The Wilson Journal of International Affairs - Fall 2019

The Wilson Journal

Fall 2019

Fall 2019

The Wilson

Journal of

International Affairs Fall 2019

Contents Editorial Staff

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Information

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From the Editor

Moriah Hendrick

Water as a Tool for Peace: Mediating the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Marisa Dinko

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Easy Come, Easy Go? Why Oil-Reliant Regimes Can Withstand Diminshed Oil Rents

Jacob Libby

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The 2009 Honduran Coup: How it Affected Extreme Poverty and Gang Violence

Zachary Phillips

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A Strategy to Reduce Violence Between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank: Identifying unification techniques in Hebron

Alejandro Rush

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The Role of Referenda in the European Union

Chloe Suzman

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Editorial Staff Editor-in-Chief

Moriah Hendrick

Co-Managing Editor and Media Manager

Landon Holben

Co-Managing Editor

Tristan Guarnieri

Production Chair

Manaal Khwaja

Program Corrdinator

Eleanor Thompson

Editing Staff

Griffin Asnis

Matthew Heller

Sukanya Barman

Emily Ma

Anna Bickley

Nicole Luz

Ben Gustafson

Guy Pastrana Kevin Wang

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Information About the Wilson Journal The Wilson Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations.

The Wilson Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Wilson Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Wilson Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at wilsonjournal.org

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Wilson Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit.

Submissions should be sent to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com.

Contact Please direct all comments to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com

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From the Editor Dear Reader,

Americans are approaching a critical presidential election here at home; one that, no matter the outcome, will have massive international effects. The political language of the past several years has been decidedly anti-globalist, pushing us towards narratives like “America First” and urging us to focus on our own interests and security before considering their impact on the global system. Because of this, student research like that presented in the Wilson Journal is more critical than ever before.

In part, we are tempted to ignore the international state of affairs because it can feel as if the global system is collapsing around us. We have seen a steady rise in nationalism and a variety of ethnic violence over the last few years. Climate change is a growing threat that has been ignored by several of the world’s most powerful nations. There are more refugees and involuntary migrants than ever before, and there are certainly days when all of this seems unlikely to change. But if we look a bit further, it’s clear that the news is not all bad. Women’s movements continue to fight for—and achieve— greater opportunities for women and girls everywhere. Global literacy has skyrocketed, and poverty rates have plummeted. Although climate change remains one of the most significant threats to the world as we know it, clean energy is cheaper and more accessible than ever before.

Student research like that presented in the Wilson Journal is a direct push against these doomsday narratives that paralyze our thinking and limit us to domestic solutions. It reminds us that an understanding of the American system requires an understanding of how we interact with the rest of the world, and the ways that other nations are interacting with one another. It also reminds us that we must engage with this global system if we wish to improve it. In this edition of the Journal, we have articles that focus on global governance and direct democracy, pressing us to ask big-picture questions about the state of the international system. On the other hand, we have

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two papers that suggest solutions to the same conflict—the ongoing crisis between Israel and Palestine. While the differences in these solutions may seem subtle, they have radically different goals and outcomes, proving that there is room for creative, innovative solutions to international problems. The study of international affairs is important not only because it drives us towards an understanding of how people interact with the international system, but because it asks us to consider how minute differences in strategy can have a long-lasting global effect.

The Wilson Journal could not exist without the ongoing support of the University of Virginia community, the International Relations Organization, and all of the authors who submit their research for publication each year. I am especially thankful to my editorial staff and the incredible work that they do. And of course, none of this could happen without our executive board and all of the hours they put into making sure the Journal is the very best that it can be.

My final thanks goes to you, the reader. As the world changes around us, these ideas take on new weight, new meaning, and new power.

As you read this semester’s Journal, I hope that you take the time to consider how these five articles will change as the world around them changes, and our understanding changes with it. The same intellectual curiosity that prompted you to read, submit, or support this work will be what continues to drive publications like the Wilson Journal into that ever-changing future.

Sincerely,

Moriah Hendrick Editor-in-Chief

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Water as a Tool for Peace:

Mediating the Israel-Palestine Conflict

By Marisa Dinko

About the Author

Marisa Dinko is a student in the University of Virginia’s Class of 2021, pursuing a double major in Global Studies: Security and Justice, and Computer Science. She is originally from Canton, Ohio. Academically, she is interested in conflict resolution, human rights in wartime and humanitarian crises, and the intersections between women’s rights, global security, and computer programming. Marisa is involved in Reflections: Oral Histories at UVA, the University Guide Service, Phi Sigma Pi National Honor Fraternity, Culture of Respect Educators, Madison House volunteering, and more. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a higher degree centered on conflict and human rights, while also developing her skills as a programmer, with the ultimate goal of one day working for UN WOMEN.

Abstract The violence occurring in the Israel-Palestine conflict is rooted in a multi-faceted, nuanced history. A complex history in conjunction with growing ideological divisions leaves little room for settlement and peace, and promotes a perceived “holy divide” of good versus evil. While the debate surrounding the region often comes down to the effectiveness of a two-state solution, this paper presents a strategy for peace that works across ideological lines. As proposed, effectively deescalating violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict occurs by creating more equitable access to water. With this, a new strategy arises that connects governmental, civil society, international, and local stakeholders to implement both bottom-up and top-down change.

Coalition formation, technological implementation, and policy enforcement act as the three tiers of the paper’s proposed strategy. As these components manifest through international pressure and the action of Palestinian women, answering the question of water disparity in the West Bank becomes possible,

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thus creating a catalytic starting point for greater movements towards peace in the region.

The Water Problem in Israel and Palestine

The violence in Israel is multifaceted; for this strategy, the focus will be Israel’s restrictions on Palestine’s water access. Currently, the already limited and unsanitary water resources in the West Bank are controlled by Israel. As established in 1995 through the Interim Agreement, only 28.9% of water resources are delegated to Palestinians, with the other 71.1% reserved for Israelis. This disparity extends through the average Palestinian’s daily water usage --73 liters per day, while the Israelis’ average water usage is between 240 and 300 liters per day (Corradin 2016). This inequity not only reflects the greater conflict in the region, but also prompts the need for an immediate and effective strategy for peace, as the average Palestinian water usage is well below the World Health Organization’s recommended daily minimum (Malone 2004, 639 – 671).

Theory of Change Overview

This paper will propose a strategy to increase Palestinian water access in the West Bank, thus creating conditions for reduced conflict. The multifaceted strategy has three main components: coalition formation, technological implementation, and policy enforcement advocacy. A coalition will be formed of international actors, empowered women, and religious representatives, which will maintain a grassroots approach crucial to a successful strategy to pressure Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel (Otis 2011). By focusing on a narrative of both human rights and political power, while also increasing awareness of the inequities with water, the proper environment can be crafted to implement water generation technology and infrastructure in Palestine, while still benefiting Israel economically, the second aspect of the plan. Lastly, the third component of the strategy will focus on policy change and enforcement through top-down pressure in order to create precedent for water-sharing standards.

The Root of the Problem

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most complicated occurrences of religious-related violence in recent history. Largely stemming from the

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philosophy of Zionism, or the conceptual belief that Jews are the rightful owners and inhabitants of land in Palestine (Cohen 2014), the conflict in the region plays off of the ever-growing religious tension. This Zionist narrative directly connects to the presence of roughly 127 government sanctioned Israeli settlements in Palestine, as well as over 100 outposts established illegally throughout the West Bank (Dana and Jarbawi 2017). Whether used in a directly religious or economic way, Zionism has resulted in a narrative of an Israeli right to land that can be seen in current law and practice. This concept of a right to land also encompasses water, as it is a vital and sacred resource.

The conflict in the region and the continued Israeli dominance is often categorized as unsolvable. However, the unifying component of many failed attempts for peace in Israel is an all-or-nothing styled approach (“Water & the Peace Process” n.d.). In order to for the strategy to be effective, it must account for the deeply rooted religious narrative of a right to space, as well as keep a narrow focus. Water has been a key component of the Israel-Palestine conflict since the Six Day War in 1967, which established Israel’s dominance over the water in Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Israel-Palestine” 2018).

While water is only one piece of what drives tension in the area, it is the focus of this strategy because of its sacred value.

Water’s Sacred Value: A Unifying Force

While religion is often portrayed as a divisive force in the region, it is also the source of unity across the different religious groups within Israel, at least in the way they view and interact with water. No matter the faith, people perceive water as a holy resource. In the Bible, it reads, “They will neither hunger nor thirst… he who has compassion on them will guide them and lead them beside springs of water.” Similarly, the Torah recounts that, “Abraham said to them: let us worship water, for it extinguishes fire… let us worship the clouds, which provide water.” Moreover, the Quran details, “In the water which Allah sent down from the Heavens and brought with it life to Earth after being dead… and in the clouds that are enslaved between the Heavens and the Earth.” Water is seen in all the aforementioned religious texts as a connective resource between Heaven and Earth, between man and God, and between man and Allah.

As these religious texts permeate the lived experiences of Israeli

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and Palestinian people, water takes on a sacred value (Sheikh et al. 2012, 110). Negotiations around water access no longer exist solely as secular conversations, but are connected to the religious narrative. Water’s sacred value is the component that will allow people across all religions to see value in the proposed strategy. Similar to the work of the Abraham Path Initiative which utilizes the sacred value of Abraham’s hospitality (Sebenius et al. 2011), this strategy will use the power of water as a connection across religious lines.

By shifting the narrative from one of religious ownership, to one of sacred, peaceful, and life-bringing discourse, water can become a tool for peace on a grassroots level.

Key Stakeholders/Actors Overview

While key stakeholders will be discussed in further detail in the following sections, a general understanding of who is involved or affected by a situation is necessary when strategizing. The three main categories of actors involved in this strategy are as follows: A. Policy Makers

Policy makers involved in this strategy include Israeli, Palestinian, and international government actors.

On the Israeli side, the key actors include Benjamin Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni, and Yuval Steinitz. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, is an extremely right-wing political leader (“Israel Profile” 2019), making him the biggest obstacle to this strategy. In this plan, Netanyahu is the only veto player, or an actor whose approval is absolutely necessary in order to succeed (Tsebelis 1995, 289-325). This allows all middle-out pressure and focus to be on him. Tzipi Livni is a former Israeli Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Susser 2019). Yuval Steinitz is the Israeli Minister of Infrastructure, Energy, and Water (Halon 2018). Moreover, the Joint Water Committee is also an Israeli policy making actor, one which is supported by EcoPeace co-director Gidon Bromberg (Rasgon et al. 2017).

On the Palestinian side, the key policy making actor involved in the strategy is Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. As the strategy is entirely aimed at providing Palestinians with access to water, there is less risk and power associated with Palestinian policy makers, as control is still in the hands of the Israeli government.

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On an international level, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) are all critical actors in developing a solution. These organizations have all previously funded or supported strategies for peace in the region, and are equipped to act as a third side that pressures Netanyahu for the sake of an international “win” (Ury 2000, 5 - 36).

B. Religious Actors

Religious actors play a crucial role in the grassroots component of this strategy. Key individuals include religious leaders like Rabbi Michael Melchior, organizations such as Rabbis for Human Rights, and international peace-bringing projects like the Abraham Path Initiative, which all act as vessels to shift local narratives surrounding the use of water. Rabbi Melchior is a key religious icon for this strategy, as he is not only a renowned Rabbi but also an experienced political figure with a heavy focus on interreligious cooperation (“Official Homepage” n.d.). Rabbis for Human rights would play a crucial role in connecting the religious narrative of water’s sacred value with the conflict and inequities in Palestine, as they are devoted to upholding human rights (“About Us” n.d.). The Abraham Path Initiative is a religiously based initiative that harnesses the sacred value of hospitality in order to foster peace in the Middle East, a strategy that can be extended to connect with this proposed strategy as well (Sebenius et al. 2011). Generally, the main function of these actors — which will be broken down further in future sections — is to create a connection across religious boundaries on the basis of water’s sacred value, and the violation of human rights due to continuing water blockades.

C. Civil Society

The third category of actors, those among civil society, provide the rest of the pressure that will be placed on Netanyahu and Israel. Each civil society actor functions in a distinct capacity. The most critical include WaterGen, URB Water, Just Vision, Anisa Mehdi, EcoPeace, as well as the Israeli and Palestinian people themselves. WaterGen is an Israeli based water generation technology company that sells its products to help provide access to water throughout the world (“Company” 2019). URB Water also provides low-level technology that separates salt from water through a chemical reaction (White 2019). Just Vision and Anisa Mehdi are two key civil society actors that will

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work in conjunction; Just Vision is an organization dedicated to fostering equality between Israelis and Palestinians through TV broadcasting and media (“About” 2019). Anisa Mehdi is a renowned journalist and producer with a specialized focus on global affairs in the Middle East (“About Anisa” n.d.).

Theory of Change: Forming Coalitions

Each of the aforementioned stakeholders and actors directly connects to my proposed theory of change. In an interview, Professor Jerry White discussed the importance of establishing coalitions of empowered actors to push strategies forward (White 2019). Taking this concept and making it the framework of this strategy, the first tier of action is creating two main coalitions that will aggregate adequate bottom-up and top-down pressure on Netanyahu to adjust Palestinian water access.

First, a coalition of international actors already indirectly invested in or connected to the Israel-Palestine crisis can pressure Netanyahu by acting as a third side (Ury 2000, 3 - 56). Because Prime Minister Netanyahu is a veto player, pressure must come from actors substantial enough to push him towards compromise. This coalition will consist of the UN, the EU, and USAID; these organizations will pressure Netanyahu through the narrative of human rights violations, as well as through the lens of him maintaining his political power. As evidenced by Jerry White, these three organizations and the international sector as a whole want to see a successful strategy implemented; there is a current need for an international “win” for the political standing of these actors — including Netanyahu — to stay intact (White 2019). To do this, these actors will use Palestine’s restricted access to water as a human rights violation to shift the narrative from one of all-or-nothing peace negotiations to a narrative fulfilling the humanitarian imperative of ensuring Palestinian water access. This narrative shift aligns with the sacred value of water as a source of divine life, as well as allows Netanyahu to take action in a way that elevates his perception on the global front.

