Washington and Lee University
The Mudd Journal of Ethics
Volume 9 Fall 2024
COVER ART DRAWN BY MARY CORCORAN
The Mudd Journal of Ethics
The Mudd Journal of Ethics is a peer-reviewed academic journal that publishes undergraduate work on a wide range of topics in ethics. Each spring the Washington and Lee University Roger Mudd Center for Ethics sponsors an undergraduate conference in ethics featuring papers that will be published in that year's journal. The journal and conference are student-governed endeavors with support from faculty and staff in the Mudd Center for Ethics. Student editors coordinate the call for papers, review and selection processes, and run the conference from start to finish.
The 2024 Mudd Undergraduate Ethics Conference was hosted by Editor-in-Chief Margaret Thompson ’24 and Associate Editor Amanda Tan ’26 on February 17, 2024. Paper presentations by Benedict Loo U-Hui from the National University of Singapore, Erica Esterly from United States Military Academy at West Point, and William Bray ’26 from W&L were followed by responses from W&L Editorial Board members Claire DiChiaro ’26, Sydney Smith ’24, Tan, and Natalie Eger ’27.
The 2024 conference featured a keynote lecture, entitled Play, Spontaneous Freedom, and the Avant-Garde, by Jonathan Gingerich, associate professor of law at Rutgers University. Gingerich was selected by members of the Editorial Board. His research explores ways in which moral and political philosophy can be enriched by attending to experiences that are often neglected in contemporary normative theory, such as experiences of spontaneity, artistic creativity, and cultural participation. He is developing a novel theory of freedom focused on the freedom of unplanned and unscripted activity, which he calls “spontaneous freedom.” More information about Gingerich’s work is available at jonathangingerich.net.
About the Mudd Center for Ethics
The Roger Mudd Center for Ethics was established in 2010 through a gift to the university from award-winning journalist Roger Mudd. When he made his gift, Mudd said that "given the state of ethics in our current culture, this seems a fitting time to endow a center for the study of ethics, and my university is its fitting home."
Today, the Mudd Center furthers that study of ethics by organizing rigorous, interdisciplinary programming. In addition to welcoming distinguished lecturers throughout the year to speak on ethical issues, the Mudd Center also sponsors and organizes ethicsbased conferences, professional ethics institutes, and other public events that further discussion and thought about ethics among students, faculty, and staff at Washington and Lee and beyond.
About Roger Mudd
Roger Mudd (1928 – 2021) graduated from Washington and Lee University with a degree in History in 1950. Mudd’s distinguished career in television journalism includes positions at CBS, NBC, PBS, and the History Channel. He has won five Emmy Awards, two George Foster Peabody Awards, and the Joan S. Barone Award for Distinguished Washington Reporting. Mudd served on the board of the Virginia Foundation for Independent Colleges (VFIC) and helped establish the VFIC Ethics Bowl, an annual competition in which teams from Virginia’s private colleges and universities debate ethical issues. He was also a member of the advisory committee for Washington and Lee’s Department of Journalism and Mass Communications and was an honored benefactor of Washington and Lee.
The Mudd Center Journal of Ethics Editing Team
Editor-in-Chief:
Margaret Thompson ’24 is from Dallas. She is majoring in cognitive and behavioral science and minoring in philosophy and law, justice, & society. She currently serves as the editor-in-chief for the Mudd Journal of Ethics and the chair of the White Book Review Committee. Margaret also works as a career fellow in the Office of Career and Professional Development and is an active member of the hearing advisor program, Kathekon, and the Senior Gift Committee. She previously served as general co-chair of the First-Year Orientation Committee and the president of Chi Omega Fraternity. After graduation, she will be working in human resources but eventually plans to attend law school. In her free time, Margaret loves to read, particularly murder mysteries.
Associate Editor:
Amanda Tan '26 is from Richmond, Virginia. She is pursuing a cognitive and behavioral science and business administration double major. She participates in CBSC research and enjoys writing poetry and hiking in her spare time. Amanda is a member of the field hockey team, Ethics Bowl team, as well as the University Wind Ensemble and Orchestra. Her career interests include human resources and clinical psychology.
Editorial Board:
Watson Deacon ’24 is from Kansas City, Kansas. He’s majoring in English and minoring in philosophy. After graduation, he plans to work as a consultant before pursuing an MFA in poetry. He enjoys reading fiction, listening to music, and spending time outdoors.
Bella Devraj '25 is a junior from Mandeville, Louisiana, majoring in neuroscience and philosophy. She is a member of the track and field team and a peer tutor for the Harte Center for Teaching and Learning. Bella is also an active member of the Burish Tutoring program and the Outing Club. After graduation, she plans to attend medical school. In her free time, Bella likes to watercolor, hike, and bake.
Claire DiChiaro '26 is a sophomore from Norwalk, Connecticut. She is double majoring in English and strategic communications and minoring in digital culture and information. She is involved in Ampersand, The Radish, and the Outing Club, and is a member of Pi Beta Phi. She loves traveling, reading, and being outside.
Natalie Eger '27 is a freshman from Wilmette, Illinois. She is undeclared in her major, but plans to focus in humanities and social sciences. She is a member of W&L's treble choir, Cantatrici, and enjoys running, crocheting, and being outside in her spare time.
Sam Griffiths ’24
Elias Malakoff ’25 is from Seattle. His major is religion, and he is broadly interested in the intersections of literature, religion, philosophy, and art. He is a member of the golf team at Washington and Lee. He is also a member of the chess club. Two of his favorite authors are Flannery O’Connor and J.M. Coetzee.
Charlie Moore ’23
Rebecca Nason ’25 is from Columbia, Maryland. She is majoring in politics and minoring in data science. At W&L, Rebecca works as a university ambassador, serves on the Library Student Advisory Board, participated in Washington Term, and is part of the Blue Ridge
Mile Clinic. This summer, she is interning at a supply chain optimization and procurement consulting firm.
