EURER#5 Including Institutions: Boosting Resilience in Europe

Page 72

sure, language barriers do play a role, as does the lack of portability of pensions and healthcare benefits. Moreover, qualification requirements and certification procedures create an additional constraint. In particular in services, making up over 70 percent of euro area GDP 47, entry and conduct regulations are often overly restrictive. The 2016 EU Regular Economic Report No. 3 focused on this largely unfinished reform agenda of creating a single market for services 48. As a result, population movements within the EU contribute little to economic convergence, even over longer periods. The economic convergence or catching-up process can be decomposed into two components: the first capturing population movement to lower and higher income countries and regions, and the second capturing catching-up growth in GDP per capita. Between 2000 and 2016, only 5 percent of the observed catching-up process could be attributed to population movements 49. Population movement accounted also for only 7 percent of the decline in the coefficient of variation (i.e. the standard deviation divided by the mean — a measure of variability) between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 2.2). Figure 2.2  Population movements contribute little to economic convergence

Decline in coefficient of variation

Decomposition of the decline in coefficient of variation into that due to changes in population compared to changes in GDP per capita 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 –0.02 2000–2008

2008–2016

2000–2008

National Change due to population movements

2008–2016 NUTS-2

Change due to GDP convergence

Note: World Bank estimates using purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant at the national and NUTS-2 level (dataset identifier: nama_10r_3gdp). The decomposition is conducted by comparing the coefficient of variation using yearly population weights compared to holding population weights fixed at the beginning of the period (2000 or 2008). The comparison of these figures gives an estimate of the amount of dispersion that could be linked to population movement. Note that this estimate can be considered to be a lower bound since population shifts contribute to changes in GDP and also feed through directly to GDP per capita. Source: World Bank calculations.

Is labor migration in response to economic shocks an optimal short run economic response? Within the EU, a recent study shows, large emigration of talent can have a negative impact on the “sending” member states and depress economic growth by reducing the productivity of the smaller and less-skilled workforce 50. Given its costs, only the adjustment to a permanent change in the national (or regional) economic perspectives could justify migration on a larger scale. Even then, this would imply running the risk of depleting a nation (or region) of its labor force, often particularly high-skilled labor, which would limit future regional growth opportunities.

Eurozone institutional architecture: a work in progress The eurozone’s institutional architecture was significantly strengthened as a result of the crises of the last decade. The crisis triggered reforms in key areas of the EMU. For instance, it became clear that the EMU needed a centralized, discretionary, fiscal backstop (but with strong conditionality), and stronger banking supervision under a single supervisory mechanism, complementing the centralized rule-setting (already in existence before the crisis) with centralized implementation. The current institutional set up is summarized in Box 2.3.

Part Two: Building resilience in the EU  |  77


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Figure 2.20 Trust in institutions (Eurobarometer)

3min
page 104

Table A8.1 Country exchange rate groupings

3min
page 135

Table A7.6 Unemployment volatility and institutional variables

3min
page 134

Box 2.15 Screening and selecting measures of trust

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page 102

Box 2.14 Poland’s successful weathering of the crisis

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page 101

Figure 2.9 Ease of doing business score and output resilience

3min
page 96

Box 2.4 Zimbabwe’s attempts to control the real exchange rate

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page 79

Box 2.3 Eurozone institutional “architecture”

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page 78

Figure 2.3 Correlation patterns across national business cycles (quarterly GDP, 2000–2017)

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page 85

Figure 2.10 Cross-country differences in ease of doing business scores and their changes over time

3min
page 97

Figure 2.2 Population movements contribute little to economic convergence

2min
page 77

Box 2.1 The European Monetary System

8min
pages 72-74

Figure O.5 Shift in the geography of those under €23 per day towards Southern Europe. Half of this population continues to be found in Central Europe however

2min
page 21

Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework: Shocks the real exchange rate, institutions and inclusive growth

3min
page 71

Convergence, business cycle synchronization and the real exchange rate

2min
page 28

Acknowledgements

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page 9

Table O.1: “Heatmap” of outcomes and institutions that support resilience in the EU (2004–14)

3min
page 27

Fiscal policy

3min
page 61

Countries and Regions

1min
page 10
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