The Wilson Journal of International Affairs - Spring 2020

Spring 2020

The Wilson Journal

Spring 2020

The Wilson

Journal of

International Affairs Spring 2020

Contents Editorial Staff

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Information

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From the Editor

Moriah Hendrick

The Effect of Historic Democratization Processes on the Implementation of Quota Systems in Japan and Korea: a Comparative Case

Andrea Eichenberger

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Shinzo Abe's Security Policy: Nationalist or Rationalist?

G. Vincient Arnold

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The Biggest Piece of Cake: Asymmetry and the Resolution of China's Border Disputes

Joshua Zabin

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Could the Canadian Point System Work in the United States?

Charlotte Roberts

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Hamas as a Social Movement

Maya Nir

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Discrepancies in Human Rights and Refugee Rights: Implications of Over-Militarization and Policing on Refugee Rights

Ramya Ravi

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Editorial Staff Editor-in-Chief

Moriah Hendrick

Co-Managing Editor and Media Manager

Landon Holben

Co-Managing Editor

Tristan Guarnieri

Production Chair

Manaal Khwaja

Program Corrdinator

Eleanor Thompson

Editing Staff

Griffin Asnis

Nicole Luz

Sukanya Barman

Emily Ma

Anna Bickley

Guy Pastrana

Matthew Heller

Catie Claire Smith

Jeanette Hosmer

Priya Viswanathan

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Information About the Wilson Journal The Wilson Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations.

The Wilson Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Wilson Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Wilson Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at wilsonjournal.org

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Wilson Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit.

Submissions should be sent to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com.

Contact Please direct all comments to thewilsonjournal@gmail.com

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From the Editor Dear Reader,

Ironically, this edition of the Wilson Journal of International Affairs appears in a global moment that it feels no amount of international affairs knowledge could have truly predicted. Six months ago, when I wrote my first Letter from the Editor, I discussed the critical presidential election that we now face, the rise of far-right political movements across the globe, the refugee crisis, and the threat of climate change to our collective future. Today we face those same issues while also navigating a global pandemic and the economic and social turmoil that it has wrought.

The world around us feels more fragile than ever, and in an increasingly virtual age, we must find new ways to fight off isolation and loneliness, new ways to navigate our collective trauma, and new ways to experience community.

When discussing the way that human flow is shaping our global society, we often say that it seems “the world is shrinking.� Though our international standing may seem shaken, and our collective future uncertain, our connection to our fellow human beings in all countries is more clear than ever before. For many of us in our college years, the COVID-19 crisis is the first time that we have experienced a truly global event - something that can stop most of the nearly-8-billion of us in our tracks. And Coronavirus is not the only force that has made the world shift in these past months. In the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder by police, protests against racism and police brutality have erupted, and continue to erupt, across not only the nation but the globe. Who could have predicted that the brutal killing of a Black man in Minneapolis, MN would lead to the Belgian government disavowing - for the first time their King Leopold II for his violent and destructive rule over the Congo?

The conversation about the value of Black life, in America and throughout the world, has required many to acknowledge that complacency must be abandoned in favor of proactively anti-racist efforts.

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In this moment of change, as our systems in all of their fragility and injustice are being reimagined like never before, we are cognizant of our connection to one another not only through sickness and injustice but also in our desire to shape a better future. This commitment to a new kind of world is what has given us the ability not only to look forward, but to look behind us; to consider the history of global and national injustice that has contributed to who and what we are today. This publication is not exempt from such accountability, and will be moving forward in the process of renaming the Journal to better honor the values of equity and justice that we believe are essential to understanding the world around us - values that were so callously disregarded by our current namesake.

I’m proud to leave the Journal in the hands of an immensely capable staff, and an executive board whose brilliant, empathetic vision will lead it to even greater progress. The Journal could not exist without the ongoing support of the University of Virginia community, the International Relations Organization, and all of the authors who submit their research for publication each year. On behalf of this editorial team and our authors - thank you for taking the time to read and value this work.

Sincerely,

Moriah Hendrick Editor-in-Chief

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The Effect of Historic Democratization Processes​on the Implementation of Quota Systems in​Japan and South Korea: A Comparative Case

By Andrea Eichenberger

About the Author

Andrea Eichenberger is a 3rd year Foreign Affairs major from Richmond, Virginia. She's also a Latin American Studies minor with a particular interest in the northern triangle region. She has taken Spanish and now is learning Portuguese. While Latin America is her specialization, she loves learning about politics globally. An area of interest for her is women's rights, hence the topic of this paper. Currently, she is a virtual intern with the Department of State. In the future, she will attend the Batten School to gain an Accelerated Master of Public Policy degree. She hopes to have a career in foreign policy analysis.

Foreword

How exciting that the Wilson Journal has chosen to publish Andrea Eichenberger’s paper, comparing how debates on whether to introduce gender quotas into the electoral rules of Japan and South Korea led to very different outcomes. Ms. Eichenberger’s paper was submitted to fulfill the requirement that all students in my 3000-level course on Japanese Politics write a 10 to 12-page research paper on an issue in contemporary Japanese politics. The topic of “women and politics” was one of 18 from which students were asked to choose, and Andrea eagerly chose this one because she

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was simultaneously exploring the topic of gender politics in a comparative context in a course with Denise Walsh. Andrea and her partner met with me early in the term to discuss their ideas for how to divide up the topic and what research materials to use. They then delivered a joint oral presentation in late October, engaging with questions from the student audience that helped each of them hone how they approached their further research and writing of their (separate) papers. Workshopping ideas for a paper with peers, I have found, is a great way for students to test out the hypotheses and evidence they have assembled and see what aspects of a topic most interest their audience and where their audience would like to see more data or details.

Andrea did an excellent job researching how gender quotas were considered and incorporated (or not) in two neighboring countries. Much of the story has unfolded only in the last few years, so she did not have many secondary sources to draw on and had to dig to find the information she gathered. The assignment did not require students to compare two countries, but Andrea’s decision to do that in her paper helped her identify why the Japanese story unfolded as it did, by looking at what happened in Korea that did not happen in Japan. The paper was already strong when I saw it, with a great introduction, clear organizational structure, and sustained focus on answering the main question posed at the start of the paper. It is even stronger with the editing work she put in before submitting it to the Wilson Journal. I won’t give away the ending, so please read to learn which country went further with gender quotas, and why.

Leonard J. Schoppa Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics University of Virginia Abstract

East Asian democracies have become some of the most developed nations in the world, with robust economies and progressive policies.

However, Japan surprisingly remains in last place when it comes to one important marker of progress. Japan has consistently ranked last out of OECD countries for its proportion of female representation in the national legislature, called the Diet in Japan. Even compared to regional powers

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like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has significantly fewer women in politics. This research paper looks to determine why Japan lags behind other countries around the globe in this area of development. To help examine root causes, South Korea will serve as a comparative case study.

More specifically, this paper will investigate what historical and political factors have led to the development of a gender quota system in South Korea but have stopped Japan from developing one. I find that in Japan, a weak women’s movement, weak opposition parties, and cultural barriers are reasons why the government has not implemented an official voluntary or binding quota system. These institutional and cultural problems ultimately stem from Japan’s historically minimal experience with popular mobilization. Japan’s major transitional periods have always been marked by top-down reformations. Comparatively, South Korea has had extensive experience with popular protests and a strong women’s movement, which campaigned heavily for the adoption of policies like the gender quota in politics. I conclude that if Japan hopes to bolster their gender equity in politics any time in the near future, the Japanese Prime Minister and cabinet will need to take a top-down approach once more to achieve their goals.

Introduction

Japan is one of the most developed countries in the world, as denoted by its membership in the G7 countries. It has one of the largest GDPs and innovative industries. However, it lags behind other countries in a major way: it often ranks at the bottom of lists when it comes to women’s representation in national politics. As of 2018, Japan only had 10% representation in the Diet (World Bank Group, n.d.). Japan must solve this problem because not only is it a failure for a representative democracy to so clearly under-represent a large portion of the population, but also many urgent issues go unaddressed by the older male parliament members that female representatives may be able to bring to the table and address more effectively. In this paper, South Korea will serve as a comparative case study; the country is similar geographically, culturally, and historically but has taken a more hands-on approach and has a legislated quota system, resulting in 18% female representation in the national legislature as of 2018 (World Bank Group, n.d.). This number still falls below the international average of 23%, but it is still higher than Japan’s. That is why this research

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paper looks to investigate the historical and political factors that have led to the development of a quota system in South Korea but stopped Japan from developing one. To examine this problem, I will review the historical backgrounds of women in Japan and South Korea, then the trends in representation data for each, analyze the results, and finally come to a conclusion as to what the key differences between the countries are.

Background: Japan

Formal democratization occurred in Japan after their unconditional surrender to the United States, which began the US occupation of the country. American reforms removed the emperor as the leader of the country, and a delegation from the US rejected the rewritten Japanese constitution presented to them in favor of a much more progressive one written by themselves. The new constitution included the process for electing prime ministers, and allowed the Diet more power to check the powers of the national leader. Experts consider the first wave of feminism in Japan to have occurred in this postwar period, with the formation of several new national women’s groups and the negotiations over a new Japanese constitution (Buckley 151). Women took advantage of this time to negotiate the inclusion of as many rights as possible. However, by the 1950s, the various movements had split between goals relating to motherhood or work (Gelb et al. 1994, 153).

The 1960s marked the start of Japan’s rapid industrial growth and with it, the integration of women into the workplace. Though the administration did not outwardly state it, working women and mothers were integral to Japan’s economic success (Gelb et al. 1994, 155). Unfortunately, the government failed to provide sufficient infrastructure and resources to support the transition of mothers into the workplace while they maintained the full burden of homemaking and childcare. Because of this, the public blamed women for not being able to take on both roles, and the government was not pressured enough to make substantial reforms. Childcare services henceforth are targeted only at part-time jobs, closing career tracks to women.

Buckley claims a new generation of feminism began in 1970 as women’s priorities shifted following the Vietnam War. During this time period, the organization of women’s movements continued to

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remain decentralized and loosely linked to maintain independence from government oversight (Gelb et al. 1994, 158). However, all the groups were in close contact and were willing to largely mobilize on one issue at a time. Through the 1970s, some of the most prominent women’s groups had lobbying success but not on issues typically considered to be gendered.

These selective successes demonstrate that these groups did have power, but were picky about what they used it for. Nevertheless, by the 1980s, women’s mobilization networks began securing victories more relevant to women, such as gendered worker protections and childcare. Japanese women’s mobilization and successes have remained largely focused around workplace equality and family protections.

In the 1990s, a coalition of parties was able to win control of the Diet from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the first time, allowing them to focus on election reforms. These election reforms both helped and hurt women’s participation in the electoral system. They reduced the influence of exclusive institutions such as factions and koenkai, but there are still adverse effects from the PR-list system that these reforms introduced.

The viability of female candidates depends heavily on their placement in the PR list (Luhiste 2015, 90). This led to another notable development for women in politics, which was Prime Minister Koizumi’s groundbreaking campaign and election. Koizumi disrupted political norms by running as a new face of the LDP party, representing change and fresh policies in 2001.

As part of his campaign strategy, Koizumi personally selected several female “assassin” politicians to run at the top of several PR-list districts to signal his new, fresh way of doing politics. However, this move was largely symbolic, as women in Japanese politics represent a lack of corruption (Gaunder 2015, 181). Following this move, women did not remain part of the Diet at elevated levels, and Koizumi did not make any noticeable efforts to strengthen women’s continued participation in politics.

Change came again not long after in 2009, in a surprising victory when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control of the Diet and the Prime Minister selection. While the DPJ also ran many women as part of their election platform, and there was an increase in female representation, the party neglected to institutionalize it, as it was assumed the system worked properly, and the representation levels would continue to grow unaided. The DPJ’s victory was short-lived, however, and soon the LDP

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took control of the government again. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has since led the party and the country. He has opted for voluntary measures during his leadership. Abe set his goal for female representation at 30%, the United Nations standard, by 2020 (Gaunder 2015, 176). The UN chose the 30% benchmark because experts widely regard it as the percentage at which female representation can begin to make a noticeable impact on policy and diversity of perspective. With less than one month to go on that deadline and only a third of the way there, it is an unlikely reality.

Background: South Korea

South Korea has a different history than Japan in many ways, but one major way is that their transition to democracy came later, and notably, from significant bottom-up reforms like coups, protests, and citizen-lead initiatives. Industrialization in South Korea marks the beginning of their modernization, as well as the beginning of many intersectional class and gender-based protests.

South Korea’s transition to democracy started after the Japanese occupation ended following the conclusion of World War II. However, at this point in time, the northern and southern parts of the peninsula remained deeply divided. Tensions continued to rise and this led to the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953. Following the Korean War, South Korea officially became a separate country, but the original democratically elected president acted more like an authoritarian ruler. In 1960, there were major protests against the regime and corruption in the government, which led to the president’s resignation and a new national assembly system. The following year was unstable politically until a military coup changed the head of state. In 1963, South Korea elected the general of the coup president. President Park initiated aggressive policies of industrialization that awakened the class consciousness in many workers while simultaneously launching South Korea to the forefront of the global economy. This formerly democratically elected leader also pushed the boundaries of his presidency into autocracy until his eventual assassination in 1979. One coup later and another despotic leader controlled South Korea until he was also deposed following further protests in 1987. From this point on, South Korea has seen several other elected leaders that finally remained more democratic than authoritarian (Korean Culture and

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Information Service, n.d.).

Throughout this tumultuous time, women’s movements played a major role in the organization and fight for national recognition. During the 1970s, female factory workers organized on the basis of gender and class as part of the Minjung movement (Louie 1995, 419). The dictatorial government heavily suppressed their efforts, so they had little success.

However, these protests laid the groundwork for larger-scale mobilization that coincided with the broader fight for democracy in 1985 and on.

Factory worker protests morphed into battles with the police. One of the largest issues women mobilized around was sexual violence, as violence against women and sexual assault persisted in the country at some of the highest levels in the world (Louie 1995, 420). Ultimately, this resistance paid off, and organizations were allowed input into the democratizing state. Currently, South Korea has legislated quota systems in the National Assembly and at the sub-national level, as well as a voluntary political party quota adopted by the Grand National Party. Their constitution and electoral laws facilitated the legislation of these quotas (International IDEA, n.d.).

Women played a pivotal role in their adoption; Tan explains:

As for South Korea, Jiso Yoon and Ki-Young Shin contend that the

local feminist organizations were at the forefront of a powerful

grassroots movement that successfully lobbied for

the adoption of candidate quotas at the national and party levels.

Unlike the [ Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan], South Korean feminist

groups overcame ideological and partisan differences to form a

large alliance, which also developed education programs to recruit

and train women candidates (Tan 2015, 172).

Despite many failures, South Korean women were ultimately able to mobilize on a large enough scale to affect changes, unlike in Japan, where women’s organizations remained ununified and ineffective. South Korean women’s lobbying groups had several battles to get to where they are today: initially, parties agreed to adopt 30% candidate quotas, but this rule was voluntary and ineffective. They continued lobbying and obtained legislated quotas of 30% for both single-member districts and PR lists. However, there was still little change because the legislation did not specify a punishment for noncompliance. Finally, women pushed for an increase of up to 50% for PR lists, and female representation doubled (Yoon 2015, 189). South Korea

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currently has about the same amount of female representation in its national legislature as the United States.

