The United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of Fairness and Democracy in an Anachronistic Tradition

The United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of Fairness and Democracy in an Anachronistic Tradition

By Susannah Gilmore

About the Author Susannah Gilmore is a 4th year undergraduate double majoring in Foreign Affairs and Global Sustainability from Richmond, Virginia. In Spring 2018, she studied abroad at Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg in southern Germany, where she studied political science and German language, and wrote this paper for a class on United Nations policy. Currently, she is an intern in the Education Abroad Office. After graduation, she hopes to work in government and eventually foreign service.

Foreword The acceptance of Susannah Gilmore’s paper titled “The United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of Fairness and Democracy in an Anachronistic Tradition“ for publication in the Wilson Journal is a much deserved reward for an exceptionally well researched, written and structured term paper. The piece concluded Gilmore’s participation in my introductory lecture course into International Relations that focused on issues of global governance, globalization and regionalization. The United Nations was one of the themes of that lecture, prompting Gilmore to probe deeper into the world organization’s reform agenda which, in particular, focuses on the UN’s most influential body, the Security Council. The structure of the Security Council, including permanent membership of five major powers, also known as P5, has been rightfully criticized as anachronistic, reflecting the global power configuration of the immediate post-World War II era. The P5 - consisting of the US, Russia, China, the UK and France - have been

endowed with veto power, which they have frequently used, often in order to give precedence to narrow national interests rather than contributing to the overarching objective of the UN, that is, maintaining peace in the world. Gilmore analyzes competently the asymmetries in the UN’s institutional architecture. She carefully discusses the pros and cons of the veto and by studying four well selected cases, enhances the reader’s understanding about the motivations to use the veto and what devastating consequences the veto might have. The Rwandan and Syrian cases are persuasive examples. I also welcome the attempt to discuss various reform proposals to overcome the current deadlock in reforming the UN’s executive multilateralism, although more than those discussed in the paper are on the table.

I am happy that the paper was selected for publication by the Wilson Journal, as it gives other students a shining example how to produce a highquality paper in the field of political science and contemporary history.

Prof Dr Jürgen Rüland University of Freiburg, Germany

Abstract In recent decades, the United Nations has received considerable criticism over its structural and political problems. Much evidence points to the United Nations’ lack of effective and timely action in matters of crisis, as well as abuses of power within the member structure. The veto power vested in the UN Security Council has specifically permitted misconduct and undemocratic decision-making. Therefore, the misuse of this power necessitates extensive reform to both remove the power veto and also to restructure the United Nations in order to ensure fair and timely resolutions.

In this paper, I will 1) give a brief history of the foundation and formation of the United Nations as well as statistics concerning veto power by country and by issue in the context of world events and key leaders, 2) outline the strengths and weaknesses of various arguments for and against the United Nations Security Council veto power, 3) explore four relevant case studies concerning Russia’s use of the veto in recent Syrian matters, China’s veto of the Guatemalan peace accords in 1997, the United States and France’s roles in the Rwandan Genocide and the United States’ use of the veto in the

Israel-Palestine conflict, 4) present several possible solutions to the current unsatisfactory United Nations Security Council structure including majority voting and majority veto voting, and 5) discuss in detail the “Binding Triad” proposal, which provides a new system of voting within the UN Security Council that attempts to more fairly distribute voting power through a triple majority vote of all members. I will conclude with my opinion on which solution is most viable and effective and what further research should be done on the matter.

I. Introduction

The United Nations, an international peacekeeping organization established as a result of World War II, remains the primary mode by which international cooperation and security action attempt to resolve global conflicts. It is the closest structure to a global government that the world has ever seen, and it has passed a significant number of resolutions that have positively progressed the over-arching goal of global peace. The United Nations Charter states in its opening chapter that its purposes are to “maintain international peace and security, . . . develop friendly relations among nations based on respect . . . achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . . [and] be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” (Charter of the United Nations). While some argue that the UN has largely succeeded in serving these purposes, many also agree that its structure is hopelessly flawed, specifically regarding the special veto powers of the Security Council’s five permanent countries, which can prevent any resolution from moving forward with a single veto. In fact, the United Nations General Assembly has coined the phrase “one nation, one vote, and no power” to emphasize the frustrating stalemates that occur so often (Daley 2016). In the remainder of this paper, I will further discuss the problems of the United Nations’ internal power structure, as well as proposed solutions using, a variety of sources from media articles, historical journals, essays, literature, and statistical studies.

