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1C • FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet

Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside

Longstreet’s errors costly during battle ■

Union soliders brilliant, brave ■

TAMMY CHEEK tcheek@farragutpress.com

Although the Confederate army outmanned the Union army by more than two to one, it still failed to keep Union troops from advancing to Knoxville during The Battle of Campbell Station. Both sides were tired, hungry and short on supplies, which included food, clothing and transportation. “They pretty much canceled themselves out because of hunger and lack of rations,” said Gerald Augustus, local historian and author of “The Battle of Campbell’s Station 16 November 1863.” “It’s really difficult to get food and resupply an army that is on the march anyway,” said Mark Blevins, Bearden High School history teacher and local historian who also participates in re-enactments. “For both sides, that’s very difficult. Here, even in Knoxville, the Union army that’s here numbering about 12,000 is more than three times the population of the City of Knoxville, so you can imagine how much food is going to be left for the civilians of Knoxville during this campaign.” Nevertheless, what they lacked in food and clothing, both sides made up for in human endurance, Augustus said. “The Confederates were pulling canons,” he said. “They didn’t have horses.” Also, the railroad locomotives did not have the power to carry all the troops, so many had to walk. Also, both sides had to trudge through mud that resulted from the storm that took place the night before the battle, Augustus said. The Union forces did have the advantage in weaponry, however. Jerry Keyes, who has been hunting and finding relics from the Battle of Campbell Station since the early 1970s, said he has found the Confederate weaponry was inferior to the Union’s. The South’s artillery was poorer quality and weaker. The artillery shells would fracture after being fired, he noted. Another factor affecting the battle’s outcome was the bickering that took place between the Southern generals – Gen. Braxton Bragg, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Brig. Gen. Evander McIvor Law, Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins, Gen. Jerome Bonaparte Robertson and Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws. Longstreet graduated from West Point in 1842. According to Augustus, he was a major in the U.S. Army when he See LONGSTREET on Page 5C

Alan Sloan

Monument honoring Congressional Medal of Honor recipients Maj. Frederick Swift and Sgt. Joseph Brandle, with the 17th Michigan Volunteer Regiment, located at Sgt. Mitchell W. Stout Medal of Honor Memorial and Virtue Cemetery off Evans Road. This site is close to where Swift’s and Brandle’s bravery was displayed, in The Battle of Campbell Station’s bloodiest confrontation, near present day Virtue Road and Virtue Mill along Turkey Creek.

ALAN SLOAN asloan@farragutpress.com

A reluctant Civil War commander of Union forces in East Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside was a failed commander of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg, Va., in late 1862. Though fighting an “intestinal affliction,” Burnside’s fortunes would change dramatically starting with The Battle of Campbell Station Nov. 16, 1863, in present day Farragut as area historians reflect upon the battle’s upcoming 150th anniversary. Burnside’s 9th Army Corps, mostly northeasters plus Michigan brigades of which 5 of 6 brigades belong, and 23rd Army Corps, one brigade of mostly Midwestern, Kentucky and Tennessee troops, added up to roughly 5,000 troops. A handful of these men distinguished themselves. Although outnumbered more than two-to-one at Campbell Station, and overcoming severe hardships faced by his men, Burnside “was brilliant” in limiting Union casualties and succeeding in his two basic goals of The Battle. That’s according to several local Civil War experts, including Mark Blevins, who in addition to teaching U.S. History at Bearden High School for 20 years also teaches a unique Americans at War class that includes Native American suffering in the Civil War. “Burnside had done very poorly up to that point,” Blevins said. “It was just a flat-out massacre at Fredericksburg.” However, “Nobody could have done any better than what he did” at Campbell Station, Blevins added. “His job is to keep [Lt. Gen. James] Longstreet [Confederate commander] at bay. While also attempting to escape Confederate flanking and reach the Union stronghold in Knoxville, “Burnside’s job is to keep Longstreet in this semi-siege for as long as possible so Longstreet cannot go back and reinforce [Gen. Braxton] Bragg in Chattanooga. … Burnside’s whole job is to delay Longstreet,” Blevins added. Gerald L. Augustus, highly respected local historian whose latest book, “The Battle of Campbell’s Station, 16 November 1863,” spells out battle details and timelines, agrees. “Burnside is not one of the great generals of the Civil War, but his East Tennessee campaign, you can’t top it,” See UNION on Page 4C


