UE - El Salvador (2009) (excerpt)

RESEARCHING POST DISASTER URBAN RESPONSES

EL SALVADOR CONTEXTUAL BOTTLENECK: CONNOTATION OF DWELLING IN DISASTER PRONE AREAS

WOUTER POCORNIE & DIEUWER DUIJF

METHODOLOGY an introduction

The country El Salvador is situated in Central America. It shares borders with Guatemala, Honduras and the North Pacific Ocean.

The country is susceptible to earthquakes because of constant seismic activities. Besides earthquakes, El Salvador is frequently struck by hurricanes, storms, floods and landslides .

4

this political context have been associated with Adjacent to these natural disasters waiting either the one or the other party . to happen, other extreme parameters in the political, economical, social and geographical In the first phase: “Preliminary Research” the contexts have to be taken into account in order to focus of the investigation was on the possibilities formulate the situation of dwelling and its urban (domain) to analyze formal and informal postcontext. With a national population density of disaster responses, generalized respectively as 342 people per km2 the capital San Salvador is top-down and bottom-up coordinated approach. the area of focus for this analysis of interrelations between post-disaster responses, urbanization and other spatial characteristics of the city. Most important is to note the influence of the civil war (1980-1992) where the right-wing government, dominated by PCN and ARENA, faced the left-wing guerilla Chalatenango movement FMLN. As a result of Santa Ana the peace agreement the FMLN was acknowledged as a political party but issues such as extreme poverty, socio-economical inequalities, arguably causing the conflict to Ahuachapán San erupt, remained . With almost Salvador Cuscatlán one third of the population living below the poverty line, Sonsonate arguably this political polarization La Libertad stimulates segregation.

This dichotomy is recognizable in conversations with La Paz most of the actors involved in the process of spatial planning, from residents to government Santa Tecla officials both local and central, in the private Mejicanos sector and NGOs. The country has attracted San Salvador the attention of national and international NGOs responding to natural disasters, who in

At the beginning of the second phase: On-site Field Research, a ‘Quick Scan’ tour provided the opportunity to visit multiple possible sites for case study locations, such as La Paz, Las Manatiales, Mejicanos and Santa Tecla. Through interviews and observations information was gathered and first perceptions of the presence of Salvadoran culture were formulated. Nevertheless an unaccompanied visit to the hectic Downtown area, Centro Histórico San Salvador (CHSS), lead to daily conversations and eventually lead to investigating CHSS as cultural input related to disaster proneness, urbanization and spatial planning in general. The main area of focus is Sector Montreal, with specific focus on the northern three communities: Buenos Aires, Finca Argentina and Iberia, in the municipality of Mejicanos, which is situated on the north side of San Salvador and part of the Metropolitan Area (AMSS). Dealing with disaster proneness, gang activity and many other issues the residents established clear social structures in such a way that it was possible to implement the toolbox by observing freely, meet and interview residents and officials, host workshops and distribute surveys. Next to CHSS and Mejicanos,

Cabañas

n

Morazán San Vincente

San Miguel Usulután

Santa Tecla became a case study for specific information on displacement and migration.

Migration and urban planning in this (cultural) context and within a time limit set by various parameters intensifies decision making both for planners as well as the affected people. The three case studies are characterized as three individuals based on observations, analysis and testimonies from different actors and stakeholders. They provide a summarized vision on urban planning and disasters responses in San Salvador.

Tools conceived in Phase 1 were adapted on site. Such as the Incentive Map where different flows of incentives (as disaster responses) were layered accordingly to acquire an insight on consequences for one’s comfort, livelihood, prosperity etc. Consequently this became the main guideline in interviews with residents.

The approach in every meeting was to map the change incentives made in the lives of the beneficiaries: observed in terms of habits.

The focus was on flows (processes). Secondly the verified stories were used as basis before generalizing a topic of interest according to a methodology inspired by Jane Jacob’s words in The Death and Life of Great American Cities: “seeking uncommon clues of small quantities that could lead to the methods how larger, more common quantities are operating” . In the Postproduction Phase (3) observation were verified and specified and additional information was gathered to bridge to a larger scale; from micro to macro, dwelling/neighborhood to national/global, ego to society.

On-site acquired data with tools like GPS and other maps serves La Unión as basis for analyses with Space Syntax to research issues of connectivity, accessibility and security.

5

For a historical interpretation the tool Evolutionary Map illustrates generic cultural background information interrelated to areas of focus. This is distilled into five main disciplines (layers): natural disaster, spatial area, population, political events and economy. These are represented in flows that indicate types of evolution while simultaneously relate to each other in a specific period. The city of Santa Tecla was originated as ‘Nueva San Salvador’ (New San Salvador) after the capital was struck and severely damaged by the earthquake in 1854.