Data

In order to visualize the effects of various historical events and policy impacts outlined in the background sections, it is useful to refer to graphs of the female participation in national government over time for the two countries. Below is a graph from the World Bank Group depicting the percentage of seats women have held in the national parliaments of Japan and South Korea from 1990 to 2018, with a break from 1991 to 1997.

Beginning by looking just at the Japanese trend line, it’s clear that although the trend of the last 20 years is growth, it has been incremental at best and wildly variable. Around the time of Koizumi’s reelection, the percentage of representation grows, but then it quickly flattens out. In 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan took control, Japanese representation peaks at its all-time high of 11% but then quickly falls again as the DPJ

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loses control. In the past decade, during Abe’s time in office, growth has largely flatlined, fluctuating by only 2%. Although overall there has been some growth, it has been mild at best, disproving the general consensus in Japan that the problem “will solve itself ” following increased elections of women.

In comparison, South Korea has seen a clear impact following the 2004 adoption of quota laws. In 2000, there was a rise in both countries, probably as a result of new millennium development goals. Yet, even then, Japan still had higher levels than South Korea. However, as soon as the quota system went into effect in 2004, South Korea skyrockets from 6% to13%, well above Japan’s 7%. While Japan’s increases have been rocky and incremental, South Korea has seen steady growth in its numbers since 2004, with only one year in which the percentage declined instead of grew. Though South Korea can still improve from 18%, its trend line supports the rapid changes and steady growth even a moderate quota system can have.

Analysis

South Korea’s quota successes are large in comparison to Japan, but on a global scale, they appear modest. Yoon and Shin explain that while the quota system has had some success, particularly for the PR list seats, these seats only comprise 18% of the total Korean parliamentary seats, and parties are not complying with the 30% requirement for singlemember district nominations. Additionally, parties use the quota systems as an excuse to avoid providing much-needed party support, funding, and training to female candidates which would “…improve women’s longterm political participation” (Yoon 2015, 191). Male party leaders oppose increased enforcement of SMD requirements as they want to protect their own incumbent elections (Lee 2019, 27). To combat these institutional flaws, “women’s groups are now calling for party-level measures to assist women nominees and candidates. Similarly, they are also advocating for the adoption of legal sanctions to punish parties for noncompliance with gender quotas in the SMDs” (Yoon 2015, 193). While there are still clear barriers to women’s political participation in South Korea, overall, women’s groups have accomplished major successes for the country by effectively mobilizing across ideological divides in order to enact their demands. Overall, the first step to increased women’s participation, the legislation of a semi-effective

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quota system, is present. Women’s groups are working hard on the second step of reducing institutional and party barriers from the paths of female politicians.

Meanwhile, Japan has failed to take the first step of implementing any kind of quota system, even a voluntary party one. Gaunder hypothesizes that the main reasons for this failure are weak domestic women’s movements and weak political opposition parties to the LDP (2015, 181). It is clear that the strong, unified women’s movement in South Korea directly influenced many of the gender equality provisions in the current government. Japan lacks any movement of this kind; instead, women’s groups are fragmented and have failed to unify across ideological divides, leaving them ineffective.

Additionally, in South Korea, the new democratic system worked and with parties alternating power, allowing for more competition in the elections (Yoon 2015, 186). This electoral competition encourages parties to put pressure on each other to include women, unlike in Japan, where even after post-election reforms, the LDP remains the biggest party by far. The LDP’s size makes it somewhat immune to competitive party pressure, supporting Gaunder’s theory. However, she leaves out an important third variable to women’s lack of participation: the cultural and societal barriers Japanese women face. Cultural barriers include aspects of Japanese society that prevent women from having equal access to the political system as men, including access to childcare, the male-oriented lifetime job protections, and a general sense of apathy from the public on many aspects of political gender equality. These political-economic institutions have made Japan a difficult environment for women to both run for office and mobilize against problematic policies.

It is clear that the strong, unified

women’s movement in South Korea directly influenced many of the gender equality provisions in the current government. Japan lacks any movement of this kind; instead,women’s groups are fragmented and have failed to unify across ideological divides,

leaving them ineffective.

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I argue the reason for the little mobilization around women’s issues, in particular the implementation of a quota system, is due to Japan’s lack of experience mobilizing major grassroots movements. In Korea, both women’s and grassroots movements were strong and common, so South Koreans had more of a basis off which to effect change. The processes through which Japan modernized and democratized have all been very top-down approaches, with the rare exception of protests such as those surrounding workers reforms in the 1970s. Even then, the LDP implemented new programs in order to maintain power, thus preventing a bottom-up restructuring of the system. Even in the Meiji Restoration, US imperialism triggered and the oligarchic system carried out reforms. In terms of large-scale systematic reforms, a popular movement has never led one in Japan. Japan has never experienced a revolution or a successful attempt to overthrow the current government lead by the citizens.

A major factor that plays into many theories about mobilization surrounding women’s rights is the significance of a regime-type change. Lisa Baldez argues that in order for women to have access to all the necessary conditions to mobilize on a large scale on the basis of gender, they must be excluded from the agenda-setting process during the transition to a new regime type, typically in the form of democratization. Japan was unable to mobilize against the exclusion of essentially all Japanese participation in the new government agenda-setting due to the consequences of their unconditional surrender following World War II. Another article argues that in order for society to become more gender equitable following a democratic transition, there must be a “combined presence of four specific characteristics--a complete transition, a cohesive coalition within the women’s movement, a transitional ideology that aligns easily with feminist frames, and a legacy of women’s activism that legitimates present-day feminist demands” (Viterna and Fallon 2008, 131). Japan also failed to meet some of these variables as a result of the tightly controlled constitutional revision which further prevented Japanese women from mobilizing in favor of a quota system or any other goal. These theories explain the low democratic representation of women in the Diet, while also supporting why South Korean women were successful in their broader gender-based mobilization.

Because of Japan’s political history, there has never been a true

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opportunity for grassroots women’s movements to significantly influence government policies during a transitional period. Japanese women have not been able to have a voice in the shaping of the Japanese political system because Japan has a unique history with the United States occupation and mandated democratization. Since a small team from the United States wrote the entire Japanese constitution with little input from Japanese citizens, female or otherwise, it would have been impossible for them to acknowledge the primary concerns of local women, despite the effort to include some gender equity such as the right to vote and work. Since this forced democratic transition, Japanese women have still remained locked out of policymaking, since it is notoriously difficult to amend the constitution and they represent so little of the law-creating upper house.

Conclusion

The main historical political factors that explain why Japan has not adopted a formal quota system, whereas South Korea has, can be explained through their different histories surrounding democratization.

In Japan, a weak women’s movement, weak opposition parties, and cultural barriers can explain why the government has not implemented an official voluntary or binding quota system. All of these features can be traced back to Japan’s very top-down history of reformation.

Comparatively, South Korea also had a history of occupation, but following World War II and the Korean War, citizens had the opportunity to protest against the new government and shape the transition to formal democracy from the bottom up with their own input.

Japan should implement some kind of binding requirement if they legitimately want to solve the low representation problem. As previously established, this reform should be something they do for the sake of representative democracy and the progress of the country. This will lead to Japan becoming a more effective government that addresses the concerns of more citizens. However, not all quotas are equally effective. If Japan is truly interested in a rapid increase in representation, they should implement a “zipper system” quota and 50% nomination requirement like South Korea has for their PR list districts, which has been effective in South Korea and would have an even greater impact on Japanese politics since PR list seats account for 36% of the Diet

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(Yoon 2015, 181). It is possible, however, that even just a voluntary party quota, if adopted by the LDP, could make a notable difference in female representation since the LDP has such a large majority in the Diet.

However, it’s also very possible that it will still take years for Japan to reach its target goal as has been the case with other countries.

It is important to note that while a quota system of some kind is the necessary first step to increasing representation, there are weaknesses to the system as shown by South Korea. Quotas must be accompanied by other reforms that address more of the root causes of low participation rates. Unfortunately, due to the weak state of opposition parties, domestic women’s movements, and institutions such as lifetime career protections, it is unlikely that the Japanese government will implement any kind of solutions soon unless top-down international pressure increases significantly.

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Bibliography Baldez, Lisa. 2003. "Women's Movements and Democratic Transition In

Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland." Comparative Politics 35

(3): 253–272.

Gaunder, Alisa. 2015. “Quota Nonadoption in Japan: The Role of the

Women's Movement and the Opposition.” Politics & Gender 11 (1):

176–186. doi:10.1017/S1743923X1400066X. Gelb, Joyce, et al. 1994. Women of Japan and Korea: Continuity and

Change. Temple University Press.

International IDEA. n.d. “Gender Quota Database: Republic of

Korea.” Accessed Nov. 25, 2019. www.idea.int/data-tools/data/ gender-quotas/country-view/163/35.

“Korean Culture and Information Service. n.d. “Transition to a Democracy

and Transformation into an Economic Powerhouse.” KOREA.

net. www.korea.net/AboutKorea/History/Transition-Democracy- Transformation-Economic-Powerhouse.

Lee, Young-Im. 2019. “The Leaky Pipeline and Sacrificial Lambs: Gender,

Candidate Nomination, and District Assignment in South Korea’s

National Legislative Elections.” Electoral Studies 59: 27–38. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.02.004.

Louie, Miriam Ching Yoon. 1995. "'Minjung' Feminism: Korean

Women's Movement for Gender and Class Liberation." Women's

Studies International Forum 18 (4): 417–-430.

Luhiste, Maarja. 2015."Party Gatekeepers' Support for Viable Female

Candidacy In PR-List Systems." Politics & Gender 11 (1): 89-–116.

Tan, Netina. 2015. "Introduction: Quotas and Non-Quota Strategies In

East Asia." Politics & Gender 11 (1): 171–175.

Viterna, Jocelyn, and Kathleen M. Fallon. 2008. "Democratization,

Women's Movements, and Gender-Equitable States: A Framework

for Comparison." American Sociological Review 73 (4): 668–89. www.jstor.org/stable/25472549.

World Bank Group. n.d. “Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National

Parliaments (%).” World Bank Open Data. data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS. Yoon, Jiso, and Ki-young Shin. 2015. “Mixed Effects of Legislative

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Quotas in South Korea.” Politics & Gender 11 (1): 186–195. doi:10.1017/S1743923X14000658.

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Shinzo Abe's Security Policy: Nationalist or Rationalist?

By G Vincient Arnold

About the Author

Vincient Arnold is a recent graduate of the class of 2020 who earned his BA with distinction in Foreign Affairs in the Politics Distinguished Majors Program, in which his research focused on Japan and East Asia.

His research interests include East Asian politics, Japanese politics, and comparative politics. Upon entering the College of Arts and Sciences, he began studying the Japanese language and traveled to the city of Nagoya for a language-intensive program in the summer of his third year. Vincient works at an international law firm in the DC area and hopes to continue his study of politics in graduate school, eventually hoping to earn a terminal degree.

Foreword

I was excited to learn that the Wilson Journal has chosen to publish G. Vincient Arnold’s paper on Japanese security policy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Mr. Arnold’s paper was submitted to fulfill the requirement that all students in my 3000-level course on Japanese Politics write a 10 to 12-page research paper on an issue in contemporary Japanese politics. He was already working with me on a distinguished majors thesis on the evolution of Japanese security policy over a longer time span, so I was not surprised that he opted to write a shorter, more focused paper on the most recent developments for this class assignment. Graduate students are frequently advised to carve out a chapter from their dissertations to present at conferences or submit for publication in a journal, while they are still working on the bigger project, because this multiplies the opportunities they have to get feedback from conference audiences and journal editors. Mr. Arnold was able to compress this experience into a single academic year by

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writing this paper in the fall before incorporating some of the material into the larger senior thesis project (that is still in progress) in the spring. He received feedback from students when he made an oral presentation to them based on the paper near the end of term, and he got additional feedback from me that he could incorporate into the larger project.

Vincient read several books published in the period since Prime Minister Abe came into office in 2012, seeking to interpret what he is doing and where he is leading the country. As he notes in the title, these books offer a lively debate on whether Abe’s recent moves should be seen as “nationalist or rationalist.” Abe has broadened the discretion Japan has to act in “collective self-defense” under Article IX and then taken on roles and missions—such as deploying the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to join the American Seventh Fleet in sailing through disputed waters of the South China Sea in May 2017. These might be explained by pointing to developments in Japan’s security environment, but Abe has been known throughout his career as an avid nationalist, eager to revise the constitution and grow Japan’s military roles, so both explanations are plausible. I won’t give away how Vincient parses the debate, so please read to learn which of the two explanations he favors, and why.

Leonard J. Schoppa Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics University of Virginia Abstract

In this essay, I argue that Shinzo Abe’s security policies are the result of calculated responses to increasing regional threats and fear of American abandonment rather than of nationalistic bravado. I argue that there are three primary reasons for this: First, many of his most notable security policies have been aimed at shoring up Japan’s defensive capabilities in order to anchor the US-Japan security alliance. Second, even the most assertive of Mr. Abe’s policies—including those not explicitly aimed at pacifying the US—represent continuities in policies addressing Japan’s security dilemma.

Third, Mr. Abe’s supposedly nationalistic behavior has been markedly reserved, given a few exceptions. I Mr. Abe’s security policies are more assertive than those of the recent past—and it is unclear that all of them

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are—it is mostly because Japan sits in a more dangerous environment with increasingly unstable protection, not because Mr. Abe is an impassioned nationalist.

Introduction: Legacy and Ghosts of the Past

During the American Occupation of Japan, Nobusuke Kishi was imprisoned at Sugamo prison in Tokyo for Class A war crimes during his time as ‘Economic Manager’ of Manchukuo, Japan’s imperial puppet state in Manchuria. Upon his release and reintegration into Japanese politics, his goal was to normalize Japan’s military, saying, “If Japan is alone in renouncing war, . . . she will not be able to prevent others from invading her land. If, on the other hand, Japan could defend herself, there would be no further need of keeping United States garrison forces in Japan . . .. Japan should be strong enough to defend herself ” (Samuels 2001).

His grandson, Shinzo Abe, has followed the family legacy of becoming a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician who avers the necessity of revising Article IX of the Japanese constitution (the ‘Peace Clause’). Abe has supported legislation to reinterpret Article IX as far as legally possible, proposed constitutional revision, increased military funding, and spoken strongly about Japan’s need for robust defensive capabilities. In a 2017 speech, echoing his grandfather’s concerns about Japan’s ability to protect itself, he stated, “It’s not an exaggeration to say our security environment is at its severest point ever since the end of the war…” (“In Key Policy Speech” 2017). Abe is known to be a revisionist nationalist, and observers are understandably quick to deride his security policies as nationalistic chestthumping.

This criticism, however, is not the full picture. I will argue that Abe’s security policies are a calculated response to increasing regional threats and fear of American abandonment rather than nationalistic bravado. First, many of his most notable security policies have been aimed at shoring up Japan’s defensive capabilities in order to anchor the US-Japan security alliance. Second, even the most assertive of Abe’s policies—including those not explicitly aimed at pacifying the US—represent continuities in policies addressing Japan’s security dilemma. These trends are balancing acts, in which Japan steps in to fill the gaps left by a receding US and responds to increasing hostile power. Third, Abe’s supposedly nationalistic

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behavior has been markedly reserved, given a few exceptions. While he may harbor revisionist sentiments, Abe the shrewd politician recognizes that such aspirations are unpopular in the Japanese public and that he lacks the electoral mandate to implement those policies. This is reflected in his security strategy, which has largely been constrained to pragmatic responses to threats and shifts in the balance of power.

