Rising Powers & Global Norms

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XXII - AJOURNAL utumn 2013 THE Issue STUDENT OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

RISING POWERS & GLOBAL NORMS

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Editorial The rise of economically influential countries from the developing world is radically changing the international balance of power. Countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) have entered the international stage previously dominated by ‘The West’, claiming a more prominent role in institutions of global governance. However, it is uncertain whether these rising powers are yet of sufficient political importance to shape global norms.

In the XXII issue of VOX we examine whether and how established institutions face the challenge of integrating a new set of goals, experiences and perspectives into international standards and shed light on other areas of global norm evolution such as gender and poverty norms.

Our series of student essays is opened with a paper analyzing the correlations between gender norms and economic development. Orban forcefully argues that while indeed there exists correlation, what we need is an entirely new ethics in the way we think about changing gender norms. Next, Dahl analyses implications of the expansion of China as an economic and political ‘super-power’. Subsequently, Field analyzes the ways in which the global spread of social media has influenced political movements such as the Arab Spring and ‘Kony 2012’. In his essay on the role of hegemony in a changing international order, Bryan agrees with Dahl that the expansion of rising powers does not go hand in hand with the emergence of a new global order and further claims that significant changes to current norms seem highly unlikely. In a response to the viral “Wealth Inequality in America” video, Karlowska warns that lack of public awareness about wealth inequality in the US can lead to a rise of ‘toxic’ elitism. Patricia Szarvas, freelance moderator and writer, analyses the ‘dark side’ of Germany’s much-vaunted social welfare reform known as “Hartz 4” and makes a case against exporting the German reform model. Finally, we present a joint interview on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in which Prof. Barakat and Dr. Bush from the University of York’s Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit criticize R2P for being yet another tool employed at the convenience of the West.

As always, we are grateful for the insightful contributions and we welcome all questions and comments which you can send to vox@clubofpep.org. Please find the Call for Papers for our next theme ‘ Religion in the Age of Reason’ on the back cover of this issue.

Dagmara Chwalowska and Manuel Holtmann Editors

Editorial Team Editors: Dagmara Chwalowska Manuel Holtmann Layout Editors: Widya Kumarasinghe Raphael Reuben 2

Sub-Editors: Viktor Rehart Lea Börgerding Phillip Jung Opemipo Akisanya

Reviewers: Thomas Tozer Oscar Stenbom Martin Kabrt Proof-reader: Jessica Orban Cover photo by Oxfam

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

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ISSUE XXII - AUTUMN 2013

contents

ESSAYS

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On the strenuous shaping of unwritten rules: changing gender norms Jessica Orban

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Beyond Hegemony: the survival of global norms in a changing international order Soran Dahl

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The rise of social media and its effect on political activism Tom Field

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The rise of autocracy: China in the liberal world Alex Bryan

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Wealth inequality, rising powers and development challenges Hanna Karlowska

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The dark side of the boom - Made in Germany Patricia Szarvas

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INTERVIEW The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ - A truly global norm?

Professor Sultan Barakat and Dr. Kenneth Bush

VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

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On the strenuous shaping of unwritten rules: changing global gender norms

By Jessica Orban In recent years, a majority of countries worldwide have introduced policies which aim at increasing measurable gender equality. Important progress has been achieved in areas such as women´s labour participation by means of e.g. establishing quotas, revision of legal frameworks to allow for the elimination of discriminatory inheritance laws, as well girls´ primary school enrolment in the developing world. Furthermore, international institutions have demonstrated increasing awareness of issues related to gender equality.

Between 2010 and 2012, the World Bank’s total share of lending operations that is gender-informed rose from 54% to 83%. However, it remains highly questionable whether these efforts have been followed by changes in our perceptions of and attitudes towards gender in general.

In the following, I will start by evaluating the links between gender equality, gender norms and development. I will take a closer look at the idea of changing gender norms in relation to cultural and societal context thereby demonstrating the complexity of norm formation and 4

change. To illustrate my point, I will then critically assess Inglehart and Norris’ thesis in Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World (2003), according to which a shift in global gender trends corresponds to processes of economic modernization. I will argue that while there might be correlations between economic modernization and progress in gender parity, it would be wrong to assert that this is sufficient in achieving noticeable shifts in global gender norms. I will therefore come to the conclusion that what we need is an entirely new ethics in the way we think about changing these norms by, for instance, paying greater attention to the role of local institutions.

In addressing the question of shifting gender norms on a global level, we are necessarily drawn back towards the more measurable question of global gender equality. With the beginning of the 1990s, the world witnessed a growing international focus on issues related to poverty as well as social and gender equality. A highly relevant example of this is the signing in 2000 of a UN Declaration by all member

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states and at least 23 international organizations that laid out a set of Millennium Development Goals to be reached by 2015. One of the eight key goals of this report was empowering women and promoting gender equality. Arguably, the growing awareness to the importance of gender issues has led to increasing equality of opportunities and chances.

Indeed, according to UNESCO’s World Atlas of Gender Equality in Education (2012), the number of female students worldwide enrolled in secondary education rose from below 200 million in 1970 to over 500 million in 2009. Moreover, academic literature on corporate social responsibility has increasingly shown sensitivity to gender issues and feminist perspectives resulting in steps towards more gender parity in the professional sphere.

However, achieving extensive gender parity doesn’t necessarily indicate that attitudes towards different sexes have become gender-neutral as well.

According to Seguino (2007), a defining character of norms is that they are embedded in social and individual consciousness. Since they are noticeable through attitudes and behaviours, the measure of their evolution across time and space is particularly difficult. The fact that they are informal and implicit rules indicates that they are elusive (World Bank, 2012). Changing

gender norms implies changing what is seen as acceptable behavioural boundaries for women and men in a given society. WomenWatch, the Directory of UN Resources on Gender Issues, argues that by overcoming stereotypical perceptions of “characteristically female and male” jobs, important steps towards alternating gender norms can be achieved (2013). However, shifts in attitudes toward gender roles do not occur in isolation. If, as explained above, gender refers to the socially constructed roles and learned behaviour of men and women, culture is critically important in shaping the predominant attitudes and values towards gender representation in any society. An understanding of how to change global gender norms, and not just gender parity policies, therefore rests upon a deeper understanding of how other social norms shape global civil society.

In Rising Tide, Inglehart and Norris attempt to identify correlations between shifts in attitudes towards sex roles and broader social, economic and cultural progress.

They argue that these shifts relate to a two-step modernization process. The first stage is the shift from agrarian to industrialized societies, which brings women into the paid workforce and gives them local political participation. The second stage is the shift from industrialised societies to 5

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post-industrialized ones, which enables women to rise in professions. Inglehart and Norris illustrate their thesis with reference to cross-national analysis of the correlations between economic development and variations in traditional vs. secular values, as well as in values of survival vs. self-expression.

They conclude “that modernization brings systematic, predictable, changes in attitudes toward gender roles” (Inglehart&Norris, 2003: 163).

Inglehart and Norris’ work is exemplified by a thorough empirical base. The depth of their research deserves without doubt appropriate merit. However, the risk in relying on this theory is that it suggests that economic development can enable not only perfect gender equality, but also an amelioration of our behaviours to sex roles towards more genderneutral ones. There are empirical inconsistencies with both these ideas. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Katar are about as rich as Sweden in per capita GDP, but women in these countries cannot even vote.

Alternatively, estimations have found that in many sub-Saharan countries which are still at what Inglehart and Norris would call the “agricultural stage”, women are “over-represented” in farming activities, and produce 80% of the food (OECD, 2011).

These findings could potentially suggest that agricultural societies are favourable to women’s positions in the 6

public sphere, and would contradict Inglehart and Norris’ core argument.

However, let it be said that the latter statistic about women’s role in agricultural activities does not imply that agricultural societies are necessarily favourable to the amelioration of the role of women. Indeed, in certain countries, gender parity policies have had more noticeable positive impacts in urban areas than in rural ones.

In South Africa, for example, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000) prohibits types of discriminations on the grounds of gender such as unequal access to opportunities by women as a result of sexual divisions of labour.

Yet, despite the enforcement of such laws, job opportunities have not increased in rural areas. According to the women’s focus group of Ngonyameni, Eastern Cape, these laws “only affect urban areas” of South African society (World Bank, 2012). While both these examples can potentially, for the first one, contradict Inglehart and Norris’ work, or for the second one, confirm it, we must be careful as to what conclusions we draw from them. While economic development and urbanization may in most cases be favourable to gender equality, thinking about shifts in global gender norms needs exploring the importance of wider and different societal, collective transformations.

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What societies worldwide lack is rather a completely fresh commitment to a new ethics in the way we approach the role of women. While policy instruments have been put into place in favour of reaching gender parity in agricultural activities, the knowledge we have of gender inequalities has not fully been put to use. A village man in Papua New Guinea states that “we understand that there are laws establishing the rights of women, but now, because of these laws, women try to control their husbands, which is not good” (World Bank, 2012).

Patriarchal forms of relations are still present in various societies worldwide.

In order to change gender norms, what is needed, is a greater emphasis on the role of local informal institutions such as family and kinship structures.

Focusing on local rather than international institutional change also enables not only a better targeting of interventions but also tracing of potential change in norms.

Moreover, current global gendermainstreaming policy instruments focus overwhelmingly on overcoming measurable barriers to gender equality rather than on discriminatory elements which are harder to quantify, namely focusing on mainstream perceptions of what a stereotypically “female” or “male job” really is. A good example of how to change static perceptions is the ProJoven vocational education program in Peru, which targets economically

disadvantaged youth groups with low chances of insertion into the formal labour market. It provides them with training and opportunity to acquire work experience. An evaluation of the program by the Inter-American Development Bank found that it had encouraged women to apply for jobs that weren’t traditionally “female”, but rather sectors that are traditionally dominated by men (Bernhardt, 2013). Emphasizing the importance of cultural contexts in changing static perceptions is also important. For example, R.T. Jenson, public policy professor at the UC Los Angeles, argues that the spread of cable television in India enabled media programs to expose their subjects to more progressive conceptions of gender norms, even though the women and men in contemporary television were still situated in local culture. The above examples suggest that establishing specific local targets for change in social and cultural contexts is very much favourable to a shift in what is seen as adequate behaviours for men and women, and therefore in gender norms.