The densification of San Salvador takes place in a horizontal sprawl, embedded in the geographical layout of mountains and volcanoes. The spatial growth of neighbouring city Santa Tecla primarily derived from the strong infrastructural connection to the capital .

The emphasis in this overview lies on the repetitiveness of natural disasters, and the dichotomy portrayed in the political layer. This dichotomy is evidence of violence with extreme confrontations such as La Matanza (The Massacre) of 1932 and the civil war from 19801992. In the layer dedicated to population figures,

6

here it is important to address the ‘continuous’ growth and especially the migration influxes.

The migration during the civil war (1980-1992) was more going out of the country, while the influx coming in began directly after the peace agreement. This influx was stimulated by the deportation of Salvadorans from USA to El Salvador, primarily those with criminal records.

Associated with this is the establishment of criminal organization, gangs which originated in Los Angeles and once established in El Salvador the government could hardly cope with the influx of violence. In some cases gangs are authority figures, such as migration-settlement Chanmico.

The relation to other countries, mainly the USA, is important to address since the number one source of income (GNP) is remittances and the absolute peak of migration (out) for the last two decades, driven by of foreign economic opportunities . Adjacent the landscape alongside the main, most accessible roads are dominated by international franchises, such as gas stations and fast-food enterprises (multinationals).

These international relations (gang activities,

PHASE 1

PHAS

Preliminary Research

On-site Field

QUICK SCAN

10/03/09 - 24/03/09

Workshops Lectures Training

Paraíso de Osorio, La Paz Santa Tecla, Las Collinas Los Manantiales Mejicanos (1) San Pedro Nonualca, La Paz Santa Maria Ostuma, La Paz Mejicanos (2): Montreal, Iberia & Guadalupe Downtown (CHSS), San Salvador

interview

Incentive Map

character case study Mejicanos -risk -aid -coping mechanisms

tools

SECTOR MONTRE

character case study Santa Tecla -displacement -migration SANTA TECLA

character case study CHSS -cultural input -planning

tools

CENTRO HISTOR

workshop

blog

e-mail

observation tools

photography

remittance and international private franchises) have a great influence on the Salvadoran culture, consequently on the built environment.

Accumulated with insecurity issues, striving for identification, inspiring individual mobilisation and very dynamic government change (3 years for local government elections and 5 years for presidential) the class struggles in El Salvador are illustrated in spatial typology and urban life; segregation, gated communities, heavily armed security guards and modest accessible (formal) public space.

7

SE 2

PHASE 3

d Research

survey

Post-production 3x

2x

Exhibition Symposium Publication

EAL

+

+

+

Peque単a Inglaterra St. Gertrudis Cobonal Chanmico 2x

RICO SAN SALVADOR

Presentation

2x

GPS

Space Syntax

4x

800 b.C.

1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980

<1955

1990

1991

1717

1525

1993

1965

1792 1877 1890 indigo capitol connection with Santa Tecla

Sa fou nta T Nu nded ecla : ev a S , afte an r e Sa arth lva qu do ak Sa e r roa nta T ds ecl Sa to W a: n e s rai Sa lro l t fi ad vado nishe sta r-S d Sa rte an d t ta n Sa Sa o o Tec n J lva pe l ac do rat a: ito r: e tow nw as Sa an inf n Sa ne ras lva xe tru do d ctu r: re (ro ad s )o Sa pti mi firs nta T ze d ho t soc ecla : us ing ial o pro rien jec tate ts d

1526-1717

1992

<1977

1932 1542-1546

Sa fou n Sa nd lva ed do , 1 r: 52 6r elo ca Sa ted cu n Sa r vill rent lvado ag l r o e b cat : ec ion am : ec ity

SPATIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT

<1935

1985

1542-1546

1854

1870 1879

+/- 1854 +/- 1859

1903

1903

1870

+/- 1894 - 1940

+/- 1975

1919

28/09/1992

1988

1982

22/06/1922

06/1991

1988

10/10/1986

1982

03/05/1965

06/05/1951

1917

1854

1806

1730

1982

1873

1815

1776

1717 1671

¢

1980

1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980

¢

¢

¢

US A vo star lun ts tar ext y d en ep ded art ure

¢

¢

¢

¢

73 000

1985

¢

¢

50

1993

Civil war en end 19 199 1992

1989 Alfredo Cristiani

0,98 mil

1980-1992

1990 990 1,5 mil

1984 José Napoleón Duarte

54 916

1977 Carlos Humberto Romero 1979

20 000

1972 Arturo Armando Molina

1960-1961 Junta of Government Direc1961-1962 Civic-Military 1962 Eusebio Rodolfo Cordón Cea 1962 Julio Adalberto Rivera Car1967 Fidel Sánchez Hernández