II. History of the League of Nations and United Nations Security Council

By the time the United Nations formed in 1945, veto powers and permanent/semi-permanent members were not a new concept. In the

formation of the League of Nations in 1920, four permanent members similarly assembled—the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan. By 1936, these four permanent members, as well as 11 non-permanent members, all had veto powers in that their rejection of certain pieces of legislation would render that legislation unmovable. Some argue that one of the main reasons the League of Nations ultimately failed was because of its inability to move legislation forward, since the veto power often led to indecision when a unanimous vote was required.

In 1945, the establishment of the United Nations framed itself similarly in that it also assigned the veto power, although only to certain permanent members. It required unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security Council to pass legislation, which at the time included the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and France. The United States especially pushed for this unanimity clause. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, President Roosevelt proposed the veto power so "the Organization could take no important action without their joint consent” (Wilcox 1945, 944). This proposal caused disagreement between the countries at the conference, but the United States made it clear that it could not join without it (Wilcox 1945, 943-956). According to United States advisor Francis Wilcox, United States Senator Conally went so far as to rip up a copy of the United Nations Charter in a dramatic speech during a conference, signaling to other states that their “defeat” of the veto meant the end of the Charter (Epstein 1995). Members finally agreed upon the clause, and thus the veto power was established.

In the charter, the veto is only briefly mentioned in Chapter V, which states that "the concurring votes of the permanent members" are required for decisions (Charter of the United Nations). The United Nations veto system was supposedly established in order to prevent the body from taking harmful action against its founding members; however, many smaller countries resented the veto power, feeling that it was forced upon them as a threat—that without it, the United Nations would not form.

III. Historic Use of Veto Powers

The United Nations Security Council has used its veto power in a variety of situations, with over 204 vetoes between the years of 1946 and 2018 (United Nations Security Council, Research). Of those vetoes, roughly 45%

have been issued from Russia and the Soviet Union, 33% from the United States, 12% from the United Kingdom, 6% from France, and 4% from China, as displayed below in Figure I. Additionally, most of the vetoes have been issued from one or more of the Security Council’s three North Atlantic Treaty Organization members (Kessel and Richter 2017).

Figure I: Displaying Security Council P5 vetoes by country from 1945- 2018

In 1973, Ambassador Charles W. Yost cast a United States’ veto concerning Israel, when he voted against a resolution that would condemn Israel for its war with Syria and Lebanon in 1970. This marked the beginning of a long tradition of the United States’ use of the veto to block resolutions that negatively affect its ally, Israel. Later, in 2011, Obama ordered a similar veto which prevented the UN from condemning Israeli settlements. The most recent veto on this matter occurred this past June when the United States rejected a resolution that would protect Palestinians while condemning Israel. Russia has used its veto more than any other country, which in its early days even caused others to nickname Soviet Union Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov “Mr. Nyet,” or in English, “Mr. No,” as 79 vetoes from the Soviet Union were used in the first 10 years of the organization (The Return of Mr Nyet 2008). Many of these early vetoes blocked resolutions for new memberships in retaliation for the United States’ refusal to admit all Soviet Union republics. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has mainly used its veto on resolutions concerning the conflict in Ukraine and Syria. Recently, in Ukraine, many argue that Russia is abusing its veto power by preventing UNSC resolutions from addressing the political unrest in the country. In 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko urged the need

for reform within the Security Council, specifically to remove Russia’s veto rights, asserting, “The UN requires immediate reform to deprive the aggressor state of its veto right” (UNIAN, 2018). The United Kingdom first used its veto in 1956 to block a proposed letter from the United States to the Security Council regarding Palestine. Other notable instances in which the United Kingdom used its veto power were again in 1956, when the U.K. blocked a resolution to resolve the Suez Canal crisis, and in 1963, when the U.K. vetoed a resolution condemning Britain for failing to use force to overthrow the Caucasian-minority government of Rhodesia.(Paul, Global Policy Forum).

France has most often used its veto alongside its neighbor, the United Kingdom, but occasionally as the sole veto. In 1976, France unilaterally vetoed a resolution that would affirm Comorian sovereignty over the Comoro Islands off the coast of Africa in order to maintain its influence over the region. France has also used its veto with Britain to reject a resolution that would call upon the termination of military action by Israeli forces against Egypt in the Suez Crisis. In a tense moment, France threatened the United States with a veto should a resolution be put forward allowing for war against Iraq in 2003, which I will further discuss in the remaining sections of this paper (Paul, Global Policy Forum).

