WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT? Understanding North Korea’s posture in negotiations—in particular, what its ultimate aims are—is critical to choosing the appropriate policy levers to achieve denuclearization. As outlined above, there has been an apparent shift in how Kim Jong Un approaches the goal of regime survival, which requires a renewed analysis of the government’s long-term objectives. Irrespective of any shift in strategy, there is broad consensus that Kim’s foremost priority is preserving the current regime—that is, maintaining a sovereign state under the control of the Kim dynasty. All other objectives of the regime, such as nuclear armament and economic development, serve to fulfill that goal. However, there remain significant disagreements as to how North Korea is likely to balance competing priorities. In particular, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the fundamental question in the current negotiations: is North Korea willing to give up its nuclear weapons program? Considering the inherent uncertainty around the regime’s strategic calculus, the following presents the spectrum of prevailing views of North Korean interests on key subjects germane to the negotiations. This section does not attempt to divine Kim’s true intentions so much as to document that competing narratives and uncertainty exist.
Nuclear capacity There are two primary opinions regarding how North Korea views its nuclear weapons program: as a means to an end or as an end in itself. Those who believe that North Korea’s nuclear program is a means to an end argue that the Kim regime’s aim in acquiring nuclear weapons is to use those weapons as a bargaining chip to seek improved relations with hostile states. This interpretation of North Korea’s motivations maintains that Kim is willing to denuclearize in exchange for a fundamentally changed strategic relationship with the United States and concrete security assurances. On the other hand, some argue that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is an end in itself and that the regime sees possession of nuclear weapons as essential to regime security. According to this view, Kim has no intention or incentive to denuclearize. Rather, he is using negotiations to extract concessions from the international community while buying time for further weapons development.
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FORGING A PATH FORWARD WITH NORTH KOREA