1950 Óscar Osorio 1956 José María Lemus

1935 Andrés Ignacio Menéndez 1944 Andrés Ignacio Menéndez 1944 Osmín Aguirre y Salinas 1945 Salvador Castaneda Castro 1948-1950 Revolutionary Council of Government

1931 Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez

1594

1900 0,13 mil 50 000 1903 5 463

CCIVIL WAR 1987

Civil war start 19 1980

$

00 de US ath wit A sta s hc rts rim to

259

1 100

Independent republic: 14 families FMLN activities intensify Part of United Provences of Central America 1840 “Football War” with Honduras (4 days) 1977 (General Manuel Jose Arce) 1969 Gains independence, part of Mexico 1823 PCN comes to power after military coup 1961 1,9 mil (Agustin de Iturbide) 1821 1950

San Salvador has 3500 habitants

During war 4 billion dollars received from USA 412 1980-1992

Civ es il wa tim r ate d7

1971

1932

El Salvador becomes Spanish colony 1525

1992

77,000

1980 3,5 mil

1982

Religion (2003 est.): 57,1% Roman Catholic 21,2% Prostentant 1,9% Jehovah's Witnesses 0,7% Mormon 2,3% other 16,8 none

19877

) ug hte r Sla

Etnicity: 90% mestizo 9% white 1% Amerindian

1984 8 1984

1980 8 1980

1982 Álvaro Magaña

Natural hazards: 'Land of Volcanoes'; frequent and sometimes destructive earthquakes and volcanic activity; extremely susceptible to hurricanes

4,7 mil 4,5 mil

Revolutionary Government Junta

Climate: tropical; rainy season (May-Oct); dry season (Nov-April); tropical on coast; temperate in uplands

Climate: tropical; rainy season (May-Oct); dry season (Nov-April); tropical on coast; temperate in uplands

MIGRATION INFLUX IN & OUT influx coming IN around 1993-1995 + influx OUT 1980-1992 major influx OUT 1998-2004

Th e

Continent: Central-America Borders: Guatemala, Honduras and the North Pacific Ocean Capital: San Salvador Nationality: Salvadoran Language: Spanish

Area: total: 21,040 km2 land: 20,720 km2 water: 320 km2

Pe es asan tim t u ate pri d 3 sin 0 0 g: " 00 La de Ma ath ta nz s a" (

General country info:

POLITICAL EVENTS/GOVERNMENT

155

500

Country name: conventional/local short form: El Salvador conventional/local long form: Republic(a) of El Salvador

800 b.C.

$1 500 000

1581 1575

NATURAL DISASTERS/HAZARDS

8

¢

¢

¢ ¢

6 bil

3 bil

402 4

1993

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

METROPOLITAIN AREA SAN SALVADOR

<2003

2009

1970

2000

SAN SALVADOR

Mo

re

05/10/2005

2009

Population

05/10/2005

ESTIMATED OF MIGRATIONS IN AMERICA 817 00 to 2,7 mil (13 to 40% of national pop) USA: 90% Canada: 6% Mexico & rest:

lva do

ria ns

90%

GDP

Sa

na o dep l re co ort (U rds SA )

396

¢

¢

¢ 12 bil

¢ ¢

$

$

$

agriculture: 11.2% industry: 24.7% services: 64.1%

15 bil

2008

513 400

EMPLOYMENT IN RURAL AREAS Agricultural Non-agricultural

URBANIZATION

urban population: 61% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 1.9% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)

2,3 mil

9 bil

¢

Metropolitan Area of San Salvador

2004

2009

2001

¢

25% 64%

1,334,529

451

11%

18 bil

$ $

Change of currency from colon to dollar 01/01/2001

Remittances are the single most important source of income 16% as a percentage of GNP 20% of households receive 655% as a percentage of foreign direct investment

LABOR FORCE

2008

844

official exchange rate: $22,28 billion real growth rate: 3,2% (2008 est.)

21 bil

$

1,6 mil

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

121 908

2009 Mauricio Funes

1995

Mejicanos

2004 Tony Saca

1999 Francisco Flores

1994 Armando Calderón Sol

116 575

San Salvador

2008

2009

510 367 209 708

2005

2006

DICHOTOMY

Political polarization: 2009 First time left-wing government is in power

2007

1994

7,185,218 (July 2009 est.) population growth rate: 1,656% (2009 est.)

