TJ Online Periodical Review Trends, latest developments, presentations and updates January 2012
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Latest Development & Trends
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The end of 2011 and the start of 2012 continue to see a veritable deluge of Jerusalem developments that are of great concern to anyone who care about a secure, stable Jerusalem and the two-state solution. With elections in the U.S. (and probably in Israel) in the coming year, it seems certain that this trend will continue and likely intensify. Constant vigilance will be vital and the engagement by stakeholders around the world crisisprevention will be more imperative than ever.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Ongoing Settlement Surge in East Jerusalem The Israeli government is on an East Jerusalem settlement binge. The pace of approvals of new settlement plans has been so fast and so furious in recent weeks, that even the most experienced settlement watchers are having trouble tracking them. Context As we reportedly previously, from March until the end of October 2010 (in the wake of the visit of Vice President Biden to Jerusalem and the Ramat Shlomo debacle), Netanyahu imposed a quiet but comprehensive settlement freeze on East Jerusalem. No new plans were approved, nor new tenders issued, during this period. On November 1, following the expiration of the official settlement “moratorium,” the East Jerusalem the floodgates were opened, ushering in a period during which the pace of plan approvals exceeded the previously high levels of 2008 and 2009 by 50%-200%. If initially this surge could be attributed to a backlog created during the de facto freeze of the previous 8 months, since the summer of 2011 the approval of new plans has been so intense – unprecedented in scope since the 1970’s – that it is clear that the surge represents a concerted effort/policy on the part of Israel to ramp up East Jerusalem settlement activity. [For empirical data documenting settlement developments during the period before, during, and after 2010’s “quiet” freeze, see our presentation “East Jerusalem Developments and Trends” (2006 - January 15th, 2011)] During much of this post-November 2010 period, the Israeli government has asserted that new plans were “merely” being approved, but that few tenders actually published – and thus criticism of its actions was unjustified. However, we cautioned that this argument was disingenuous, given that “merely” approving plans has significant political impact and sets the stage for future (even imminent) tenders and construction. Events of the past two months bear this warning out. Today new tenders are being published at a rate significantly higher than the already high levels of those in recent years, and we have every reason to expect that this trend will continue, with dire implications for Jerusalem and the two-state solution.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Recent Presentations
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Mordot Gilo in Context
Pending Settlement Schemes on Jerusalem’s Southern Flank October 2011
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Mordot Gilo in Context - Summary •
.....
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Plan 13261 The Mordot Gilo Plan 13261 which was approved for public review on September 27, 2011 and provides for the construction of 780-1380 units in East Jerusalem did not take place in isolation. It is part of a series of plans that create a buffer between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem that will make the two-state solution virtually impossible
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Plans Under/Awaiting Plans Construction Construction on some of these plans has already commenced, or awaits the publication of tenders: • Approximately 620 units are under construction in East Talpiyot. • Construction is underway, or the publication of tenders are expected shortly, for the construction of approximately 1483 additional units in Har Homa B & C.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Plans in Advanced Planning Stages Some of these plans are in the advanced planning stages, (after either final approval or after deposit for public review) – which means that publication of tenders may be only months away. • The two Mordot Gilo Plans, west and south, have been recently deposited for public review, and provide for construction of 1630-2200 new units. • The two Givat Hamatos Plans, A and C, have been recently approved, or are near approval, and provide for construction 3150 new units
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Plans in Initial Planning Stages Some of these plans are in the initial planning stages, where the statutory approval process has begun, but where the plans have not yet been published for public review. • The two Givat Hamatos Plans, B and D, provide for construction 550 new units and 1100 hotel rooms. • An undisclosed number of units are planned for Mordot Gilo North. • Approximately 500 units are planned for Bethlehem Gate.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Pre-statutory Plans Two of the southern flank plans are being prepared by governmental, quasigovernmental and private bodies, but the formal statutory planning process has yet to begin. • The Givat Yael plan entails the construction of 10,000-13,000 new units.. • The Mazmoiryah plan envisions the construction of approximately 6000 units.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
All Pending Plans on the Southern Flank In October 2011, there are, on Jerusalem’s southern flank: pending statutory plans many at, or close to implementation - for the construction of app. 7933 – 8503 units, with an additional 16,000-19,000 units in the prestatutory stage. In July-September 2011 alone, significant steps were taken towards the implementation of four plans (final approval of Givat Hamatos and Har Homa C, and deposit of the two Mordot Gilo plans). These are significant steps towards starting the construction of approximately 5983-6553 new units.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Buffer between Jerusalem & Bethlehem The cumulative impact of these plans is stark and incontrovertible: •They create a critical mass of continuous built-up settlement areas that detaches East Jerusalem from Bethlehem and its environs in the southern West Bank. • These plans almost invariably alter the potential border between Israel and Palestine. • The severing of East Jerusalem from Bethlehem and its environs in the West Bank will be likely fatal to the two-state solution.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Settlement Surge Throughout East Jerusalem We have focused on Jerusalem’s southern flank because of the recent interest in Mordot Gilo, and its significance. As this map displays, the situation at Jerusalem’s northern and eastern flanks is no different: • This non-exhaustive list of settlement schemes shows that in these areas, there are pending plans for the construction app. 8000 new units, with app. 11,000 in the prestatutory stage. • These plans have a similar impact on pre-judging the borders between Israel and Palestine, and in undermining the very possibility of the two-state solution.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Old City and its Environs The Contours of a Permanent Status Agreement Update October 3, 2011
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Executive Summary The Contours of a Permanent Status Agreement 1. The overarching principles of territorial sovereignty The organizing principle of any two-state permanent status agreement will be based on the binary division of territorial sovereignty between the respective states of Israel and Palestine.
2. Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution While Jerusalem presents some specific challenges, the basis of a permanent status agreement in Jerusalem is based on that same division of territorial sovereignty.
3. Deviating from the pure model of territorial sovereignty in the Old City The unique character, the urban complexities and the symbolic attachments to Jerusalem’s Old City require deviation - whether smaller or larger - from the strictures of binary division of sovereignty.
4. Between “Territorial Sovereignty” and “Special Regime” The various permanent status proposals disclose a major, unresolved issue relating to permanent status in the Old City: will the issue of sovereignty be addressed, resolved and divided between Israel and Palestine, as in the “territorial sovereignty” model, or deferred/suspended, as in a “Special Regime”?
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Executive Summary
5. The inevitability of “Special Arrangements” While in principle the parties will be required to make a clear-cut choice between resolving the issue of sovereignty or not, in practice, all significant proposals entail elements of division of authority, as in the territorial sovereignty model, and third party authority, as in the special regime. At a pragmatic level, the distinction between the two models is less significant than meets the eye - and the proposals are located on a continuum between the two. We designate this hybrid as the “Special Arrangements” model.
6. The optimal/likely Outcome Our examination of the respective merits and disadvantages of each proposal leads us to conclude that the optimal and likely outcome will entail (a) a political division of sovereignty the Old City, (b) physical boundaries around, rather than within its walls, and (c) a robust but focused international involvement deriving from, rather than contradicting, the sovereignty of the respective parties.
7. Expanding to sites in the environs of the Old City Many of the same factors that make a deviation from pure territorial sovereignty within the walls of the Old City inevitable apply to the sacred and historic sites within its immediate environs. Components of the Special Arrangements model may be potentially extended to these sites. Sunday,12 February, 2012
Introduction Binary Territorial Sovereignty and the Two-State Solution
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Logic of the Two-State Solution The primary motivations of Israelis and Palestinians for a two-state solution are:
Israelis: Seeking finality, legitimacy and a secure, recognized border, with Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
Palestinians: Seeking independence and end-of-occupation, with a viable Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem
The respective Israeli and Palestinian motivations converge in a desire for clarity and finality, which is the essence of a territorial division of sovereignty: “this is Israel”, “this is Palestine”.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Principle of Solution The organizing idea of any IsraeliPalestinian agreement: two states, based on the binary principles of territorial sovereignty
Jerusalem
Israel
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Palestine
Old City
Israeli Jerusalem
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Palestinian Al Quds
The Logic of the Two-State Solution in Jerusalem The same Israeli and Palestinian motivations - defining what is “ours” and what is “theirs” apply in Jerusalem. While there are a number of specific, Jerusalem-related challenges (e.g. security issues deriving from close physical proximity, issues relating to access and mobility) every credible effort to address permanent status Jerusalem has entailed a political division of the city.
Old City
Israeli Jerusalem
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Palestinian Al Quds
Division of Sovereignty in Jerusalem: Past Proposals Though differing in details, all serious negotiations thus far have dealt with Jerusalem on the principle that a solution will involve a division of political sovereignty in Jerusalem, based on existing demographic realities and land swaps.
(as revealed in the Palestine Papers)
* as revealed in the Palestine Papers
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Division of Sovereignty in Jerusalem: Past Proposals Though differing in details, all serious negotiations thus far have dealt with Jerusalem on the principle that a solution will involve a division of political sovereignty in Jerusalem, based on existing demographic realities and land swaps.
