European Graduate Fellows Conference Journal 2021

Europe Today: Challenges & Opportunities Proceedings from the 2nd Annual International Conference of the European Studies Graduate Fellows at Yale University on April 16-17, 2021

Published by the European Studies Council at the Whitney & Betty MacMillan Center for International & Area Studies of Yale University European Studies Council Whitney & Betty MacMillan Center for International & Area Studies Yale University P.O. Box 208206 New Haven, CT 06520 www.europeanstudies.macmillan.yale.edu

PARTICIPANTS KEYNOTE ADDRESS I. PROTEST AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN EUROPE

TABLE OF

OVERVIEW

27

II. THE THIN LINE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM: EUROPE 2020

41 51 73

III. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY

91 105

IV. EUROPE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE V. EU AND GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY VII. EASTERN EUROPEAN MIGRATION TO CENTRAL EUROPE VIII. URBAN SUSTAINABILITY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE NORTH: PERSPECTIVES FROM EUROPE AND EURASIA

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The 2nd annual European Studies Graduate Fellows conference brought together young scholars from across the globe to discuss some of the most pressing social, political, economic, and cultural issues facing Europe today. Organized by a graduate student planning committee, the conference was hosted by the European Studies Council of the MacMillan Center at Yale University. The conference was titled "Europe Today: Challenges & Opportunities." It was the culmination of a collaborative effort spanning nearly a year and gathered together 45 graduate students and faculty representing 21 institutions worldwide. Throughout the two-day virtual series, speakers shared their interdisciplinary insight into the most pressing challenges facing Europe, Russia, and Eurasia today.

"This year's conference took place under conditions beset by a pandemic; nevertheless, the situation only increased the relevance of the discussion among young scholars. Contextualizing contemporary European problems through the methodological lenses of various disciplines, the students shared deep reflections about Europe's present and past. It was exciting to watch the exchange of ideas and arguments between emerging scholars from different academic disciplines," noted Edyta Bojanowska, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures, and Chair of the European Studies Council at the MacMillan Center.

This year marked the third anniversary since the launch of the European Studies Fellows Network at Yale — an initiative that has supported a growing community of junior scholars throughout the university and is now comprised of over seventy students. While recent global events have undoubtedly disrupted the world as we know it, we hope that this recent conference will foster future interdisciplinary collaborations and joint research initiatives on contemporary Europe. We thank all presenters and members of the International Alliance for Research Universities for participating in this very special event. Cambridge University was especially involved, and the Council increased its collaborative efforts the University College London (UCL), Fox International Fellowship, the BadenWürttemberg Exchange Program.

Our sincere appreciation is given to the following members of the the Planning Committee for conceptualizing and organizing the conference: Elena Adasheva-Klein, Yale University Orel Beilinson, Yale University Marguerite Bertheau, University of Cambridge Lisa Sophie Fenner, University of Cambridge Morgan Forde, University of Cambridge Jacqueline Georgis, Yale University Marc Ibáñez Díaz, Yale University Jesslene Lee, National University of Singapore Nadia Kalisiak, University of Cambridge Ryan Nabil, Yale University Aniket Sangwan, University of Cambridge PAGE 01

Participants ELENA ADASHEVA-KLEIN Elena Adasheva-Klein is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociocultural Anthropology at Yale University. Her academic interests lie at the intersection of environmental anthropology and Indigenous Studies in contemporary Russia. Her doctoral research explores human-environment relations and governmentality in the Siberian Arctic. Elena holds a B.A. in Anthropology and Studio Art from Hunter College of the City University of New York. She was an Eva Kastan Grove Fellow at the Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute and Ronald E. McNair Scholar. In 2019, Elena received the Summer Institute in Museum Anthropology Fellowship from the Smithsonian Institution, where she researched the Department of Anthropology’s collection of Siberian objects.