2C • FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION

Roughly 16 hours needed for Union ■

ALAN SLOAN asloan@farragutpress.com

Roughly 16 hours, that’s the estimated time frame summing up The Battle of Campbell Station Nov. 16, 1863. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, commander of Union 9th and 23 armies in East Tennessee, and roughly 5,000 troops started out churning in knee-deep mud upon leaving present day Lenoir City on Lenoir Road, which no longer exists, while dragging 1,400-pound cannons before fighting off numerous Confederate flanking attempts in present day Farragut. The payoff was a much less obstructed path to Union-fortified Knoxville on Kingston Road (roughly what is today’s Kingston Pike) around 6 p.m. Around 2 a.m., “Burnside sends from Lenoir Station — which was just basically the plantation, there was no city — a cavalry detachment, a relatively small one, right after midnight [Nov. 16] to go up [Lenoir] Road, close to Kingston Road, to secure the Campbell Station intersection,” said Steve Dean, creator/producer of “The Heartland Series” that has run on WBIR-TV channel 10 since 1984, who also is a local historian. “Shortly after they left, he started sending all his troops in the early morning hours.” Burnside won a race most historians describe as “a turtle’s pace” to Campbell’s Station. “After sunrise, the Confederate forces … didn’t know where Burnside was so they were a little hesitant about

going in,” Dean added. “Right after the sun comes up, 7 to 8 a.m., and this is all rough [estimates], they go into [what is now] Lenoir City and see in fact that most of Burnside’s troops have gone, and they immediate start chasing him, those are [Brig. Gen. Micah] Jenkins’ people, on the Lenoir Road.” Meanwhile, “Word gets to [Confederate Maj. Gen. Lafayette] McClaws around 8 a.m. to pursue on the Kingston Road,” Dean said. Gerald Augustus, highly respected local historian whose book “The Battle of Campbell’s Station” was released to coincide with The Battle’s upcoming 150th anniversary, said little fighting took place before 9 a.m.: the estimated time at which all of Burnside’s forces finally reached the key location, the intersection of Kingston Road and Lenoir Road where the front parking lot of present day First Baptist Concord is located. However, Augustus added about time estimations, “Everybody [in 1863] had their own time. There was no standard time … that doesn’t come until the 1880s. … Even if [soldiers] give a time, it doesn’t mean it’s that [equivalent] in modern times.” Immediately upon arriving at the crossroads, the first Union cavalry sent out upon reaching the Lenoir Road intersection with Kingston Road “went two miles down Kingston Road west to sort of delay the advance of McClaws’ troops a bit. And perhaps they did,” Dean said. See 16 HOURS on Page 4C

Tactical mistakes plague Confederates ■

TAMMY CHEEK tcheek@farragutpress.com

Twenty-four hours changed the lives of some 17,000 soldiers 150 years ago, when The Battle of Campbell Station made the Farragut area a battlefield. Charged with flanking the Union forces and stopping them from reaching Knoxville, Confederate troops headed to the junction at Campbell Station. Gerald Augustus, local historian and author of “The Battle of Campbell Station 16 November 1863,” noted the bloodiest fighting was at Virtue Road, where Gen. John Bratton’s brigade fought William Humphrey’s brigade and had 18 killed and 106 wounded. The Confederates and Union wanted to take Knoxville. Mark Blevins, Bearden High School history teacher and local historian, said Knoxville was important because of the railroad and the poultry and other food available there. Blevins’ interest in history was spurred on by his own family history, as his greatgreat grandfather was a private in Longstreet’s corps during The Battle of Campbell Station. “This railroad here links Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Georgia,” Blevins said. “So when the Confederates lost the railroad, they knew they had to regain it. “They have to go on railroad through the Carolinas and then across South Carolina into Georgia, up through Atlanta, and they just get to the battlefield in the nick of time at Chickamauga. And, as soon as they get in line, Longstreet’s forces just burst through the Union line, pushed the Union

forces back on Snodgrass Hill and really had a chance to destroy the Union Army. Augustus said the Confederates began to place a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River during the night a couple days before. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, the overall commander, was across the Tennessee River on Nov. 15. “He would have liked to really come in from the east,” Augustus said. “It was flatter, but he lacked the wagons and bridges. “The alternative was to go west only a mile but it was five to six miles from Union troops in Loudon,” Augustus said. “Confederates crossed at Huff’s Valley the next morning.” The historian said it had stormed the night before, leaving the roads muddy so troops’ advancement was slow. Augustus said during the night Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Army of the Ohio, had ordered his troops to withdraw toward Knoxville. “His [Burnside’s] job was to keep Longstreet at bay, to keep Longstreet in this semi-siege as long as possible so Longstreet could not go back and reinforce Gen. Braxton Bragg in Chattanooga,” Blevins said. “The primary thing was to keep Longstreet here and keep him occupied so [Gen. Ulysses S.} Grant’s and {Gen. William T.] Sherman’s armies can move in to Rosencrantz to help Rosencrantz’s former army, who now Gen. George Thomas is the head of the army there. So then you have three Union armies move in, which is eventually what happens, and they are able See TACTICAL on Page 3C

Photo submitted

A family portrait of Robert Russell’s family taken around 1900 in front of their home. Pictured from left are Charles Walker Russell, Matthew Russell III, Lida Belle Russell, Andrew Pitner Russell (Tobe), Dannie Russell, Avery Russell, Pleasant Russell and his wife and children.