Second, a coalition of predominantly Palestinian women, religious leaders, and select media outlets will harness the collective resistance of women to spread awareness and place bottom-up pressure on Netanyahu (Ryan 2015, 299 - 315). This coalition is vital in concordance with the international coalition; by fostering grass-roots activism as well as a mass dialogue, the

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Palestinian water crisis can become a priority on the global agenda. Rabbis for Human Rights and Rabbi Michael Melchior will act as the religious leaders in the coalition, brought together by their focus on protecting human rights regardless of religious affiliation and strengthened by Melchior’s personal government experience. With their guidance and connections to women in Israel, they directly connect to the role that Just Vision, Anisa Mehdi, and the Palestinian women will play.

In order for a strategy to have systemic change, it is crucial to harness the strength and resilience already being displayed by victims of violence. This is the exact philosophy that the grassroots coalition will follow. Palestinian women are already practicing a sacred value of sumud, or the practice of “resilient resistance” to a perceived Zionist erasure of Palestinian identities.

This concept crosses religious lines, as both women of Muslim and Christian faiths practice this form of resistance (Ryan 2015, 299 - 315). As this value is held in a high enough regard to transcend religious identities, it equips women to stand unified as survivors of human rights violations, rather than as pawns in a religious conflict tied to their personal beliefs. The first tier of my strategy would focus on highlighting these women’s voices in a way that protects their safety while empowering them and fostering peaceful connections among religions — the basis of much systematic change.

Palestinian women practicing sumud will be given the opportunity to share their stories in a documentary film produced by Just Vision and crafted with the guidance of Anisa Mehdi. This would bring awareness in a grassroots way that is dignified and protective of Palestinian women.

Theory of Change: Implementing Technology

While the first tier of my strategy refocuses the narrative from an all-or-nothing dialogue to protecting human rights, sacred values, and international standing, the second tier is focused on implementing measurable change to redistribute the water in the region. The main plan for this tier of my proposed strategy is to use funding from the international coalition as well as fundraising brought in by the grassroots groups to subsidize the purchase of WaterGen technology, which costs under 2 cents per liter of water. While WaterGen claims this cost is, “up to 10 times cheaper than local filtered well water (at developing world prices), by combining subsidization and Palestinian payment, the technology can be made even more financially

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accessible (“Company” 2019). Moreover, the actors in the international coalition are able to provide more funding than what a coalition of solely NGOs would be able to raise, making implementation more feasible.

WaterGen technology is a dehumidifying technology that generates water during the night, when electricity costs are lowest and humidity rates are highest, and works in Middle Eastern climates (“Company” 2019). While this technology is clearly favorable for Palestine’s interest in increasing water access, it is also beneficial for Israel and Netanyahu’s interests as well.

According to GiStrat, GDP increase is the biggest indicator of reduced violence in a region (“GiStrat” 2017); Prime Minister Netanyahu would be able to increase Israeli GDP by allowing an Israeli company to directly benefit from the sales, as well as reduce violent conflict. Netanyahu acknowledged this sentiment when he said, “[dealing] with the water problem … is both a humanitarian interest and an outstanding Israeli interest” (Bromberg and Giordano 2018). While the global sphere can see this implementation as a humanitarian venture, Netanyahu can perceive it as an economic pursuit that results in a win-win situation for Israel.

However, it is critical that the entire strategy does not rely on one Israeli company — this is where the URB Water comes in to play. URB Water is an inexpensive, low-level technology being developed by a Canadian company.

This technology alters the chemical makeup of the water and salt particles, making salt heavier so that it can sink and be separated from water (White 2019). If this alternative source, independent from the Israeli economy, is available as an option for Palestinians to make saltwater drinkable, it will put more pressure on Netanyahu to accept the deal with WaterGen. If WaterGen is the technology implemented, Israel benefits; Netanyahu will be placed into a double bind of choosing between making a political statement or facing a loss to the Israeli economy.

The final piece of the second tier of the strategy would be to connect Palestinian women with access to water generation technology to the Abraham Path Initiative (API). The API relies on people along the path opening their homes and providing a hospitable experience for the people traveling. However, this initiative is also centered around creating economic gain for the regions along it (Ury 2000, 3 - 56). By connecting women with the technology and the economic participation of the API, there is not only increased access to water but also increased participation of women in the

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economy, which means the increased participation of women in another peace bringing strategy. Moreover, when women are consulted on strategies involving water, “installations are more frequented, better maintained, and technically appropriate” (Albarmoosh 2014).

Theory of Change: Policy Accountability

The final tier of my proposed strategy and the most long-term component meant to occur after the implementation of water generation technology is by establishing a convention to maintain accountability of the actors involved. A frequent failing of past peace initiatives was the lack of accountability seen in the Israeli government. In order to ensure there is no blockade against any Palestinian water projects after the water technology has been implemented, both bottom-up and top-down pressure must continue. This convention would consist of the actors involved in both coalitions, international and grassroots. By bringing together the government actors, civil society actors, and religious actors, as well as incorporating the testimonies of victims of violence, there is an increase in accountability. This convention style is meant to mirror the “nothing about us without us” motto seen in the campaign constructed by landmine survivors (White and Young n.d.). Moreover, this component of the strategy is a way to create a precedent for future peace negotiations. If the narrative approach can shift to a onepiece-at-a-time strategy, followed by accountability and communication that incorporates the resilient survivors, doors open for future negotiations to follow the same model.

Strategy Components

This proposal fulfills the components of an effective strategy. First, my strategy is specific; the three-tiered approach breaks down each actor into a designated role, as well as specifies how each actor intertwines with the others. Second, my strategy is time-bound. Looking first towards the coalition formation and documentary production, the timeline would sit roughly at one year. As the documentary is released and the pressure rises, the next year would be spent implementing water technology and integrating women into the Abraham Path Initiative. Lastly, the convention would take place over the following year. The convention being the final piece in this time-bound strategy makes it the most effective, as the coalitions will already be formed,

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and Netanyahu will already be involved, making it more realistic to initiate a convention in a relatively short amount of time.

My strategy is realistic because it pulls from the strengths of various pre-existing organizations and initiatives to create a new, more successful strategy. Nothing needs to be built from the ground up, but rather just needs to be connected and shifted towards the proposed goals. On a similar note, this strategy is achievable because of the low risk it poses for Israel. Israel is ultimately concerned for its own global position as a nation, and this strategy uses that consideration as a motivating factor for Netanyahu’s agreement.

This strategy not only benefits Palestine and increases water access, but has a tangible positive effect on Israel as well. Lastly, this directly connects to the fact that this strategy is measurable. At the most basic level, Palestinian water access can be monitored and the numbers can reflect the outcome and efficacy of the strategy.

Evidence that this strategy will succeed comes from an EcoPeace and GiStrat joint study. The effectiveness of a water agreement is most reliant on economic factors. Moreover, trade/business between the West Bank and Israel increases conditions for peace, another key component of my proposed strategy (White 2019). Looking towards the giCompute data in Appendix A, there is also a clear probability that my strategy will result in more equitable water distribution. Despite Netanyahu’s low likelihood to approve, the pressure of the other actors will outweigh his initial alignment.

The “Results by Stakeholder” chart shows that the majority of actors would push the strategy into action, regardless of Netanyahu’s stance. Moreover, the randomized runs of the strategy show a high frequency of success.

Systematic Change Despite Roadblocks

Two key features of this strategy that will guarantee systematic change are how women are being utilized, as well as the physical construction of water technology. Specifically looking at the role of women, by having marginalized women step into the media spotlight, there can be serious limitations on who can participate. In order to resist so publically, women must have a certain level of privilege, which isolates the victims of violence who often experience the worst conditions. By creating a documentary, there is a channel for women to share anonymous, impactful testimonies; a woman does not need to risk public shaming in order to tell her story. By elevating

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Palestinian women to step into resilience, while also connecting them with religious actors of different faiths, the most underlying cause of the violence in Israel is inherently addressed and a systematic step towards interfaith peace is taken. Moreover, establishing physical infrastructure in Palestine addresses the underlying issue of a right to space as well; there is a natural reinforcement of Palestinian ownership of the land simply by building water technology on Palestinian land. Overall, this strategy will not only bring more water equity and systematic change to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but it will also do so in a way that appeases the Israelis enough for the strategy to be accomplished.

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Overall Results:

Appendix A: giCompute Analysis

Veto Influence Rankings:

Results by Stakeholder:

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Reliability:

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Appendix B: Logframe

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Alharmoosh, Katarina. Water, Cooperation, and Peace: The Peacebuilding

Impact of JointIsraeli-Palestinian Wastewater Projects. 2014, arava.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Water-Peace-and- Cooperation-2014_Final-Report-compressed.pdf.

Bromberg, Gidon, and Giulia Giordano. “Israeli Water Diplomacy and

National Security Concerns.” EcoPeace Middle East, Jan. 2018, ecopeaceme.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Water_Diplomacy.pdf.

Cohen, Peter. “The Root Cause of the Never-Ending Conflict in Palestine;

and How to Fix It.” HuffPost, HuffPost, 4 Oct. 2014, www.huffpost. com/entry/root-causes-in-palestine_b_5499127.

Corradin, Camilla. “Israel: Water as a Tool to Dominate Palestinians.”

Palestine News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 23 June

2016, www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/israel-water-tool- dominate-palestinians-160619062531348.html.

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Palestine: Zionism's Entangled Project." Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1, 2017.

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Religion. 2017.

Halon, Eytan. “Geopolitics: How an Energy-Friendly Future Will Bolster

the Region.” TheJerusalem Post | JPost.com, 17 Nov. 2018, www.

jpost.com/Israel-News/Geopolitics-How an-energy-friendly- future-will-bolster-the-region-572028.

“Israel-Palestine: Water Sharing Conflict | ECC Factbook.” ECC Library,

15 Jan. 2018.

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Malone, Andrew R.. "Water Now: The Impact of Israel's Security Fence On

Palestinian Water Rights and Agriculture In the West Bank." Case

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Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 36, no. 2/3,

2004, pp. 639 - 671.

“Official Homepage of Rabbi Michael Melchior.” Rabbi Michael Melchior | Jerusalem Otis, Rebecca Ann, "Palestinian Women: Mothers, Martyrs and Agents of

Political Change." 2011. Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 491. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/491 Rasgon, Adam, et al. “Israel Gives Pal. Authority Limited Water Autonomy

in West Bank.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, 17 Jan. 2017, www. jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-gives-Pal-Authority-limited- water-autonomy-in-West-Bank-478672.

Sebenius, James K., et al. “Negotiating the Path of Abraham.” Harvard

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Judgment and Decision Making 7.2. 2012. pp 110.

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Easy Come, Easy Go?

Why Oil-Reliant Regimes Can Withstand Diminished Oil Rents

By Jacob Libby

About the Author

Raised in Houston, TX, a critical global oil hub, Jacob Libby grew up in a diverse community where petroleum ruled the local political economy.

He speaks English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Mandarin, and Arabic, and found his passions for foreign languages and international law to intersect in the arena of global politics. In May, Jacob will receive a BA in Foreign Affairs and a BA in Spanish, at which point he hopes to serve as a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant in Taiwan before entering law school. Jacob’s interest in oil regimes began after exposure to the crisis in Venezuela in both his majors, and the recent wave of populist demagoguery sparked his curiosity about authoritarianism, particularly during the immigration crisis he witnessed first-hand while studying abroad in Valencia, Spain in 2018. Going forward, Jacob hopes to leverage the law to establish multilateral frameworks that leave no country behind.

Abstract

Finite as it is, the diminishing global oil supply is beginning to put stress on many oil-reliant regimes. Authoritarianism tends to thrive on oil reliance because the wealth oil generates allows these leaders to financially appease the populace, staving off democratization urges – typically referred to as the rentier effect. But what happens when those regimes experience significant ebbs in oil revenue, as will happen with increased frequency these next few decades? This paper looks at the critical situations in Venezuela and Iran as proxy cases for such an event, with authoritarianism tightening its grip. On the other hand, this paper considers the emergence of a nascent democracy in Nigeria as a case of unusual resilience against rentier dynamics, and the flourishing sovereign wealth fund in Norway as a model for economic

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diversification. Oil depletion will soon be a global crisis – the stability of the world order depends heavily on how these regimes react.

Introduction

Oil and democracy seem to mix like, well, oil and water. The high returns from the oil market maintain a sense of appeasement in oil-rich countries; as long as the money flows in, citizens can live in a sort of ignorant bliss — or so the theory goes. As oil rents begin to dwindle, however, their role in propping up governments becomes a ticking time bomb. Now that we know oil will not last forever, or likely even for fifty more years, the threat of crisis remains imminent, calling into question the stability of the aforementioned regimes: How will they react? As of now, the answer remains uncertain, though some countries are already feeling the effects, providing fertile ground for research.

Moreover, a useful proxy for predicting the outcome of this impending crisis beckons an analysis of how oil-reliant states have reacted to drops in the production of oil wealth, which subsequently reduced their national income and ability to maintain both their institutions and the ignorant bliss of their citizens. The oil market is naturally volatile and subject to the whims of cartels such as OPEC as well as to the whiplash of geopolitics, thus this proxy tool proves highly relevant. One caveat, however, is that in these cases the threat was not existential, but rather an example of weathering the storm.

Acting as a stabilizing factor in what would otherwise be an unstable regime, oil is, in fact, analogous to a life raft slowly leaking air — as its wealth production deflates, regimes cling to it with increasing desperation. As a result, a reduction in access to oil rents for an oil-rich state causes political instability in the form of either authoritarian resilience or the inhibition of democratization, depending on the regime. Furthermore, dormant social sentiments erupt under this strain and manifest themselves through heightened levels of protest, leading the state to crack down on fundamental civil liberties.

This paper explores the negative side of the oft-researched question of how oil wealth enables authoritarianism. Specifically, I test how oil-reliant states, or ‘petrostates,’ react to a loss of this oil wealth. Measuring this loss is relatively straightforward: I analyze oil production and price trends, as well as geopolitical developments such as sanctions, to assess the effect on GDP and

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the general economy. Authoritarian resilience and lack of democratization are more fluid concepts, which can be difficult to measure. Though I utilize Polity and Freedom House scores to provide a general idea of the political situation in each country, these sources can, at times, lack nuance. As such, I supplement them with descriptions of political developments — such as repression and media control — in the wake of diminished oil wealth.

