Appendix

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Appendix A: Our suggested statement for the Biden Administration regarding the U.S.-Republic of Cyprus strategic partnership, outlining the main contours of the U.S. Cyprus strategy articulated in this report.

Appendix

Office of the Press Secretary

[To be released after or during a senior level (Assistant Secretary or above) meeting between the governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus.]

Statement by the President on Encouraging Conflict Resolution in Cyprus

The United States supports the return to settlement talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities under the bizonal, bicommunal federal framework. The United States stands ready to assist our Cypriot friends to settle a conflict that has divided both communities for over five decades. We call on the leaders of both communities to de-escalate tensions and return to productive talks. President Biden has long supported settlement talks among the two parties, commending both communities for their historic progress towards settlement on one of his last calls with foreign leaders as Vice President in 2017.

We continue to recognize the strategic importance of Cyprus and its many decades as a strong U.S. partner in the region. As the United States seeks to expand cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus on a range of issues including trade, investment, and security cooperation, we are deeply concerned about the malign influence of Russia and other foreign powers in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

We are also concerned about intensifying hostilities in the region. The United States strongly condemns Turkey’s provocative behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean. We call on Turkey to respect international norms and laws regarding maritime boundaries and natural resource development.

The United States calls on the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to restart talks on a comprehensive and fair settlement for the benefit of all Cypriots and for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

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Appendix B: Background on U.S. Defense Trade Regulations with the Republic of Cyprus

In 1987, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to restrict U.S. sale or provision of military aid with the goal of avoiding an arms race and fostering reunification efforts on the island. In December 2019, Congress passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019.135 This Act lifted the prohibition, allowing for the export, re-export or transfer of arms and services on the U.S. Munitions List to the RoC. The aim is to advance U.S. security interests in Europe by helping to reduce the dependence of the government of the RoC on other countries, including countries that pose challenges to U.S. interests around the world, for defense-related material. Some restrictions remain, the Secretary of State may deny exports based on “credible human rights concerns,” and the Act requires the U.S. President to certify annually that the RoC is working to implement AML regulations and taking steps to deny Russian military vessels port access.

However, in October 2020, the Trump Administration took advantage of a provision in the Act and in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 allowing the President to waive the AML and port access limitations and allow transfers of non-lethal defense articles and services if “it is essential to the national security interests of the U.S.”136 According to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department: “The interagency license approval process will review potential exports to Cyprus on a case-by-case basis to ensure only non-lethal defense articles and defense services are approved for export.”137 If the administration deems it necessary, the United States could permit exporting lethal aid. Additionally, if there is a certification of the above, then the administration cannot have a policy of denying defense articles to the Cypriot government. While the waiver can only last one fiscal year, there is no explicit language forbidding the administration from renewing it. The authorizing legislation refers to the U.S. Munitions List (USML) codified in regulations under part 121 of title 22 in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), but the list does not explicitly differentiate between lethal and non-lethal articles and services. U.S. law already provides mechanisms to allow lethal aid and Congress could make it easier by removing the limitations. However, Congress intends for Cyprus to make efforts to combat AML and deny Russian naval visits, the latter of which will be challenging for the RoC government to achieve. A Biden Administration may face some political pushback if they extend the waiver or even certify Cypriot progress if there is no meaningful reciprocation from the Cypriot government. Additionally, any progress an incoming administration can attain from Cyprus would have to outweigh the inevitable fallout from Turkey should the United States permit lethal aid to the Cypriot government.

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Appendix C: Monitoring Russian Influence

The United States may evaluate if new policies are working to decrease Russian influence in Cyprus by measuring 1) the prevalence of Russian narratives in traditional and social media spaces, 2) a contraction in formal diplomatic relations, 3) frequency of Russian naval visits to Cypriot ports, and 4) influx of Russian money on the island. To evaluate the first metric, the State Department’s Bureau of Global Public Affairs Research and Analytics team and Global Engagement Center’s Science and Technology team could utilize custom, advanced analytics tools to measure the relative volume and engagement with Russian media sources and Russian-based accounts on Cypriot social media compared with U.S., European, and Cypriot sources. These reporting tools could assess how Russian influence in the media space has changed over time, especially while the United States is implementing other short and medium-term recommendations in this report. To evaluate the second, the appropriate offices should track the number of state visits and signed agreements between the states and note in particular decisions by either side to jettison planned agreements, such as Russia’s decision to throw out a tax deal this past August.138

In addition, the same office should track the number and type of Russian calls to Cypriot ports to assess whether these are decreasing.

Finally, given that billions of dollars in Russian money is registered in Cyprus but invested in other locations, the United States should assess whether the number of Russian bank accounts on the island and the amount of money in those accounts continues to decrease. Similarly, understanding the level of Russian tourists, as measured by the number of tourists annually and the proportion of Cypriot GDP composed of Russian tourism, will help the United States understand the role that Russian tourism plays in perpetuating Cyprus’ interest in appeasing its Russian demographic. In particular, it will be important to evaluate if Russian tourism to Cyprus rebounds to previous levels following the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the pandemic’s effect of virtually eliminating Russian tourism could be an opportunity for U.S. policy to prevent it from returning to prior levels, thereby cutting off one mechanism of Russian influence on the island.