OREL BEILINSON Orel Beilinson is a social and cultural historian of modern Central and Eastern Europe, broadly defined. Drawing on a broad interdisciplinary training, he hopes to integrate sociolinguistic insight, archival research, and formal methods drawn from sociology to write cultural and social histories. His current project is tentatively called End-of-Life Decisions: Understanding, Regulating and Preventing Suicide in Eastern Europe, 1870-1939. He aims to reconstruct the meanings endowed in suicide in Eastern Europe, mainly in the Habsburg Empire and its successor states, and different trajectories and corpora of knowledge developed and recruited by historical actors to understand, regulate and prevent it. For this purpose, he is exploring sources ranging from police records and psychiatric case files to newspapers and literary works and methodologies that include both distant reading based on statistical exploration and, in the other extreme of the scale, a close reading of archival sources.

MARGUERITE BERTHEAU Marguerite is an MPhil Student in Modern European History at the University of Cambridge. Her current research explores migration form the Eastern Bloc to West Germany around the fall of the iron curtain and its ensuing changes to German Asylum Law. She has obtained her undergraduate degree at AlbertLudwigs-Universität in Freiburg, Germany with her bachelor-dissertation looking into the legal frameworks for the immigration of Russian-Speaking Jews to Germany between 1990 and 2005.

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ALESSIA CAPUTO Alessia Caputo is a dual-degree candidate attending the MSc in Economics and Management of Government and International Organizations at Bocconi University and the MPA at the University at Albany, State University of New York.

Her interest in economics, international, and societal matters began during her Bachelor’s in Economics and Social Science at Bocconi University. Her research focus also includes Public Health, to the extent that she serves as a researcher for the Healthcare Hub Bocconi. Currently, she is working in the Office of the New York State Senator Todd Kaminsky.

IVANA DAMJANOVIC Dr Ivana Damjanovic completed her PhD at the Australian National University in November 2020. Her thesis examined the role of the EU in the global reform of international investment governance and dispute settlement. Ivana is a qualified lawyer in Australia and her native Croatia and has expertise in international law and international relations. Her professional background encompasses nine years as a career diplomat for the Government of Croatia, with diplomatic postings in Europe and Australia, as well as research and policy roles for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she participated in tasks related to Croatia’s accession to the EU. Ivana is an Assistant Lecturer in law at the University of Canberra and participates in a number of research projects on EU trade as a Visiting Research Fellow of the ANU Centre for European Studies.

ANNA-DOBRAWA KICIŃSKA Anna-Dobrawa Kicinska is an architect and urban planner, currently pursuing MPhil in Architecture and Urban Studies at University of Cambridge. She holds a MSc degree from Delft University of Technology and a BSc degree from Warsaw University of Technology. During her research in Cambridge, she pursues topics of civic agency and participation in the context of development of cities and shaping of urban identity. She is especially interested in how public space and architecture are affected by systemic changes, such as 1989 transition from communist to capitalist economy in Warsaw.

CLAUDE EWERT Claude Ewert is a second-year PhD student at the Faculty of History at the University of Cambridge and a member of Wolfson College. His PhD dissertation is looking at EC-USSR relations from 1973 to 1991, under the supervision of Dr Mark B. Smith, senior lecturer at King’s College. Claude Ewert holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree from the University of Luxembourg. His BA thesis looked at Luxembourgish relations with the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period from 1944 to 1956, and his MA thesis dealt with EEC-USSR relations from 1958 to 1972. He worked as a student research assistant for both the Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C2DH) and the Institute of History (IHIST) at the University of Luxembourg.

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LISA SOPHIE FENNER Lisa Sophie Fenner is a PhD student at the University of Cambridge. Her academic interests lie in the politicisation of European integration, transnational social movements and the effect of protest on policy-making in the EU. Lisa holds a BA in Political Science from the Free University Berlin and an MPhil in International Relations and Politics from the University of Cambridge. She was a German Academic Scholarship Foundation Scholar and an Honorary Benefactors’ Scholar at St John’s College, Cambridge. She now holds the YouGov-Studentship at the Department of Politics and International Studies.

MORGAN FORDE Morgan Forde is completing a Master of Philosophy in Architecture and Urban Studies at the University of Cambridge. Her research focuses on the urban theoretical and spatial relationships formed between Black and Soviet communities in the 20th century. In Fall 2021, she will begin pursuing a doctoral degree at the Harvard University Graduate School of Design.

