Religion In The Age of Reason

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THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Published termly by the Club of PEP at the University of York

Religion In The Age of Reason 1

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Editorial

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Thomas Paine’s pamphlet ‘The Age of Reason’ compelled its readers to critically reflect on religious dogmas and texts. “Of all the tyrannies that affect mankind, tyranny in religion is the worst; every other species of tyranny is limited to the world we live in; but this attempts to stride beyond the grave, and seeks to pursue us into eternity.” 200 years on, the question of whether religion and reason are compatible is still highly relevant.

The enlightened man wants to make use of his own understanding and the sum of scientific discoveries and philosophical arguments seem to pose insurmountable difficulties for various theistic positions. Yet, especially in times of (political) crises he is also longing for unshakable moral values and guidance often found in religion and spirituality. Does science undermine theological stories leaving the ethical lessons unscathed? Is religion compatible with a modern democratic society? We hope to discuss these and other questions in the 2014 spring issue ‘Religion In The Age of Reason’.

We begin with a debate between Collins and Tozer, who discuss the role of religion in the modern world. Our series of essays opens with a paper by Louise Gramstrup, who emphasises the role of women’s interfaith groups in times where words like fundamentalism and conflict are aligned with male-dominated faith traditions.

With reference to the Arab spring movement, Freuler asks whether religion is compatible with democracy and warns that unlimited freedom of religious factions facilitates a shift towards autocratic theocracies, which poses a threat to civil rights and undermines democratic societies. Following that, Hagemeister forcefully argues that, for a feminist Islam to be realised, the prevailing European conception of Muslim women as victims needs to be deconstructed. Next, Woodcock seeks to explain the divergence between atheists and theists with reference to the psychological phenomenon of belief polarisation and presents a viable strategy for atheists to ‘win’ the argument. While presenting the core characteristics of Buddhism, Tozer argues its compatibility with modern science and its vital role in the human quest for happiness. Expressing an unwariness about calls that advocate rejecting religious world views, Hamadouche points to the limits of reason and argues that religion provides more convincing answers to questions about morality and “the good life”. Dr David Efird concerns himself with “Abraham’s dilemma”. He argues that only a loving God should be seen as the true source of morality and, thus, presents a ‘way-out’ of the dilemma for the theist. Finally, Czech economist and best-selling author Tomáš Sedláček argues that economics is the dominant “faith-system” of our time and warns that believing its dogmas too willingly will pave the way to future crises.

With this issue marking the end of our editorship, we would like to thank everyone who contributed ideas throughout the year but, most importantly, the hard-working and talented members of the editorial team. We hope the new editors, Raphael Reuben and Oscar Stenbom, will find their new role as rewarding and inspiring as we have.

Editorial Team Editors-In-Chief: Dagmara Chwalowska Manuel Holtmann Proof Reader: Jessican Orban 2

Dagmara Chwalowska and Manuel Holtmann Editors-In -Chief Junior Editors: Martin Kábrt Raphael Reuben Oscar Stenbom Thomas Tozer

Senior Editors: Opemipo Akisanya Lea Börgerding Phillip Jung Viktor Rehart

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Layout Editors: Widya Kumarasinghe Raphael Reuben Web Officer: Jack Turner Front Cover - Hugh Kretschmer Back Cover - Arctic Explorer

THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

ISSUE XXIII - SPRING 2014

contents DEBATE Is Religion Outdated?

Alfie Collins and Thomas Tozer

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ESSAYS Religious Women Take The Lead Louise K. Gramstrup

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Religion And Democracy Nino Freuler

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Towards A Feminist Islam Felix Hagemeister

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Belief Polarisation: How Should Atheists Go About Debating With Theists?

Aiden Woodcock

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The Value Of Buddhism In The Age Of Reason Henry Tozer

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Non-Rational Foundations Of Scientific Worldview Khalil Hamadouche

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Abraham’s Dilemma And The Radical Dependence Of Morality On God Dr David Efird

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Believe Like Econo.myst Tomáš Sedláček

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VOX is an academic journal run by students that provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and offers insight into debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as other universities world-wide.

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Is Religion Outdated?

Alfie Collins and Thomas Tozer Alfie Collins and Thomas Tozer are 2nd year undergraduates studying Philosophy and PPE respectively at the University of York, with divergent views on the role of religion in modern society. Tozer argues that religion has a positive and necessary societal role, whilst Collins claims that religion has been, and continues to be, destructive and irrational. The following is an informal but heated dialogue between the two, in which Tozer starts off the proceedings.

Tozer: Religion remains as valuable today as it has ever been. Modern technology and material development have solved many problems, answered many questions and made many aspects of life easier to deal with. Despite the increase in material comfort, there are many respects in which human suffering has not decreased; we still have unanswered spiritual needs with the most basic questions of life still remaining. Improved technology has led to problems too; it has created risks and dangers - such as threats from nuclear power and rampant consumerism – that didn’t exist before. Only religion can offer an answer to the following questions: What happens after death? What is the meaning of life? Why is there so much suffering in the world? How can I become a better person? Is which there a force greater than myself that can help me? These questions remain deep in our minds, troubling us, causing, in the words of Mother Theresa, a ‘hunger of the heart’. Only religion is able to offer answers to these questions and give meaning to people’s lives. Science is incapable of answering these sorts of questions because it is confined to empirical analysis of that which is the case.

Religion is necessary for discovering that which ought to be the case. Hence, ethical issues lie outside the domain of science.

Collins: Religion, in the narrower sense of the word, has been a burden and a hindrance to scientific and moral progress and continues to be so. I am not attacking spirituality; I have great respect for the spiritual practices of meditation, the attempt for self-actualization, and for the general striving for purpose and meaning.

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Rather, I am attacking theology, which is what is generally meant by religion. I am targeting the religious texts, the harmful dogmas and the widescale beliefs in the frankly unbelievable, hence my caveat ‘narrower sense of the word.’

You say that only religion can answer the following: ‘What happens after death? What is the meaning of life? Why is there so much suffering in the world? How can I become a better person?

Is there a force greater than myself that can help me?’ I argue that science can provide insight into some of these questions. For example, through neuroscience, we can find indications of what happens after death. This is done by seeing whether the mind supervenes on the brain, and hence, whether the mind will cease after the destruction of the brain. Through social studies, we are able to collect data about which lifestyles tend to bring suffering, and hence, provide clarity to the question of why there is so much suffering in the world. Through philosophical ethics and introspection, we can attempt to answer how we can become better people. Not only can reason provide insight into these questions, reason provides better insight than the statements contained in the Holy Scriptures. This is because we have experienced scientific and moral advancement over time, and hence are in a better position to answer these questions than the millennia old societies in which the authors of the Holy Scriptures belonged.

Tozer: To what extent can ‘spirituality’ exist in a sense that is independent of religion? It seems to me unreasonable to draw such a sharp distinction

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 between spirituality and religion.

How do people develop spiritual values?

Granted, some sense of ethics and consideration for others is possible without religion. Yet for many people, religion is at the very heart of their ethical perspective. I once saw Richard Dawkins lambasting a passage in the Bible that was said to be teaching ‘humility’, asking: ‘Why can’t you just say humility?’ Well Richard, the answer is that cultivating humility is just not that simple. You can’t learn its meaning merely from the word ‘humility’. However, some stories, teachings and passages in the bible can help to teach us about humility. Other religious passages, and other religious texts, can help to teach about other ways in which we can improve our character and find meaning in our life. Some passages may simply help us to understand the universe a bit better. This remains as true today as it ever has done. More and more, I see people in this ‘Age of Reason’ stressed, confused and unhappy; rich on the outside, poverty-stricken on the inside. I do not believe this ‘hunger of the heart’ has improved in any way since the rise of technology and scientific progress. In fact, I would argue that it has probably got worse.

What is the solution to this? Spirituality. And where do many people get their spiritual values?

Religion.

I concede that religion has sometimes been used in destructive ways. This is a fault of specific aspects of religion, such as misinterpreting bible passages. More importantly, it is due to man using religion in a negative way — becoming attached to his personal views which become so dogmatic that he will not tolerate anyone holding contrary views — and not due to anything inherently negative in the nature of religion.

Behaviour such as indoctrination is clearly very destructive, but this no fault of religion, it is a fault of indoctrination and the character of men that indoctrinate others. Even if men didn’t hold attachment to religious views, they would surely be attached to views about other things, inevitably leading to conflict on that basis instead.

I am not saying that all of religion is good and perfect, but that where it is harmful; it is due to negative aspects of the human character and very specific misguided religious dogmas. People

continue to suffer from the ‘hunger of the heart’ - a deep feeling of disillusionment - as much today as they ever have done. Religion offers an invaluable opportunity for people to resolve this hunger through spirituality and therefore remains essential today.

Collins: I will outline exactly how spirituality can exist independent of religion. One point to note is that they can indeed overlap; religion is a subset of spirituality: all that is religious is also spiritual. However, the spiritual is not necessarily religious. For example, the practice of meditation may be seen as spiritual, but it need not be religious. By ‘religion,’ I am referring primarily to that which is laid out in Holy texts.

I also refer to the beliefs that people have of the texts’ contents and the consequences of such beliefs. By ‘the spiritual,’ I refer to the search for meaning and for profound experiences. Another distinction is between the institutionalised and organised nature of religion verses the lack of organisation and authority inherent in purely spiritual practises.

You write, ‘for many people, religion is at the very heart of their ethical perspective on life,’ to which I reply ‘yes, and what an unfortunate fact this is.’ First, I would argue that relying on an external source for one’s ethical perspective and knowledge is of less value than relying on one’s natural ethical instinct. It seems there is something intrinsic in torture (namely the suffering caused) that makes it wrong and that no text is required for one to be aware of this. Therefore, reliance on religious texts for ethical behaviour undermines the natural ethical goodness of people; it suggests that we would not know better if not for these texts. Second, it provides the wrong reasons for moral behaviour. It is better to perform a good action for the inherent goodness produced by the action rather than for the sake of appealing to the writings within a Holy book.

Third, having people base their ethical perspectives on external sources is potentially dangerous (as is the case with indoctrination). In cases where religions lay out positive and good teachings, there is no danger; yet the religious texts of the major religions are not confined to the morally good. A reliance on religious texts for ethical guidance means a reliance on the moral quality of

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VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy the given piece of scripture, whether one is good or bad depends on what scripture one has faith in.

About the ‘hunger of the heart,’ you write, ‘what is the solution to this? Spirituality. And where do many people get their spiritual values? Religion.’

I agree that spirituality can play a role in feeding the hunger in our hearts. This is all well until spirituality is soiled by theology. The New Testament was written circa 30-150AD, the Torah was written circa 1380 BCE, and the Qur’an was written between 609 and 632 AD. I would suggest that from the times these texts were written, humanity has developed superior spiritual and moral values.