To conclude, we have seen that gender inequalities are in a slow but constant process of decreasing in many parts of the world. It has been illustrated that this has accompanied efforts for economic development. However, although there exists a correlation between empirical evidence on economic development and gender 7

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parity, the nature of cultural and societal norms isn’t as straight-forward as scholars such as Inglehart aanddaa and Norris believe it to be. What is needed is greater attention to the role of informal institutions, cultural and social contexts, efforts on a community and individual level, and above all, patience, in shaping the way societies form their representations and attitudes around the role that women and men hold in contemporary societies.

Bibliography

Barnes, K.; Bouchama, N.; & Loiseau, E., Shifting wealth, shifting gender relations? Gender inequality and social cohesion in a converging world, Jan. 2011, OECD Development Centre

Inglehart, R. & Norris, P., Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World, 2003, Cambridge University Press

Seguino, S., Plus ça change?

Evidence on Global Trends in Gender Norms and Stereotypes, 2007, Feminist Economics

Bank Progress in Genderinformed Lending (FY10-12), Gender and Development, The World Bank; Accessible at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTGENDER/REsources/Monitoring_ resultsFY12.pdf

Bernhardt, J. Combating Discriminatory gender Norms is Smart Development Policy, July 23, 2013, Center for American Press; Accessible at: http:// www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy report/2013/07/23/70331/combatingdiscriminatory-gender-norms-is-smartdevelopment-policy 8

Commission on the Status of Women, Gender norms and stereotypes, socialization and unequal power relations, and sharing and balancing life-work responsibilities, March 2013; Accesible at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/ csw57/panels/panel4_moderators_summary. pdf

Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination – Act no 4 of 2000; Accessible at: http://www.westerncape.gov. za/text/2004/11/2003_eqc_brochure.pdf

Munoz Boudet, Ana Maria; Petesh, Patti; Turk, Carolyn; Thumala, Angelica, On Norms and Agency: Conversations about Gender Equality with Women and Men in 20 countries, 2012, The World Bank; Accessible at: http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/

USAID, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, March 2012; Accessible at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ PDACT200.pdf

World Atlas of Gender Equality in Education, 2012, UNESCO; Accessible at: http://www.unescodoc.unesco.org/ images/0021/002155/215522E.pdf

Jessica Orban is a Third Year Politics and International Relations Student at the University of York

Issue XXII - Autumn 2013

The rise of autocracy: China in a liberal world

By Soran Dahl The vast expansion of rising powers such as China and Brazil and the relative struggles of the US have led some analysts to conclude that the era of US global political dominance is beginning to fade. They argue that the unipolar international order is likely to be replaced by a multipolar international system characterised by the presence of a number of powerful states, rather than a single overwhelming behemoth (Florini, 2011:25). The supposed global power realignment raises a key question: what effect will a shift in the international order have on the global norms which have emerged over the past 100 years? Without the benefit of foresight we cannot hope to conclusively answer such a question but I aim to illuminate the debate about the future of the current norms regime. I begin by placing current international norms within a system of US hegemonic dominance and argue that the hegemonic nature of this rule is essential to current norms regimes. Secondly, I reject the claim that global hegemony is impossible in the modern world. Finally, I argue that the continued presence of the US as a world power makes significant change to current norms highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The predominant structures and insti-

tutions of international society were created in a historical period characterised in part by the overwhelming military, economic, cultural and political dominance of the United States.

It is therefore unsurprising that these structures and institutions reflect certain values that the United States is keen to promote, such as economic liberalism and individualism. Together they constitute an institutional hegemonic international order. The norms which have emerged within this international order must be seen as a product of these power dynamics. Human rights norms, humanitarian intervention norms (R2P), and chemical weapons norms (to name but a few) all in their own way either promote a specific worldview or allow the US to pursue its interests within a legitimating order; for instance, chemical weapons norms which aim to prevent states from attaining chemical weapons help to maintain a global US military dominance. It must also be noted that as a hegemon, the US is able to introduce and shape norms according to its strategic goals and to exempt itself from international norms and standards whenever it desires. For instance, it does this by maintaining chemical weapons arsenals, refusing to adopt the Rome Statue and recog-

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nise the International Criminal Court and also through military interventions, initiating ‘coalitions of the willing’ as seen in the Iraq intervention.

The key aspect of this order being hegemonic ‘is not simply a matter of the most powerful countries imposing international law on the rest. It is also a matter of the rest of the world internalizing the necessity and legitimacy of domination through law.’ (Rajagopal, 2006:771). Although we see anti-Americanism and dissatisfaction

able to secure a ‘worldwide triumph’ in its expansion due to its ‘universal appeal.’ (Zizek, 2009). And just as capitalism can transcend its historical origins, so too can norms. It is indeed the case that norms and values such as human rights and economic liberalism will, if universalised, broadly support the US’s foreign policy objectives.

Yet as the US becomes less overwhelmingly dominant, it is not clear whether the current norms will be sustained or instead be challenged by the other major actors shaping the new order. A

“One way in which the rising powers could potentially disassemble US hegemony and the US-supported global norms regime would be to establish their own global hegemony. ” with US foreign policy throughout the world, this is not usually translated into dissatisfaction with the existing international norms and order. For instance, the World Social Forum has been consistently critical of capitalism, globalization and US foreign policy over the past decade, but it mainly seeks to strengthen existing principles within the international system - such as democracy - rather than to overthrow it. The hegemon gives birth to or cultivates these norms but after being entrenched as norms they become independent of that hegemon.

A parallel can be drawn here with the process of European capitalism becoming global. Despite Capitalism’s humble European beginnings, it was 10

number of considerations come into play here. First, many of the emerging powers, particularly in Asia, have yet to take enthusiastically to the task of global governance. Florini (2011) notes that while there is an increased desire among Asian countries to be involved in global governance, it is not clear what approach they would take within such a system; Acharya argues that Asian nations so far have seen global governance to be within the task of self-governance, differing significantly from the Western conception of global governance (Acharya, 2011). We can see this in China’s refusal to sanction UN action against Syria, as it perceives such intervention to be an encroachment of sovereignty. We must also

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acknowledge that although the rising powers see themselves as different from the US, they have risen to prominence within a system of US hegemony, and have therefore experienced their successes within the current order. This is evident in the economic policies of nations like China and Brazil, which adjust themselves to, rather than radically challenge, US economic policy. For instance, Brazil had recently emerged as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in its attempts to reform the R2P norm, instead advocating for a ‘responsibility while protecting’ which would limit the use of force and enforce a chronological sequencing of the R2P pillars (Benner, 2013). As countries such as Brazil begin to impose themselves upon the existing system through which they have emerged as global powers, they might be loath to change it as long it is still allows them to pursue their objectives.

One way in which the rising powers could potentially disassemble US hegemony and the US-supported global norms regime would be to establish their own global hegemony. However, some political theorists, such as Agnew, question whether this is even theoretically conceivable. He argues that globalization is changing the nature of international power politics in such a way as to make global hegemonic control by any single power impossible (Agnew, 2005:viii). Globalization is fundamentally shifting the way in which people communicate and power

translates, placing an increasing emphasis on horizontal networks. These networks do not depend on political authority and are not constrained by territory unlike the hierarchical structures of order and authority which global powers have traditionally depended upon to exert their might. By this view, then, the US has built a world which has outgrown its creator; a world too rich and complex for a single nationstate to control. However, this view considerably underestimates the abiding political power of the nation-state, and mistakes the nature of hegemony.

The social importance of the nationstate may well have reduced for its citizens but its blunt power structures, though invisible, are still present and when governments exercise these power structures they remain hugely powerful. The development of globalization does not make the concept of hegemony an anachronism. In fact, I argue that it does the opposite, it strengthens its potential. Increased communications possibilities, liberalised markets and the increased advertising potential of the individual enable a genuinely global diffusion of power, making hegemony even more powerful in a globalized world than in one butchered with impassable borders.

Although future hegemony is theoretically possible, it is highly unlikely that any of the rising powers will want or be able to cultivate global hegemony 11

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in the conceivable future. The rising global powers have come of age in a US dominated world and are unlikely to want to radically alter the system that enabled them to prosper.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that any rising power will become more powerful than the US in the foreseeable future. It seems probable that the US will maintain its position as one of the dominant powers, if not the dominant power of the new international order.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, as well as a powerful economic and political force, it will continue to play a major role in world affairs. Its global cultural dominance in particular will help it maintain this power as other nations increase their economic and military

power. The ability of the US to wield its ‘soft power’ in the next few decades should remain strong, as nations which will increasingly rival the US in terms of ‘hard power’ have little experience in international cultural expansion.

For instance, US entertainment can continue to inculcate pro-US values around the world in spite of a relative decline in economic might. So, any attempts to radically alter existing norms will be met with strong, multi-headed US opposition. In continuing to promote its interests, it will maintain its support for current international norms which in turn support the US and the West in general. Most international norms ‘have their roots in the jurisprudence of European scholars of international law and in the notions

Photo by Agencia Brasi 12

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and patterns of acceptable behaviour established by the more powerful Western European states’(Nadelmann, 1990:484). It is a mistake to think these roots will wither while the soil from which they have grown remains as strong as it has ever been.

Bibliography:

strategy. Third World Quarterly, Vol 27(5), pp 767-783.

Patnaik, A. K. (2004). Gramsci today.

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 39(11), pp 13-19.