(as revealed in the Palestine Papers)
December 2000 : The parameters laid down by President Clinton
Sunday,12 February, 2012
* as revealed in the Palestine Papers
Division of Sovereignty in Jerusalem: Past Proposals Though differing in details, all serious negotiations thus far have dealt with Jerusalem on the principle that a solution will involve a division of political sovereignty in Jerusalem, based on existing demographic realities and land swaps.
(as revealed in the Palestine Papers)
December 2000 : The parameters laid down by President Clinton
Sunday,12 February, 2012
2008: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's proposal to President Mahmoud Abbas
* as revealed in the Palestine Papers
Division of Sovereignty in Jerusalem: Past Proposals Though differing in details, all serious negotiations thus far have dealt with Jerusalem on the principle that a solution will involve a division of political sovereignty in Jerusalem, based on existing demographic realities and land swaps.
(as revealed in the Palestine Papers)
December 2000 : The parameters laid down by President Clinton
Sunday,12 February, 2012
2008: Prime Minister Ehud
2009:
Olmert's proposal to
Palestinian negotiator Saeb
President Mahmoud
Erekat’s positions*
Abbas
* as revealed in the Palestine Papers
Defining the Problem Deviating from the model of binary territorial sovereignty: Jerusalem’s Old City
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Special Challenges of the Old City While the strictures of a division of sovereignty can be applied in Jerusalem, these appear to be inadequate in addressing the special challenges posed by the Old City, for reasons that are both simple and complex.
Herod’s Gate Muslim Quarter
Damascus Gate
St. Stephen’s Gate
New Gate
Christian Quarter
Jaffa Gate
Jewish Quarter
Armenian Quarter 1967 Border
Dung Gate
Old City Gate Jewish Site Zion’s Gate
Christian Site Muslim Site
Sunday,12 February, 2012
WEST JERUSALEM
EAST JERUSALEM
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City?
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City?
The unique character of the Old City requires demands an approach to permanent status issues that differs from the customary approaches applicable throughout Israel/Palestine:
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City?
The unique character of the Old City requires demands an approach to permanent status issues that differs from the customary approaches applicable throughout Israel/Palestine: 1. The possessive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at its peak in relation to the Old City. At the same time each side aspires to control the area, the collective psyches of both sides reject ceding control or sovereignty to “the other� as sacrilege.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City?
The unique character of the Old City requires demands an approach to permanent status issues that differs from the customary approaches applicable throughout Israel/Palestine: 1. The possessive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at its peak in relation to the Old City. At the same time each side aspires to control the area, the collective psyches of both sides reject ceding control or sovereignty to “the other” as sacrilege. 2. Territorial sovereignty fails to adequately address the fears and the aspirations of both sides. For Israelis and Palestinians alike, Jerusalem’s Old City epitomizes the pinnacle of national aspirations, to which each claim exclusive entitlements.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City?
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City? 3. Each side has fears regarding equities that will be left on “the other side”. Whatever political boundary is drawn, Israelis and Palestinians alike will have important equities – holy sites, sites of paramount national and cultural significance etc. – left in the hands of the other side, which in turn will evoke a sense of violation.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City? 3. Each side has fears regarding equities that will be left on “the other side”. Whatever political boundary is drawn, Israelis and Palestinians alike will have important equities – holy sites, sites of paramount national and cultural significance etc. – left in the hands of the other side, which in turn will evoke a sense of violation. 4. Inflammatory acts in and around the Old City by potential spoilers, even post-agreement, are no mere possibility, but a virtual certainty, and entail a high risk of undermining an agreement. With an untrammeled division of territorial sovereignty, each side will have opportunities to humiliate the other, even without crossing a border. Such incidents are too complex and volatile to be left exclusively in the hands of Israelis and Palestinians.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What are the Special Challenges Posed by the Old City? 3. Each side has fears regarding equities that will be left on “the other side”. Whatever political boundary is drawn, Israelis and Palestinians alike will have important equities – holy sites, sites of paramount national and cultural significance etc. – left in the hands of the other side, which in turn will evoke a sense of violation. 4. Inflammatory acts in and around the Old City by potential spoilers, even post-agreement, are no mere possibility, but a virtual certainty, and entail a high risk of undermining an agreement. With an untrammeled division of territorial sovereignty, each side will have opportunities to humiliate the other, even without crossing a border. Such incidents are too complex and volatile to be left exclusively in the hands of Israelis and Palestinians. 5. A binary division of sovereignty in the Old City would likely harden into a physical boundary, gravely wounding its cultural historic and religious integrity.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Old City - Not Merely Real Estate The Israel-Palestine conflict is, in large part, a bitter territorial dispute amenable to binary geographical solutions. But Jerusalem’s Old City is not merely “real estate”. Rather, it is for both Israelis and Palestinians: ... the repository of historic memory, and its holy sites are the physical embodiments of religious belief. ... the primordial materials of national consciousness and faith. ...the arena of conflicting symbol and narrative, located at the epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For all these reasons, a binary division of territorial sovereignty will be inadequate in addressing the unique challenges of the Old City.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Old City Alternatives to a binary division of sovereignty
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Two pure models: “Territorial Sovereignty” vs. “Special Regime”
Territorial Model Embodies the principles of territorial sovereignty even in the Old City. Example: Geneva Accords
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Special Regime Model
Avoiding geographical division between the sides and side-stepping sovereignty issues (by internationalization, Corpus Separatum, suspending or indefinitely deferring the issue of sovereignty, joint management etc.) Example: The Canadian Jerusalem Old City Initiative
The Pros and Cons of the Territorial Model
Advantages
Disadvantages
1 Compatible with underlying logic of 1 agreement, i.e. a Palestinian state alongside of Israel. 2
Clear and binary, lending itself to end of claims.