Now focusing on your claim that it is misguided Bible passages rather than religion itself that leads to destructive consequences, we must ask ourselves, how can pieces of scripture be misinterpreted? First, they cannot be misinterpreted in and of themselves since they are God’s word, with the Qur’an being the verbatim word of God. Secondly, they can’t be misinterpreted when the intended meaning is often so blatant. Although major religions have many positive and moral teachings, the regrettable fact is that they contain many passages which are execrable: Leviticus 20:13 says that ‘If a man also lies with mankind, as he lies with womankind, both of them have committed an abomination, they shall surely be put to death, their blood shall be upon them.’ Colossians 3:22 reads, ‘slaves, obey in everything those who are your earthly masters.’ Some passages in the Quran (2:191-193) says ‘and kill them wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out’ and ‘Al-Fitnah [disbelief ] is worse than killing.’ Passages cannot be misinterpreted in and of themselves if they are the word of God, and in most instances they cannot be misinterpreted when the correct interpretation is so blatant Tozer: You claim that developing our morality from religion is 1. ‘of less value than relying upon one’s natural ethical instinct’; 2. ‘provides the wrong reasons for moral behaviour’; and 3. is ‘potentially dangerous’. You allude to the idea that it would be better to take spiritual values from the literature and art of a more advanced society than from the writings of a primitive people; to rely on these Holy texts for spiritual advice is to hinder spiritual and moral progress. I will respond first to these arguments, and then to your attack on my claim that it is misinterpreted

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religious passages, or misguided religious people, rather than religion itself, that is destructive.

In my opinion, our ‘natural ethical instinct’ to be compassionate and considerate is usually buried beneath our selfishness, so if we just leave ourselves to nature, as it were, we are unlikely to be especially moral beings. The point of religion that I am propounding is not to replace our natural ethical instinct with religion as the source of our morality but that religion can be a very valuable tool to bring out and nurture our natural ethical instinct. We all have the seeds of compassion and altruism within us, but it is through receiving teachings on compassion, empathy and so forth that we can water these seeds and bring our natural ethical instinct to sprout.

No doubt you will respond by reiterating reasons 2 and 3: religion provides the wrong reasons for moral behaviour and is potentially dangerous. But to these I reply first, that something is valuable if it improves our moral behaviour in a genuine sense. Secondly, once again, it is not religion that is dangerous but misinterpreted religious passages or misguided religious people.

If something simply makes us act in a way that seems to be moral but is actually motivated by a selfish intention - such as hoping that God will grant our selfish wishes - then that is not genuinely moral. If someone’s moral behaviour genuinely improves, it implies that their motivation improves, as well as their actions.

Otherwise, their moral behaviour may seem to have improved, but this is only because we do not know what the person’s real motivation is.

Thus: if religious teachings cause us to improve our compassion, humility and so forth, then this is just as much a valid improvement in our moral character as a change caused, for example, by selfreflection, or advice from our parents. The point is that if our character improves, then the change is valid and positive. It is not contrived and of no value simply in virtue of being caused by religious inspiration.

I accept the point that religious texts can sometimes contain unambiguously harmful messages. For most people however, these need not be a problem. People can benefit greatly from religion as a source of meaning and morality in

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 life, without having to accept everything included in Holy Scriptures. The questions that religion answers and the meaning that it brings to peoples lives, remains as valid and valuable today as it ever have done.

Collins: When I say ‘man’s natural ethical instinct,’ I am perhaps guilty of over-simplification and should expand this to ‘man’s natural ethical instinct in combination with his societal and familial conditioning.’ This addition shows that what is most important in making moral decisions and forming moral opinions is a combination of one’s natural ethical instinct (whose existence is owed partly to evolution) and societal values, with the constraints and the conditioning these bring. My suggestion is that these two things alone are sufficient for moral values and moral action.

You write, ‘the point of religion that I am propounding is not to replace our natural ethical instinct with religion, as the source of our morality. Rather, I propose that religion can be a very valuable tool to bring out and nurture our natural ethical instinct.’ But what right do these texts have as a source of moral guidance? The Qur’an includes abhorrent passages such as verse 9.5: ‘then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush,’ it also sanctions wifebeating: ‘Men are the maintainers of women ... the good women are therefore obedient, ... and (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them.’ (Qur’an 4:34) Just as a mathematics textbook would never be used as a source of mathematical teaching if it was rife with errors, a religious text should not be used as a source of ethical guidance when it contains such large numbers of unethical teachings.

A conceivable response here is to say: ‘Yes, but let’s ignore these passages and focus on the moral ones’ – this is equivalent to your response of having a more liberal reading of the Bible and Qur’an.

In 1 Thessalonians 2:13, Paul writes, ‘when you received the word of God which you heard from us, you welcomed it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God.’ Peter 1:25 says, ‘but the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And

this is the Word which by the gospel is preached unto you.’ If we accept this as evidence that the Bible is supposed to be the word of God, then we cannot take a liberal interpretation of the Bible since we will be ignoring words that were formed in the mind of God. Even if we do not go this far, we must at least, in order to classify ourselves as Christian, believe the Bible to be inspired by God. To believe that the Bible is inspired by God would be to take a great risk in ignoring certain passages, and it would certainly be a risk to treat such passages as being unworthy of attention. Muslims believe that Muhammad wrote down word for word what was revealed to him by God. It would be uncontentious to say that to be a Muslim, one must believe that the Qur’an is the word of God; hence, liberal interpretation is untenable here. Therefore, your statement that people don’t have to accept everything written in the scriptures is simply plain wrong in the case of Islam, and certainly dubious in the case of Christianity and Judaism.

You write, ‘the questions that religion answers and the meaning that it brings to peoples lives, remains as valid and valuable today as it ever have done.’ To this I reply, ‘truth is more important than meaning.’ I may get meaning from believing that friendly invisible dwarfs live under my bed and that they protect me during the day and give me good dreams during the night. One may similarly get meaning from believing that a baby was born from a virgin, and was killed and resurrected from the dead, or from believing that after death they will enter Jannah. One getting meaning from something does not render

their belief-system good or true. As rational agents, our most important consideration is truth and this is what we should strive for.

Religion has hindered scientific and moral progress, with modern examples including the issue of gay rights and the push in the United States to get creationism taught in schools in place of evolution. Science teaches us things that are testable and ultimately uncertain. Theology gives us authoritative teachings, offering the illusion of knowledge, but is in fact ignorance.

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RELIGIOUS WOMEN TAKE THE LEAD: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGH INTERFAITH DIALOGUE Louise K. Gramstrup

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of religion” because it inspires mutual understanding and points us in the direction of constructive dialogue between religions. In contrast to institutionalized interfaith dialogue which often focuses on doctrinal issues, it emphasizes everyday interactions and therefore serves to strengthen cross-religious ties within communities rather than between theologians.

Women’s interfaith groups can thus engender social cohesion, which is essential in a post-9/11 world characterized by religious divide. First, I will examine the character of interfaith dialogue to illuminate its crucial individual and social functions. Then, I will explore the manners in which religious women are strengthening community ties through interfaith interactions, and conclude what lessons we can learn from such meetings.

Photographer - Liam Noris

Mutual understanding, empathy and respect are not concepts commonly associated with religion in the 21st century. In fact, words like fundamentalism and violence align smoothly with contemporary conceptions of faith traditions; reason and harmony, on the other hand, do not.

Furthermore, throughout history, religious authorities have traditionally been male-dominated, effectively marginalizing women’s religious experiences and knowledge. However, the reality of religion is changing. In 8

particular, 9/11 stressed the need to reconceptualise relations between different faith traditions. Moreover, this tragic event engendered significant changes in the affiliation between women and their faiths, a relation which has opened up for a more positive vocabulary about religion. It may be argued that the reason for such positive connections is the recent upsurge in interfaith dialogue, and more specifically women’s interfaith groups.

In this essay, I claim that women’s interfaith dialogue reveals the “reason

Interfaith dialogue challenges an individual’s self-understanding and religious worldview through meeting the “other”, but also unites people across faith traditions. Interfaith dialogue is essentially people from different religions coming together to talk in an attempt to understand each other. All dialogue constitutes the negotiation of similarities and differences between “self and other”, which is challenging because “acknowledging the place of another is to make contingent one’s own place” (Keaten and Soukup, 2009: 172). Thus, an individual’s self-

understanding is necessarily impacted by and negotiated in relation to the “other”. Such subjectivity negotiation can be rewarding because one discovers commonalities and learns to respect differences. Despite the benefits of being attuned to diversity, unfortunately it is easier to judge people based on culturally learned identity factors like religion. For instance, a hijab, a veil covering the head and chest, has come to signify oppression rather than an expression of Islam. Such simplistic categorizations, however, create a distance between “us” and “them”. They construct stereotypes that generate fear and prejudices.

The refusal to try and understand “others” creates the foundation for hostility on both an individual and social level. In contrast, participation in interfaith dialogue breaks down religious stereotypes because people actively seek to understand alternative religious outlooks. In this way, interfaith activities bring people together by revealing commonalities despite divergent religious beliefs.

Interfaith dialogue is essential in a world increasingly divided over religion. This rift manifests itself in discriminatory behaviour, such as cumulative harassment of British and American Muslim women based on their religious dress (ACLU; Townsend, 2013). It is also evident within global politics when rightwing parties promote religious homogeneity to the detriment of 9

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religious minorities (PewForum, 2014). Interfaith dialogue is important because it can dispel misconstructions of religions that invite social division.

The reason is that interfaith dialogue “demystifies the religious other”, which then contributes to building the trust necessary to addressing the complex issues faced in contemporary multi-religious societies (Keaten and Soukup, 2009: 183). According to the American sociologist Robert Wuthnov, understanding one’s religious “others” is essential for social cohesion (2005: 307). Specifically, Wuthnov argues, “people learn to relate to one another as unique individuals, rather than representatives for social categories” in interreligious settings, thereby overcoming such stereotypes that hinder social integration (2005: 307). In multi-faith societies, individual participation in interfaith activities is therefore critical for ensuring harmonious communities.

The events of 9/11 further stressed the need for greater cross-religious understanding and provoked a response from countless religious women. 9/11 was claimed to be done in the name of Islam. Thus, it triggered suspicion and tension amongst individuals and between religious communities. For instance, Sikhs were attacked because their turbans allegedly made them resemble al-Qaeda members whilst many mosques were vandalized. Generally, individuals increasingly responded 10

with distrust towards unfamiliar religious groups (Lohre, 2006: 3). 9/11, then, caused social division, and accordingly made interfaith engagement more pressing as a tool to overcome this rift. The destruction produced by 9/11 united numerous women against social upheaval through interreligious activities. Across the US, especially, women found common ground by joining together to promote interfaith understanding. In fact, the majority of women’s interfaith groups have been formed post-9/11 (Lohre, 2006: 4). Rather than succumbing to fear, neighbouring women of different religious convictions took “personal action toward engagement with the religious ‘other’” by talking together in the wake of 9/11 (Lohre, 2006: 7). Women thus acknowledged interfaith dialogue as a constructive way to eliminate anxieties and misconstructions of religious beliefs.

“The destruction produced by 9/11 united numerous women against social upheaval through interreligious activities.”

The outcome, purpose, gender dynamic, and topics discussed in women’s interfaith groups differ radically from conventional interreligious dialogue amongst religious leaders and scholars.

Institutionalized interfaith dialogue takes place in a conference format in

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which discussions explore doctrinal issues in search for theological commonalities. Whilst these debates might be intellectually stimulating, they often fail to reach the wider public, and consequently are unable to create understanding amongst religious communities. Additionally, religious leadership is still male-dominated; consequently, women’s voices are largely ignored within conventional interfaith settings and institutionalised exchange. In contrast, women’s interfaith initiatives concentrate on female everyday experiences. They shift the members’ starting point from a maledominated academic or religious authority to “real-life” religious expertise.

