USA - Poland: Not so special relationship

USA-POLAND:

A NOT SO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (ANY MORE)

Prof. Bohdan Szklarski

Professor Bohdan Szklarski, a professor at the American Studies Center at the University of Warsaw and a lecturer in Collegium Civitas talks to Witold Żygulski.

For many years Poland boasted about the spe-

cial character of its relations with the U.S.; what is left of this today?

The answer has to be twofold. One issue concerns the Polish narrative, how the authorities in Warsaw perceived relations with the US, and the other is how these matters were perceived in Washington. The Polish view was that we were a vital ally for the U.S., both militarily and politically; the American view was that we could be a useful ally in particular political games as well as a valued counterparty to multi-billion dollar arms deals.

The Polish view of the alliance with the U.S. is well illustrated by several old caricatures drawn by Andrzej Mleczko [a popular Polish satirical cartoonist]; in one, a Polish boxer is trying on a giant glove, larger than himself; in another, an American soldier is carrying a flag whose tiny element is the Polish flag, carried by an equally tiny Polish soldier.

However, the authorities in Warsaw, especially in the last years of the so-called United Right governments, consistently

MANIFEST SUPPORT FOR TRUMP DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BEHAVIORS VISIBLE TO THE NAKED EYE, SUCH AS THE MUCH-DELAYED CONGRATULATIONS TO BIDEN BY POLISH PRESIDENT ANDRZEJ DUDA, WERE CERTAINLY NOTICED IN WASHINGTON

promoted a narrative of strategic partnership, in fact being at best a client of the US. What is worse, at some point it was decided that the Polish little ship, which so far has been following the great American battleship, can sail on its own, in the same direction, but without looking at the hegemon’s ship.

Donald Trump’s administration, so well liked in Warsaw, wanted Poland to be America’s mouthpiece in the European Union, to buy American military equipment, and to support the U.S. in military operations around the world, as exemplified by the Polish military presence in Afghanistan or Iraq. Today, however, the U.S. involvement in both countries - especially with the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan - is at least questionable. Poland’s role in the European Union, in turn, has diminished to an extraordinary degree, due to a series of conflicts with the Polish government over the rule of law, media freedom and other systemic issues. The same issues that the Trump administration treated instrumentally, while Joe Biden’s team recognizes as the basis of shared democratic values.

To what extent does the Polish government, which previously bet heavily on Donald Trump, now count with Biden’s new policy?

Manifest support for Trump during the presidential election, behaviors visible to the naked eye, such as the much-delayed congratulations to Biden by Polish President Andrzej Duda, were certainly noticed in Washington. This is evidenced by the fact that the new American president met with Duda only once, on the occasion of the Baltic Leaders Summit, in the corridor, without any diplomatic setting due to a “strategic ally”. We simply ceased to be important, not because of any dislike of the new administration, but because of the many political mistakes we made, both in relations with the United States and with the European Union. Their result has been a loss of position, best demonstrated by the cardinal change in U.S. policy toward the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Joe Biden made a deal with Angela Merkel and cancelled all sanctions against the companies carrying out this investment, without considering the position of Poland,

Ukraine or the Baltic States, which was seen in Warsaw almost as an act of betrayal. We simply ceased to be an ally that Washington counts with and I am afraid that it may take not years but decades to regain this role.

So what were the mistakes you mentioned?

First of all, it was forgotten that the US, with all its pragmatism in foreign policy, is committed to democratic values. This was less evident under Trump, his administration rather wanted Poland to represent the pro-American trend in the EU. But even then we offended Washington, for example with the new law on the Institute of National Remembrance or changes in the re-privatization regulations. According to the US and Israel, they hit the victims of the Holocaust.

The last controversial move of the Polish authorities was, of course, the famous “anti-TVN” law [see also pages 18-19], directly aimed against the most popular independent private television, owned by the media giant Discovery. According to many, the possible entry into force of this regulation [parliamentary procedure is underway] may cause a colossal change in the attitude of American business towards investing in Poland.

Do you think that the act, which many politicians and experts believe is aimed at media freedom, may have serious consequences for Polish-American relations?