Saaraim Núñez ’27 is from San Antonio, Texas. He is majoring in philosophy and politics with a minor in law, justice, and society. He is a Bonner Scholar and serves as community service chair for Club Latina Estudiantil. Saaraim is also a member of Mock Trial, the Ethics Bowl team, and is a writer for the Ring-tum Phi. In his free time, Saaraim likes to play and watch soccer, practice Portuguese, and color.
Siya ’27 is from Gurgaon, India. She is undecided about her major but is most interested in exploring economics, physics, and computer science. On campus, she is currently involved with the Library Student Advisory Board, the South Asian Student Organization, the Contact Committee, and the Bonner Program. In her free time, Siya loves to read, cook, and cycle. She hopes her time at W&L, and the Mudd Editorial Board, will be one filled with a rich learning experience, exposure to new perspectives, and guidance in shaping her future path.
Sydney Smith ’24 is a junior from Damascus, Maryland, in pursuit of a biology major and poverty and human capability studies minor. Sydney spends her summers as a geriatric nursing assistant in a nursing home and volunteers with Rockbridge Area Hospice and Campus Kitchen during her time in Lexington. Sydney is also a member of the Mudd Student Ethics Society, the women’s soccer team, Red Cross Club, and Alpha Epsilon Delta health professions honor society. Following graduation, Sydney plans to attend medical school.
Margaret Witkofsky ’24 is from Ridgely, Maryland. She is majoring in religion and minoring in French and law, justice, and society. She is the vice president of the Francophone Student Organization, manager of Women's Leadership Programming and a senior peer tutor. After graduation, she plans on attending law school. Outside of class, Margaret loves spending time outside and hiking.
Teresa Yoon ’26 is from Seoul, South Korea. She is double majoring in accounting and studio art. She currently serves as the activities coordinator for the Pan-Asian Association for Cultural Exchange and the treasurer for the women’s club volleyball team. She is also a financial analyst for Diversified Capital Group as well as an introductory fellow for the W&L chapter of Effective Altruism. Teresa’s long term goal is to use her own investment portfolio to fund herself as an independent artist. Teresa does not have two kidneys.
Supervising Faculty
Rachel Levit Ades, Ph.D. is the Postdoctoral Fellow at the Mudd Center for Ethics. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Arizona State University in 2023 and B.A. in philosophy from Carleton College. Her areas of specialization are the philosophy of disability, applied ethics, and social and political philosophy. She is interested in questions about difference and imagination and what it means to participate in the world. Rachel has worked in deaf education, special education, and inclusive arts education, and she is passionate about community projects that apply ideas about ethics and access.
Letter from the Editor-in-Chief
Margaret Thompson ’24, Washington and Lee University
Dear Mudd Journal Readers,
As my time as editor-in-chief of the journal draws to a close, I reflect with profound gratitude on the privilege it has been to serve in this role over the past year.
Driven by a deep curiosity about ethics, I joined the Mudd Journal my sophomore year as a member of the Editorial Board. Engaging with my fellow members of the Editorial Board, authors, and the Mudd Center staff has been nothing short of enriching and intellectually stimulating.
I want to extend my heartfelt appreciation to each individual who has contributed to the success of the journal this year. In particular, I want to thank Amanda Tan, whose dedication as associate editor has been invaluable. I am also immensely grateful to Rachel Levit-Ades, Kate Saacke, and Karla Murdock, whose unwavering support has been instrumental throughout this journey.
This year's publication is a testament to the collective efforts of our community. We are privileged to present three exceptional authors, each offering unique perspectives on diverse topics. It is my sincere hope that through your engagement with their work, you will not only expand your intellectual horizons but also challenge yourself to grow personally and ethically.
As I pass the torch to the next editor-in-chief, I am confident that the Mudd Journal will continue to serve as a platform for thought-provoking discourse and meaningful dialogue. Thank you for your readership and support.
Warm Regards,
Margaret
Table of Contents
Nudging and Paternalism: A Critical Examination of Their Permissibility and Potential Implications in Contemporary Policymaking
Benedict Loo U-Hui, National University of Singapore . . . . . . . 1
On Identity and Epistemological Understanding
Erica Esterly, United States Military Academy at West Point . . . 10
Can Objective Aesthetics be Used for Valuing Nature?
William Bray, Washington and Lee University .
15
Nudging and Paternalism: A Critical Examination of Their Permissibility and Potential Implications in Contemporary Policymaking
Benedict Loo U-Hui, National University of Singapore
Abstract
This essay critically examines the permissibility of nudging and paternalism, highlighting their potential benefits and pitfalls. While nudging is generally lauded as permissible because it preserves an agent's freedom of choice, paternalism invites greater scrutiny due to infringing on an individual’s liberty. This essay argues that paternalism can be justified in specific contexts despite its restrictions on choice. The essay discusses the mechanisms through which nudges and paternalistic laws can lead to desirable outcomes and considers the implications of both approaches in policymaking and the nuanced act of balancing individual freedom and societal welfare when implementing nudges and paternalistic laws.
Introduction
In recent years, governments and public officials have shown a considerable increase in interest in leveraging the behavioral sciences to advance public policy goals (Krawiec, 2021). In particular, governments have been increasingly employing nudges in policymaking, effectively allowing them to alter the choice environment of their citizens and steer them towards better options without limiting their freedom of choice (Schmidt, 2019). Meanwhile, governments have also continued adopting a paternalistic stance in their policymaking decisions. Paternalism is defined as, "the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced” (Dworkin 1972, 65). Briefly speaking, paternalism entails an infringement of an agent’s liberty justified because it is “for their own good.” This typically manifests in the enactment of paternalistic laws where the government removes citizens’ freedom of choice to protect them from harm or to promote their own well-being, even if those laws are against the citizens’ wishes or interests. Nudges and paternalistic laws are, thus, similar in that both aim to improve citizen satisfaction and outcomes in contemporary policymaking. However, they differ in their degree of interference. Nudging is seemingly permissible, given that an agent’s freedom of choice remains intact. On the other hand, paternalism is seemingly impermissible given that it infringes on an agent’s freedom of choice since it mandates citizens to follow the state's law. This essay, therefore, examines the permissibility and potential implications of nudging and paternalism in contemporary policymaking. In particular, I will first examine how nudges can lead to beneficial outcomes before considering paternalistic laws. I will argue that even though paternalism limits an agent’s freedom of choice, it can lead to beneficial outcomes that warrant its permissibility in specific contexts. Due consideration will also be given to the potential pitfalls of enacting paternalistic laws before considering the potential implications arising from the outright removal of paternalistic laws. This emphasizes the importance of caution that public officials should embody when enacting paternalistic measures despite their permissibility.