Moreover, whilst theologians talk of absolutes, women’s interfaith dialogue shows that in practice individuals interpret their faith in diverse ways, and thus contests oversimplifications of religious traditions (Fletcher, 2013: 179). Women’s interfaith dialogue usually takes place in informal singlesex settings. Commonly women gather over meals to share stories about personal experiences of faith. They move the conversation away from theological discussions to focus on ordinary religious experiences where “conflicts of identity” are more important than ideological issues (Lohre, 2006: 1). In fact, the personal character of these narratives makes them establish the basis for building friendships across religious lines (Fletcher, 2013: 1789). Crucially, then, women’s interfaith

groups can engender social cohesion in contrast to institutionalized dialogue.

“Whilst theologians talk of absolutes, women’s interfaith dialogue shows that in practice individuals interpret their faith in diverse ways, and thus contests oversimplifications of religious traditions.”

Relative to such multi-faith friendships, conversations that display subjectivity negotiation are “the foundation for building stronger, more connected communities” (Lohre, 2006: 14). The women’s interfaith group “Women Transcending Boundaries” (WTB) exemplifies this positive effect. The climate of suspicion between the Christian majority and Muslim minority following 9/11 encouraged a Christian and a Muslim woman in Syracuse, NY, to reach out to each other. After initially meeting to talk about their beliefs and experiences over coffee, they decided to involve other religious women in their neighbourhood, and therefore established WTB. Currently, 60 women meet to serve the community in numerous ways every month.

For example, the women run a literacy project in Syracuse and have raised money for a girls’ school in Pakistan.

Moreover, WTB encourages members of different religious traditions 11

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to share each other’s ritual celebrations through its “Life Cycle” series (Lohre, 2006: 10-1; WTB, 2014).

In this way, WTB creates interfaith friendships and strengthens communities both locally and internationally.

Another women’s interfaith group creating stronger communities is “Women’s Interfaith Solutions for Dialogue and Outreach” (WISDOM).

In 2006, four women belonging to Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and Judaism, respectively, established WISDOM in Detroit in response to their community’s increasing religious division. Currently, WISDOM unites 55 women. Besides sharing personal stories of faith, the women unite across religious affiliations to build houses for the homeless. In fact, they find common grounds in shared moral conceptions across religions, which manifest in charity activism. Additionally, WISDOM educates school children about religious tolerance in order to fight religious stereotypes from an early age and also stimulate interfaith friendships by uniting college students in cultural productions (WISDOM, 2014). WISDOM, thus, facilitates religious tolerance and improves cross-religious understanding.

Clearly, both WISDOM and WTB disclose that women’s interfaith groups generate human wellbeing on a personal, communal, and social level.

Women’s interfaith dialogue based 12

on lived experiences accentuates that we must want to “build bridges” in order to understand each other and ourselves. It teaches us to be openminded and speak respectfully with others rather than judge people on the basis of their religious beliefs.

Furthermore, interfaith dialogue is vital in an increasingly multicultural and religiously diverse world. 9/11 underlined the need for greater understanding across faith traditions. Through interfaith engagements religious women are leading the way towards more interconnected and tolerating communities. Their chosen search for appreciation of diversity over submission to fear of the unknown teaches us the most constructive manner in which to approach our “others”, namely as individuals who are worthy of our time irrespective of religion. Women’s interfaith initiatives reveal the “reason of religion” by directing us on the path to mutual understanding. It is time to follow their lead. It is a mistake to think these roots will wither while the soil from which they have grown remains as strong as it has ever been.

Bibliography:

Fletcher, J. H. 2013. “Women in Inter-Religious Dialogue”, in The WileyBlackwell Companion to Inter-Religious Dialogue, edited by Catherine Cornille.

Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd, pp.168-183.

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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). “Discrimination Against Muslim Women”. New York: Women’s Rights Project: American Civil Liberties Union. Available online: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ files/pdfs/womensrights/ (Accessed 22/02/2014).

Keaten, James A. and Charles Soukup, 2009. “Dialogue and Religious Otherness: Toward a Model of Pluralistic Interfaith Dialogue” in Journal of International and Intercultural Communication Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 168-187.

Women’s Interfaith Solutions for Dialogue and Outreach (WISDOM).

2014. “History of Wisdom”. Bloomfield Hills, MI. Available online: http:// www.interfaithwisdom.com/history-ofwisdom/ (Accessed 22/02/2014).

Women Transcending Boundaries (WTB). 2014. “Bringing women of faith together after 9/11: About”.

Available online http://www.wtb. org/?page_id=6 (Accessed 21/02/2014).

Wuthnow, R. 2005. America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lohre, K. 2006. “Women’s Interfaith Initiatives in the United States Post 9/11”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Pluralism Project. Available online: http://www.pluralism.org/reports/ view/35 (Accessed 13/01/2014).

PewForum. 2014. “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High”. Washington D.C.: PewResearchCenter. Available online: http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/ religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/ (Accessed 22/02/2014).

Townsend, M. 2013. “Muslim helpline reveals majority of faith attacks on women” in The Guardian, online edition: http://www.theguardian.com/ uk/2013/mar/09/muslim-helpline-faithattacks-women (Accessed 22/02/2013).

Louise Gramstrup is currently a PhD candidate in Religious Studies at the University of Edinburgh. She holds a M.St. in Women’s Studies from the University of Oxford and a MA (with honours) in Religious Studies from the University of Edinburgh.

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Religion and Democracy Nino Freuler Religion has returned to the political sphere it left in the reconstruction period after the two world wars. Not only do we see its influence in turning the Arab spring from a democratic uprising to a messy, sectarian transition period towards Islamic governments, but it also seeps through American society and is the backbone of Russian autocracy. Religion, religious parties, and movements against foreign religions have grown in importance in Europe and the West in general. It is no longer the case that politics and religion are separate entities; they have become increasingly intertwined and are now part of a muddled sphere of ethical and political debate, especially to the right of the political spectrum.

Does this new trend pose a threat? Is religion incompatible with democracy? And if so, should we aim to move towards more secular societies? This paper will address these three questions and analyse them in the light of recent political events; arguing that the failure to place a limit on religion in political society will lead to a move towards autocratic theocracies, posing a threat to free speech and other civil liberties.

The best example of the impact of religion on politics in today’s world can be found in the Third World and the Mid-

dle East. The Pope’s word remains vital to many African societies. In Latin America, religion plays a key part in social cohesion. Similarly, Sharia Law is on the rise in the Muslim world. Recently, we have also seen a clear shift away from “Western” and “secular” ideals of freedom and democracy towards more traditional, fundamental and religious values of Islam in most of the countries which experienced the upheaval and turmoil of the Arab Spring three years ago. These examples, despite the obvious benefits of religion, show a darker side too.

There is no doubt that most aid work in the Third World is carried out by faithbased organisations, charities and orders (Goody, 2003: 64-67). Similarly, religion played a great part in overcoming the dictatorships and autocratic regimes in Latin America. Religion and religious organisations played a key part in the events of the Arab Spring and its transition towards a new political order. On the other hand, the Catholic Church’s position on both GMOs and contraception has held Third World societies back and continues to do tremendous damage that could easily be averted, especially in relation to the fight against HIV/AIDS (Trinitapoli et al, 2012). Moreover the rise and dissipation of radical Islam (and as a spin-off, Islamic

“When asking whether religion poses a threat, one must therefore bear in mind that religion has the potential to do tremendous good in this world, and religious leaders can be true forces of good.”

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 terrorist organisations) pose a very real threat to the life, liberty and happiness of today’s societies. When asking whether religion poses a threat, one must therefore bear in mind that religion has the potential to do tremendous good in this world, and religious leaders can be true forces of good. In their extremes however, religion, as a fundamental emotional connection between each individual and the respective institution (Thagard, 2005: 58-73), can be a very real and serious threat to democracies. This becomes evident when looking at the failures of the Islamist transitional government in Egypt under President Mursi, or the extremely oppressed societies in central Africa, where the Catholic Church still

we have seen, this trend often incites very heated debate, as people attach a lot of emotion to their respective beliefs (Thagard, 2005: 58-73). Indeed, religious parties pose a very real threat to key democratic values. When looking at Islam, some ready examples of excessive censorship can be quickly found and it is beyond any doubt the case that the Fatwa on Salman Rushdie for his book ‘The Satanical Verses’ in 1989 was an extreme measure taken by a religious institution. There is a clear correlation between religiosity and criticism of certain “heretic” lifestyles or attitudes.

In the US, religious values of society severely hinder progress on gay rights issues.

In less liberal states, as for example the

“There is however no doubt that functional democracies require a great degree of secularism. This is necessary because only through having a value- neutral superstructure that is not tinged with religious preconceptions, traditions and prejudices can open debate be ensured.” has tremendous sway over lifestyle choices and social interactions. It is clear therefore that the answer to the first question of this enquiry is that the rise of religious extremism, by which is meant religion in general, not simply radical Islam, is very dangerous, due to its emotive power and strength.

It is important not to forget that religion in politics has been rising in the industrialised West too. There is no doubt that the United States has always been a religious nation. In the past decade however, the Christian right has become a dominant force in US politics and it has been able to push its agenda very successfully. As

Russian Federation or Nigeria, homosexuality is even officially outlawed. These are all resonances of religion in society. Why though, one might ask, does it matter?

Civil liberties and autonomy are believed to be among the most intrinsic of human rights, yet they can only be fully enjoyed in liberal democracies that exhibit a progressivism that is often seen as dangerous to more traditional and religious societies.

Democratic, liberal and progressive societies can however only develop if opinions are open to debate, if individuality is encouraged and if individual life choices are not punished by social disapproval, or, even worse, by state intervention. This 15

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy essential tenet was clearly recognised by difficult question[to answer]. It seems clear, John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1859: 11-38). Yet, however, that democracies are incompathis words have not been put into practice. ible with strong religions and that religions One root cause of this lack of democratic within society should be checked, so as not progress is arguably the antagonistic force to grow too powerful. This answers the secof religion across countries. Allowing free ond question and renders a vantage point and divergent opinions on matters of life- from which reconciliation between relistyle choices, human rights, morality and gion and democracy might yet be possible. belief necessarily weakens every religion (Waldron, 1993: 138). As a consequence, It is clear that in small doses religious institutionalized religions often aim to re- opinions in politics are a good -potentially strict dissenting opineven necessary - thing. ions, or, if not in a poThere is however no sition to do so, simply doubt that functional deignore it. Examples of mocracies require a great this can be seen in the degree of secularism. This debate between creais necessary because only tionism and Darwinthrough having a valueian evolution, between neutral superstructure contraception and that is not tinged with abstinence, and many religious preconceptions, more. Through the traditions and prejudices suppression of opposcan open debate be ening opinions, religions sured (Sweetman, 2010: limit the availability 14-17). Religion, by its of information to the inherent authoritariangreater public. As a ism, cannot fulfil this result, implicit centask. It can therefore not sorship occurs, and be part of the legislative Photographer - James Lemass framework of a country, democratic processes, which heavily rely on the open deliberation other than through the collective voice of of ideas, come to a grinding halt. Clearly the electorate and referenda, wishing for religion as a social institution is not direct- legislation in line with religious values. ly opposed to democracy, and it is impor- This means that in practice the existence tant to give religious groups a public voice. of religious parties should be questioned However if they gain too much power, and any move towards a combination of as has happened in the last decade in the religion and state needs to be prevented United States, then these negative effects at all costs. The fact that religions can acwill come into play and cause serious issues tively prevent the development of democfor democracies. Where exactly the line racies can aptly be demonstrated by two between socially beneficent contributions examples. Russia, after the breakup of the from religious groups and social oppres- Soviet Union, was said to be on the road sion through religion is to be drawn is a to democracy. Besides the obvious echoes 16

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 of the previous state structure having an influence on the way in which oligarchs, rather than elected representatives, rose to power, religion clearly had a large part to play in determining Russia’s future and preventing a greater democratisation. After the collapse of the duma structure almost overnight, Russia was left in administrative turmoil. One of the only social institutions that was not tinged with the inefficient clout of the former Union was the Church.