Zizek, S. (2009). Violence: six sideways reflections. London: Profile Books Ltd.

Acharya,A. (2011). Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century. International Affairs, Vol 87(4), pp 851-869.

Agnew, J. (2005). Hegemony: the new shape of global power. Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press.

Benner, T. (2013). Brazil as a norm entrepreneur: the “Responsibility While Protecting” initiative [Online]. Global Public Policy Institute GPPi Research Paper Series. Berlin: GPPi.

Clark, I. (2011). China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies?

International Affairs, Vol 87(1), pp 13-28.

Florini, A. (2011). Rising Asian powers and changing global governance.

International Studies Review, Vol 13, pp 24-33.

Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society. International Organization, Vol 44(4), pp 479-526.

Rajagopal, B. (2006). Counter-Hegemonic international law: rethinking human rights and development as a third world

Soran Dahl is a second- year PPE student at the University of York 13

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The rise of social media and its influence on political activism

By Tom Field This essay will consider how the growth of social media has influenced political movements. I will first establish that social media use has become the norm amongst a broad range of demographic groups. This has allowed it to play a prominent role in recent political movements, particularly the Arab Spring, by introducing a new avenue of political lobbying, e-democracy. The second section of this article will demonstrate that ‘petitioning’ nevertheless remains driven by traditionally politically active groups.

Furthermore, mass online movements, specifically ‘Kony 2012’, do not represent an end to this trend but instead engender a ‘clicktivist’ culture in which supporters often fail to engage in activism with a high utility cost, such as volunteering or protesting. Ultimately, I will conclude that poor participation poses an issue for social media’s use as a tool by activists but successful use of this medium by emerging groups of educated campaigners, as well as global trends in improving education and internet access, suggest hope for a more demographically inclusive online activism to develop.

The Growth and Globalisation of Social Media 14

Social media allows users to ‘create highly interactive platforms through which individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content’ (Kietzmann, et al., 2011:241) including social networking, wikis, and blogs. Internet use is becoming more widespread in both developed and developing countries (International Telecommunication Union. 2013) and the use of social media amongst a broader range of demographic groups has increased along with it. In the developed world, cheaper internet access and technological advances have seen a sharp rise in internet use from tablets and internet enabled TVs, particularly in the USA where increased use of portable technology has made accessing social networks the primary activity of US internet users (Neilson Holdings, 2012: 3-6). This has made social media use mainstream amongst a greater range of socio-economic and generational groups because of lower financial costs and social normalisation (Norman, 2010) which has resulted in social media sites making up many of the internet’s most visited sites (Alexa, 2013).

The global ‘digital divide’ created by a lack of internet access and technical expertise in the developing world is also

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being increasingly reduced. According to the European Travel Commission’s New Media Trend Watch most developing countries still have relatively poor high speed fixed Broadband connections (2013) but smart phones are mitigating this issue, with the number of mobile-broadband subscriptions in developing countries more than doubling from 2011 to 2013, and surpassing those in developed countries in 2013 (Ibid.). As in developed nations, much of the increased online activity is spent on social media (Nielson Holdings. 2011) and so considerable in scope that large businesses have made moves to capitalise on the emerging trend (KPMG, cited in Colpi, 2012).

Even China’s banning of Facebook and Twitter failed to curb the developing enthusiasm for microblogging that has seen 309 million Chinese signed on to the Twitter equivalent ‘Weibo’, even after several instances of their closure by government authorities. In summary, it appears social media’s spread by improvements in portable internet capable technology and lowering costs make it an important element in the lives of individuals who do not belong to traditional demographic groups, both in the developed and developing world.

The Positive Impact of Social Media on Political Movements The influence on such an extensive range of demographic groups has resulted in considerable consequences for political movements. Internet

technology’s ability to provide instantaneous communication offers an advantage not enjoyed by previous movements, especially during the incipient phase of insurgency when recruitment and incitement to action is so vital (Lindsey, 2013). The significance of this organisational tool has been recognised by the governments of many countries, including Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia (Duffy, et al. 2011:3), who have all tried to suspend internet access in recent years, and even the UK government, who considered limiting access to social networks and texting services during the 2011 riots (Cameron.

2011). Yet the rapid dissemination of information across borders is difficult to stop, as shown by the Arab Spring revolutions. By using servers abroad, as the Muslim Brotherhood did in London during the Tahrir Square protests, and the support of hacker communities like Anonymous and Telecomix crippling government operations through denial-of-service attacks and circumventing state firewalls, many revolutionaries were able to evade the state censor (Duffy, et al. 2011:8). It was this robustness that allowed revolutionary propaganda to continue stirring prospective supporters into action by linking them to Western news sites, such as the BBC and CNN, as well as spreading inspiring images and videos, or the ‘freedom meme’, which were captured on mobile phones (Ibid. 13).

In nations with more comprehensive internet censoring programs

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social media is still having a political impact. China’s Weibo has repeatedly adapted to avoid government closure, and through publicising the attempted cover-ups of incidents including the 2011 Wenzhou train collision and 2010 Shanghai fire, forced policy changes for health and safety in transport and construction, and in the former case, apologies from the Chinese Railways Minister. Ultimately, as social media is decentralised, less hierarchical than traditional means of lobbying, and has multiple points of production, it is particularly difficult for governments to control, with or without interference from external states or activists. Furthermore, even when such censoring is possible, the speed at which posts and images can go viral, as occurred with the 26 million online comments made on the Whenzhou train collision, makes it simply too difficult for authorities to censor without incensing citizens (Lafraniere & Wines. 2011). Though China’s new anti-rumour laws may curb protests the practicalities of enforcement, given the nature of social media and large numbers of online activists, suggest its impact will only hinder, not end, the use of social media as a political tool.

Social Media and Meaningful Engagement The above examples show how social media is now used by a broader range of groups and has advanced, or has 16

the potential to advance, considerable political change. Nevertheless, its success in motivating traditionally less politically active groups is less evident.

Many of the groups prompting reform in the above movements are demographics already known for political activism. The majority of Chinese on the country’s more politically active Weibo, Sina Weibo, consist of a developing educated middle class (Ibid.

2011); the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were also driven by an emergent, young, urban, and well-educated class (Duffy, et al. 2011:2). Similarly, the US’s major growth in political activity on social networking sites between the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections was found once again to be stimulated by the well-educated and financially well-off (Smith, 2013:4-5). Therefore, it appears that though social media use has become more common amongst certain groups political activism across them has not. Though some scholars argue the diverse mass membership of many online campaigns are both politically active and productive (PeñaLópez. 2013:347-8), these movements are often viral and have a membership which only gives spurious support.

Ultimately, social networks are often only effective at increasing limited participation, as they lessen the level of motivation that contribution requires whilst still providing a feel good factor.

Research by Colding-Jorgensen suggests that this support for online move-

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ments is common because they allow us to construct an online persona for ourselves (cited in Hesse: 2009), a persona often created implicitly through the kind of campaigns and groups people join (Zhao, Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008:1824-6). This makes it difficult to evaluate individual contributions to online groups and allows ‘clicktivists’ to free ride by being affiliated to movements without actually contributing to them (Morozov, 2009). It is this clicktivist culture that has seen the failure of movements like ‘Kony 2012’, which faded into obscurity after the lack of participation in its ‘Cover the Night’ campaign (Carroll. 2012), as well as the low donations received from many social networking campaign groups relative to their actual online membership (Gladwell, 2010).

Concluding Thoughts The impact of social media on political activism is huge, yet still has some way to go. The decline of the digital divide, as exclusivity of online access based on wealth and technical expertise diminishes, has allowed social media to become a part of the day-to-day lives of hundreds of millions of people. This global rise has allowed politically active groups to influence policy making by adding a further dimension to traditional pressure groups and lobbying, with the decentralized nature and multiple points of production for social media enabling a new form of political action, cyberactivism or ‘hacktivism’, to develop (Fernández-Prados cited in Peña-López, 2013:345-6). Though the successes of Chinese Weibo, the Arab Spring, and other contemporary move-

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ments have at times been sporadic, there have nevertheless been achievements, as politically active groups have been able to spread awareness of their causes and influence the policy of even non-democratic governments.

As such, even though clicktivism remains an issue for realising many political goals, there is every indication, especially with global improvements in education and internet access, that the size of the politically active online class is only set to grow.

Bibliography: Alexa: The Web Information Company. (2013). Top Sites: The Top 500 Sites on the Web. [online] Available at: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global;0 [Accessed: 08/09/13]

Cameron, D. (2011). PM statement on disorder in England. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-on-disorder-in-england [Accessed 02/11/13]

Carroll, R. (2012). Kony 2012 Cover the Night fails to move from the internet to the streets. The Guardian 21 April 2012. [online] Available at: http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ apr/21/kony-2012-campaign-uganda-warlord [Accessed 03/11/2013] Colpi, M.B. (2012) Oxford Business Group: Increase in Social Media use in Emerging Markets. Totally Communications. 1 November 2012. [online] Available at: http://www.totallycom18

munications.com/news/oxford-businessgroup-increase-in-social-media-use-inemerging-markets/ [Accessed 08/09/13]

Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Howard, P.N., Hussain, M, Mari, W. & Mazaid, M. 2011. (2013).

Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? Seattle: Project on Information Technology and Political Islam.

[Online] Available at: http://pitpi.org/ wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2011_ Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-MariMazaid_pITPI.pdf [Accessed: 07/09/13]

European Travel Commission New Media Trend Watch. (2013). Broadband Access. [online] Available at: http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/world-overview/102broadband-access [Accessed: 10/09/13] Gladwell, M. (2010). Annals of Innovation: Small Change.

