertarian Nozick built his argument for a minimalist state based entirely on Natural Rights and Entitlement as Justice. Nozick believed that no one can use coercion against individuals, but believed that the “invisible hand” of the market would lead to geographical territory monopolies for defence contractors. The state therefore cannot more functions without an infringement on our rights (Nozick, 1974). Rawls in contrast argued that the Veil of Ignorance would establish mutually agreeable principles on how a society should be constructed. The institutions of society should be arranged so individuals can equally exercise liberty, there is fair equality of opportunity between citizens and the inequality in society is to the greatest benefit for the least advantaged (Rawls, 1971). Both theories, however different are formulated from abstraction and theory, and are based on certain rules. This is because the rationalist believed

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“The world around us is not based upon a central plan, but on trial, error, historical events and accidents. Whether the Common Law, the Rule of Law, Constitutional Monarchy, and the British experience of limited government based incremental reform, these institutions and traditions are known to work as they have been built upon an accumulation of ‘practical knowledge’ “ the sovereignty of technique that makes up the ideology is all that matters; “reason” is seen to be to be a completely reliable guide within politics (ibid: pp. 11-21). Michael Oakeshott however believed that all ideologies suffer from a common epistemological 1 problem. To Oakeshott, “…the theoretical understanding of some activity is always the child of practical know-how, and never its parent” (Callahan, 2009). The ideologue has gotten things the wrong way round. An experienced chef does not imagine, rationalise and use theoretical techniques to create his recipe; he only masters his culinary skills by trying and testing different ideas in the kitchen (ibid: pp. 12-13). When an apprentice comes along, he cannot create his master’s signature dish by just copying his recipes. He believes at first that the perfected recipe (the technique and instructions to create the dish) needs revising (Callahan, 2009) but this is 1

The Philosophical term for knowledge

not the case – the truth of the matter is that he does not have much practical experience to recreate the chef ’s perfected dish. By analogy, the ideological individual who reads from his beautifully crafted textbook cannot create a plan from it to reach his end, as he does not have any concrete knowledge to rely on. His ideology is continuously reformed, as well as his plan to reach the desired end, but the book is nothing more than “puffed up nonsense” (Fuller, 1991: xv). Those who are ideological in their politics are akin to the apprentice chef – inexperienced and lacking any grounding in practice (Oakeshott, 1949: 35; Callahan, 2012: 52). The world around us is not based upon a central plan, but on trial, error, historical events and accidents. Whether the Common Law, the Rule of Law, Constitutional Monarchy, and the British experience of limited government based incremental reform, these institutions and traditions are

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known to work as they have been built upon an accumulation of ‘practical knowledge’.

by the central authority, and promoted to the citizenry through state broadcasting and the education system.

For example, when the House of Commons clashed with the House of Lords with the Peoples’ Budget in 1909, the Liberal Government reduced the power of the Upper Chamber through the Parliament Act 1911. A rationalist would have abolished the hereditary chamber, and replaced it with something completely different from a plan. This would have wiped clean the accumulated knowledge within the Lords, altering the very nature of the British Constitution. The Liberals however acted in the British Political Tradition, built upon a slow and incremental attitude to reform. In short, the rationalist/ideologue, only has ‘technical knowledge’ that can destabilise a situation, constitution or society.

Through the centralisation of power, there were huge conflicts within governing elites, leading to the suppression of political freedom and “purges” of supposed enemies. Individuality was suppressed and in China, citizens were executed in some instances for not wearing the “Mao suit”. Economies were unproductive and lagged by the Western world because a lack of entrepreneurship and technological progress.

Ideology in practice: Oakeshott’s attack on ideology was directed at both moderate and extreme positions. At one end of the pole, the Soviet Union and other Communist States pursued a revolutionary form of socialism. Private property was abolished and replaced with worker selfmanagement. The economy was nationalised and centrally planned, with committees setting prices, production quotas and following “grand plans” set by the Kremlin. Culture was dictated 16

The British experience with ideology has been at the more moderate end of the pole, but still not without grave consequences. The traditional way of British governance was based on keeping the “ship afloat” and not trying to promote an ideological end. This was most evident throughout the 18th and 19th century where government reformed the constitution incrementally and intervening in social affairs when necessary. Throughout this period there was rapid economic growth that was improving living standards. In addition, there was relative political and economic stability achieved through constitutional and social reform as opposed to the continent which was undergoing revolutions and unravelling political orders. The election of the Labour Party