It had all the necessary contacts to ensure a smooth transition and played a rather large part in Putin’s stellar rise from an out- ofwork KGB- agent to Leader of the Russian Federation in little under three years. It is no surprise then, that the Russian political system resembles the autocratic nature of the Russian Orthodox Church and that social values are very much dictated by it.

Another more recent example of democratisation-turned-sour can be found in Egypt after the ejection of Hosni Mubarak. Here, much like in Russia, the only two social institutions that had an inherent structure capable of taking over the organisational mess that was left in the aftermath of the Arab spring were the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. Having risen up against Hosni Mubarak, himself having been a man of the army, it was clear that the army could not hope to claim power in the longer term and it was therefore inevitable that religion would take over as the social institution capable of taking up the roles of state. Again, the emotional connection with a religion (Thagard, 2005: 58-73) and the autocratic nature of religious institutions were translated into the new system from the start and led to further instabilities, which effectively prevented the transition to a democratic system of government.

What, then, can be taken from these points? As outlined at the start, it is clear that religions have been and still are an important and potentially good force in politics. In order for religions to fulfil their role in a democratic fashion, however, it is essential that religious opinions be stifled to prevent the drowning out of other opinions. Politically, religion and the institutions of state need to be clearly and effectively separated. If religious opinions are allowed to come into political debate, they have to be moderated through relative weakness of the respective parties, meaning that they should never be the defining feature of the ruling party or coalition. If this is not the case, as for example in Egypt or in 1990’s Russia, democracies will be stifled and will eventually fail to develop.

Consequentially it is clear that for the development of - and the progression towards - more democratic societies, secularism is necessary. This is necessary not only in the name of democracy, but also in the name of diversity and individuality. Whilst secularism does not imply complete censorship of religious opinion, it nevertheless advocates a strong limit on the dissemination of religious opinions. If this is not done then religious opinions will keep on systematically undermining democratic societies and values, replacing them with their own.

Bibliography: Goody, J. (2003). Religion and Development: Some Comparative Considerations.

Development. pp. 64-67.

Trinitapoli, J., Weinreb, A. (2012). Religion & AIDS in Africa. Oxford University Press Thagard, P. (2005). The Emotional Coher17

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Towards A Feminist Islam ence of Religion. Journal of Cognition and Culture. Springer, pp. 58- 73.

Felix Hagemeister

Mill, J.S. (1859). Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion. On Liberty. pp.

11- 38.

Waldron, J. (1993). Rushdie and Religion.

Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981 –1991. Cambridge University Press, p. 138 Sweetman, B. (2010). Secularism and Religion in Modern Democracies. The Sacred and the Sovereign. pp. 14- 17

“For a feminist Islam to become possible, the prevailing European image of the Muslim woman as a victim needs to be deconstructed.”

On 4 February 2014, the Student Rights group, a body set up in June 2009 to ensure freedom from extremism on university campuses, received a letter from a number of students at the University of Sheffield.

The letter raised concerns about a talk due to take place on 10th March by Sahar AlFaifi, a proponent of a campaign called “The Muslimah´s Rennaissance”. With a series of events from Lancaster to Cardiff, this campaign aims to empower women by emphasizing their Muslim identity. The students believed that Al-Faifi´s presence could damage campus cohesion and create an atmosphere of fear.

Nino Freuler is currently reading PPE in his 1st year at the University of Oxford 18

It seems to me that the concern of the Sheffield students is representative of a more general worry that Islam and Islamic

culture are incompatible with modern conceptions of women´s rights. In this essay, I want to show that this worry needs to be overcome or at least substituted by a more nuanced understanding of Islam.

My argument is that for a feminist Islam to become possible, the prevailing European image of the Muslim woman as a victim needs to be deconstructed. After drawing a distinction between two different understandings of Islam, I will critically engage with what I call the simplistic view of Islam, arguing that the implications of viewing Islam as unchangeable are the cause of female discrimination and domination. I will propose the method of deconstruction in Spivak´s sense of radical multiculturalism to render feminist Islam possible.

19

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy Two ways of understanding Islam Islam can be understood in various ways.

For the purpose of this essay, let me distinguish between two different understandings of Islam. The first understanding is “a way that brackets Muslims from the rest of humanity, raising a psychological barrier, claiming that democracy, human-rights including those of minorities - and gender equality have no place in Islamic societies.”

(Bennett, 2010: 207) This understanding rejects the idea that Islam is or should be made coherent with women´s rights as engraved in international Human Rights.

I will refer to this understanding as the simplistic view. The second understanding is “a way that [Islam] affirms human solidarity: God created tribes and nations so that we can know one another (Qur’an 49: 13)” (Bennett, 2010: 208). In contrast to the first type, this understanding holds that Muslim Law is or can be made compatible with human rights standards. I will call this understanding the compatibilist view.

Several questions emerge from this distinction. First, which understanding is the correct one? Second, why should people want to embrace one rather than the other? Third, what are the implications of the different understandings? Finally, how is it possible to move from one understanding to the other?

The simplistic view of Islam as unchangeable In his bestselling book of 2010 called Deutschland schafft sich ab [Germany Does Away with Itself ], Thilo Sarrazin 20

argued that because birth rates are higher across the Muslim population, European values of gender equality and non-discrimination are being demographically undermined. He fears the growing influence of Islam in Europe, which is manifested by the wearing of headscarves: “the headscarf signals at the same time the acceptance of submission of women to men, that is to say the rejection of emancipation of women according to the Western model” (Sarrazin, 2010: 299). The success of his book seems to suggest that for some, the image of veiled Muslim women is strongly associated with female oppression and is perceived as a threat to democratic values.

Crucially, this fear rests on the assumption that Islam is unchangeable and inherently incompatible with women´s rights.

It depicts a “simplistic notion of culture as immutable, and […] Muslim culture as necessarily and unchangeably violent” (Weber, 2013: 2). Not only is the simplistic view of Islam found in the perceptions of some Europeans; it is found by some Muslim jurists in the interpretation of Islam, as Sachedina explains: “The problem reverts to the theology of revealed texts that provide the religious premises for discriminatory treatment of Muslim women. Muslim jurists are fond of referring to these texts as “absolutely binding” injunctions (musallamāt dīnīya) that cannot be questioned by any believer. If that is the case, then one can, without any hesitation, conclude that there can be no compatibility between the articles of the UN Declaration and other international documents that speak to the inalienable rights of women and traditional Islamic teachings that insist on gender distinc-

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 tions and use them to discriminate against women” (Sachedina, 2009: 121).

The simplistic view holds that because of the perceived connection of Islamic discriminatory laws to the Quran, it is impossible to reconcile Islam with feminism. Advocates of this view point to laws such as those that restrict Muslim women´s ability to get divorced (allowing this step for men rather freely); laws that make female offspring inherit only half as much as their male counterparts; and laws allowing men to engage in polygamy but not women.

Islamic criminal code effectively ascribes an inferior position to women: “The testimony of a woman is viewed as half as valuable as of a man´s. Additionally, testimonies of women alone, irrespective of their numbers and validity, are not sufficient to convict a murderer” (Kazemi, 2000: 461).

Finally, segregation of men and women in education, public transport and the work place in some Islamic countries are seen as confirmations of the simplistic view.

Deconstruction of the simplistic view I argue that the simplistic view helps perpetuate patriarchal structures and must be overcome for a feminist Islam to be realised. The determination of the public image of European Muslims works as a “regime of gender violence” (Weber, 2013: 3), which makes it only more difficult to reform Islamic law that discriminates against women. The simplistic view functions as a Foucauldian truth regime, a “system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation statements […] linked in a circular relation with systems of power which

produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (Foucault, 1972: 133). To project the image of an oppressed victim onto female Muslims means creating an implicit bias and truth regime that prevents Islam from becoming more feminist. It means not acknowledging “the emergence of a new figure, the female Islamist intellectual” (Gole, 1996: 5).

To take an example, consider the controversy in many European countries about Muslim women and girls wearing the hijab. In contrast to what Sarrazin assumed, veiling can indeed be voluntary and even be an expression of female protest or liberation. Veiling has been used as “a symbolic act of protest against authoritarian regimes and their policies in both Egypt and prerevolutionary Iran” (Kazemi, 2000: 462).

A girl that was banned from attending a public school in France because she wore the hijab said: “I feel completely liberated by the veil. As soon as I put it on, I felt as if I´d blossomed. The veil allows a woman no longer to be a slave to her body. It is the belief that a woman can go far through means other than using her body”(Parekh, 1998: 405). This statement challenges the simplistic view because it makes possible a re-evaluation of a tradition that was perceived to be necessarily oppressive.

“What is being deconstructed is the inherent assumption of the simplistic view that Islam and Islamic culture are fixed and unchangeable.”

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy This form of challenging traditional stereotypes could be called deconstruction in the sense of Spivak´s radical multiculturalism which Weber describes as: “a multiculturalism that can undo, or at least intervene, in transnational cultural racist scripts, in part through deconstruction of the notion of culture itself ” (Weber, 2013: 9). What is being deconstructed is the inherent assumption of the simplistic view that Islam and Islamic culture are fixed and unchangeable. Deconstruction with the example of a hijab becomes evidently necessary when it is seen that the word hijab in the Quran did not refer to something worn on the head, but “to a partition between rooms” (Idrissi, 2012: 75).

This clarification deconstructs the link of an unchangeable Muslim culture to gender violence. First, female veiling does not need to entail female oppression. Second, the cultural notion of the hijab being a headscarf for women is misconceived and could be reformulated.

Towards a feminist Islam I have argued that for a feminist Islam to be realised, the belief that Islamic culture is unchangeable must be overcome. This means on the one hand that islamophobic projections on Muslim culture must be deconstructed and exposed as culturally racist. It is not true that practicing Islamic culture necessarily implies female oppression. On the other hand, the theological doctrine that revealed Islamic rules as immutable, perfect and independent of the culture and time they are applied to must be challenged. There are very good arguments against the simplistic view that rest on a possible rereading of the Quran that does not dismiss its status as the im22

mutable word of God. Sachedina claims that “the Qur’anic idea that all human beings are unconditionally equal in dignity through God´s act of creation […] is sufficient to convince any Muslim that all human beings, regardless of their race, sex, and creed, are entitled to certain rights as part of their inviolable personhood” (Sachedina, 2009: 115). There is also an invitation from God in the Quran to use human reason, a divine gift from the creator, to shape society such that it reflects the will of God (ibid.).

There is no reason why the simplistic view is the correct understanding of Islam. Its implications are sometimes - not always - female discrimination and fear of extremism. Therefore, the simplistic view might be adopted in order to either justify patriarchal structures or perpetuate a truth regime of gender inequality in Islam.

Thirteen centuries ago, Islam changed the pre-Islamic Arabian attitudes in favour of women, by allowing them some personal integrity and limited legal status. It is now time to fully empower women within Islamic law and deconstruct the image of the oppressed female Muslim, in order to officially recognize the feminist understanding of Islam many Muslims already believe in.