I find that both reduction in oil production and global price shocks entrench authoritarianism in petrostates with weak institutional capacity and a lack of economic diversification, while petrostates with stronger institutions are able to withstand such an economic downturn. Lastly, I discover that economic diversification is likely the best strategy moving forward for these petrostates, as their authoritarianism, though persistent, becomes more fragile.

These findings complement the existing theories on authoritarian resilience nicely, exploring the effects of a relatively under-researched cause which has particular relevance looking ahead; regimes will more and more often find themselves dealing with a lack of oil wealth rather than an abundance of it.

In this paper, I will first analyze the extant literature on authoritarian entrenchment and barriers to democratization before summarizing the mechanism linking these to petrostates’ diminished oil wealth. Next, I will examine the cases of Venezuela and Iran, which exemplify this mechanism (though in quite different ways), before presenting the cases of Nigeria and Norway to explore how these states managed to avoid the same fate. Though Norway is a full democracy, it still provides an excellent model of how an oilreliant state can diversify, a model which petrostates such as Saudi Arabia are beginning to follow.

Literature Review

There exists an abundance of literature on the causes of authoritarian resilience and democratization inhibitors, which may be classified into the following four categories: level and distribution of income, oil income reliance, electoral manipulation, and weak institutional capacity (Lust 2015, 54-59).

Level and Distribution of Income

In poor countries, especially in those where per capita income does not exceed $2,000, poverty is nearly inexorable. Over the span of 40 years,

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57 of these 83 countries actually grew poorer (Przeworksi 1997, 83-155). The democratic regimes among these countries could expect to backslide into authoritarianism within 18 years (Przeworksi 1997, 83-155). The theory at work here is that the costs of authoritarianism are lower in poorer countries while the value is relatively greater. In addition, the shackles of poverty in these countries foment apathy toward the type of political regime, making it easier to retain authoritarianism. Once a country becomes a democracy, the level of wealth is a key exogenous factor: economic growth drastically reduces the chances of democratic backsliding. This captures nicely the “Modernization Theory” of democracy, which suggests that higher levels of wealth drive modernization, creating a more educated populace committed to democratic values. The level of income is useful for the analysis of the effect reduced oil rents has upon political stability, with this variable being an important piece of the puzzle.

The “level of income hypothesis” lost strength, however, in the latter half of the 20th century, when the distribution of income gained importance and it became more expensive to simply “buy” democracy (Boix 2002, 515549). The argument thus shifted to economic equality and a more endogenous view of the relationship between economic growth and democratization. For instance, it was found that the chances of a country shifting to democracy increased tenfold when three quarters of the population was urbanized as opposed to one quarter. This greater equality can serve as a proxy for other key factors in democratization, including increased proximity between citizens, which fosters key social movements. Oil-rich states tend to have higher levels of inequality, so a reduction in oil rents will strain the position of economic elites and induce backsliding.

Oil Income Reliance

Oil, as previously stated, has generally been found to be a hindrance to democracy, primarily for the following three reasons: the rentier effect, the repression effect, and the modernization effect (Ross 2001, 325-361).

The rentier effect entails a government using oil wealth to effectively pay off its citizens and keep taxes low, maintaining their economic security in exchange for reduced government accountability. This effect is particularly strong in the Middle East, where oil is the principal economic driver. The repression effect explains how oil-rich states exploit oil wealth to amplify the

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surveillance of their citizens and suppress dissent. Finally, the modernization effect demonstrates how oil wealth can hold certain social and cultural movements fundamental to democratization at bay. The rentier effect is especially compelling, as it pertains to the reduction in access to oil rents because of its inherently precarious nature — any destabilization would likely awaken the dormant population, lulled to sleep only by an offer they could not refuse. Nevertheless, this argument focuses more so on the abundance of oil income rather than what occurs in its relative absence, while this paper explores the latter.

Electoral Manipulation

In addition to economic factors, political leaders themselves can exhibit rather devious tendencies to either entrench authoritarianism or erode democracy. Though strategies such as coups may have worked in the past, leaders are now committed to avoiding the appearance of impropriety, maintaining a façade of democracy while surreptitiously securing their prolonged dominance. This may manifest itself through restricting media access, changing electoral rules, using government funds to subsidize incumbents’ campaigns, or harassing opponents (Bermeo 2016, 5-19). Even though electoral manipulation is not inherently destabilizing, it tends to disparately impact democracies. This is also a rather handy tool for political leaders who fear being supplanted. In the case of an economic downturn, a disgruntled populace may instill such sentiments in the ruling elite, who find electoral manipulation a means of retaining power while not setting off alarm bells in the global community. The poverty that results from reduced oil income can, in fact, motivate leaders to exploit the situation of voters, offering daily necessities in exchange for votes.

Weak Institutional Capacity

If a country lacks strong institutions, checks on the leader are typically weak. For example, a weak judiciary fails to strike down law manipulation by the regime leader, yielding free reign to executive aggrandizement. Judicial review plays a crucial role in preventing democratic backsliding, and it only retains ethos within a strong judiciary (Lust 2015, 54-59). Moreover, cooptation is a convenient tool for leaders, meaning bringing the opposition into the government or paying off opponents to remain atop the political

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pyramid (Magalon 2008, 715-41). Without strong governmental institutions to resist such moves or to provide a viable platform for the opposition, it is quite facile to erode democracy or ingrain authoritarianism. Governmental institutions play a considerable role in any regime change or time of political instability, regardless of their strength or weakness. The repression effect, due to oil income reliance, yields just one of many links between institutions and oil wealth. Due to this, I will return to the issue of institutional strength throughout my analysis.

While these four categories explain regime entrenchment rather well, they can also be symptomatic of an underlying cause worth exploring, playing a compounding rather than originating role. Throughout this paper, I will refer back to these phenomena to explore their role in, and reaction to, the diminished access to oil rents.

Theoretical Argument

When a regime’s economy is dependent on oil rents to maintain peace among its citizens and finance governmental operations, it is in a hazardous position. Exogenous factors, such as global oil production and price shocks, can suddenly deprive the regime of its lifeline, stripping it of its favorite panacea. Of course, the most pressing factor going forward is the nonrenewability of petroleum, which will inevitably place all oil-reliant states at an existential crossroads. For now, a reduction in oil wealth causes oil-reliant states with weak institutions and undiversified economies to entrench their authoritarian position and avoid democratization.

When a government experiences diminished access to its primary source of wealth, the effects quickly trickle down to the citizenry. Taxes increase and welfare decreases as the government passes the burden down, building resentment among the general population, which since has occurred in Venezuela when President Nicolas Maduro succeeded Hugo Chávez. As protests erupt, the government attempts to strengthen its grasp on its citizens to avoid losing power to the opposition. These attempts include censorship, hampered civil liberties, and electoral manipulation, among other strategies — all characteristic of regime backsliding. Since Maduro’s questionable reelection in 2018, he has ordered mass arrests and often had opponents killed in order to retain his power.

In addition, the government must face accountability for the economic

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downturn, which can result in the cooptation of rising opponents and blackmarket deals to keep money flowing into the government. In other words, oil-reliant states experience increased corruption — another cornerstone of authoritarianism. In Iran, economic elites have survived oil sanctions by exploiting their special access to state resources to use back channels as a means to maintain their prosperity. Nigeria, on the other hand, has begun to fight corruption on its journey to democratization.

To preempt backsliding or entrenchment, oil regimes should diversify their economies while they can still finance themselves with oil. Norway provides an excellent example of this, as the country responsibly manages its Sovereign Wealth Fund (invested with oil revenues) and reorients its economy toward clean energy and technology. Saudi Arabia has initiated a similar plan called “Saudi Vision 2030,” though its commitment to that plan and its honest disclosure of oil reserves are both in question. Similar plans in other petrostates, like Qatar and the UAE, show that Norway’s model will serve as a particularly important guide moving forward. Once regimes have cultivated an equivalent, sustainable source of income to oil, its substitution for oil will be a smoother process, and political instability will be minimized.

Venezuela and Oil: Star-Crossed Lovers

Venezuela sits on the largest proven oil reserves in the world, yet this natural resource has proven to be the country’s biggest Achilles’ Heel through oil dooming the nation to its current state of destitution (Rapier 2019). The oil fields in Venezuela are cursed geologically, demanding greater investment to maintain production and access to oil, due to their fast decline rates ( Johnson 2018). The problems began under Hugo Chávez, who was elected president in 1998 on the platform of economic reform. He had a dramatic socialist agenda and set out to use the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) to accomplish it. As a member of OPEC, Venezuela was required to adhere to its oil production policy, which in the early 2000s was one of reduced oil production to keep prices up. Astute PDVSA leaders had the opposite agenda — increased production was necessary to fund the further development of oil fields. As a result, Chávez removed these skilled leaders and replaced them with less knowledgeable Chávez loyalists, but the trouble with PDVSA did not end there. In addition to the management overhaul, Chávez repeatedly humiliated PDVSA workers, which led to mass

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strikes and, ultimately, Chávez firing some 18,000 workers. However, his welfare agenda did have some success as he managed to cut poverty by 20% (Labrador 2019) and keep his approval ratings above 50% (Aleem 2017).

The fact that Chávez used PDVSA revenue to finance his social agenda was problematic, primarily because that money could not be used to reinvest in alternative oil production techniques and development strategies. Venezuela’s oil economy was buoyed by foreign investment and generally strong oil prices, which peaked at nearly $150 in 2008, so no significant reduction in oil wealth occurred, though it seemed a downturn was inevitable (Macrotrends). Among his other questionable policies, Chávez sold oil at a discount to various countries as a means of garnering political allies, which doubled government debt due to massive spending (Labrador 2019). Additionally, the result of centering the economy on PDVSA was virtually zero diversification, meaning while funding social programs, PDVSA revenues paid for imported consumer goods. This subjected the entire Venezuelan economy to the volatility of the oil market and led to various shortages even under Chávez ( Johnson 2018).

To parallel these economic changes, Venezuela underwent significant political changes as well in this time period. When Chávez was elected in 1998, Venezuela had a Polity score of 9, positioning it as a strong democracy, but when he left office in 2013, Venezuela’s Polity score had been hovering at -3 for four years; in other words, it had eroded into a closed anocracy. Chávez ended term limits, commandeered the Supreme Court, limited freedom of the press, and nationalized hundreds of private businesses, all while remaining an unusually popular president (Labrador 2019). The general success of the oil economy under Chávez yielded the classic “rentier effect,” as he successfully appeased the masses while rapidly consolidating power (Ross 2001, 332-335).

But while the Chávez regime lends credence to the “oil income reliance” argument, the regime of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, demonstrates how the absence of economic success with oil can also entrench authoritarianism.

In 2013, Nicolas Maduro was elected president and Venezuela’s Polity score briefly rose to 4, reflecting the peaceful passage of power. But at the beginning of 2016, oil prices plummeted from around $110/barrel to $36/barrel (Macrotrends), and in an economy which depended on oil for 98% of its export earnings and 50% of its GDP, this spelled disaster (Labrador 2019). Oil production had already been on a decline due to Chávez’s stripping of PDVSA, falling from 3.5 million barrels/day when Chávez was elected

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to 2.7 million barrels/day when Maduro took power, to eventually just 1.5 million barrels/day in 2017 (Rapier 2019). This combination of low prices and low production distinguishes what Maduro had to deal with as compared to Chávez during oil shocks. Oil prices hit a low of $27.86/barrel in 2001, but high production meant Venezuela was still bringing in $89 million/day in oil income. The low of $36.07/barrel under Maduro in 2016, combined with significantly limited production, meant Venezuela was only generating $72 million/day in oil income, a 20% reduction (Macrotrends).

To cover the massive debt incurred under Chávez’s spending programs, Maduro was forced to pay a total of 400,000 barrels/day to China ( Johnson 2018). Of the oil Venezuela produced, much was shipped away for nothing in return. Moreover, Maduro felt obligated to continue Chávez’s foreign policy of selling discounted oil to allies. Finally, PDVSA’s complete disarray and bringing in very little money, which caused Chávez’s successful welfare programs to vanish and poverty to skyrocket, reaching 90% (Labrador 2019). Food shortages erupted, and the nation’s population lost an average of 24 pounds in 2017 (Labrador 2019). This was a humanitarian crisis that sparked mass opposition to President Maduro. The fact of the matter was that Maduro had inherited a Venezuela that was existentially dependent on oil but not committed to its development, leaving it extraordinarily vulnerable to price and production shocks.

Maduro retaliated against the opposition as a result of the oil crisis, and Venezuela’s Polity score returned to -3. This included an indefinite ban on protests, which resulted in government forces killing at least 46 demonstrators in the latter half of 2017 (Aleem 2017). In addition, after losing the National Assembly to opponents in 2015, Maduro staged a “legislative coup” in 2017, forming a legislative super body that wrested control from the National Assembly (Rosati 2017). And after using the National Electoral Council, composed of his loyalists, to stave off a recall referendum that would have ousted him in 2016 and was supported by 75% of Venezuelans (Viscidi 2016, 133-140), Maduro won reelection in 2018 in elections widely deemed illegitimate and undemocratic (he had thrown most of his opponents in jail) (Neuman 2017). Even more important, Venezuela’s Freedom House score fell precipitously from 38 to 19 over Maduro’s first term, as Venezuelans continue to suffer from both poverty and repression.

So while Venezuela’s economic vulnerability and resultant collapse

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were conducive to uprisings, it also catalyzed Maduro’s consolidation of power to hedge against this opposition. Alarmingly, Maduro exploited poverty to his own advantage in the 2018 elections by giving food rations to those who would vote for him in return (Neuman 2018). Not only did Maduro lack the expertise to turn the oil economy around, he clearly had little incentive to do so. It becomes clear that authoritarianism under Maduro was even fiercer than it was under Chávez, in the context of nearly opposite economic conditions. When total reliance on oil leads to economic success, it equips regimes with the tools to entrench authoritarianism; when it leads to economic failure, it forces regimes into authoritarian entrenchment — the latter often an inevitability of the former. The staunch opposition Maduro has faced since being reelected, with many not even recognizing him as president, suggests this authoritarian resilience may be fragile — only time will tell.