Russell family witnesses war firsthand ■

ROBBY O’DANIEL rodaniel@farragutpress.com

The house where Charlie Russell grew up was marked by the Battle of Campbell Station: A bullet hole was in the front door. It has since been patched up, but Russell remembers it. “I was told that one of the chimneys was shot off by cannon shot or broken partially down,” Russell said. Those are not the only ways markers were left at the home, located at the corner of North Campbell Station Road and Kingston Pike, from the battle. “We had the floors sanded, when I was probably 12 or 13 years old, upstairs,” he said. “They’re big pine boards. ... Mother asked, ‘Well can’t you get this out over here and clean this?’ The guy said, ‘No, ma’am. That won’t come out. That’s

blood.’ He said that we’d sand all the way, we’d be downstairs if we tried to sand that out. He said that’s something that’s set there a long time and stained it. ... You can look and see some colorations. I thought at first it was the boards, but if you look, you can see that and other people have said that’s what it appeared to be.” The blood is most likely from the wounded – soldiers on both the Confederate and Union side of the battle -- who were sheltered that day in the house, he said. The family of Robert Russell, Charlie’s great grandfather, lived at the house, as well as other family members and servants, he said, at the time of the battle. “The old block house was still here then, and that had been used as an inn and a store,” he

said. “There was a tannery here. ... They were farming. They had a farm here, and also the farm was over 500 acres. ... I assume that’s what they were doing during the war, and that’s what I was told – they ran this farm during the war. I was also told that they had a favorite white horse that they took in this basement, and most likely, with some of the servants and the rest of the family, and hid there during the Battle of Campbell Station.” Most likely Robert’s father, John, and possibly Robert himself ran the store, he said, during the time of the battle. One of the ledgers kept in 1855 gives evidence to the type of store it was. “They sold thread, tobacco,” he said. “... Flour, coffee ... and clothing, thread, needles and leather.”

Galbraith, locals care for North, South wounded ■

ROBBY O’DANIEL rodaniel@farragutpress.com

Caretaking of a Union soldier after he was injured in the Battle of Campbell Station led to years of correspondences from a soldier to a local family. “Nancy Galbraith and the local people all took care of those soldiers, fed them, nursed them,” said Gerald Augustus, historian and author of “The Battle of Campbell’s Station: 16 November 1863.” Local women changed bandages and brought in food, he said. V. W. Bruce was a Union soldier. In the Battle of Campbell Station, he was shot in the leg. He ended up losing his right leg while he was at the home of Nancy Galbraith, Augustus said. The Confederate surgeons amputated Bruce’s leg since it had been shattered at the knee. But Bruce remained in contact with the Galbraiths years after the war, Augustus said. Six letters from Bruce to Nancy’s daughter, Eliza, are at the Farragut Folklife Museum, said local historian Barbara Beeler, with dates that range from 1896 to 1898. According to notes by Beeler, “From reading these six letters from Bruce, it appears that he had been writing Nancy Galbraith and

Robby O’Daniel

A “shoe purportedly belonging to V. W. Bruce,” along with one of his letters, is displayed at Farragut Folklife Museum.

other members of her family from the time he returned home from the Civil War. We just did not receive those letters at the museum; they were perhaps lost after Eliza died.” Nancy Galbraith was the focus of Beeler’s personal research. “I’m more interested in her than I was [interested in] Bruce,” she said. “Because you don’t hear very much about the ladies who were heroes of the Civil War.” Nancy Galbraith was a widow that had plenty of worries at the time of the battle. “They had a massive farm, and here she had these young kids [two sons], 13 and 11,” Beeler said. “And the others were in the

service, the two older ones, and then she had her 9-year-old boy, he died right before [the battle].” Beeler wrote in her notes that she provided: “The troop movements and the skirmishing around her house in Virtue had made Nancy uneasy for the boys trying to complete their farm work, with what help her two daughters, ages 15 and 7, and a small 5-year-old son could give them.” On the night of the battle, a group that consisted of Confederate soldiers, Union prisoners, wounded Union soldiers and a Confederate doctor went to her house, Beeler said. The group included Bruce.


THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION

Tactical From page 2C

to defeat Bragg easily at that point. “Of course, Bragg should never have sent Longstreet up here to begin with, but he was trying to get rid of one of his main nemesis ... most of his generals were anti-Bragg.” Bragg was the principal commander in the Western Theater of the War Between the States and later was the military adviser to the Confederate President Jefferson Davis. “Davis had already visited Chattanooga to bring the generals together but it actually made it worse, and then Davis left Bragg in command at Army in Tennessee because they were best friends, and that really made things worse for the Confederate army in Tennessee.” For Confederate troops, the day of the battle started at daybreak, when Confederates, led by Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins, began to move toward Lenoirs but found the Union forces were gone. “Gen. Jenkins’ men had a terrible time,” he related. “They started to raid Burnside’s wagons but had to pass up on the food.” The Confederate troops were then ordered to follow the retreating Union troops led by Col. John Bratton’s South Carolina 5th Infantry of Jenkins’ Division. Daybreak: Fighting Begins: At 8 a.m., Longstreet sent orders for Brig. Gen. Evander McIvor Law’s men, who camped at the north end of Hotchkiss Valley Road, to advance to Kingston Road, which is now Highway 70, and cut off Union forces before they could get to Campbell Station. That plan failed. “Gen. Layfayette McLaws was ordered to wait until Law comes down,” Augustus said. “Everything hinged around Law getting around. “McLaws started to move men forward then Longstreet orders him back.” Longstreet would later criticize Law, saying he did not go far enough. Augustus said, adding Longstreet’s plan was that McLaws could reach Campbell’s Station ahead of Union troops and attack. Burnside’s army reached the junction at about 9 a.m. A cavalry force was sent down the road toward Kingston. The Confederate cavalry, commanded by Col. John R. Hart, and in advance of McLaws’ infantry division, met the 6th Indiana Cavalry, led by Col. James Biddle, after it went about two miles. Augustus said the Union cavalry successfully drove the Confederates back to their infantry support. Several Union forces gathered between Kingston and Concord. Augustus said Hart’s Confederate cavalry could see the Fed-

eral troops deploying ahead and watched as they went into battle, Augustus said. Union Col. John F. Hartranft’s Infantry Division, which consisted of two brigades commanded by Col. Joshua K. Siegfried and Lt. Col. Edwin Schall and Companies L and M [Consolidated] 3rd U.S. Artillery, reached Kingston Road behind the cavalry, the historian related. Rather than head to Knoxville, though, Hartranft’s brigades and two cannons of its artillery turned left onto Kingston Road. Schall’s brigade had been stationed in Knoxville during the battle. After traveling a short distance west on Kingston Road, Siegfried’s and Schall’s brigades went into battle north of the road. After that attack, Biddle’s cavalry took up position on the right of Hartranft’s line, Augustus said. Col. Marshall W. Chapin’s brigade of the 23rd Corps followed Hartranft’s troops, which were sent to the east on Kingston Road. They stopped beyond Campbell’s Station Inn and went into battle across Kingston Road. As Col. Benjamin C. Christ’s brigade arrived at the junction, it turned toward Campbell Station, Augustus said. The troops continued until they stopped to defend the artillery on the north side of Kingston Road near the junction of Concord Road. Next, Augustus said, Col. David Morrison’s Union brigade arrived at the junction and took up a position in an open field between Kingston and Lenoir roads. “The 8th Michigan Infantry was to the left of the 36th Massachusetts with their left on the Lenoir Road,” he said. “The 45th Pennsylvania Infantry was in front of the brigade, acting as skirmishers. The 79th New York, which was also a part of the brigade, had been sent with the artillery and wagons to the junction of Concord and Kingston roads.” The brigades of Siegfried, Schall and Morrison were then engaged with McLaw’s Confederate infantry, which had arrived at Kingston Road. Meanwhile, Union wagons and artillery were moving on Lenoir Road. Union Col. William Humphrey’s Brigade was fighting Jenkins’ troops. At about 10 a.m., all of the Union wagons and artillery finally passed onto Kingston Road and were moving toward Knoxville. Meanwhile, just north of Virtue Cemetery, the 17th Michigan infantry was ordered to stop and slow the advancing Confederates, Augustus said. “There are skirmishes running with Union troops running into Confederates, who are darting behind trees like Indians,” Augustus said. “The Northern infantry realized it was being flanked and started to pull back.” While one Union troop fought to slow Jenkins’ men, the rest of