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in 1945 to Oakeshott was a threat to this mode of governance. Oakeshott was concerned with the rise of democratic socialism that could only be promoted by central planning. The concentration of power towards the centre through the state monopolising healthcare, education, welfare and housing, (Gamble, 2012: 159) were all a means toward a socialistic end. Ideology and urban planning are closely intertwined. Labour in 1945 believed that it could create a more equal society and better social conditions for the people living in “slums” by building New Towns, Council Estates and Tower Blocks. They moved families out of “inadequate social conditions” and into these new social

complexes. They constructed what they thought would work for the community in terms of play areas, schools and housing arrangements but the result was not the desired end. Residents lack personal space leading to confrontation; urban development designs were shambolic leading to crime being “built in” into estates and networks of “eyes” on the street disappeared as street designs were not favourable for children playing out. In addition, family, community and welfare networks were completely uprooted reducing levels of social capital (See Bartholomew, 2004: 225-231; Callahan, 2009). Networks however have not been rebuilt due to government provision of welfare that reduces the need for communities to come together (Green, 1993: 98)

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The planners creates problem for themselves, and requires further top-down plans to ameliorate them. This leads to constant intervention by government that “is resolved into a succession of problems and crises” (Oakeshott, 1947: 27-28). Oakeshott’s concern was that politics now became a battle between competing parties over rival plans for their “vision” for society (Oakeshott, 1947: 208 cited by Gamble, 2012: 157). The Tories became dragged into rationalistic politics. Take for example the election of Margaret Thatcher who tried to recreate a socially conservative society that resembled her own upbringing. As Andrew Sullivan suggests however, the individualistic rhetoric she promoted led to the reverse result, and in some instances a more selfish and more socially liberal society (Sullivan, 2013). A more recent example of the failures of political rationalism and centrally directed projects is the European Union. The desires of politicians of creating a Federal Superstate 2 have been completely shaken after the sharing of a common currency and the failure of rationally devised institutions to limit the borrowing of peripheral countries, which a number 2 As the President of the European Commission readily admitted: “This is our project. A project which is step by step but with a big ambition for the future with a Federation of Europe” (Europa, 2012)

are now (potentially) facing bankruptcy. Those more Euro sceptic in nature and not totally on board with the whole “project” (ie, Britain, Norway and Sweden) are more financially sound than large countries (eg, France (Telegraph, 2013)) and are able to use their own monetary policy to tackle the economic slowdown. It is argued however that Germany has benefited from the Euro as the Southern European countries have devalued the single currency relative to a potentially free floating Deutschmark; however, the long run cost for bailing out profligate governments maybe greater than the benefit of having a devalued currency. Rejoinders to Oakeshott: I have argued that recent flirtations of ideology supports Oakeshott’s theoretical critique of rationalism. spite this, we must beg the question if ideological projects can be successful. One that immediately comes to mind is the United States of the America. The “founding fathers” created a nation founded on abstract principles. They had a “vision” of a free society that Oakeshott looked down upon. The US is very successful economically and politically stable. Many of the goals dreamt up by the Founders have come true and is a case where Oakeshott’s critique maybe argued to be false. Oakeshott however be-

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lieved that the American Constitution was the most “sceptical” that was ever designed (Oakeshott, 1996: 80). The Founding Fathers’ were modest in their aims and were not seeking to plan society from the top-down. They left individuals to pursue their own goals, and built a framework for citizens to achieve them. This is in stark contrast to the cases presented above which are based on central plans and specific end states. A second issue with Oakeshott is his political conservatism. In societies that are oppressive, is not ideology a good thing that seeks to promote a better end (eg, achieving democracy)? Oakeshott’s response would be that reform should be approached incrementally, from the bottom-up and within the traditions within a society. Upsetting the social fabric and replacing it with a structure from a textbook is not the way forward, as it creates instability. This is quite clear with American intervention in Iraq, whose aim was to create a democratic Iraqi state (Brooks, 2003). Democracy in the UK and the US was achieved through incremental reform over a long period of time, not through swift reforms. Conclusion: To summarise, Oakeshott’s criticises ideology as being based upon a confusion about how knowledge is acquired. To the ideologue, it is found

within thought experiments and abstract principles; whereas to the political conservative, it is located in practical reality and within the institutions we already have. As the rationalist does not have access to the correct type of knowledge, trying to abridge an ideal into reality is very difficult, as he cannot devise a plan to reach his desired plan. Therefore ideologically motivated projects have issues within them and are likely to fail as when implemented from the top-down. Oakeshott’s alternative to the political rationalism is based upon small, and prudent government that has little scope to interfere within a free-flowing society. What matters for government is how it acts rather than what it does. Government uses the traditions that have accumulated over time to upkeep the “rules of the game” and settle disputes between conflicting parties. It also has a role in breaking up concentrations of power (public and private) so coercion is minimised. Reform is undertaken when necessary and within the given traditions of a society and is to be pursued in an incremental way so that stability is maintained (See Oakeshott, 1949: 404-406; Oakeshott, 1956: 426-432; Gamble, 2012: 171). This is the Conservative view of government that seeks to keep the state of affairs on an even plateau, rather than pursuing ends that can destabilise the existing social, political and economic order. 19

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Bibiliography: Bartholomew J (2004). The Welfare