China has used its veto power the most sparingly throughout UN history, first in 1955 (then represented by Taiwan) to block Mongolia’s application for membership, which held strong until 1960, when China conceded under pressure from the Soviet Union. (Vetoes Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council, 2019). In recent decades, China has generally abstained its vote when resolutions do not directly concern its interests. The country has also vetoed in concert with Russia to prevent sanctions and military intervention in Syria in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

IV. Argument against P5 veto powers

Many voices point to the unrepresentative nature of the United Nations’ current structure, in that very few regions are represented. No African, Latin American, or Middle Eastern states are among the permanent members—nor is India, though its large population and expanding economy make it a key influencer in the world. The United States, France, and United Kingdom are all Western countries, which causes a disproportional influence

on Security Council decisions. The vetoes of these permanent members act in directions to forward their countries’ national interests, which often conflict with the United Nations’ overarching goal of peace. By putting the fate of peace interests around the world into the hands of five nations, the United Nations risks a veto of a single nation undoing years of work on existing peace issues.

Many have heavily criticized the United Nations Security Council for its inability to take action on important, time-sensitive matters which sometimes result in loss of life. Because just one of these vetoes, or often mere threats of vetoes, can so easily dismiss a resolution, the Security Council only operates pragmatically and effectively when the resolution at hand concerns the protection of the five permanent members’ interests. History has demonstrated that the Security Council is unable to take action that goes against the foreign interests of the P5. As a result, the UN has repeatedly deadlocked on important matters.

For the reasons discussed above, many consider the Security Council P5 veto power anachronistic. UN researcher Peter Nadin wrote that “. . . the veto is an anachronism . . . In the twenty-first century, the veto has come to be almost universally seen as a disproportionate power and an impediment to credible international action to crisis” (Nadin 2016, 133-134). It does seem outdated for the permanent members of the council today to be the five victors of a war that took place nearly 80 years ago. World powers shift and flux, and this must be taken into account when assigning power to countries on the Security Council. It is often noted that two of the P5 members, Britain and France, are relatively medium-ranked world powers, whereas many other countries such as India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil—which have large economies and progressing industry and thus carry significant weight in world affairs—are severely underrepresented.

The need for a more effective system of international governance is especially dire in light of potential imminent crises. Climate change especially has the potential to displace millions of people (most of whom live in alreadyimpoverished areas) from their homes and countries. A large climate-related refugee crisis looms in the upcoming decades as rising sea levels in coastal areas threaten infrastructure, and rising temperatures in the Middle East threaten health and agriculture crises. Inevitably, this would bring political conflict, which may require UN peacekeeping action. In addition, the population

growth accompanied by food shortages in the face of climate change will also likely require UN mitigation and response. The United Nations needs a reformed, secure voting system that will allow it to quickly and effectively respond to crises in a rapidly changing physical and political world.

When discussing reform of the veto power, the system itself proves to be incapable of internal reform, since one can assume that one or more (if not all) of the P5 will oppose a decision to abolish the veto. In this case, it seems that the ineffectiveness of the Security Council is doomed to continue. Nevertheless, at the end of my paper I will present several options for viable reform.

V. Hidden Vetoes and Their Problems

Aside from the many Security Council resolution vetoes since 1945, there have been just as many, if not more, un-proposed resolutions that P5 members have prevented from coming to the table due to a “hidden veto.” I define the hidden veto as the direct or indirect threat of veto usage should a particular resolution be put forward that jeopardizes the foreign interests of an individual permanent member. These threats usually occur in private meetings before a resolution officially forms and can convince other council members to shift position or abandon a resolution before anyone can bring it forward. Hidden vetoes have a very negative and hindering impact on the ability of the Security Council to pass resolutions.

For example, the United States consistently threatens to veto any Security Council measure deemed critical of Israel, its long-time ally. Many have also criticized China for using a hidden veto to prevent Security Council resolutions from taking action to designate Pakistan-based Masood Azhar as a global terrorist (China Again Sides with Pakistan, Blocks UN Move to Ban Masood Azhar 2018). India’s representative to the UN, Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, stated in 2018 that the Security Council’s usage of hidden vetoes in situations “where it was never meant to be exercised” is negatively affecting the effectiveness of the Council. (The Tribune, 2018)

Since these vetoes are usually not made public or known by all parties, they don’t receive much media attention, and thus the problem is underestimated. The issue of hidden vetoes outlines the larger issue that with such a small circle of veto-power countries, the outcome of almost every resolution is assumed beforehand, thereby affecting the process before it even

VI. Arguments for P5 Veto Powers

Varied arguments exist in support of the current permanent member and veto power system in the UN Security Council. One opinion asserts that the veto power crucially prevents the formation of dictatorships, one of the primary reasons for which the UN was founded after WWII. In this case, it could be argued that the current Security Council structure has been quite effective, since there has not yet been a dictatorship as destructive as the world saw in WWII.