The Benefits of Nudging
Schmidt (2019) postulates that using nudges in policymaking does not limit an agent’s freedom of choice, given that their options remain unchanged. Instead, nudging changes how choices are presented to them. Nudges can, therefore, be beneficial as they can be used to guide agents to seemingly better options and, hence, outcomes without interfering with their personal choice or autonomy. Some may argue that nudges are impermissible because they interfere with an agent's freedom of choice by skewing how they will perceive different choices in a given option set. For instance, if a nudge is used to make a specific choice more salient and/or ideal, it would increase the propensity that an agent would choose that specific option, which suggests that nudges do, in fact, interfere with an agent's autonomy which renders it impermissible. Although this argument does present a valid critique of nudging, it does not take away from the fact that the said agent can still make a different choice should they choose to do so in the presence of a nudge, indicating that their freedom of choice is still preserved, which thereby warrants the permissibility of nudges.
Take, for example, the Singaporean government’s use of nudges to increase the uptake of vaccinations among Singaporeans during the COVID-19 pandemic. The government introduced “vaccination differentiated safe management measures (VDS),” which made vaccinations necessary in order to enjoy certain benefits, such as the ability to dine in at eateries or to enter shopping malls (Khalik 2021). This policy choice was attributed to the fact that non-fully vaccinated people infected with COVID-19 “are more than seven times more likely to become critically ill,” which is not only detrimental to their own health but also further reduces the already strained healthcare system’s capacity (Poa 2022). The employment of the VDS in Singapore effectively presented the choice of becoming vaccinated as more desirable than remaining unvaccinated, given that more conspicuous privileges are afforded to the vaccinated, contributing to the increase in overall vaccination rates (Poa 2022). This is not only beneficial for those who choose to become vaccinated (since they are less likely to become critically ill if they contract COVID-19) but for society as a whole (since the strain on the healthcare system would be alleviated as fewer nonvaccinated individuals are critically ill in the ICU). It is also important to note that this policy choice does not infringe on the freedom of choice to remain unvaccinated should Singaporean citizens want to do so since it is not a vaccine mandate. Some critics might argue that the inability to go to a public place is in and of itself an impingement on an individual’s freedom of choice. That being said, it is noteworthy that the norm during the COVID-19 pandemic was that most countries closed their public spaces to curb the spread of the virus (Sepe 2021). Thus, the Singapore government's employment of the VDS to allow vaccinated individuals to go to public spaces should be portrayed as the enhancement of a vaccinated individual's freedom rather than the incursion of an unvaccinated individual's freedom.
The above example of Singapore's use of nudges in the form of the VDS to promote vaccination rates illuminates the benefits that nudging can bring in contemporary policymaking as it allows governments to steer individuals toward options that are beneficial not only for themselves but for society as a whole as well. Furthermore, nudging simply alters the choice environment and does not infringe on an individual's freedom of choice, which warrants its permissibility. Singapore's successful case study in employing effective nudges could serve to propel increased acceptance and, hence, a greater shift in governance around the world toward taking more proactive and preventative
nudges aimed at addressing societal challenges ranging from public health crises, such as the aforementioned COVID-19 pandemic, to increasingly salient concerns such as environmental sustainability.
The above section has illuminated the benefits that nudges can bring to contemporary policymaking, which is bolstered by the fact that they preserve an agent's freedom of choice. Having said that, it is not necessarily the case that governments and policymakers believe that preserving an individual's freedom of choice is an uncompromising trait that takes precedence over all else in policymaking, as seen from the prevalence of paternalistic laws around the world. While nudging operates within choice architecture, paternalism is characterized by a more direct form of interference where an agent's autonomy is infringed upon. The next section transitions to exploring the complexities of paternalism to provide a broader view of the discourse surrounding the government's role in balancing the interests of public welfare with that of personal liberties.
The Benefits of Paternalism
Dworkin (1972) defines paternalism as the interference with a person's freedom of choice justified by considerations of their own “welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values” (p. 65). Paternalistic laws greatly differ from nudges in policymaking because the former restricts the freedom of choice of their citizens out of the paternalistic belief that it is beneficial for them, while nudging merely operates within the realm of choice architecture. In response to paternalism, libertarians such as Mill (2001) argue against it because “neither one person nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it” (p.70). In essence, libertarians argue that paternalism is unjustified because people are more likely to understand their interests better than the government and should, therefore, be left to make decisions about choices that affect themselves without interference. Having said that, it is crucial to recognize that while individuals are generally capable of rationality and making informed decisions, there are instances in which they may be unable to act in their best interest given external factors or cognitive biases. Paternalistic interventions can, therefore, be justified in such cases despite their incursion on individual liberties insofar as they can safeguard the actual interests of said individuals.