Bibliography: Weber, Beverly M. 2013. Violence and gender in the “new” Europe: Islam in German culture. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Bennett, Clinton 2010. Muslim women of power [electronic resource] : gender, politics,

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014 and culture in Islam. London, New York: Continuum, 2010.

Foucault, Michel 1972. „Truth and Power“.

In: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980.

http://themuslimahsrenaissance.org/ http://realstudentrights.wordpress.com/

Gole,Nilufer 1964. “Ideology as a cultural system”. Ideology and Discontent. Ed. David Apter. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Kazemi, F. 2000. ‘Gender, Islam and Politics’, Social Research, 67, 2, pp. 453-474, Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost viewed 8 February 2014.

Parekh, Bikhu 1998. “Equality in a multicultural society”. Citizenship Studies, Vol.2, No.3, pp.397-411.

Sachedina, Abdulaziz 2009. Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford an New York.

Sarrazin, Thilo 2010. Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen.

München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.

Online Ressources: Student Rights on 5 February 2014 at 4pm “Sahar Al-Faifi and the Muslimah´s Renaissance” http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2171/sahar_al_faifi_and_the_ muslimah_s_renaissance

Felix Hagemeister is currently reading PPE in his 3rd year at the Univeristy of Warwick 23

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:

elief olarisation HOW SHOULD ATHEISTS GO ABOUT DEBATING WITH THEISTS? Aiden Woodcock Belief polarisation is the phenomenon whereby individuals who hold antecedently opposed views only become more entrenched in these views after exposure to a mixed body of evidence. I shall argue this explains some of the divergence in beliefs between theists and atheists, but that this cannot explain away the entire disagreement. Finally, I shall conclude by suggesting that atheists should, as a way of arguing, begin by establishing common-ground with the theist on points of reason.

I Let there be two individuals A and B who disagree over proposition p. Suppose A assents to p and B dissents from p. A and B are then exposed to the same mixed body of evidence regarding p; that is, a body of evidence which supports p and not-p in roughly equal measure. Perhaps it is natural to think that A and B would experience a convergence in their beliefs, where, even if A still assented to, and B still dissented from, p, the amount of credence they would give the opposing view would increase respectively.

Alas, if A and B are typical psychological subjects, then it is likely that after 24

exposure to the same evidence they will only become more entrenched in their respective views.

‘Exposure to evidence of a mixed character does not typically narrow the gap between those who hold opposite views at the outset… in fact, exposure to such evidence tends to make initial disagreements even more pronounced’ (Kelly, forthcoming: 2).

This is the so-called phenomenon of belief polarisation . The counterintuitive nature of this phenomenon leaves it in need of psychological explanation.

Just why do people tend to become entrenched in their views when presented with mixed evidence? There is a deeper question: assuming the beliefs of A and B do polarise, are they being unreasonable? Clearly, the first question must be answered in order for us to proceed to the second.

Prima facie, one may be inclined to think that the belief polarisation emerges from a kind of dogmatism, where, say, A discards evidence that is unfavourable to his antecedent position. Doubtless, if this really was the explanation behind belief polarisation, then those who exhibit the phenomenon would be being unreasonable.

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014

However, the empirical evidence suggests that typical subjects A and B will pay more attention to counterevidence than to evidence supporting their own view-point (Kelly, forthcoming: 8).

Kelly gives us a psychological model with the power to explain this. On this view two mechanisms are at work in polarising beliefs. I shall call these mechanisms the scrutiny mechanism and the space of hypotheses mechanism.

The idea behind the scrutiny mechanism is this: when A hears a piece of evidence in support of p he recognises this as consistent with his belief in p and so-to-speak takes it at face value. However, when A comes across evidence contrary to p, his antecedent belief in p motivates him to subject this evidence to greater scrutiny. This greater scrutiny may lead him to find, where they exist, genuine flaws in the evidence for not-p (Kelly, forthcoming: 8). This point is crucial: A’s reasons for rejecting evidence for not-p on this view are legitimate reasons; thus, when A discovers them he is reasonable in rejecting such evidence. Clearly A’s rejecting the evidence for not-p is causally dependent on his antecedent belief because it is this which has motivated him to scrutinise the evidence for notp thoroughly, but it is not his belief in p which justifies his rejecting evidence for not-p as it would be if he were simply being dogmatic.

The space of hypotheses mechanism relies on the following claim: ‘The Key Epistemological Fact: For a given body of evidence and a given hypothesis that purports to explain that evidence how confident one should be that the hypothesis is true depends on the space of alternative hypotheses of which one is aware’ (Kelly, forthcoming: 14).

Now, suppose B is presented with some evidence, E, which under hypothesis, H, is evidence supporting p.

Given that B initially believed not-p, he will be motivated to seek a plausible alternative hypothesis, HA, under which E is not evidence for p. This expands the hypothesis space of B and by The Key Epistemological Fact reduces the amount of credence B gives E as supporting evidence for p . By contrast, A sees E, as explained by H, as consistent with his initial belief about p. Thus, A does not search for other hypotheses and consequently does not encounter HA, hence maintaining the same hypothesis space he began with.

‘Over time this invisible hand process tends to bestow a certain competitive advantage on our prior beliefs with respect to conformation and disconfirmation’ (Kelly, forthcoming: 15).

So far, I have explained the phenomena of belief polarisation and argued that it is best explained by the processes embedded in the scrutiny mechanism and the space of hypothesis mecha25

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one’s own conclusion could be plausibly construed as not providing such support.

“How can atheists best go about persuading theists they are mistaken?”

Illustrator - Chris Mooney

nism. It is important to make clear the epistemic status of these respective claims. The phenomenon of belief polarisation is supported by much empirical evidence and thus is essentially confirmed. By contrast, the psychological mechanisms used to explain it in this article are arguments to the best explanation; moreover, it is nowhere argued that because these psychological mechanisms are the most prevalent cause of belief polarisation that they cause it in all subjects – there may well be some dogmatists out there.

Before discussing religion then, I want to summarise my answer to the second question I asked earlier: “assuming the beliefs of A and B do polarise, are they being unreasonable?” Answer: If the psychological process I have described causes the polarisation, then they are not being unreasonable. They are rejecting evidence for legitimate reasons 26

and/or following a plausible epistemic principle.

II With regard to religion or otherwise, the moral of the story so far has been that, even if one is convinced that one’s opinion for a particular conclusion is based on legitimate lines of reasoning and sound epistemic principles, this is not in itself enough to guarantee one’s conclusion has been arrived at from a random sample of evidence. Indeed, assuming that one has been exposed to a mixed body of evidence and that the cause of the putative polarisation of one’s views has come about on the model described, it seems to me the best way to remedy the problem is to spend more time searching for problems in one’s own evidence and looking for plausible hypotheses under which the evidence one uses to support

The question I want to address in this section is this: “How can atheists best go about persuading theists they are mistaken?” Since space will not permit arguing these points, assume atheism is both true and the rational conclusion from the available evidence.

Now, it may seem that from the discussion of belief polarisation that the answer is obvious: simply, atheists must point out flaws in the theist’s evidence and expand their hypothesis space to explain the evidence theists see as evidence for God, in a way that casts it in a different light. This is of course correct; however, it is insufficient to stop here. For it seems that simply making people aware of these arguments is not enough, atheists must find a way of making theists listen empathetically to their arguments and to critically engage with them.

The point above may seem not to follow from my argument. If belief polarisation functions by the mechanisms I have described, then surely “reversing” the effects of these mechanisms should be sufficient to eliminate the bias. It is important here to note

that belief polarisation is particularly prevalent when the antecedent beliefs are ones which are emotionally important to the person holding them and consequently are beliefs one will fight before giving up. Thus, I explain this apparent indiscrepancy by suggesting that another psychological mechanism is at play. I believe the mechanism is of the following kind: the theist is aware at the outset or at some point in the reasoning process that a particular line of argument may lead to a conclusion he does not wish to accept, therefore he will look for some way of making compatible both his antecedent belief and the points of the argument he initially finds objectionable.

In some cases this will simply manifest as the dogmatism that I dismissed as unreasonable earlier. However, I think that much of the time it is something slightly more subtle than this. I do not so much think that the theist dogmatically resists conclusions that his reasoning leads him to, but rather that he will alter his principles of reason to accommodate his antecedent belief and, say, a putative falsification of it. One advantage of doing this is that the theist can maintain his antecedent belief whilst accepting that on “other” principles of reason this-and-that would be a counter-example to it. As a way of arguing, challenging principles of reason also provides a much better strategy: whereas being dogmatic is always unreasonable, challenging the princi27

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ples of reason is a potentially justified move. There is much to be said about the epistemic status of “scientific fact” and even the laws of deductive reasoning are not set in stone. Indeed, there is no knock-down argument to most objections of this kind. If, however, one alters one’s principle of reason only to accommodate a specific belief with a specific piece of evidence, then it is uncontroversial that the argument is ad hoc. Thus, the theist adopts the strategy of clinging to his antecedent belief by challenging counter-arguments, not in their content, but in their form . What is important is that if all such arguments are ad hoc, then the theist is still being manifestly unreasonable.

What one should not take this argument as saying is that the typical theist does not care about reason at all. I do not believe it is true. Doubtless, the religious dialogue outside academic circles rarely focuses on points of reason. Indeed, all too frequently vacuous terms like “true for me” or “a deeper truth” are used to describe what is expressed by the propositions assented to by theists . The idea of relative truth is absurd, and whilst the idea of separate metaphysical categories of truth should not be dismissed out of hand, I doubt whether the typical advocate of such a view could give expression in other terms to the idea of “deeper truth”. Yet, what is important is that the theist is, like we saw before, paying more attention to principles of reason: 28

the intellectual defence of his position now hangs on some point about how reasoning should be conducted. Imperatively, I speculate that advocates of theism are vehemently opposed to the idea that a reasonable account of their theism could not be provided.

So, my recommendation for atheists involved in debates with theists is to begin the argument by “being a bit meta”. Specifically, try to overtly establish common-ground with the theist on things like principles of inference, the nature of truth, the weakness of empirical hypotheses that are unfalsifiable, etc. Then, as the standard arguments that seek to scrutinise theistic arguments and expand the hypothesis space in a congenial manner are put into play, there is no retreat, conscious or otherwise, for the theist to ad hoc principles of reason.

Bibliography: Kelly, Thomas (forthcoming) ‘Disagreement Dogmatism and Belief Polarisation’ forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.

Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) ‘Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37, No.11, pp.2098-2109.

Aiden Woodcock is currently reading PPE in his 3rd year at the Univeristy of York

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014

The value of Buddhism in the Age of Reason Henry Tozer In a world increasingly driven by the empirical discoveries of science, religion is seen by many as a simplistic, ungrounded nostalgia.

Yet the advancements of modern science have not been met with a corresponding increase in human happiness. Indeed, it might be said that there seems to be more stress and unhappiness than ever before. This essay seeks to demonstrate the value of Buddhism in the Age of Reason through three main points. First, Buddhism is compatible with science and can itself be seen as a scientific method. Second, it is relevant and practical to modern people in their daily lives. Third, it relies upon logic, not blind faith, so retains authenticity and reliability in the Age of Reason. Buddhism offers an alternative between the fundamentalism of the creationist view and the nihilism of the atheist, materialistic position: an alternative science which is equally empirically verifiable but establishes how reality is in the very nature of peace and joy, and how each of us possesses the potential to experience this reality.