Another common argument holds that the veto needs to remain a powerful and strong tool only available to responsible, (mostly) democratic members of the UN. Referring to economic and political weight, this viewpoint acknowledges that the governments of many non-permanent states in the United Nations do not necessarily represent their population’s best and most forward interests. Many believe that the veto power lies in the most capable and leading nations, which can be trusted to make use of their weight to ensure that the UN does not unnecessarily intervene in situations that would waste resources or make matters worse. The P5 system is also deemed necessary to ensure aid from the five large countries, especially the United States.

Nevertheless, the view that P5 countries should be entrusted with veto powers in order to “check” United Nations’ resolutions because these countries have better perceived foresight or intelligence is extremely paternalistic and implies an undemocratic system of governance. In reality, the P5 and veto power system allows these nations to undermine UN peacekeeping goals through the pursuit of their own foreign interests. The blocking of a resolution by a single veto against the unanimous support of every other Security Council member is a recipe for inaction and abuse of power.

Additionally, some argue that hidden vetoes can serve as preventative checks which can benefit peace-keeping resolutions by thwarting potentially problematic actions. The most notable example occurred in 2003, when French President Jacques Chirac threatened a veto should the United Nations Security Council pass a resolution to threaten war against Iraq. He publicly stated during an interview, “My position is that whatever the circumstances,

France will vote no. . . We refuse to follow a path that will lead automatically to war . . . [For the United States to wage-war without the assent of the international community would set] a dangerous precedent”(Sciolino 2003). In this case, France argued for cooperation as an alternative to war threats, in direct opposition to the United States, which produced an unusually positive effect in that the resolution was not put forward. This, combined with the publicity gained through the use of French and worldwide media, served as an effective tool in keeping the United Nations, and particularly the United States, from making use of a threat of war.

While this example does show a positive effect of the veto power, it is an extremely unusual case and is unlikely to happen in the future. Furthermore, the fact that the United States declared war on Iraq despite the United Nations Charter’s prohibition of this action, shows that France’s hidden veto in this case was not sufficient to prevent war. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2004, “I have indicated it was not inconformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and the UN charter point of view, [the war] was illegal” (Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN Charter, n.d.). UN Security Council reform is direly needed to restructure the veto power and ensure that powerful countries will not abuse their positions.

VII. Case Studies

The following four sub-sections contain various case studies illustrating the problematic effects of the P5 Security Council veto:

1. Case 1: Russia and Syria As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia has used its veto power in order to block peacekeeping action from being taken in the ongoing civil war in Syria. Specifically, Russia has blocked many UN peace resolutions to investigate the government’s use of chemical weapons against the people of Syria, due to its close contractual relations to Assad. Russia has issued 12 Security Council vetoes against Syrian-related resolutions (Russia’s 12 UN Vetoes on Syria, 2018). Most of these have prevented investigation into the government’s use of chemical weapons, but Russia has also blocked other resolutions to prevent sanctions, condemnations, and accusations.

Russia has justified its Security Council veto on Syrian matters mainly through the denial that the circumstances pose a significant threat. In 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated Russia’s adverse position to United Nations interference in the Syrian civil war, saying “The situation doesn’t present a threat to international peace and security. . . Syria is a very important country in the Middle East and destabilizing Syria would have repercussions far beyond its borders” (Hetou 2018). He then went on to support Assad’s own attempts at reform within the country.

Russia has opposed resolutions that would enable the United Nations to threaten Assad with economic sanctions in response to chemical warfare. Many have suspected that this is because the arms embargo stated in the sanctions would hinder Russian firms from selling to Syria, which would eliminate Syria’s main source of war weapons. Russia has repeatedly called upon the United Nations to support the quick implementation of Assad’s reforms, rather than directly interfere via sanctions or investigations.

Recently, in 2016, during the peak of the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo, Russia vetoed a resolution to call upon “all parties to the Syrian conflict [to] cease . . . any and all attacks in the city of Aleppo to allow urgent humanitarian needs to be addressed . . .” and give the United Nations and its partners “unlimited humanitarian access” to help the situation (McKirdy 2017). This past April, Great Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations, Karen Pierce, commented that Russia had “crossed the line” in the international order and that Russia “would rather cross the Weapons of Mass Destruction line than risk sanctions” against Syria. Later, United Kingdom Foreign Minister Boris Johnson joined Pierce and tweeted that Russia was “ holding the Syrian people to political ransom” by continuing to support Assad’s regime (Sampathkumar 2018). Johnson made these comments in response to Russia’s most recent veto against a proposed UN investigation into the use of chemical weapons warfare in Syria.

In regards to the United Nations, the relationship between Syria and Russia exemplifies how the current structure has allowed powerful nations to abuse the veto power and undermine international law to protect their own foreign interests. The vetoes made by Russia (and often China) are indicative of a short-term agenda as well as a neglect of violent humanitarian crimes.