2
3
Requires minimal Israeli-Palestian joint efforts.
3
4
Minimizes Palestinian fears of 4 “creeping”Israeli hegemony, and Israeli fears of a “creeping” Palestinian right of return. Clear legal authorities on sensitive issues: 5 property, residency etc.
5
6
Necessitates little if any third-party involvement.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
6
Requires each side to waive equities of cardinal importance that will be ceded to the sovereignty of the other side. Each side will be able to inflict pain on the other without crossing the sovereign line, particularly in relation to archeology, access and integrity of holy sites, etc. Treats Old City as real estate, not repository of sanctity, memory, narrative. Entails the potential of the political division to harden into a physical division, thereby wounding the Old City. Cuts against the grain of the broad international and world churches support for a “shared Jerusalem”. Lacks a third party “responsible adult”.
The Pros and Cons of the Special Regime Model
Advantages 1
Disadvantages
Maintains geographical, historic and religious 1 integrity of the Old City, and dovetails with the primarily Palestinian aspiration to an “Open City”. Entails the creation of a third-party “responsible 2 adult” in conflict-sensitive areas and rapid, forceful security intervention in times of crisis.
Cuts against the “binary territorial sovereignty” fibers of the overall Israel-Palestinian agreement. In essence, could create an Old City “one-state solution”. Requires enhanced Israel/Palestine/Third Party joint management, contrary to preference of both sides for separation. Exacerbates Palestinian suspicions of “creeping” Israeli hegemony.
3
Denies each party claims to “ownership” of sites important to the other, allowing each to believe “it’s not theirs”.
3
Defers resolution of dispute over sovereignty in key areas, undermining the “end of claims” element of a peace agreement.
4
Entails third-party protection of access to and integrity of holy sites.
4
5
Invests international underwriting into the preservation of the respective religious and national equities/narratives.
5
Requires complex legal and administrative mechanisms, in extremis creating the “independent state of the Old City”. Requires the sides to submit to third-party intervention and decisions in the most controversial issues: property in holy sites, residency etc.
6
Fits with international stake-holders vision of “shared Jerusalem”.
6
2
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Potentially embroils unfamiliar third-party representatives in visceral Mideast conflict, potentially creating a neo-colonial image.
A Hybrid Model: “Special Arrangements” The Territorial and Special Regime Models differ from each other regarding one fundamental, often theoretical issue: will sovereignty be resolved and divided, as in the former, or deferred or “diluted”, as in the latter. But in reality, very few of the serious proposals have devoutly adhered to either model, and in matters that deal with the pragmatic mechanics of governance in the Old City, most are hybrids that borrow from both the Territorial and Special Regime Models – so much so that these deserve a categorization all their own.
Territorial Model
Special Regime Model
Hybrid Model Sunday,12 February, 2012
Defining the Special Arrangements Model
Territorial Model The physical border and the borders of governmental authority are identical, going so far as to necessitate a physical boundary within the Old City.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Special Arrangements Model There is no necessary correlation between the physical boundary, which may be the walls of the Old City, or on its periphery, and the sovereign authorities – which would be divided geographically between Israel and Palestine.
Special Regime Model The physical border would encompass the Old City, or be located on its periphery, authority vested in an international or joint body, while the question regarding sovereignty over the Old City would remain unresolved.