The New Yorker October 4, 2010 [online] Available at: http:// w w w. n e w y o r k e r. c o m / repor ting/2010/10/04/101004fa_ fact_gladwell?currentPage=1 [Accessed 09/09/13]

Grasmuck, S., Martin, J., & Zhao, S. (2008). Identity construction on Facebook: Digital empowerment in anchored relationships. Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 24, Issue 5, September 2008, Pages 1816–1836

Hermkens, K ., Kietzmann, J.H., McCarthy, I.P., & Silvestre, B.S. (2011).

Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media. Business Horizons, Volume 54,

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Hesse, M. (2009). Facebook Activism: Lots of Clicks, but Little Sticks.

Washington Post, July 2nd 2009. [online] Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103936. html [Accessed: 07/09/13]

International Telecommunication Union.

(2013). Key 2006-2013 ICT data for the world, by geographic regions and by level of development. [online] Available at: http:// www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/ stat/default.aspx [Accessed: 02/11/13]

Lafraniere, S., & Wines, M. (2011). In Baring Facts of Train Crash, Blogs Erode China Censorship. New York Times, July 28, 2011. [online] Available at: http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/world/ asia/29china.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=1& [Accessed: 08/09/13]

Lindsey, R.A. (2013). What the Arab Spring Tells Us About the Future of Social Media in Revolutionary Movements. Small Wars Journal, July 29, 2013. [online] Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-thefuture-of-social-media-in-revolutionarymovements#_edn1 [Accessed 10/09/13]

Morozov, E. (2009). From Slacktivism to Activism. Foreign Policy.

September 5, 2009 [online] Available at: http://neteffect.foreignpolicy. com/posts/2009/09/05/from_slacktivism_to_activism [Accessed: 08/09/13]

Neilson Holdings. (2011). Connecting and Engaging with Digital Indian Con-

sumers. [online] Available at: http://www. nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2011/connecting-and-engaging-with-digital-indianconsumers.html [Accessed: 07/09/13]

Neilson Holdings. (2012). The Social Media Report, State of the Media: 2012. New York: USA. [online] Available at: http://www.nielsen.com/ content/dam/corporate/us/en/reportsdownloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Media-Report-2012.pdf [Accessed: 08/09/13]

Norman, J. (2010). Boomers Joining Social Media at Record Rate. CBS News. November 16, 2010 [online] Available at: http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2010/11/15/national/ main7055992.shtml [Accessed: 09/09/13]

Peña-López, I. (2013). Casual Politics: From slacktivism to emergent movements and pattern recognition. In Balcells, J., Cerrillo i Martínez, A., Peguera, M., PeñaLópez, I., Pifarré de Moner, M.J. & Vilasau, M. (Coords.), Big Data: Challenges and Opportunities. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 25-26 June, 2013. Barcelona: UOC. recognition.pdf Smith, A. (2013) Civic Engagement in the Digital Age. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. [online] Available at: http:// pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/CivicEngagement.aspx [Accessed 08/09/13]

Tom Field is a third-year Philosophy and Politics student studying at the University of York 19

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

The rise of autocracy: China in a liberal world

By Alex Bryan “China is a sleeping giant” Napoleon said, “… when she awakes she will move the world”. Two centuries later, the prediction unmistakably holds true. Indeed, the question no longer centers on if China will rise, but rather the implications this will have on the international community.

The present international system was designed under the leadership of the United States and aims to establish global order through means of multilateral rules and institutions uniting states in the pursuit of mutual benefit in a free global economy. At the core of the current international system is the prevalence of a shared rule of law among states and the predominance of global free market ideals such as free trade and equal access. In this respect, our contemporary world order is a distinctly liberal one. A common assumption holds that economic liberalism naturally leads to political liberalisation and democracy. Accordingly, the liberal world order provides ideal conditions for the global proliferation of political rights. Thus, Francis Fukuyama famously declared - as communism fell and global capitalism ensued - “The End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989). Yet history progressed, and the optimism faded. Today, the expansion 20

of China’s power is perceived by many as a threat to the liberal world order, and the future appears uncertain.

At the same time, the US’ legitimacy in their role as the world’s sole remaining hegemon has eroded rapidly following the aggressive foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration, aggravating talk of an American Empire in literature. Besides its negative connotations, the term arguably also predicts the fall of the US as the last in a string of casualties of inevitable imperial demise. According to hegemonic stability theory (HST), a single dominant state is required to maintain stability in the international political order. Subsequently, HST anticipates the demise of the present world order as China’s power grows and American hegemony abates. In contrast to HST, this essay argues that the liberal world order does not depend solely on the US as a stabilizing hegemon, and that it is indeed in China’s interest to maintain it. However, while the rise of China does not pose an existential threat to the existing order, it does endanger the global proliferation of political liberty.

According to liberal institutionalist theory, the current world order is based on international cooperation

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for the mutual benefit of states. Following this line of thought, the multilateral institutions it consists of, put constraints on the actions of member states, thus reducing transaction costs and uncertainty in the global community. In the same way as actors in a domestic economy rely on a degree of consistency in the circumstances under which they operate, states depend on regularity in the norms governing the global economy. Besides providing such conditions, multilateral institutions also create an environment in which state actors convene in informal contact and communication. As transgovernmental relationships are formed, the basis is laid for further cooperation in world politics as policy makers are provided with high-quality information about the likely actions of other governments (Keohane, 2005:101).

The liberal world order, therefore, facilitates trans-governmental relations that are indispensable when engaging in foreign affairs; the opportunity cost of operating outside it is simply much higher than the benefits (Keohane, 2005: 102).

When the authority of principles favouring a closed and planned economy died with Mao in the late 1970’s, Chinese policy makers increasingly saw the above benefits of opening up (some) industries to the global market. As a part of the 1980’s economic reforms that fuelled the Chinese economy, the country joined the World Bank, the

IMF, and the GATT. Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that China has been economically successful because of the liberal world order, not despite of it.

“As a part of the 1980’s economic reforms that fuelled the Chinese economy, the country joined the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT. Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that China has been economically successful because of the liberal world order, not despite of it.”

Thus, it immediately seems inconsistent for Chinese policy makers to desire any radical change in its design. For example, significant investment from the United States and Europe has been crucial to the unprecedented development of China’s economy (Ikenberry, 2011:6). In this regard, liberal institutions have played an important role in the economic growth of China. Within a year of the country’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China saw an increase in the inflow of foreign direct investment by 30% (Boden, 2012). At the same time, China is looking outwards for trade and investment opportunities, and as the economy grows, she will encounter protectionist regimes 21

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

“... the persistence of the liberal world order relies on its capacity to promote the common interests of states. Within it, economic gain comes from cooperation rather than subjugation, meaning that the success of one state does not depend on the misfortune of another. In other words, economic disputes are not zero-sum. However, power struggles are: ... ”

in slow growing economies. Consequently, China will, and does, rely on multilateral institutions and rules providing non-discrimination and equal access (Ikenberry, 2011:6). China is already deeply involved in this system with 30% of its GDP consisting of exports, and liberal industrial countries are its most significant trading partners (Trading Economics, 2013). In 2012, nearly 40% of China’s exports went to the US and the EU alone (U.S. Global Investors, 2012).

In light of the obvious advantages provided by the liberal world order, the tremendous amount of resources that would go into replacing it provides sufficient reason not to do so (Keohane, 2005:102). Order building and maintenance is expensive as is well demonstrated by the US’ huge military budget making up 39% of global military spending (Sipri, 2013). Furthermore, the resources invested in shaping the institutions of the present system cannot be recovered. So the demolition 22

of the existing order and the creation of a new one must be more profitable than to simply comply with the current rules and principles for there to be any incentive to do so (Keohane, 2005:102). Rather than replacing it, then, it is more likely that China takes on a more leading position within the existing order. Results of American leadership range from the primacy of the dollar as the international reserve currency to the persistent bias of international institutions towards a certain kind of liberal democratic government. IMF and World Bank lending for example, entail conditions of developing “good governance”. That there is an aspiration in China for assuming a more significant role in the global community is already evident as China’s official press agency, Xinhua, recently called for a de-Americanized world, and a new international reserve currency (Roberts, 2013).

As we have seen, the persistence of the liberal world order relies on its capac-

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ity to promote the common interests of states. Within it, economic gain comes from cooperation rather than subjugation, meaning that the success of one state does not depend on the misfortune of another. In other words, economic disputes are not zero-sum.

However, power struggles are: “Anything that increases A’s power over B necessarily decreases B’s power over A” (Brilmayer, 1994:12). In this respect “China is shrinking the West” (Halper, 2010: xi). While the growth of China’s capacity to challenge US supremacy will not cumulate in a radical restructuring of the rules and institutions that presently dominate world politics, the growing presence of China will potentially undermine the ability of American policy makers to shape the international agenda. Apart from the shared advantage of maintaining the liberal world system, an ideological divide still exists between the East and West, and it is likely to grow ever more evidently with the further diffusion of global power.

China’s influence is already observable though it is emanating from “soft” power rather than coercion and force.

Following the rapid growth of China’s economy, the Chinese version of autocratic state-directed capitalism has become a model of admiration for developing states in Asia, Africa and South America. At the same time, China has become rich enough to provide a new source of financial assistance and

economic development for developing countries, and does so without the conditions of political liberalization that is generally a condition of Western aid (Halper, 2010:76). Moreover, by providing access to its growing markets, China offers developing countries an alternative route into the world market allowing them to bypass Western demands so that they no longer have to choose between emulating the Western model of democratic government and rejecting capitalism (Halper, 2010:209). This allows developing countries to remain self-legislating and autonomous, something that is especially appealing to former colonies who often regard Western interference as intrusive and fundamentally neo-colonial in nature. Together, the emergence of China as a centre of economic autonomy and the growing appeal of authoritarian capitalism has been conceptualized as components of an on-going “autocracy promotion” rivalling the promotion of democracy by the West (Burnell, 2010:6). Rather than being an active crusade to spread authoritarianism, the phenomenon emanates from the unwillingness of a sizeable power to take part in democratization and its consistent press for national autonomy.