2. Case 2: Guatemala and China

In 1996, the ongoing violence in the Guatemalan Civil war— fought between the Guatemalan government and leftist guerrilla groups (named the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)--appeared to come to a peaceful resolution. The United Nations proposed a resolution to verify Guatemala’s signed peace accords by sending peacekeeping forces to the country. The mission seemed to be unanimously supported by many nations and had a very positive outlook of success. On January 10, 1996, China unilaterally vetoed the resolution, not due to a disapproval of the peace accords, but rather because it disliked the close ties shared between Guatemala and Taiwan, who China was in conflict with over sovereignty disagreements. China and Guatemala had engaged in earlier discussions in an attempt to negotiate its friendship with Taiwan in order to receive the UN resolution, but Guatemala refused to sever ties with Taiwan. China’s veto demonstrated how the veto power could be used by permanent members for reasons entirely unrelated to the resolution or issue on the table.. As a result, the veto of a powerful country punished a much smaller country against the support of all other four P5 Security Council members, as well as many of the semi-permanent members (Stop Abuse of U.N. Security Council Veto Power 1997).

3. Case 3: Rwandan Genocide and France/United States Just as P5 vetoes can result in the delay or abandonment of peacekeeping resolutions, hidden P5 vetoes can also pose just as many disastrous consequences in humanitarian crises. In early 1994, the Rwandan Genocide began as the Hutu majority government directed the slaughtering of the minority Tutsi peoples in mass numbers in response to the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu. This led to the deaths of 500,000–2,000,000 Tutsis in the country and is regarded as one of the most brutal, devastating genocides in world history. At the time, the United Nations failed to intervene in Rwanda due to the hidden vetoes of France and the United States. France had maintained close relations with President Habyarimana while he was in power and had supported his military during the civil war in order to preserve French influence over the country.

During the start of the genocide, France helped evacuate expatriates and Hutu officials in the country and reportedly refused to aid any Tutsis seeking evacuation, even separating expatriates and children from their Tutsi spouses

(Administrator, n.d.). The United States, on the other hand, abstained from intervention due to its fear of a similar situation that had occurred in Somalia and the lack of significant U.S. interests at stake in the situation. President Clinton stated at the time, “Whether we get involved in any of the world’s ethnic conflicts. . . must depend on the cumulative weight of the American interests at stake” (Genser 2016). Intelligence reports revealed that President Clinton was well aware of the planned genocide before its height (Carroll 2004).

France and the United States also exerted their influence with hidden vetoes to weaken the United Nations’ stance on the genocide, preventing the Security Council from passing any resolution even containing the word “genocide,” as this would require intervention by parties under the 1951 Genocide Convention. This led to months of delay in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsis’ lives were lost in Rwanda before any kind of humanitarian intervention occurred. Human Rights Watch advisor Alison Des Forges summed up the Security Council’s unethical inaction in a report, saying “The Americans were interested in saving money, the Belgians were interested in saving face, and the French were interested in saving their ally, the genocidal government. . . All that took priority over saving lives”(Rwandan Genocide Could Have Been Stopped, 2015).

It’s clear through this situation that the P5 veto power has resulted in mass loss of life in humanitarian crises throughout history, both through direct and implied vetoes of world powers. It is unacceptable to allow these five world powers to dictate United Nations peacekeeping action according to their personal foreign interests, especially when so many lives are at stake. The P5—the United States especially—has an unequal amount of power and influence over UN decisions and context framing, as seen evidenced by the body’s successful attempt to prevent the Rwandan killings from being defined as “genocide” for the first three months. This is an abuse of power exercised in order to redefine factual global events to favor one’s foreign interests and has had quite obvious morbid consequences.

4. Case 4: United States and Palestine/Israel After Russia, the United States has vetoed the most resolutions proposed by the UN Security Council. Many of these have been resolutions that involve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The U.S. has been a long-term ally of Israel, providing billions of dollars in annual grants to

the country since 1985 (Fas, n.d.). This has rendered Israel militarily and economically dependent on the United Sates. Since 1970, the United States has used its veto power against resolutions concerning Israel 43 times (The 43 Times US Has Used Veto Power against UN Resolutions on Israel, n.d.).

In 2016, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power stated the reason for the United States’ veto, saying “One cannot simultaneously champion expanding Israeli settlements and champion a viable two-state solution that would end the conflict. One had to make a choice between settlements and separation.” (Nichols, 2016). Most recently, the United States has vetoed resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory as well as resolutions denouncing the violence inflicted upon Palestine by Israeli forces, maintaining that Israel has the right to defend itself, albeit against many unarmed civilians. President Trump later vetoed a UN resolution calling upon the United States to reverse its decision to formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; the resolution noted that the largest number of protestor killings occurred the day after the United States moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These recent decisions represent a long pattern of United States favoritism towards Israel, as the country has vetoed nearly all resolutions which seek criticize or threaten Israel in any way.