DANIEL GEBEL

Daniel Gebel is a doctoral student at the Federal Institute for Culture and History of the Germans in Eastern Europe (BKGE), Oldenburg – PhD-Project: Everyday Life and Memory. Russian-German and Jewish “Soviet baggage” after the Emigration. In 4/2018, I received my Master of Arts in Comparative Modern History at the Albert-Ludwig-Universität Freiburg – Master thesis: The Russian parliamentary election 1993 in the mirror of the German press. In 10/2014, I received my Bachelor of Arts in History and Slavic Studies at the Carl von Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg. My academic and research interests are the following: History of Russia with an emphasis on the 1990s, Nationality conflicts in the 19th and 20th century, and History of diplomacy in the 19th and 20th century.

JACQUELINE GEORGIS Jacqueline Georgis is a PhD candidate in ethnomusicology within the Department of Music. Her work explores ideas of cultural hybridity and transnational exchange within the Lusophone-Atlantic. She is particularly interested in researching these themes through the lens of a contemporary Afro-Portuguese-inspired electronic dance music genre from Lisbon, Portugal, asking how this and other electronic musics challenge and re-imagine neo-colonial sociocultural and political configurations in Portugal. Before coming to Yale, Jacqueline received her B.M. in cello performance from the School of Music, Ithaca College (2013), and continued cello performance study under the tutelage of Geneviève Teulieres-Sommer at the École Normale de Musique de Paris, Alfred Cortot (2013-2015) in Paris, France.

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DESPOINA GEORGIOU Despoina Georgiou is a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, specializing in EU Labour and Competition Law. In 2019, she was a visiting researcher at Harvard Law School. She currently serves as the Editor-in-Chief of the Cambridge Law Review and its undergraduate law journal, De Lege Ferenda. Miss Georgiou has received multiple prestigious awards and scholarships such as the Cambridge European Scholarship, the Cambridge Arts and Humanities Research Council Studentship and the Onassis Foundation Scholarship. She has authored various articles (most recently, “‘Business-Risk Assumption’ as a Criterion for the Determination of EU Employment Status: A Critical Evaluation” published in 2021 in the Industrial Law Journal) and has participated in many conferences (such as ILO, CERIC, and CILJ conferences).

MARC IBÁÑEZ DÍAZ Marc Ibáñez Díaz is a La Caixa Fellow pursuing an MA in Global Affairs at the Jackson Institute. While at Yale Marc will study how to make global governance more citizen centric focusing on the European Union. Thus, he will focus his studies on global governance, European integration, nationalism and transnational democracy. His interest in citizen centric governance stems from his engagement in local politics since he was first elected to his town’s youth council at the age of eleven and his later role as a local activist. Marc graduated with extraordinary honors from the University of Barcelona with a BSc in Economics. His published senior thesis focused on the impact of Brexit on the UK financial sector. Marc went on exchange at the University of Pennsylvania (US) and Burgas Free University (Bulgaria). A member of multiple student groups he was elected a student representative to the university government. Before coming to Yale, Marc worked for three years in Sabadell Consulting, the internal strategic consultancy unit of the Sabadell Banking Group. As a consultant he designed and managed strategic projects and led the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation in the group.

KELSEY JONES Kelsey Jones is a master's student studying Environmental Resource Policy at George Washington University. She graduated with her B.A. in Political Science with minors in Anthropology and Sustainability from the University of Florida in 2016. Her graduate research looks at opportunities and challenges for renewable energy implementation in Arctic cities. She works in government affairs at the Nuclear Energy Institute.

CRISTIANA LUCCHETTI Cristiana Lucchetti was born in Salerno, Italy and currently lives in Munich, Germany. She is a PhD student at LMU Munich, where she is working on her PhD project titled “Language and Culture in the Context of Migration. A Study on Russian-Speaking Communities in Israel and Germany”. Her main research interests are migration, multilingualism and integration processes, with particular focus on the post-Soviet context.

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JESSLENE LEE Jesslene Lee is a graduate student at the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Jesslene's research interests are in the subfields of International Relations and International Political Economy. Her research is motivated by the central question: how do rising powers affect global economic governance? She is particularly interested in examining how rising powers’ international economic engagement in the areas of development finance and trade supports or challenges the rules, norms, and institutions of existing global economic governance. Her current projects revolve around the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative.