The last century has witnessed an unprecedented shift in global consciousness: from religion to science. As the tenets of science have become more widespread, the seemingly ungrounded, unscientific nature of religion and faith has led to its general dismissal as mere superstition. Ironically, atheism has been called the “fastest growing religion” , whilst simultaneously there has been a rise in more militant, fundamentalist religious groups which totally reject many principles of modern science. For many, it seems that the

concepts of “religion” and “science” are mutually exclusive. But where is Buddhism placed in this polarity?

“Whereas for most people, scientific beliefs are held because of the studies of ‘experts’, in Buddhist practice you can, and are encouraged to, conduct the experiments on yourself.”

Buddhism as a science of the mind In his bestselling book Modern Buddhism, Geshe Kelsang writes: “The instructions given in this book are scientific methods for improving our human nature and qualities through developing the capacity of our mind”(Gyatso, 2011, p: 9). What does this mean? For an experiment to be scientific, it must be replicable and must give the same result each time.

In Buddhism, you are the scientist and your mind is the experiment. You see through your own experience that the more inner peace you develop, the happier you become: it is impossible to develop inner peace and not become happier. Geshe Kelsang subsequently writes “If everyone sincerely practices the path of compassion and wisdom all their problems will be solved and never arise again; I guar29

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy antee this” (Gyatso, 2011, p: 4). Such a claim can surely only be made if this experiment has been carried out many times, and seen to work. In this way, Buddhism can even be seen as more tangible and reliable than conventional science, because you directly experience the result yourself, rather than having to rely upon someone else’s findings. Whereas for most people, scientific beliefs are held because of the studies of ‘experts’, in Buddhist practice you can, and are encouraged to, conduct the experiments on yourself. Indeed, Buddhist teacher Kadam Morten Clausen, principal teacher of the Kadampa Meditation Center in New York City, says: “Everything that Buddha taught can be empirically verified through your own experience” (Clausen, 2012).

The relevance of Buddhism in the modern world The word “dharma” – the teachings of Buddha – also simply means “truth”. Indeed, the Tibetan term for Buddhist, “Nangpa” literally means “insider” (Rinpoche, 1992), i.e. someone who looks for truth inside the mind.

Buddhism is sometimes translated as “inner science”: a science of the mind, a science of happiness. In Buddha’s first teaching, the Sutra of the Four Noble Truths, he says: “You should know sufferings” (Gyatso, 2011, p: 44). In this very first teaching, Buddha is presenting something that we can all relate to. We all suffer.

We all want to be happy. But again and again, we experience problems. For many of us, there is a sense of living life in denial – denial of the inevitability of sicking, ageing and death, denial of the reality of our underlying discontent.

Buddhism utterly embraces and faces these realities. Indeed, it is for this reason that for some people, Buddhism can seem negative, morbid and depressing. But it is only through 30

an honest recognition of reality that one can develop the authentic minds of renunciation and compassion, which are by nature deeply peaceful and joyful minds.

The Second Noble truth states: “You should abandon origins” (Gyatso, 2011, p: 56). Here, Buddha is saying that if we wish to be truly happy and free from all suffering (which we do), we need to abandon the causes of our suffering. What are those causes? Normally we feel that suffering is the consequence of undesired external situations, such as when our car breaks down, we become ill, or our partner leaves us. But Buddha flips this on its head and says: “Happiness and suffering are states of mind and so their main causes are not to be found outside the mind. If we want to be truly happy and free from suffering, we must learn how to control our mind” (Gyatso, 2011, p: 9). So then we see that our main problems are not our difficult external circumstances, our main problems are our unpleasant feelings in our mind: our internal responses to adverse external conditions. Geshe Kelsang continues, “If we were to respond to difficult situations with a positive or peaceful mind they would not be problems for us; indeed, we may even come to regard them as challenges or opportunities for growth and development” (Gyatso, 2011, pp: 9-10).

Some may argue that modern psychology combined with modern medicine offers sufficient solutions to depression and anxiety, but it is clear that relying upon a drug to be “happy” only treats the symptoms, neglecting the underlying causes of the depression. Ultimately, although of course such treatments can be helpful for certain people at certain times, they are founded on a sense of running away from life, of escapism and denial, and can

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“Popular science asserts that the underlying nature of conscious beings is of selfishness, or at least self-centredness. Buddhism on the other hand identifies a much deeper reality, seeing that selfishness is merely a superficial, surface-level construction, whereas limitless joy and limitless love are intrinsic to the mind.” never be a permanent solution because true happiness is not found through suppression, but acceptance. We can see from our own experience that happiness comes from inner peace. Popular science asserts that the underlying nature of conscious beings is of selfishness, or at least self-centredness. Buddhism on the other hand identifies a much deeper reality, seeing that selfishness is merely a superficial, surface-level construction, whereas limitless joy and limitless love are intrinsic to the mind: they are part of the nature of consciousness itself. By simply letting go of your ordinary worries and unhappy thoughts, the mind naturally becomes peaceful: you don’t have to force peace onto your mind. This clearly indicates that the nature of the mind is peaceful. Buddhism is an exploration of reality. Love, for example, is seen to be reality through recognising the interdependence of all beings: how we totally depend upon others for everything we have and enjoy, and how at heart all living beings are just like us – they just want to be happy and free from suffering.

Through deeply recognising these truths a feeling of connection and love naturally arises, because it is in accord with reality.

Buddha can be seen as the ultimate psychologist. His teachings on Ultimate Truth, or emptiness, to which all his other teachings

lead, reveal how all of our painful feelings and problems have their basis in a hallucination, a misunderstanding of the way things exist, particularly the way our self exists. For example, on a day to day basis most of us relate to ourselves as fixed and limited individuals – perhaps thinking “I am insecure” or “I am not good enough”. We grasp onto this, believing it to be real, and we suffer accordingly. Buddha says that if this self were to exist in the way that it appears (i.e. as real and independent of all other phenomena), then it must be findable. Essentially these teachings boil down to a very simple question: is the insecure self that I am relating to inside or outside the mind? Clearly it is inside the mind. If it is inside the mind, then it is just a thought, just an idea, just a mental construct. And if it is just an idea, then we can let it go.

All this is easy to talk, read or think about, but is it possible to actually live in a way such that we are not constrained by our limited view of ourself and others? That is where meditation comes in. Buddha taught that through meditation we can learn to reduce negative, harmful minds or thoughts, and increase our positive, beneficial minds, until ultimately we have eradicated all mistaken minds and our whole being corresponds to reality. Geshe Dag Powa says, “Since our present state of mind is impermanent, if we 31

VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy practise [meditation] in this way repeatedly, although we may think we have no hope of gaining profound realizations, we shall gain them quickly” (Gyatso, 2011, p: 87). However, in our modern world it is not possible to spend most of our day meditating, so it vital to be able to transform our daily activities and enjoyments into the spiritual path. Buddha’s tantric teachings give us practical methods to do this. Indeed, Buddha teaches that right now we have perfect conditions to train our mind.

In this essay I have demonstrated how Buddhism holds up to intellectual scrutiny, modern science and the eclecticism of modern society and culture. It is compatible with modern science, being scientifically verifiable; it is relevant to people of the modern world because it provides practical solutions to the stresses and insecurities of modern people; and it is based on logic, not blind faith, so its very tenets are based on the principles of the Enlightenment. Therefore, we can conclusively state that Buddhism is of great value in the Age of Reason.

Logic, not blind faith

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[Accessed 7 February 2014].

Gyatso, G. K., 1992. Clear Light of Bliss.

2nd ed. Ulverston: Tharpa Publications.

Gyatso, G. K., 1995. Joyful Path of Good Fortune. 2nd ed. Ulverston: Tharpa Publications.

Gyatso, G. K., 2011. Modern Buddhism: The Path of Compassion and Wisdom.

Ulverston: Tharpa Publications.

Gyatso, G. K., 2013. How to Understand the Mind. Ulverston: Tharpa Publications.

What about faith? Interestingly, although a necessary initial step, correct beliefs are seen in Buddhism to be deceptive minds because they do not understand the object directly through experience (Gyatso, 2011, p: 249).

Buddha himself famously said: “Do not accept my teachings simply because I am called Buddha.” Geshe Kelsang writes:

Rinpoche, D. P., 1992. “Buddhism as a Science of Mind”, excerpted from a transcript on the “Khejuk Teachings”. [Online] Available at: http://www.dpr.info/teachings. htm [Accessed 7 February 2014].

Time and time again, [Buddha] reminded his disciples not to accept his teachings out of blind faith, but to test them as thoroughly as they would assay gold. It is only on the basis of valid reasons and personal experience that we should accept the teachings of anyone, including Buddha himself. (Gyatso, 2011, p: 156) This is perhaps at the heart of why Buddhism still holds value in the present day, the Age of Reason: it is based on experience and logical reasoning. Buddhism presents a middle way between the fundamentalist creationist view and the materialist nihilist view, demonstrating a real alternative: a scientific, wonderful reality.

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Photographer - Secil Gevora

Bibliography: Clausen, K. M., 2012. Buddhism as a “Science of the Mind” [Interview] Available at http://bigthink.com/users/kadammorten

Henry Tozer is currently studying Music in his 3rd year at the Univeristy of Cambridge 33

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Non-Rational Foundations of Scientific Worldview Khalil Hamadouche In most contemporary Western societies representations of religious and secular worldviews differ in some way or another on notions of “reality, the good life, and human destiny” (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997: 69). Recently, some secular and atheist camps have begun advocating for a wholesale rejection of religious comprehensive perspectives on the grounds that they are absurd and based on unreasonable foundations, while theirs is rational and based on science and reason. This paper examines whether science and reason alone can form the basis of a comprehensive perspective. I will argue that they cannot because essential issues, such as fundamental ethical questions, fall beyond their scope.

The first part of this essay concerns itself with the teleological foundations of religious worldviews. It is in this context that I intend to undergird my proposition that secular worldviews according to their own principles cannot dismiss their religious counterparts out of hand. The second part, then, turns to the limited role of reason, particularly in the field of ethics. It is appropriate to mention why I have chosen to deal with this topic: In my opinion, humankind’s religious heritage, in which we find 34

the accumulated wisdom of many great scholars of previous centuries, has provided great answers to those great questions that all human beings are forced to ask at one time or another: Where do we come from? Why are we here? Where are we going? How do we lead a blissful life? What gives us fulfillment? I think that religion offers an eminently plausible way of making sense of the world and of improving the human condition. As such, it is worth defending.

The state referred to as “flow” by psychologists is a good metaphor to illustrate two key elements of religion: teleological reasoning and mystical experience.

Sometimes during a match, often in the context of goalscoring opportunities, footballers reach a mental state of complete absorption with total concentration and intrinsic enjoyment. They feel that their thoughts, movements and sensations come together in an unusual yet natural way. In psychology, this holistic sensation is called flow (Busch et al.

2013: 239). In the Islamic worldview, everything we perceive around us and within us is a sign that points beyond itself to its divine originator and sustainer. The tradition classifies the signs of God into prophetic signs

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and natural signs. The prophetic signs can be subdivided into oral or written (scripture) and physical (miracles).

The natural signs can be subdivided into external (pertaining to the world around us) and internal (pertaining to ourself ) (Murata and Chittick 2006: 54). Muslims see in natural phenomena signs that point to the divine. Similar to the example above, where the separate activities of determining the best cause of action, running, passing and shooting during a football game are part of one game and relatively meaningless in and of themselves, separate natural phenomena prove their worth only when understood as signs that indicate divine unity.