In order to build upon the discussion of paternalistic interventions, it is imperative to examine and analyze examples that demonstrate the complexities and implications of such laws/policies. A salient example is Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF), which is a mandatory social security savings scheme created by the Singaporean government to provide retirement, healthcare, and housing benefits for Singaporean citizens and permanent residents. Both employers and employees must make monthly contributions to the CPF, which are calculated based on the employee’s age and as a percentage of the employee’s wages (CPFB 2023). Although the Singaporean government provides an attractive compounding interest rate on CPF savings of up to 4 percent, it is important to reiterate that contributions to the CPF are mandatory. Singaporeans are essentially forced to contribute to it without their consent, given that they cannot opt-out even if they would like to (CPFB 2023). The opposition to the CPF’s forced saving scheme can be explained by how it effectively reduces the average Singaporean’s “take home” pay (Mohan and Kit 2023), which has become especially salient at a time when the average Singaporean is struggling to adapt to the higher cost of living (Yi 2023).
However, research has found that individuals tend to suffer from bounded rationality. Bounded rationality limits human cognitive capabilities and knowledge in decision-making processes (“Bounded Rationality” 1990, 15-18). This can occur in the form of hyperbolic discounting, which is an individual’s inclination to choose present rewards over future rewards, even if the value of the future rewards is higher than that of the present ones (Black et al., 2012). In the aforementioned case of savings, this would mean that individuals would under-save and/or under-invest for retirement because of their increased propensity to discount utility from a future event at an increasing rate given the psychological preference for present levels of utility, or in other words – immediate gratification (Thaler and Benartzi 2007, 81-104). For instance, an individual may choose to splurge on a lavish holiday instead of saving for their retirement because they are unable to accurately perceive the benefits that retirement savings would entail for their future self in comparison to the immediate gratification that they can get. This clearly reveals the necessity of Singapore’s paternalistic CPF policy, given that it helps Singaporeans to more amply save for their retirement than they would have done so in its absence, given the negative ramifications of bounded rationality. This, thereby, reveals that enacting paternalistic laws can be permissible despite the fact that they essentially eliminate a person's freedom of choice since they can lead to beneficial outcomes due to the fact that people are not always fully rational.
The Potential Pitfalls of Paternalism
The enactment of paternalistic laws places a great amount of faith in governments and public officials to make the right policy choices for the benefit of their electorate. This faith can have negative, albeit unintended, consequences. For example, consider the aforementioned mandatory social security savings scheme in Singapore, the CPF. Husain (n.d.) showed that empirical estimates indicate decreases in private voluntary savings offset increases in mandatory CPF savings in Singapore. This could be attributed to the fact that Singaporeans view the mandatory contributions to their CPF accounts as sufficient for their savings/retirement goals, making them less likely to engage in private voluntary savings, a form of compensatory behavior. However, reliance solely on CPF savings poses a significant risk that individuals are left inadequately prepared for their retirement. Surveys have revealed that most Singaporean workers rely solely on their CPF savings for their retirement, even though the payouts from the CPF may not be sufficient to meet one’s retirement income needs (Chang 2018). Thus, the Singapore government’s use of mandatory social security savings in CPF contributions may inadvertently harm Singaporeans, albeit unintended, as Singaporeans may understate private voluntary savings as necessary for their retirement. This serves to illuminate that paternalistic laws/mandates can result in adverse effects, suggesting that extreme caution needs to be exercised by governments and public officials when enacting such policy choices. After all, these policymakers are humans and, hence, are fallible too. As such, the successful implementation of a paternalistic law would be defined by its deliberate enactment, reducing its likelihood of failing and/or leading to adverse outcomes. The systematic approach consisting of key stages such as research and consultation with key stakeholders would ensure the law’s increased likelihood of achieving its desired outcome.
The section above has revealed the potential pitfalls of paternalism and, thereby, raises the question of the potential implications of removing a paternalistic law should it be
unable to achieve its desired outcome. The next section endeavors to examine the potential implications of repealing a paternalistic law by analyzing the legalization of assisted suicide for individuals with psychiatric illnesses. There, I will confront the question of where to draw the line between paternalistic protection and individual choice while also addressing the need for public scrutiny to ensure the government's choice to repeal such paternalistic laws is rooted in the goal of enhancing the public’s autonomy and welfare.
The Potential Implications of Removing Paternalistic Laws
Now that I have established a potential objection libertarians have against paternalism and the potential pitfalls that paternalism entails, I will consider the potential implications of removing paternalistic laws. For example, consider the case of Canada in 2021, where they passed a law to allow patients who suffer from intolerable psychiatric illnesses to use euthanasia (Komrad 2021). The legalization of assisted suicide for the mentally ill is effectively the same as removing the paternalistic law of deeming suicide as illegal because it essentially removes legal barriers for an individual to choose to end their own life in certain circumstances – which grants individuals increased autonomy over their endof-life decisions in both cases. This is desirable in the eyes of libertarians as individuals suffering from intolerable psychiatric illnesses have the freedom of choice to end their lives along with their pain and suffering. It is fair to assume that such individuals would best understand their pain and suffering compared to policymakers not involved in the situation.
The practical implications of enacting this policy change were not considered, which resulted in a delay in implementation. For instance, some clinicians were concerned that the healthcare system was unprepared to handle complex cases, given that a set of “best practices guidelines” had yet to be established amongst them (Cecco 2022). This is problematic because assisted suicide involves potentially lethal medications or procedures, which makes it essential to ensure that patients are fully informed and have given informed consent. As such, the lack of clear guidelines entails that there is an increased risk of errors, miscommunication, and other problems that could jeopardize patient safety. Thereby revealing that the sudden transition away from paternalistic laws, as is the case with Canada's legalization of euthanasia, needs to be done cautiously as they can have profound ramifications for individual and societal welfare if there are inadequate safeguards in place to facilitate such a change.