Separation Anxiety: Anchoring the US-Japan Security Relationship

Abe’s security policy decisions have been emblematic of bilateral power balancing policies with the US, not a broadly nationalistic policy.

Whereas an ideologically-motivated, jingoistic security policy would be expected to result in a broad military buildup and provocation of regional adversaries, Abe’s policies have not displayed such characteristics. In fact, Abe’s security policy choices have reflected classical realist balancing behavior, in which a nation balances its military powers with those of its neighbors and adversaries to maintain an equilibrium. Stephen Walt describes the phenomenon within the context of alliances, noting that when a smaller state is threatened by a larger state and cannot balance that threat by themselves, it may turn to a friendly large state and become allies, in order to de facto balance its collective security (Walt, 1985).

Jennifer Lind adopts this theory and applies it specifically to the case of Japan. She argues that if Japan’s security policy is an example of realist power balancing, then Japan should only increase its military power when its security guarantor—the US—fails to respond to a threat (Lind 2004, 92-121). She finds historical evidence for this claim, showing that Japanese military buildups occurred in the 1970s, when the Soviet threat in the Far East became much more significant as the US was removing troops there when the US reoriented its focus to the Middle East, and when it failed to respond sufficiently to the threat posed by North Korea. Abe’s security policies reflect a similar behavior.

Consider what is perhaps Abe’s most aggressive and significant security policy change: the 2014 cabinet decision to reinterpret Article IX to allow for collective defense, and the subsequent 2015 “Peace and Security Legislation” solidifying that decision. This legislation allows Japan to act in collective defense with the US or other allies under certain conditions (namely, when Japan’s national security is threatened). While

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these legal moves were considered some of the most notable changes to the constitution under the Abe Administration, and perhaps in the post-Cold War era, many scholars consider it to be a rational response to concerns of US abandonment. In other words, Abe pushed this change to reassure Washington that Tokyo is a worthwhile partner. Sheila Smith writes, “The Abe cabinet’s decision to reinterpret the constitution to allow the right of collective self-defense was also seen as a means to improving the U.S.-Japan alliance at a time when Tokyo most needed Washington’s support,” (Smith 2019). While there were fears in the Diet ( Japan’s national legislature) and in the public about “entrapment”—that is, being pulled into an illadvised American war—Japanese legislatures felt that, given Trump’s ire towards alliances, Japan needed to prove that it could pull its own weight.

Adam Liff echoes this sentiment: “Despite widespread assertions that Abe is pursuing a “nationalist” agenda, the second of three core features of his government’s national security strategy has been to reinforce Japan’s alliance with Washington,” (Liff 2018, 9-34). Notably, in the first implementations of the 2015 legislation, the Japanese Self Defense Forces ( JSDF) escorted a US bomber in May 2017 and deployed the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) with the US Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea the following year (Smith 2019). That same law gave a JSDF peacekeeping operation in South Sudan more flexibility to defend civilians. Following the 2015 legislation, the US and Japan revised the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further signaling Japan’s willingness to act as a strong partner in the alliance. This bilateral agreement further integrated their new collective defense framework into the shared defense stratagem. In sum, it is clear that this legislation primarily sought to reassure the US that Japan was willing to play a more substantial role in the bilateral security relationship.

Realist in the Rough: Responses to a Changing Security Environment

Nonetheless, US-oriented legislation notwithstanding, the Abe administration has presided over significant improvements to Japan’s defense abilities. Some of the most notable Abe policy changes, in addition to the 2014 decision and 2015 legislation covered above include the 2013 creation of a National Security Council; a move to a “proactive pacifism” policy (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi), which implies force-projection and active defense; the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines that outline

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the JSDF’s commitment to protect outlying islands (ostensibly against Chinese incursions); the purchase of two Aegis Ashore batteries, landbased ballistic missile defense systems; and committing to purchase F-35B fighter jets from the US in order to turn the JS Izumo into an aircraft carrier of conventional standards (Gady 2019). While this is not an exhaustive list, these policies highlight Abe’s appetite for security renewal. However, such policies are frequently misinterpreted as norm-shattering symbols of resurgent nationalism.

While these policy changes represent a serious departure from the strict pacifism that once characterized Japanese military policy, they were not motivated by drum-beating nationalism. Rather, they were responses to greater threats in Japan’s surrounding security environment at a time when it is less clear that the US will sufficiently defend Japan. In other words, these changes were rational and expected upgrades to Japan’s defenses given its security position (à la Lind), regardless of who the prime minister was at the time. There are two primary reasons that such hard-nosed policies ought to be expected.

First, Japan’s security context is much more severe than it was at the end of the Cold War. China’s economic clout has been on a steep upwards trajectory, and its military power has risen with it. From building artificial islands in the South China Sea to christening its first aircraft carrier, passing increasingly frequently through the Miyako Strait (a strategicallyimportant international passageway, through which foreign militaries may pass), to engaging in increasingly hostile and frequent encounters with the Japanese Coast Guard off the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, China’s military might is more threatening than ever. In 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over the Sea of Japan, exposing the vulnerabilities of Japan’s territory to a missile strike. In 2017, the fear was renewed when a North Korean ballistic missile passed over the island of Hokkaido in Japan’s north, exposing Japan’s continued vulnerability to short-range missile threats, despite a more robust ballistic missile defense (BMD) system than it had in 1998 (“Japan is Alarmed and Outraged” 2017). In 2019, yet another missile test further illustrated the vulnerability of Japan’s defenses as the North Korean nuclear program made steady progress (Rich 2019). The effects of the missile tests go beyond the physical; the “North Korea threat” is psychologically pervasive. Concerns that the

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US will harm Japanese security in a rash deal with the North Koreans have further deepened anxieties in Tokyo over the costs of relying on the US.

Second, as the regional security environment grows direr, there is heightened concern over US abandonment. While the US focused on conflicts in the Middle East, it was unclear how much-continued interest it had in Japan. Japanese policy circles grew increasingly more anxious about the reliance of US assistance in a hypothetical ‘gray-zone’ conflict with China, such as the Senkaku Islands. Would the US risk life and limb for uninhabited islands? The election of President Donald Trump only exacerbated pre-existing Japanese anxieties about the US security guarantee, as he has reportedly suggested removing the US from the US-Japan Security Treaty and demanded Japan quadruple its financial contributions to US bases there ( Jacobs 2019; Seligman and Gramer 2019). Trump’s scrapping of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was seen by Japanese officials as a stabilizing and democratizing counterforce to China’s growing hegemony in the Pacific, shook Japanese faith in the US’s concern over China’s growing power and its interest in maintaining the liberal order that has protected Japan. Trump’s ire for alliances like NATO and his abandonment of the Kurds in Syria have sent clear messages to Japanese defense planners about the risks involved in placing complete trust in America.

Thus, while Abe’s upgrades to Japan’s security abilities may appear ‘nationalistic,’ they are completely rational according to realists like Lind, and such upgrades are expected from any prime minister given Japan’s security position in the changing environment.

Power Balancing: New Dog, Old Tricks

Insofar as Abe’s security policies have responded to Japan’s external security environment, they largely represent continuities of trends that predate his tenure in office. In other words, while his policies are bold, they are more precisely a product of long-standing policy trends than drivers of them. As Liff puts it, “Abe’s widely cited ‘ideology’ and ‘nationalism’ are acting, at most, as second-order drivers” (Liff 2018, 9-34).

First, consider the 2013 creation of a National Security Council, which can be interpreted as an institutionalization of national security within the cabinet. While this formalization of a ‘whole of government’ strategy to national security is an important milestone, it is far from an

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unprecedented nationalistic agenda item: the original Security Council was created in 1986 and the Ministry of Defense was only created in 2006 (which replaced the 1954 Defense Agency).

Second, Abe’s move to “proactive pacifism,” the idea of Japan playing a more assertive and autonomous role in global security despite its pacifism, can better be described as an evolution of an old idea rather than a novel creation. While Abe has coined the term, LDP leadership has attempted to play a more proactive and engaged role in security affairs, particularly through peacekeeping operations and training exercises with allies, since the Gulf War. Historically, the JSDF has behaved this way since the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which obliged Japan to defend sea lanes of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles off its coast. Moreover, shifting from a “U.S.-dependent” security policy to a more autonomous one in which Japan plays a role in ‘regionalism’ to counterbalance Chinese power has been a key policy point in the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) platform (Hughes 2012, 109-40).

The DPJ is widely considered to be the less nationalist of the two major parties. Indeed, the 2010 NDPG laid the groundwork for Abe’s “proactive pacifism,” outlining a new concept of “dynamic deterrence,” increasing pressures on the JSDF to actively upgrade its capabilities as the security environment evolves.

Third, strengthening the JSDF’s commitments to littoral defense against Chinese incursion (outlined in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines) may appear to be an aggressive turn in policy, emblematic of nationalist assertiveness. Once again, concern over Chinese activities in the outlying littoral areas of Japan has been growing since long before Abe’s tenure. As Andrew Oros points out in his book Japan’s Security Renaissance, Chinese threats are not new and extend beyond the Senkaku Islands. He highlights aggressive passes through the Tsugaru and Miyako

Mr. Abe’s move to “proactive

pacifism,” the idea of Japan playing a more assertive and autonomous role in global security despite its pacifism, can better be described as an evolution of an old idea rather than a novel creation.

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straits, Chinese helicopters buzzing MSDF vessels, Chinese vessels locking fire-control radar on Japanese vessels, and increasingly provocative defense planning from China including satellite attacks and desire for a blue water navy (Oros 2017). The 2010 NDPG (under DPJ Prime Minister Kan) highlighted Chinese aggression as a growing threat and underscored the likelihood of ‘gray zone’ conflict. In fact, it was under a DPJ government that Japan purchased three of the Senkaku Islands, sparking outrage in China. In other words, given the context of Japan’s security decline relative to China and growing concern over the US’s commitment to protecting Japanese assets, the continuation of a policy that bolsters littoral defense capabilities is far from unexpected and does not merit being considered as an outlier.

Fourth, the purchase of Aegis Ashore batteries is also a continuation of a long-term trend of strengthening Japan’s BMD system, begun in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the purchase of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) systems, as well as Aegis-enabled warships.

While Abe has strengthened Japan’s BMD system, this is to be expected considering its failure to sufficiently parry incoming threats from North Korea in the past. As North Korean and Chinese mid-range capabilities improve, one would expect Japan to upgrade in kind. While first-strike capability would be a major change, it has not evolved past hypothetical brainstorming.

Finally, the planned conversion of the JS Izumo into an aircraft carrier with F-35B fighter jets on deck represents the greatest departure from the norms of Japanese security policy evolution. Aircraft carriers are not defensive assets but rather are used for force projection; this change under Abe’s leadership stretches the definition of defense even farther, blurring the line between ‘proactive defense’ and ‘offensive capability.’

Nevertheless, this development may be overhyped. It is worth noting that the F-35B has a smaller fuel tank than most fighter platforms, thus significantly limiting its range. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that the JSDF does not have in-air refueling capabilities, thus rendering the future F-35B Izumo group to defensive and small-scale operations. Retired Vice Admiral Toshiyuki Ito has remarked that Japan would need at least four Izumo-like vessels to serve in any real naval combat operations and that the Izumo can only carry ten jets on deck, which is inadequate for defending

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a fleet. He suggests that the transformation of the Izumo is more “a message to China” than a practical tactical upgrade (“Japan’s Plan to Remodel Izumo-Class Carriers” 2019). In other words, while Abe’s plans to integrate F35-B jets onto the Izumo appears to be ambitious and a large departure from the strictly defense policy of the past, the purpose of the move is more likely a show of power to China than a truly offensive strike group like the US Seventh Fleet.

All things considered, Abe’s major security policies, upon further inspection, appear to fall into two camps: either anchors to the US-Japan security alliance or responses to its failings. These trends in Japanese security policy predate Abe, and it would, therefore, be misleading to classify them as results of a deeply conservative nationalism particular to him.

Proof by Omission: Abe's Nationalism in Greater Context

If one accepts the idea that Abe’s security policies are results of a passionate nationalism unlike his peers or predecessors, then one would expect to see such nationalism manifest itself not only in security policy but also in other political realms. At first glance, there appears to be sufficient evidence of this; a trip to Yasukuni Shrine and a trade war with South Korea, point to nationalism. However, Abe’s tenure has also overseen significantly fewer trips to Yasukuni than some prime ministers in the past and a commitment to upholding international rules and norms, including his personally taking the lead on the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP). He has shown considerable restraint over the Senkaku Island dispute and more broadly a warming of relations with China. His administration is much less focused on security policy issues in general in place of a pragmatic focus on the economy (Abenomics).

Abe has visited the Yasukuni Shrine, in a move that enraged both China and South Korea; Koizumi did so six times. Abe has shown significant restraint in deescalating the Senkaku Island dispute—which he inherited at an extraordinarily divisive point from the previous DPJ government—by not deploying any further personnel or pursuing construction on any of the islands (Mochizuki 2013, 25-41). Though Abe has achieved numerous security policy achievements, he learned from his first failure as Prime Minister to be more pragmatic -- most of his policies have since focused on reviving Japan’s sluggish economy. Instead

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of pandering to protectionist and nationalistic groups in his economic policies, he has focused on integrating women into the economy (though not particularly successfully) and solidifying the CPTPP to lower barriers to trade in the Pacific.

While Abe has escalated a trade row with South Korea, Japan’s escalations were retaliatory, not offensive. Despite increasing tariffs on South Korean goods and all but ending vital chemical exports to South Korea, Abe intends to rely on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle the dispute. Abe’s second term looks like a much more mature and tempered one than his first. This is unsurprising as his past failures have taught him a lesson about pragmatism and realpolitik.

Conclusion: Less Nationalist, More Rationalist

All things considered, it is unclear whether Abe’s security policy is emblematic of the extreme revisionist nationalism that it is so often portrayed as. This is not to say that Abe does not have revisionist, nationalistic, or even jingoistic aspirations; based on his writings in Toward a Beautiful Nation (utsukushii kuni e), and some of his interviews and speeches, it seems likely that he does. Though he may personally harbor those sentiments, there is little proof that his security policies are a wild departure from the eroding norms of Japanese pacifism. The reality is that Japan’s strict adherence to pacifism began to erode in the Cold War, and Abe has overseen a continuation of that trend. To be sure, Abe’s security policy changes have serious implications, not least of them being constitutional reinterpretations that have set precedent for future policies and vindicated past decisions that were once questioned. Nonetheless, if Abe’s security policies are more assertive than those of the recent past -- and it is unclear that all of them are—it is mostly because Japan sits in a more dangerous environment with increasingly unstable protection, not because Abe is an impassioned nationalist.

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Aircraft Carrier.” Accessed December 3, 2019. https://thediplomat. com/2018/12/japan-to-convert-izumo-class-into-f-35-carrying- aircraft-carrier/ Hughes, Christopher W. “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New

(but Failing) Grand Security Strategy: From ‘Reluctant Realism’

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or Evolutionary Shift?” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3

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The Biggest Piece of Cake: Asymmetry and the Resolution of China's Border Disputes

By Joshua Zabin About the Author

Josh Zabin, of Northern Virginia by way of Switzerland and Southeast Asia, is a recent graduate of the College, where he majored in History and Chinese. While at UVA, Josh was involved in the student newspaper and Persian Conversation Club, among other pursuits. He also interned with the US Mission to the UN and USAID Indonesia. In 2019, Josh spent a semester learning Persian in Tajikistan, where he also researched the Belt and Road initiative and how China has resolved its border disputes in Central Asia.