Burnside’s army reached the junction of Kingston and Lenoir roads, Augustus said. Most of the Confederate cavalry, commanded by Gen. Joseph Wheeler, was already sent to the other side of the river to try to capture the hills overlooking Knoxville. The day before the battle, Wheeler’s cavalry fired on Union forts. However, Augustus said the forts were heavily defended so Wheeler chose not to make an all-out attack, instead riding south from Knoxville to rejoin Longstreet. Blevins said this was one of Longstreet’s errors of the battle. Had he kept the cavalry with him, it could have flanked Burnside. Once Burnside got his wagons and artillery through the LenoirKingston Road junction, he was ready to retreat to Knoxville. Humphrey’s brigade was the first to move; however, the brigade was heavily engaged and had to charge the Confederates to drive them back before they could withdraw. Humphrey’s brigade held its position until 1:30 p.m., when they went into a ravine as a reserve and was out of the heat of the battle. Siegfried’s and Schall’s troops withdrew next without difficulty, Augustus said. Then, the 8th Michigan Cavalry moved back to help protect the artillery on the plateau on the far eastern end of the battlefield, Augustus added. Then, Confederates fought Morrison’s brigade, which was stretched between the Lenoir and Kingston roads, while Confederates advanced on both roads, for about 30 minutes, then McLaws’ men advanced past Morrison’s line on the Kingston Road. The Confederates were temporarily back by a volley from 36th Massachusetts and 8th Michigan infantries but the two infantries were overtaken by the Southern troops. While the infantries were captured, Morrison’s men retreated to Kingston Road. Augustus said the Confederate troops forced Morrison’s men to move north of the road past the Campbell home and through a new line of battle, which formed west of the Nelson House. They stopped at Concord Road and rested behind another battle line. Augustus said the next phase of fighting took place in a valley, in which the northern rim is now occupied by Farragut High School. At that time, the area was wooded. He said the most important feature was a small plateau. During fighting there, the Russell family and their white horse hid in the basement, Augustus said. While Confederates fought the brigades of Humphrey, Morrison, Siegfried and Schall west of the Lenoir-Kingston Road junction, Burnside created a new defensive line across the valley just west of the Nelson home, Augustus said.

FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013 • 3C

At about 3 p.m., Humphrey’s Brigade was moved to the rear of the artillery on the hill, Augustus said. Meanwhile, the 29th Massachusetts was on the extreme right of Burnside’s infantry. He said another Union battle line was formed in the middle of the valley with reserves near Concord Road. McLaws’ Confederate forces, which advanced on Kingston Road, joined the forces of Jenkins from Lenoir Road, Augustus said. That was the first time the two divisions were reunited. McLaws reported to Longstreet for further orders. He was ordered to deploy his men to the north of the road but “not to show it beyond the woods.” With McLaws positioned on his line of battle, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw’s South Carolina Brigade took a position on the right nearest the road. Following Kershaw was a Georgia brigade, led by Col. Solon Z. Ruff, and Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphrey’s Mississippi Brigade was on the extreme left of the division. Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan’s Georgia Brigade was behind the line. Augustus said Jenkins’ brigades filed to the south of Kingston Road into battle. Col. John Bratton’s South Carolina Brigade, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson’s Georgia Brigade and Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning’s Georgia Brigade joined his troops. He said Jenkins division was unobserved because of the wooded nature of the area. Augustus said when the Confederates first came out of the woods toward Union troops they were mistaken as Union soldiers. He said the Confederate troops had been issued new uniforms, which resembled Union uniforms, which were issued after the retreat at Gettysburg. As the Southern forces moved toward the Union, the Confederate artillery was still trying to move through the mud so they had no artillery support, the historian said. Then, the Confederates moved into a ravine and began firing. The fire was quickly returned, he said. Longstreet’s artillery arrived to support the infantry. Col. E. Porter Alexander’s infantry supported Jenkins’ Division. While the Union troops were down in the valley, the Confederates were up on a hill, making it difficult to return fire. After the Confederates withdrew into the woods, Confederate and Union artillery began heavy firing. During the fighting in this location, Longstreet had two close calls from artillery fire. His luck ran out May 6, 1864, when he was accidentally fired on by his own men and was disabled. The fighting continued as bullets and shells exploded. During the battle, Burnside attempted

to send a telegraph to Col. William P. Sanders near Knoxville to ask for Sanders to form a battle line on Kingston Road to protect his retreating army and slow up advancing Confederates, but he gave up because the Confederates occupied Concord, Augustus said. After Longstreet’s three unsuccessful attempts to break through Union lines, he ordered McLaws’ Division to move forward and engage the enemy. One of McLaws’ brigades and some of Hart’s Cavalry went around to the left of the line to strike at the Union left flank. Both attacks were supposed to occur simultaneously. McLaws began to place his brigades forward. After waiting for the attack on the right to begin, McLaws ordered his division to advance. He didn’t hear the attack on Jenkins’ flank, and Longstreet rode over and stopped McLaws’ advance. About 3 p.m, Jenkins began to position his men to attack. When Law reported he was in position, Jenkins ordered Anderson’s Brigade to move forward and attack. However, he discovered Law had not gone far enough and sent word to Anderson’s Brigade to stop and wait for orders. He then ordered Law to attack without Anderson’s men. Law advanced and overlapped Anderson’s Brigade. Augustus said the result was Hartranft’s left hand force was able to change fronts and withdraw to a new position on the east side of Concord Road. Both Jenkins and Longstreet blamed Law for the failure. Augustus said Law would blame Longstreet for not ordering McLaw’s Division to move sooner and distract the enemy. Evening action: Withdraws begin: Late in the afternoon, Augustus said the final battle line was formed by tired, hungry Union soldiers of the 9th and 23rd Corps. Anticipating a retreat, all of Buckley’s Battery D, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, except one section of two 12-powder cannon, commanded by Ezra K. Parker, was ordered back about one mile about 4 p.m. The 1st Rhode Island waited there in reserve until about 5:30 p.m. With no indication it would be needed, it was ordered to proceed to Knoxville, Augustus said. As Union forces began toward Knoxville, there were only two artillery units left firing at the Confederates: Battery D, 2nd U.S. Artillery and the two 12 Pounders of Parker’s Battery D, 1st Rhode Island Artillery. Augustus said when it became too dark to see, Parker’s two-gun section was ordered to withdraw. Then Battery D, 2nd U.S. Artillery began the night retreat as well. At the end of the battle, Longstreet, which had 11,000 men, had 340 casualties while Jenkins had 22 killed and 152 wounded, Augustus said. There was never a report from McLaws.