More interestingly, this might be a tactical move that the Canadian government has made to reduce the strain on healthcare services under the guise of expanding the liberties of its citizens. Favaro (2022), a CTV National News medical correspondent, revealed concerns that the Canadian government’s move to legislate assisted suicide for the mentally ill came at a time when Canadian health services were under immense stress. For instance, “the wait times for our [mental health] treatment programs in Ontario are up to five years” (Favaro, 2022). Braswell (2021) corroborates this by postulating that the legalization of assisted suicide of the mentally ill “would only make it easier [for the Canadian government] to avoid the hard but necessary work of meeting the needs of disabled people.” The legalization of suicide for the mentally ill provides a simple remedy to the problem of an overstrained healthcare system since it would reduce the need to allocate time and resources to other alternatives, such as therapy and rehabilitation services. This, therefore, implies that increased public scrutiny is required to ensure a government's choice to repeal such paternalistic laws fundamentally stems from their desire to enhance the populace's
autonomy and well-being and not for any other potential ulterior motives such as to reduce healthcare expenditure which is possibly the case in Canada’s move to legalize euthanasia. Moreover, the fact that the legalization of assisted suicide is specifically for the mentally ill makes it inherently discriminatory. The Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (Corbella 2012) propounds that this “two-tiered system” of legalizing assisted suicide for the mentally ill would mean that such individuals will receive suicide assistance when they request it whilst the non-mentally ill would receive suicide intervention, perhaps in the form of therapy or rehabilitation services. This could potentially signal to society that the lives of the mentally ill are worth less, given that it implies that trying to intervene on behalf of the mentally ill is deemed ineffective. Not to mention the fact that this would eventually result in the “death” of the socially inferior group of the mentally ill because they will no longer receive suicide intervention should they request euthanasia.
This Canadian case study reveals that the electorate must increasingly scrutinize the removal of paternalistic laws, given the potential implications. The sudden removal of paternalistic laws without the establishment of clear guidelines can be potentially harmful because it can jeopardize the well-being of the very individual it seeks to benefit. Furthermore, it could also be done out of the government’s desire to find simple remedies to complex policymaking issues as opposed to the enhancement of liberties. This would result in poorer resource allocation, governance, and even the protection of vulnerable groups such as the disabled. Due consideration must also be given to whether the removal of a paternalistic law is for all peoples or if it is ‘two-tiered’ given that the latter is inherently discriminatory and can lead to undesirable outcomes.
Conclusion
In summary, this essay has engaged in a critical examination of nudging and paternalism in contemporary policymaking. I first examined the mechanism by which nudges can lead to beneficial outcomes. This happens by altering the choice environment of agents whilst preserving their freedom of choice. Next, I considered the use of paternalistic laws by governments, and I concluded that paternalistic laws are indeed permissible despite limiting an agent’s freedom of choice. This is because they can lead to beneficial outcomes. I also illuminated the potential pitfalls of enacting paternalistic laws owing to the fact that policymakers are human and, hence, fallible. Lastly, I considered the potential implications that may arise from the outright removal of paternalistic laws. This essay has, therefore, revealed that although nudging and paternalism do indeed have an indisputable place in contemporary policymaking, they need to be used with a great amount of care and consideration because they profoundly influence the day-to-day lives of civil society.
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On Identity and Epistemological Understanding
Erica Esterly, United States Military Academy at West Point
Abstract
This paper explores the intricate interplay of social identities and epistemological understanding, particularly in the context of racial and ethnic diversity in America. It identifies the polarizing opinions on how identities should be treated, cautioning against extremes like identity blindness and reductionism. Drawing on Linda Alcoff's analysis of subjective and objective identities, this paper emphasizes the importance of recognizing the impact of one's identity on interactions. It advocates for critical reflexive openness, as proposed by Miranda Fricker, to navigate biases and prejudices. This paper further underscores the significance of hermeneutic horizons – the unique perspective of each individual formed by different experiences – in shaping perspectives and argues against dismissing identity. Finally, this paper asserts that understanding unique struggles fosters collective cohesion while avoiding regressive attitudes.
Social identities are integral to the fabric of human existence and interactions, and yet contention remains about how one ought to treat their identity. The racial and ethnic diversity in America has polarized beliefs about how identity ought to be understood in the context of communities, education, household, and the work force. Some fervently believe that identity ought to be ignored and focus should be placed solely on qualifications. Conversely, too much of a focus on identity can lead to a hyperfixation on certain aspects of personhood and a dangerous inclination towards reductionism, or reducing an individual’s personhood down to the identity to which they belong. Tokenism, the choosing to grant one some sort of status simply because of their identity, is a harmful approach to understanding identity (Gillespie 2022). Linda Alcoff, a professor of social epistemology at City University of New York, discusses the impact of identity in her examination of Sonya Sotomayor’s famous remark regarding the “richness of experience” that an old Latina woman may have compared to an old white man (Alcoff 2010). In her writing, Alcoff compares subjective and objective identities and integrates her examination of Sotomayor’s quote to aid her argument for why different people see the world in unique ways (Alcoff 2010).
This concept, described by Hans-Georg Gadamer as a “hermeneutic horizon,” is the perspective that everyone has a unique outlook of the world, or a “horizon,” that is shaped by the individual and their choices, experiences, and attitudes (Alcoff 2010). However, understanding one’s identity, and the fact that each person has a unique perspective, is just the beginning of developing epistemic knowledge. Individuals ought to dedicate themselves to practicing critical reflexive openness to achieve epistemic justice, a virtue proposed by Miranda Fricker, a professor of philosophy at New York University. Fricker’s development of concepts related to identity such as critical reflexive openness – – or the ability to receive, verify, and trust knowledge given to us – – is useful in understanding how to improve interactions with others. Communities can better recognize the epistemological differences between groups and navigate tension through intentional consideration of one’s identity, collective understanding of hermeneutic horizons, and implementation of critical reflective openness.