Meanwhile, the Chinese model of autocratic capitalism enjoys recognition.

Freedom House’s annual survey found that democracy has declined on a global basis for seven consecutive years, the 23

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Photo by Tom Brewster

longest streak in 60 years (Freedom House, 2013:1). Countries like the Philippines and Malawi are losing faith that democracy and economic development necessarily go hand in hand, while autocratic states like Rwanda have enjoyed immense economic growth and decrease in corruption without the proliferation of political liberties. In addition, Russia is shifting ever further away from democracy, and despite the eastward movement of global power, only a few East Asian countries are truly democratic.

With these developments we enter a time with cause for both confidence that the liberal world order will persist, and dismay that it might not look as we thought it would. A central question of political economy considers the relation between capitalism and democracy. Intuitively, the two seem incompatible; the former naturally 24

produces differences while the latter in principle is egalitarian (Iversen, 2006:1). Yet, for a long time history suggested that they are most successful when appearing together. As China and other authoritarian capitalist states achieve economic growth in the liberal world order, however, this view is questioned. Unlike the Cold War, the challenge of the current shift of global power from West to East is not one of survival. The liberal democratic West can exist in a pragmatic relationship with China and other authoritarian capitalist states, and achieve mutual economic benefit through cooperation in the liberal world order. However, a worldwide promotion of democracy and political freedoms will require an active presence and this is where EastWest interests will inevitably collide in the future.

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Bibliography: Boden, G., (2012) “China’s Accession to the WTO: Economic Benefits,” The Park Place Economist: Vol. 20, Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol20/iss1/8 Brilmayer, L., 1994. American hegemony: political morality in a one-superpower world.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

Burnell, P., 2010. Is there a new autocracy promotion? In: FRIDE, [online] Available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/748/ is-there-a-new-autocracy-promotion> Freedom House, 2013. Freedom in the World 2013. [pdf] Washington DC: Freedom House. Available at: <http://www. freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20 2013%20Booklet_0.pdf>

ed. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Political Exconomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ch. 33 – available at: <http://www.people. fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/DemocracyCapitalism.pdf> Keohane, R. O., 2005. After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Roberts, D,. 2013. China’s State Press Calls for ‘Building a de-Americanized World’.

Businessweek, [online] 14 October. Available at <http://www.businessweek.com/ articles/2013-10-14/chinas-state-press-callsfor-building-a-de-americanized-world> [Accessed at 28 October 2013] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2013. Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Stockholm: SIPRI

Fukuyama, F., 1989. The End of History?, The National Interest, [online] Available at: <http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf >[Accessed 15 September 2013]

Trading Economics, 2013. China Export.

[Online] Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/exports> [Accessed at 13 September 2013]

Halper, S., 2010. The Beijing consensus: how China’s authoritarian model will dominate the twentieth century. New York: Basic Books.

U.S. Global Investors, 2012, Unmasking the Asian Giant. [Online] Available at: <http://www.usfunds.com/investor-library/ frank-talk/category/topics/china-india-asia/ link

Ikenberry, J., 2011. The Future of the Liberal World Order, Foreign Affairs, [online] Available at: < http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/ zselden/coursereading2011/Ikenberrylib. pdf> [Accessed 10 September 2013] Iversen, T., 2006. Capitalism and Democracy, in Wittmann, A. D, and Weingast, B. R.,

Alex Bryan is a third-year Philosophy and Politics student at the University of York 25

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Wealth Inequality, Rising Powers and Development Challenges

By Hanna Karlowska

A YouTube video on American perception of who has money and how much of it has recently awakened a heated debate. The video presents statistics which indicate that the poor and middle classes have a lot less than most people think. More precisely, as of 2012, the bottom 50% of Americans own only 0.5% of the country’s wealth while the top 1% hold nearly 50% of it. The video, which has been viewed more than 10 million times, draws heavily on the wealth inequality work of Micheal Norton and Dan Ariely, professors at Harvard Business School and Duke’s Fuqua School of Business, respectively. The duo asked Americans how they thought wealth was distributed, and found that the estimated and ideal divisions of wealth bear little resemblance to reality.

The video has been widely criticised by many economists. Forbes’ analyst Tim Worstall regards the claim as a ‘fallacy’ and an inaccurate, static representation of the true domestic distribution of wealth. He also disregards the analysis for its simplicity and popcultural approach (Worstall, 2013).

Similarly, in his article “In response to 26

the viral ‘Wealth Inequality in America’ video”, Mark Perry (2013) criticises the video for not taking into consideration current efforts in combating this imbalance, and for neglecting to factor in any sort of social mobility. In fact, their advocacy for recognizing efforts to resolve the issue of wealth inequality reinforces its severity. What ‘The Inequality of Wealth in America’ does successfully is stimulate critical debate regarding unequal distribution of wealth in the US, whether $10 trillion to $70 trillion is an accurate distribution or not. What is interesting and significant are the implications of this imbalance in regards to power ‘as residing in relationships between social and economic groups’ (Cox, Furlong and Page, 1986:16). The video also raises questions on the lack of awareness in American society. What happens when the US population do not realise that the top 1% own 50% of the country’s wealth? This lack of public awareness about the true state of play, the direction of movement in the distribution, and the implied endowment of power, can lead to the rise of elitism and thus to development challenges.

What is the relationship between

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wealth and power? To avoid confusion, let us make sure we fully understand these two different terms. Wealth refers to the value of everything people own, with the subtraction of what they owe. However, for purposes of economic and power studies, the main focus is on ‘marketable assets’, such as real estate, stocks and bonds, leaving aside consumer durables like cars and household items because they are not as readily converted into cash and are more valuable to their owners than they are for resale (Wolf, 2004). Power, in socio-political sense, can be considered as an ability or capacity to realise wishes, or reach goals, even in the face of opposition (Wrong, 1995). Some definitions refine this point to say that power involves Individual A or Group A affecting Individual B and Group B—“in a manner contrary to B’s interest”, which then imposes a discussion of “interest”, and quickly transgresses into the realm of philosophy (Cox, 1986; Lukes, 2005:30). Leaving those discussions for philosophers, let us return to the question on the relation of wealth to power proposed by Cox. Firstly, wealth can be considered as a “resource” that is useful in exercising power. That seems like an obvious observation when we think of voluminous donations to political parties, payments to lobbyists, and grants to experts who are employed to construct policies beneficial to the wealthy. For instance, Microsoft has a long history

of political contribution, donating a total of $24 million since 1988 (McIntyre and Hess, 2012). Moreover, Bill Gates, the company’s chairman and the wealthiest individual in the United States (Forbes, 2013), has exclusively contributed smaller, incremental donations directly to party groups and candidates, rather than providing PACs with large contributions. In addition to Gates, CEO Steve Ballmer has made more than 20 political contributions ranging from $1,000 to $15,000. Donations from these and other employees accounted for 67% of the money raised in the present election cycle (McIntyre and Hess, 2012).

According to Pareto (1966), the concept of the ‘elite’ derives from the notion of inequality of distribution of qualities, good or bad, that guarantee power. In this sense, the top 1% of Americans who hold nearly 50% of the wealth can be considered an ‘elite’, which connotes a looser grouping of individuals, each exercising power and playing central roles in an organised society. In the case of the United States, the rise of influence of the top 1% leads to the formation of elitism, which is likely to be harmful to democracy as the group of the wealthiest contributes to politics. For instance, the dependence of presidential campaigns on a handful of billionaires can interfere with free and just elections.

What about the rest of the society? If they are unconscious of the true distri27

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

bution of wealth then one may disregard whether they are further aware of the implication this has on the ability for democracy to function equitably.

Instead of initiating policies, or even controlling those who govern them, the citizens become passive spectators, cheering heroes, but taking little or no direct part in political action. As a result, the control of their destinies has fallen into the hands of the elite.

Although not included in the video, income distribution can also be used as a power indicator. According to Wolf (2012), the top 1% of income earners received 17.2% of the total income in 2009. Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s an increase from 12.8% for the top 1% in 1982. This substantial jump parallels what is happening with wealth distribution. This is further supported by the inference that the power of the corporate community and the number of the wealthiest group has been increasing in recent decades.

The degree of income inequality in the United States can be compared to that in other countries on the basis of the Gini coefficient, a mathematical ratio that allows economists to put all countries on a scale with values that range from zero (everyone in the country has the same income) to 100 (one person in the country has all of the income).

On this widely used measure, the United States ends up 95th out of the 134 countries that have been studied, next to Iran, Mexico and Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;all of which are presently recognized as 28

developing countries (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).

From the data a question on a development problem arises. According to Edward Muller (1988), income inequality and democratic stability could simply be a reflection of a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development. He found that high income inequality may have negative impact on the level of democracy by casing a reduction of democracy in a country that is supposedly highly democratic. In the case of the United States, it can be evident in the Democracy Index. The country has declined in ranking over the past two years from place 19 down to 21 (Democracy Index 2011; Democracy Index, 2012).

It is undeniable that the United States is not on a same development level as Brazil. However, if such countries face an income inequality and development problems today, it also may be the case of the United States in the future.

The Youtube video on wealth Inequality in the United States provides a good lesson on the modern world.

The imbalance between the top and the bottom is critical in the context of power, democracy and development.

If American society perceives national wealth as equally distributed, it presumably does not have knowledge of who is holding power and of the problem of increasing elitism. This lack of public awareness articulates how power can affect the quality of modern democracy. Moreover, the economic

Issue XXII - Autumn 2013

imbalance between groups may also lead to a reduction of democracy in a country and thus to development challenges. The current discussion does not only apply to the United States, but also to other countries. For instance, Brazil is also symptomatic of the economic imbalance described, and is by many considered as a flawed democratic country which still faces development challenges. However, in contrast to Americans, Brazilian society realises that the economic imbalance is a problem. It can be evident in demonstrations held in Rio de Janeiro this summer.

