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PLANNING IN INLAND CHINA: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN CRITIQUE of Changsha, China (2003 - 2020)
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introduction
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The First Xiang River Bridge. This is the first bridge built in 1971 to connect the east and west parts of the city. Changsha
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Changsha Railway Station. It used to be the only large railway station in the city before high speed railway station took its place. The flame shape clock tower indicates the city’s revolutionary past. Changsha
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Huogongdian Palace. It is the most famous restaurant in Changsha and a tourist destination. Operas played here weekly are popular among residents. Changsha
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hangsha, meaning “long beach” in Chinese, is the capital of Hunan Province in central south China. Located on the bank of the Xiang River, a major tributary of the Yangtze River, Changsha is a medium-sized city sitting over 400 miles inland from more developed, coastal megacities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing. Amid the nationwide wave of urbanization, Changsha faces unprecedented growth and development pressure. Local development demand rivals the State’s projections for diversifying city economies, as the nation continues to transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based one. In this context, Changsha began a comprehensive planning process in 2003 to guide the path of development. This article reviews the Comprehensive Plan for the City of Changsha (2003 - 2020) and the process that generated it. The Central Government adopted this plan in 2003, and adopted a revised version in 2014. The plan is important for two reasons. First, it provides a typical case study of planning in the emerging inland cities of China. Changsha, the capital city of Hunan Province in central China, is a second-tier city. Its population of 7.31 million makes it the 45th largest city in China (NSB, 2011). The city’s aggregate GDP is CNY 782.48 billion, or USD 125.8 billion, for a per capita GDP of CNY 107,683, or USD 17,312 (CSB, 2014). Studying the creation of this plan can allow us to better understand the role of planning in China’s many emerging inland cities and how planning in these cities may be
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Figure 1. Location of Changsha in China, courtesy of d-maps, reproduced by author
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different from planning in other parts of the country. The plan is also important because it was created in a time of massive change. The population in Changsha grew by 17% from 2003 to 2010. At the same time, the city’s GDP nearly quadrupled and the urban built area expanded by 88% (CSDR 2003, CSB 2003, 2010). One of the key reasons for revising the plan was that most of the growth targets set by the 2003 Plan were achieved by 2010, thus the plan could no longer effectively guide development. From studying the merits and mistakes of this plan, we can better understand the future role of planning in the ongoing rapid urbanization in Changsha and other cities with similar conditions. There were both internal and external reasons for updating the plan in 2010. Internally, the unexpectedly rapid growth of the city demanded adjustment of development goals and strategies. Specifically, Changsha’s GDP reached CNY 450 billion in 2010, surpassing the projected 2020 GDP in the 2003 Plan. The city’s built area reached 350 km^2 in 2009, also exceeding the 2003 Plan’s projected level for 2020 (Zhou, 2014). Real estate development was occurring especially quickly: the real estate sector attracted USD 5.8 billion of investment in 2007, a rise of 36 percent over 2006 (CSCB, 2008). Large tracts of rural land in the city’s fringe areas were being converted into housing projects, something the 2003 Plan had not anticipated, and the expansion of Changsha’s administration area in 2006 opened up new land for development. Further, new transportation projects were integrating the city’s economy with the wider region. The government launched a series of large-scale infrastructure projects in 2008, including the expansion of Huanghua International Airport, the construction of high-speed railways connecting Changsha to Guangzhou and Beijing, and the building of new highways, which constituted a part of the State’s Economic Stimulus in response to the 081
the planning culture of Changsha
global financial crisis (CSCB, 2008). Externally, a new plan was necessary to guide development consistently with newly issued national and regional plans. In December 2007, a three-city region covering Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan was designated as the National Pilot Reform Zone for Resource-Efficient and EnvironmentFriendly Society. This required Changsha to begin transforming into a sustainable low-carbon economy (NDRC, 2007). Also, affected by the economic downturn in 2008, manufacturing activity in coastal areas began moving inland in search of lower labor and rental costs. Finally, the National Law for Urban and Rural Planning (NLURP) was updated in 2007, requiring ongoing plans to adapt to new standards. In all, according to Huifang Wang, the Chief Engineer at the Changsha Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, the purpose of the 2010 revision was to “build, with an ecological perspective and international view, a spatial framework featured with multiple centers and corridors that could support the sustainable development of The statutory authority to plan (legal requirements for making plans in the locality). The legal basis for consistency (the extent to which public and private actions must be consistent with an adopted plan). The power and support for regulating private property. The range of legitimate intervention domains (the fields that planning is justified to impact). The breadth of planning functions. The independent revenue authority and ability to direct public investments; and The importance of a participatory planning process.