Understanding identity is important to avoid reaching one of two common extreme positions: identity blindness and identity reductionism. In America, differences in identity politics have plagued communities, media outlets, and areas of political discourse, hampering the ability for individuals to engage in authentic discussions in epistemological endeavors. Epistemological understanding of identities refers to the fact that each person has a different awareness and cognition about their identity and about the identities of others. Misunderstandings often occur between groups when individuals fail to critically examine their prejudices and lack knowledge about objective identity structures. Alternatively, those who are apathetic argue that recognizing others’ objective identity as an attempt at diversifying workplaces and communities is a waste of time and energy and can be unfair towards others. However, when individuals genuinely challenge themselves to understand the backgrounds of others, it can lead to a greater ability to see differences in identity as an enriching aspect of the human experience. Lending credence to the value of acknowledging the identity of others begins with a critical evaluation of oneself. Engaging in critical consideration of one’s own identity and the identity of others is an important task in furthering one’s breadth of epistemological understanding.
Polarizing opinions about the way that identities ought to be treated has led to dangerous angles such as identity blindness – neglecting to recognize identity at all – or reductionism. The first extreme, identity blindness, is characterized by an unwillingness to consider the identity of other individuals and instead adopting an active ignorance towards one’s racial, ethnic, and gender features. This attitude, though perhaps well intended, stifles the perceived individual’s ability to understand and interact with their identity and prevents the perceiver from acknowledging any personal preconceived judgements they may have. Further, insisting on a blind attitude towards important facets of a person is often an excuse to be passively dismissive of the privilege and accessibility that surrounds certain groups of people. The other extreme, identity reductionism, describes a hyperfixation on objective features of identity and a disregard towards any aspects of a person deeper than the groups to which one belongs. This approach is similarly damaging because it undervalues the personhood of individuals and leads to damaging effects such as tokenism. Tokenism manifests in forms such as “diversity picks,” or the decision to choose someone of a minority group for a position based solely on the identity with which they associate, can have a detrimental effect on individuals. Working to avoid one of these extremes in approaching identity will foster important conversations between different identity groups.
Social identity can affect epistemological understanding if one is not aware of their identity and the way that identity impacts interactions with others. The concepts of subjective and objective identities clarifies how individuals see themselves. Akeel Bilgrami, a professor of moral philosophy at Columbia University, defines subjective and objective identities and expresses how these identities inform the insight individuals have about themselves. Bilgrami describes subjective identity as what one conceives oneself to be, and how these perceptions influence the thoughts and feelings individuals have about themselves. Objective identity is the way one is viewed by others, based on external characteristics, stereotypes, or preconceived notions. Sometimes, individuals can struggle to understand the full extent to which their objective identity influences the viewpoint of others in their work environment, home life, and social setting. Internally, those within an identity group may not realize how aspects such as location, community history, and generational wealth affect their status among others. Subconscious biases can manifest
externally through prejudiced notions about individuals within different identity groups. Additionally, Alcoff notes that objective identity ought to be understood as the way that one is positioned and ascribed worth in social systems according to features about their identity. It is important to recognize that oftentimes one’s objective and subjective identities do not align, meaning that the way that an individual views themselves is incongruent with the reality of how others perceive them.
Dissecting the distinction between these identities and the consequences that occur when these two identities are disconnected is important to understand the impact of one’s objective identity on themselves and the interactions one has with others. While subjective identity is malleable to their beliefs, experiences, and holistic perception of themselves, objective identity is beyond their power to change. When individuals interact with the reality of their objective identity, they have a better understanding of the privileges, opportunities, and resources – or lack thereof – that may be associated with their identity. Gaining awareness of objective identity often entails encountering the reality that socially constructed institutions treat different identities with distinct degrees of equity. To build epistemology of identities, one ought to attain a full understanding of their subjective and objective identity, which requires comparing one’s internal view of themselves with aspects of their objective identity. Moreover, understanding where these identities converge or detach from each other can aid one in developing an awareness of how identity impacts navigating interactions with others. Furthermore, one ought to critically evaluate the veracity of one’s subjective identity by using self-awareness to compare one’s perception with reality. This ability to critically evaluate subjective identity further entails a willingness to adjust that perspective of their identity if needed. Seeing oneself and others through structures grounded in reality will further help individuals to avoid identity blindness and reductionism.
Some argue that instead of focusing on identity, communities may reach a common understanding by focusing on shared human hardships. Proponents of this view argue that to reach cohesion and unity between groups, communities ought to focus on the struggles endured by people regardless of identity, such as poverty, unemployment and access to education. Those who support identity blindness argue that differentiation based on identity may only divide groups further, instead of helping groups develop epistemological knowledge. This objection hinges on the argument that all people, regardless of identity, undergo the same difficulties, and so concentrating on understanding each other’s shared adversity is more effective at bringing groups together. While it is true that there is knowledge to be gleaned from sharing struggles, this argument neglects to consider how certain struggles disproportionately affect certain identity groups. Recognizing these issues helps develop critical epistemological understanding among individuals who are otherwise uninformed about these problems. Once individuals understand the issues that affect people with different identities, communities can work together to implement change and reform systems. While relying on common human adversity to bring communities together is an important aspect of forming collective cohesion between groups, discrediting the impact of identity will only cause communities to regress.
Furthermore, this argument ignores how having a certain identity or undergoing adversity that is specific to a group shapes the perspective one has about the world. The concept of hermeneutic horizons is significant because it captures the principle that individuals in an identity group share profound connections to certain events. Individuals
can relate heavily to others who have similar shared experiences, developing unique outlooks about interpretations of these events. Hermeneutic horizons are a vital aspect of grasping why certain events had a greater impact on some individuals rather than others, and are unique because each person has a unique outlook. Additionally, hermeneutic horizons help individuals avoid identity blindness or reductionism, and instead holistically view someone else’s personhood. To neglect this aspect of objective identity is to neglect to consider how certain experiences affected groups of people in profound ways, which others may ignore. Starting to identify and become more attune of the hermeneutic horizons of others is just the beginning – as Alcoff says, “hermeneutic horizons are starting places, not end points,” (Alcoff 2010). Hermeneutic horizons are helpful to recognize how each person’s view and experience is drastically different from another’s because of the factors that affect one’s perspective about the world. However, one must intentionally restructure engrained prejudices and assumptions to truly increase one’s knowledge of identities.