He will attend OCS in the fall in hopes of earning a commission in the US Marines, and ultimately seeks to join the State Department.

Foreword To most of us, Tajikistan is an exotic name that we might have a hard time placing on a map. To Joshua Zabin, Tajikistan is now a familiar place, a country that he has thoroughly explored thanks to a government language scholarship. He lived there with a family for seven months while intensively studying Persian, the language of Tajikistan. He has also taken four years of Chinese at UVA, so he is well prepared for the empirical focus of this article, the border negotiations between Tajikistan and China.

But how does an experience become an article? In my seminar “China and the World” we cover the general patterns and dynamics of China’s foreign policy. One of the basic facts about China is that it is larger than its neighbors. Its relationships have therefore been asymmetric, but has not meant that it could simply dominate the rest. As China reemerges as the Asian economic center its

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asymmetric relationships must be renegotiated rather than forced.

Josh saw Chinese military columns in Tajikistan displacing some of the Russian influence there. But as he argues, Tajikistan, despite its size and double economic dependency on China and Russia, was in a rather good bargaining position, one of “reversed asymmetry.” China needed the cooperation of smaller Central Asian countries like Tajikistan for the success of its grand plan of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Professor Brantly Womack Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics University of Virginia Abstract

When the Soviet Union fell, China and the fifteen former constituent states of the Soviet Union inherited those border disputes. Most were small ethno-republics that could no longer rely on collective economic and political support from the center which they had dependent upon. Yet those border disputes remained just as pressing, only that the balances of power had flipped in China’s favor. Traditional international relations theory dictates that as the more capable state, China should have been able to resolve said disputes on terms most favorable to itself. The SinoRussian border issue, the longest and most intractable dispute, was resolved without significant issue. But it took China another 20 years to resolve its other disputes with the former satellites. Resolution with the Central Asian republics took considerable time, effort and compromise. This apparent contradiction can be explained by an extension of asymmetry theory.

Introduction

Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, had described the Sino-Soviet relationship like a pair of swimming ducks: on the surface, the relationship appeared calm and cordial, but privately behind closed doors, tensions raged. Ties between the two Communist superpowers, formerly described as close as “lips and teeth,” deteriorated rapidly in the 1960s following disagreements over leadership in the worldwide Communist movement, CPSU support for the Guomindang in the Chinese Civil War, and extensive territorial disputes that were a

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legacy of 19th century Tsarist expansion in Central Asia and the Far East.

These disputes quickly escalated into a state of undeclared war, and border skirmishes broke out across the entirety of the vast Sino-Soviet frontier.

Swans among ducks may have been a better description: China, lacking a strong indigenous defense industry and reeling from the withdrawal of Soviet advisers and technicians, felt especially vulnerable to Soviet power in Central and East Asia. It feared a multi-fronted isolation from the Soviet Union and the United States, and that fact pushed it to partner with America to counter the Soviet threat. But even with American backing, the Sino-Soviet relationship remained decidedly asymmetric, with Soviet military and economic might vastly outpacing China’s own capabilities.

When the Soviet Union fell, China and the fifteen former constituent states of the Soviet Union inherited those border disputes. Most were small ethno-republics that could no longer rely on collective economic and political support from the center which they had previously depended upon. Hegemony had now flipped. Those border disputes remained just as pressing, only that the ball was now in China’s hands. The SinoRussian border issue, the longest and most intractable dispute, was resolved without significant issue. But it took China another 20 years to resolve its other disputes with the former satellites (the last being Tajikistan in 2011). Resolution with the Central Asian republics took considerable time, effort, and compromise – China had to dangle significant diplomatic sweeteners to come to any sort of agreement.

In other words, balances of power had shifted overnight, but realities on the ground had not. This quick turnaround provides an interesting window into the practical workings of Asymmetry Theory, which I will use to compare and contrast the resolution or – in the case of India – the failure to resolve China’s external border disputes. I seek to build on Womack’s work on asymmetry, which is defined as a theory that “acknowledges that a disparity of capacity and power between states creates real differences of perception and relative interest (Womack 351-66).”

Through this analysis, I hope to resolve the central paradox presented above: Why did the resolution of border disputes with China’s most powerful neighbor, Russia, occur so rapidly, and why did resolving disputes with China’s weaker neighbors require so much diplomatic wrangling? More broadly, I will explore what China’s experiences can teach about the practical

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applications of asymmetry and resolutions of border conflicts worldwide.

Some Important Points on Asymmetry

Asymmetry takes on many different forms in international relations.

Traditional international relations theory states that more powerful states have a greater capacity to exercise influence, and thus should be able to bully smaller states into submission to achieve their geopolitical aims. That “big fish eat little fish” mentality runs into practical roadblocks, as it ignores the obvious fact that international politics do not occur in a vacuum: if China bullies Vietnam into ceding a few specks of sand in the South China Sea, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other small states that border China will take notice, and China’s ability to get its way in future dealings with these countries will be curtailed. As such, relations between countries with extreme power imbalances do not necessarily reflect it as much as expected.

Second, asymmetric relations are not one bilateral relationship but two intersecting unilateral relationships. The concerns, aspirations, and importance of the Central Asian states’ relationships with China vastly differ from those of the Chinese. As Brantly Womack puts it, “each player is playing a different game, [and] each player interprets the behavior of the other in terms of its own game…and is often surprised by the actions of the other (Womack 9).” It is thus not surprising that in the case of Central Asia, asymmetric relations are characterized by deeply ingrained mistrust that inhibits the expansion of bilateral ties.

Third, and related to the concept of two sub-relationships, is the notion of exposure. Simply put, exposure relates to how vulnerable a unit feels to its surroundings. In the case of China and its neighbors, exposure is an omnipresent part of international relations. For the smaller state, China always looms large, as China will theoretically, based on absolute power, always have the upper hand in a conflict. In contrast, concerns of a smaller state rarely “intrude on the national consciousness” of a larger state in a deeply asymmetric relationship (Womack 9). Smaller states must walk a fine line between showing deference to their more powerful neighbors while not appearing to act as an appendage of that country.

China’s disproportionate size, economic prowess, and strong military suggest that asymmetry will remain an integral part of its relationships with developing states for the foreseeable future. China is well aware of this advantage: At the 2010 ASEAN Regional Defense Forum,

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then-Foreign Affairs Minister Yang Jiechi warned that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact (Lowsen).” Generally, asymmetric bilateral relationships benefit China, while multilateral forums where smaller nations can join forces to negate Chinese superiority do not. This is why China seeks to increase connectivity between itself and other nations – because more connections reinforce China’s position as the central hub of disparate geographic units, similar to spokes on a wheel (Womack 12-24). This “network of interlocking and self-reinforcing” bilateral partnerships and global engagements serve as a force multiplier for Chinese power and exacerbate the asymmetrical nature of already existing Chinese relationships (Eisenman, Heginbotham).

Generally, asymmetric

The Politics , Parameters, and History of Central Asia

Central Asia is a regional and historical anomaly.

Historically, Central Asia was a major power, sitting at the crossing point of China and Europe. The region boasted some of history’s most impressive civilizations in Bukhara, Samarqand, and the Mongol empire. However, for centuries, foreign policy circles dismissed it as an empty space between China and Europe. This was furthered by Central Asian nations who limited regional integration despite so many historical ties and a shared cultural heritage.

The economies of poor Central Asian states like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are far more dependent on the Russian economy than those of their neighbors. This is a legacy of the Soviet Era where the Soviets kept Central Asia dependent on Soviet transfers without encouraging development, providing the technological know-how to drive economic expansion. As Rumer noted five years after independence, the “depth and tempo of indigenous reform has likewise been anything but equal” across Central Asia (Rumer 6). To this day, 25 years later, nearly a third of Kyrgyz and Tajik GDP is composed of remittances from migrant workers in Russia--a figure that was significantly higher before the 2014-15 Russian financial crisis that

bilateral relationships benefit China, while multilateral forums where smaller nations can join forces to negate Chinese superiority do not.

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reduced the value of the ruble (World bank, Bhutia). This demonstrates the preeminent parameter that governs the Central Asian ecumene: diminishing reliance on Russia for economic growth and therefore political stability.

This economic dependence is not surprising, given the shared experience of Soviet rule. Economic asymmetry, despite China’s attempts to rebalance trade networks and re-center the regional economy around itself, will persist, even if the lure of the Russian economy is on the wane. The Central Asian states are caught between an old power, Russia, trying to preserve its influence, and China, a new power trying to assert itself as the gateway to Europe. The geopolitical power struggles in the region do not rise to the level of a “new Great Game,” as many commentators suggest, and regional governments loath being pawns of either power.

Today, Sino-Russian cooperation is based on what Thomas Sutter terms “common objectives and values, perceived vulnerabilities in the face of U.S. and Western pressures, and perceived opportunities for the two powers to expand their influence at the expense of U.S. and allied countries.” The asymmetrical strength of the Chinese economy, a mutual understanding of the past historical animosities that almost drove the two sides to war, and China’s unrelenting economic espionage limits the extent of potential bilateral cooperation. It is important to note that while the two countries may share the same geopolitical outlook, that in and of itself is not a strong predictor of a close relationship: research by Robert Sutter suggests that “notions of ideological affinity appear to be less powerful predictors of China’s choice of partners.” As always, China deals in partnerships, not alliances, which are fundamentally centered around shared goals an facilitate further cooperation. Partnerships do not, however, “obligate one or more of the signatories to use force,” as Robert Osgood defines of an alliance, and thus places fewer constraints on how a state must conduct itself internationally (Wilkins 53-76).

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Central Asia still relied on Russian forces to maintain regional stability, a responsibility Russia was eager to preserve as it protected Russian hegemony in the region. This commitment has taken many forms, such as intervention in the Tajik Civil War and managing the porous Tajik-Afghan border, which Russia sees as a thin “bulwark against the chaos of Afghanistan (Putz).” However, the extent of Russia’s economic and military asymmetric advantage over China is

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declining; though, the Russian security still holds – or at the most has reached parity. Russian forces no longer guard Tajikistan’s southern border alongside Afghanistan, with Chinese frontier units taking their place. The regional integration of China works better for Central Asian economies as well: if you can get an item to Kashgar, you can get it to Beijing, Guangzhou, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Central Asia may look towards China as the key to unlock economic prosperity, but its fortunes are still very much tied up with Russia, its former colonial master and power hub during the Soviet years.

Thus, Central Asian countries are situated in an undefined political and economic dilemma that I call double asymmetry.” Very few countries find themselves completely dependent on two rival powers for security and economic prosperity. Therefore, it would be logical to infer that in such an extreme case of asymmetry, those countries are pawns in a larger geopolitical competition, but in fact the opposite is more often true. Central Asia’s geographic location, ethnic makeup, and natural resources create a unique dynamic where two asymmetrically advantaged powers covet control, and, therefore, if the asymmetrically disadvantaged states skillfully conduct diplomacy, asymmetry should actually flip. The two powers create parity, or near parity, and smaller states can leverage that parity to create favorable outcomes for themselves by playing the larger parties off of each other. A historical example of this would be how China manipulated the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States to create a more favorable international environment.

Womack, the primary proponent of Asymmetry Theory, suggests that: In sum, asymmetric parity implies a long‐term relationship rather than a climax of hegemonic confrontation. If China cannot become the United States, then its relative gain may be inconvenient and distressing to the United States, but not threatening (Womack 1463-80).

Going one step further than Womack’s original theory, I suggest that asymmetry can flip, creating a new “Reversed Asymmetry” model. Two conditions must exist for Reversed Asymmetry to occur. First, the asymmetric relationship must be extremely asymmetrical. Deng-era China and the United States enjoyed this type of asymmetry. Today, China and America are too close to parity for Reversed Asymmetry to occur—even if the Sino-American relationship is still asymmetrical.

Second, the disadvantaged power must possess something of value that

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is highly coveted by the advantaged power. This could be something as abstract as improved relations with the disadvantaged power. Third, it helps when two advantaged powers want whatever the smaller state possesses, although this condition is not imperative for Reversed Asymmetry to occur. Using this model, I will resolve the paradox presented earlier: why did the resolution of border disputes with China’s most powerful neighbor occur so quickly, and why did resolving disputes with China’s weaker neighbors require so much diplomatic wrangling?

The Thickest Piece of Cake: China and Resolving Central Asian Border Disputes

The problem with territorial disputes is that territory forms an imagined body of a community and so any compromise is seen as amputation.

But how do you split a foot in two?

For China, the strategic value of Central Asia is clear: it is a place where they can easily avoid American and Indian encirclement; establish new trade routes to Europe that cement China’s role in the global economy; and create a land-based “string of pearls” to protect against separatism in Xinjiang. General Liu Yazhou of the People’s Liberation Army even claimed that Central Asia was “the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heavens.” It is no surprise then that China placed significant effort into achieving a speedy resolution of border disputes in Central Asia.

The ambiguous borders surrounding China after the breakup of the Soviet Union were a legacy of Tsarist expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In a series of diplomatic maneuvers and treaties, Russia deprived China of nearly one million square kilometers of land in Manchuria and Central Asia. The ambiguity of those treaties and the mountainous terrain that they sought to delineate would lead to significant disagreements on where the lines should be drawn today. I will now quickly summarize those efforts to resolve border discrepancies with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

Kyrgyzstan The Sino-Kyrgyz border runs for 1,063 kilometers down from the Kazakh tripoint down towards the Tajik frontier at Peak Lenin. When the Shanghai Five--now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—was

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established in April 1996, China sought to reopen border discussions with the organization, a move that reinterpreted the Deng-era promise to “end the pass and open up the future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC).” Rather than mitigate the border issue altogether, China saw the SCO forum as a way to peacefully reclaim land that it thought it was rightfully owed. To this day, it is uncertain how and to whose advantage the border was resolved. Martha Olcott notes that Kyrgyzstan ended up ceding 1,250 square kilometers of land whose sovereignty had never been disputed during the Soviet era (Olcott 64). Though, Fravel asserts that China offered “considerable concessions (Fravel 164).” When then-President Aksar Akayev tried to ram the deal through Kyrgyzstan’s parliament with little discussion or debate, he completed the negotiations in secret, which almost lead to his impeachment for “treason (Pannier).”

Tajikstan The 296-kilometer-long Sino-Tajik border took the most time to resolve, which is peculiar given that the frontier is the shortest of all of China’s land borders, excluding Afghanistan. The frontier zone is mountainous, and the only official crossing at Qolma reaches an elevation of nearly 15,000 feet.