Despite the criticism it can be argued that the video and, more importantly, the response it has received,

have been of some benefit. While it is important to carefully consider the accuracy of the information, the real problem lies not in the exact figure of existing inequality, but the contrast between the actual and perceived scenarios in the minds of an average American, while they still have the democratic capability to influence the change. If the current inequality and the consequent consolidation of power are allowed to perpetuate without increased awareness, then it is plausible that the power to influence change has been lost to the majority of the population before the problem is even realised.

Photo by Troy McCullough

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VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy Bibliography: Acemoglu, Daron; James A. Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, A., Furlong, P. and Page, E. (1985). Power in capitalist society. Brighton : Wheatsheaf.

Central Intelligence Agency (2010).

World Factbook: Country Comparison: Distribution of family income - Gini index. [Online] Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/ rankorder/2172rank.html [Accessed 26 October 2010].

Democracy index 2011: Democracy under stress. (2011). Economists Intelligence Unit. [Online]. Available at: https://www. eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campai gnid=DemocracyIndex2011 [Accessed: 20 December 2011].

Democracy index 2012: Democracy at a standstill. (2012). Economist Intelligence Unit. [Online]. Available at: https://www. eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campai gnid=DemocracyIndex1214 [Accessed: 24 March 2013].

Forbes (2013). The Forbes 400. The Richest People in America. [Online] Forbes.

Available at: http://www.forbes.com/ forbes-400/list/ [Accessed September 2013].

Mark, J. P. (2013). In response to the viral ‘Wealth Inequality in America’ video. [Online]. Last updated: 8 March 2013. Available at: http://www. aei-ideas.org/2013/03/in-response-tothe-viral-wealth-inequality-in-americavideo/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_ medium=feed&utm_ campaign=Feed%3A+aei-ideas%2 Fposts+%28AEIdeas+Posts%29&u 30

tm_content=Google+Reader/. [Accessed 23 October 2013].

McIntyre, A. D. and Hess, M. E. (2012). 10 Companies making the biggest political donations: 24/7 Wall St. [Online]. Last updated: 7 February 2012.

Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2012/07/02/corporate-politicaldonations_n_1644375.html. [Accessed 7 February 2012].

Pareto, V. (1966). Sociological writings.

London: Pall Mall Press.

Wealth Inequality in America (2012).

Wealth Inequality in America. [online].

Available at: http://www.youtube.com/ watch ?v=QPKKQnijnsM#t=296. [Accessed 20 November 2012].

Wolff, E. N. (2004). Changes in household wealth in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. Working Paper No. 407. Annandaleon-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.

Wolff, E. N. (2012). The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class. New York: New York University.

Worstall, T. (2013). The problem with the wealth inequality in America Video.

It commits Worstall’s Fallacy. [Online].

Last updated: 3 September 2013. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/ timworstall/2013/03/09/the-problem-withthe-wealth-inequality-in-america-videoit-commits-worstalls-fallacy/. [Accessed 3 September 2013].

Wrong, D. (1995). Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (Second ed.). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Hannah Karlowska is a thirdyear History and Sociology student at the University of York

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The dark side of the boom - Made in Germany Why Europe should not follow the example of Germany’s crisis management Patricia Szarvas is a freelance moderator, executive media coach and writer.

For over 14 years she was a financial journalist and anchor of CNBC TV based in London and has moderated a variety of Economic and Political Forums, such as the WEF in Davos and the Euro Finance Week in Frankfurt.

Analysing Germany’s much-vaunted social welfare and labor market reform known as “Hartz 4”, Szarvas makes a case against exporting the German reform model. Shedding light on the ‘dark side’ of Germany’s economic success story, she warns us of the consequences of increased ‘social injustice’, posing a threat to the country’s’ long term socio-economic wellbeing.

As a notorious caffeine and news junky, the first thing I do in the mornings, is to sit down with a mug of freshly brewed coffee and my i-pad to scan the news. On one such morning, I stumbled over a Bloomberg article with the title: ‘Merkel’s working poor pose election-year dilemma as divide grows’ (Bloomberg, 2013). Hang on I thought, can poverty really be an issue in a rich country such as Germany?

How can that be possible, if – as we all know - Germany is Europe’s strongest economy, boasting its lowest unem-

ployment rate since World War II. How does the “Engine of European Growth“ image of Germany fit in with such a profound poverty problem?

Somewhat shocked and confused I read on: in 2011 about 13 million people -that is almost every 1 in six - hovers on the brim of poverty (DeStatis, 2012). The number increased from the year before by 0.3% to about 16.1% of the population. In the past 20 years, poverty in Germany as measured by relative income levels has increased.

Did you think it possible that one in nine children in Germany suffer from poverty, lacking regular warm meals, adequate clothing and have no equal asses to education? In OECD comparison, Germany holds place 14. That is worse than Hungary (8th place) and the Czech Republic (13th). In contrast, only 2.7 percent of children live in poverty in Denmark, Sweden and Norway (lowest OECD poverty levels).

Touched by what I read, I dug deeper. In its latest country note (OECD, 2008), the OECD stated that ‘since 2000, income inequality and poverty have grown faster in Germany than in any other OECD country’. They increased by more in five years (20002005) than in the previous 15 years31

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combined (1985-2000). And it seems that, despite its employment boom reducing unemployment from about 12% in 2000 by about half today – not much has changed. As its latest study in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Stiftung showed, Germany lags other OECD countries especially in social justice (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011): ‘Among the 31 members of the OECD, Germany ranks 15th -- only mid-field -- when it comes to the areas of poverty reduction, educational access, employment, social cohesion, social equality and intergenerational justice’.

My research took me on a journey of incredible stories about people who, despite having a job, don’t make enough to live on. Visiting foodbanks, such as ‘die Tafel’ and the so called ‘Suppenküchen’ (Soup Kitchen), I saw whole families cueing up for a warm meal. These are not just the homeless.

In fact many of them are families with children, single mums as well as many of the elderly; all tip toeing on the brim of poverty. It is sometimes objected that a poor person in Somalia would love to be a poor person in Germany, as it must seem like a life in luxury to them. However, while any definition of poverty is presumably to some point arbitrary, it is important that the benchmark used coincides with the social poverty norms, i.e. the common understanding of what it means to be poor (World Bank, 2011). German poverty is thus limited to and defined by its country borders and it therefore makes only limited sense to consider 32

poverty in absolute terms. In the case of Germany that means: a person who has less than 60% of the median net income available is at the edge of poverty. So, if you are a single, living alone and earning less than 980.00- Euro net a month, you are defined as poor.

What lies behind Germany’s persistent poverty risk, so much at odds with its economic ‘power house’ image?

Furthermore, how can we justify and explain the phenomenon of ‘the working poor’, i.e. people who in the stats count as employed, yet do not earn enough to live on, which has recently gained momentum.

“Agenda 2010” and its ambivalent consequences My research, involving interviews with top economists such as Prof.

Hans Werner Sinn (IFO) or Prof. Marcel Fratzscher (DIW), political figures such as former Bundeskanzler Dr. Gerhard Schröder and his former Federal Minister of the Interior Dr. Otto Schily, as well as real life stories recounted by people struck by poverty, point to an interesting picture.

In 2005 the reform under Schröder’s “Agenda 2010” merged and actually cut the standing unemployment benefits for long-term unemployed, cut welfare benefits, and reduced the duration of unemployment benefits.

The social welfare and labor market reform known as “Hartz 4” was the largest inGerman history (Launov and Wälde, 2013). Since its implementation, employment boomed (unemployment halved from a historic high

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of over 12% to its current level), but at the same time atypical work relationships such as mini-jobs, temp, part-time and flex-work ballooned. As a result of that Germany now has one of the biggest low-wage sectors in the world, with over 1.3 million people receiving subsidies because they earn too little to live on. Unions and the social democrats point a finger at the private sector. It has exploited the reforms, kept wages as low as possible and never really transformed atypical work, such as short time and temp work, into full time employment to bolster profitability and competitiveness.

Sociologists warn that ‘social injustice’ including child-and youth poverty as well as old-age poverty, poses a distinct threat for Germany’s long term socio-economic well-being, such as political extremism (note that the Anti-Euro party “AFD” which is commonly positioned on the far-right of the German political scale almost made it into Parliament last September), voter boycotting, violence, aggression and crime. Increasing poverty risk implies that people fall back relative to others and are limited in their social participation which might also lead to social unrest.

The case against the German Model Doubts about the actual long term benefits of the Agenda 2010 start to creep up. Whilst some of its effects seem positive, the end game might arguably have more losers than winners.

Ultimately, the underemployed quickly lose acceptable living conditions and societal status, the government spends additional tax Euros to support the low-income sector and the long term unemployed. Plus, additional costs for public services such as the police and prisons rise with increased petty crime rates (although the case for a causality is not straight-forward, admittedly).

It seems the private sector is the real winner of the reforms, allowing them to hire and fire according to market demand, pay the lowest possible wages (as Germany does not have a statutory minimum wage yet) and thus increase productivity, profitability and competitiveness. Yet appearances are deceiving! Even the private sector is at risk of losing out if the level of low wage earners and socio-economic equality does not shift to the better. For Germany’s economic long term health, a solid domestic market is of crucial importance. Its export strength exposes it to and makes it dependent on the global economic health. A buffer for that vulnerability is a strong domestic market. This, however, is a challenge yet to be faced as long as the current system allows for an ever increasing rift between the haves and the haves-nots.

To what extend does the Agenda 2010 - with its often ignored “dark side” – hence pose a potential threat to the country? Which parts should be fine-tuned, changed or just totally abolished? How should ‘Agenda 2020 or 2030’ look like to insure a reduction in socio-economic inequality and 33

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poverty?