Using identities and horizons to consider one’s epistemic processes allows individuals to increase their understanding of those who are different and increase cohesion between communities. However, while helpful, simply acknowledging the effect of identities and including them in discussions is not enough. The prejudices and judgements that are deeply interwoven into the fabric of one’s decision-making processes can be difficult to identify in our subconscious. Thus, endeavoring to adjust one’s perspective authentically and quantifiably about how identities are involved in understanding others requires a willingness to listen. Fricker’s concept of critical reflexive openness describes the virtue of receiving the testimony of others, acknowledging it, and lending the testimony credit. The goal of critical reflexive openness is to ascertain knowledge by practicing openmindedness towards others and critically reflecting on one’s own views. Critical reflexive openness begins with the internal process of evaluating one’s views and the way they are projected onto others. Critical reflexive openness can help prevent certain prejudices from manifesting from identity blindness and identity reductionism. Epistemological justice cannot be achieved until one has judiciously analyzed one’s own biases and the way these prejudices inhibit one’s thought processes.
In conclusion, identifying the ways that social identities affect epistemological understanding helps individuals form cohesive bonds both within and between groups. A functional understanding of identity entails critically evaluating subjective and objective identities and recognizing misalignment between the two. A deep examination of identity is important to avoid identity blindness, identity reductionism, and one’s own prejudices. Further, individuals ought to implement critical reflexive openness to evaluate one’s own beliefs and subconscious biases and to better understand the way that hermeneutic horizon differs between people. By practicing the virtue of critical reflexive openness, individuals can better understand why certain experiences and events are more important to certain identity groups, and individuals who lack understanding about other identity groups can be held accountable for their ignorance and apathy by developing self-awareness. By intentionally taking the time to grasp one’s own identity, and working to implement critical reflective openness, communities can work towards epistemological understanding and avoid polarizing extremes.
References
Alcoff, Linda. “Sotomayor’s Reasoning.” http://www.dialogoglobal.com/barcelona/ readings2018/AlcoffReadings/Alcoff-Sotomayor-Reasoning.pdf.
Ashokkumar Manoharan, J. Christensen-Hughes, G. Garib, S. Gröschl, D. Gursoy, K. Iverson, et al. “Identity-Conscious vs Identity-Blind: Hotel Managers’ Use of Formal and Informal Diversity Management Practices.” International Journal of Hospitality Management, May 13, 2014. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0278431914000693.
Gillespie, Claire. “Tokenism Isn’t the Way to Achieve Diversity and Inclusion.” Health, December 7, 2022. https://www.health.com/mind-body/health-diversityinclusion/tokenism.
“Your Full Self: Social Identities and the Workplace.” YW Boston, August 23, 2023. https://www.ywboston.org/2020/10/your-full-self-social-identitiesand-the-workplace/.
Can Objective Aesthetics be Used for Valuing Nature?
William Bray, Washington and Lee University
In Aesthetics and the Value of Nature, contemporary philosopher Janna Thompson attempts to establish aesthetics as an objective foundation for an environmental ethic where wild nature possesses intrinsic value due to its beauty. Objective differences in aesthetic value could then be applied as a new environmental, aesthetic ethic. To prove this, Thompson considers art as an analogous case, considering several examples of parallels of aesthetic value between art and nature. However, I argue that the objectivity of art criticism cannot be translated to nature.
Thompson establishes the work of 20th century philosopher G. E. Moore as a foundation in aesthetics by regarding beauty, whether in nature or art, as an intrinsic good. By extension, Thompson concludes that as good things, all beautiful things should be appreciated. The difficulty for Thompson lies in proving that differences in beauty are objective. For art, Thompson argues that critics are expected to provide a justification for why they think a work of art ought to be valued, and through appreciating criticism we can gain an improved understanding of the beauty of a work of art (Thompson, 292). Thompson argues that in the same way this establishes an objective platform for valuing art, studying nature can provide an objective way to value nature. This would provide the possibility for a practical aesthetics framework to approach environmental issues while the exact metrics for objectively valuing nature are open to improvement.
Thompson’s aesthetic is relatively intuitive and has clear practical applicability, so it may be easy to accept. Additionally, Thompson presents a philosophy that is reconcilable with other contemporary environmental ethicists, such as J. Baird Callicott, while separating her philosophy from objectionable parts of those philosophies. For example, Callicott’s argument to value the history of nature is separated and even disproved by Thompson, but the desirable conclusion is still achieved with Thompson’s arguments. Callicott writes in support of a “land ethic,” first proposed by the conservationist Aldo Leopold. According to Callicott, everything in nature is intrinsically valuable. To fully realize and appreciate this value, Callicott finds it necessary to study natural history and ecology (Callicott, 125-136).
Allen Carlson, a contemporary philosopher in environmental aesthetics, uses this as a foundation for a positive nature aesthetic, though both he and Callicott find categories of aesthetic appreciation of art not appropriate to nature (Thompson, 295). In contrast to the land ethic of Callicott, Thompson’s aesthetic is more equipped to address specific cases, whereas a land ethic calls for appreciation of all land but does little in instructing how to prioritize one ecosystem over another.
I argue that because different methods must be taken for valuing art and nature, Thompson’s proof of the objectivity of such a valuation of nature does not apply. Thompson does address a related objection, which she claims too readily accepts the idea that the intentional nature of artistic products makes their evaluation different from the evaluation of natural objects because not all judgments about art do or can depend upon reference to artists’ intentions (Thompson, 300). However, Thompson fails to prove that those evaluations specifically are objective. Just because some art critiques are objective does not necessarily mean that all critiques of a certain category of art are as well. Additionally, all comparisons between nature and art provided by Thompson are not necessarily objective. Thompson’s first comparison between art and nature examines the magnificence of the
Chartres Cathedral and the Grand Canyon. Thompson stresses that above all, they both have aesthetic value by providing a feast for the senses (Thompson, 301). As such, their value is subjective. The Grand Canyon is likely to provide significantly less of a feast for the senses to a blind individual compared to a sighted one due to physical limitations on experiencing the canyon through means other than sight. While it may be objective to say that most people are able to appreciate the Grand Canyon’s magnificence through their senses, and that such sensations may be better than at other locations, these are statistical estimates for the majority of current humans. Additionally, two individuals with identically well-functioning sensory organs will have entirely different sensations from witnessing the Grand Canyon, which suggests that those senses are subjective. Thompson relies on magnificence, not geological or biological information, that separates the Grand Canyon from a less aesthetically valued place. Therefore, Thompson’s reasons for the Grand Canyon having greater aesthetic value are subjective.