State We’re in. Politico’s Publishing Ltd Brooks D (2003). ‘Arguing with Oakeshott’. The New York Times. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/27/opinion/arguing-with-oakeshott.html Callahan G (2009). ‘Michael Oakeshott on Rationalism in Politics’. Freeman. Available at: http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/ detail/michael-oakeshott-on-rationalism-inpolitics#axzz2ORi3q8cw Callahan G (2013). ‘Liberty versus Libertarianism’. Politics, Philosophy, Economics, vol. 12, pp. 48-67 Europa (2012). ‘State of the Union Address 2012’. Europa. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_ en.htm Fuller T (1991). ‘Forward’. In Rationalism in Politics [1991]. Liberty Fund, pp. xiii-xxiv Gamble A (2012). ‘Oakeshott’s Ideological Politics: Conservative or Liberal?’. In Efraim Podoksik (Ed.). The Companion to Michael Oakeshott, Cambridge University Press Green D (1993). Reinventing Civil Society: The Rediscovery of Welfare Without Politics. Civitas: London Nozick R (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic books Oakeshott M (1947) ‘Rationalism in Politics’. In Rationalism in Politics [1991]. Liberty Fund, pp. 5-42 O akeshott M (1949) ‘Political Economy of Freedom’. In Rationalism in Politics [1991]. Liberty Fund, pp. 384-406 Oakeshott M (1956) ‘On Being Conservative’. In Rationalism in Politics [1991]. Liberty Fund, pp. 407-437 Oakeshott M (1975) [1991]. On Human Conduct. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition Oakeshott M (1996). The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, (ed by Timothy Fuller), Yale University Press, Rawls J (1971). A Theory of Justice.

Harvard University Sullivan A (2013). ‘Thatcher, Liberator’. The Dish. Available at: [http://dish. andrewsullivan.com/2013/04/08/thatcher-

liberator/] Telegraph (2013). ‘France worse off

than UK in the 1970s’. Available at: http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/10093809/France-worse-off-than-UK-in-

the-1970s-Axa-chief.html

James Paton is a third-year PPE student at the University of York

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Realism: A useful theory or dangerous ideology? By Thomas Tozer Realism is a theory of international politics which seeks to demonstrate that due to the self-interest of states and the structure of anarchy in international politics, relationships between states are characterised by the Hobbesian state of fear, mistrust and conflict (Baylis, et al., 2011, pp. 84-99; Waltz, 1979). After establishing that realism offers a valuable perspective on international politics, this essay will argue that it gives an alarmingly inaccurate analysis of the stability offered by the bipolar structure of power during the Cold War, and is mistaken in its belief that nuclear weapons make the world safer (Waltz, 1990). Therefore, this essay will contend that realism espouses gravely confused proposals about how to ensure international stability, and so although it has merit as a theory that helps to explain some aspects of international politics, as an ideology, realism is dangerously misguided. The Value of Realism as a Theory of International Politics Historically, realism has been divided into a number of different schools. It is broadly composed of ‘classical realists’ who attribute conflict in international politics to human nature’s

drive for power, and ‘neo-realists’, also known as ‘structural realists’, who believe that global anarchy propels the conflict between states (Baylis, et al., 2011, pp. 84-99; Lynn-Jones, 1998; Heywood, 2010). There is a further subdivision within structural realism between defensive and offensive realists, who believe that states prioritise the maximization of security, and power, respectively (Heywood, 2010; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). This leads some theorists to argue that realism comprises many competing views of politics – it is not a unified theory, and so it certainly cannot be thought to proffer a coherent ideology (Baylis, et al., 2011, pp. 84-99; LynnJones, 1998). Yet there are many assumptions shared by all branches of realism. They all believe in state supremacy and that human nature is essentially selfish and therefore competitive (Heywood, 2010). Furthermore, all realist theories converge on the view that survival and self-help—the principles that states prioritise their own survival and essentially help themselves without relying on other actors or institutions such as the UN—accurately describe politics, and cite these as the main reasons for tension and conflict (Baylis, et al., 21

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2011, pp. 84-99; Heywood, 2010). An example of this is the Iraq war in which US hegemonic power bypassed the UN in order to invade Iraq in 2003 – its motivation for this invasion was clearly self-interest, even if ostensibly it was presented as a humanitarian intervention. It is possible to understand the cause and nature of many wars in this way, and for this reason the perspective that realism gives on international politics is useful and valuable. Moreover, realism’s underlying assumption that there is no system of global governance is indisputable, and it is uncontroversial in asserting that states usually pursue their own interests (Donnelly, 2000). Therefore, while critics may object to realism as Photo by Adam Thomas

theory of international politics because it is not a unified theory, this objection can be refuted on the basis that there are many assumptions shared by all schools of realism. In assessing realism’s explanation of the Cold War, and the ideological implications of this explanation, this essay takes realism to be defined by these shared assumptions. The past 10 years of international relations have been dominated by the ‘neoneo debate’ between neo, or structural, realism and neo-liberalism, therefore where there is an inescapable divergence in thinking between different strands of realism, this essay will take the arguments given by structural realists to best represent realist thought.