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Changsha in the coming twenty years or longer…” (Zhao, 2011). Planning culture is a term created by Friedmann (2011) to characterize the specific social, economic, and historical contexts where planning takes place. A strong planning culture encourages a high level of public sector responsibility in managing current and future urban growth and its impacts (Landis, 2015). A weak planning culture discourages such responsibility. There are seven criteria to assess planning cultures as defined by Friedmann: As in other Chinese cities, advanced comprehensive planning is a legal mandate in Changsha. The NLURP states that planning is a tool “to coordinate [the] spatial layout of urban and rural areas, to improve the conditions of living environment, [and] to promote integral and sustainable social and economic development” (NPC, 2007). Usually, jurisdictions must update their plans every five years. Here, the Changsha Urban and Rural Planning Bureau, a department in the Changsha Municipal Government, set the agenda for the Plan. Legally, development need not explicitly follow a plan. Municipalities have a considerable degree of flexibility. The NLURP provides that “local governments should act according to the local economic and social development level, as well as their capacity, with respect for the people’s demand, incrementally implement the urban or rural plan in an organized way” (NPC, 2007). The legal constraints of planning are embodied in three documents, namely, the Site Choice Recommendation, the Land Use Permit, and the Construction Project Permit, that are issued by the planning department of the jurisdiction. Prior to construction, all building activities in the planned area must have these three permits. There is, however, some level of legal requirement regarding consistency, especially concerning sprawl and overdevelopment. According to the NLURP, “it
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Changsha Ningxiang Liuyang
Figure 2. Map of Town System in Changsha, Comprehensive Plan of the City of Changsha.
is strictly prohibited to build new industrial park[s] or economic development zones outside the planning boundary.” The 2014 Plan also imposes strict regulations concerning building height, historic preservation, and ecological protection. In the Taiping Street Historic City Block, for example, the plan specifies a maximum building height of 8 meters in the core protection area and 14 meters in the buffer zone. The plan draws an Ecological Control Line encompassing, among other features, “the important water reservoir, featured landscape sites, natural parks, and wetland parks.” Any construction, except public utilities and infrastructure, is strictly prohibited beyond this line (CMG, 2014 Plan, 7:2). As these controls demonstrate, the Changsha government has a high level of power to regulate private property. Land in China is owned by the state and there is a lack of clear legislation regarding private property rights. When it reclaims land for redevelopment, the government usually offers residents a below-market price as compensation, as low as 65% of the surrounding market price (Mei, 2015). The state ownership of land also provides the basis for a wide range of legitimate
intervention domains including land use regulation, spatial development planning, infrastructure and transportation planning, growth management, green space planning, water management planning, historic preservation planning, urban design, and disaster reduction. Perhaps surprisingly, the breadth of planning functions in Changsha’s plan is relatively narrow. The plan mainly serves as a spatial development tool. The 2014 Plan devotes a significant part to the framing of a hierarchy of cities and towns, which includes metropolitan Changsha as the central hub, the town of Liuyang and Ningxiang as two sub-hubs, and 71 additional towns categorized based on different development strategies (See Figure 2). Unlike Western countries, China still maintains a remnant of its central-planning tradition, implemented through the Five-Year Plan of Social and Economic Development and the Development and Reform Commission at various administrative levels. Because this plan covers broader functions— such as resource allocation, social equity improvement, and economic development—the Changsha plan is not 083