I would be far from panicky comments on this issue. The ‘anti-TVN’ law is not that different from media regulations in other European Union countries. So I don’t think that, as some people say, the result of its coming into force will be e.g. reduction of the American military presence in Poland or cancelling lucrative contracts for the USA concerning supply of equipment for the Polish army. Therefore, it is likely that Abrams tanks, Patriot missiles or F-35 fighters will be sold to Poland. This is simply due to business reasons. American servicemen will continue to take pictures with President Duda or Minister of Defense Mariusz Blaszczak. One cannot forget, however, that the American military contingent in Poland, so often boasted by the United Right government, has mainly a symbolic dimension. A few dozen fighter planes or a few bases are of no military importance if, God forbid, a war were to break out in the East. Their presence was and is an act of good will on the part of the U.S., which is aware that the probability of any conflict on the eastern front is negligible.

Another issue, however, a very important one, is the question of investor confidence. If the “lex anti-TVN”, concerning, which is worth emphasizing, the biggest American investment in Poland, came into effect, other companies from the States would think twice whether it is worth putting their capitals into ventures in the Vistula region. After all, there are plenty of places to invest in the world.

A separate issue is of course freedom of the press, a fundamental value for Americans. U.S. senators have already sent several letters to the Polish authorities on this issue and a spokesman for the State Department has also expressed criticism. There is no doubt that the bill pushed through by the ruling majority, targeting a station sympathizing with the opposition, will seriously damage Poland’s image as a country of liberal and democratic values.

In recent months, politicians from the ruling camp have repeatedly accused U.S. diplomats of meddling in Poland’s internal affairs without justification and inconsistent with their status. What do Polish-American diplomatic relations look like today?

The situation is indeed complicated. Witold Waszczykowski, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Law and

Abrams tank, Photo PAP

Andrzej Duda and Joe Biden, Photo PAP

Justice (PiS) government openly writes about the American charge’d’affairs Bix Aliu as a diplomat unacceptably violating his status through comments on violations of the rule of law in Poland, violations of LGBT rights or the aforementioned freedom of the media. Earlier, the former Ambassador Georgette Mosbacher was criticized for her comments on the new legislation on reprivatization. Now the issue of the new ambassador’s prolonged Polish citizenship agreement has been added to the mix [Mark Brzezinski is the son of Zbigniew, former international affairs advisor to President Jimmy Carter].

What role can the new ambassador play?

I think that the appointment of Mark Brzezinski [see also pages 12-13] as ambassador was a kind of goodwill gesture on the part of the Americans. For many years his father was praised in Poland as one of the most outstanding Poles, a star in world political science and diplomacy. He was even proposed as a candidate for the Polish presidency. A candidate for ambassador to Warsaw therefore seemed ideal, and yet the Polish authorities said “no, thank you” to begin with. If I were Mark Brzezinski, then, I would think that I was about to leave for a country that is reluctant to me, a country that elevates my father to the heavens and shuts the door in my face. Brzezinski is a young diplomat, not a classic State Department insider, and not a businessman like his predecessor Georgette Mosbacher. She could call straight to the White House bypassing the State Department. That will no longer be the case, by any means. The new ambassador is not an entrenched figure in American power structures. His appointment was a symbolic gesture, it did not mean that Washington was sending to Warsaw someone really important, a politician who would represent American interests in Poland and Polish interests in the United States. That is the role of an ambassador - he represents the interests of his country in the country where he serves, but at the same time he is the best lobbyist for that country. Yet even before taking up his diplomatic post, the Polish government made it clear that it did not care about the latter. Therefore, Brzezinski will not be a fringe event in Warsaw’s political salons, and Polish politicians will not take pictures with him.

This brings us back to the question of goodwill; will Mark Brzezinski be willing to turn a blind eye to the circumstances of his arrival, will his evening talks with his father be more important to him than the reproaches he suffered in Poland? I think so, but the Polish side has to work for it. I am reminded of the former foreign minister Władysław Bartoszewski’s apt description of “diplomorons”.

Georgette Mosbacher raised primarily economic issues, herself a businesswoman. Brzezinski is not a businessperson, he is a stranger to the American Chamber of Commerce. At various conventions of business organizations he does not feel like a fish in water, this is not his environment.

So what kind of game do you think the current Polish government will play in relations with the US?

I have an impression that someone in our government made a strategic decision: let’s wait for 4 years of Joe Biden’s government. Those in power are counting on Donald Trump coming back in 4 years. Imagine what will happen in Poland if Trump runs in the next presidential elections, what will be the coverage of the Polish public journalists, controlled entirely by the ruling right wing. I can already hear it being said that Trump will come back and things will be good again. Perhaps someone in Law and Justice has bet on such a strategic scenario. I am very careful to use the term “strategic thinking” when talking about this grouping, but such a scenario is possible.