Pamir Plateau's geographic remoteness; facilitation of easy transit between Afghanistan and Xinjiang; and historical resonance for China complicated a speedy resolution of the border. An initial survey in the late 1990s revealed three disputed areas (Assel 63-81). Two of these areas—one near Markansu river valley and another near Karazak pass—were resolved rather quickly. But

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as shown on the map, China also claimed over half of Tajikistan’s GornoBadakhshan Autonomous Oblast, arousing local anger (Bitabarova 71). With so many observers, China engaged in the same “great power chauvinism” Mao warned about. The two sides reached a deal in 1999 (Bitabarova 72), where Tajikistan ceded 5.5% of the land originally sought by China. However, the deal was not ratified by Tajikistan until twelve years later in January 2011 (Bitabarova). That the Tajik parliament—frequently described as a rubber stamp for the country’s authoritarian leader Emomali Rahmon--would delay ratification of the agreement demonstrates the widespread discontent about the accord, whose exact contents were never publicly released. As in Kyrgyzstan, the opposition claimed that the President had betrayed both the constitution and the territorial integrity of the nation, and Pamiri residents vigorously protested against the deal Russia The Russian sector of the Soviet-PRC border had been the scene of violent clashes since the late 1960s, during the Tsarist era when a set of so-called “unequal treaties” were imposed upon China. The newest outbreak of violence along the Ussuri river brought the two Communist powers to the brink of nuclear war. Scholarly consensus concludes that China – specifically Mao – instigated frontier violence to teach the Soviets a “bitter lesson” (Gerson).

After the Soviet Union fell, China and Russia inherited the longest section of the disputed Sino-Soviet frontier. Their disputes were largely settled without delay. For example, an agreement for demarcation of the entire eastern border was in place less than a year later. The rapidity at which the two sides came to agreement is surprising: the area along the Tumen River concerned Chinese access to the Sea of Japan, which Russia feared would diminish the economic value of Vladivostok. In the end, China gained more from Russia than from any Central Asian state, as the disputed areas were roughly divided in half between the PRC and Russia (Fravel 143).

The Asymmetric Resolution of the Disputes

On paper, the 1990s were as peaceful and prosperous a decade as the PRC had ever witnessed in its short forty-year history. The precipitous and surprising collapse of Soviet power meant that for the first time in its history, the PRC did not face imminent threat of invasion by a great

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power along its borders. The newly independent Central Asian states and Mongolia were focused on solidifying new governments and institutions and had little time to spend worrying about China and its intentions. In other words, for perhaps the first time since the rule of the Qing Emperor Qianlong, China became the dominant regional power. It had the perfect opportunity to resolve its territorial disputes on its own terms but chose not to. Taylor Fravel, writes: The rapid shift in the global balance of power created an unparalleled opportunity for China to bargain hard over territory that it had

long contested in the region, threaten the use of force, or even

seize some disputed land on the cheap. Nevertheless, China was not

more assertive or belligerent in this period (Fravel 126).

If anything, China demonstrated restraint that it had never shown in dealing with the Soviet Union in decades prior. Without the looming Soviet threat, it reached eleven distinct agreements dealing with seven countries in the 1990s alone, and this fast resolution of disputes reflects China’s belief that they should be quickly resolved before the Central Asian states could organize against the PRC

As both Fravel and any clear-eyed observer will note, the late 1980s and 1990s was a period of unprecedented internal instability in the PRC. Even if the alarmist predictions about the inevitability of China’s collapse appear almost comical today, in the early 1990s they were entirely credible, at least from afar: 1989 protests may have centered on Tiananmen, but they engulfed over 400 cities nationwide. The Baren uprising in Western Xinjiang’s Akto County raised fears of widespread revolt in Xinjiang on a scale never seen before, aided by the instability and war in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The Soviet Union and its communist system had just collapsed in spectacular fashion; Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis was in vogue—In a dangerous mix of rational fear and irrational worry, Chinese leaders looked at how the Soviet Union fell and wondered if China was next.

Problems of reliability notwithstanding, the news that trickled out of Tibet and Xinjiang in the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals a region saturated in discontent, fueled by repressive state policies, leading to widespread protest, rioting, and violence. To China’s leaders, “the global wave of national self-determination following the Cold War, the rise of Islamic radicalism, and the creation of new states in the region” created a

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perfect storm that threatened Xinjiang’s territorial inviolability (Fravel 155).

Fravel writes of Chinese leaders’ “keen awareness” (and likely paranoia) about the historical grievances of a region that had never fully submitted to Beijing’s iron grip (Fravel 153). They also believed that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had tacitly allowed pro-Uighur groups to provide “material support” for their brethren across the border (Fravel 156). Beijing’s immediate goal was to stamp out both violence and the separatist sentiment that inspired such chaos. To do this, China had to cut off the influx of weaponry and feelings of solidarity pouring through the newly-opened Sino-Central Asian borders.

Faced with the unpalatable decision of either relinquishing its claims to lands nominally controlled by the Qing dynasty or risking full-fledged Central Asian support for separatist movements in Xinjiang, China chose to swallow its historical pride. Because of this realpolitik decision, China got very little of what it wanted from the Central Asian republics, even when it placed sustained pressure on them. Usually, without backing from a larger power, a small country—like any one of the Central Asian states—would fold in the face of continued diplomatic pressure.

The Tajikistan example is even more instructive. Beset by civil war and with its eastern Badakhshan region under total blockage from the west, it could not have resisted a Chinese annexation of its eastern third--uncoincidentally the sector where most Uighur separatists and weaponry entered China. Yet throughout the entire process of border demarcation, China largely acceded to Tajik demands. This observation is true at both the high-level bilateral talks and the actual ground-level demarcation efforts, where China accepted a Tajik request to let Russian diplomats join negotiations. The inclusion of Russian representatives, with advanced technical capabilities and accrued historical knowledge, significantly leveled the playing field in Central Asia’s favor. China was so fixated on maintaining stability that it was forced to let an asymmetrically disadvantaged player set all the rules of the game.

This is not to say that the relationship between China and the Central Asian states is entirely asymmetric to Central Asia’s advantage.

However, during this time period of border resolutions, the Central Asian states held the upper hand. Womack reminds us that “capabilities count, and asymmetry continues to shape perceptions,” even if globalization heightens

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the potential costs of big power hegemony (Womack XVI). China feared that exercising its hegemonic power over a weaker Central Asia would be detrimental to Chinese social stability and territorial integrity in the long run, thus attenuating China’s actual power. China’s desire to avoid this loss of power created a unique situation where its relative interest and perception of the need to resolve the dispute exceeded that of the weaker Central Asian States. For that moment, China was always focused on future authority, and the Central Asians failed to organize into a more powerful opponent when the opportunity presented itself.

Some Parting Thoughts

To return to the original paradox, Reversed Asymmetry provides an explanation for the discrepancies in how China resolved its border disputes with Russia and the Central Asian states. Two requisite conditions for the formation of Reversed Asymmetry are outlined: a situation of unilaterally extreme Asymmetry must occur and the advantaged power must covet something from the disadvantaged power. The Sino-Central Asian relationship is clearly extremely asymmetrical and will remain so for the foreseeable future. China depended on the Central Asian states to heed off what it viewed as existential threats to its territorial integrity and was thus willing to concede to nearly all the demands of Central Asia to the disputed border. Fravel echoes this sentiment, writing, “regime security best explains why China compromised [in Central Asia] despite its superior military position (Fravel 151).” As such, despite China’s absolute authority, asymmetry, for a brief moment, was reversed in favor of Central Asia.

The territorial dispute between China and Russia did not involve such far-reaching implications for the PRC. In dealing with Russia, China had to swallow its historical pride and surrender land stolen during the Tsarist years, which was a comparatively easier task. Therefore, the second condition for Reversed Asymmetry – that the advantaged power must covet something of high value from the disadvantaged power – is not met. With this comparison between the Russian and Central Asian cases in mind, we can conclude that Reverse Asymmetry is a helpful extension of Womack’s original thesis on asymmetry.

That conclusion has broader implications for China’s asymmetric partners. Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative is outside the scope of this

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paper. Much of the discourse around BRI focuses on how BRI participants are forced to accept unfair Chinese investment terms and conditions because they have no alternative. Using Reversed Asymmetry, it seems that BRI countries could drive a harder bargain with China: if BRI is so strategically important for China, it should be more inclined to accede to BRI participants’ demands. As Stephen Smith writes in The Diplomat, “Xi Jinping’s desire for public submission to his vision of regional order has created space for smaller states to bargain (The Diplomat).” And if China yields to more of its investment partners’ demands, trust in its soft power initiatives would increase. China’s metaphorical Central Asian cake would grow even bigger.

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World, vol. 3, no. 1, 2018, pp. 12–24.

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Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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in China’s Territorial Disputes. Princeton University Press, 2008.

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Border. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004.

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Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969.” CNA Analysis,

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Eurasianet.” Eurasianet.Org, 23 May 2018, https://eurasianet.org/ russian-remittances-to-central-asia-rise-again.

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Could the Canadian Point System Work in the United States?

By Charlotte Roberts About the Author

Charlotte Roberts is a second year studying Foreign Affairs and Sociology from McLean, Virginia. She wrote this paper in her fall semester of 2019 for Sociology of Immigration. Through this class, Charlotte learned more about social, political, and economic factors that shape immigration policy and trends. Outside of academics and IRO, she volunteers with GirlUp at UVA, hikes, and travels. Charlotte will continue her studies in Sydney, Australia during the fall of her third year.

Foreword

It would not be overstating to say that immigration is a key issue in present-day America. Always important historically, the issue has heated up as massive inflows of non-white immigrants, spurred by liberal reforms in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, undocumented immigration, and refugee admissions, are reconfiguring the country’s demographic and racial landscape. Simultaneously, questions have arisen about immigrants’ impact on the economy, provoking claims that the country is admitting the “wrong” kinds of immigrants. Such claims, changes, and questions highlight the importance of immigration policy as a tool whereby, theoretically, the state arbitrates between the needs of American society and those of immigrants. But what if such policy becomes lop sided, harshly penalizing immigrants in a quest to “put America first”? This is the state of affairs that has existed since 2016, and it has provoked a crisis not just in the society at large but also in the student body at the University of Virginia. As a result, students now evince an intense interest in matters pertaining to immigration, which means that courses such as The Sociology of Immigration now routinely attract a full complement of deeply engaged

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undergraduates.

Students in that course are required to complete a research paper on any topic of their choosing related to immigration. That is, the papers need to revolve around a distinct question, argument, and be supported by data and scholarly literature. Miss Roberts’s paper emerged out of my fall 2019 immigration course and tackled one of the central questions in the current immigration debate: whether the U.S. should adopt, as immigration policy, a Canadian-style point system. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act removed racial considerations from immigration policy and, instead, prioritized family relationships. However, this emphasis has encountered increasing criticism over time as promoting the chain migration of non-productive immigrants. The upshot has been the recent passage of the “public charge” amendment to immigration law denying admission to immigrants who are perceived by the U.S. government as being unable to support themselves. Instead, it is argued that the U.S. should adopt Canada’s point system since that system ties the admission of immigrants very closely to criteria – such as high levels of education, fluency in English and French, and young age – that, theoretically, will make them economically productive. The question is: would such a system work in the U.S.?

Miss Roberts’s paper ably rebuts this presumption. In systematic fashion, it presents an overview of American immigration policy, Canadian immigration policy, and then it evaluates whether the latter can apply to the U.S. She disagrees, convincingly arguing that the point system might not even be working as intended in Canada, since, for instance, its bias towards highly skilled immigrants might be leading to gaps in that country’s labor market. Something similar could happen in the U.S. were this country to adopt a point system. Moreover, adopting such a system would radically shift America away from its historical emphasis on giving opportunity to the world’s downtrodden. Instead of a full-blown point system, the paper advances the suggestion that aspects of U.S. immigration policy should be adapted to meet the country’s labor needs. The implication is that immigration policy need not be all or nothing; a point system or one emphasizing family relationships. Perhaps a better system is one that combines elements of both policies.

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Milton Vickerman Department of Sociology University of Virginia

Abstract

This paper explores the possibility of the United States adopting the Canadian point system for admitting immigrants. This is a relevant topic of research given the current political climate. President Trump has advocated for immigration reform to reduce family sponsorship and increase economic migrants. The paper begins by comparing the current systems of the United States and Canada. While both wealthy, democratic, and North American, these nations have very different migration patterns.

Canada primarily has economic-based immigration, the US has primarily family-based immigration. Then comes the question of whether it would be smart to implement the Canadian system in the US. I present facts about the contrasting economies, historical trends, and culture. I come to the conclusion that the Canadian point system would not work in the US and that we should craft a comprehensive immigration reform that is conducive to our economic needs and our values.

Within the last few decades, North America has experienced an influx of immigration. The causes for, and reactions towards, this trend vary by country. Further, Canada and the United States’ immigration policies are remarkably different. The majority of immigrants entering the U.S. do so either through family sponsorship or by the aid of immediate relatives in America; while in Canada, most immigrants enter through the point system. Both political parties in the U.S. have called for comprehensive immigration reform—yet this is where the agreement ends, as neither side agrees on whom, and how many, should enter each respective country. A comprehensive examination of the immigration policies of other countries, particularly those of our neighbors, can help spur important changes in the U.S.’s own policy measures. In this paper, I will first discuss the Canadian point system and its efficiency, and then explore the idea of implementing a similar system in the United States, while invoking various pressing questions: Does the point system effectively fill the labor shortages in Canada, and would it fit the labor needs of the U.S.? Does family-based immigration fulfill the needs of the host country? Is it unethical to pick who

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can immigrate based on level of education? Such questions are important to consider when addressing immigration reform. After a thorough analysis of immigration and labor trends, and of arguments for and against Canada’s system, I will assert that the point system cannot work in the United States.

United States Immigration Policy

Since the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, the number of nonwhite immigrants in the U.S. has risen dramatically. Prior to this reform, the U.S. operated under the National Origins System, in which immigration laws were explicitly racist, as they targeted specific nationalities, ethnicities, and races when deciding who could or could not enter; examples include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the 1921 Emergency Quota Act (Cohn 2015). When the first wave of immigrants arrived in the 1850s from Ireland, the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs)— the majority of Americans—were not accepting of them because they were Catholic. Those most staunchly opposed to these immigrants even established a nativist political party, known as the KnowNothing Party. Racism persisted with each new wave of immigrants. The Chinese, the Japanese, Southern Central and Eastern Europeans, Jews, and now Hispanics have all been subjected to xenophobia at some point in U.S. history (Cohn 2015).

Key to discussions of immigration in America is the concept of race. Race has always been, and continues to be, an important factor in immigration policy. There exist two ways of looking at race: race as essential and race as a social construct. The former view argues that race is an indicator of inherent genetic endowments, while the latter view posits race as nothing more than phenotypic features that society has categorized to imply internal qualities. Perceived as superior by the former, whiteness has remained at the core of American citizenship and immigration, and beliefs of white supremacy remain instilled in American culture. This idea was reinforced in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries by scientific race theory and eugenics. Scientific race theory encompassed the use of pseudoscience and the scientific language to “prove” that there was a hierarchy of races in which white Nordics and Anglo-Saxons were situated at the top and sub-Saharan Africans at the bottom. Subsequently, this theory gave birth to eugenics, a movement to sterilize “non-whites” so as to

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prevent them from passing on “inferior" traits, including those of Southern, Central, and Eastern European origins (Cohn 2015). These ideas have long persisted, and they have been adapted throughout American history, continuing to shape U.S. immigration laws. Today, for example, LatinAmerican immigrants are labeled as a threat to white America (Lee 2018).

In 1965, the Hart-Cellar Act reformed immigration policy in the U.S., bringing an end to race-based regulations and catalyzing a rise in family-based immigration. Although the U.S. issues visas like the H1B and the EB5 which allow people to immigrate based on education and investment, respectively, most people currently immigrate to the United States through immediate relatives who are already citizens, as well as through family sponsorship.