Thompson then compares Van Gogh and a forest of eucalyptus, citing their ability to challenge the senses as a source of aesthetic value (Thompson, 302), just as oak trees and a less challenging painting may have some beauty, but not to the extent of Van Gogh or the eucalyptus. However, Van Gogh’s art is great because he was able to portray the world in a way other than it exists, such that it must challenge everyone’s senses, whereas those who are used to eucalyptus are not challenged by it but might be by the planted oak trees. Because the eucalyptus’ additional value is subjective, Thompson again fails to demonstrate the objectivity of art translating to the objectivity of nature. Such a property is also arguably subjective within art criticism, because a Van Gogh painting challenges the senses much less now, as his style is widely known, and as a result they have become the artistic equivalent of a planted oak tree in Thompson’s analogy.
Thompson then compares how certain art works challenge one’s perspective with how wild nature causes one to consider perspective. However, unlike with art, where some works of art challenge perspective more than others for all individuals, all of nature has this effect. The only difference in nature is how frequently individuals are prompted to think about it. For example, an individual spending a week in remote wilderness may still not meditate on their place in nature. Likewise, a botanical garden may have this effect more frequently than a wild grassland even though the botanical garden is designed by humans. The source of these differences lies in how challenging nature is to one’s senses. If one is raised in remote mountains, they will not have such an effect on that individual, but a rainforest might. The only difference between the two is that one is foreign and challenges the senses, causing the individual to consider their perspective. Therefore, my argument above on challenging the senses applies. This difference, as described with the oak and eucalyptus above, is created by subjectivity. Therefore, challenging perspective is also not an appropriate metric for objective aesthetic value in nature.
Thompson argues that by connecting us to the past, both culturally significant art and nature both have aesthetic value beyond that of other works of art or ecosystems, respectively. Therefore, plains resembling those that once covered much of Australia are significant in the same way early Renaissance paintings are significant, proving that such an ecosystem has objective value. However, this analogy assumes that like art works, nature is static. The plains she observed may have resembled what once was, but in truth, they are quite different and are naturally destined to change. In deciding what history of nature to deem culturally significant, subjectivity is introduced. Only through a work of art, such as
a photograph or painting, can this be achieved objectively. Value would be provided by the wild ecosystem in the form of ecology and natural history, neither of which are related to aesthetic categories presented by Thompson. For example, an art critic would not praise a work of art just because it pictured a historically significant location, even if it provided historians with valuable insight. Likewise, the significance of a landscape resembling what once was a culturally significant type of ecosystem is difficult to connect to other than through the historical insights it might provide. Such insights are not related to aesthetics, demonstrating the lack of objective aesthetic value in an object that can connect us to the past.
An objection Thompson might make is that I proved subjectivity but failed to disprove the existence of some objectivity in aesthetic valuations of nature. Thompson does not explicitly argue that non-intentionally based criticism can be objective, or that it may be subjective in some instances. However, one could argue that this does not mean that such criticism can never be objective. Additionally, in the same way that subjective and objective metrics may be used to value art, it may be that humans may value nature in a combination of both subjective and objective metrics. Similarly, it may be possible to construct metrics on which to ground an objective aesthetic evaluation of nature, but that these have not yet been developed, just as one could imagine there being no art critic with objective standards to evaluate Paleolithic cave paintings when they were created.
I argue that taking this stance would reduce the effectiveness of Thompson’s conclusion due to any remaining possibilities of objectivity being indistinguishable between different ecosystems. It may be that some objective metrics can be considered in any aesthetic consideration of beauty. However, this seems to lead to identical objective arguments that can be made about everything in nature. All of nature has history and an aesthetically appreciable form, and the significance of one history in comparison to another seems quite subjective. As a result, it is not clear that differences in value can come from objective assessments. Instead, only a baseline value may be established for all things. This would render Thompson’s arguments useless in applied ethics. Additionally, Thompson fails to prove that any objective metrics in valuing nature can be separated from subjective ones, which would pose significant problems in the application of aesthetics as an environmental ethic. For example, if biodiversity were used as an objective measure for an ecosystem, subjectivity would still be introduced in what actual quantity was considered representative of biodiversity (species richness, species diversity, genetic diversity, etc.). These metrics may have further embedded subjectivity in recording, the area of land considered, and what we consider distinct species.
As a brief summary, Janna Thompson’s art analogy relies on the objectivity of criticism outside of the artist's intentions and its translation to nature as an analogous case. However, examination of comparisons presented by Thompson demonstrates that such metrics are not always objective. Additionally, the possibility of some objectivity still renders the ethic nonfunctional through an inability to separate subjective and objective or establish differences in objective valuations. Therefore, Thompson’s aesthetic environmental ethic is at least extremely weakened, though it may still be possible to use aesthetics to approach ethical problems if one is willing to accept some subjectivity. Implications of this might involve environmental decision making based on cultural significance, accepting that at some point in the future, under different cultural conditions, those decisions are viewed as wrong.
References
Thompson, J. (1995). “Aesthetics and the Value of Nature.” Environmental Ethics. 17(3), 291-305.
Callicott, J. Baird (1987). “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic.” Pojman, Louis P. (2001). Environmental Ethics: Readings in theory and application (3rd ed.). Wadsworth. 125-136.