Special Arrangements: Already a Widely Accepted Model All the proposals for a final status agreement can be situated along this spectrum:
Territorial
Special Arrangements
Special Regime
Indeed, while the Clinton Parameters, Barak’s Camp David proposals, the Geneva Initiative and the Palestinian positions revealed in the Palestine Papers clearly tend in the direction of the territorial model, they each include sufficient third party involvement to place them in the category of Special Arrangements. And the Canadian Old City Initiative for a Special Regime contains vesting certain authorities that are characteristic of a division of sovereignty in Israel and Palestine, respectively. In essence, the one overarching fundamental choice that will be made by the decision makers is between the resolved sovereignty of the Territorial Model and the undetermined sovereignty of the Special Regime. In the practical matters of governance, all relevant plans are located on the continuum of Special Arrangements, some emphasizing a division of authority, others vesting greater authority in a third-party. Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Benefits of the Special Arrangements Model The Special Arrangements Model, like the Territorial Model, entails a conclusive determination of territorial sovereignty in the Old City. In doing so it: ✓satisfies the possessive urges of the parties ✓establishes a clear, uninterrupted political boundary ✓makes the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians life in the Old City as similar as possible to the lives of those in Israel and Palestine, respectively. But in addition the Special Arrangements Model, like the Special Regime Model, maintains the geographical and cultural integrity of the Old City. In doing so it: ✓ creates a powerful third-party involvement in specific, conflictsensitive matters ✓provides maximal protection and access to the sensitive religous and historical sites. Sunday,12 February, 2012
Expanding Special Arrangements to the Old City’s Immediate Environs
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Old City’s Environs Sheikh Jarrah
Muslim Quarter
City Hall City Center
Mammila Cemetery
Christian Quarter
OLD CITY Jewish Quarter
Armenian Quarter
WEST JERUSALEM
Mt. Zion
Abu Tur
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Kidron Valley
Mount of Olives Cemetery
Silwan City of David
EAST JERUSALEM
The Pros and Cons of Expanding Special Arrangements to to the Old City’s Environ
Advantages
2
Disadvantages
1 The same inherent inadequacies of territorial 1 sovereignty in addressing the unique character of the Old City also apply to the numerous sacred and historical sites in its immediate proximity.
The Old City is a clearly distinct geographical unit, which easily lends itself to special treatment, with a logic of its own. The environs of the Old City is not clearly defined, and the area is also an integral part of the urban fabric of East Jerusalem beyond the Old City walls, making this “special logic” less compelling.
The Old City - its narratives, symbols and 2 patterns of movement - are intimately connected to the sites surrounding it. Detaching these sites from the Old City would not only be artificial, but would create a sense of violation that would undermine support for an agreement among key 3 constituencies.
Expansion of any physical boundaries beyond the walls of the Old City into its environs to the east is potentially highly disruptive of the patterns of life and patterns of movement in a central section of what will be Palestinian East Jerusalem.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Expanding special provisions to the environs of the Old City – like vesting management of the Mount of Olives Cemetery to Israel or an international body - will either give rise to a pronounced asymmetry or to demands for parallel provisions to apply to Muslim sites located on the Israeli side of the 1967 lines, like the Mamilla cemetery, in West Jerusalem.
The Two Options for Expanding Special Arrangements to the Environs of the Old City: the Territorial and Functional
Notwithstanding the challenges, there are compelling reasons to argue for an expansion of the special treatment of the Old City to its immediate environs.
Territorial
Mammila Cemetery
OLD CITY City of David
Functional
Mount of Olives Cemetery
The territorial dimension deals with the location and nature of the physical border within this area (which may or may not overlap the political boundary).
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Mammila Cemetery
OLD CITY City of David
Mount of Olives Cemetery
The functional dimension deals with the possibility of empowering either a third party or a joint IsraeliPalestinian body in certain areas of governance (like security, archeology, holy sites, etc.), or at certain sites (Silwan/ City of David), irrespective of the route of the physical boundary.
The Physical Border Entailed in Expanding Special Arrangements Beyond the Old City Walls
Mammila Cemetery
OLD CITY
Mt. Zion
City of David
Mount of Olives Cemetery
OLD CITY
The physical boundary will remain on the perimeter of the Old City
Mamilla Cemetery
OLD CITY City of David
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Mount of Olives Cemetery
The Physical Border Entailed in Expanding Special Arrangements Beyond the Old City Walls
Territorial: the physical boundary will no longer be on the perimeter of the Old City, but around the sites nearby.
Mammila Cemetery
OLD CITY
Mt. Zion
City of David
Mount of Olives Cemetery
OLD CITY
The physical boundary will remain on the perimeter of the Old City
Mamilla Cemetery
OLD CITY City of David
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Mount of Olives Cemetery
What Would Jerusalem Look Like Under the Special Arrangements Model?
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What Would Jerusalem Look Like Under the Special Arrangements Model?