24 bil

$ $

estimated: 2,5 Salvadorans living abroad

Population below poverty line: 30,7& (2006 est.)

$355 700

24/06/2005

06/2003

dor

03/07/2008

05/2005

10/2003

05 2005

+2,5 mil

7,2 mil

va El Sal

6,7 m mil

304

2000

475

06/1993

2009

05/2001

09/1995

6,1 mil

affected people

tha live n 20 ab % o roa f S d ( alv 90 ad % o in rans US A)

13/02/2001

13/01/2001 10/09/1999

315

33

$22 400

09/2000

25/10/1998

05/1998

$388 100

01/1995

09/1993

26/07/1996

07/1994

$1 500 000

mi

448

SANTA TECLA

+/- 2007-2009

15/06/1993

+/- 1986 - 1995

l

3

2001

<1995

3

3

2000

AMSS

3

Santa Tecla

2007

9

RISK

valley of hammocks In the context of a disaster prone El Salvador many issues such as urbanization and lack of capacity complicate urban spatial planning, leading to an increase in vulnerability to risk which has become unaffordable at this point.

10

San Salvador is known as the Valley of Hammocks, consciously avoided by the indigenous inhabitants of El Salvador but for the Spanish colonists very suitable to founding a settlement which would evolve in the capital it is today . It describes the geographical layout; a scenery of mountain and volcano hills and steep valleys, while at the same time continuously being dynamic and susceptible to risk. Frequent earthquakes, hurricanes, landslides, floods and volcano eruptions form the first degree of risk.

All stakeholders are well aware of this (cultural) issue: the repetitiveness of hazards. This presence forms insecurity and influences the way of living in El Salvador. Afore mentioned other cultural issues, see previous chapter, distract the importance of also being aware of the increasing vulnerability

and exposure to a second degree of natural disasters that are waiting and are likely to happen.

The civil conflict and the rural-urban migration stimulated the growth of the metropolitan area of San Salvador significantly in the last 50 years . This rapid urbanization created a group of urban poor who are exposed to very high risk.

Neglected by neoliberal governmental policies this group has few to no opportunities for being part of prosperity and as a result they resort to dwell in the most disaster prone areas . Numbers indicate that the level of urbanization in El Salvador is 60.3% (2000), with an estimated growth to 69.9% (2010) and 75.6% (2020).

Annually a decline in rural population of -1,08% and an increase of urban population of 3,18% (2000-2010) It illustrates the rapid urbanization. Consequently the city surface sprawls and squatter settlements, shantytowns and outskirt cities emerge and increase their

risk

livelihood

risk

own vulnerability to risk and that of neighboring settlements. The underlying causes for this urbanization demand attention because they form the second degree of risk. Accumulating to this is the way of construction of formal and informal settlements (to house this influx of urban citizens). Because of soil degradation these become high risk areas and increase the vulnerability of their neighboring settlements.

Those underlying causes directly relate to economic decline, increasing inequality, loss of formal-sector jobs, rapid immigration, poor governance and exclusionary actions . They form the second degree of vulnerability to risk but are not solely the direct consequences of geographical, economic, political and social setbacks. In general urban planning does not implement risk as important factor. Adding to the complexity of disaster preparedness is the lack of technical expertise and documentingevaluating-implementing lessons based on past experiences. Described as cultural perception; â&#x20AC;&#x153;Salvadorans seem not to learn from past eventsâ&#x20AC;? . On community level, local NGO Procomes explained that their programs to raise awareness have a very low turn out during the summer, the dry season, but an almost complete attendance during the winter, rainy season, when people are literally losing their homes .

On government level,

Wisner criticizes the missed opportunity to learn and become better prepared after the experience with Hurricane Mitch (1998). The most important aspect here is the lack of governance.

The governmental plans make sense on paper but in the actual practice it fails . The problem is not that they did not learn, but that they do not apply proper communication systems or put the lessons learned into practice. Research that could magnificently compliment urban planning is being done by local NGOs such as Fundasal, and universities in collaboration with international NGOs, such as the UCA and GTZ. For example research that provides results for structural community approach, construction methods and soil characteristics, and evaluation of capacity building. These efforts are applied by the initiator self, but still are not reaching the developers.