required to serve these functions. At the same time, the Changsha municipal government has a strong ability to direct public investments. This is due to the close tie between governments and state-owned financial institutions. The four largest state-owned banks control 48% of the total assets in the Chinese banking system (Fox, 2011). These banking giants tend to offer financial support for urban redevelopment with a very low interest rate. In 2015, Chinese governments had an estimated gross debt of 43.2% of the country’s GDP (Knoema, 2015). This close tie between banks and governments has contributed to local governments’ ambitious urban development plans and massive building activity based on debt financing. Finally, planning in Changsha is not very participatory. According to the NLURP, “all draft documents of the plan should be open to public for no less than 30 days, during which the plan-making institution should hold feasibility study meetings, public hearing meetings, and other forms of public discussions to collect opinions from experts and the general public, before the draft plan is submitted for review.” But the law does not specify the scale and format of the meetings, or
who can attend, or most importantly, how to incorporate public opinions into plan-making. Necessary evaluation of the effectiveness of the meetings is not defined either, except for the short, thirty-day period for public information disclosure. In making the 2014 Plan, the Changsha Planning Bureau published the draft planning document for one month, or 2.2% of the total plan-making period (CMG, 2014). There was thus barely any communicative planning or formal public participation in the planning process. Providing a score based on this discussion to each of Friedmann’s criteria yields a comprehensive score is 3.28. This suggests that the local planning culture in Changsha is neither strong nor weak. The municipal government of Changsha organized the planning process according to the legal requirements for planning, as displayed in Figure 3. During the planning process, the State Council had a decisive influence on the plan. The application and feedback between the municipal government and The State Council took 45 months in total, 83% of the planning time, while the actual making of the plan took only 6 months, or 11%. The State Council also gave decisive direction on the plan’s framing
evaluaTing Changsha’s loCal Planning CulTure
Table 1. Scoring for Changsha’s Local Planning Culture, created by author 084 — PANORAMA 24
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Figure 3. Planning Process in China, Courtesy of Qi and Zhou, reproduced by author
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and goals. In its feedback on the revised plan, the Council stated that “Changsha is the capital city of Hunan Province, an important city in the middle Yangtze River Region, and a national historic city,” a description reiterated in the plan as the “nature of city” (State Council, 2014). As in the other five capital cities in the Central China Region, the State Council definition of Changsha serves as a foundation for the plan. As for an appropriate planning model to summarize the planning process, The 2014 Plan for Changsha approximates the strategic planning model. Strategic planning is a process by which an organization identifies a mission statement, conducts an analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT), identifies the specific issues raised in the analysis, develops a compelling vision for future, and identifies strategies for achieving the vision (Landis, 2015). The 2014 Plan significantly emphasizes the city’s opportunities in terms of growth, national policy, transportation, and ecology, rather than alternative paths. Rather than an analysis of alternatives, the Plan instead discusses the strengths and opportunities for different spatial units. For example, for the Yuelu Spatial Unit, the Plan mentions its high
concentration of academic institutions as a strength and the establishment of a national advanced technology zone as an opportunity. For the Muyun Spatial Unit, the Plan emphasizes its strategic location on the intersection point of three cities— Changsha, Zhuzhou and Xiangtan—as a key strength and persistent urban growth as an opportunity. These examples demonstrate a partial SWOT analysis in a strategic planning model. The 2014 Plan develops simple and compelling organized visions. For example, the Plan summarizes the spatial structure of the city in the future with an illustrative phrase: “One axis, two bands, and multiple centers with one major hub, two sub-hubs and five spatial units” (CMG, 2014, 13). Also, the Plan envisions the Airport Spatial Unit becoming a new industrial hub with high-end manufacturing and services and airportrelated industries. At the same time, the 2014 Plan serves a short-term timeframe. As a revised version of the original plan— which is more accurately seen as a new planning cycle—the plan only covers six years, from 2014 to 2020. In a departure from the 2003 Plan, the 2014 Plan proposes a larger and denser city, with more spread-out growth 085
Figure 4. Comparison of Population and Planned Area of 2003 Plan and 2014 Plan, by author.
