sprusansky_15-20_Special Report 8/6/15 8:58 PM Page 19 not address Iran’s role in the region. Gulf leaders would have preferred to have seen the nuclear issue resolved as part of a broader “grand bargain” in which a whole cacophony of issues were addressed, she said. Gulf leaders also fear the deal signals that Washington is pivoting away from its current allies and toward Iran, said former Defense Undersecretary Miller. But, he added, “I don’t see anyone in the United States administration, or elsewhere for that matter, wanting to go this path. On the contrary, I’ve seen the administration saying the right things about Iran, about consultation and about the strength of our commitment to our allies and partners.” Goldenberg suggested that the U.S. could assuage Gulf concerns by entering “serious and strategic” dialogues with the region’s leaders in which the parties discuss how to deal with Iran in the region. This, he said, “will signal to our partners that we mean it when we say we are going to push back on this behavior that we don’t find acceptable from Iran.” Why Is Israel Unhappy? In terms of Israel, Pillar believes the country’s objections to the deal are largely political. “The Israeli government does not want to see Iran as an unfettered competitor for influence in the Middle East,” he said. “It’s not only a competitor for influence in the Arab world and elsewhere in the region, but it’s one that will continue to be highly critical of Israeli policy in a way that does not get restrained by any relationship with the U.S., as is true, I would suggest, with the Gulf Arabs.” Netanyahu views the Iran deal as a hindrance to Israel’s talking points, Pillar added. The specter of the Iranian threat, he explained, has been “one of the main rationales for sustaining major U.S.-Israel security cooperation.” The deal, he added, “not only diminishes this threat, but also undermines the whole concept that Israel is the only worthwhile partner for the United States on anything in the Middle East.” Finally, Pillar believes that Netanyahu fears the deal will prevent Israel from using Iran to deflect attention from the occupation. “The Iranian threat is the allpurpose go-to diverting topic whenever something else comes up, like the occupation of Palestinian territories, that they don’t want to talk about,” he said. “The response always is, ‘but the real problem in the Middle East is Iran, and especially its nuclear program.’” SEPTEMBER 2015 A Better U.S.-Iran Relationship? Regarding the possibility of a détente between the U.S. and Iran, Goldenberg expressed skepticism. “I don’t see [Khamenei] pursuing a major rapprochement with the United States in the years ahead,” he said. “We are unlikely to see a restoration of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran for years,” Pillar added. “I would look, as an exemplar on this, to the experience with China, in which several years transpired between the time President Nixon made his historic visit to Beijing and diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic were finally established under President Carter in the late 1970s.” Nevertheless, Goldenberg expects dialogue to take place between Tehran and Washington. The U.S., he said, needs to “take advantage of the fact that we actually have this channel of communications with the Iranians for the first time in 35 years. That is meaningful and important.” DiMaggio suggested the U.S. test how much it can achieve diplomatically with Iran, proposing direct, low-key talks on regional issues. “Knowing the sensitivities of this, it would have to be done quietly,” she added. This is not a farcical dream, she insisted, noting that the U.S. and Iran did discuss Yemen and ISIS on the sidelines of the nuclear talks. Given that Iran and the U.S. are operating militarily in the same territory and against the same enemy, DiMaggio said “it would be the height of irresponsibility” not to engage Iran on ISIS. Shehadi, however, disagreed with DiMaggio’s plan for under-the-radar talks between Tehran and Washington. “There’s nothing that would alarm U.S. allies in the region more than that,” he warned. In Khoury’s opinion, the U.S. must use the deal as an opportunity to discuss Syria, which he believes is vastly more important than the nuclear issue. “I’m afraid that if we limit ourselves to simply relaxing and saying Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon…that we will have done ourselves a disservice,” he said. “The Syrian conflict is a potentially ideal place to start and give this new agreement with Iran the chance to develop diplomatically and to build a better understanding between the West and Iran on what really matters.” Outside of the Arab world, Pillar believes the U.S. and Iran could work together on Afghanistan. “We have already shown during those few brief months in late 2001 and early 2002, at the time of the Bonn conference, that the United States and Iran and its diplomats could work constructively toTHE WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS gether on shared interests,” he noted. All speculation aside, Pillar emphasized the importance of accepting the Iran deal for what it is: a non-proliferation agreement. “The agreement has to stand or fall as a nuclear agreement,” he emphasized. “It does not depend, nor should it depend, on particular assumptions or projections about the rest of the [U.S.-Iran] relationship or about other aspects of Iranian behavior.” Is There a Better Deal Available? A common retort of the nuclear deal’s opponents has been to suggest that a better deal could be reached with Iran. Experts, however, view this notion as not only wholeheartedly inaccurate, but dangerous. “This is basically a dangerous illusion,” stated Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “There isn’t a better deal on the horizon, and if Congress somehow blocks this agreement, there are going to be very tough, negative consequences. We will have broken with our European allies. The necessary international support for Iran-related sanctions will dissipate. Iran would not be subject to limits on its nuclear program and could expand this program. We would lose out on enhanced inspections. The risk of a nucleararmed Iran and a conflict would grow.” Even those who disagree with components of the deal must realize that the agreement is vastly preferable to the alternatives, argued Walsh. 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