As displayed in Figure 1, 64% of immigrants to the U.S. arrive via family connections. This trend has led to more Latinx and Asian immigrants entering the U.S. through what is known as chain migration—if a migrant has family members already living in America, like a child or a spouse, then she can enter as well. It should be noted that the percentages in Figure 1 are likely to be considerably different today, as the number of refugees admitted to the United States has plummeted since President Trump entered office. In 2018, only 22 thousand refugees were admitted versus the 70 thousand admitted in 2015 (Amos 2018).

The context of the labor market is another important factor in understanding U.S. immigration policy. The United States boasts a relatively low unemployment rate at 3.7%, indicating that the country needs more workers (“Unemployment, total” 2019). There is currently a labor shortage for 3D jobs (jobs that are dangerous, dirty, and difficult), typically performed by unskilled immigrant workers; many people argue that American citizens are not willing to do these jobs (Jones 2019). Nevertheless, there are many debates about the role immigrants play within an economy (Borjas 1994).

Key to discussions of

immigration in America is the concept of race. Race has always been, and continues to be, an important factor in immigration policy.

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Figure 1: New Legal Permanent Residents by Broad Class of Admission, 2015

From stealing jobs, to being innovators, to providing cheap labor, immigrants, along with their contributions, are highly politicized.

President Trump has considered establishing Canada’s points-based system as a possible change in policy.

Canadian Immigration Policy

For the past twenty-five years, approximately 250,000 immigrants per year have entered Canada (Edmonston 2016). The country currently employs a point system in order to regulate immigration, meaning one must earn a certain number of points to enter. In Canada, points are calculated based on level of education, language skills, and employment.

Figure 2 shows the complete list of categories. One must obtain 67 out of 100 points to pass (“Canada's Points System” 2009). The Canadian system is beneficial to countries that need highly skilled workers and value assimilation. The points-based system, however, is not the only way someone can enter Canada, though it is the main one. The makeup of recent immigrants to Canada is 60.3% economic immigrants, 26.8% family class immigrants, 11.6% refugees, and 1.3% other. (O'Doherty and Katem 2017). Compared to the United States, which has over 60% familybased immigration, only about a quarter of Canada’s immigrants enter via family members. Instead, the majority of Canada’s immigrants enter via the workforce—a result of the point system. One should note that Canada currently maintains a 5.7% unemployment rate, close to the U.S.’s rate of 3.7% (“Unemployment, total” 2019). This suggests that Canada, like the U.S., also has a strong economy.

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Like the United States, Canada has a history of racism in immigration policy; both nations were founded by Western Europeans on stolen native lands. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 and the 1919 Act to amend the Immigration Act serve as examples of Canadian laws that, similar to the U.S.’s past immigration laws, barred the entry of certain ethnic groups (Edmonston 2016). The immigration reform in 1967, like the 1965 reform in the United States, led to a policy that did not discriminate on the basis of race. Though such reforms did not eradicate racism from immigration policies, they did omit race and nationality as formal criteria.

Alternatively, it is also necessary to re-evaluate these laws as time proceeds; what may have been predicted to work in the 1960s might not prove useful today.

Figure 2: Six Selection Factors and Pass Mark

Point System in the United States

Under the current Trump administration, there is a shift in plans in terms of immigration policy. The President has made it clear that he does not support immigration from Mexico; in fact, thwarting Mexican emigration was featured at the top of his campaign platform. With fear-mongering rhetoric like, “They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us,” “They’re bringing drugs,” “They’re bringing crime,” and “They’re rapists, “ “And some, I assume, are good people,” Trump gained popularity by virtue of his ultra-conservative stance

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on immigration (Lee 2018). Other than expressing his disdain for Mexican people and undocumented immigrants, Trump has also emphasized support for economic over family-based immigration (Chishti & Bolter 2019).

Over the past few years, Donald Trump has issued numerous executive orders while overseeing the introduction of various immigrationrelated laws. Reforming immigration policy is difficult in the U.S. due to a divided Congress and political polarization. Thus, a point system is unlikely to pass via a single bill. Such a bill, known as the RAISE Act, was proposed, which aimed to dramatically cut family-based immigration and establish a point system for employer sponsorship (Gelatt 2017). As this bill was not passed, Trump and his administration have slowly shifted towards a point system in a piecemeal fashion. By overturning Obama’s DACA, Trump will be able to reduce family-based immigration and shift the focus to “merit-based” economic immigration (Shear 2019). Now, immigrants must prove that they can pay their way, which is making family-based immigration less of a qualification. What’s more, this controversial shift is making it harder for the poor and uneducated to come to America.

The main argument in support of a points-based system in the U.S. is economic in nature. Permitting more highly educated people to come to the United States would potentially boost the American economy. Someone with “valuable skill, an offer of employment, an advanced education or a plan to create jobs” would be prioritized over an unskilled worker (Mermani 2019). Those that support Trump’s plans argue that, given our current system which focuses on family-based immigration, the U.S. does not possess enough control over who comes into the country (Mermani 2019).

One criticism levied against the point system posits that Trump’s current regulations inspired by the Canadian point system are failing to help the American economy. The American population is aging because American women’s birth rates are dropping and life expectancy is rising (Levitz 2019). Consequently, it is argued that limiting immigration to the United States is unwise. Unskilled immigrants, such as people emigrating from Mexico, are typically young, hard-working, and able to pay taxes. It is argued that the main effect of Trump’s changes mimicking the Canadian system has resulted in a decline in the number of people immigrating to the U.S. It is important that our country maintain a sufficient workforce to support our elderly citizens, in light of demographic shifts (Levitz

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2019). The Canadian points system does award points to those who are young, but the trajectory of the Trump administration’s merit-based system appears to lower immigration rates as a whole (Levitz 2019).

The point system has also attracted controversy with regard to race, for it advantages those who are likely to assimilate with relative ease, possess an understanding of Canadian culture, and speak French or English with proficiency (“Canada’s Points System” 2009). As a result, more people emigrating from English-speaking countries, as well as those with higher access to education, may enter more easily; thus, it is possible that a point system would lead to fewer nonwhite immigrants. The U.S.’s H1B visa is similar to the point system in that those who are highly educated are eligible to receive this visa for temporary work (“H1B Fiscal Year” 2010). Since many of the migrants who use the visa hail from South and East Asia, a points-based system may, in fact, lead to a growth in Asian immigration. It can be implied, though, that the general distrust towards Latin Americans has inspired this shift towards merit-based immigration.

Given that most immigrants from Latin America are low skilled workers, and that the merit-based system omits such professions, it is likely that a point system would exclude many Latin-American workers. Hence, many racial implications could still follow from the point-based system.

Why the Canadian Point System Would Not Work in the United States

I argue that the Canadian point system is flawed, not only for America but also for Canada. Both nations face a labor shortage in service jobs (Little 2007). Canada, for example, faces a significant shortage of nurses in its hospitals (Little 2007). The Canadian point system would likely prevent a nurse from immigrating to Canada because of the emphasis placed on high levels of education. This issue will be further magnified if the immigration system remains unchanged. For the U.S. to establish a successful point system, the country would need to adjust the categories in order to accept immigrants who will fill jobs that are not currently occupied

by U.S. citizens.

Another issue to consider is America’s history as an ideal place for immigrants to find refuge and prosperity while working towards the American Dream. Emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty is: "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The

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wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempesttost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!" (“The New Colossus” n.d.).

For decades this statue has represented the hope and opportunity America provides for everyone—especially immigrants. Many immigrants who initially faced discrimination upon arrival, such as the Irish or the Italians, are now thoroughly integrated into American society. As time passes, the descendants of immigrants become more and more “American,” while the definition of “American” evolves, as well. Cherry-picking immigrants who seem to be good candidates for assimilation could jeopardize the diversity of cultures and opinions.

A system similar to the Bracero program could be put into place to provide a legal path for low-skilled workers to fill American labor shortages.

This program was created under the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement in 1942, a time when the United States was in desperate need of workers due to WWII (Cohn 2015). The program ended in 1965, after which many workers whose status was once legal became illegal overnight. The demand for cheap, and potentially temporary, labor has not disappeared since then, and so reinstituting a program like the Bracero program where workers from Mexico could legally immigrate for temporary work could be a solution to this country’s economic needs. A common view in America is that immigrants strengthen our nation (Jones 19). Therefore, a system for working legally in the U.S. would likely be supported by public opinion.

America’s economic needs are unique; if a point system were to be instituted, it could not be identical to the Canadian one, but rather it must be adapted to the country’s particular situation. Distributing points to those under the age of 40 would help offset an aging population and help fund government aid programs. Points based on experience in lowskilled jobs, like construction or farm work, would help fill labor shortages in 3-D jobs. Points granted to those who have completed school or are seeking to complete school for care and service jobs, such as nursing, would ameliorate labor shortages in hospitals and elderly care centers.

Conclusion

The point system by and large works for Canada’s needs; however, the Canadian point system would not work in the United States, due to disparities in cultural and economic needs. While immigration reform is imperative, the U.S. requires a system that is unique to its population,

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political culture, and history. Immigrants helped build the foundations of modern America. The U.S. must make new immigration policies that can handle the economic, racial, and moral issues which the country faces in the current moment. Lawmakers and those in political office can be inspired by other nations’ immigration policies, but they should also bear in mind America’s economic situation and its legacy as a beacon of economic opportunity.

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Bibliography Amos, Deborah. 2018. “2018 Was A Year of Drastic

Cuts To U.S. Refugee Admissions.” NPR.

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680308538/2018- was-a-year-of-drastic-cuts-to-u-s-refugee-admissions.

Figure 2: Admin. 2009. “Canada's Points System: Six (6)

Selection Criteria and Pass Mark.

” Gateway to Canada. Retrieved October 21, 2019 (https://www.gatewaytocanada.com/2009/07/ points-system-six-6-selection-criteria.html).

Borjas, George. 1994. “Economics of Immigration.”

Journal of Economic Literature 32:1667–1717.

“Canada's Points System: Six (6) Selection

Criteria and Pass Mark.” 2009. Gateway to Canada.

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.gatewaytocanada. com/2009/07/points-system-six-6-selection-criteria.html.

Chishti, Muzaffar, and Jessica Bolter. 2019. “‘Merit-Based’ Immigration:

Trump Proposal Would Dramatically Revamp Immigrant

Selection Criteria, But with Modest Effects on Numbers.”

Migration Policy Institute. Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merit-based- immigration-trump-proposal-immigrant-selection.

Cohn, D. Vera. 2015. “How U.S. Immigration Laws

and Rules Have Changed through History.”

Pew Research Center. Accessed October 20, 2019.

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u- s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history/.

Edmonston, Barry. 2016. “Canada’s Immigration Trends and

Patterns.” Canadian Studies in Population 43(1-2):78–116.

Figure 1: Gelatt, Julia. 2017. “The RAISE Act: Dramatic

Change to Family Immigration, Less So for the

Employment-Based System.” Migration Policy Institute.

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy. org/news/raise-act-dramatic-change-family-immigration-less so-employment-based-system.

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Green, Alan G., and David A. Green. 1995. “Canadian

Immigration Policy: The Effectiveness of

the Point System and Other Instruments.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 28(4b):1006.

“H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Cap Season.” 2010.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigaration Services (USCIS).

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.uscis. gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b -specialtyoccupations-and-fashion models/h-1b-fiscal-year-fy-2020-cap-season.

“Immigration Regulations, Order-in Council PC 1967-1616,

1967.” n.d. Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21.

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://pier21.ca/research/ immigration-history/immigration-regulations-order in-council-pc-1967-1616-1967.

Jones, Bradley. 2019. “Majority of Americans

Continue to Say Immigrants Strengthen the U.S.”

Pew Research Center. Accessed

October 21, 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank /2019/01/31/majority-of-americans-continue- to-say-immigrants-strengthen-the-u-s/.

Lee, Michelle Ye Hee. 2018. “Donald Trump’s

False Comments Connecting Mexican

Immigrants and Crime.” The Washington Post.

Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps- false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/.

Levitz, Eric. 2019. “Trump's Immigration Policies

Are Working (to Make America Poorer).”

New York Magazine. Accessed October 21, 2019.

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/09/trumps- immigration-policies-are-working-against-america.html.

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Study.” Health Services Research 42(3p2):1336–53.

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Make Up 21.9% of Canada's Population:

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News. Accessed October 21, 2019. https://www.cicnews. com/2017/10/immigrants-make-up-21-9-of-canadas population-statscan-109735.html#gs.bet4jz.

Shear, Michael D. 2019. “Trump Has Right to End

DACA, Justice Dept. Tells Supreme Court.”

The New York Times. Accessed October 21, 2019. https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/us/politics/daca-trump.html.

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Entry).” 2019. Government of Canada. Last modified

September 19, 2019. Accessed October 21, 2019. https:// www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/

services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/eligibility/federal- skilled-workers/six-selection-factors-federal-skilled-workers.html.

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estimate).” 2019. The World Bank. Accessed October 21, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.uem.totl.zs?name_desc=false.

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Hamas as a Social Movement

Applying social movement theory to the

Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood

By Maya Nir

About the Author

Maya is a second-year in the college of Arts and Sciences. She is interested in global trends of corruption, environmental justice, and postcolonial liberation movements. As an Israeli-American raised in Jersualem during the Second Intifada, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is close to Maya’s heart. At UVA, she is the co-president of J-Street: a Pro-Palestine, ProIsrael, Pro-Peace policy and advocacy club as well as a member of the UVA Women’s Ultimate Frisbee team and a Career Peer Educator at the Career Center. In the future, she hopes to work in conflict-resolution or diplomacy.

Foreword

Maya Nir’s paper, Hamas as a Social Movement, was written for Professor Sree Sathiamma’s Spring 2019 course “Social Movements and Development” (GSGS 3116). The course “examines debates about social movements and development, from workers responding to changes in their sphere of work, to communities responding to the seizure of land, water or other resources. Issues will include displacement, migration, trafficking, labor rights, environmental damage; gender, class and caste aspects of movements; human rights of marginalized groups; the role of the state and non-state organizations.”

Maya’s paper was selected for publication in the Wilson Journal not only for her clarity and strength of writing, but for her ability to “step away from the Western definition of Hamas” and engage with greater theories about social development in order to understand a deeply complex issue. By engaging with social and political contexts, she helps us to understand the factors that have made Hamas a powerful social force.

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Professor Sathiamma moved on from the University of Virginia in 2019, and was unable to provide a foreword for this paper. She now works as an Assistant Professor in Gender and Political Economy at the International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague, Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Abstract

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, “terrorism” has been used to characterize several political groups that are tied to Islam. Hamas, a powerful political, militaristic, and social organization in the occupied Palestinian territories is one of these groups.Hamas is characterized as a “terrorist organization” by several American news outlets and by most, if not all, mainstream American political leaders. Hamas does commit acts of terrorism, but it also is comprised of a system of complex social and political structures. These structures, which, in some circumstances, attempt to improve and liberate the lives of Palestinians, are largely unaccounted for in the media or academic and overshadowed by the label of “terrorist.” This paper explores the complexities and roles of Hamas as an impactful social movement in the occupied Palestinian terrirotories.

Introduction

Hamas is a complex organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, territories currently occupied by the state of Israel. It is a political, social, religious, and military actor in the Israel/Palestine region. As the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has connections around the Arab world. It is understood differently from individual to individual, from civilian to government official, and from East to West. The United States, along with several European governments, refers to Hamas solely as a terrorist organization.