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The Myth of Bi-Polar Stability The Cold War was the struggle between two great hegemonic powers that defined the latter part of the twentieth century (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2007, p. 151; Gray, 2007, pp. 205218). It is predominantly thought to have been caused by geopolitics, the clash of ideology between the US and Soviet Union, and Stalin’s refusal to cooperate with the West (Gray, 2007, pp. 184-204). This implicitly confirms realist causes for the war since without an underlying animosity caused by anarchy and self-interest, geopolitics and clashing ideology would not lead to war, cold or otherwise. The two super powers were united by the approach of survival and self-help, not a common morality; each feared that nuclear war would destroy them both and engaged in their nuclear pursuits on the basis that they had to ‘conquer or be conquered, destroy or be destroyed’ (Morgenthau, et al., 2006, pp. 376, 365). Despite this underlying conflict, structural realists describe the Cold War as a long peace in which the US was made extremely secure by the USSoviet bipolarity and the presence of nuclear weapons – the only threat to this stability was the danger that the US might pursue an overly aggressive foreign policy (Friedman, 2006; Heywood, 2010; Waltz, 1990; Walt, 1998). Indeed, realists aver that bipolarity is the most stable structure of

power in international politics (Donnelly, 2000). Some realists argue that this stability is confirmed by the eruption of many conflicts soon after the Cold War bipolarity ended (Duffey, 2000, p. 117; Spiers, 2000, p. 161). Such arguments are mistaken. The Cold War was pervaded by uncertainty and miscalculation, with a real risk of intentional or unintentional deployment of nuclear weapons (Ritchie, 2009). Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crises of 1962 is widely considered the most dangerous event in human history, and the notion that nuclear weapons prevented war between the US and Soviet Union is unfounded: trillions of dollars were spent on various proxy wars, such as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, which were a direct consequence of the Cold War – the so-called ‘long peace’ was neither as stable or peaceful as often claimed by realists (Gray, 2007, p. 194; Gavin, 2009, p. 23). For example, in 1962 a Soviet submarine was struck by US forces who were unaware of the submarine’s significance: a vote on whether to respond with nuclear retailation was vetoed by only one member of the crew – without his veto a nuclear response would have followed, with cataclysmic effect (Hough, 2004, p. 48). Examples such as this, combined with the proxy wars, clearly show that the Cold War bipolarity did not ensure peace and security; contrary to the intention of realism, the stability of international politics rested on palpably unstable foundations during 23

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that period. In arguing that bipolarity leads to international stability, realism therefore advocates a flawed ideology. An alternative approach is that human nature is perfectible, or at least can be improved to some degree, and that cooperation, not conflict, could be the defining feature of politics. Such is the view of liberalism, realism’s principal opposing school of thought (Walt, 1998; Baylis, et al., 2011, pp. 100-113). A discussion of liberalism is outside the scope of this essay, but it is worth noting that there exists a compelling alternative to realism’s pessemistic view of international politics. Realism’s Fallacious Faith in Nuclear Weapons Realists believe in ‘the supreme importance of the miltary instrument’ and assert that due to the principals of survival and self-help, states should aim to maximise their own security (Carr, 2001, p. 102; Lynn-Jones, 1998, p. 177). Hence, realists believe that nuclear weapons make the world safer; they are the reason why, although there were accidents, the US-Soviet disagreement never escalated into armed conflict (Gray, 2007, p. 217; Gavin, 2009). Indeed, Waltz (1990) argues fervently that nuclear weapons are a ‘trememdous force for peace’ (1990, p. 731). These theorists believe that the nuclear revolution was a symptom, not a cause, of the US-Soviet geopolitical and ideological rivalry. In fact, so the 24

“... the notion that nuclear weapons prevented war between the US and Soviet Union is unfounded: trillions of dollars were spent on various proxy wars, such as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, which were a direct consequence of the Cold War – the so-called ‘long peace’ was neither as stable or peaceful as often claimed by realists” argument goes, nuclear weapons make states far more reluctant to fight and therefore raise the political threshold for war (Gray, 2007, pp. 184-218). This diagnosis is profoundly misguided. Nuclear weapons injected incalculable danger into the Cold War, causing crises which would not have arisen in the prenuclear world (Ritchie, 2009; Gavin, 2009). They gave any state possessing them the capacity to completely obliterate their enemy or indeed the world, and, while it is impossible to know whether nuclear weapons helped to avoid World War III or whether it was ultimately avoided despite the existence of nucle-

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ar weapons, it is clear that nuclear war was a genuine possibility throughout the Cold War (Gat, 2006; Gray, 2007, p. 218, 216). Further evidence that history has come down believing in a world which is safer without nuclear weapons is that even US president Obama, a clear reflection of contemporary political norms, has stated his determination ‘to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’ and strengthened the international community’s commitment to nuclear disarmament

“ ... much of realism is based on flawed analysis and has dangerous implications for the future of humanity.” (Indyk, et al., 2012, pp. 40-41). Nuclear weapons create a potential for cataclysmic destruction which would not otherwise exist; in the hands of extreme regimes such as in North Korea and Iran, they present untold risk to all countries of the world. In arguing that nuclear proliferation makes international politics more stable, contrary to the claims of the current US president, realism espouses an outdated ideology that actively encourages the risk of nuclear warfare. Such an ideology is not only mistaken, it has grave implications for the future peace and stability of international politics.