NADIA KALISIAK Nadia Kalisiak graduated from the University of Aberdeen in 2020 where she completed her degree in History, writing her dissertation under the supervision of Professor Robert Frost on nineteenth century national movements. Nadia is currently working towards completing her MPhil by thesis in comparative Slavonic literature at the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Dr Stanley Bill, focusing on nineteenth century Romantic literature, challenging the current postcolonial thought on the effects of Orientalism on national identities in Poland and Ukraine. Alongside her degree she is a researcher at the Cambridge Development Initiative and previously interned at the Polish Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. Her interests lie in international relations, literature, and post-colonialism.

DAN MOCANU Dan Mocanu is a MPhil candidate at the Centre of Development Studies, University of Cambridge, where he studies as a Cambridge Trust Scholar. His research interests include European economic governance, industrial policy, global value chains, and the role of professional networks in transnational policymaking.

Prior to Cambridge, he worked at Sciences Po Paris, where he researched the collaboration of the EIB Group with national development banks. He is a graduate of the College of Europe and holds a double-BA from the University of Groningen, Netherlands.

MASHA MONAKHOVA Masha has always been interested in learning about different regions and cultures and gaining a better understanding on how the world works on a global scale. Through obtaining two Bachelor's degrees in International Economic Relations and International Law from the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, she attained a solid knowledge of processes and major forces that shape the international landscape. She increased her expertise on different countries and specific regional policies when completing a Master's degree in Geography at the University of Northern Iowa focusing on sustainable development. Continuing on the pursuit of knowledge Masha took up a position as an intern at the UNDP in New York City to prove her knowledge and gain more experience. Choosing the Arctic as her main study area was natural for her as it takes on a new geopolitical and economic importance related to climate change and its effect on people, ecosystems, and economies. Currently, she is pursuing a PhD program in Environmental Social Science with Arizona State University where she continues working on critical policy challenges around climate change in the Arctic region.

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YELYZAVETA MONASTYROVA My name is Yelyzaveta Monastyrova, I am an International Relations graduate from Ukraine and presently a second-year student of the Erasmus Mundus International Master in South European Studies at the University of Glasgow, Autonomous University of Madrid and LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. My research interests include international development, state fragility, socioeconomic inequalities, and migration, and after completing the Master I aim to pursue an academic career.

CARLA MONTIGNY Carla Montigny is a Politics and Security postgraduate student at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies. She has a background in History and Politics, and her research has mostly focused on nationalism, nation-building and national identity. She has looked at these topics through the prism of language and gender, specifically in relations to the Western Balkans and Russia. Her undergraduate dissertation explored the link between language and nationbuilding efforts after the breakup of Yugoslavia, while her master’s dissertation studies the impact of changing gender roles on Russian national identity post1991.

SENNI MUT-TRACY Senni Mut-Tracy is currently a research assistant at the Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity and the European Narratives at the University of Helsinki. She has a background in world politics and is currently pursuing her master’s degree in European and Nordic studies. Prior to this, she has worked, among other places, as a visiting fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) and as a researcher with EU-commissioned projects. Senni has co-authored an in-depth report on Discriminatory Laws Undermining Women’s Rights for the Human Rights Subcommittee of the European Parliament.

RYAN NABIL Ryan Nabil is currently a Fox Fellow at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), where he researches Chinese diplomacy in Europe, British foreign policy, and cybersecurity-related issues. Ryan is a recent M.A. graduate from the Yale Jackson Institute, where he studied international relations, comparative law, and diplomacy. As part of the MacMillan Center’s graduate certificate in European studies, he wrote a master’s thesis on Europe-China relations and its implications for European security and foreign affairs. While at Yale, Ryan served as a teaching fellow for three courses, including China in the World and Power Shifts, and worked as a research assistant for Professor Odd Arne Westad. In addition to his academic work, he served as the managing editor for the Yale Journal of International Affairs. Ryan was also part of the Stanford Forum for American Chinese Exchange and the Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum, where he researched strategies to improve U.S.-Russian economic relations.