Sector Montreal, Mejicanos represents the general increase in vulnerability for urban El Salvador. It originated in the 1970s as an informal settlement and now partially formal with residents that range from urban poor to lowermiddle class . Sector Montreal is one of the most high risk sectors in Mejicanos with low urban vitality. The vulnerability is characterized by weak constructed houses, illegal tenure and

risk

11

risk

risk

socio-economic exclusion. The erosion of soil increases the vulnerability for the vast growing urban population. The newly constructed formal and informal settlements, which benefit from the enhancement of infrastructure in Mejicanos stimulate this process. The top layer called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;terra blancaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; loses its structure easily and does not form a proper layer for foundation. Aside from construction, landslides and flashfloods are a direct consequence of heavy rainfall. Still squatters continue to occupy these areas. Since most squatters occupy no-rent land that has so little worth that no one bothers to have or enforce property right to it, they are tolerated because the sites are temporarily worthless in a depressed economy . While being tolerated they are also prone to be exploited. In Mejicanos private landowners use illegal tenure to exploit some residents, which works easily in already stagnated and low-vitality neighborhoods , but at the same time squatters exploit the social character of the municipality by squatting on municipal ground, aware of having the security of not being evicted .

60%

NO O

50%

70%

YES NO

Familiarity with alarm sytem Sector Montreal

YES

12

The social, leftist perspective of this Municipality also results in distributing aid as much as possible.

They focus on infrastructure and not favour any particular private owned dwelling or plot, while there are houses on the verge of collapsing, or partially destroyed, currently inhabitants are hoping to survive next rainy season. In order to mitigate risk the municipality (with help of local and international NGO plus EU funding) implements alarm systems, protection walls, evacuation routes and community houses for shelter. According to the surveys and workshops in the area they seem to provide comfort and an increase in security although almost 50% is still unaware of the alarm system . The problem in this particular urban fabric however is the lack of options for escaping. Since most dwellings are connected by dead-end passages the most vulnerable at the end of a passage only have one single option to escape and that is the staircase: a canal that forms a lane were a landslide is destroying everything in its path.

YES NO

50% 40%

Buenos Aires

informal settlement

Finca a Argentina Arrg genti a

formal settlement Iberia

landslide

flashflood

soil erosion

The UN describes Risk as hazard x vulnerability , Mike Davis breaks down vulnerability in assets and fragility. Urban environmental vulnerability (risk) = hazard (frequency and magnitude of natural event) x assets (population and shelter exposed to hazard) x fragility (psychical characteristics of built environment) . Considering assets in Mejicanos such as large families and elderly, and a fragility caused by the spatial fabric indicate how some have nowhere to escape when a disaster occurs. The interviewed residents acknowledged the risk, and explained to solely rely on ‘the will of God’ for survival . In the end the poorest in sector Montreal, Mejicanos live in the highest risk areas.

While case study Mejicanos illustrates the risk for outskirt settlements, the situation in CHSS portrays the importance of acknowledging the urban poor and informal economy to a national level. A disaster here would have tremendous national consequences. The infrastructure of the San Salvador city center is of high importance for the national economy, which depends for

80 to 90% on this network . A natural disaster here will form a crisis . The vulnerability to risk increases because of the intensification in CHSS, characterized with crowded streets, market stalls and autobuses that already form a constant threat on the security of the population. This intensification is mainly cost by the increase of the informal economy which continuously grows but caused a peak as a result of the 1986 earthquake . When an earthquake occurs here, the ready-to-collapse buildings could come down. The second degree of risk is also illustrated by (flash)floods such as the one in 1921 when the water level reached 2 meters in 5 minutes and more recently the flood of 2008 . Aside from the desperate need of investment in different fields from different stakeholders, regulating the public space is a must for providing quick evacuation plans in the center.

CHSS contains important psychical and related non-psychical evidence of Salvadoran culture, treasured by many and regulated through policy which aims to protect such buildings and obstructs drastic interventions. For example a maximum allowed height of 3 levels for new buildings set by CONCULTURA as a response to the repetitive destructions caused by earthquakes. Again the main problems here are social, political and economically tinted while the continuous intensification of occupation in public space, negligence of vulnerable buildings and in general “overurbanization” are, as in Mejicanos, causing the unaffordable increase of vulnerability to risk.

ready-to-collapse

flashflood

intensification

13

MANAGEMENT Management in risk prevention and disaster responses need a joint approach. Past experiences with natural disasters exposed weaknesses in structural organization of actors involved in urban planning. Accusations go back and forth between these stakeholders. Therefore, a structural analysis is needed on the contemporary situation of management in disaster responses as a part of urban planning in general.