Many would argue that this history of the veto shows the United States abusing its position as a permanent United Nations member in order to ensure its economic and political relationship to Israel. The United States gains extensive insight into Middle Eastern affairs through its close ties to the country and has collaborated in the past on technological projects. One such example occurred in 2010 when the two countries created a high-tech malware system used to infiltrate Iran’s cyber infrastructure and delay its progress towards the creation of nuclear weapons (Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities, n.d.). Named the “Stuxnet Worm,” the system analyzed and infiltrated target Windows’ networks and computer systems, specifically targeting Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities and compromising them by having the ability to operate, access, and override various machinery and nuclear sites. The malware was so effective that any USB that was plugged into an affected computer system would immediately become infected and infiltrate any subsequent computer system it was plugged into. It is evident through this action that the United States gains a significant amount of access and information to pursue its foreign interests through its relationship with

Israel. By using its UNSC veto power to protect these interests, the United States demonstrates an abuse of power that is made worse by the lives of thousands of Palestinians at stake.

The United States has also provided billions of its foreign military aid funds to Israel (which have been used against Palestinian protestors) in exchange for defense projects. Perhaps it is the realist nature of international relations to assume that the United States will stand by its ally through the use of its veto at the Security Council table, but it is the P5 system itself that allows this to happen and therefore must be addressed. In the following section, I will describe and analyze some of the solutions that have been proposed to fix the abuse of power and perpetuated stagnation that so often occurs in the United Nations Security Council structure.

VIII. Solutions

Various Solutions have been invoked to improve the UN Security Council. One popular solution calls for an end to the veto power, instead establishing a “majority rules” framework in which all countries cast votes to determine if action should be taken. A variation of this solution calls for a majority rule framework in which a majority vote from the current permanent members is required for any resolution to be passed. In the past, only 13 of all vetoed resolutions received vetoes from three or more permanent countries (United Nations, Security Council, n.d.). This would prevent a single state or two states from vetoing a resolution that the remaining three or four permanent states support. Additionally, propositions have been suggested that involve the United Nations only using the unanimous voting requirement in certain serious situations rather than every single resolution. In 2015, France proposed an amendment to the United Nations that would restrict the five permanent members of the UN Security Council from utilizing their veto power in specific cases of “mass atrocities and genocide” (Charbonneau 2015). After announcing the proposal, 75 countries representing Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia pledged their support out of the 193 UN member nations. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated France’s independent commitment to not using its veto in these cases, hoping that other nations would follow his example. The proposal noted the obligation that such a veto power entails, saying “We underscore that the veto is not a privilege, but an international responsibility.” While Britain has expressed support for the proposal, both Russia and China have

1. Binding triad In the 1970s, founder of the Center for War/Peace Studies Richard Hudson developed a proposed solution for the UN Security Council voting system. The solution, known as the “Binding Triad,” allowed resolutions to move forward with three supermajority votes: the majority of the people, the majority of nation states, and the majority of financial contributions to the UN. Each resolution would need a minimum two-thirds majority vote in all three categories and would eliminate the power of vetoes. This proposal was intended to transform the United Nations into a “world parliament,” which would be able to make global decisions more effectively than the current UN. The Binding Triad proposal comes with two limitations to majority voting. The first is that the reformed UN would deal solely with international affairs, abstaining from any one nation’s internal affairs, and the second limit is that the UN would be forbidden to have its own military force. It would also call for a new World Court to be established when dealing with difficult international cases.

This proposition appeals to some due to its relatively easy installment, as it would only take two amendments to transform the current United Nations charter into a limited world government. The first amendment would apply to the General Assembly voting system, specifically Article 18. The original article states that each member of the assembly receives one vote, that decisions on “important questions” will be made by a two-thirds vote, and that decisions on other questions shall be made by a majority vote of present members (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.). The new amendment would call for the triad voting system to make resolution approvals instead. Members would also need to amend Article 13 of the General Assembly chapter, which originally states that the General Assembly will make studies for the purposes of promoting international cooperation in the political, developmental, economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields.

According to Frank Barnaby, the new amendment would shift the role of the General Assembly “ from a powerless town meeting of the world into a functioning global legislature” (Barnaby 1991). Peacekeepers and economic sanctions would make binding laws enforceable, without UN military forces. It is expected that over time, the Binding Triad reforms will allow the UN

to gradually shift its power towards the individual level as member nations begin to disarm under increasing global law. It would cause military budgets to decrease dramatically, allowing these savings to be spent towards social benefits or other areas.