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What Would Jerusalem Look Like Under the Special Arrangements Model?
Under any permanent status agreement, the unique character of the Jerusalem’s Old City and its environs will likely require special arrangements that go beyond a division of territorial sovereignty. The following is a description of what the new reality that this would create will look like. * The Old City embedded within a politically divided Jerusalem, with East Jerusalem a viable, contiguous Palestinian capital, and West Jerusalem a viable contiguous Israeli capital, with an international border between them.
* Sovereignty in the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall vested in Israel, and in the remaining areas of the Old City in the state of Palestine. No physical boundaries in the Old City, but around the Old City. * A border regime that allows for dignified, efficient and universal access to the Old City from both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem, in ways that are compatible with the border regime between Israel and Palestine.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What Would Jerusalem Look Like Under the Special Arrangements Model?
Under any permanent status agreement, the unique character of the Jerusalem’s Old City and its environs will likely require special arrangements that go beyond a division of territorial sovereignty. The following is a description of what the new reality that this would create will look like. * The Old City embedded within a politically divided Jerusalem, with East Jerusalem a viable, contiguous Palestinian capital, and West Jerusalem a viable contiguous Israeli capital, with an international border between them.
* Sovereignty in the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall vested in Israel, and in the remaining areas of the Old City in the state of Palestine. No physical boundaries in the Old City, but around the Old City. * A border regime that allows for dignified, efficient and universal access to the Old City from both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem, in ways that are compatible with the border regime between Israel and Palestine. * Certain sovereign authorities in conflict-sensitive areas (e.g. archeology, access to and protection of holy sites, public order and security) ceded by the sovereign parties to an empowered, acceptable third party Special Administrator. All other authorities will remain within the hands of the respective states.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
What Would Jerusalem Look Like Under the Special Arrangements Model?
Under any permanent status agreement, the unique character of the Jerusalem’s Old City and its environs will likely require special arrangements that go beyond a division of territorial sovereignty. The following is a description of what the new reality that this would create will look like. * The Old City embedded within a politically divided Jerusalem, with East Jerusalem a viable, contiguous Palestinian capital, and West Jerusalem a viable contiguous Israeli capital, with an international border between them.
* Sovereignty in the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall vested in Israel, and in the remaining areas of the Old City in the state of Palestine. No physical boundaries in the Old City, but around the Old City. * A border regime that allows for dignified, efficient and universal access to the Old City from both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem, in ways that are compatible with the border regime between Israel and Palestine. * Certain sovereign authorities in conflict-sensitive areas (e.g. archeology, access to and protection of holy sites, public order and security) ceded by the sovereign parties to an empowered, acceptable third party Special Administrator. All other authorities will remain within the hands of the respective states. * Extension of the certain of the Old City Special Administrator authorities to sacred and historical sites in proximity to the Old City, without derogating from the sovereignty of the respective parties, or creating an additional physical boundary. Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Old City and its Environs under the Special Arrangements Model Sheikh Jarrah Garden of the Tomb
Muslim Quarter
City Hall City Center Mammila Cemetery
Christian Quarter
Kidron Valley
OLD CITY Jewish Quarter
Armenian Quarter
WEST JERUSALEM Israel
Mt. Zion
Palestine Physical Border Political Border Area Subject to Special Arrangements Sunday,12 February, 2012
Abu Tur
Silwan
Mount of Olives Cemetery City of David
EAST JERUSALEM
The Old City and its Environs under the Special Arrangements Model Sheikh Jarrah Garden of the Tomb
Muslim Quarter
City Hall City Center Mammila Cemetery
Christian Quarter
Kidron Valley
OLD CITY Jewish Quarter
Armenian Quarter
WEST JERUSALEM Israel
Mt. Zion
Palestine Physical Border Political Border Area Subject to Special Arrangements Sunday,12 February, 2012
Abu Tur
Silwan
Mount of Olives Cemetery City of David
EAST JERUSALEM
The Old City and its Environs under the Special Arrangements Model Sheikh Jarrah Garden of the Tomb
Muslim Quarter
City Hall City Center Mammila Cemetery
Christian Quarter
Kidron Valley
OLD CITY Jewish Quarter
Armenian Quarter
WEST JERUSALEM Israel
Mt. Zion
Palestine Physical Border Political Border Area Subject to Special Arrangements Sunday,12 February, 2012
Abu Tur
Silwan
Mount of Olives Cemetery City of David
EAST JERUSALEM
East Jerusalem Settlements and the Imminent Demise of the Two-State Solution January 2012
Sunday,12 February, 2012
East Jerusalem Settlements and the Imminent Demise of the Two-State Solution - summary
•
.....