This is an especially delicate and important question to ask since we all observed the German government recommending other European countries to follow its reform example in order to overcome the (debt) crisis. Alarm bells set of in my head! Should Europe really follow this invitation to ‘copy and paste’ the German reform template.

Increased hostility towards our newly re-elected Chancellor in most of the PIIG countries may to some extent be justified and forward looking after all!

There are as many views as minds about this topic and the evaluation of Germany’s labor market reforms and adjustments of the public transfer system remains highly controversial.

Debates about statutory minimum wages, a cap on temp. and part-time work, equality in the education, and pension system are bubbling away and need to come up with a constructive reform path sooner rather than later.

The dark side of the boom is starting to gain momentum. Future policies and reform alignment need to narrow if not close the country’s socio-economic gap. Failing to do so effectively increases the likelihood of Germany’s ticking time bomb to finally blow up, making it yet again the ‘sick man of Europe.’

Bibliography Bertelsmann Stiftung (2011). “Soziale Gerechtigkeit in der OECD - Wo steht Deutschland?“. (Online) Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany. Available at: http:// 34

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms_bst_dms_33013_33014_2.pdf (Accessed: 10.11.2013) Destatis, Statistisches Bundesamt (2012). “Fast jede 6. Person war 2011 armutsgefährdet“. (Online) Destatis, Germany. Available at: https://www.destatis. de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/ EinkommenKonsumLebensbedingungen/ LebensbedingungenArmutsgefaehrdung/ Aktuell_Hauptindikatoren_SILC.html (Accessed: 10.11.2013) De Weck, J. (2013). “Merkel‘s Working Poor Pose Election Year Dilemma as Divide Grows“. (Online) Bloomberg. Last updated: 06.03.2013. Available at: http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-05/ merkel-s-working-poor-pose-electionyear-dilemma-as-divide-grows.html (Accessed: 10.11.2013) Launov, A. and Wälde, K. (2013).

“Hartz IV reform did not reduce unemployment in Germany“. (Online) Universität Mainz. Last updated: 07.11.2013.

Available at: http://www.uni-mainz.de/ presse/16797_ENG_HTML.php (Accessed: 10.11.2013) OECD (2008). “Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries“. (Online) OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/41525386. pdf (Accessed: 10.11.2013).

Worldbank (2011).

“Choosing and Estimating a Poverty Line“. (Online) Worldbank. Available at: http:// go.worldbank.org/AOCMSD1N30 (Accessed: 10.11.2013).

Issue XXII - Autumn 2013

interview: The

‘Responsibility to Protect’ a truly global norm?

Interviewed by Dagmara Chwalowska and Manuel Holtmann

University of York academics Sultan Barakat and Kenneth Bush discuss the concept of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) which has increasingly gained momentum in both International Relations Theory as well as foreign policy debates. Barakat and Bush criticize the concept for being yet another tool to be employed at the convenience of ‘The West’, call for an alternative ‘Responsibility to Prevent’ and share their views on the recent humanitarian crisis in Syria and Libya.

Dr. Kenneth Bush is the Al-Tajir Lecturer in Post-War Recovery Studies. Dr. Bush was a tenured founding professor of the Conflict Studies Programme of St. Paul University in Ottawa, Canada. His pioneering work on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), bridges the gap between Peace and Conflict Studies and Evaluation research and practice.

Prof. Sultan Barakat is the Founding Director of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York. He is internationally known for having pioneered both scholarship and practice in the field of post-war recovery. Further, he works as a Senior Adviser and Consultant to the United Nations, the World Bank, European Union, DFID, ILO, IFRC as well as a variety of governments and international non-governmental organizations.

VOX: At 2005’s UN World Summit all member states unanimously adopted the so-called ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) concept. The international agreement promises to do away with inaction in the light of mass atrocities and genocides which countries allow within their own borders. What exactly are we to understand by a government’s “responsibility to protect” its own citizens?

Barakat: Let’s start by taking a step back to look at the international structure of nations and their relationships.

Traditionally, sovereignty was the key issue: no one could intervene with anybody else’s internal affairs and states were fully responsible for their own populations. Since the end of the Cold War, that notion of sovereignty has been challenged in a number of ways.

R2P introduced a norm (it is not a 35

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law) which entails that, firstly, the state has the responsibility to protect its citizens.; secondly, which is important and where the grey area begins, that the international community has the responsibility to help the state to protect its citizens in cases where the state fails to do so; and thirdly, and even more controversial, the international community has the responsibility and right to intervene directly against the principle of sovereignty to quite often dismantle the state. The evolution of this norm was driven by experiences made in Rwanda and Bosnia where the international community remained inactive and was unable to prevent mass atrocities and genocides. The general idea was acceptable to the majority of the General Assembly. But what I think a lot of nations struggle with is that, in reality, R2P is seen more as the responsibility of the West rather than the whole international community and that it is further highly selective in its application. A few years ago, when the Arab States debated about Gaza, and you can’t get a much more miserable situation than you have in the Gaza Strip, where was R2P to protect the Palestinians in Gaza? There is that almost cynical view developing that it is yet another tailor-made tool that allows the West to intervene in everybody else’s affairs under a humanitarian pretext. Syria has only helped to amplify that perception.

Bush: I think one of the major issues 36

around R2P is the apprehension of those who were not sitting in the UN Security Council (SC) as to how this would be used. We have these very fine norms that can be enshrined in terms of the statements from the Secretary General and agreement within the UN, but then you have a massive chasm between the principle, the institutional structure within which it is embedded and everything else which is going on in the world. I think that existing apprehensions about R2P, and the fear that it can become a justification for the pursuit of crude national interests by those who are in the SC are indeed valid concerns. When you move from the norms of the UN to specific real-life cases A, B, C or D, whether that’s Libya or Syria, that is where politics enters the discussion.

When we evaluate the concept we have to look at it from top-down and bottom- up perspectives.

I would argue that it’s the bottom-up dimension of norms that ultimately shapes our understanding of what they are.

VOX: R2P in its official definition is quite broadly defined. Do you think it is a norm applicable to each and every instance?

Bush: I think it is important to put more attention to early stages in the emergence of conflicts. R2P is somehow blind to structures, processes and actions that lead to the crisis in the first place. In reality, none of these dis-

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asters simply occurred out of thin air.

It is crucial to understand not just the concept but to also look at the implications of these international actors in the creation of these crises. Who are the major arms traffickers in the world?

Actually, they happen to be sitting on the SC for the most part. So on the one hand, we have weapons being sold all over the place and on the other hand, we have the SC with its peace-building agenda. This feeds the cynicism that Sultan mentioned as well as the view that there exists a moral doublestandard within the actions of the SC. VOX: You criticize that the international community puts insufficient focus on the early stages of conflict evolution. Can we thus conclude that R2P should be employed one step earlier, rather than not at all, in order to successfully avoid conflict?

Bush: If we say yes, then we move from the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to a ‘Responsibility to Prevent’ and that’s a different story altogether.

The latter is not just related to arms trade, it is further related to the terms of trade, to global politics, commodity prices, copyright issues, GMO-seeds.

All of the above links into the discussion about the ‘Responsibility to Prevent’.

VOX: There already exists significant opposition towards R2P by many countries, such as the BRICs, who attach higher importance to the idea of sovereignty. In the light of this,

would the concept of a ‘Responsibility to Prevent’ not likely be seen as an even more inacceptable encroachment on sovereignty rights?

Bush: I would think just the opposite. R2P is employed when corpses are already strewn all over the place.

A ‘Responsibility to Prevent’ instead, looks at the broader network of relationships in the international community: economic, social, political and so on. So I would say it is a broader view of the political terrain that we are looking at. Further, a principle like the ‘Responsibility to Prevent’ would more likely be accepted by those in the Global South who are at the receiving

“ The scope of R2P is too narrow, it has been narrowed down to five major crimes against humanity which means that you can only trigger the norm when talking about genocide. In Libya they therefore used Gaddafi’s one speech to ‘prove’ that genocide was on its way.

But in reality, the majority of people are not dying because of genocides.”

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end of all the injustice and poverty that seem to flow from the current global political dispensation. The reason why I think there would be greater receptivity is because it would place emphasis on the causes of these man-made catastrophes. It would reject quite explicitly the inadequate, idiosyncratic, band-aid responses that follow spastically from the national interests of the powerful countries of the world.

Barakat: I fully agree. The scope of R2P is too narrow, it has been narrowed down to five major crimes against humanity which means that you can only trigger the norm when talking about genocide. But in reality, the majority of people are not dying because of genocides. We just have 10.000 people taken in Philippines due to a natural catastrophe.

Also, there already exist other acceptable mechanisms which are not about rights or responsibilities; which are well-established and trigger a response but yet are not sufficient to prevent the next catastrophe. And this is why I like the idea of turning it around to Responsibility to Prevent rather than simply to protect after and protect some.

VOX: Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff challenged the concept of R2P, proposing instead the alternative conception of a ‘Responsibility in Protecting’. It has been argued that this was a pioneering move and Brazil has entered the international stage as 38

a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Benner, 2013).

Do you agree with this analysis?

Bush: When it comes to international politics, I think it is important to remember that everybody wants to be the author of the killer phrase. When we talk about norm entrepreneurs within institutions it is really interesting to see the motives, incentives for political leaders to stand on the international stage and in the case of the BRICs, geopolitical aspirations are quite overt. Any leader speaking at the international level may be pointing this way to the audience but is actually speaking to the domestic constituency behind him. Sometimes you do nevertheless get unbelievably altruistic leaders and one part of creating norms is to have champions who can articulate it, who are able to fight for it.

Barakat: Rather than a different theoretical conception, what I believe to be a real test for the concept is if we were to see a group of South Asian or South American countries coming up with a response to a regional crisis. In reality, I do not see it happening for another hundred years. The concept was fundamentally forged to allow Western powers to interfere in sovereignty while upholding other principles and international prestige. They really like the opt-out option to work around the system whenever it suits them. This is why Russia and China voted against intervention in Libya.