4C • FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

16 hours From page 2C

Behind the cavalry came a Union infantry wave to slow the Confederates coming east on Kingston Road, courtesy of Col. John F. Hartranft, commander of Second Division of Union’s 9th Army. “It’s not until you get your infantry in there that the road is halfway secure” for the Union, Augustus said. Dean said he doubts Burnside beat Longstreet to the Kingston Road-Lenoir Road intersection by just 15 minutes or so, a commonly held belief. “You hear that, but it takes a lot longer than 15 minutes to get the amount of supply wagons and artillery and cannons through there,” Dean said. “Maybe [Burnside’s troops] got through there with 15 minutes to spare. Augustus said estimates on McClaws’ arrival at the crossroads behind Burnside’s men “varies from 15 minutes to a half-an-hour.” The 17th Michigan Volunteer Regiment was rear guard of the Union Army as Jenkins’ Confederate forces were closing in on Lenoir Road. Their successful mission, to “delay the advance of the Confederate forces up Lenoir Road” at

Union From page 1C

Augustus said. “He did everything exactly right in this case.” The key during Campbell Station is “being able to slip that army out twice and get them up to Knoxville,” Augustus added. Unlike Longstreet’s troop miscommunications at Campbell Station, Burnside’s “troops had to do what he wanted, and they did … they did what they were told and they accomplished their goal,” Blevins said. “The command of the Union Army was so far superior to the command of the Confederate Army in this particular battle, it’s almost uneven,” Blevins added. Joan Markel is Civil War curator at McClung Museum of Natural History & Culture. “Everybody said it was textbook. … One of the contemporaries who wrote about it said, ‘It was like moves on a chessboard,’” Markel said. “These [Union] units were very well disciplined and did exactly what they should to accomplish their goal, which was holding the road so

THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION

Turkey Creek near modern day Virtue Road and the former Virtue Mill, “would probably have been around 11 a.m., maybe close to noon,” Dean said. However, Augustus puts the time of this bloody confrontation closer to 9 a.m. The portion of The Battle east of the Kingston RoadLenoir Road, which spread roughly one mile north-tosouth in the Turkey Creek valley and ended with the Union successfully holding its position on Concord Hills [near old Farragut High School] on the Union’s left flank and near the current FHS location on its right flank, ran roughly “from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m.,” Dean said. “Burnside purely was in a defensive position. He wasn’t ever going to move forward. He knew he could not keep retreating because they would catch him, so he had to stop, turn and fight at least until dark, which he did successfully.” As action moved east while also spreading north and south, “The first of three Confederate charges began at roughly 1 p.m. in the afternoon,” Augustus said of battles including where the current Kroger parking lot is located.

With the Confederates failing to break through Union lines, “By the time everybody gets reorganized, somewhere around 3 or 3:30 is when [Confederate commander, Lt. Gen. James] Longstreet decides to try and flank [the Union],” Augustus said. Meanwhile, Union troops found artillery position on high ground just east of Concord Road and north at the current FHS location. The 29th Massachusetts, Second Brigade of Union’s 9th Army, successfully fought off a Confederate attempt to flank his northern line of Union resistance, on a wooded hill near where present day FHS, around 3:30 to 4 p.m, Augustus said. About that same time, Col. John F. Hartranft, commander of Second Division of Union’s 9th Army, fought off Brig. Gen. Evander Law’s attempt to do the same east of Concord Road at Concord Hills, near where FHS was located until fall 1976. With Burnside’s forces greatly aided, by their hilly position, to evaluate Confederate advances, Union forces held Kingston Road when darkness fell, then headed to Knoxville. “For the Knoxville campaign it was extremely important

because Burnside was able to get out with most of his men and all but two of his cannons,” Augustus said. “His total casual-

ties were 338. … He had 31 killed, 211 wounded, 96 captured or missing.”