At the core of the Binding Triad reform lie three crucial elements. The first is an executive department headed by an executive figure. The UN already fulfills this element with the Secretariat and Secretariat General, currently António Guterres. The second is an effective judicial arm, which is also already provided for in the current UN through the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The third is an effective legislative body. Currently, the United Nations Security Council is the closest body to this element, but it cannot make any decisions on matters other than international peace and security, and the veto power limits its effectiveness, as I have explained. The poorly designed Security Council thus limits the other two elements, as there are limited laws to be interpreted by the judicial branch as well as to be implemented and enforced by the executive branch.

Possible reception of the Binding Triad is not well known, but many predict that the most difficult task will be persuading the P5 members to give up their veto power and accept a majority triad system of voting. Large powers that are not P5 members, such as Japan, India and Germany, would likely be the most receptive to the idea, since these countries feel severely underrepresented in the current UN Security Council structure. Other smaller nations of the Third World could also see the appeal of the triad system. For the Binding Triad to come into effect, a transfer and trade-off of power must be accepted in order for all states to receive equal representation in the voting system. Inevitably, there will be cases where it appears smaller states carry an equal and thus disproportionate weight in decisions concerning large and powerful states, even though there are extreme population, economic, and political strength differences between them. The three-majority voting style of the Binding Triad would hopefully keep this difference from carrying a significant weight, but it is something to consider. Barnaby later states that “The reformed organization would have better efficiency to do its job, while keeping a sufficient number of checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power that is so often seen today.” (Barnaby 1991). A more extensive solution proposed by University of Minnesota

Professor Joseph Schwartzberg discusses the problems of the current “one nation-one vote” system of decision making in UN agencies, as well as the unfair allocation of power in the Security Council, which causes nations to hesitate to give the UN the resources it requires to promote peace. A reformed system would include a weighted voting formula to accommodate the requirements of shareholders and stakeholders in various agencies. Schwartzberg also stresses the urgency of this issue in the world today, arguing, “It is not only the threat of nuclear annihilation that is being denied. . .comparable threats arise from . . . warming, loss of biodiversity, depletion of vital resources such as petroleum and fresh water, and the explosive potential inherent in the obscene gap between the world’s haves and have-notes”( Schwartzberg and Thakur 2013). The acknowledgment of arising global crises is important when presenting a convincing case for UN reform, as nuclear and environmental threats will likely cause devastating conflict in the future and will therefore necessitate a secure global governance system to address and mitigate such challenges.

XI. Conclusion

Ultimately, the United Nations is in dire need of procedural restructuring and reassignment of power. In its current form, the P5 veto allows certain countries to abuse their power and influence peace-keeping actions in order to promote their own foreign interests. Throughout history, peoples and countries have suffered at the expense of the veto of a single nation positioned against the rest of the world. The Rwandan genocide in particular is perhaps the most devastating example of a UN Security Council failure. Both France and the United States used their power to avoid direct intervention, and the UN’s inaction led to hundreds of thousands of lost lives. From a realist perspective, it is natural to assume these powerful P5 countries will continue to act in their own self-interests, as has been shown through the four case studies provided. Therefore, the United Nations structure itself must be changed so as to more evenly distribute the power and decrease unilateral decision-making on the Security Council. The Binding Triad proposal presents an intriguing reform that could solve the current problems of the UN through the abolishment of the P5 veto and the creation of a more democratic voting procedure.

Ultimately, the solutions presented above are not realistically implementable due to the veto power. It is very unlikely that all P5 members

will vote to relinquish the veto power, as doing so would act against their own interests and potentially leave them at risk in the future. Therefore, the establishment of a new peacekeeping organization is necessary. Looking back through history, if the League of Nations was the first generation of a multilateral peacekeeping organization, the United Nations was the second generation, and a third one is needed to truly improve—and hopefully perfect—the goal of international peace between nations.

Books Barnaby, Frank. 1991. Building a More Democratic United Nations Proceedings of CAMDUN-1. Frank Cass.. Genser, Jared. 2016. United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights. Cambridge Univ Press. Schwartzberg, Joseph E., and Ramesh Chandra Thakur. 2013. Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World. United Nations University Press.