Don’t Bite the Hand That Feeds You: Iran’s Story

While volatility in oil prices is one way an oil-reliant regime can lose oil wealth, it is certainly not the only way. In fact, it is rather common for oil-reliant states to suffer diminished oil wealth under the imposition of economic sanctions. This has been particularly prevalent among countries in the Middle East as their ideological conflict with the West rages on. The theory is that sanctions will hurt the economic elites ruling these nations and foment democratization of the region (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 48-65). In reality, the opposite has occurred, as Iran’s experience exemplifies. Its Polity score of -7 (strongly authoritarian) did not change throughout the sanctions as Venezuela’s did in response to the drop-in oil prices, but Iran did exploit the consequences of the oil sanctions to maintain the strength of its regime in the face of Western democratization efforts. This, I contend, makes Iran not only a principal component of my argument but also an intriguing glimpse into the efficacy of foreign policy with the Middle East.

During the 2010-2016 sanctions period in Iran, crude oil sales dropped 60% and the nation lost approximately $160 billion as a result (US Congress). These sanctions hit Iran where it hurt: 80% of its export earnings come from oil sales, as does 50-60% of government revenue (United 2013).

In 2015, GDP was estimated to have been about 15-20% lower than it would have been had sanctions not been imposed, and the unemployment rate swelled to nearly 20% (US Congress). But politically, Iran was unfazed. In

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fact, “sanctions shift the balance of power in a society in the regime’s favor” and it has been found that “as sanctions make resources harder to find, authoritarian regimes hoard them” (Beinart 2018). As a result, “sanctions widen the power gap between society and the state,” disproportionately affecting society rather than the state, contrary to the sanctioners’ professed goal (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 52).

In Iran, state and semi-state entities control about two-thirds of the economy, largely due to the power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which holds unmatched economic and political power. As a result, when oil rents diminished and the economy shrank, the power imbalance between the IRGC and civilians was magnified. Per the rentier effect, the state had been able to render the citizens dependent via the provision of public goods. The result of the oil sanctions, intriguingly, entrenched this dependency, instead of overturning it, for as goods became scarce, those who had the most access to them could exploit that scarcity to their own benefit. Moreover, independent media outlets crumpled under the constricted economy, giving way to full state hegemony over the flow of information. Overall, civilians became even more dependent on — and manipulated by — the state.

Often, the goal of sanctions is to generate civil unrest in the target country and incite rebellion against an oppressive regime. This belief translates to the general reduction of oil rents in an oil-reliant state — does this not incite popular uprising?

Not to the extent one would think. There are cases like Venezuela in which protests are simply banned and the state military is used to arrest and kill any violators, and there are cases like Iran, in which the most likely critics of the government are silenced by the disparate consequences of diminished oil rents (Labrador 2019). A classic theory posits that participation in social movements involves a risk threshold, and when citizens’ livelihood depends entirely on the government’s provision of foodstuffs, they have much to lose by rebelling against the government (Tarrow 2011, 22). This plays out exactly so in Iran. There are three groups most likely to protest the government — women, students, and workers — yet their voices were muffled (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 53). As the economy faltered, traditional conservative ideology took hold and men forced women out of the workforce and back into the home, effectively removing women from society (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 57-58). Students constituted 35% of the Iranian population yet composed 70% of the unemployed population, and they also encountered severely limited education opportunities, both of which significantly hurt collective action prospects. Lastly, workers often either worked for drastically lower minimum wage or were subject to mass layoffs. The economic

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downturn would also encourage businesses to curtail workers’ rights, such as the right to strike (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 58-59).

Though the reduction in oil rents in Iran was not necessarily the result of depleted reserves or global price shocks, the effect on authoritarianism is nonetheless of intrigue and importance. In the absence of strong institutions and a diversified economy, economic instability ground the rentier effect into the soul of society and made collective action against the state extraordinarily difficult. As a result, the authoritarian regime in Iran has been remarkably resilient against oil sanctions, demonstrating how a regime such as this can exploit a lack of oil wealth just as much as an abundance of it to retain dominance over civil society.

Against the Odds: Institutional Accountability Buoys Nigeria’s Democratization

Nigeria has had a tumultuous past, suffering from military coups and rampant corruption. It may seem odd to include Nigeria as an example of a nation that avoided the fates of Venezuela and Iran, but despite persistent issues of corruption and poverty, democracy is strengthening. This is due, in no small part, to oil bargaining, unionization, and more robust institutions. Since 2006, average oil production in Nigeria has fallen from nearly 2.5 million barrels/day to around 1.7 million barrels/day in 2017 (Nigeria Crude 2019).

Still, oil income constituted approximately 77% of government revenues in 2017 (Malden 2017, 1-18). Its Polity score, however, rose from 4 (open anocracy) to 7 (democracy) over that time period, a marked difference from the effects observed in Venezuela and Iran.

One unusual aspect of diminished oil production in Nigeria is that it is due in large part to oil theft, which in itself is a result of the widespread poverty that plagues the nation (nearly 90 million people live on less than $1.90/day) (Campbell 2019). In 2013, Nigeria’s Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala reported that “400,000 barrels of crude were being lost daily.” While the exact number is unknown, it is clear that oil theft erodes a significant portion of Nigeria’s national oil production. As a result, politicians have found themselves unusually accountable to the people for an oil-reliant regime, for two reasons: political leaders can reduce oil theft and revive the oil economy by bargaining with rebels, as President Goodluck Jonathan did during his 2011-2015 term, and they can reduce oil theft by addressing the

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root issues of poverty and corruption, as President Muhammadu Buhari has done since his election in 2015 (Mark 2015). Though their attempts have not necessarily been successful, they have contributed to greater attempts by politicians to address the needs of the people, thus leading to a partially democratic election in 2011 and a promising democratic election in 2015.

Within the Nigerian oil industry, two strong unions dominate: Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN) and National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG).

As a result, collective bargaining has had general success in the nation. For example, in 2002, a government plan regarding the sale of some state entities negatively impacted employment in the oil sector leading PENGASSAN and NUPENG to carry out a two-day strike (Faiana 2005, 1-47). They organized meetings with management and got unemployment benefits paid promptly, all the while having their right to organize respected. Unions in Venezuela have not been met with such levels of respect, and the union system in Iran is, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent (Labrador 2019). Such unionization in Nigeria, on the other hand, has limited state hegemony over workers and led to more of their rights being protected.

Lastly, Nigeria has demonstrated a far greater commitment to democratic institutions than have Venezuela and Iran. Indeed, corruption is a significant issue in Nigeria, but the nation also recognizes that and has made important strides in correcting it. After officially becoming a democracy in 1999 per its new constitution, Nigeria operated primarily as a single-party authoritarian regime for the next decade under the rule of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (Campbell 2015). The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has made headway recently, however, with the support of Western governments and particularly under the leadership of Attahiru Jega (Campbell 2015). The year 2015 marked the first credible elections won by the opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), Also, because Nigerians are quite aware of the issue of corruption, Buhari’s anti-corruption platform was wildly popular and ensured his success (Campbell 2015).

So despite Nigeria’s faltering oil economy, the government’s growing accountability to the people, bolstered by strong institutions such as labor unions and anti-corruption bodies, has allowed the nation to break through the barriers to democratization when the odds were stacked against them.

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Though state government officials continue to siphon off oil revenues to ingrain their societal dominance, it appears that the days of such activities are numbered.

A Well-Oiled Machine: Norway’s Revolutionary Fund

Blessed with proximity to the oil-rich North Sea, Norway was destined to have success in the oil trade. After discovering its first oil field in 1969, Norway spent oil revenues quickly during the 1970s and 1980s, though the country soon realized the strain that doing so put on the economy, when external factors such as price shocks occurred (Lie 2013, 1-22). To maneuver away from oil dependence, Norway established a Sovereign Wealth Fund in 1990 called the Government Pension Fund, into which it funneled oil revenues that would be invested abroad. It was a means of distributing the benefits of the oil trade across generations, while also providing financing for various social programs in Norway. When the first transfer of funds to the SWF occurred in 1996, oil production was near 3.5 million barrels/day, but that number had dipped to 1.5 million barrels/day by 2017 (Norway Crude).

That same year, however, the SWF had ballooned to a remarkable $1 trillion, the largest in the world (McCarthy 2017). In contrast, Iran’s SWF has $91 billion in assets, Nigeria’s has $1.5 billion, and Venezuela’s comes in at just $800 million (SWFI 2019). Norway has distinguished itself in its commitment to developing its SWF as a form of insurance for the future. The withdrawal limitations of the SWF ensure that the government remains moderate in its spending habits (Lie 2013, 1-22), while the government’s abstention from the use of oil income to finance the budget freed domestic consumption from dependence on oil revenues (Mohammed 2016, 94-101).

As a result of an aggressive, successful commitment to the SWF, Norway liberated its economy from the whims of the oil market. This meant it could pursue investment in education, social programs, and general economic diversification, with a considerable private sector. In fact, Norway topped the World Economic Forum’s list of inclusive economies in 2017, which factors in sustainable growth, diversification, job creation, and poverty levels (Corrigan 2017). All the while, it has maintained the highest possible Polity score of 10 (full democracy), avoiding democratic backsliding as oil production fell.

Norway was deliberate with its diminished oil production as it recognized the perils of dependence on non-renewable resources, and earlier this year

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the nation made the decision to divest much of its $37 billion in oil and gas holdings as a means of further diversification away from oil (Norway’s 2019). Oil has been a boon to Norway’s economic security, because it has been handled in a remarkably responsible manner. Whereas most oil-reliant states focus solely on oil, and use revenues to fund imports in all other sectors (as Venezuela has done, for example), Norway has avoided this dangerous cycle.

Though countries like Venezuela and Iran lack the strong democratic institutions which buttress Norway’s political and economic regimes, they can still follow elements of its model to reduce dependence on oil. Venezuela, with its massive oil reserves, can reintroduce private firms and foreign investment to its oil fields, funneling the state’s share into its fledgling SWF. Strong corporate tax rates on private firms can begin to generate enough tax revenue to relieve the poverty crisis. Once oil production picks up and the SWF begins to swell, Venezuela should have the breathing room to clear most of its debt and begin diversifying the economy. As education improves in conjunction with the burgeoning economy, democracy should become more attainable, and funds from the SWF could finance social programs. This would spark a return to some of the success experienced under Chávez, but in a far more sustainable manner. Of course, Venezuela’s success is wholly contingent upon the state accepting a smaller role in economic affairs, and that begins with the removal of President Maduro from office.

Iran has the benefit of a better-established SWF, and it also has begun to maneuver away from using oil revenues to finance imports. If this trend continues, oil sanctions should maintain a weaker impact on the Iranian economy. Eventually, the West would likely abandon the practice due to its inefficacy, and Iran could begin making greater contributions to its SWF. As Iran’s economy diversifies, the middle class should reemerge, leaving Iranian civilians less susceptible to economic downturns. Once the SWF is growing at a steady rate, infrastructure and social projects will be more possible, too. Of course, Iran will find it necessary to invest in education if it hopes to continue developing the economy, and consequently, democracy will enter into the equation. For now, the focus should be on reducing the IRGC’s stranglehold on the economy, developing the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and ameliorating relations with the West to avoid further sanctions. Diversification is in the regime’s best interest, for a continued dependence on oil exposes Iran geopolitically to its enemies.

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Concluding Remarks

Between Venezuela and Iran, it is evident that a combination of weak institutions and overdependence on oil leaves an economy exposed and a regime insecure. Nigeria proves to be a fascinating foil to these two nations, demonstrating how the path to democratization in a petrostate can be imperfect in many ways. In fact, it only takes a few robust measures to turn the corner. When oil rents diminish, as they are apt to continue to do, authoritarianism ought to begin to weaken. Either economic mismanagement is exposed and the regime should fall to the people, or the regime should make the astute decision to preempt such an event with economic diversification.

That is what should happen, though this has failed to occur in many states. As the oil market becomes ever more volatile, we should continue to return to this question.

Looking ahead, many countries — particularly Gulf states — have proposed “Vision 2030” plans to shift away from oil dependence. It will be intriguing to observe how the Norway model suits these nations. Further, these plans could sound the death knell for authoritarianism in some regimes.

But will such regimes truly be able to escape oil so quickly? After all, oil is a slick business.

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Raids." npr. Last modified August 1, 2017.

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Maduro Amid Widespread Disillusionment." The New York Times.

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The 2009 Honduran Coup: How it Affected Extreme Poverty and Gang Violence

By Zachary Phillips About the Author

Zachary Phillips, of Stafford, Virginia, is a fourth year student in the College of Arts and Sciences majoring in Foreign Affairs and Spanish. He focuses primarily on Latin America, studying governments, how their policies affect their respective current political and social environments, as well as the historical contexts that led those countries to where they are today. Zachary’s primary policy interests, outside of Latin America, include education, Internet deployment and access, and LGBTQ rights. Outside the classroom, Zachary is an active member in the University Guide Service, and has served on the executive board as Secretary for the One Thousand Schools project since his second year. He hopes to pursue a law school education after graduating in 2020.

Abstract

This paper will discuss the 2009 military coup d’état in Honduras and analyze its role in the spike of extreme poverty and gang violence in that country. I aim to explain the coup, the conditions and events leading up to it, as well as the immediate consequences in the aftermath. Then I will illustrate the history and present state of gang violence and poverty in Honduras, examining different factors that perpetuate both of those issues. I argue that while the coup played a major part in the spikes of poverty and homicide rates, it served more as a catalyst for other economic and political conditions rather than as a direct cause for this increase. Climate change, a failing education system, and American immigration policy are conditions that have sustained extreme poverty and gang violence in Honduras. While the 2009 coup served as a spark that ignited a political flame, these other conditions are the flames that are burning the country down

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An Unraveling Democracy

Honduras, a country slightly larger than the state of Tennessee, is nestled along the Caribbean Sea on what is called the Northern Triangle of Central America (C.I.A. 2018). Surrounded by Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador, Honduras and its neighbors are some of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. Honduras spent most of the 20th century under authoritarian rule, where political bosses and leaders in the armed military forces established a dictatorship in the 1940s. It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s when, with much pressure from the United States, the Honduran military-led government began to democratize into more of a civilian government (Ruhl 2010, 93-107). During the 1980s, Honduras served as a refuge for Contra rebels who were fighting and escaping the Marxist, Sandinista guerrilla forces in Nicaragua (CIA 2018). Since that time, Honduras has been under a presidential republican system, but the military still plays a central part in its political game. Moreover, Honduras’s economy has historically always been weak. As one of the poorest countries in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere, its economy is dominated by oligarchic, economic elites and is largely based in services, industry, and agriculture (CIA 2018). Together, with a staggering economy and corrupt government systems, Honduras provides the perfect storm for extreme poverty and gang violence.