26

The context of this type of management becomes a story of capacities and resources. Risk reduction efforts are integrated with incentives to reduce poverty in various projects, international partners mainly those initiated by NGOs. A project thrives especially when collaborations between stakeholders religion are set up successfully. While on organization the other hand the dichotomized social state of mind tends to force the process of a development project to a complete stop. Relations (primary in communication) between stakeholders in that situation seem to need intermediary actors to successfully transfer data back and forth and coordinate projects. political capacity

municipality

network capacity

intermediary: resident + government

As described in the previous c h a p t e r , national international

post-disaster aid either channels through the national government or the Church. capacity time Financial aid is controlled building capacity by the national government.

The national government distributes the responsibilities to local authorities. However, the local municipalities lack proper financial resources. Adjacent to this lack of resources, governmental stakeholders have to deal with time pressure.

On top of that there is a shortage of technical capacity, to coordinate aid and help/ mobilize beneficiaries in organization as well as network capacity to channel the demands to the government or international stakeholders.

The municipalities and other governmental institutions tend to focus on short-term projects; time capacity is a big factor for these stakeholders. Mayoral elections take place every government three years and presidential elections every five.

OPAMMS Considering the political polarization, change in government could spell drastic change in technical policies; as a consequence most officials focus capacity (data) on projects that they can realize in their (set) time period. Simultaneously, projects become part of political propaganda, promises used in order to gather votes. Because of these projects, community beneficiaries

NGO Plan

technical capacity (soil study)

architecture and public spaces become politically tinted, literally colored; susceptible to negativity of political polarization and social dichotomy.

There are no land taxes in El Salvador and the political capacity of the national government struggles to provide strict regulations to address illegal tenure and land use, which currently severely complicate urban spatial planning.

NGOs Fundasal and Procomes pursue political capacity in collaboration with municipalities to obtain legal documents for residents in postdisaster (migration) settlements and integrate slum upgrading incentives which are not necessarily related to disaster planning. This step of obtaining legal rights is essential in urban planning and often demands a great deal of time, effort and financial investment from these stakeholders. The duration of this process and financial contribution influence the trust and migration patterns, but are (if successful) highly appreciated as incentives among beneficiaries .

international partners

private sector

financial capacityy

local NGO Fundasal

technical capacity (research)

capacity building

Construction ruction of Houses ouses Econmic onmic (SeComE) omE “Seed” for Economic

26

Socia cial Organization Social (e.g .g. ASPodepaz) (e.g.

international NGO GTZ

In the country’s globalized economic model, the financial capacity is significantly larger in the private sector than in the public sector, especially when compared to other stakeholders. Independent organization OPAMSS gives out permits to some construction companies even though they are well aware that these projects eventually increase vulnerability in highrisk areas. These policies are tolerated since this organization needs to provide for itself. Generally the supply of houses needed to cover the demand from the increasing population and dense urban centers is so great that afore mentioned cultural issues complicate urban development. It becomes less interesting, (unprofitable) to invest in. In the case of CHSS, issues such as violence, safety, prostitution, etc demand large integrated interventions.

Subsequently developers focus their projects in locations outside the center, mostly in suburban areas, again stimulating sprawl and urbanization. As Jane Jacobs states “Private investment shapes cities, but social ideas (and laws) shape private investment.” In the process -orof obtaining permits for construction these private developers have to negotiate and compromise with different stakeholders; national and local government and other privatized companies, for basic services such as ANDA who provides water services.

Municipalities occasionally try to exploit the financial capacity of the private sector for unrelated projects. When the process of obtaining permits stalls because compromises are not reached, (duration can add up to four years) the loans from banks will cost the private sector money . This in turn could lead to applying social pressure, which can

27

shortage of time capacity

consequently result in a complete stop . After an influx of financial capacity (post-disaster), donors need understanding of the inexperience and lack of local capacity to organize and distribute properly. In addition the general Western approach of aid needs to recognize the cultural perception of leadership and patterns to correctly supply and monitor financial aid in any country. Western discourse therefore needs more than supplying technical and financial aid . Only by strong collaboration with local stakeholders the vulnerability can be properly understood and reduced.

28

Is this case study technical capacity extends to constructing and designing dwellings, technical research and the educating/training of professionals and beneficiaries. The Ministry of Housing (national government) works similar on projects as NGO Fundasal. Arguably Fundasal exceeded the Ministry of Housing in the technical capacity to house people, even more in research and building earthquake proof techniques, but it remains insufficient in order to take full responsibility . For construction and maintenance these actors need more manpower, more network capacity. Therefore NGOs like Fundasal and Procomes as well as governmental organizations on different levels (Protection Civil) focus on capacity building and raising awareness.