A Useful Theory, But a Dangerous Ideology Realism offers a useful framework within which to analyse international relations, although it would certainly benefit from a splash of liberal optimism. However, although it can sometimes help to explain certain aspects of international politics in ways that other theories cannot, it also offers many confused explanations of international politics, and the normative recommendations which follow from taking realism as an ideology should be largely discredited. In particular, although it argues that the bipolarity of the structure of power during the Cold War and the presence of nuclear weapons made for stable international security, this essay has shown that these conclusions are unfounded: on several occasions nuclear devestation was only narrowly avoided, and a number of proxy wars were fought soley as a consequence of the Cold War. Realism still holds huge appeal because the central issue that it seeks to explain—the regular condition of conflict and competition between states—remains true today. However, much of realism is based on flawed analysis and has dangerous implications for the future of humanity. Politics aims to help citizens secure freedom and security within states; international politics aims to secure freedom and security between states. 25

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The ideology of realism may feign support for this cause, but by believing that relations between states are determined by self-interest and, hence, are inevitably charactersised by fear and conflict, it draws unacceptable conclusions, such as the recommendation of a bipolar structure of power and nuclear proliferation to ensure stablity between states, that actually run contrary to the intention of international politics. Realism presents a valuable perspective on international poltics, but, as an ideology, the proposals it makes to secure international stability are dangerously mistaken. Bibliography Baylis, J., Smith, S. & Owens, P., 2011. The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carr, E. H., 2001. The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Donnelly, J., 2000. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Duffey, T., 2000. Chapter 7: United Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. In: C. Kennedy-Pipe & C. Jones, eds. International security in a global age: securing the twentyfirst century. London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 116-137. Friedman, T. L., 2006. New York Times. [Online] Available at: http://select.nytimes. com/2006/05/10/opinion/10friedman. html?_r%021 [Accessed 11 12 2012]. Gat, A., 2006. War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gavin, F. J., 2009. Same As It Ever Was. International Security, 34(3), pp. 7-37. Gray, C. S., 2007. War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history. London: Routlege. Heywood, A., 2010. Global Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hough, P., 2004. Understanding global security. 1st ed. London: Routldge. Indyk, M. S., Lieberthal, K. G. & O’Hanlon, M., 2012. Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs, 91(3), pp. 29-43. Lynn-Jones, S. M., 1998. Realism and America’s Rise. International Security, 23(2), pp. 157-182. Mansbach, R. & Rafferty, K., 2007. Introduction to Global Politics. London: Taylor & Francis. Mearsheimer, J. J., 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. London: W. W. Norton & Company. Morgenthau, H. J., Thompson, K. W. & Clinton, W. D., 2006. Politics Among Nations. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. Ritchie, N., 2009. Deterrence dogma? Challenging the relevance of British nuclear weapons. International Affairs, 85(1), pp. 8198. Spiers, E., 2000. Chapter 9: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In: C. Kennedy-Pipe & C. Jones, eds. International security in a global age: securing the twentyfirst century. London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 155-175. Walt, S. M., 1998. International relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Policy, Issue 110, pp. 29-46. Waltz, K. N., 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. Waltz, K. N., 1990. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review, 84(3), pp. 731-745.

Thomas Tozer is a first-year PPE student at the University of York

Issue XXI - Summer 2013

Arab Spring By Ege Ozyegin In the following excerpt from the author’s review of several books about the Arab Spring focuses on one book in particular: “Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US – Egyptian Alliance” by Jason Brownlee. The author argues along the lines of this book that US foreign policy towards oppressive regimes in the Middle East hardly changes - regardless of the president and party in power. The protection of their own interests and the state of Israel are identified as paramount to the US, even if a disregard and even oppression of spreading democracy is the price to pay. This ingrained foreign policy seems to have become an unquestionable and unshakable ideology, as generations of presidents follow

it. All references in this article are made to Brownlee, Jason.(2012). Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US – Egyptian Alliance. Cambridge University Press, NY Editor’s note, Phillip Jung The most important reason behind the Arab Spring uprising’s lack of success is international support of autocratic regimes. US strategic interests in the region have blocked the Arab Spring from attaining democracy. In Democracy Prevention, Brownlee provides us with convincing findings of how the United States has thwarted democracy in the Middle East for so long in order