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CÉLESTE PAGNIELLO Céleste Pagniello holds a Bachelor of Music degree from McGill University (2018) and a Master of Philosophy degree in music from the University of Cambridge (2020), where her research, supervised by Professor Marina Frolova-Walker, focused on Boris Asafyev and The Fountain of Bakhchisarai ballet. She has spent time studying in Saint Petersburg, Russia, and Minsk, Belarus, and is currently undertaking a second Master of Philosophy degree at the University of Cambridge, in comparative literature and Slavonic studies, under the guidance of Dr. Rory Finnin. Her dissertation focuses on Soviet Belarusian literature and national identity. Her research interests include everything Tchaikovsky, Russian and Soviet ballet, socialist art, and the relationship between literature and music.

FERNANDO A. REMACHE VINUEZA Fernando Remache - Vinueza is currently a postgraduate student of the Erasmus Mundus international masters EUROSUD - South European Studies at the University of Glasgow. He holds a bachelor degree in History issued by Complutense University of Madrid. His research interests are identities and nationalism in Southern and Eastern Europe.

GABRIEL ROSENMAN Gabriel Rosenman is a Ph.D student in Political Science at École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. Resuming studies after 10 years as a railroad worker and union organizer, his research focuses on the use of strike funds in the French workers' movement. His field inquiry includes participant observation of strikes, exploitation of union archives and analysis of financial data, thus combining ethnographical, historical and statistical perspectives.

ABIGAIL SKALKA Abigail received her bachelor's degree in government, magna cum laude, from Cornell University in 2020. Her honors thesis was a quantitative analysis investigating a link between personal religiosity and support for right-wing populism, focusing mainly on Poland in a comparative perspective. She is now pursuing a master's in the regional studies of Eastern Europe at Harvard University, writing her thesis on the effect of clerical abuse scandals on the political power of the Polish Church.

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PEDRO SCHILLING DE CARVALHO Pedro is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Cambridge, where he is a Richard Tee Scholar at Sidney Sussex College. He is also a Doctoral Exchange Student at Harvard Law School. Pedro holds an LLM from the University of Cambridge and an LLB from the University of São Paulo. His PhD thesis examines how international financial regulation has been affected by the current aversion to multilateralism, focusing on developments in the EU and UK. His research aims to understand how domestic and regional regulatory frameworks can be used to overcome these issues, facilitating coordination and development. During his studies, he was awarded a grant from the São Paulo Research Foundation, a Chevening Scholarship, and a Cambridge International Scholarship. Currently, he is a research assistant at the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, and a Rapporteur to the Oxford International Organizations Project. In the past, Pedro has served as an an expert witness for the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union of the UK House of Commons. Pedro also has experience as a practicing attorney in Arbitration, was Chief of Staff to the Chief Justice of the Commercial Law Chamber of the São Paulo State Supreme Court, and Secretary General of Brazil’s largest legal aid NGO.

ANIKET SANGWAN Aniket Sangwan is a graduate student at the University of Cambridge in the Department of Land Economy. His current research is based on the political economy of British urban finance. Aniket did his undergraduate studies at the University of Wisconsin Madison where he majored in Economics and Geography.

MARTINA SPATUZZO Martina Spatuzzo is a second-year MSc student in Economics and Management of Government and International Organizations at Bocconi University. Her research interests include International Health Economics and Public Health Policy. In 2021 she moved to the United States, where she is completing an MPA degree at Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the State University of New York while working for the New York State Assembly.

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YALE EUROPEAN STUDIES GRADUATE FELLOWS CONFERENCE YALE EUROPEAN STUDIES GRADUATE FELLOWS CONFERENCE

Keynote Address Radosław Sikorski, MEP

Member of the European Parliament

Radosław (Radek) Sikorski is a Member of the European Parliament for his native Kuyavian-Pomeranian region of Poland. Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) and the Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE), he also chairs the Delegation for relations with the United States. He is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University and a Distinguished Statesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Formerly, he served as Poland’s Minister of Defense (2005-2007), Minister of Foreign Affairs (20072014) and Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (2014-2015). Together with Carl Bildt, he initiated the EU’s Eastern Partnership. He also proposed establishing the European Endowment for Democracy and the Solidarity Prize.