The Coup

On June 28, 2009, 200 military and police personnel invaded the home of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in the capital city of Tegucigalpa, taking him prisoner and flying him to Costa Rica. A letter declaring his resignation was forged in his name, but Zelaya held a press conference from exile in San José denying that letter and encouraging his constituents to peacefully resist against the military. That same day, the president of Congress declared himself the constitutional president of Honduras, and influential institutions around the country instead rallied in support of the military-led coup d’état (Fasquelle 2011, 16-21).

The coup marked the beginning of a democratic unraveling in Honduras, as the military started to move back into the center of political influence. The military had significant support for overthrowing Zelaya: “they had a court order from the nation’s highest tribunal and near-unanimous support from the National Congress” (Ruhl 2010, 93). With such a strong

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coalition alongside major political players, military commanders allowed the Congress to form an interim civilian government, with its President, Roberto Micheletti, at the head. The Micheletti administration would then oversee the general presidential elections later that year in November when a conservative rancher named Porfirio Lobo Sosa took the bid for the National Party and ultimately was elected President of Honduras. Lobo Sosa provided a change for Honduras after the coup, but the question still remains: why was Zelaya overthrown in the first place?

Zelaya’s first term in office began in 2006 with no clear path of what he wanted to accomplish. He did tremendously in terms of increasing educational opportunities for children in poorer neighborhoods, but he failed to crack down on gang violence and he alienated leftist political organizations (Ruhl 2010, 98). Zelaya also established a very close relationship with the socialist president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. His hope in swinging left was that he could finally develop a stronger connection with the majority of Hondurans, who up to that point felt more disenfranchised by the elitism of the traditional party system. However, Zelaya’s unorthodox approach to leadership and unique ability to irk his allies led to the eventual overturn of his political support and a national plebiscite in which the public would essentially determine a major reform to the constitution. This “constituent assembly” would decide whether or not Zelaya could run for a second term, something that is constitutionally prohibited for Honduran presidents. The fear was that the plebiscite would allow Zelaya to override the second term clause and win a reelection bid (Seligson and Booth 2009, 1-6). This power move resulted in a decrease in trust and support from the populace and military leaders who had previously backed him. By mid-2009, Zelaya had lost his base and was spiraling into becoming one of the least popular governmental officials in the country.

Gang Violence and Crime

Honduras is considered one of the most dangerous countries in the world, and especially so in the western hemisphere (Stoll 2017, 121-131). Since its democratization, it has seen a substantial spike in violence and crime all over the country. Muggings, auto theft, bank and house robberies, and kidnappings spiking in the 1990s, Honduras “attained one of the world’s highest homicide rates with 53 murders per 100,000 residents in 2008” (Ruhl 2010, 96). Part of the reason for this increase in violence and murder is due to the introduction

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of street gangs to Central America, including Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13 for short, and Calle 18, or 18th Street in English. Both groups formed in Los Angeles, California, but MS-13 was created by Salvadorian refugees escaping political conflict in their home country, hoping to connect young people with other Salvadorians as well as to protect themselves from other existing Latino and African-American gangs (Fogelbach 2017, 417-462). Eventually, the primarily Salvadorian MS-13 and the primarily Mexican Calle 18 both formed in Los Angeles, California, and their neighborhood turf war spread into an international setting. Both gangs have been charged with “extortion, drug distribution, prostitution, robbery, and murder, as well as in more transnational illicit activity such as drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking” (Finklea 2018, 1-15). In the case of Honduras, MS-13 and other street gangs have intricate networks and infrastructures that allow them to operate, including hitmen and other personnel that carry out the gang’s tasks. These personnel also have been noted to have strong connections to the government in Honduras, and that role in crime “provides a camouflage for an outside group that wishes to keep its participation secret” (Insight Crime 2013, 1-50).

Shortly after the coup, the homicide rate in Honduras skyrocketed.

In 2010, the homicide rate was 77.5% and in 2011 it peaked at 86.5%, a stark contrast to rates of 67.0% in 2009 and even 47.6% in 2007 (Rísquez 2017).

Before the coup, while there was political instability within the government, the homicide rate, while still comparatively high, was fairly stagnant. It was not until Zelaya took office and began swinging left that murder rates began to increase. In the months and years immediately following the coup, Honduras experienced its highest murder rate ever, leading the hemisphere and the world in that category. As shown below in Figure 1, the homicide rates for the country steadily rose until 2009 - 2010, where it stayed above 80% until 2013 when it went back down to 77.45% (Rísquez 2017).

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Figure 1

So, was the coup part of the reason why the homicide rate skyrocketed?

After Zelaya was ousted, Honduras was under an interim government led by President of Congress Roberto Micheletti, from June until the general elections in November. The coup left Honduras divided; by October, 52% of Hondurans reported they favored Zelaya, 59% of people on average disapproved of the coup, and only 41% viewed Micheletti favorably (Ruhl 2010, 102). According to data from Amnesty International, demonstrations that ensued in protest of the coup were brutally put down by armed military and police forces, resulting in “hundreds of beatings and detentions� as well as more than two dozen civilian deaths (Ruhl 2010, 102-103).

Extreme Poverty and the Economy

Honduras has historically faced more economic weakness and instability than most countries in the western hemisphere. As the second poorest country in Central America and the third poorest country in the Americas (CIA 2018), Honduras has paled in comparison to the economic success and stability of other countries in the western hemisphere.

In Figure 2 below on the left, I show the gross domestic product (GDP) of Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, and Chile from 1997 - 2017, to show how much Honduras has fallen behind its Latin American neighbors. These are all countries who have undergone significant regime changes in recent decades and have faced staggering levels of political and economic stability. It is evident

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that Mexico is much more developed than the other countries shown. In this time frame, the largest difference in GDP between Mexico and Honduras was in 2013 at USD $1,255.5 billion, which is telling not just of Mexico’s success in the 21st century, but also of Honduras’s economic shortcoming. In Figure 2, the blue line showing Honduras’ progress hardly moves. This is because it’s GDP only increased by US $18.316 billion in 20 years.

Figure 2

In this graph, there does not seem to be much positive change; however, by looking at Figure 3 below on the right, we can see that, despite the small amount of change, there has been a steady positive change in Honduras’s GDP in the last 20 years. So, while Honduras’ economy is still very weak in comparison to its neighbors, there has been no sign of negative change or worsening since the beginning of the 21st century (The World Bank 2018).

Figure 3

Moreover, according to data from the World Bank, Honduras had a poverty rate of 64.3% as of 2016. One in five Hondurans lives on less than $2 a day, meaning that one in five Hondurans lives in a condition of extreme poverty

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(The World Bank 2018). According to the graph shown below in Figure 4, the percentage of Hondurans living under the poverty line since 2001 has fluctuated between 58.2% (at its lowest in 2007) and 66.5% (at its highest in 2012), and has staggered between 60-70% since 2010 (The World Bank 2018).

With this information, it is unlikely that the 2009 coup was a direct cause of an increase in poverty rates in Honduras. However, it is possible that the political instability that the country faced in the aftermath of Zelaya’s ousting caused economic conditions to waver.

Figure 4

After the coup, the Honduran economy took a staggering hit. According to J. Mark Ruhl, Suspensions of tens of millions of dollars of economic assistance by the European Union, the United States, and the World Bank damaged an economy already reeling amid a global recession. Investment and tourism came to a halt, and more than 180,000 Hondurans lost their jobs. The economic collapse encouraged negotiation and may have given some Honduran business leaders second thoughts about the coup, but the deteriorating economic situation never broke up the anti-Zelaya coalition (Ruhl 2010, 103).

The economy suffered greatly after the coup, and the U.S. ultimately did not help the situation much either. Despite showing a great deal of commitment to restoring Zelaya to the office immediately following the coup, by late October and early November 2009, the Obama administration wavered its support and backed down. With Micheletti still in charge, and new elections about to occur, the political and economic situation was very much unstable and on edge.

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Other Contributive Causes Law, Order, and American Immigration Policy

One alternative cause of the spike in violence in Honduras could be attributed to consequences of law and order and tensions with government authority. Beginning in the 1990s, the U.S. government cracked down on arresting and deporting Latin Americans in Los Angeles, California, with two main factors at the forefront: the MS-13/Calle 18 turf war and the Rodney King riots, in which many Latin Americans participated in the rioting, looting, and destruction of businesses (Stoll 2017, 122). Particularly in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, the spike in gang violence in the 1990s was blamed on the gang-affiliated deportees from the U.S. In this respect, gang-related crimes are a result of an American export to Central American countries, where members of MS-13 and Calle 18 wreaked havoc on society and politics (Stoll 2017). While in the U.S., gangs were often victims of government repression; despite their involvement in dangerous and violent activity, state officials treated minority groups more harshly simply as a consequence of the race-related tensions at that time, especially in Los Angeles. However, once those gang members were deported back to Central America, they converted from victims of state repression into the repressors themselves (Stoll 2017).

In Honduras, since most gang members hold jobs and have social networks outside of the gang itself, they are able to weave themselves into different facets of society – especially into politics and government – to where the gang becomes a critical part of the system of law and order. As a result, unfortunately, gang violence in Honduras is perpetuated because gangsters hold important roles in Honduran bureaucracies and administrations (Fogelbach 2011, 422423).

Through the mass deportation of these criminals from the U.S., MS-13 and Calle 18 members transplanted their organizations into Central America; between the two groups, 112 cells were formed in Honduras, and there are now estimated over 36,000 members in these gangs in Honduras (Fogelback 2011, 421). Furthermore, between 2001-2010, “nearly 130,000 foreign nationals were deported to Central America because of a criminal conviction, primarily to the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,” and consequently these deportees established strong gang connections outside of the U.S (Finklea 2018, 1). The law and order and immigration policies of the U.S., in this case, seem to only benefit

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Americans; yes, its own streets are slowly being cleansed of gang activity, however by removing MS-13 and Calle 18 members and putting them back on their own streets in Central America, the U.S. is playing a direct role in perpetuating the cycle of gang violence and activity in countries like Honduras. The vigilance of American government officials has resulted in a direct infusion of gangsters into Honduran society, which is why gang activity and homicide rates have spiked since the mid-2000s. Moreover, since both the Obama and Trump administrations have taken hard stances on gangs and immigration, more Central Americans are being pushed back into their home countries, where they then become unable to evade the presence of gangs. The perpetuated cycle of fear of gangs, stringent U.S. immigration policies, and deportation, all contribute to the ever-present danger of gangs in Honduras.

A Failed Education System

Another cause for the persistently high rates of poverty and violence is a lack of primary and secondary school enrollment for Honduran adolescents.

Despite a literacy rate of 89% in 2015 of individuals over the age of 15 (CIA 2018), enrollment and attendance rates, especially for secondary schools, are low. According to data from UNICEF, between the years of 2008 - 2012, the net attendance ratio for primary school participation was at 92.5% for males and 93% for females; however, those numbers drop to a staggering 43% for males and 52.4% for females in secondary school participation (UNICEF 2013). This is due to severe inaccessibility to higher levels of education in Honduras. Public schools do not provide adequate levels of education for students; private schools are expensive and consequently exclude students from lower-income households; private bilingual schools are even more exclusive. Since most families cannot afford tuition for private schools, let alone a bilingual education, thousands of children do not receive adequate access to schools. This, unfortunately, prevents them from finding better jobs and opportunities as adults, and it also makes children and teenagers more likely to join street gangs since they are not in the classroom. Inaccessibility to education thus perpetuates both the cycle of poverty as well as of gang violence in Honduras because, if children cannot go to school, they cannot pursue higher educational or occupational opportunities, and as a result feel more obliged to join gangs.4

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The Invisible Perpetrator: Climate Change

Fluctuations in weather patterns have also contributed heavily to the economic struggles facing Honduras. Since 2009, global temperatures have increased and sea levels have risen, and the warming climate, in particular, has had an effect on Honduras’s agriculture industry. Since Hurricane Mitch devastated 70% of Honduras’s crops and infrastructure in 1998, the country has struggled to get back on track, as agriculture contributes to 14% of its GDP (USAID 2017, 1-5). Climate change has detrimental effects on Honduras; according to data compiled in 2017 by the Climate Change Adaption, Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS) Task Order, Climate change will increase the frequency and severity of water scarcity and climate-related hazards, and put additional strain on the Honduran government’s capacity to address ongoing development barriers, including extreme inequality, low levels of education, acute environmental degradation, and rampant crime and violence (USAID 2017, 1).

Moreover, ATLAS projects that climate change will cause the following impacts on Hondurans: water shortages and degradation of water quality, crop loss and soil erosion, increased risk of vector- and water-borne diseases, loss of forest cover, reduced energy production potential, and rising food prices and food imports (USAID 2017, 1). These will have lasting impacts on Honduras’s already struggling economy as well as the livelihood of citizens.

In 2018, a caravan of over 3,000 Latin American individuals— mainly Honduran, Salvadorian, and Guatemalan—were marching towards the southwestern U.S. border to claim asylum, in an attempt to escape the gang violence and extreme poverty that plagues their countries. But what many people do not realize is another significant factor behind the caravan’s formation is climate change. Alongside violence and poverty, “climate change in the region is exacerbating – and sometimes causing – a miasma of problems including crop failure and poverty” (Milman, Holden, and Agren 2018).

According to an article from The Guardian, migrants typically do not attribute climate change as a direct reason for leaving Central America, but “people in the region who depend on small farms are painfully aware of changes to weather patterns that can ruin crops and decimate incomes” (Milman, Holden, and Agren 2018). With less annual rainfall each year, crops are failing and farmers are less able to provide for themselves and their families; one of the reasons many people joined the caravan is because they are experiencing the

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economic effects of climate change firsthand and want to escape its clutches.