Photo by Ameer K 27

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to pursue their strategic self-interest in ings in Egypt, the US did not promote the region. Brownlee’s book is an exer- popular sovereignty, but instead backed cise of realism, which aims to undermine an “orderly transition” to someone who the United States democracy rhetoric would keep the US interests safe in the that has been around since the 1970’s. region. The United States was only willThe January 25th “Revolution” has “dif- ing to accept a change that would profered in process and outcome” writes tect those interests. In this case, it was Brownlee as he argues that the Egyptian only the leader, evidently not the regime protesters did not challenge a “tottering that changed. There are two reasons as and isolated state” but rather under- to why the protesters in Egypt were only mined Mubarak’s otherwise depend- able to replace a ruler, but not a regime: able repressive The US foreign organizations and policy desire in foreign support “The Luck egalitarian theorist “preventing a manetwork. People would argue that policies jor Arab – Israeli also derailed US’s War and maintainplans of an Omar that disproportionally impact ing ties with Gulf Suleiman succes- individuals living in developing oil exporters”. As sion. Yet, how is countries are unjust, because the a consequence in it possible that the resultant inequalities are created Egypt, the security protests eventustate was “erected by arbitrary factors; namely where by Sadat, expandally followed the path that the Su- one is situated in the world.” ed by Mubarak preme Council of and enhanced by the Armed Forces the US” (Brown(SCAF) seemed lee, 13). The US’ to be moving in? Brownlee highlights continual disregard of public opinion Washington’s consistent foreign policy in Egypt, which desired less US and Isdecision to value national interests over raeli involvement in Egyptian regional fostering democracy in the Middle security affairs, promoted an autocratic East. He suggests that the US backing state that supported a US led regional of authoritarian rule in Egypt is “in- order. This order was built around Isstitutionalized and ingrained” beyond raeli security and had influence in the any specific administration – in other Persian Gulf. Therefore, the people faced words, US foreign policy had become a a strong challenge as they tried to make generation-spanning ideology. Brown- real structural change. A sudden opening lee’s reasons are legitimate as he explains of the regime and greater public particiwhy authoritarianism persisted in Egypt pation could bring unknown figures to with American support even though power and “jeopardize strategic coopthe US continually claims to encourage eration” (Brownlee, 68). The aforemendemocratic change. During the upris- tioned US interests encouraged Wash28

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ington to block the will of the people most importantly with the help of one factor, which, according to Brownlee, is foreign aid. The US military aid worked towards strengthening the national defense, coup proofing the regime, maintaining economic stability and domestic repression of the people. The goal was to “keep the military loyal and people quiet” so that these autocratic leaders would not lose power during a military takeover and people would remain subordinate. Most of the US aid is spent on the police force that repressed people on a day-to-day basis. The “war on terrorism” was the rhetoric US used in order to keep this military aid flowing. The attacks on September 11th gave the US administration a sufficient reason to join intelligence forces with Egypt. In his book, Brownlee points to the leverages that Washington exerted on Egyptian officials. Debt forgiveness, aid packages and military collaboration were not granted to Egypt in order to promote democracy, but rather to enhance Israeli security and US interests. The US would take military aid away when they were not satisfied with Mubarak’s performance on securing US interests – not when he failed to secure democracy in his own country. Establishing Egyptian democracy always came second for the US, or maybe even third. The reason that the SCAF took over the revolution in Egypt, even though it may seem to be working towards the goal of the people, was de facto in order to “safeguard the regime’s ties to Washington”, as Brownlee puts it. Ultimately, the US problem was not with Islam, but with the people

and their populist movements. Democratically elected governments, whether led by Islamists or secularists, could review Egypt’s relations with its allies. The US was never willing to take that risk. At this point, it is useful to turn to one of Brownlee’s other findings: Tunisia. This small Mediterranean country is the only one whose revolution may be considered successful. Brownlee argues that the success of the Tunisian Revolution should be attributed to the country’s looser ties with Washington. Tunisia mattered less to the US, which turned out to be a blessing for the protesters in the country. As a result of the uprisings in Tunisia, the country swung sharply from authoritarianism to democracy (Brownlee, 168) Tunisia was never a regional powerhouse, nor did it pose a strategic challenge to Israel. Tunisia was also not a major oil exporter and it did not control a geographically strategic point, like Egypt did with the Suez Canal. It has never been a major geostrategic ally of the west. All these reasons put together, as well as the military’s non-politicized role (which again takes us back to the US supporting the Egyptian military) contributed to the success of the Tunisian Revolution in delivering democracy. Tunisia changed not only a leader but also a regime unlike other countries where international actors support undemocratic regimes due to their self-interest. In his conclusion, Brownlee explores how Egypt did not change under Morsi after Mubarak resigned. Mubarak was 29