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significantly expanding public transit systems. Traffic congestion in Changsha has become so serious in recent years that visitors from Beijing or Guangzhou find it harder to find a taxi in Changsha than in these large cities (Zhou, 2014). The plan proposes seven subway lines running 200 - 260 km in total, coupled with further development of bus transit. It aims for residents to take 35% of all trips by public transit (CMG, 2014). Finally, the 2014 Plan incorporates ecological conservation as a key concept. The City of Changsha initiated a specific plan for the Ecological Control Line in the Greater Changsha region. Nearly half of the 5000 km^2 intensive development area is planned to be ecological conservation land, free of urban construction. This move is consistent with Changsha’s designation
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hubs, a well-connected public transit network, and ecologically preserved areas. It projects that 6.29 million people, or 81% of the city’s population, will live in a planned area of 4,960 km^2, which is 71.4% larger than the area of the 2003 Plan. This represents a 140% increase in metropolitan population over the projection in the 2003 Plan, leading to a population density of 2016 people/km^2, which is higher than the current density of 1883 people/ km^2 (CSB, 2014). Changsha’s projected population density is the second highest among the six capital cities in Central China, behind only Nanchang. Compared to the relatively small Nanchang, the 2014 Plan envisions a rather large and dense Central Chinese metropolis. In terms of a spatial development strategy, the 2014 Plan suggests directing development from the current monocentric core into multiple compact growth centers and along the Xiang River corridor. Currently the city’s most developed area is contained within the east bank of Xiang River and the Second Ring Road. The high density in this core has created problems such as congestion and pollution. To alleviate these issues, the plan proposes two sub-growth areas: the Yuelu Spatial Unit on the west bank of Xiang River and the Xing-Ma Spatial Unit to the east of the Second Ring Road. Five other spatial units located around the city’s fringe are also proposed as potential growth hubs. The 2014 Plan also suggests
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Figure 5 (left):. Spatial Development Structure Plan, Comprehensive Plan of the City of Changsha.
Figure 6 (above). Residential Land Use Evaluation Map, Courtesy of Duan et al., reproduced by author
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as the National Pilot Reform Zone for a Resource-Efficient and EnvironmentFriendly Society. Land use patterns provide a direct benchmark for measuring the differences between planned and actual development. To evaluate the implementation of the 2003 plan, Duan et at. (2011) used GIS to compare the visions set by the 2003 Plan with current conditions. Duan concluded that the city reached a majority of the 2003 Plan’s projected growth thresholds of land use for 2020 by 2009, thus the Plan clearly failed to control growth and make necessary adjustments. This analysis highlighted several
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land uses inconsistent with the 2003 Plan. The actual constructed area in 2009 was 35,068 ha, surpassing the 31,000 ha target by 13.12%. Yet some 27.87% of the planned area was undeveloped, and areas with a total size of 41% of the planned area have developed outside the designated area. Changsha thus experienced persistent sprawl that was ineffectively guided by the 2003 Plan. The actual residential land area in 2009 was 13,126.5 ha, exceeding the target of 8,680 ha by 51.22%. A large portion of the planned residential areas (42.87%) remained undeveloped, while new residential areas, as large as 94.09% 087
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of the total planned residential area, were developed outside the designated area. The new developments outside the planned area were sprawling out across the city, encroaching on the proposed conservation areas (Duan et al., 2011). Similarly, industrial development was hardly guided by the plan. The actual industrial land development was 4,259.2 ha, 32.5% larger than the designated size. Nearly 60% of the planned industrial area was never developed, yet areas equal to 92.13% of the planned area were developed without proper guidance. Industrial land was sparsely distributed across the city, and a portion of the industrial land was in proximity with residential land. Open green land grew relatively slowly compared with other types of land uses, and 33.37% of the green land target was not reached by 2009. Only a quarter of the existent green land fell within the plan. The majority of the green land was still concentrated in large parks and there was a lack of smaller neighborhood parks within walkable distances. Institutional and recreational land development occurred relatively within the Plan, however, only exceeding the 2003 target by 8.8% in 2009. Half of the new development was within the designated land area and the other half was developed in the vicinity of the planned sites. However, newly developed urban districts lacked a proper supply of public institutions and recreational places. 088 — PANORAMA 24
Other studies have evaluated the 2003 Plan at a more detailed level. For example, as one of the specific plans under the Comprehensive Plan scheme, the Urban Commercial Network Layout Plan (UCNLP) for Changsha published in 2005 was not implemented well. Ye et al. (2013) compared the development of large retail businesses in Changsha to the visions framed by the UCNLP and concluded that the specific plan only had “a minor influence” on directing and controlling the spatial development of Changsha’s urban commercial network. Among the fourteen planned retail commercial areas, only two had developed to the level as designated. Only five areas had developed the designated retail format, and three of them developed based on pre-existing commercial areas. As an explanation, Ye et al. (2013) indicated that the UCNLP lacked a thorough understanding of the retailers’ strategies concerning business site choices. He also pointed out that the plan should have devoted more study on flexible retail formats, rather than assigning different business formats according to theoretical paradigms. In evaluating the planning process, Duan et al. (2011) stated that Changsha’s 2003 Plan lacked critical benchmark setting and updates for milestone projects. The plan included only one phase of milestone projects, thus construction often lacked necessary guidance. The 2003 Plan instead focused on grand pictures of