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VOX: The UN Security Council mandate on intervention in Libya explicitly referred to the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians in Benghazi. You just mentioned the BRIC countries’ vote of abstention. This has widely been regarded as a form of initial, tacit consent, while the same countries later on heavily criticized the ‘coalition of the willing’ for having illegitimately extended the mandate beyond the mere protection of civilians. Do you share this criticism or was reference to R2P legitimate in the context of the Libya conundrum?

Barakat: I do believe that the civil war in Libya never reached the scale of genocide and it was nowhere near to what is going on in Syria today.

There are many other mechanisms the international community could have employed - diplomacy, mediation but they chose to pick Qaddhafi’s one speech where he referred to the insurgents as rats and said that he would eradicate them. They then followed from this single sentence that there is an immediate threat of a potential genocide. I think when the BRICs and Arab countries voted with abstention, they had something totally different in mind. And now they understand why it was a mistake, they have hit his military bases and the arms are spread all over Africa. Yes, I do share this criticism.

VOX: It is widely acknowledged that

decision-making processes about interventions always entail some degree of weighing of economic, political and human costs. Roland Paris (2001) goes so far as to call peace operations an ‘updated and more benign version of the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’.

Do you agree or is R2P instead a genuine commitment to the enforcement of universal Human Rights?

Barakat: I would deny that Western nations ever make decisions based purely on humanitarian response.

And when they do, you can tell by the (insignificant) amount of money they commit to it. Today Britain put 6 million to the Philippines which is, quite frankly, nothing. There is no coherent explanation for the existing priorities other than Western nations being driven by strategic motives.

The West is always very responsive if there is a strategic threat like a spread of weapons or refugees. Had Syria had a border with Europe, I think the reaction would be very different. A second decision-making basis is, of course, economic interests at hand.

Essentially, this has to do with where the gas is, the oil, the pipelines. And then the last, and presumably least important one, is the humanitarian criterion. Rwanda is a perfect example: in terms of economic and strategic interests it was totally irrelevant to a lot of countries. As a result, they left it for what it is and now they regret it. I would argue that R2P is seen as a right 39

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rather than a responsibility. In reality though, when parliamentarians meet they never debate on a humanitarian basis, they debate on a strategic basis.

VOX: As you said earlier, R2P was officially designed as a means to avoid mass atrocities and genocides such as in Rwanda from happening again. Do you believe the international community and R2P as a norm are strong enough to actually stand up to what it promises?

Barakat: Any norm develops on the basis of credibility, trust and experience.

The concept has not been employed in any consistent way, particularly in the eyes of the Third World. The UN failed to insist that R2P is a universal norm, and to consistently employ it.

Bush: If you just need one killer quote then it would be ‘Don’t let the language of norms eclipse the imperatives of politics, strategic interests and national self-interest’. And I sound more and more like an arch-neo-realists but of course I see it from a completely different perspective. I recognize that the political decisions underpin the behavior in the international system.

VOX: There is a controversial argument put forward by Luttwack (1999), who said that instead of intervening we should “give war a chance”. Do you agree?

Barakat: If I sit in Boston or somewhere else far off from all the conflicts we 40

have talked about so far, I could easily say ‘well, let’s give people the chance to kill each other’. I don’t agree at all of course not! He does not understand war because he has not been in one.

Bush: I entirely agree. Furthermore, the argument has been completely disingenuous in the sense that he says ‘war is something that happens out there, in those brown countries, those hot countries’. Yes, he has never smelt a war but he’s also somehow, very conveniently, blinded himself to the direct implications that his country has in creating these conditions and perpetuating these wars. There were as many as 17 countries selling arms to Iran and Iraq. I am not reducing war to arms transfers, but what I am saying is that when Luttwack is sitting in his wonderful ivory tower, he remains indifferent to all types of violence that fuel these wars: social violence, economic violence, suffering, poverty around the world. And I think there is something fundamentally immoral about that.

Give war a chance? I don’t think so.

VOX: You have convincingly criticized R2P for being yet another tailor-made tool to be employed at the convenience of the West. Most people would presumably agree that ‘giving war a chance’ isn’t the way to go either.

Now, one might wonder: what would an appropriate response by the international community to conflicts

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such as in Syria and Libya look like?

Barakat: First, I think it’s important to bring the ceiling down. By the time you recognize genocide, there would obviously be one. What follows is that more emphasis needs to be put on prevention, human security, equity as well as opportunities for development. Second, any actions and decisions taken need to be consistent and justifiable. Third, action needs to be genuinely global. If you allow the UK and France to intervene somewhere else, then if there are riots in London, Libya and others should be able and allowed to come to help you out, too.

It is essential to point out that there is a need for a responsibility to all, not responsibility to some. This is how you build responsibility amongst states.

Bush: There is also a need to recognize that it is never just one but instead multiple conflicts which lead up to a humanitarian crisis. We have violent conflicts all over the world today and the disappointing surprise is that we watch it happen over such an extended period of time. And when it explodes the media rush there and say ‘Oh look, it has exploded!”. We have seen the gradual disintegration of the rule of law, we have seen authoritarianism developing and we have seen escalations of human rights violations. Yet we sit there and watch.

VOX: You have mentioned a number of early indicators of something going wrong. Yet in many cases, whether the respective countries would actually allow the international community to intervene at earlier stages seems highly questionable.

Bush: Indeed, I think there is acute sensitivity within any conflict zone to have international actors intervene in any way. It is a violation of not just sovereignty, which is an abstract state-level concept, but of one’s sense of citizenship and attachment to this place. There is this idea which is aided and embedded by International Relations Theory that the necessary capacities somehow do not exist in the worst conflict zones, that somehow they have gone underground or have been dismantled but that is just not true. Even in the worst conflict zones you will find unbelievable capacities, active engagement on the levels of human rights support and political activism. And yes, the government will come to jail them, torture them and make their case spectacular so that the broader public sees that. But they do exist. So the idea that R2P actors will come from outside and save the day is a fundamental injustice to those acting before, during and after the violence.

Where are these R2P-guys once the peace agreement is signed? They are off to the next one. And this applies both to natural and military disasters.

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VOX: You argued that there is a need for R2P to be truly universal as well as to be consistent in its application.

Should actors who don’t fulfill their responsibility to protect be held responsible? And is it possible to do so if R2P is merely a ‘gentle-men’s agreement’, a norm but not a binding law?

Barakat: Legally you cannot. But morally I think people are already held responsible and this is why people increasingly question the norm. They ask questions about Libya and Syria and don’t receive satisfying answers.

People understand that an appropriate response does not necessarily have to entail power and violence. You can respond in other ways that protect people indirectly. And Syria is a very important example. The money sent there is a drop in the ocean, the international community could have responded in a much more efficient way to show that the conflict is not just the regional responsibility of Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey, but a truly global one. For example, refugees do not necessarily have to stay in the first point of contact. What we need are much more imaginative concepts but you can only come up with them if you rid yourself of the strategic motives for response, if you care genuinely about humanitarian needs.

Bush: You were asking whether states can and should be held responsible. I just want to add that this should espe42

cially be the case when they have contributed to creating those conditions that have led directly to this catastrophe. It is one thing for a state which does not have blood on its hands not to respond, but it is a different matter when you have been fuelling dictatorial regimes, buying the oil, making the deals. In a nutshell: absolutely yes.

VOX: You both agree that there is an urgent need for a truly global solution. We would be interested in knowing where such a solution would come from. Can this sort of change realistically occur from within existing international institutions? One might argue that as we are moving towards a more multi-polar world (see the article on ‘China and the Rise of autocracy’) we are indeed moving further away from any such solution?

Bush: Every conflict has its own actors, history, and politics. Is there this one pill that we can take that will inoculate us? The answer is: no, there is not. But there are other progressive steps that can be made, one at a time, so that things get better.

The major point of reference here is indeed the international architecture that directs and guides the actions of international actors. To give an example, broadening the Security Council beyond the cabal of ‘Permanent Five’ is not a step in the wrong direction.

Barakat: Western states are also very

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Photo by Thorsten Strassasp

good in being legal. When you take two people to the International Court of Justice: Hussein and Bush, both killed people in the same war. One will have to justify his actions in front of the court while the other has already prepared a way to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;legallyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; work himself out of being held responsible. That is a small but very important distinction of capacity: who owns the law, and who writes it. The fact that we neither generate knowledge nor norms in the South, is a huge problem. The Global South is always expected to be at the receiving end of the process. The norms are thrown at them. That is why a new group of fragile states, the G7+ are trying to question these principles. And there is some promise there.

Dagmara Chwalowska and Manuel Holtmann are editors-in-chief of VOX and currently studying PPE in their third-year at the University of York 43

VOX – the Student Journal for Politics, Economics and Philosophy – is calling for essays to be submitted for the Spring Issue 2014, under the controversial theme ‘RELIGION IN THE AGE OF REASON’.

Essays should be between 1,000 and 1,500 words in length, and fully-referenced using the Harvard style. If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your article to vox@clubofpep.org by 12 January 2014.

You may wish to write on a topic from the list below:

• • • • • • • • •

Religion and gender (in)equality Is religion merely a useful hypothesis?

Is democracy compatible with theocracy?

Is atheism a new religion?

The role of religion in the Arab Spring movement?

Does rationality undermine religion?

“Is Goodness without God good enough”?* Religious affiliation and its impact on economic behaviour ____________ (your own idea)

Undergraduates, graduates and academics all welcome. All undergraduate submissions will be considered for the VOX Essay Award.

Back issues are available at: www.voxjournal.co.uk.

* Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (eds), Is Goodness without God Good Enough? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009)

Photo by Conor Lalitte