In this paper, I wish to apply social movement theory to Hamas as an organization. I attempt to redefine and reframe Hamas in terms of its social power and effective advocacy work, while not ignoring or underrepresenting its violent acts, which I regard as unjustifiable. As an Israeli American, I am deeply connected to the conflict in Israel/ Palestine—referred to in this paper as “the Conflict”. I grew up in Jerusalem during the Second Intifada, and my parents served as Palestinian Affairs correspondents for American and Israeli news publications. Last semester, in

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a class called “Religion, Politics, and Conflict,” I studied the role of Political Islam in the Arab world, and the Western reaction to it. This paper serves as a case study in the role of Political Islam in an oppressed society.

In applying social movement theory to Hamas, I hope to step away from the Western definition of Hamas as a terrorist organization, and understand it as a more complex, multifaceted movement. The goal of this paper is not to justify or advocate for the group or its actions but to reframe and better understand the group in accordance with social movement theory.

Political Islam and the Emergence of Hamas

Political Islam, or Islamization, is an academic term used to denote the introduction of Islam into the secular political sphere (Hirschkind).

Political Islam has been adopted by several extremist groups in the Middle East in the past several decades. The ideological goal of Islamization is to rule all Muslims under Islamic law rather than Western political constructs.

For many extremist groups, the ultimate goal is to abandon nationalism and unify the “umma”— Muslim people worldwide— under one caliphate in the Middle East (Denny 1977). Modern Islamism is often practiced and supported by Western-educated intellectuals of the upper middle class, not students of classical Islam. Though the ideology is rooted in religious belief, it has gained popularity because of its clear counter to modern Western thought. For many, adoption of Islamization is a political tool to move away from the post World War colonialism and forced modernization that occurred in the Middle East (Robinson 2003, 117).

The Muslim Brotherhood is often pointed to as the first modern Islamic extremist group with this goal. The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt and advocated for unified Islamic Law in the Middle East.

By the 1940s, the Brotherhood had spread to several different countries in the region and was celebrated for providing social services ( “Muslim Brotherhood”). The Brotherhood publicly opposed secularism, nationalism, Western colonialism, and Zionism in several Arab states (Robinson 2003, 120).

Thus, after the state of Israel was founded in 1948 and then occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip—referred to in this essay as “the Territories”— in 1967, the Brotherhood spread to these territories in opposition to what it viewed as a Western, Zionist, colonial power.

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Palestinian Islamism gained traction for the same reason that it had gained popularity in neighboring Arab states: growing dissatisfaction with secular Arab regimes inhibiting economic growth, the Islamic revolution in Iran as a role model for the unity of Islamic law, and tension over the wealth of the Islamic gulf states after the 1970s (Robinson 2003, 119). The Brotherhood, and Palestinian Islam ideology in general, was still in the minority. The ruling force in the Territories was the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO, a secular nationalist movement, was the dominant political force after 1967; consequently, Israel saw the PLO, and Fatah within it, as its primary enemy and focused on repressing the PLO while tolerating the growing influence of what at the time was a nonviolent Islamic movement. For this reason, many point to Israel as playing a key role in bolstering Islamic extremism in the Territories, particularly in the Gaza Strip (Robinson 2003, 124).

In 1977, the Likud party rose to power in Israel (Robinson 2003, 119). Likud is a conservative, nationalist, Zionist party that advocates for the retention of the Territories (Britannica, “Likud”). The Likud party attempted to reframe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a nationalistic or territorial conflict to a religious one as a political tool (Robinson 2003, 120). They advocated for the sovereignty of the Jewish state and targeted “the Muslims” rather than “the Palestinians” as Israel’s greatest enemy.

Likud’s rhetoric was essentially adopted and flipped by political Islam in the Territories— Palestinians now saw “the Jews” as the enemy (Robinson 2003, 131). This rhetoric helped provide a political space for the Brotherhood to organize and mobilize in the Territories, and thus Likud’s effect on the growth of Palestinian Islam was not just ideological, but also through concrete policy. Because the PLO was seen as the largest threat, Likud worked to pit Islamic groups against the secular PLO to promote infighting, a tactic used by several other Arab leaders against popular uprisings in the Middle East (Robinson 2003, 121). Along with the developments of the Likud party inside of Israel, external forces promoted the development of the Brotherhood, and later Hamas, in the Territories. When Abdul Nasser came to power in Egypt, he outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (Robinson 2003, 120). Because Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip between 1948 and 1967, activists in Gaza were tasked with building their own localized, covert organization. Thus, the Brotherhood in Gaza established an independent

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form of Palestinian Islam, unique to its situation and struggles. In contrast, under Jordanian rule between 1948 and 1967, the West Bank had largely followed the culture of the Brotherhood in Jordan. For example, Jordan had banned violence on the border with Israel, so the Brotherhood in the West Bank largely refrained from violence (Robinson 2003, 120). Because of their differing influences, the Islamist organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip never established a formal connection.

Even after decades under occupation, the Brotherhood remained focused on social Islamization rather than confrontation with Israel.

They included Israel in the Western movement to devalue Islam and turned further into their religion to find a solution to the occupation.

The Brotherhood framed the siege of Palestine as God’s punishment of Palestinians for turning away from Islam, and believed that Palestinian society had to become devoutly Islamic before they could regain their land (Robinson 2003, 131). The Brotherhood was slowly effective, though, in bringing Islam into Palestinian society through mosques controlled by alMujamma al-Islami: The Islamic Association of the Muslim Brotherhood (Robinson 2003, 127). The al-Mujamma mosques functioned past worship and expanded into several social services. Schools, hospitals, charities, and sports clubs were opened and run by al Mujamma, often from inside of mosques. The mosques established casual social networks between Muslims within Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. Though al-Mujamma provided social services, the Brotherhood was still criticized in Palestinian society for being too focused on local social development and too passive in confrontation with Israel (Robinson 2003, 128). Thus, a slow rift among the Islamic movements in Gaza began in the 1980s regarding the question of liberating Palestine. The Brotherhood believed in purifying society, then confronting Israel (Robinson 2003, 122), but Muslim Brotherhoodaffiliated al-Mujamma al-Islami leaders realized that their approach was untenable on the ground and began to advocate for liberating Palestine first, then establishing an Islamic state afterwards. Hamas was officially created out of this realization in 1987, during the first weeks of the first Palestinian intifada— or uprising against Israel (Britannica, “Hamas”). Hamas, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, gained popularity and formed a powerful minority movement because of its radical, fast-paced goal for the liberation of Palestine (Berti 2015,18). Hamas brought together religious

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members of the PLO and confrontational politicians of the Brotherhood (Britannica, “Hamas”). They maintained many of the social structures and benefits introduced by al-Mujamma, but they also took a more active political and military role.

Hamas as a Social Movement

From its inception in 1987, Hamas developed into three distinctive wings: a political organization, an armed force, and a complex network of social institutions (Berti 2015, 30). Hamas began as a minority, grassroots political organization, successful on college campuses in the Territories and among the middle class. Hamas gained political support through its social action in local communities; they offered education, religious service, medical aid, and even basic food and water supplies. The group filled a void, especially in Gaza, of organized social welfare and community involvement; thus, Hamas won political support by engaging with and offering aid to its constituents. Al-Mujamma had already gained Palestinian support for and reliance on social services from Islamic institutions, and Hamas was able to offer those same services with a stronger political message: liberation of Palestinian lands, then the creation of an Islamic state (Berti 2015, 13).

With this support, Hamas gained a major voting bloc in 2005 and then won Palestinian elections over Fatah (the PLO in Gaza) in 2006 gaining sovereign power over the Gaza Strip (Britannica, “Hamas”). Consequently, the military wing of Hamas was now the primary player in violent confrontation with the state of Israel. Hamas created an “Executive Force” — a security force in the Gaza Strip responsible for policing Palestinians, securing land, and confronting Israel (Berti 2015, 17). Despite the social actions and political mission of Hamas, most media coverage of the movement focuses on its military actions. Hamas’s military branch, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has carried out attacks on Israeli civilians and has been accused of torturing and committing atrocities against Palestinian citizens suspected of colluding with Israel (Al Jazeera 2015). For this reason, the United States, European Union, and UK, among other countries, have recognized Hamas exclusively as a terrorist organization. Though Hamas has committed acts of terror, and its military wing acts as an extremist militant organization, the social benefits and practices of the organization are often overlooked, resulting in a misunderstanding of Hamas’s role within

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the region. In reframing Hamas as a complex, violent social movement rather than an exclusively terrorist organization, one can better understand the group’s role in its region, its rise to popularity, and its prospects for the future.

Social theorist Charles Tilly defines a social movement as “a party with broad aspirations and a unifying belief system ,” and classifies a social movement as “a sustained interaction between a set of authorities and various spokespersons [who] challenge... those authorities ” (Tilly 1984, 305). Hamas fits perfectly within this broad definition. Hamas has “broad aspirations” to create an Islamic state in the land of Palestine and for the society of that state to function in accordance with Islamic law. Hamas has also been a sustained interaction between authorities— both of opposing Palestinian parties and with Israel— and challenged these authorities (Berti 2015, 13). Hamas fits into an even more specific definition presented by Tilly, that of a National Social Movement (NSM). Tilly defines the social movement interaction of a NSM as “an interaction with the authorities who staff a national state” (Tilly 2015, 305). Hamas serves as a grassroots political party in its region; it took part in elections, first as a minority party, then rose to power. It challenges the authorities of the state of Israel to liberate Palestinian lands, clearly defining its political wing as an NSM. The social wing of Hamas can also be viewed through Davita Glasberg’s definition of a social movement as a “structure and strategy that may empower oppressed populations (Glasberg 2011, 150).” Through Hamas’s social education initiatives, Hamas has inspired new generations of Palestinian intellectuals to retaliate against the 52-year-long military occupation imposed by Israel (Berti 2015, 24). Its social education work has also helped the movement gain support. By providing much-needed organizational structure to the Palestinian school system, Hamas was able to disseminate its rhetoric to large numbers of students. They spread antiSemitic conspiracy theories and reframed Islamism to fit into a nationalistic structure, effectively indoctrinating new members into its social movement from a young age (Robinson 2003, 118).

Even the military wing of Hamas can be analyzed according to social movement organization (SMO) theory. According to the Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, a “complete” social movement organization must have a substantial presence of “membership, rules,

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hierarchy, monitoring, and sanctioning” (Hond 2015, 293). The military wing of Hamas practices stricter membership policies than the social and political wings because of the confidential and potentially dangerous information that is shared. There is a hierarchy within the military wing— a division between strategists and individuals actually carrying out attacks.

There are rules within this hierarchy on the involvement of women, the tactics used, and the availability of knowledge, among other things. Finally, Hamas created its own security force, the Executive Force, to monitor and impose sanctions on its members across all branches (Berti 2015,17).

Because the military wing of Hamas fulfills Oxford’s “complete SMO” criteria, it can be framed as a social movement.

In identifying all three wings of Hamas—political, social, and military—as social movements, it is fair to identify the greater organization of Hamas as a social movement. In accordance with Rosalba Icaza and Rolanda Vazquez's assessment of social struggles, influenced by American political philosopher Hannah Arendt, social movements are a break in the norm of history. They “shred the veil of normalcy;” they are not predicted, and they have the ability to re-pave the road of a nation, people, or ideology (Icaza 2013, 688). Hamas decisively broke from the norm. Whereas Palestinian Islamism could have continued in the footsteps of the Muslim Brotherhood or disintegrated into a secular, nationalistic movement, Hamas formed and filled a void. It served a purpose that was absent from society and from political discourse in their region, gained popularity, and ultimately centralized and harnessed an immense amount of power (Berti 2015, 30). In reframing Hamas as a social movement, one is able to challenge the Westernized generalization and simplification of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Whereas orientalism — an inherent belief that all things “oriental” (eastern) are unanalyzable from the West— can cause misunderstandings applying social movement theory to Islam, and especially to Hamas, helps to understand the movement in the context of worldwide social struggles.

In reframing Hamas as a social movement, one is able to challenge the Westernized generalization and simplification of Hamas as a terrorist organization.

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Hamas, NGOs, and Social Media

Analyzing Hamas’s relationships with NGOs and social media is another way to de-Orientalize the analysis of Islam. NGOs have a long and complex history in Gaza. After the Oslo Accords in the mid 1990s, there was an influx of NGOs to the region. They were seen as an alternative democratic structure to the largely ineffective Palestinian National Authority (PNA). In accordance with Aziz Choudry and Dip Kapoor's analysis of NGOization, Palestinian NGO’s became dependent on foreign aid and were vilified by the PNA as elite, outsider influence in Gaza shortly after their introduction to the region (Hammami 2000, 17). Additionally, in accordance with NGOization, several grassroots organizations that had been established before the Oslo Accords were subsumed by larger international NGOs in the region with stakes in the peace process between the PLO and Israel. Whereas the PLO signed a treaty to discredit Palestinian NGOs in the region, Hamas did not. Hamas actually enjoyed many financial benefits from the funds raised and distributed by international NGOs. These NGOs gave money to Hamas largely to support and maintain its many social aid projects in the region. Hamas even defended the presence of these NGOs in its newspaper, Al Risaala (Hammami 2000, 19), though they didn’t support all NGOs in the region. In many cases, Hamas closed down or silenced NGOs working with Fatah or under PLO control and instead poured their own supporters into the executive boards. In an attempt to preserve international image, though, Hamas let high-profile NGOs remain intact.

In this way, Hamas utilized the pre-existing NGO community to promote its best interests (Brown 2012).

Hamas’s newspaper is not their only method of communication with Palestinians and the world. Like Western social movements, such as the Black Lives Matter movement, Hamas has had a large impact on social media, especially in the most recent war with Israel in 2014 (Zhang 2014). Hamas has used both images and hashtags on twitter to help gain support and to depict daily life in Gaza to the world. The hashtag “#GazaUnderAttack ” from the movement’s most official and popular Twitter account, @hamasinfo, was a trending topic on Twitter in 2014 and continues to be used to reveal atrocities committed by Israel on Gazan civilians. “Every data entry by Hamas-related social media fits under one of the following six categories: positive incentives, persecution and threat,

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war damage, military display, criticism and attack, and diplomatic services” according to one study in 2015. “Positive incentives” made up the majority of Hamas’s tweets; generally advocating for resistance and unity (Zhang 2014). Like videos and images spread by the Black Lives Matter movement to reveal police brutality in the United States, videos and images of Israeli soldiers beating Gazan civilians or demolishing Gazan homes have gone viral and created an online space for Gazans to inform and attract sympathy and outrage worldwide (Ismail, “#GazaUnderAttack”). Hamas’s use of social media has not gone as viral in the U.S. due to language barriers, but supporters of the group in the Arab world can easily access information and updates on the movement and the situation in Gaza through its social media accounts.

Conclusion: the Future of Hamas as a Social Movement

Hamas has demonstrated considerable success in solidifying Islamic social institutions in the Gaza Strip and in leveraging these institutions to bolster its power as a political actor and as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip. Hamas remains deeply rooted in Gaza’s daily life and has been successful in thwarting opposition, in solidifying its power there, in forging a tense political relationship with Israel and Egypt, and in securing support from Arab Gulf governments. Now, Hamas’s goal is to challenge PLO authority in the West Bank and potentially take over the area as it did the Gaza Strip. To do this, Hamas would have to exponentiate its social programs and activism strategies to increase public support. With the help of tools such as funding from the Gulf, social media, NGO support, and civilian frustration with the stagnancy of the PLO in the West Bank, Hamas could spread its control there, and ultimately unify the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a Palestinian Islamic ideology and government.