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spatial layout, lacking specific initiatives and strategies to implement. In summary, the 2003 Plan was not a successful plan. It was poorly implemented, due to a lack of understanding of private market forces. The Plan also lacked effective means of measuring success. evaluation of the 2014 plan
As discussed above, the State Council approved revisions to the Plan in 2014. Between 2013 and 2014, the population of Changsha increased by 1.25%, reaching 7.31 million, with 72.34% living in the urban area. If population continues to grow at this rate, the population in 2020 will be 7.87 million, 21.3% lower than the target set by the 2014 Plan. Considering the aging population and economic restructuring that is reducing labor-intensive industries, it is difficult to expect significantly higher population growth, suggesting that the 2014 Plan made ineffective population and urban growth projections. In 2014, as the Plan expected, multiple growth centers outside the core further developed, fueled by a 24.6% increase in infrastructure investments. Among the major projects are the new subway line, transit hubs, and expressways linking new development areas, such as Meixihu New City on the west and Xingsha
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New City on the east. However, the real estate market continued to fall: while the investment in real estate development grew by 13.6%, the sale revenue of market housing decreased by 23.2% (CSB, 2014). Therefore, while in line with the general trend of decentralized development, the 2014 Plan failed to account for the rapidly shrinking real estate market. The plan’s goal for the development of public transportation has been achieved, however. By the end of 2014, 36.9% of all trips were made on public transit, exceeding the 35% target set by the 2014 Plan (Zeng, 2015). However, traffic congestion persists due to the rapid increase in private car ownership. There were 1.44 million cars running on Changsha’s roads in 2014, a nearly 20% increase from the previous year. Until Changsha balances the conflict between public transit and private vehicles, it will be difficult to really address traffic congestion in the city. Public engagement was also an underperforming section of the 2014 Plan. The NLURP requires all completed planning documents to be published and open to the public for at least 30 days, and the 2014 Plan followed this requirement exactly. Most of the two years of the development of the Plan
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Residents moving out their homes that are to be demolished for new development soon. Changsha
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Old residential area in Changsha. The recent rapid growth of the city has transformed many parts of its old fabric. Changsha
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Spectators on street. Public participation is much demanded in Changsha but lacks implementation. Changsha
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was spent on review and investigation by higher administrative entities. The public simply did not have adequate channels to participate in decisionmaking concerning both the content and the process of the Plan. A few individuals reportedly to send their opinions to the media, but there was no organized entity, either as formal administrative bodies or informal groups, expressing the needs of local communities. Under the mild planning culture that Changsha stands in, neither the 2003 Plan nor the 2014 Plan was well implemented. This underperformance indicates several major problems shared by inland cities in China. Inland cities are faced with different challenges than larger frontier cities like Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen. Inland cities experience more external pressure from competition. The economies of inland cities tend to be less diversified and thus have more similarities in development patterns, which result in higher levels of competition ( Jing, 2004). As seen by the huge difference between projected and actual development after the 2003 Plan, this competition has led to conflicts between the top-down positioning of the city from the Central Government and the local need to build capacity to compete for development. The State Council defined Changsha’s role as building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly city, yet the 2014 Plan’s projections of population growth
and development facilitate ambitious growth on par with the other five capitals in Central China. The failures of the 2003 Plan also demonstrate the consequences of China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The level of residential and commercial development in Changsha implies that the 2003 Plan simply did not account adequately for market forces. The role of developers continues to grow in the massive urbanization wave taking place in many second-tier cities like Changsha. The negligence of residents’ voices in planmaking, the unfair means by which the government and developers compensate residents for property, the coalitions formed between private developers and the government raise big challenges for planning in these cities. Moreover, the planning process lacks reliable channels for residents to express their opinions and participate. However, the 2003 Plan did point to strategic moves that are generally beneficial to Changsha’s development goals. It correctly identified decentralization through multiple growth hubs as the spatial development strategy. It actively proposed the development of public transit system as the main choice for commuting in the city. The Plan also imposed relatively strict regulations through building height limits in historic preservation zones and ecological control lines
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he Comprehensive Plan for the City of Changsha (2003 – 2014) is thus indicative of the mild planning culture potentially found in similarly-situated, inland, secondtier cities. Its ineffectiveness in guiding real development also demonstrates the conflicts between the grand vision imposed by the Central Government and local demand. The need for more public engagement during the process of rapid urbanization poses a challenge that planners in Changsha and other inland Chinese cities must confront.