The Qur’ān frequently exhorts the reader to ponder the signs, saying: “We shall show them Our signs in every region of the earth [lit. in the horizons] and in themselves, until it becomes clear to them that this is the Truth. Is it not enough that your Lord witnesses everything?” (Abdel Haleem 2004: 310). Consider the following brief example of one of those signs

in the horizons: “Do they not see the birds above them spreading and closing their wings? It is only the Lord of Mercy who holds them up: He watches over everything” (Abdel Haleem 2004: 383). With regard to these signs, Islam holds that human beings are of three sorts: there are those who are distracted by the singular facts and get lost in them; there are those who on occasion perceive the unifying principle behind every fact; and there are those who are in constant cognizance of the ultimate reality. The last type then comprises the saints who are in a mystical flowlike state, that is, they continually see the signs for what they are, they are not preoccupied with the signs, but focus on the divine that the signs point to.

Let me turn to the role of teleological reasoning on the one hand, and scientific-rational reasoning on the other, in the field of the natural sciences. Both types of reasoning attempt to explain natural phenomena. Teleology identifies these phenomena as signs and tries to grasp the language of the natural signs. In a certain sense, this is

“Modern science may claim that such comprehensive perspectives are based on rationally unverifiable foundations, but that is very different from claiming that those foundations are wrong or absurd.”

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Montage - Crying June

what modern science does; it tries to understand the message of nature and the cosmos. According to Murata and Chittick, however, “science has certain presuppositions about the nature of reality, and hence it leaves aside the question of God, considering it irrelevant to the scientific enterprise” (2006: 54-55). They refer to a development that took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when philosophers and scientists began to abandon teleological explanations in science, not because they were deemed wrong, but because the intellectual tradition held that they could not be proven true or false (Johnson 2008: 23-24). In other words, modern science from that time onwards has concerned itself with strictly scientific claims, that is, claims that are empirically and rationally falsifiable. Any claims that lie outside the 36

physical (empirical and rational) realm are beyond science.

Rejecting teleology because it is impossible to rationally validate has interesting implications. If modern science has chosen to take the path of only concerning itself with statements that can be falsified by reason, then what judgments can modern science make on those comprehensive perspectives (such as Islam) that do base themselves on teleology?

Modern science may claim that such comprehensive perspectives are based on rationally unverifiable foundations, but that is very different from claiming that those foundations are wrong or absurd. If, for example, the proposition “God exists” is based on teleological reasoning, along the lines of the argument that “the universe

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exhibits a fantastic complexity and this complexity and design indicate the existence of a Creator”, then modern science cannot falsify this statement (as it lies beyond the empirical and rational). Modern science is not interested in the question of whether God exists. What it can do – as indeed it does – is to provide an alternative, mechanistic-causative explanation of the cosmos and our existence. One could also argue, in line with John Gray, that modern science, confined by the premises on which it operates, is a method of inquiry rather than a settled view of the world (Gray 2011, “Delusions of Peace”, para. 7).

“Modern science is not interested in the question of whether God exists. What it can do – as indeed it does – is to provide an alternative, mechanistic-causative explanation of the cosmos and our existence.”

If modern science cannot falsify teleological reasoning on its home turf (natural sciences), how does it fare in the field of ethics? In fact, I believe that modern science cannot furnish a settled view of the world, as empirically and rationally verifiable knowledge cannot be obtained in fields of knowledge that lie outside the natural

sciences, particularly when it comes to ethics. Few philosophers share John Locke’s opinion that it is possible to construct a deductive system of moral truths, a so-called scientia of morality (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997: 87-88).

Secular modern ethicists seem to agree that human reason has a limited domain when it comes to ethics (Blackburn 2003: 95). Unlike in mathematics and logic, they point out, ethics is the domain of preference and choice.

Here, the heart (i.e. emotions) is a considerable actor. Even basic concerns, such as solidarity with others, ultimately depend on sympathy and sympathy is not determined by reason alone. We might say that reason is involved in our approach to understand and describe the world. It is because we must act in the world that we need to know about it, but what we then prescribe is beyond reason’s jurisdiction (Blackburn 2003: 95-96). Hence, a form of scientism, a comprehensive perspective rooted in scientific knowledge alone seems out of the question.

To add another important point, much of the content and substantive assumptions of our rationality, are not filtered through empirical and rational lenses, they are acquired during our childhood and have a dramatic influence on the way we see the world. Wael Hallaq (2009: 14-15) makes the cogent remark that, for example, the content of our modern rationalist thinking about the natural environment may be 37

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our immediate concern with material welfare and physical comfort, but the consequences of this thinking could lead to environmental disaster. On the other hand, if the positive content of our rationalist thinking were to be, say, the integrity of the natural order, then our conclusions and resultant actions and effects would be entirely different, despite the fact that nothing in our rationalist methods themselves has changed. The majority of Muslim scholars thus adopted the position that content and substantive assumptions must be predetermined by the all-knowing God, who has revealed a particular body of knowledge through the Qur’ān and the Prophet Muammad. This combination is viewed as a marriage between reason and revelation (Murad 2012: 66).

our present age the “Age of Reason” is to believe in the universal applicability of the scientific method - but it merits no such monopoly over knowledge and truth.

In conclusion, I do not think that we can construct a comprehensive perspective on reason alone. Ethics is an integral part of any comprehensive perspective and ethical deliberations are not based purely on reason. It follows, then, that any comprehensive perspective, including a secular perspective, cannot be based on reason alone. As a result, even a secular comprehensive perspective can lay no claim to objective or universal truth and denounce religious comprehensive perspectives as unreasonable. This paper’s chain of argumentation calls the present journal’s title “Religion in the Age of Reason” into question. To call

Busch, H., Hofer, J., Chasiotis, A., Campos, D. (2013) “The achievement flow motive as an element of the autotelic personality: predicting educational attainment in three cultures”, Educational Psychology Review, vol. 28, pp.

239-254.

Bibliography: Abdel Haleem, M. A. S., 2004, The Qur’an: A new translation by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford world’s classics), Oxford UP, Oxford.

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Johnson, M. R., 2008, Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford UP, Oxford.

Murad, A. H., 2012, Commentary on the Eleventh Contentions, The Quilliam Press, Cambridge.

Murata, S. & Chittick, W., 2006, The Vision of Islam, 2nd edn, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London.

Audi, R. & Wolterstorff, N., 1997, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., London.

Blackburn, S., 2003, Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford UP, Oxford.

Gray, J. 2011, Delusions of Peace, Prospect Magazine, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ magazine/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/#.UsX_TbSSnC9 [accessed on 10 January 2014].

Khalil Hamadouche is currently reading Oriental Studies in his 3rd year at the University of Oxford 39

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Abraham’s Dilemma and The Radical Dependence of Morality on God

“For many, the relationship between religion and morality is one of grounding: facts about God, such as his nature and what he commands, wills, desires, intends, and so on, ground facts about morality, such as what is morally right and wrong, obligatory and permissible, good and bad.”

Dr David Efird

Rev’d Dr David Efird received his doctoral degree from the University of Oxford and is currently a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of York. His research focuses on modality (i.e. the philosophy of necessity and possibility) and philosophical theology. In his contribution to VOX, Dr Efird concerns himself with ‘Abraham’s Dilemma’, thus, addressing one of the most challenging moral dilemmas for divine command theorists.

Painting - De Agostini

Imagine the scene: Abraham, a now old man, is taking his son, Isaac, a son he never thought he would have, up a mountain.

Unbeknownst to Isaac, Abraham is intending to sacrifice him. Abraham is doing this not out of any malice or hatred towards Isaac; quite the contrary: he loves Isaac very much. He is doing this 40

out of love, love for God and he believes with as much certainty as he has for any of his perceptual beliefs that God has commanded him to kill his son. Abraham further believes, out of this love for God, that what God commands is, of necessity, morally right. Yet he cannot seem to shake the deeply held intuition that killing his

son would be morally wrong, horrendous, even. So, what should Abraham do?

This dilemma, with some poetic licence, is taken from the 22nd chapter of Genesis, the first book of both the Hebrew and Christian Bible. It has inspired countless theological and philosophical reflections, taking us deep into the heart of morality and its relationship to God. For many, the relationship between religion and morality is one of grounding: facts about God, such as his nature and what he commands, wills, desires, intends, and so on, ground facts about morality, such as what is morally right and wrong, obligatory and permissible, good and bad.

Such facts about God are, thus, given a metaphysical explanation of facts about morality such that facts about morality are true in virtue of facts about God. By analogy, facts about H2O give a metaphysical explanation of facts about water such that facts about water are true in virtue of facts about H2O. Importantly, what follows from this account of facts about God is that those who believe, or know, moral facts, also believe, or know, facts about God, in just the same way that believing, or knowing, facts about water does entail believing, or knowing, facts about H2O. On this account of God’s grounding morality, then, atheists can believe, and know,

moral facts just as well as theists can.

For simplicity, and since it is all we need in order to think about Abraham’s dilemma, let’s restrict ourselves to what’s often called ‘Divine Command Theory’, according to which: (1) Necessarily, if God commands that I ϕ, it is morally right for me to ϕ.

(2) Necessarily, if God commands that I not-ϕ, it is morally wrong for me to ϕ.

(3) Necessarily, if God doesn’t command that I ϕ and doesn’t command that I not-ϕ, it is morally permissible for me to ϕ.

Now, Abraham’s dilemma seems to pose a counter-example to the first claim, since Abraham is certain that God has commanded him to kill his son, and so, according to the first claim, it follows that it is morally right for Abraham to kill his son, which contradicts his moral intuition that it is morally wrong to kill his son, since nothing, it seems can be both morally right and morally wrong. So, what should Abraham do? Here are some options:

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VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy Option (1): Abraham should reject his belief that God commanded him to sacrifice his son, no matter that he is as certain as he is about it as he is of any of his perceptual beliefs. He should do so because it is impossible for God to command such a thing. Since God is essentially good, it would be logically impossible for him to command Abraham to kill his son. Even though God is omnipotent, he cannot do the logically impossible. And so God, even though he is essentially omnipotent, cannot command Abraham to kill his son, since he is essentially good.

My worry about Option (1) is that it seems inconsistent with (DCT1). How is it that, given (DCT1), God’s being essentially good entails that God cannot command Abraham to kill his son? For (DCT1) expresses God’s sovereignty over the moral, and maintaining that God’s being essentially good entails that God cannot command Abraham to kill his son requires a standard of goodness apart from the sovereignty of God. So, if (DCT1) is true, how could it be impossible for God to command Abraham to kill his son?

Option (2): Abraham should reject his belief, no matter how deeply held it is, that it is morally wrong for him to kill his son. This belief is founded on an intuition, an intuition that need not be reliable.

As fallen creatures affected by sin and the disorder it brings, we should not trust our intuitions, since the noetic effects of sin, that is the effects of sin on the mind, are as damaging as the volitional effects of sin, that is, the effects of sin on the will. 2 My worry about Option (2) is that, 42

even if it is granted that our intuitions are unreliable, to the extent that Abraham’s intuition that it is morally wrong to kill his son is unreliable, that intuition will be at best only defeated and not explained away.

An intuition is defeated when it is thought that that intuition is false, for some, usually theoretical reason, for example, inconsistency with (DCT1). An intuition is explained away when it is shown that it is the result of a confusion, and if we had been thinking properly, we never would have had it in the first place. Intuitions that are explained away vanish like the morning mist. Intuitions that are defeated hang around like a bad smell. So, Option (2) is never going to be definitively convincing for divine command theorists because it only defeats the intuition that it is morally wrong for Abraham to kill his son.