In 2014, at the height of mass protests against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, he led the EU mission to Kiev, which stopped the bloodshed on the Maidan. In 2012 Foreign Policy magazine named him one of its Top 100 Global Thinkers “for telling the truth, even when it’s not diplomatic.”

A highlight of the conference was keynote speaker, Member of the European Parliament Radosław Sikorski. In his talk, which was moderated by Professor Marci Shore (Yale), MEP Sikorski spoke to a packed audience with about 100 attendees on questions of EU sovereignty, trade, democracy, and federalism (watch the full video recording). Through a generous Q&A, he fielded questions from the audience, speaking powerfully on the pressing topics of populism and climate change. He congratulated the graduate panelists on their incisive choice of panels topics, saying: “You are the first conference in my conscience that has had a panel on East European Migration to Central Europe… I think this is going to become an interesting political fact in the future and needs to be discussed.”

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Presentations I. Protest and Contentious Politics in Europe Co-Chairs: Lisa Sophie Fenner, University of Cambridge & Jacqueline Georgis, Yale University Yelyzaveta Monastyrova (University of Glasgow) Gabriel Rosenman (École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) (Paris, France)) Abigail Skalka (Harvard University) Discussant: Maria J. Hierro, Lecturer in Political Science (Yale University)

Euroscepticism and COVID-19: examining the Spanish political landscape in the face of the pandemic Yelyzaveta Monastyrova (University of Glasgow) Introduction Signalling the making of European political identity, Euroscepticism – opposition to European integration – reflects the EU’s ever mounting demand for legitimation. It intensifies at pivotal points of its history and was provoked by and fuelled political uncertainty surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, European Constitution project, sovereign debt and migration crises, and Brexit (Brack & Startin, 2015: 239).

Mainstreaming of Euroscepticism evidenced democratisation of the Community and “normalised” its political dynamics (Vasilopoulou, 2013:164). That said, the division between harsher forms of dissatisfaction which fall short of exiting the EU, and appeals to leave, arguably marks a qualitative difference between acknowledging the EU as a polity one belongs to, or an international organisation to abandon should costs outweigh gains. “Hard” Euroscepticism, therefore, endangers validity of the European political project, simultaneously exposing its democratic deficit problem. As for “softer” varieties of reform-encouraging criticism, purportedly only political forces which advocate diminishing the EU powers are genuinely Eurosceptic (Treib, 2020: 4). At the same time, progressive politicisation of the Union means opposition to the EU policies may amount to confronting the EU as such (Niccoli, 2017: 314-316).

Euroscepticism is inevitably multi-layered as contestation occurs and attitudes form in national public spaces. Political parties have been most vocal in instrumentalising the discourse (so that Euroscepticism is no longer a sign of marginality) (Treib, 2020: 7). However, even when used to pursue one’s agenda and not a goal per se, party Euroscepticism affects public opinions and ultimately policies (Pirro & Taggart, 2018: 257).

Whilst Euroscepticism is nation-specific, it has followed regional patterns. In Spain, Portugal and Greece, passages to European integration were closely interlinked with democratisation, determining historically high, even though not undisputed, loyalty to the EU and guaranteeing its legitimacy. “Soft” Euroscepticism as regards the benefits of membership, observable prior to accession, albeit never disappearing altogether, dropped afterwards (Verney, 2011, 2017). Moreover, trust in European institutions often exceeded satisfaction with national governments (Teperoglou & Belchior, 2020: 13).

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The picture changed with the sovereign debt crisis as the most Europhile turned into the most Eurosceptic after 2009 (Verney, 2017). The crisis undermined the legacy of democratisation and exposed alternative narratives of national past and present. The EU’s image as a beacon of solidarity, preserved since transitions, faded as the EU-imposed austerity policies limited perceived national sovereignty (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018: 346). Economic grievances and the sense of being left at the periphery of integration prompted nostalgy for the “pre-EU” past (Demeter & Goyanes, 2020: 9). Even though, South European Euroscepticism, embraced predominantly by left-wing radical parties, remained “soft” (Brack & Startin, 2015: 244).