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution The two-state solution will take place in Jerusalem, or it will not take place at all.
Greater Jerusalem
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution This will require a political division of the city that will:
• Create a viable contiguous
Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, and a viable, robust Israeli capital in Israeli Jerusalem.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution This will require a political division of the city that will:
• Place the Palestinian
residents of East Jerusalem under Palestinian sovereignty, while incorporating the large settlement neighborhoods of East Jerusalem into Israel, in the framework of an agreed, equitable land swap.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution This will require a political division of the city that will:
• Create a border regime that
will allow both Israelis and Palestinians, to go anywhere in their respective cities without crossing a border or encountering the authorities of the other side.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution While the large settlement neighborhoods in East Jerusalem create daunting difficulties in implementing a political division of the city, the possibility to do so still exists in the beginning of 2012.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution That said, during the last decade settlement construction has eroded significantly into the possibility of implementing the two-state solution in Jerusalem.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution • For example, under the 2003
Geneva Accords, the area of Har Homa is to fall under Palestinian sovereignty. But today, a settlement neighborhood that did not exist in 2000 is now home to 12,000 Israeli residents.
• Consequently, the Palestinians insist that Har Homa will become Palestine, while Israel demands that it be integrated into Israel.
• Despite this obstacle, whatever be
decided about the fate of Har Homa, it still remains possible to politically divide the city.
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem and the Two-State Solution • For example, under the 2003
Geneva Accords, the area of Har Homa is to fall under Palestinian sovereignty. But today, a settlement neighborhood that did not exist in 2000 is now home to 12,000 Israeli residents.
• Consequently, the Palestinians insist that Har Homa will become Palestine, while Israel demands that it be integrated into Israel.
• Despite this obstacle, whatever be
decided about the fate of Har Homa, it still remains possible to politically divide the city.
Har Homa
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Greater Jerusalem 2012 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
The Surge in East Jerusalem Settlement Activities Following a quiet, de facto settlement freeze imposed by PM Netanyahu in March 2010, in November 2010 settlement activities in East Jerusalem resumed and have since exceeded even previously high levels by 50%-200%. East Jerusalem has not witnessed settlement activities of such a pace and scope since the 1970’s.
Announced East Jerusalem tenders/ Plans (Nov.2011- Jan.2012)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Surge in East Jerusalem Settlement Activities Following a quiet, de facto settlement freeze imposed by PM Netanyahu in March 2010, in November 2010 settlement activities in East Jerusalem resumed and have since exceeded even previously high levels by 50%-200%. East Jerusalem has not witnessed settlement activities of such a pace and scope since the 1970’s.
Announced East Jerusalem tenders/ Plans (Nov.2011- Jan.2012)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Surge in East Jerusalem Settlement Activities •
The map opposite details the settlement projects significantly expedited in the three month period between November 2011 and January 2012.
•
For an in-depth analysis of the current settlement surge, see: http://www.t-j.org.il//Portals/26/images/ EJSettlementsNov152011.pdf
•
Given the pace, scope and intensity of current East Jerusalem settlement activity, we deem it imperative to examine the impact of these plans on the possibility of reaching an permanent status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.
Announced East Jerusalem tenders/ Plans (Nov.2011- Jan.2012)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Surge in East Jerusalem Settlement Activities •
The map opposite details the settlement projects significantly expedited in the three month period between November 2011 and January 2012.
•
For an in-depth analysis of the current settlement surge, see: http://www.t-j.org.il//Portals/26/images/ EJSettlementsNov152011.pdf
•
Given the pace, scope and intensity of current East Jerusalem settlement activity, we deem it imperative to examine the impact of these plans on the possibility of reaching an permanent status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.
Announced East Jerusalem tenders/ Plans (Nov.2011- Jan.2012)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Projecting Jerusalem’s Map at the End of 2013
•
Given the current trajectory of the expedition and implementation of settlement plans in East Jerusalem, we can now project what the map of East Jerusalem will look like at the end of 2013, should the current trends continue.
•
In our projection, we account only for large settlement plans (100 units or more), in the advanced planning stages (after deposit for public review), and that are being actively promoted by the Israeli government.
•
Our projection excludes smaller plans, those in the initial planning stages, plans that appear to be dormant, and the settlement schemes in the Old City and its environs.