Important for these actors and for international donors, is to recognize cultural patterns in social hierarchy. In order to reach individuals on a community level a clear understanding is needed on leadership and responsibilities. Fundasal has been working for the last 10-15 years not only on the technical organization of communities but also focusing more on the local â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;knowhowâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; with cultural patterns in organization and social hierarchy . For disaster aid, whether it is national or internationally based, the aim is a more sustainable and direct approach to the beneficiariesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; needs. This is achieved by utilizing stakeholders who posses enough network capacity to reach out to them. Schools,

international NGO Tzu Chi

handover

churches and technical projects of local NGOs could provide this.

Certain proceedings and milestones obstruct the efforts to gather data from community level (bottom up) to a national level, and in return distribute aid more effectively (top down).

A distinction between small-scale frequently repetitive disasters e.g. landslides caused by heavy rainfall, and large-scale disasters such as the earthquakes of 2001, is needed again to illustrate how lack of capacities results in obstruction. When it comes to small-scale disasters, stakeholders like Fundasal and OPAMSS focus their efforts in research, concept design/typology development, construction and maintenance. In pursuit of sustainable final products, collaborations and capacity building are necessary to compensate for capacityshortcomings. It seems that political coordination is avoided by aiming for international financial funding and developing methods for increasing their own network and political capacity (shortcircuiting). In observations these methods

local NGO Procomes EU

international NGO Oxfam Novib

lead to complex crusades to acquire legal rights for land and (basic) services. The lack of capacities becomes even more evident in the case of large-scale disasters. Because of shortcomings and time pressure, intensified by disaster, international stakeholders tend to short-circuit the local established network approaches. The forthcoming internationally based settlements plans; public space, dwellings, school, often fall victim to the handover (a milestone for maintenance). The significant difference between technical and financial capacity between international NGO Tzu Chi and local municipality San Juan Opico resulted in incompleted infrastructure and a currently excluded settlement controlled by gangs.

On a positive note, communal organization and the alarm system set up by collaboration between the municipality of Mejicanos, NGO Procomes, the EU and Oxfam resulted in mitigation and strong structural community organization.

This social organization is essential in disaster planning (as a response) and is achieved through establishment of political capacity (legal rights) complement of financial capacity establishment of time capacity

increase of network capacity

recognizing the strengths (and weaknesses) in stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; capacities before implementing an incentive.approaches. The forthcoming internationally based settlements plans; public space, dwellings, school, often fall victim to the handover (a milestone for maintenance). The significant difference between technical and financial capacity between international NGO Tzu Chi and local municipality San Juan Opico resulted in incompleted infrastructure and a currently excluded settlement controlled by gangs.

On a positive note, communal organization and the alarm system set up by collaboration between the municipality of Mejicanos, NGO Procomes, the EU and Oxfam resulted in mitigation and strong structural community organization.

This social organization is essential in disaster planning (as a response) and is achieved through recognizing the strengths (and weaknesses) in stakeholdersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; capacities before implementing an incentive.

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PLANNING

stimulating opportunities Afore mentioned (socio-political and socio-economic) complications in management and planning are not solved by architecture and urbanism. However the opportunity is there to technically address (intangible aims) and facilitate incentives which strive towards solutions (tangible results).

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An essential step which needs to be undertaken in disaster planning is the transfer of data (knowledge) derived by professionals who focus on small-scale disaster responses (mainly in the methodology of prevention) to those responsible, coordinating, large-scale disaster responses. In the case of El Salvador, it is important to consider disaster planning; for relief, transitional and permanent (re)development, in well connected urban centers.

The methodology of disaster response (smallscale) focuses primarily on surviving the handover, the milestone in the process where the responsibility of completing and maintenance entirely depends on the actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; capacities. Since in most cases, for many reasons, the beneficiaries are the key to answer the great demand, capacity building is utilized to meet intangible aims (e.g. land rights, social coexistence etc). Prevention depends highly on this, and the turn-out of beneficiaries to systematically prepare is (in the case study of Mejicanos) only sufficient in times of relief, immediately after a disaster (#SOURCE PROC). However the successes of projects, through incentives, are accredited by its scale (of social organization) and the field of focus. Recognizing this scale, social organization prospers if the responsibility is adjusted to the network capacity of who it is awarded to, especially in closed communities such as mesones. The field of focus is the improvement

of infrastructure. It offers the best possibility to implement incentives considering the political and geographical contexts. Regarding the period of time, infrastructure (public space) can gradually improve, if capacity building is established, by NGOs and residents. Temporal governance tends to focus on short-term projects, while these aims such as obtaining land rights, social coexistence and improving the quality of soil structures will take a long time to develop and demand patience from the majority of the actors involved.