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behind bars but his institutions kept running. The SCAF retained Mubarak’s propaganda arm and instead of addressing the public’s concerns, “the junta answered with censorship, detentions and police raids” (Brownlee, 161). The ministry of information also kept running as well as the coercive instruments, the internal police and the state security. Nobel Peace Prize winner Barack Obama, too, did not change the US policy after Bush and he is still backing up the regime in Egypt. Even though Obama opened his foreign policy hoping to improve the Unites States’ image in Muslim majority states – and Mubarak’s Egypt was a centerpiece to his campaign –he did not pivot from the status quo. Brownlee reminds us how Obama has called for a new beginning between the US and the Middle East, based on mutual interest and respect (Brownlee, 134). Contrary to all this rhetoric, all he did was re-package old priorities. During one of his speeches Obama said: “For decades the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons … Pursuing Arab Israeli peace. We will continue to do these things, with the firm belief that America’s interests are not hostile to people’s hopes’ they’re essential to them… Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind ”. Obama’s words greatly resembled Bush’s National Endowment for Democracy Speech in 2003. This new chapter in American policy “purported to break the 30

mold” (Brownlee, 165). While declaring a pro democratic policy, Obama and his national security team defended military aid and only mildly urged the Egyptian army to reduce repression. Although posing an iconoclast, Obama offered no end to the despotism Washington has enabled. As it is evident, leaders do not change much. At the end of the day, it is the national interests of major players that matter the most. Prevalent foreign policies are hard to change and many leaders would never challenge the status quo - preventing structural changes in the regime from becoming a reality.

Ege Ezyegin is a third-year PPE student at the University of Pennsylvania

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Interview with Dr. John Bone and Dr. Andrew Pickering Interviewed by Oscar Stenbom

University of York economists John Bone and Andrew Pickering discuss defining ideology within economics, contrasting a broader definition of ideology as an ingrained way of thinking with a narrower one of subjective preferences. Tackling a debate often shunned by economists as irrelevant, Bone and Pickering cover environmental policy, teaching standards and the impact of an economic mindset on political ideology to conclude that the difference between methodology and ideology in economics is not quite as clear as it may seem. How would you define ideology? John Bone (JB): I would define ideology as a system of ideas, of basic assumptions that you make in trying to understand the way the world works or in trying to say something about how the world should be. In economics I think ideology means assumptions about trying to understand the world in terms of individual behavior and preferences, thinking about whether market systems are

preferable to non-market systems. 1 [Ideology could also be defined as] a difference of objective; when faced with macroeconomic policy constraints do you reduce unemployment and increase inflation, or decrease inflation and increase unemployment?2 Andrew Pickering (AP): You can reconcile ideology with economics once you admit the possibility of different objective functions. 3 It’s not obvious that assuming individual rationality will lead to the destruction of the environment; there’s probably some irrationality along the way. The assumptions that one finds in literal terms objectionable aren’t necessarily the ones that lead to the policy 1Bone refers to “An Ideology of Disconnection” by Michael Taylor; a broad critique of Rational Choice Theory which argues that the way economists look at the world is objectionable. Taylor cites environmental policy as an example of the limit of a strict definition of human rationality. He contends that the norm of fair reciprocity motivates us to do our part in cooperative endeavours. 2 Pickering accepts the narrower definition of ideology; admitting that economists often have difficulty explaining how two people with the same information can reach different policy conclusions. 3 Pickering refers back to Taylor’s critique of the economic way of thinking, especially in regard to the natural environment.

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mistake; it’s usually something else; market failure or some ‘short-termism’. JB: The first theorem of welfare economics essentially says under certain conditions market equilibrium is Pareto efficient. What that essentially means is that given these conditions you reach market equilibrium where it isn’t possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off in terms of their own preferences. That’s often thought of as being an endorsement of markets but it actually isn’t; there’s a long list of very strict conditions that the theorem identifies as being necessary to this kind of optimality of markets but furthermore the Pareto efficiency itself is pretty weak. It doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a good situation at all; if we have £1000 in the middle of the table and I took it for myself then that would be a situation where we cannot make anyone in the room better off without making anyone else worse off. Sometimes economics students walk away from their economics theory thinking it is. AP: That is regrettable, but the evidence is a bit patchy on this. If you compare the attitudes of economists to sociologists, in terms of data collection they are not random samples; there’s a typology associated with each set. However there is a yet unpublished study that shows some difference between first year and third year eco32

nomics and sociology students but in that case the authors may be finding what they want to find. 4 AP: Economists mostly answer that the manager should lay off some staff since they have been taught to mathematically profit-maximize, and after a while that becomes the right thing to do. Without that training they might have answered differently. On the other hand, if you’re a public corporation you’re legally obliged to maximize profits anyway. The admittance of an ingrained method of economic thought in this example combined with the possibility of it being legally enshrined on a broader scale is perhaps the closest one can get to accepting an ‘economic ideology’ from a narrower definition of ideology. However we do neglect ‘the small print’ in teaching economics; we ought to emphasize that this [Pareto efficient] list of conditions never gets met in practice. It’s actually the most important part of the argument. We don’t always succeed as teachers in getting this across. 4Pickering then refers to the Rubenstein Dilemma whereby a hypothetical manager of a profit-making factory must decide if he should lay off some staff in order to make an even bigger profit or to carry on with the status quo.