Additionally, by publicizing their social action work, Hamas could gain increased validation and support from international bodies that currently characterize it exclusively as a terrorist organization.

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Discrepancies in Human Rights and Refugee Rights: Implications of Overmilitarization and Policing on Refugee Rights

By Ramya Ravi

About the Author

Ramya Ravi is a third-year studying Public Policy and Biochemistry.

Her main policy interests include international affairs, housing, healthcare, education, and income equity. Her research interests focus on the application of data analysis in informing and improving policy-making and implementation, as well as in identifying both root causes of inequities and successful upstream initiatives.

Abstract

Governments have started to use national security as a way to get around many laws, especially concerning privacy, immigration and even the conventions on universal human rights. This impacts refugees in both determining who is allowed into the country, and what rights they have in camps or when they arrive to a host country. Despite the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights and local conventions, there are many violations in camps and host countries, especially for the rights to life, health, work, assembly, and of non-refoulement. These violations and oversights are becoming increasingly important, as there are more and more refugees and internally displaced people, with unresolved conflicts and new causes of migration, such as climate change, paralleled with an overall global decrease in support for refugees.

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Foreword

Ramya Ravi's paper, Discrepancies in Human Rights and Refugee Rights: Implications of Over-militarization and Policing on Refugee Rights, was written for professor Mrinalini Chakravorty in the Department of English.

The paper was chosen for the Journal due to its analytical eye upon contemporary refugee circumstances. Her analysis offers insight upon the difficulties refugees face as well as policy issues that permit these difficulties to exist. Moreover, this engaging piece directly grapples with the future of refugee rights as it offers solutions and a critical analysis of current policies.

Over-Policing of Refugee Camps: Violations

Syrian refugees in the Arsal region of Lebanon have been forced to dismantle their homes to remove the upper half of their house so that all refugee houses were shorter than 5 cinder blocks high. This is one way in which the government of Lebanon is indirectly trying to push refugees out of the country and back to Syria (Simpson et al.). While this theoretically should be in violation of the housing guarentee, there is no minimum standard of housing that is guaranteed or can be enforced.

In February of 2018, refugees from Congo who were placed in the Karongi District camp of Rwanda protested the lack of food and poor housing conditions. In response to the unarmed, peaceful protesters, Rwandan police used live ammunition and tear gas, killing 12 refugees and wounding many more in one day. More than 60 refugees were then arrested and detained in the following months. The government continues to lie about the details and there have not been any investigations into this human rights violation (Simpson et al.). These acts directly violate refugee’s rights to life and safety, but due to over-policing and fear of militarization of refugee camps, people are often not allowed to even congregate or assemble, with curfews and restrictions on leaving and re-entry, which also violate many laws that are superseded by the priority of “national security”. The African Union has Declarations that Congo has signed which guarantee the right to life and assembly (AU Banjul Charter). In this particular situation there is also no way for refugees to bring this to attention, since the government and local police are the parties violating human rights.

In Dadaab and other camps, there are similar restrictions on leaving and working, all despite the stipulations of the African Charter on Human

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and People’s Rights that clearly enshrines the rights to personal liberty, protection, association, assembly, movement, property, work, and education (“African Commission on Human Rights”). While the focus is on citizens, human rights should be applied and enforced for refugees and camps.

In Papua New Guinea, asylum seekers have been arbitrarily detained and denied lawyers and access to their families. They are placed in unsafe conditions with little food and resources, despite not having committed a crime. Most of the detainees are men from Iran and will not be released unless they “volunteer” to return to where they had just fled. since Iran does not accept the forcible return of people who were rejected for asylum. This is in direct violation of the non-refoulment clause in the 1951 convention (“Papua New Guinea”).

Many governments of countries with refugee camps have used the risk of militarization of camps as basis for these violations. While there are examples of militant organizations using camps as recruitment centers, like in Dadaab, where terrorist groups offer salaries of $600/month, or al-Shabaab in Somalia, or in Zaatari near the Syrian-Jordanian border; the main cause of militarization is the lack of resources for refugees (“Reducing the Risk of Militarization in Turkey’s Refugee Camps”). While it is hard to prove direct causations, many non-UN backed organizations like Amnesty International and other Human Rights groups have started to find correlations between lack of funding and rises in militarization (“Refugee Rights in 2018”). If refugees were allowed to go to school, work, and have enough to eat, not only would recruiting be ineffective, but governments could focus the money they currently spend on over-policing borders towards support programs, preventing militarization and eliminating the need to over-police the camps and refugees themselves. While these steps would not completely eliminate the threat of militarization within camps, they would make it far less effective, as the driving force for violence and recruitment within refugee camps is poverty, hunger and poor living conditions. Many governments also use this threat and past examples even in camps and countries with minimal evidence of infiltration, and try to shut down camps, reduce funding or reduce refuge rights.

Shortcomings and Flaws in Current Policies

In 2018, the UN tried to make changes through the Global

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Compact to provide better guidelines for the international community, but failed to make any real changes. The Compact was severely lacking in what it set out to address, as there are no mentions of human rights or refugee rights, nothing supporting climate change being a valid reason for migration, and nothing about non-refoulement, therefore contributing to the continued lack of autonomy for refugees. The international community continues to ignore refugee voices by cutting them out of decision-making and needs to start consulting refugees when deciding the best course of action (Amnesty International).

Not only are many host countries reducing their resettlement quotas, but many countries are using “national security” as reasons to forcibly send back migrants, violating non-refoulement. There are many examples in these past few years, with more than 10,000 Afghans forcibly returned from Europe between 2015 and 2016. This continued even last year in 2018, with Finland deporting 75 people, Germany sending back 366, and many other countries, like the Netherlands and Norway, also starting to send people back (“Refugee Rights in 2018”). Europe, like the US, has stopped accepting refugees from certain countries. The EU has not only started reducing the number of refugees they are accepting, but has also started helping countries in preventing people from fleeing through militarization. The EU has supported governments like Libya in putting the lives of people who are trying to flee in danger. Amnesty International reports that over 1,200 people were reported dead or missing near the central Mediterranean coast over the summer of 2018 (“Refugee Rights in 2018”). This is also reflected in Europe’s increase in funding for border control, and their deal with Turkey, which was established despite clear evidence of continued human rights violations, including shootings and beatings of refugees, a clear violation of the declared rights to life and freedome from torture (Buxton and Akkerman 2016).

As governments continue to cut funds for programs that support refugees, there has been an increase in community-based organizations that are sponsoring refugees. While this has been successful in countries like New Zealand, Canada and Spain, the push towards criminalizing refugees as a way to shirk responsibility is also affecting theses groups through both policies that restrict what organizations can do without government support (with laws that allow arrest of those that help undocumented immigrants) and by influencing public perceptions to make people less likely to help by associating refugees

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with words like “invaders”, “illegal aliens”, and “threats” in official press releases and reports."

The US government has spent billions of dollars on ineffective border control, but continues to cut funds for organizations that resettle refugees. In February of 2019, Congress offered President Trump a deal that would put $1.375 billion towards 55 miles of fencing near the Rio Grande Valley. In addition to these funds, President Trump also appropriated $2.5 billion from the Department of Defense’s Drug Interdiction program, $3.6 billion from the Department of Defense’s military construction funds, and $1.5 billion from elsewhere within the Department of Defense (American Immigration Council). This was justified by the President’s claim that refugees are bringing over guns and drugs, when it has been proven that most of the time it is the other way around, with Americans smuggling arms and drugs through countries in South America and the Northern Triangle. For example, at least 50% of the guns in El Salvador are from the US (News Republic). Focusing solely on borders allows us to ignore the lack of resources and support available to refugees once they arrive and are re-settled. These are all in violation of the rights stipulated in Chapter 1 (General Obligations) and Chapter 2 (Civil and Political Rights) of the Inter-American Commission on Rights (OAS IACHR). These include the right to life, judicial personality, and privacy. This document also clearly stipulated that these rights are guaranteed to every human: “jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition….For the purposes of this Convention, "person" means every human being.” (OAS IACHR).

Additionally, the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) budget has doubled from $3.3 billion in 2003 to $7.6 billion in 2020.

Facilities to hold detainees are also now more overcrowded and underfunded than before. Instead of funding more resources at these centers, the money is shifted towards fencing, surveillance technology, and aerial vehicles (American Immigration Council). This over-policing further propagates the idea of a division between foreigners versus insiders, so that US citizens view refugees as outsiders, with a lot of politics surrounding the distinction of who is allowed into the Country. Countries like the United States should

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have a moral obligation to use this money towards providing more training and better support both financially and with resources, but since there are no clear laws around refugee rights, many countries can do whatever they want.

Policy Shifts

The emphasis on border security is harmful for refugees and asylum seekers, not only due to the criminalization and resulting over-policing, but also because this drives the focus of resources and discussions towards the question of who gets entry rather than about the actual rights of refugees once they arrive. While debates on who qualifies as a refugee are very important to help update the definition in new contexts, more resources to support refugees after they arrive are needed. Refugee rights once they arrive, as described by the UNHCR declaration, are also very vague and ambiguous and national laws by host countries are often temporary and constantly changing.

While both the definitions of refugees and the implementation for accepting them need to be updated, a first step to setting and defining clear refugee rights is a new declaration that is applied to host countries as well as to camps. The main issue with trying to implement this would be to ensure countries still maintain their camps with a minimum number of refugees. A law or addendum to the UNHCR that only lets countries reduced the number of refugees by a certain small percent every couple years, except in cases of economic or other issues, may need to be implemented so that countries cannot suddenly stop or exclude certain countries, ethnicities, or backgrounds. While some governments could potentially still use refugees and re-settlement as a political bargaining tool, this would hopefully help keep current refugees protected since more countries are taking in fewer refugees because of the rise of the public perception of refugees as invaders and national security threats.

The Universal and various other regional Declarations and Conventions on Human Rights stipulate rights that are often ignored or seen as not applicable to refugees. Part of this is due to the over-militarization of refugees and part of is due to the feeling that nothing more is owed to the refugees since they are already being taken in. A possible way to try to address this is to convey more accurate representations and facts about refugees in the media through collaborations with actual refugees. The definitions of refugee rights and of national security threats need to be updated with a requirement for strong compelling evidence that is reviewed by a third party before reducing or violating any of those rights.

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New policies are needed that also address contemporary, non-Western causes of migration, such as climate change and different forms of violence.

Also needed is a body to oversee and enforce human rights in refugee camps.

This organization needs to not only factor in refugee voices and opinions in re-settlement and crisis solving, but also provide an avenue for refugees to bring up grievances and violations, since there is often no way for refugees and asylum seekers, and especially undocumented immigrants, to report these clear violations and exploitations.

While this shift needs to be implemented into policy, it would be hard to enforce given the lack of accountability. Since there are no real repercussions for a country that ignores this, it would be hard to advocate for change when many governments continue to cover up and deny these violations. Figuring out how to hold host countries and organizations like the UN accountable is the next challenge in the step forward, especially since many countries are on the verge of shut down refugee acceptance. Many European countries that are trying to decrease the number of refugees being accepted would just stop accepting refugees all together if there is too much intervention as well. This would be especially problematic if the host country itself has to put up more money and resources for things like greater access to education, medical care, and better housing. Therefore, the UN would also need to invest more money into these camps and provide incentives for host countries. However, since many countries have signed multiple documents in support of maintaining these rights, a first step would be getting it into policy and then working on enforcement and a more direct line of communication between refugees and international organizations, rather than through relying on the host country intermediary.

The 26 countries that have signed the current UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees have already agreed to uphold these rights. However, many of the articles in the document are vague and give the ultimate power to the host country since many of the “guaranteed rights” can be modified as seen fit by the host country. For example, the wording in Articles 20-23 on rights like housing, social security, and education are very vague and are subject to change, with phrases like “as favorable as possible” and “in line with local authorities” (UNHCR USA). Education is only guaranteed until elementary level, and even that can not be currently enforced. This needs to be updated to lay out clear stipulations for minimum standard of housing

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conditions, such as how many people can stay within a certain square mileage, as well as basic health and building codes.

Refugees should be guaranteed certain rights that cannot be taken away regardless of national security. While this is hard to enforce and would require countries to step up and take responsibility, which is hard to force, this would be a step in the right direction in protecting these rights. Refugees should be guaranteed the right to life, safety, and housing that meets a certain condition after a certain number of months that a camp has been established, and work in all situations, with better enforcement. Even after host countries accept refugees, they continue to either ignore or criminalize them. The way that this manifests is different; in the US, refugees are expected to work right away and only get access to certain resources if they are working, but in other countries, such as the UK, it is illegal for refugees to work. This was shown in the movie Dirty Pretty Things as refugees were not allowed to work in the UK and this was used as way to deport and criminalize refugees who needed to work to eat and pay bills. Despite the portrayal of refugees as a risk, refugees are the ones who are at risk themselves as they are often trafficked and exploited through jobs or over food and housing when it is illegal for them to work. Despite the universal human “right to freedom from torture or degrading treatment�, refugees have no way to escape or report exploitation in these situations without the risk of being arrested or deported.

The US needs more support for refugees. While I was interning for the International Rescue Committee (IRC), I got to see how caseworkers distributed resources and how long they were allowed to support refugees after their arrival and how long employment specialists in the IRC helped refugees through their first couple jobs. The right to work is not only good for refugees, but also local business in resettlement cities. For example, in Charlottesville, many of the present refugees work in hotels and restaurants, and local businesses rely on their work. Additionally, medical care (including access to appointments and interpreters) and financial assistance for certain utility bills are only available for the first 2 years, after that refugees in the US are expected to make it for themselves with little job training or support.

While I was there, many families I worked with talked about how they still needed more support after that arbitrarily determined two-year limit was up, since this time did not factor in things like unemployment, unforeseen bills, or unexpected health costs, especially for medications. We need more funding

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for programs that support refugees and asylum seekers. While it would be hard to convince the current administration to put more funding towards refugees, arguing for more rights is crucial. Being able to access the same resources as citizens would allow for better and safer resettlement. Even thought the UN’s Declaration on Human Rights guarantees the right to seek asylum (Article 14) and the right to a nationality (Article 15), many countries make it harder and more dangerous to flee, like the Europe/Turkey dilemma, and do not allow for the same rights for refugees (“UN Declaration on Human Rights”)

While I personally think that once we accept a refugee into the United States, they should get the same rights as citizens, this would be hard to push into policy. But some ways to implement more rights are creating updated UN protocols on refugee rights and restricting valid invocations of national security and protocols of actions in response to crises, as the best way to address refugee crises is to prevent them from happening or worsening through enforcement of human rights and international pressure and intervention. We need to update national security laws for what is considered a valid threat and when it can be invoked and what rights it can and cannot take away during these times of valid threats. The best way to approach this is to set up new international committees through conventions to 1) oversee and remedy violations through more direct communication with refugees themselves, 2) to review invocations of “national security” or other issues cited by a host country in either not accepting certain refugees or reducing the number of refuges accepted, and 3) increased funding, as well as better resource distribution and access to aid.

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