Analysis of Findings

In the years following the coup, both poverty rates and homicide rates increased—for the former, 58.8% in 2009 to 66.5% in 2012 and for the latter, 67% in 2009 to 86.5% in 2012 (The World Bank 2017). It can be argued that the coup contributed to the spikes in those years immediately following the coup, but after 2012 it does not appear that the coup was as central of a catalyst anymore. Homicide rates began to decrease again (dropping back down to 60.02% in 2015) and GDP continued to escalate ($17.71 billion in 2011 to $22.98 billion in 2017). Poverty rates even began to decrease, going from its 2012 peak at 66.5% to 60.9% in 2016, the lowest it has been since the coup. Strangely, in 2017, that number shot right back up by over 4%, leaving the poverty rate for that year at 64.3% (The World Bank 2017).

From these data, I can conclude that the presidency of Porfirio Lobo Sosa was met with more economic and political uncertainty, as Honduras faced its highest rates of poverty and homicide in the last two decades under his administration. As for Juan Orlando Hernández, who was elected in 2014, he began to turn the country around. However, he began making moves to consolidate his presidential power by trying to illegally change the constitution to allow himself to run for reelection. As Honduras is painfully aware, the last time a president tried to do that, it resulted in a coup d’état. Juan Orlando’s controversial bid for a second term and subsequent victory were caused by an unconstitutional attempt to rewrite the rules of the game, and it resulted in violent protests and riots in the streets of Honduran towns and cities, denouncing his leadership and his self-approved stay in office. Constituents have vandalized city parks and public monuments with the phrase “¡Fuera JOH!” which means, “Out with Juan Orlando!” They have burned buildings and destroyed toll booths and blocked bridges on major roads, all in an effort to oppose his presidency.5 JOH’s reelection correlates with another spike in violent crime and poverty in Honduras since his presidency is surrounded by controversy and strong political moves that only benefit himself and political elites. Since his reelection in 2017, Honduras appears to be back on its previous track of increasing poverty rates and crime rates.

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Conclusion

This paper discussed the 2009 military coup in Honduras and analyzed its role in the spike of extreme poverty and gang violence in that country. I found that, while the coup played a major part in the increase in poverty and homicide rates in the years immediately following the coup, there were other factors at play that contributed to these issues as well—a failing education system, climate change, and stringent American immigration policy.

After Porfirio Lobo Sosa was elected in 2009, he struggled to get the country back on track; Juan Orlando HernĂĄndez started to turn things around in 2014, but unfortunately is currently reversing much of his work due to his own ambitious, unconstitutional, politically self-motivated interests. Honduras is trying, and its people want the problem to be solved; but if it wants to get out of the woods, its leaders need to commit to uniting the country and moving forward together.

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Endnotes

1 Figure 1 demonstrates “Historic: Homicides Rate 2006-2017 (rate projected

through December).” Graphic provided by ASJ, published by Ronna Rísquez through

InSightCrime.org. Translated from Spanish, the description below the graph says: “This

graph of projection is made on a basis of the reduction of 1,461 homicides by the

31st of December, 2017. On average, in the following months, a monthly reduction of

150 homicides will be achieved from November to December, compared to the same

months in 2016. If these trends are maintained, a homicide rate of 41.61 homicides per

each 100,000 citizens will be achieved by the end of 2017. In November, there should

be 254 murders and 240 in December. You thus get a reduction in the homicide rate by

17.44 points in comparison to the rate in 2016.” (Translated by Zachary M. Phillips)

2 Figures 2 and Figure 3 were drawn by the author, Zachary M. Phillips. Data

acquired from the World Bank.

3 Figure 4 was drawn by the author, Zachary M. Phillips. Data acquired from the

World Bank.

4 This knowledge was gained through three years of participation in Students

Helping Honduras, a service organization aimed at alleviating extreme poverty and gang violence through education and youth empowerment. Part of SHH’s mission is to build 1,000 schools in Honduras in neighborhoods that demonstrate need and desire

for more classrooms. Through my involvement in this group, I have learned a lot about

the importance of education in Honduras, why schools are so hard to access, and what

the consequences are if schools are not available to kids. While in Honduras in 2017,

I talked firsthand with other volunteers as well as members of the community about the situation, and Hondurans confirmed the statements I affirm in this paper. Without their testimony, I would not know this information.

5 The toll booth mentioned here is one I drove by when I was in Honduras. It is

located along a major highway that connects San Pedro Sula (the economic capital of

Honduras) with El Progreso (a smaller city about an hour southwest). This booth in particular was notorious for being expensive for drivers, and Juan Orlando Hernández

pushed for the toll to be increased. At the end of 2017, shortly after his reelection was

announced, Honduran citizens protested in the streets, blocking bridges, roads, and

other major thoroughfares. This toll booth was also destroyed – protesters rigged it with

explosives and blew it up, in an attempt to tell the government that they did not want

to pay the toll. As of January 2017, only the foundation of the booth and rubble from the explosion remained on the highway.

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Bibliography Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. “Honduras – Geography.”

2018.

Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. “Honduras – Introduction.”

2018.

Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. “Honduras – People and Society.” 2018.

Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. “Honduras – Economy.”

2018.

Fasquelle, Rodolfo Pastor. “The 2009 Coup and the Struggle for Democracy in Honduras.” NACLA Report on the Americas, Feb. 2011, pp. 16-21. (16).

Finklea, Kristen. “MS-13 in the United States and Federal Law Enforcements Efforts.” Congressional Research Service Report, 20 Aug. 2018. Pp. 1-15. (3).

Fogelbach, Juan J. “Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.” San Diego International Law Journal, vol. 12, 2011. Pp. 417-462. (420).

InSight Crime. “MS-13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction.” Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, 2013, pp. 1-90. (45-46).

Milman, Oliver, Emily Holden, and David Agren. “The unseen driver of the migrant caravan: climate change.” The Guardian, 30 Oct. 2018 (accessed 14 Nov. 2018).

Rísquez, Ronna. “7 Keys to Understanding Honduras’ Declining Homicide Rate.” InSightCrime.org, 15 Nov. 2017 (accessed 20 Nov. 2018).

Ruhl, J. Mark. “Honduras Unravels.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 2, April 2010. Pp. 93-107. (95).

Seligson, Mitchell A. and John A. Booth. “Predicting Coups? Democratic Vulnerabilities, the Americas Barometer and the 2009 Honduran Coup.” Latin American Public Opinion Project, “Insights” Series, 2009, pp.

1-6. (1).

Stoll, David. “Gang Wars of Central America: What Anthropologists Have to Say.” Latin American Politics and Society, 2017, pp. 121-131. (121).

The World Bank. “Gross Domestic Product Data.” World Bank Group, 2018 (accessed 18 Nov 2018). Data obtained for Honduras, Guatemala,

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Mexico, Chile, and the United States of America.

The World Bank. “Honduras Overview.” World Bank Group, 2018 (accessed 20 Nov. 2018).

The World Bank. “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) – Honduras.” World Bank Group, 2018 (accessed 18 Nov. 2018). Data obtained only for Honduras.

UNICEF. “Statistics – Honduras.” UNICEF, 27 Dec. 2013 (accessed 30 Nov. 2018).

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A Strategy to Reduce Violence Between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank Identifying Unification Techniques in Hebron

By Alejandro Rush

About the Author Raised in Lexington, Virginia and Dubai, and having lived in Spain for a year, Alejandro Rush grew up experiencing a melody of cultures. He speaks English, Spanish and French fluently. A third-year in the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy B.A. program, Alejandro is minoring in Arabic. His interests include criminal justice reform, domestic policy and international politics – particularly Middle Eastern politics.

Alejandro’s interest in Middle Eastern politics began in 2010 when he moved to Dubai. At UVA he has explored this interest throughout the International Politics department as well as in Batten.

Abstract

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has persisted for over a century. Currently, the Israeli government controls about 60% of the West Bank, while Israelis account for only 24% of the population (Beaumont 2017). The expansion of Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank breaches the borders established under the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

The continued expansion has become more energized since U.S. President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capitol. The Knesset, certainly influenced by Trump’s decision, passed legislation claiming that Israeli law can be imposed over all Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank (Liebermann 2018). This decision was met with anger from Palestinian officials, claiming the decision was a “declaration of war” and demonstrates “the end of the so-called political process” towards a two-state solution (Ibid).

This has led to increased violence between Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank, spearheaded by radicalized Palestinians retaliating against a

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strict, occupationalist regime imposed on them by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). IDF officers have been accused by Palestinian civilians of committing war-crimes in the last two decades (Waldman 2014).

In the following paper, I will discuss a multifaceted strategy directed at Hebron and its surrounding area, where poverty and violence rates soar above those of the rest of the West Bank and where much of the violence in the West Bank stems from. The strategy is threefold.

The first step is deradicalizing Palestinians in Hebron, and, simultaneously, facilitate religious dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis in and around al-Shuhada Street and the Ibrahimi Mosque. Through deradicalization, the IDF will loosen its tight restrictions on Palestinian movement. The precedent here derives from historical observations of key violent outbreaks where the IDF has tightened its hold on Hebron in retaliation. If violence on the Palestinian side can be decreased and religious dialogue for families can be facilitated through an Interreligious and Regional Dialogue Board headed by religious leaders from both sides at a location as symbolic as al-Shuhada Street and the Holy Site, then communication can be established between both countries. Second, the strategy calls for establishing a renewable energy power grid in Hebron to reduce electricity prices and make the community more energy independent, as both the Palestinian and Israeli governments agree on promoting renewable energy and facilitating STEM research. Hebron is the perfect location—symbolically speaking— to initiate cooperation between both governments on this type of project due to the shared holiness of the Old City of Hebron. Finally, the strategy includes an IT job training center that would both unify the two groups and reinvigorate the once-economically prosperous al-Shuhada Street. This will also provide job training for displaced Palestinians who lost their jobs due to the closure of al-Shuhada Street.

Introduction: Why Hebron?

Hebron is home to the Ibrahimi Mosque, known to Israelis as the Tomb of the Patriarch. This site is sacred to both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims, as it is the burial place of Abraham, a religious figure in all Abrahamic religions for his role in founding them. This is the main reason for the increasing number of Israeli settlers entering the city — to gain more access to the holy site.

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In 2017, the United Nations declared the site and the surrounding neighborhoods of Old Hebron an UNESCO world heritage site. This caused pushback from Israel, since it too claims historic, religious, and cultural rights to the site (Beaumont 2017). As expected, the UN sided with Palestine on this issue, as it has repeatedly told Israel that its settlements in the West Bank are a breach of international law (Security Council).

In the holy city of Hebron, Palestinians number over 200,000 while Israeli settlers number roughly 800. However, the Israeli forces control the vast majority of the city’s territory — much like they do in the rest of the West Bank. Here, the IDF, whose stated purpose is to protect the ultraorthodox Israeli Jewish settlers, restricts Palestinian movement through a series of checkpoints and roadblocks, and has even closed Hebron’s former economic hub, al-Shuhada Street, where many Palestinians once lived and worked.

This has been the status quo since 1994, when an American-born Israeli killed dozens of Palestinians and injured hundreds gunning down the Ibrahimi Mosque. In an effort to promote security for Israeli settlers, the IDF closed al-Shuhada street, removing all Palestinians from their homes and closing shops in the area. This street was the most used path for Palestinians travelling to the Ibrahimi Mosque. Now, there is an IDF checkpoint at the holy site’s entrance, making it even more difficult for Palestinians to enter the mosque (Lieberman 2018).

The Israeli strategy is obvious: By constantly harassing Palestinians in Hebron’s Old City, the IDF hopes that they will leave the area and make way for more Israeli settlers (Kuttab 2017). However, this strategy only increases violence in the West Bank region. For example, in 2014, two agents of Hamas kidnapped and killed three Israeli teenagers who were children of settlers. In response, IDF forces struck down with an iron fist, arresting hundreds in search of these Hamas members. Hamas then fired rockets from the Gaza Strip in retaliation (Dorfman 2017). This demonstrates how events in the region normally play out: Israel restricts Palestinian rights in Hebron, radical Palestinians from various territories retaliate violently, and the cycle continues. The situation in Hebron is a microcosmal representation of this divisive, ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Realistically, Israel cannot be expected to pull all its settlements from Palestinian lands. President Netanyahu has already made this clear,

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seeing emigration as a sign of weakness. This attracts more violence from the Gaza Strip, namely Hamas, such as missiles and rocket fire (Berger 2018).

Furthermore, Palestinians have established that continued restriction of Palestinian movement and rights will result in more unwanted violence for Israel. The Palestinian Authority, however, has shown that they share Israel’s interest in decreasing violence in Palestinian territories, demonstrating a willingness to cooperate between the two governments.

Lawrence Freedman’s Pareto Principle states that few inputs can have an overwhelming effect on a larger number of outputs. Following this principle, the more common ground and cooperation there is between Jews and Palestinians, the higher the chance of peace in Hebron. Applied on a macroscale, if peace is reached in the Holy City, positive effects will ripple throughout the Palestinian territories.

Part One: Deradicalization of Palestinians in Hebron Reducing Palestinian Violence Towards Israelis in Order to Facilitate Freer Palestinian Movement Throughout the City

Since 1997, after the city was divided into the Palestinian Authoritycontrolled H1 zone and the IDF-controlled H2 zone, Palestinian movement has been slowly restricted (Kamisher 2017). These restrictions come after violent outbreaks between Palestinians and Israeli settlers to ensure the safety of Israeli settlers. Paradoxically, much of the radicalization of Palestinians stems from increased Israeli immigration to Hebron. That being said, less radicalization and violence would likely lead to less Palestinian movement restrictions.

However, violence and retribution are not new to Hebron. In 1927, Hebron’s Jewish and Muslim communities lived peacefully, owning shops side by side and worshipping at the same Holy Site with no altercations (Lazaroff 2017). This changed in 1929, when a group of angered Palestinians massacred 67 Jews in Hebron (Ibid). In 1967, the IDF first appeared in Hebron to protect a group of settlers that moved into the area. Palestinians saw this as a hostile occupation and threw rocks at settlers entering the city.

Out of resentment for Palestinians’ past violence and to protect the settlers, IDF forces began to harass and intimidate Palestinians (Waldman 2014).

In 1994, when Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 Palestinians praying in the Ibrahimi Mosque, survivors subdued Goldstein and became violent

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towards IDF soldiers in the area since Goldstein himself wore an IDF uniform.

Afterwards, the IDF imposed strict roadblocks and checkpoints around the mosque and closed down al-Shuhada Street, the central marketplace and business hub for Palestinians. In 2000, following the Second Intifada committed by Palestinians, the IDF again restricted Palestinian movement throughout the city, closing roads to Palestinian drivers around the city of Hebron (Ibid).