•
The projected map is consequently a conservative estimate as to the situation on the ground at the end of 2013.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Projecting Jerusalem’s Map at the End of 2013 The additional built-up areas on our projected map entails the following: the construction of between app. 11,983-12,670 additional units in East Jerusalem, and increase of 23%-25% in the total number of units built in East Jerusalem since 1967.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected Map at the End of 2013 The map opposite displays areas that are not developed today and that under current trends will either be fully developed or under construction with homes being marketed to the public by the end of 2013.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Projecting Jerusalem’s Map at the End of 2013 While some of the units will be built within the existing contours of the settlement neighborhoods, others will expand the footprint of the built-up areas by 3.1 sq. km., a 15% increase in the territorial base of the settlement neighborhoods.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Projecting Jerusalem’s Map at the End of 2013 The additional construction will add app. 45,000 residents, a 23% increase in the settler population of East Jerusalem.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Impact on the Two-State Solution While under current circumstances, the implementation of the twostate solution in East Jerusalem is still, with difficulty, possible, our projections indicate that this will not be the case by the end of 2013:
•
Beit Tzafafa
The Givat Hamatos construction will rule out the possibility of any agreement based on a division of territorial sovereignty (like the Clinton parameters/ Geneva accords) in and around Beit Tzafafa.
Givat Hamatos
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Impact on the Two-State Solution While under current circumstances, the implementation of the twostate solution in East Jerusalem is still, with difficulty, possible, our projections indicate that this will not be the case by the end of 2013:
•
Construction on Jerusalem’s southern flank will create an effective buffer between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
Beit Tzafafa Sur Bhir
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Impact on the Two-State Solution
Pisgat Ze’ev Ramot
Gilo
Sunday,12 February, 2012
While under current circumstances, the implementation of the twostate solution in East Jerusalem is still, with difficulty, possible, our projections indicate that this will not be the case by the end of 2013:
•
The “welding” of settlement neighborhoods to adjacent Palestinian areas (in places like Gilo, Ramot and Pisgat Ze’ev) will make the creation of a viable border more difficult.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
The Impact on the Two-State Solution The construction will increase the size of the lands needed for a land swap.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
The Impact on the Two-State Solution As noted, our projections exclude smaller settlement projects, and those in initial planning stages. At least some of these will approach implementation during the coming months, and could add thousands of additional units to our projections.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with the Geneva Accords Border)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Possible Additional Settlements: E-1 The most prominent of these is E-1. While no formal steps have been recently taken to implement the plan, there are indications that this is being considered (the pending displacement of the Bedouin in E-1, the construction of a road grid diverting Palestinian traffic from E-1, etc.)
6 מפה
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with possible construction of E-1)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Possible Additional Settlements: E-1 E-1 would seal East Jerusalem from its environs in the West Bank
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with possible construction of E-1)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Possible Additional Settlements: E-1 E-1 would seal East Jerusalem from its environs in the West Bank, and dismember the potential Palestinian State into two, discontinuous cantons. Implementation of E-1 would itself signify the demise of the two-state solution, and requires constant vigilance. That said, the impact of the southern flank construction is no less devastating in its impact, and unlike E-1, is already under way.
Projected Jerusalem - Dec. 2013 (with possible construction of E-1)
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected 2013 Map: The Conclusions
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected 2013 Map: The Conclusions
•
Our conservative projections of the potential map of Jerusalem at the end of 2013 provides incontrovertible evidence that the current settlement surge constitutes a clear and present danger to the very possibility of the two-state solution.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected 2013 Map: The Conclusions
•
Our conservative projections of the potential map of Jerusalem at the end of 2013 provides incontrovertible evidence that the current settlement surge constitutes a clear and present danger to the very possibility of the two-state solution.
•
Left unattended, the situation on the ground could well be considerably worse than predicted.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected 2013 Map: The Conclusions
•
Our conservative projections of the potential map of Jerusalem at the end of 2013 provides incontrovertible evidence that the current settlement surge constitutes a clear and present danger to the very possibility of the two-state solution.
•
Left unattended, the situation on the ground could well be considerably worse than predicted.
•
That said, if a quiet, de facto settlement freeze were to be put in place, as it was in 2010, the potentially devastating circumstances we envisage can be averted.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
Jerusalem’s Projected 2013 Map: The Conclusions
•
Our conservative projections of the potential map of Jerusalem at the end of 2013 provides incontrovertible evidence that the current settlement surge constitutes a clear and present danger to the very possibility of the two-state solution.
•
Left unattended, the situation on the ground could well be considerably worse than predicted.
•
That said, if a quiet, de facto settlement freeze were to be put in place, as it was in 2010, the potentially devastating circumstances we envisage can be averted.
•
Consequently, achieving a de facto settlement freeze in East Jerusalem is an imperative of the highest order if the two-state solution is to remain even remotely viable.
Sunday,12 February, 2012
TJ Activity Update
Sunday,12 February, 2012
www.t-j.org.il
Sunday,12 February, 2012