Websites, Articles & Journals Carroll, Rory. 2004. “US Chose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, March 31, 2004. www.theguardian.com/ world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda. Charbonneau, Louis. 2015. “Dozens of Nations Back French Appeal to Limit Use of U.N. Veto.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, Sept. 30 2015. www. reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-vetoidUSKCN0RU30V20150930. “Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. ET Bureau. 2018. “China Again Sides with Pakistan, Blocks UN Move to Ban Masood Azhar.” The Economic Times, July 12. 2018. economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-again-sides-with-pakistanblocks-un-move-to-ban-masood-azhar/articleshow/56256016.cms. Daley, Tad. 2016. “An Aging United Nations in 2015. But How About a New United Nations in 2020?” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost. com, July 16, 2016. www.huffingtonpost.com/tad-daley/an-agingunited-nations-i_b_7814386.html. Epstein, Edward. 1995. “When Nations United / The Historic Gathering of Delegates from 50 Countries to Sign the U.N. Charter Half a Century Ago Was One of San Francisco's Finest Hours.” SFGate, Apr. 23, 1995. www.sfgate.com/news/article/When-Nations-United-Thehistoric-gathering-of-3035304.php. HETOU, GHAIDAA. 2018. SYRIAN CONFLICT: The Role of Russia, Iran and the Us in a Global Crisis. ROUTLEDGE INDIA.

Kessel, Isabel von, and Felix Richter. 2017. “Infographic: Who Vetoed the Most in the UN?” Statista, Aug. 21, 2017. www.statista.com/ chart/10758/un-security-council-resolutions-vetoed/. “Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN Charter - Annan | UN News.” United Nations, United Nations, news.un.org/ en/story/2004/09/115352-lessons-iraq-war-underscore-importanceun-charter-annan. McKirdy, Euan. 2017. “8 Times Russia Blocked a UN Resolution on Syria.” CNN, Cable News Network, 13 Apr. 13 2017. www.cnn. com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-unsc-syria-resolutions/index. html. Paul, James. “Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes.” Razor Tie Artery Foundation Announce New Joint Venture Recordings | Razor & Tie, Rovi Corporation, web.archive.org/web/20080317010910/http:// www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm. Sampathkumar, Mythili . 2018. “UN in Deadlock after US and Russia Vote against Each Other over Syria Chemical Weapons Attack.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, Apr. 11, 2018. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/syria-chemical-attack-doumalatest-us-russia-un-deadlock-investigation-a8298671.html. News, RTÉ “Russia's 12 UN Vetoes on Syria.” RTE.ie, RTÉ, 11 Apr. 2018, www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0411/953637-russia-syria-un-veto/ “Rwandan Genocide Could Have Been Stopped.” 2017. Human Rights Watch, Apr. 17 2015. www.hrw.org/news/1999/03/31/rwandangenocide-could-have-been-stopped. Sciolino, Elaine. “THREATS AND RESPONSES: DISCORD; France to Veto Resolution On Iraq War, Chirac Says.” 2003. The New York Times, The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2003. www.nytimes. com/2003/03/11/world/threats-and-responses-discord-france-toveto-resolution-on-iraq-war-chirac-says.html. “Stop Abuse of U.N. Security Council Veto Power.” 1997. The New York Times, The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1997. www.nytimes. com/1997/01/18/opinion/l-stop-abuse-of-un-security-council-vetopower-220205.html. Fas. n.d.“Striving For A Safer World Since 1945.” Preparing for the 21st Century, fas.org/.

“Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities.” n.d. Wireless Inductive Charging. large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/holloway1/. “The 43 Times US Has Used Veto Power against UN Resolutions on Israel.” n.d. Middle East Eye. www.middleeasteye.net/news/42-times-ushas-used-its-veto-power-against-un-resolutions-israel-942194703. Administrator. n.d. “The Hidden Veto.” How the Bush Administration's, www. globalpolicy.org/security-council/42656-the-hidden-veto.html. “The Return of Mr Nyet.” 2008. The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, July 17, 2008. www.economist.com/international/2008/07/17/thereturn-of-mr-nyet. Tribune News Service. “India Criticises Use of 'Hidden Veto' in UNSC Subsidiary Organs.” Tribuneindia News Service, 2 May 2018, www. tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-criticises-use-of-hidden-vetoin-unsc-subsidiary-organs/582988.html. Wilcox, Francis O. 1945. The Yalta Voting Formula, , The American Political Science Review, vol. 39, no. 5 (Oct.): 943-956,UNIAN. 2018. “Poroshenko Calls for Stripping Russia of Veto Right in UNSC.” Information Agency, UNIAN, Apr. 13, 2018. www.unian. info/politics/10080554-poroshenko-calls-for-stripping-russia-ofveto-right-in-unsc.html. “United Nations, Security Council.” United Nations, United Nations, research. un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. “U.S. Says Settlement Building Undermines Israel Security.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 23 Dec. 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-israelpalestinians-un-usa-idUSKBN14C21Q. Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946-2012 . Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2019, p. 4, Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946-2012 . https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vetoed-draftresolutions-in-the-united-nations-security-council-1946-2012