Changsha Commerce Bureau (CSCB). Invest in Changsha. 2008. http://www.csinvest.gov.cn/jrcs_csgh.asp. Changsha Municipal Government (CMG). Comprehensive Plan of the City of Changsha (2003 - 2020). 2014. http://www. changsha.gov.cn/xxgk/szfxxgkml/ghjh/qsfzgh/201411/t20141105_657380.html. Changsha Development Report (CSDR) for 2003. 2003. http://bbs.sjtu.edu.cn/bbscon,board,Hunan,file,M.1080133565.A.html. Changsha Statistics Bureau (CSB). Changsha’s Economic and Social Development Report for 2014. 2014. http://www.cstj.gov. cn/static/ndcss/20150323/28174.html. Changsha’s Economic and Social Development Report for 2010. 2010. http://www.cstj.gov.cn/static/ndcss/20110323/15586. html. Changsha’s Economic and Social Development Report for 2003. 2003. http://www.hntj.gov.cn/tjgb/szgb/200403220043.htm. Duan, Peng, Bohong Zheng, and Ke Hou. “An Evaluation of Comprehensive Planning based on GIS: A Case Study on Changsha’s Comprehensive Plan (2003 -2020).” Symposium for the National Planning Conference. Beijing: The Urban Planning Society of China, 2011. Fox, Eric. “Introduction to the Chinese Banking System.” Investopedia. 2011. http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ economics/11/chinese-banking-system.asp. Friedmann, John. Insurgencies: Essays in Planning Theory. New York: Routledge, 2011. Jing, Tihua. “A Report on Regional Economic Development in China.” 2004. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ documents/APCITY/UNPAN019958.pdf Knoema. “Chinese Fiscal Condition.” 2015. http://cn.knoema.com/atlas. Landis, John. “Urban and Planning Theory.” University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2015. Mei. “Demolition in Kaifu District.” 2015. http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-free-5068683-2.shtml. National Development Reform Commission (NDRC). The Note on Designating Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan Region as the National Pilot Reform Zone. 2007. http://www.hunan.gov.cn/cztlxsh/qwxx/gfpf/200801/t20080124_95980.htm. National People’s Congress (NPC). National Law of Urban and Rural Planning (NLURP). 2007. http://www.china.com.cn/ policy/txt/2007-10/29/content_9139260.htm. National Statistics Bureau (NSB). China 6th Population Census. 2011. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/html/fu03. htm. Qi and Zhou. “Urban and Rural Planning Laws.” China South University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China, 2015. State Council. The Reply of State Council on the Approval of Changsha Comprehensive Plan. 2014. http://www.gov.cn/ zhengce/content/2014-04/18/content_8769.htm. Ye, Qiang, Yitian Tan, Xuebin Zhao, Liwu Luo, Na Chen, and Hui Xiang. “An Evaluation of Urban Commercial Network Planning’s Implementation based on GIS.” Geographical Research 32, no. 2 (2013). Zeng, Hualin. “Changsha’s Growing Number of Cars.” Decision-making Reference, Vol 34. 2015. http://cstj.gov.cn/static/ jcztfx/20150401/28245.html. Zhao, Jing. “Changsha Launching Revision of the Plan.” 2011. http://news.rednet.cn/c/2011/01/11/2157809.htm. Zhou, Hui. “Changsha’s New Plan.” 2014. http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140425/12201218_0.shtml.
photos cited
01 Author
All photos are licensed for fair use under Creative Commons 2.0 or permissions have been specifically granted by the author
02 Author 03 Author 04 Tu, Yuhao. Residents in Beizhengjie Moving Out Homes. Aug 19th, 2014. Changsha Skyline, Changsha. 05 Tu, Yuhao. Gutan Street. Aug 19th, 2014. Changsha Skyline, Changsha. 06 Jonathan. Spectators. Available from Flickr Commons. Taken September 11, 2005. https://flic.kr/p/59zsUS
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