The IDF’s behavior towards Palestinians is extremely biased. Reports indicate that IDF soldiers turn a blind eye to incidents of Israeli settlers harassing Palestinians. Jewish children have thrown rocks at Palestinian children and heckled them in the streets. Israeli settlers have written antiArab graffiti on Palestinian property (Ibid). These hyper-religious Jewish settlers believe that Hebron belongs to them by God’s will. Thus, they demand that Palestinians leave Hebron peacefully and go live in other Arab nations (Underwood 2004).

This anti-Palestinian culture, however, stems from the settlers themselves, not the IDF. The IDF, who is the face of the Israeli government, cannot risk forcefully removing Palestinians from Hebron, since doing so will produce even more backlash from the international community.

Therefore, the IDF allow Palestinians to live peacefully and only crackdown when there is violent insurgence.

Although the IDF has been known to look away from injustices towards Palestinians, this is mostly because they must uphold their image as security-keepers for Israeli settlers. However, they cannot continue to disregard Palestinian rights if their goal is enduring, peaceful coexistence.

Furthermore, resentful as they may be towards the increasing number of IDF soldiers and restrictions, Palestinians would benefit from acting less violently towards Israelis in the city. This would likely reduce IDF crackdowns on Palestinians like those of the past.

Using Decreased Tensions between Israelis and Palestinians to Produce Religious Dialogue Between Israelis and Palestinians on al-Shuhada Street

With less IDF restrictions on Palestinian movement due to reduced violence, Hebron’s local government could establish an Interreligious Dialogue Board headed by Salafi Sheikh Ashraf Jabari and Israeli Dr. Yehuda Stolov, head of the Interfaith Encounter Association.

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Jabari, who preaches against the typical radical Salafist teachings of jihad, instead preaches peace and pacifism and focuses mainly on Palestinian youth —the demographic with the highest crime rate against Jews. His goal is to create an atmosphere of charity and support amongst Muslims in Hebron over resentment and violence towards Israeli Jews (Issacharoff 2014). Similarly, Dr. Stolov’s mission with his NGO, the Interfaith Encounter Association, is to facilitate religious dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. His efforts have proved effective in Jerusalem, where he has successfully brought hyper-religious orthodox Jews and Palestinian Muslims together to share their beliefs and culture with one another (Ibid).

The Interreligious Dialogue Board would focus on women and youth to bring the Israeli settlers and Palestinians in Hebron together, using Dr. Stolov’s experience incentivizing sustained religious dialogue between Muslim and Jewish women and children and Sheikh Jabari’s preestablished relationship with the Palestinian youth.

Part Two: Facilitating Solar Power Training, Research, and Instalment Throughout Hebron

Due to increasing poverty and unemployment rates across the West Bank, Palestinians have struggled to pay for electricity —88% of which is supplied by Israeli companies (Yamin 2015)). As a result, the Israeli electrical companies have cut power at certain times throughout the day to reduce company losses due to the ever-increasing Palestinian debt of $560 million (Lieber 2017).

Israel’s government has grown increasingly aggravated over Palestine’s dependence on Israeli electricity, as Palestinian debt increases the price of electricity for Israeli citizens. Therefore, the Israeli government encourages Palestinian energy independence. In July of 2017, the two governments signed an agreement wherein the Palestinian Authority’s debt could instead be used to restructure the Palestinian energy sector to become more self-sufficient (Ibid).

Currently, renewable energy in the form of solar and wind accounts for merely 2% of Palestine’s energy supply. The Palestinian Authority has declared its goal to reach 10% domestic renewable energy by 2020 (Yamin 2015). Consequently, the CEO of Israeli NGO Energiya Global, Yosef Abramowitz, has declared his goal to create a self-sufficient Palestinian

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solar energy grid that could provide over 1000 megawatts of energy to the West Bank by 2022 (Udasin 2014). This would be done by constructing solar energy fields in the vast open desert of the West Bank.

The Palestinian Energy Minister, Dr. Omar Kittaneh, has already begun developing the framework to facilitate this change with the financial and logistical support of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (Ibid). Kittaneh’s support for this plan no doubt comes from the Palestinian government’s desire to become energy-independent from Israel.

If this Israeli NGO and the Palestinian government were to work together, it would provide hundreds of megawatts of renewable, domestic energy that is more affordable for Palestinians. Moreover, this would lower Israeli electricity bills, since the Israeli electric companies providing power to Palestine would no longer have to deal with Palestinian debt.

Local Israeli governments have already taken solar energy implementation into their own hands. For example, Kfar Sava, a small city about 50 miles west of Hebron, has begun funding solar panel installation on the roofs of homes across the city by the popular demand of the city’s inhabitants (Rinat 2018).

If Hebron, the poorest of major cities in the West Bank, were to implement solar power, it would lower electricity prices for Palestinians, allowing for more economic freedom among the Palestinian demographic.

In turn, this economic growth would likely lower crime rates. Moreover, the Israeli settlers in Hebron would also benefit from the lower electricity costs by installing solar panels on their own homes. Additionally, al-Shuhada Street —Hebron’s former economic hub —would be the ideal location to begin solar power implementation and research.

The city’s ancient Jewish-Islamic history symbolizes the value of reinvigorating collaboration between Muslims and Jews. A Palestinian solar energy power grid in the West Bank already has the financial and logistical support of both the Israeli government and the OPIC. Furthermore, cooperation between both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority on economic and energy matters like this will open a direct line of communication between the governments —something that has not always existed in the past.

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Part Three: Implementing and Incentivizing IT Job Training on alShuhada Street

Hebron’s unemployment and poverty rates are drastically higher than the rest of the West Bank, with 77% of Hebron’s Palestinians living below the poverty line (Kaplan, 2015). To promote economic growth and job placement, an IT job training center will be opened on al-Shuhada Street to both economically reinvigorate the former economic hub of the city and raise employment rates among Palestinians.

Funding for this facility comes from the United Arab Emirates, who funded 80% of construction costs after directing a similar project in Kochi, India called SmartCity that created over 90,000 jobs (Reporter 2018).

Cooperating with the Interreligious Dialogue Board, the facility would offer free lessons to all community members who attend sustained religious dialogue sessions on al-Shuhada Street in order to incentivize higher attendance in both organizations. The main incentive for people to come is the possibility of landing a job in the growing IT sector of the Middle East and reducing the poverty and unemployment rates in Hebron. Palestinians would then be able to open their own businesses or work for companies in the IT sector, and, in the long term, producing economic growth and lowering violence rates.

Recommendation Recap., Conclusion, and Feasibility Analysis

This strategy is sustainable because it focuses on one area of the West Bank: Hebron’s al-Shuhada Street. It details a three-step strategic process to reduce Palestinian violence, grant more freedom to Palestinians in Hebron, and facilitate religious dialogue between Jews and Muslims. The strategy also invigorates economic growth by lower electricity costs, facilitating cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian governments, and providing IT job training for Palestinians. The strategy is measurable because the its outcomes can be easily recorded, such as crime rates, economic growth, movement restrictions, and electricity bills. It is achievable because the outcomes are welcomed by all stakeholders in Hebron. It is realistic because it considers historical precedents to determine the nature of the strategy, provides incentives for all parties such as increased safety for Israeli settlers, economic growth for Palestinians, reduced electricity costs for both Israel and Palestine, and other shared goals. Finally, the strategy is

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timely because it takes into account each government’s desire to increase renewable energy options, such as completing solar panel implementation by 2022 and modelling the IT training program in Kochi that produced tens of thousands of jobs in just three years. There are also incentives for Jews and Muslims to partake in religious dialogue, producing a mutual understanding and reducing violence: The Palestinians want to reopen all of Hebron, and Israelis want to reduce Palestinian violence. giStrat Analysis

The giStrat program provides clear, quantitative feedback on the feasibility of the strategy, taking into account each stakeholder’s level of interest and investment at each step. Appendix C shows that significantly improved relations lead to reduced violence, greater freedom of movement for Palestinians, and economic prosperity for all roughly 56.8% of the time.

Roughly 26.7% of the time, the status quo is unchanged. Finally, only around 6.67% of the time do relations worsen, and about 10% of the time lead to full-scale war between Israel and Palestine.

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Appendix A: Targeted Factors of Stakeholders

Appendix B: Targeted Factors of Stakeholders

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Probability of Outcome:

Appendix C: giStrat Data

Influence Driven Outcomes:

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Cost of Friction Outcomes:

Stated Positions of Stakeholder Groups:

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Projected Outcomes for Stakeholder Groups:

Stated Positions of Individual Stakeholders:

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Projected Outcomes for Individual Stakeholders:

Degree of Convergence for Stakeholder Groups:

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Degree of Convergence for Individual Stakeholders:

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Bibliography Beaumont, Peter. “Israel Only Occupies 2% of West Bank, Says US

Ambassador.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 28 Sept.

2017 Berger, Yotam. “Netanyahu Vows to Never Remove

Israeli Settlements from West Bank: 'We're Here

to Stay, Forever'.” Haaretz.com, Haaretz, 24 Apr. 2018.

Dorfman, Zach. “'The Possibility of Escalation Is Always There'.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 28 Jan. 2017.

Issacharoff, Avi. “Eating Hummus with Salafists in Hebron.”

The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel, 22 Feb. 2014.

Kamisher, Eliyahu. “Hebron: The Conflict in a Nutshell.” The

Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, The Jerusalem Post, 24 Sept. 2017.

Kaplan, Yael. “Luxury Alongside Poverty in the Palestinian Authority.”

Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs, The

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 Nov. 2015.

Kuttab, Daoud. “Hebron: 20 Years of Apartheid and

Oppression.” Alaraby, The New Arab, 17 Jan. 2017.

Lieber, Dov. “In Deal with Israel, PA Takes 'Historic' Step toward Energy Independence.” The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel, 10 July 2017.

Liebermann, Oren. “Israel Accelerates Plans That Imperil Two-

State Solution.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Jan. 2018, Lazaroff, Tovah. “Hebron's Jewish Community

Receives Separate Municipal Standing.” The Jerusalem

Post |JPost.com, The Jerusalem Post, 30 Aug. 2017.

Reporter, Staff. “SmartCity Kochi on Fast Track, Leases out

80% of IT Building.” The Hindu, The Hindu, 2 Mar. 2018.

Rinat, Zafrir. “Israeli Cities Take the Lead in Recycling and

Renewable Energy.” Haaretz.com, Haaretz, 8 Mar. 2018.

Security Council. “Israel's Settlements Have No Legal

Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International

Law, Security Council Reaffirms | Meetings Coverage

and Press Releases.” United Nations, United Nations.

Udasin, Sharon. “West Bank Solar Industry Could Fuel

Palestinian Energy Independence.” The Jerusalem

Post | JPost.com, The Jerusalem Post, 16 October, 2014.

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Underwood, Lee. “Israel's Right to the Land.” Israel

National News, Israel National News, 1 Apr. 2004.

Waldman, Ayelet. “The Shame of Shuhada Street.”

The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 12 June 2014.

Yamin, Mohammed Ziad. “Renewable Energy

in Palestine.” EcoMENA, EcoMENA, 8 Mar. 2015.

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The Role of Referenda in the European Union

By Chloe Suzman

About the Author

Chloe Suzman is a third year from Scarsdale, New York majoring in Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law and French. During the summer of 2018, she studied abroad at Oxford and wrote this paper for a class about the politics of the European Union. This course inspired her interests in populism, immigration, and constitutional design, particularly in Europe. She loves to travel and plans to study abroad in Lyon, France in the spring.

Abstract

European Union member states have held dozens of referenda relating to their relationships with the EU, yet the referendum’s efficacy as a democratic tool remains ambiguous. I begin this paper with an overview of the types of referenda held on EU matters followed by an explanation of the traditional arguments for and against policymaking by referendum. I then examine three examples of EU-related referenda: the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, the 2016 Brexit referendum, and the 2016 Hungarian migrant quota referendum. In all of these cases, the referendum was motivated by domestic partisan calculus and leaders’ desire to strengthen their bargaining position with the EU. Further, each referendum bred a toxic information environment which rendered citizens incapable of making an educated choice. For these reasons, I conclude that the referendum is an ineffective democratic tool in today’s European political climate.

There have been 60 referenda on European Union matters since 1972 (Mendez 2017, 10). National governments have conducted all of them, as the European Union does not administer EU-wide referenda. Some referenda are constitutionally mandated while others are advisory (Beach 2018); overall, about one-third of EU referenda have been of the former type (Mendez 2017, 34). Member States may choose to hold an advisory referendum for strategic, normative, or political purposes. Furthermore, referenda in EU countries have

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allowed citizens to vote on three issue categories: EU membership, treaty ratification and revisions, and specific EU policies. EU accession referenda are most common, but policy-specific referenda have become increasingly popular (Beach 2018), accounting for 75% of EU referendum activity since 2010, as opposed to 8% before the 2000s (Mendez 2017, 32). Most EU referenda have been government-initiated; though, there have been two instances of citizen-initiated referenda in Italy and the Netherlands (Mendez 2017, 26). In this paper, I will explore whether referenda on EU matters are an effective democratic tool, focusing particularly on three governmentinitiated, advisory referenda introduced since 2015 in Greece, the United Kingdom, and Hungary.

Scholars since Plato have debated the merits of direct democracy tools such as the referendum. One long-standing critique of direct democracy is that citizens are ill-informed and not equipped for complex decision-making and therefore should not participate directly in important policy decisions (Beach 2018). Scholars such as O’Brennan (2009) and Dehousse (2006) have applied this voter competency argument to criticize European Union referenda. In contrast, arguments in favor of direct democracy emphasize referenda’s educational capacity, as they empower voters to familiarize themselves with policy issues and bolster civic engagement (Mendez 2017, 13). According to Schmitter (2004), this engagement is especially feasible in the modern technological landscape, through which EU citizens might easily provide input and gain knowledge about issues online. Another critique of EU referenda is that they prompt citizens to vote based on second-order factors--such as the popularity of the national government--rather than their assessment of the larger EU issue at hand. However, an increasing number of scholars have converged around the idea that issue voting takes precedence over second-order factors in the minds of voters for EU referenda, especially when the referendum deals with a high-salience issue (Beach 2018). The problematic nature of today’s referenda thus lies not with voters’ mindsets, but rather with the manner in which the referenda are conducted. I aim to prove, using Greece, the UK, and Hungary as examples, that referenda are an ineffective democratic tool in today’s European political climate because the partisan politics and unreliable information environments that accompany them render them incapable of empowering voters.