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JB: I disagree. In all sorts of areas where economists teach about policy, such as health care or the environment, they point out that small print. However it does give you a particular perspective on what environmental degradation means which may not correspond at all to what common sense may say is an optimal state for the environment. So do you believe in a difference between methodology and ideology? JB: I would tend to say that that mind-set does go from a methodology to becoming an ideology. In my mind ideology and methodology are much more closely connected than Andrew sees them. I do see it becoming an ideology in the sense that the way you approach problems is framed in a precise way which comes from a set of ideas, a way of viewing the world. To me that’s where it becomes a sort of ideology. AP: Perhaps the environmental example is the hardest possible one because of the multitude of dimensions. The point at which methodology turns into ideology is better explained by examples of irrationality; when somebody doesn’t wear a seatbelt or might drink too much, or smoke. Quite often policy makers have a paternalist instinct whereas economists from the traditional perspective think that individuals know what’s best for them.

I’m not convinced that individuals always know what’s best for them; for example when it comes to seatbelts. It’s policy because we don’t believe in individual rationality. [In general] there is a systematic inclination towards a libertarian absence of policy; but there are situations where governmental paternalism is sensible and I do not know how we can embed them to economics without saying people are stupid. What you can do as an economist is validity tests on your argument; you can take rationalism as this useful tool for analysing behaviour but you always need to ask yourself about robustness; what happens if I change the assumption of rationality just a little bit? From a small robustness check you can resuscitate sensible policy; the best economists are very practical. [However] I would admit that there is a skew towards (…) non-interference and that skew is an ideological one that does follow from individualism and rationality. JB: I do not think economists at all believe, or at least do not teach, that individuals rationally perusing their own interests always lead to a good outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma is a prime economic example of where that’s not true; which is a template 33

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for what we mean by market failure. What economists do have is a particular kind of way of thinking about how the world can go wrong, and it’s a way of thinking about it in terms of individuals and their preferences. The whole point of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that when individuals rationally pursue their own objectives it leads to an outcome which is worse for them in terms of their own objectives. If that’s your perspective on the way things go wrong in society then you’re automatically thinking about solutions that are measured in terms of individuals and their own preferences. So when we try to think about what an optimal environmental policy would look like then we think about it in terms of the satisfaction of individual preferences; there’s no good or intrinsic value in bio-diversity as such. The value of biodiversity is only to be found in what is valued by individuals. [A] case has to be made in terms of individual preferences and objectives and that’s what I would call an ideology. And I happen to share it.

You can see it in terms of the global warming debate; some people think global warming mustn’t happen and we must do everything we can to stabilize general climatic temperatures. But an economist might ask; why? You end up thinking of global warming not as an absolute but instrumentally. To me that’s a kind of ideology; it’s a set of ideas. Andrew starts with the view that ideology is a set of preferences but where do you actually get those ideas from? Ultimately they come from the same place; something within you says these are my general preferences about how I would like the world to be. So would you agree that the difference between methodology and ideology in economics is not quite as simple as it may seem? AP: The more I’ve studied economics the more I’ve come round to that position, when I first started teaching I was quite dogmatic about it.

So from an economic mind-set, biodiversity is of value only in terms of its subjective value to individuals? Does that not imply some philosophical or ideological assumption?

JB: I don’t see that there is any way to disentail ideology from methodology. For me that is where ideology is, in method, but it’s just a different sense of the word. Ideology can mean different things to different people.

JB: If enough people in the world like bio-diversity then that’s what makes it valuable, I suppose.

Oscar Stenbom is a first-year PPE student at the University of York

Issue XXI - Summer 2013

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

VOX

THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

voxjournal.co.uk

Call for Papers VOX – the Student Journal for Politics, Economics and Philosophy – is calling for articles to be submitted for the Autumn Issue 2013, with the broad theme ‘Rising Powers and Global Norms’. Articles should be between 1,000 and 1,500 words in length, and fully-referenced using the Harvard style. If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your article to vox@clubofpep.org by 1 September 2013. You may wish to write on a topic from the list below: • • • • • • • • •

Rising powers and development challenges Security concerns arising from the new global configuration BRICS countries during recession: dwarfing of Europe and North America? How are the world’s diminishing sources of energy changing the international balance of power? How are current shifts in power relations affecting opportunities for state cooperation? Do global norms exist? Are global gender norms shifting? Urbanisation and growth: challenges and implications ____________ (your own idea)

Undergraduates, graduates and academics all welcome. All undergraduate submissions will be conisdered for the Vox Essay Award. Back issues are available at: www.voxjournal.co.uk.

Front cover photo by Mo Riza. Back cover photo by Thmas Hawk