that all of Burnside’s troops and wagons could get into Knoxville.” After the war, Burnside said about the battle, “’Don’t give me credit for it, give my men credit for it,’” Augustus said. In giving credit to his men, however, Blevins notes that Burnside “is a politician, too. He’s the future governor of Rhode Island.” Regardless, “If they hadn’t performed a virtually superhuman thing of pulling those cannon and getting out of there, [Burnside] would have been trapped” on Lenoir Road before reaching the intersection with Kingston Road, Augustus said. With rain a major factor creating thick mud, “Mules were sinking up to their stomachs. … Men literally helped pull, along with 12 animals, the cannons and other supplies,” Augustus added. Col. Ebenezer Pierce, leading the 29th Massachusetts, made a critical decision to save Burnside’s right flank near what is now Farragut High School in the afternoon hours of Nov. 16. “The 29th sends out into the wood skirmishers, a couple of companies, that’s when they

run into the Confederates,” Augustus said. “They realize they’re being flanked, and so they start pulling back. … If they hadn’t had those skirmishes out there they would have caught them right in the flank behind and right on the side and would have really rolled that end up.” Roughly 250 troops of the 17th Michigan were the rear guard for Burnside’s men who headed to Campbell Station from Lenoirs (now Lenoir City) on Lenoir Road (now a non-existent road, some of which now parallels Martel Road) and connecting with Kingston Road (now Kingston Pike) where the main front parking lot of First Baptist Concord now is located. The bloodiest battle connected with Campbell Station happened along Turkey Creek where present day Virtue Road runs, adjacent to the former Virtue Mill and up the hill where present day Sedgefield subdivision is located. Flanked by Confederate forces and trapped along the creek, the 17th Michigan, part of Col. William Humphrey’s Third Brigade, would produce two Congressional Medal of

Honor recipients: Maj. Frederick Swift and Sgt. Joseph Brandle. The 17 Michigan “panicked and start splashing across and going through the woods up the hill. … Brandle starts waving the flag and ordering the men to stop,” Augustus said. “And he’s hit in the right eye, he’s hit in the side. He’s losing so much blood that he’s about ready to pass out. And the colonel [Comstrock] orders him to hand the flag over to Cpl. Robert McKnight. As soon as he hands it off, McKnight is almost instantly killed, shot through the head. At that point, Frederick Swift, who actually is only a captain at the time, but he’s the acting major. “… He grabs the flag and yells, ‘Form on me.’ And by George they do,” Augustus added. “And they form a line and are able to hold long enough that they can get the artillery up on the hill so they can start firing down on the Confederates.” Also, Sgt. John H. Starkins of 34th New York Artillery was honored “for getting his cannon virtually up that hill … and successfully keeping it from getting

captured … for ingenuity, for bravery,” Augustus said about moving a roughly 1,400-pound cannon. “The simple thing would have been to just leave it.” Sgt. Valentine Rossbach “did exactly the same thing” despite not receiving the Medal of Honor for this gutsy act, Augustus said. By battling the Confederates at Virtue Road and Sedgefield, “Humphrey’s brigade was letting the rest of Burnside’s army get on up to the Kingston Road,” Augustus said. Markel summed up the value of Burnside’s brilliance at Campbell Station. “If Longstreet had won there, stopped Burnside’s army from getting back to Knoxville, the whole outcome would have changed,” she said. “[Longstreet] probably would have turned to go back down to Chattanooga and could have changed the events down there. “If Chattanooga hadn’t fallen, what then would Sherman have done and how they would the march to the sea been different?” Markel added. “You just don’t know.”

Union Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter.


THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION

Longstreet From page 1C

resigned in June 1861 to join the Confederate Army as a brigadier general. He was promoted to major general in October 1862. Augustus said between Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside and Longstreet, he thought Longstreet was the better general. He said Gen. Robert E. Lee praised Longstreet for his performances in many battles, such as the Battle of Chicamauga. The reason Longstreet is motivated to be in Tennessee, Blevins said, is he hopes to get Bragg’s job. “He wants to be the commander of the Army of Tennessee,” he said, adding that would be equal to the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet’s corps has two of the three divisions that come with him, he added. However, Augustus acknowledged the general’s mistakes – jealousy and bickering with the other Southern generals, not having adequate maps, his mistrust of the locals near Campbell Station – all contributed to the battle’s outcome. “Longstreet made a lot of mistakes,” Blevins said. “Longstreet is looked at as a superior commander, and he was a great defensive commander. “To me, the major thing to me is Longstreet did not understand that some East Tennesseans were loyal to the Confederacy, and those people who gave him advice, he ignored it,” he said. “He did not have maps – Bragg would not furnish him maps – so he’s in a foreign land for himself; he doesn’t understand the terrain here; and so a lot of what he

FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013 • 5C

is doing is guessing. “A big mistake he makes is dividing his army, his calvary. He’s going to send his calvary [on to Knoxville] and on the way up to Fort Dickerson, he wants to slip the calvary in on the back side and try to pinch Burnside’s army. Of course, that’s totally going to be unsuccessful. “Had Longstreet kept his calvary with him, they can flank Burnside’s army. They could get to Campbell’s Station easily because they are on horseback. They could be waiting for Burnside right there [at the crossroads.],” he said. “By the time they get to Turkey Creek, by my estimation, the Union army could have been surrounded.” Another mistake historians note: the Confederates needed to destroy the Union army in Chattanooga before advancing to Knoxville. “You want to get Knoxville, but Chattanooga’s more important, initially,” Blevins said. “If they had destroyed the Union army before Grant and Sherman could get there, then they could hold Chattanooga and then they could easily take Knoxville.” “Then, they would have regained East Tennessee,” he added. “It wasn’t just Knoxville, they had to take East Tennessee,” Blevins said. “They had to have won at Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain as well because Knoxville’s still not going to make a difference if you lose Chattanooga.” Another factor in the South’s outcome was the performance of Bragg. Blevins described him as the worst general in both armies.

“The U.S. Army thinks so highly of Braxton Bragg – our top fort, Fort Bragg, is named for him,” Blevins said. He noted the Army of Tennessee never wins a major battle other than Chicamauga. Additionally, feuding took place between Law and Jenkins, Augustus said. The rivalry began when Jenkins was given a command Law felt was his. Also, Augustus said there were bad feelings between Law and Longstreet, who was unsatisfied with Law’s performance on occasions. Augustus said at Campbell Station, Jenkins and Longstreet both criticized Law for failing to close the left flank of Burnside’s army. Augustus noted Longstreet’s observation of Law’s rivalry with Jenkins, saying Jenkins would have gotten the credit if Law had succeeded. Later though, the historian said Longstreet brought charges of misconduct against Law, but the Confederate War Department ignored him. Longstreet also had problems with Robertson, leader of the Robertson’s Texas brigade. After the Battle of Wauhatchie, [Tennessee], Augustus said Longstreet blamed Robertson for the failure and relieved him of command Nov. 1, 1863. Bragg later reviewed the case and restored Robertson to command. Longstreet also had issues with McLaws from Georgia. Augustus said their friendship came to an end during the Gettysburg Campaign in 1863, when other generals were trying to remove Bragg from command of the Army of Tennessee, McLaws refused to take Longstreet’s side.

A commitment of giving back to the community honors area veterans David’s Abbey Carpet & Floors, a locally owned family business, has been serving East Tennessee for 40 years. David Hayes started the business in 1973 with a commitment to offer the community the highest quality in floor coverings; to provide impeccable customer service and offer a sincere dedication to giving back to the community. In an effort to achieve this commitment of giving back and show appreciation for area veterans, Hayes has become involved in HonorAir Knoxville, a program dedicated to honoring East Tennessee World War II (WWII) and Korean veterans and the sacrifices they made to ensure our freedoms. “I really appreciate all the veterans. Without those guys fighting for our country and the freedoms we have, I wouldn’t be able to be in business and we wouldn’t have the freedoms we have today,” said Hayes. “I am very thankful for that.” Through contributions Hon-

orAir flies as many East Tennessee WWII and Korean War veterans as possible to Washington D.C. to see the memorials built in their honor at no cost to those veterans. Usually about 120 veterans are able to make the trips in the spring and in the fall. “I am one of many who sponsor these trips,” explained Hayes, who said he promotes HonorAir several times a year. “We will run the current HonorAir promotion through the end of the year. If someone comes in the stores and makes a $25 donation I’ll match it.” According to HonorAir just over 16 million Americans served in World War II and quite literally saved the world from domination by the forces of Hitler's Third Reich, Mussolini’s Italy and the Empire of Japan. About three million veterans are alive today and each day approximately 1,200 are lost. In five or ten years almost all WWII veterans will be gone.

File photo

David Hayes, owner of David’s Abbey Carpet & Floors poses next to the donated $1,000 check to the HonorAir Guardian of Knoxville. HonorAir flies World War II veterans to see the World War II Memorial in Washington D.C. free of charge, a trip most would not be able to make without the HonorAir program.

David’s Abbey Carpet & Floors has two locations. The main store is at 10853 Kingston Pike, Farragut, Tenn. and the second is at 259 Old Mill Avenue, Pigeon Forge. David’s Abbey Carpet & Floors offers carpet, tile, hardwood, and area rugs including traditional, contemporary and

transitional designs that are hand knotted and handmade as well as machine made. The stores feature the latest patterns and colors available. The staff includes four members who have interior design degrees and who can assist customers with their selections for floor coverings and

also tile in kitchens and baths that will best meet their wants and needs.

For more information please visit davids.abbeycarpet.com or call 865.777.0661.


6C • FARRAGUTPRESS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION


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