In July 2015, at a peak of the Greek debt crisis, Greek Prime Minister

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Alexis Tsipras held a referendum on the bailout plan offered by the Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) following 6 months of bitter negotiations. Tsipras championed a “No” vote, and 61.3% of Greek voters rejected the bailout agreement (Triga 2017, 120). In Britain, Prime Minister David Cameron called a referendum on maintaining British membership in the European Union, also known as the Brexit vote, in June 2016. Cameron campaigned for “Remain,” but the final result was 51.9% in favor of “Leave” (Manavopoulos 2017, 89). Lastly, in October 2016, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban held a referendum on the European Union’s migration crisis relocation plan, which included refugee quotas for Hungary. He advocated for a “No” vote and, 98% of Hungarian voters supported him; however, with only 32% voter turnout, the referendum was invalid. These three cases were all advisory (not constitutionally required) referenda initiated by the country’s ruling party (Beach 2018). In addition, partisan calculus motivated all three and resulted in votes that went against the EU. These examples represent a larger trend: Domestic political reasons motivate most EU referenda, and scholars have observed an accelerating rate of failure among them.

Many generally consider politically-motivated referenda such as the Greek, British, and Hungarian examples as democratically suspect (Mendez 2017, 34). They fail as democratic tools because national leaders use them not to increase citizens’ power, but rather to boost the popularity of a government or to heal division within a party. As Pallinger (2017) explains, “Rather than checking the ruling elite, direct democracy becomes a tool of the ruling elite to mobilize supporters and enhance their power in both domestic and foreign affairs” (167). Prime Minister Tsipras called the Greek referendum both to maintain the popularity of his Syriza party and to mediate a split within the party itself. Voters had elected the Syriza government based on their antiausterity platform, so the party was unwilling to make the political sacrifice of accepting the austerity measures offered by the Troika. By holding a referendum, they were able to buy time, delaying a split in their own party (between those who were and were not willing to budge on austerity) and delaying a reversal of their campaign promises, thus maintaining popular support (Mendez 2017, 31). Scholars have speculated that the Greek government may have secretly hoped that the referendum would result in a "Yes" even though they were campaigning for "No." In the case of a "Yes," the government would

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be able to shirk responsibility for the unpopular austerity measures--they would simply be following the will of the people instead of breaking their campaign promises. Some of the government’s counterproductive campaign tactics support this theory. Firstly, much of their messaging centered around attacking their negotiating partners, the Troika, which would theoretically make renegotiation more difficult after the referendum. This tactic made little sense given that they had also advertised the referendum as a way to enhance their negotiating position. Secondly, the Syriza government chose to forego public funding and refrained from conducting an official campaign, a questionable decision had the government been truly determined to prevent austerity measures (Triga 2017, 125).

Similarly, in Britain, Prime Minister David Cameron called the Brexit referendum to mediate a rift in his Conservative party. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the issue of EU membership has increasingly divided British Conservatives (Mendez 2017, 59). The electoral danger of this division manifested itself in 2014 when the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) won a majority of seats in Parliament. Desperate to avoid defections to UKIP and to secure a Conservative victory in 2015, Cameron pledged to renegotiate EU membership and to put the renegotiated agreement to a referendum by the end of 2017. This pledge allowed Cameron to temporarily hold his party together (Manavopoulos 2017, 89). Early polls indicated a strong preference for “Remain," so Cameron expected to continue to lead his party after the vote with a renewed mandate for a pro-EU stance (“Who said Brexit was a Surprise?” 2016).

Hungarian Prime Minister Orban organized the migrant quota referendum to enforce the power of the Fidesz party. Orban wanted to distract citizens from his failures in areas such as health care, education, and corruption, knowing he would be able to rally support around the unpopular EU migrant quota (Garavoglia 2016). Fidesz also started collecting signatures for the referendum in order to compete with the far-right Jobbik party, which had already started its own petition against the quota. Using a referendum to strengthen Fidesz' power was not a new tactic for Orban. In fact, Fidesz initially came to power following a strategic referendum in 2010 (Pallinger 2017, 57).

Governments’ usage of the vote to gain negotiating leverage against the EU also exemplifies the political motivation of these referenda. Governments

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have used this tactic in previous EU referenda such as the 2005 Constitutional Treaty referenda. In fact, Hug and Schulz (2007) argue that in countries where voters opposed further integration, governments that scheduled referenda procured greater concessions in the constitutional negotiation process than countries that did not hold referenda. In Greece, the UK, and Hungary, politicians used this tactic but did not achieve the desired results. The Greek “No” campaign centered around putting pressure on the Troika by providing a popular mandate against the terms of the bailout. British Prime Minister Cameron hoped that the threat of a Brexit vote would force concessions from the EU. He promised EU partners that he would campaign for “Remain” if his conditions were met, blatantly using UK citizens as a bargaining chip to stand up to EU negotiators (Manavopoulos 2017, 89). Hungarian campaign materials emphasized the referendum’s role in strengthening the national government’s hand in bargaining with slogans such as, “Let’s send a message to Brussels which they can understand!” (Pallinger). The Hungarian government hoped to demonstrate popular rejection of the migrant quota through the referendum, thus pressuring the EU to abandon it (Mendez 2017, 56). Orban sought, in particular, to chip away at German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s authority, as she had championed the relocation plan and represents a more liberal vision for Europe, which Orban abhors (Mueller 2016).

All three governments failed in leveraging their domestic referenda to procure their desired concessions, largely because they were unrealistic in their expectations. Greece, under strict capital controls and approaching the expiration of their IMF loan, was completely at the mercy of the Troika and the Eurogroup (Beach 2018). Britain was already subject to a myriad of EU accommodations, leaving little room for further concessions. Furthermore, the concessions that Britain wanted, such as exemption from the free movement of people across borders, would be impossible without a major treaty amendment, requiring votes from all 28 member states (Manavopoulos 2017, 90). Hungary had already been outvoted in the Council of Ministers on the matter of migrant quotas, and many generally considered Orban a political pariah without much negotiating leverage to begin with (Garavoglia 2016).

These referenda also failed as democratic tools because they took place in volatile information environments characterized by questionable

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legitimacy, a deficiency of common facts to guide decision making, and disagreement about the implications of the vote. In all three countries, challenges arose regarding the validity of the referendum itself, fostering confusion from the beginning of the campaigns. In Greece, the opposition legally challenged the referendum in court, but the Greek Supreme Court ruled against them (Triga 2017, 126). Further questioning of the referendum’s legitimacy came from externally. According to the IMF, the referendum was taking place on conditions that had already been retracted, and President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker accused Greece of putting an earlier agreement on the ballot that had fewer concessions than the most recent version (Triga 2017, 137). The Brexit referendum also faced challenges in court, although not until after the referendum took place. The High Court ruled that Article 50 could not be invoked based on an advisory referendum alone and would require an act of Parliament (Storer 2016). In Hungary, the referendum also dealt with challenges, but the Supreme Court ruled that the referendum was constitutional and dismissed later appeals. Afterward, numerous critics of this decision denounced it as legally questionable (Pallinger 2017, 163). Critics also characterized the phrasing of the question on which the voters were deciding as biased towards “No” to the point of being invalid: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?” (“Boundary Issues” 2016). Opposition parties advocated for a boycott of the vote to protest the referendum’s illegitimacy, at least partially accounting for the referendum’s low turnout (Beach 2018).

In addition to ambiguous purposes and dubious legitimacy, the referenda campaigns were riddled with insufficient and inaccurate information that made it impossible for voters to properly educate themselves about the relevant issues. In Greece, the timeline of the vote posed the largest threat to voter education. Prime Minister Tsipras announced the referendum just 10 days before it was set to take place. This did not leave enough time for constructive debate or comprehensive educational campaigns that could have helped voters make a more informed choice. This lack of time was especially problematic because the bailout agreement consisted of 38 highly technical pages (Triga 2017, 119), causing much of the brief campaign period in Greece centered around figuring out what the referendum was even about.

The government claimed that the purpose of the referendum was to express

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dissatisfaction with the bailout terms and strengthen the government’s negotiation position, while the opposition framed the referendum as a question of membership in the Eurozone (Mendez 2017, 58). As Triga and Manavopoulos (2017) point out, “In this informational environment, the first dilemma voters faced concerned not the persuasiveness of the two sides’ arguments, but which side was making arguments relevant to the referendum” (131). The Greek “No” side relied on fiery rhetoric and emotional appeals, using phrases such as “A Yes vote means capitulation” and “On Sunday we say No to blackmail” (Triga 2017, 133). Consequently, they often neglected to articulate any practical benefits of rejecting the bailout terms.

Outright lies and contradicting statements dominated the Brexit campaign, coming from both the press and the leaders of the campaigns. The lies ranged from promising that leaving would return £350 million a week to the UK to asserting that Turkey was joining the EU (Stone 2017). As toxic as the lies themselves were, the claims and counterclaims by each side that the other side was lying left voters facing an unnavigable landscape of competing facts and figures (Moore 2017, 129). The use of Russian internet trolls that planted fake stories and divisive rhetoric further exacerbated the information crisis of the campaign (“Russian Twitter Trolls Meddled” 2017).

The Fidesz party in Hungary used an aggressive campaign filled with exaggerations in order to convince citizens to vote “No” on the EU’s migrant relocation scheme. One poster read, “Did you know that Brussels wants to resettle illegal immigrants equivalent to the size of a Hungarian city?” This statement was untrue on two levels: firstly, the people being relocated were asylum applicants, not illegal immigrants; secondly, the migrant quota for Hungary was only 1,294 people--certainly not the size of a city. Fidesz also spoke of a secret government plan to settle tens of thousands of additional migrants in Hungary and distributed millions of pamphlets falsely claiming that immigration had created “no go zones” in London, Brussels, and Berlin.

The government further slanted public information regarding the referendum in Orban’s favor by spending exorbitant amounts of state funds on referendum coverage--over five times what Fidesz spent on its previous election campaign--through media outlets controlled by oligarchs allied with Orban (Mueller 2016). In short, in all three countries, voters were unequipped to make informed choices. The competency argument against direct democracy is valid in these cases, but the voters’ incompetence is not intrinsic; it is a result

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of a failure on the part of those providing the information.

Because governments called these referenda for purely political purposes and conducted them in volatile information environments, the implications of the end results were unclear. This lack of clarity allowed the ruling parties to interpret results for their own benefit and further undermine the democratic nature of the vote. In Greece, the government knew that the implications of a "Yes" would mean accepting the terms of the bailout.

Yet, they were utterly unprepared for a “No,” despite having campaigned for it. Firstly, the referendum had not specified what the implications of a “No” would be for Greek membership in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the referendum had not done anything to improve the government’s negotiating position or the deepening liquidity crisis. Given no clear pathway based on the referendum results, the Syriza government reversed its previous position and quickly negotiated a new bailout agreement that largely resembled the one that voters had rejected. This agreement came at an enormous cost to voters, the Greek economic situation worsening each day that went by. In their unwillingness to bear the political costs of accepting an earlier deal, the government prolonged their citizens’ suffering. Instead of proactively searching for solutions, they obstinately resisted negotiations with the Troika, placing their hopes in a referendum that would ultimately do nothing to boost their position (Triga 2017, 137).

In the case of Brexit, confusion was also rampant after the referendum.

The course of action following a “Remain” result would have been obvious.

Cameron would continue to lead the Conservative party with a renewed pro-EU mandate. When the referendum resulted in the decision to “Leave”, neither the people nor the government seemed to have considered what the process of leaving would entail and what sort of relationship with the EU they would negotiate. Following his failure with the vote, Prime Minister Cameron immediately stepped down. When Theresa May took his place, she appeased hard Brexiteers by making vague statements such as “Brexit means Brexit"; however, to this day, the terms of leaving the European Union continue to sharply divide British politicians. While Cameron called the referendum to enhance party unity, the results only generated increased division and uncertainty (Rose 2017, 118).

Post-referendum confusion occurred in Hungary as well. Despite the invalidity of the results due to low turnout, Fidesz called the referendum a

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success. Fueled by the mandate he perceived in the referendum results, Orban immediately announced plans to introduce a constitutional amendment forbidding the settlement of foreign citizens in Hungary. The opposition parties, on the other hand, declared the referendum a failure that only weakened Hungary’s negotiating position (Pallinger 166). All of these postreferendum crises reflect another issue with referenda at large: they are too binary (Colignatus 2017). Abjorensen (2017) explains, “The process requires [voters] to distill difficult and contested policy choices down to a simple yes or no, and determine by a simple majority the outcome of decisions so complex that even experts might spend years struggling to understand them.� Whereas a Parliament can carefully debate the implications of a proposal, when the people have to make decisions about complex policy matters, nuance is lost, and the implications of the vote are too ambiguous to evaluate. Hence, referenda fail to truly empower citizens, instead creating an uncertainty that allows leaders to use the results as a carte blanche to pursue their own political goals.

Not all referenda are incompatible with effective democracy. For example, Switzerland, among other countries, has a robust tradition of constitutionally-codified referenda that offers citizens consistent input on policies that affect their lives (Mendez 2017, 12). However, in the larger EU context, national leaders seeking a power boost can too easily weaponize referenda, and campaigns are too often mired in illegitimacy and dishonesty. These circumstances force voters to make a choice based on unreliable information, and they cannot use the referendum as a means to hold leaders accountable because those leaders design the vote to strengthen those in power. These themes in EU referenda interweave with the broader trends of majoritarian democracy and Euroscepticism that exist today in Europe. With citizen perceptions of the EU plummeting amid seemingly existential challenges, such as terrorism, migration, and the Eurozone crisis, citizen demand for democratic input is on the rise (Mendez 2017, 10). Thus, leaders can stoke anti-EU sentiment and harness it through referenda to enhance their own power under the guise of democratic legitimacy. For direct democracy to work for EU institutions, Brussels must forge new pathways for citizen input that encourage comprehensive voter education, deter partisan motivation, and allow for more nuanced policy outcomes.

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