Option (3): Abraham should modify his belief, born out of love, that what God commands is, by necessity, morally right.

Instead, taking a lead from his own love for both his son and for God, he should believe that what a loving God commands is morally right. Since commanding him to kill his son is not an act of a loving God, he should not believe that it is morally right for him to kill his son.3 My worry about Option (3) is that, while Abraham is no longer morally obligated to kill his son, it remains morally permissible for him to do so. That is, in these circumstances, it would not be morally wrong for Abraham to disobey God and not kill his son. But equally, it would not be morally wrong to obey God and to kill his son either, since a loving God has not forbidden him so to do.

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“Abraham should take a loving God to be the source of morality: if God were not loving, then there would be no moral truths whatsoever. So, in such circumstances Abraham is not morally obligated to obey God, since he is not loving as shown in his command to Abraham to kill his son.”

Option (4): Abraham should modify his belief, born out of love, that what God commands is, by necessity, morally right.

Instead, Abraham should take a loving God to be the source of morality: if God were not loving, then there would be no moral truths whatsoever. So, in such circumstances Abraham is not morally obligated to obey God, since he is not loving as shown in his command to Abraham to kill his son. Thus, it would not be morally right, or morally wrong, or morally permissible for Abraham to obey God; indeed, in such circumstances, killing his son is neither morally right, nor morally wrong, nor morally permissible. So, if Abraham were really commanded by God to kill his son, God would not be loving, and there would be no facts about morality whatsoever.

love for us, by postulating a truly radical dependence of morality on God, such that in circumstances in which there is no loving God, there are no truths about morality whatsoever. Thus, where there is no love, there is no morality, either. This, I think, is the heart of Divine Command Theory and the best way for Divine Command Theorists to approach Abraham’s dilemma.

Option (4) is my preferred way of dealing with Abraham’s dilemma. It has none of the features I found objectionable to Options (1)-(3), it is clearly consistent with (a modified form of ) (DCT1), it requires no deeply held intuitions to be defeated, and on it, it is not morally permissible for Abraham to kill his son. But even more importantly, it expresses more fully the spirit of Divine Command Theory, a theory born out of love for God and God’s 43

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Believe Like Econo.myst

the “real” world around him.

Tomáš Sedláček

“If one reads between the lines and approaches its underlying assumptions from a different, critical perspective, one will sooner or later find that economics only poses as value-free.

In reality, it dictates values, norms and beliefs.”

Tomáš Sedláček is a Czech economist and university lecturer. He is the Chief Macroeconomic Strategist at ČSOB, a former member of the National Economic Council of the Czech Republic and an economic advisor to former President Václav Havel. In 2006, the Yale Economic Review mentioned him in an article titled “Young Guns: 5 Hot Minds in Economics”. His book ‘Economics of Good and Evil’, a bestseller in the Czech Republic, was translated into English and published by the Oxford University Press in June, 2011.

Ideology in the ‘post-ideological era’ Some describe the current era as postideological. However, in ‘The Plague of Fantasies’ Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek importantly points out that, in fact, quite the opposite is true. The era we live in is the most ideological ever. The home run of every ideology is to look like no ideology at all, for us not to even think about it as such, to appear natural and ‘God-given’ to the point we don’t even recognize it.

This translates into us perceiving it as an ultimate truth, without even realizing that we are dealing with ideology, a belief system that mystifies the real problem.

One of the most influential and most agreed upon ideologies of our times is economics. Yet it is often praised as being ideology- and value-free, somehow neutral, an unorchestrated orchestrator that leads us into the future, guarantor 44

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of peace and harmony. We understand that there are various cultures, many religions, different beliefs, but only one oecumenic economy. But if one reads between the lines and approaches its underlying assumptions from a different, critical perspective, one will sooner or later find that economics only poses as value-free. In reality, it dictates values, norms and beliefs. The economy has become normative backwards: We are not supposed to give it any norms and values, it grants norms and values to us. Economics has become the most commonly-shared global belief.

It is often believed that faith is the result of fear. In other words, at first one experiences certain kind of fear, for example fear of the unknown. In response to that, one creates some kind of a belief or ideology, which helps him manage his fears and hopes. People are ruled by the idea that a human “created” faith or ideology as a response to

But that very idea is already a part of the ideology. The dialectical relationship between fear and faith/ideology could also be completely antithetic.

What if fear was the result of an ideology or a belief system? Indeed, fear on its own, without ideology, is not a conclusive phenomenon. Only ideology creates a framework of what is to be feared and how to react to it. For instance, one first needs to believe in vampires, in order to be afraid of them.

Death in itself is not scary, it is the ideology around it that makes it so. Only a belief in a divine judgment, possibility of heaven (and thus also deprivation of thereof ) makes the concept and inevitability of death ideology-laden and fearsome.

From this point of view, ideology is not a reaction to the fear of the unknown, but exactly the opposite. The

Unknown is just a vacuum, a gap in an ideology. The Unknown is an ideologically empty place, one in which ideology is uncertain, insufficient or unconvincing. The Unknown is a place where ideology cannot fully exercise its explanatory power. The Unknown exists only within some ideology, not outside of it. The Unknown cannot exist without an ideology, just as these paradoxical relationships between fear and faith cannot.

There is a crack in everything If this statement is indeed true, then we should focus on the fears of our economic ideology rather than remain oblivious to its very existence. To do so means to reveal the weakest point of an ideology and is not without a strong benefit: As Leonardo Cohen sings “there is a crack in everything, that is how the light gets in”. A place where ideology is quiet is usually guarded by a taboo - ghosts lurk in the dark or spontaneously emerge to spook around, so that nobody goes there. Confronted with such a taboo one should ask whether this fear is functional and necessary (such as fear of pain) or whether it exists only in the abstract (fear of ghosts, death, the unknown, etc.) - albeit the two are often inseparably linked. Furthermore, one should examine whether this fear can be used as a tool of intellectual, political or economic control.

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VOX | The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Photographer - Günay Mutlu

“Our problem is not, as often believed, that markets, consumers and investors suffer from too little confidence, but the contrary: We have believed in our own models, hopes and myths too blindly, too readily.”

Now, how does all of this relate back to economics? For instance, the omnipresent and all-dictating fear of an economic slowdown has acquired religious dimensions. It stems from the belief that our system has to self-improve constantly, that the economy has to grow at all times and at all costs. If not, our civilization will disassemble, markets will collapse, and democracies will vanish. Europe as we know it will plunge back to war. This fear could be examined in different ways. Most importantly, it reveals that our ideology cannot work within such a businesscycle properly. It cannot explain it per46

suasively, and cannot dominate at all.

Naturally, ideology can also create a positive sense of security, where the dose of fear is appropriate. However, our problem is not, as often believed, that markets, consumers and investors suffer from too little confidence, but the contrary: We have believed in our own models, hopes and myths too blindly, too readily. Neither is the problem the lack of trust – or absence of a commonly shared ideology – but exactly the opposite: Before the crisis, Western banks were lending too trustfully and markets enjoyed more reli-

Issue XXIII - Spring 2014

ance than they deserved – as did our ever-so sanguine economic prophecies, based on fairytale-like models. Likewise, rating agencies were giving excessive amounts of ever-so-better-thanreal-life ratings with no legible signs of distress, until the distress came.

The result was an over-confident attitude, full alliance with our economic ideology which, naturally, was not in a position to meet our expectations. If we would have only believed a bit less, if only we would have been a little bit more sceptical, and thus a little more careful, if interest rates were higher and if the borrowing was not coming so easily, many pitfalls could have been avoided. Hand in hand with the much favoured “just believe in yourself ” there seems to come the understanding that one needs to simply believe in the very ideology that one fancied around oneself. This seems to hold not only for individuals, but also for entire civilizations.

What do Economists believe in?

For a long time, “The Economics” by Paul Samuelson was arguably the Bible of mainstream economics. Based on this book generations of young students were trained to „think like an economist“. It seems to me that one would have to immediately ask: which one? Like eclectic Keynes? Or reductionist Friedman? Or moral-philosopher Adam Smith? Or Hayek? Or

is his book supposed to be describing their mutual agreement? But if one can be sure of one thing it is that if we put all of the above in one room, the one thing they would be the least likely to agree upon would be the content of this very textbook.

But what is it then – to think like an economist? Would it not be more appropriate to say ”think like Paul Samuelson, without explicitly saying it“? Or, would it not be more precise to say that we are teaching the students to believe what Paul Samuleson believed, and as economists believe?

The method, the issues, what we measure and what we do not, the hidden beliefs and values disguised as common sense assumptions and selection of (un-)important issues brought to our attention while reading the book.

Nowadays, the key to being a successful economist seems to be exactly in not seeing and not thinking about certain issues - i.e. those that lie outside the current, mainstream framework.

Robert Nelson, the author of Economics as Religion, describes the method of transforming one’s worldview into what seems to be a scientifically valid argument: On many pages we present a rigorously mathematical proof and somewhere in the middle of the mathematical discourse insert a sentence such as “and because we assume/believe that man is a free and rational being we can continue the proof…” and then 47

Call For Papers “Even in the age of reason (we believe in reason, we believe reasonably), we cannot abstain from religion for too long. In fact, the latter seems to be part of the human construction. It is so strongly rooted in one’s mind, that one can find its traces even in a rock-solid mathematically constructed homo oeconomicus.” return to mathematics. At the end of the “proof ” twice underline and write QED (quod erat demonstrandum, which was to be proved) and the result seems to satisfy the conditions of a ‘scientific proof ’. However, instead of achieving rigorous effects of a logical process, by smuggling in one’s own political or ethical judgments, we end up with a pseudo-scientific argument.

And here, I think, lies the core of the issue. It is not that economics needs values. Economics already has its own, built-in ethics. While economics tries to appear non-normative, its normative nature is inbuilt backwards – it tells you what the values are and what the ethics is. The normativity is in the “is”: human being is proxied by homo economicus, which is rational, egoistic and free to make choices. We are not to prescribe norms and values to it, it will give them to us. It is telling us how to think properly („think like an economist!“), it dictates which values are important (the ones that are measured as opposed to those 48

which are not).

Economics poses as a belief-, valueand ideology-free science. In reality, it simply replaces one belief system with another. Even in the age of reason (we believe in reason, we believe reasonably), we cannot abstain from religion for too long. In fact, the latter seems to be part of the human construction.

It is so strongly rooted in one’s mind, that one can find its traces even in a rock-solid mathematically constructed homo oeconomicus. Economics is little more than a belief system, covered by a mathematical cloak. And while there is nothing wrong with it such, we must be wary of its limitations and be a little bit more careful or afraid.

The Final Frontiers Arctic and Space

VOX is calling for submissions for the upcoming summer issue: The Final Frontiers. We welcome students and academics to submit short abstracts, essay plans or completed essays.

Some suggestions to get you thinking: Who owns the Arctic?

Is there a balance between preserving the arctic and the exploitation of its resources?

Is space exploration worth further investment?

Will observatory space technologies affect security and development given increasing space debris and the limited number of satellite paths?

Does China and America’s development of counterspace weapons pose a threat to global security?

Does global warming matter if we can move to space?

Deadline for abstracts and essay plans: 27th April 2014 Deadline for completed essays: 9th May 2014

Essays should be between 1000 and 1500 words and full referenced using the Harvard system. For all submissions and any other queries, email vox@clubofpep.org

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