The familiarity of prevention methodology needs to be channeled to and received by the beneficiaries as well (transferring knowledge).

The top-down notification of the alarm system seems to fail in reaching the entire community even while integrated with capacity building (#SURVEY MEJ). From a technical perspective, more sirens and involvement is probably needed.

Organization wise, the communities could strive towards projects to raise awareness and achieve concrete results. For example the garbage pickup system needs more places for storage, in addition to the need of strengthening soil and attacking deforestation.

Specifically for disaster mitigation, improvement of infrastructure is portrayed by canalization and protection walls which basically amount

to more time for evacuation and protection of dwellings. Gradual growth in construction for mitigation corresponds well to the overall improvement of stairs, the accessibility to safe buffer zones in public space and the altogether quantity of evacuation routes to community shelters. Meaning, if an organized group of beneficiaries could construct (expand) on a strong infrastructural network, they will work on improving habitat conditions (modular planning). If flows of (informal) economic activities, mutual exchange such as reciprocity, can be integrated in relations between (parttime) shops, market places and other economic activities, the neighborhood in question will have the opportunity to significantly grow, such as certain areas did in Mejicanos. If denser living is accepted, plot boundaries are well established and through capacity building the community is actually able to obtain legal rights in this political dichotomy, the push and/or pull to migrate (tenure exploitation) can be overruled by safer, legitimate dwelling structures. Essentially technical solutions could provide enough incentive through disaster mitigation, principally with the use of capacity building, for a disaster prone, peripheral area to evolve to a safer (from disaster) situation for habitat.

The same disaster planning, for reconstruction and growth, is applicable on the scale of a singular house. A strong(er) foundation, on well prepared soil, that can facilitate expansion; horizontally and vertical. These technical conditions should be accompanied by intangible aims such as legal rights, in order to be persuasive for more dense living. Dense dwelling structures are primarily needed in city centers (prone areas) but also in peripheral (prone) areas, as important coping mechanisms. The rate of urbanization will not allow large plot sizes for families in these ‘popular’ areas. Homogeneity of this architecture should be avoided (see chapter TYPOLOGY) in order to respond to the great need for identification, as well as for the economic ability

to improve one’s home. Especially considering the repetitiveness of small-scale disaster and one’s financial capacity, a variety of materials should be able to ‘fit’ in the modular planned structures. Access to the dwelling, or in this case evacuation, should allow at least two options in case the main entrance is obstructed. This however needs to integrate the sense of (social) security and control. On one side a closed-off courtyard accessible to a number of families (semi-public spaces) such as those in mesones and project Altavista. On the other side, directly connected to the public street/passage a elevated terrace, small yard, or solely a couple of steps could provide the transition of public to private as well as offer space to facilitate systems for basic services (see photo? Mejicanos dwelling). The overall statement is to integrate intangible issues, explicit local conditions, in modular planning in order to increase the resilience to disasters.

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In conclusion, like mentioned afore, the expertise that is developed locally in the methodology of prevention (small-scale) disasters should be correctly managed in times of a largescale disaster. This includes (pre-established) reservation of public spaces for relief camps, and planning of transitional settlements preferably in or close to city centers considering the high dependence of livelihoods. CHSS is an extraordinary case, since revitalizing these old typologies could, if innovatively managed, turn out to be great economical and social investments.

In order to integrate intangible aims, such as this revitalization of architectural monuments and public space, legal rights, capacity building etc. an international organization should approach a local, established organization such as Fundasal.

Reach out to actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; capacities, utilizing the means such as intermediaries and capacity building to overcome improper contextualized (disaster)typologies. Investigate socio-economic, political and disaster mitigation patterns and attempt to implement these semantic elements in tangible products and services; incentives.

An international organization should primarily focus on establishing a sustainable (aiming on duration of long-term development) solution that can be coordinated by organized communities/beneficiaries and local NGOs after the handover.

Urban scale, the connectivity of CHSSâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; historic grid A widely considered true statement about Salvadoran culture is the hard working nature of its residents. As described in previous chapters, this attitude thrives on a strong foundation.

Semantic is the centralization of livelihood in and around the grid of historic city centers such as in CHSS. In relief as well as the (economic re)development of an area, the quantity and quality of infrastructural connections sum up connectivity. Planning depends highly on the areaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s connectivity, whether the psychical relations are technically/socially/economically based.

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