Since the “refugee crisis”, those South European countries whose share in hosting migrants has been disproportionately high have had another reason to bear grudges against the EU. Lack of assistance from non-affected member states and the latter’s reluctancy to EU-wide commitments, have exacerbated a “North-South” cleavage and stimulated Euroscepticism (Bürkner, 2020: 549).

In a way, articulation of “soft” Eurosceptic stances demonstrates the maturity of South Europeans’ approach to the EU. However, the disturbingly high share of “ambivalent” Europeans is a pool of potential Eurosceptics. In critical situations, such voters are likelier to fall for populist and antiEU appeals – should these be present on the political spectrum (Verney, 2017: 173).

Does the COVID-19 pandemic represent the next “critical juncture” for the EU? Will it trigger Eurosceptic attitudes in Southern Member States? Such are the questions which guided the remainder of this paper. Namely, after discussing the destabilising potential of the COVID-19 crisis, it focuses on the possible impact of the pandemic on the evolution of Euroscepticism in Spain, examining the political situation and attitudes to the EU since the announcement of the state of emergency in March 2020.

COVID-19: a perfect storm?

The COVID-19 pandemic came as a global external shock, literally leaving no one out. It aggravated vulnerabilities of individuals, social groups and states unequally, while inducing an economic recession of dimensions unseen since the Second World War (Cirillo, 2020; Saad-Filho, 2020: 480).

And, as if it were a war, it invoked emergency rhetoric within national and supranational administrations. The “crisis management” mode ensured states’ omnipresence, mobilising resources and soliciting sacrifice for the sake of an eventual victory (Heisbourg, 2020: 10).

Simultaneously, a technocratic, “expert” discourse and individualisation of responsibility depoliticised the pandemic (Zahariadis et al., 2020). So, while economic repercussions have been generating preconditions for discontent, this has been mitigated, or at any rate postponed, by the “wartime” logic. Contrariwise, a “positive impact” of lockdowns on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and the “rally-around-the-flag” effect were discussed to explain rising support for incumbents (Bol et al., 2020).

COVID-19 halted integration processes globally; yet the authority of international bodies such as the WHO was strengthened and appeals for unity and coordination proliferated. In a similar fashion, although the EU’s role was circumscribed by the fact that critical policy sectors – national security, healthcare, social benefits – rest within national competencies, the pandemic is assessed as a chance for a leap in integration via enhancing the sense of common destiny – but also a spectre of dissent if such efforts fail (Bénassy-Quéré & Weder di Mauro, 2020; Van Uden & Van Houtum, 2020: 338).

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Early debates on avoiding a breakdown of the EMU in the face of national recessions resuscitated “North-South” cleavages from the times of the Eurozone crisis (Teperoglou & Belchior, 2020: 22). “Southern periphery” states, on which populations and economies the disease had taken a severe toll in spring 2020, unequivocally demanded solidarity-based measures. Meanwhile, the “northern core” was weary of the idea of commonly issued “corona-bonds” (promulgated in particular by the Spanish Prime Minister) and inclined to “remind” the Southerners of their poor fiscal management and last-minute responses at the crisis unfolded (Vallespin, 2020; The Economist, 2020).

European institutions did come up with initiatives – from liquidity injections by the ECB and funds to support national employment and healthcare to the Next Generation EU instrument, now embedded within a new Multiannual Financial Framework of the Union. Whether these measures will prevent an upsurge in Euroscepticism hangs upon the EU’s capacity to communicate its contribution to citizens (Samadashvili, 2020: 126). For instance, in southern countries with youth unemployment of roughly 30 % in 2019, and estimated 40-46 % for 2020, a European Youth Guarantee providing economic support or employment offers could alleviate political disenchantment and highlight communitarian values (Tamesberger & Bacher, 2020).

The pandemic temporarily suspended free movement inside the Schengen zone. Patriotic narratives accompanying anti-COVID-19 measures ripened conditions for populist nationalism, which, in its turn, precipitates Euroscepticism (Van Uden & Van Houtum, 2020: 341). Besides, the crisis prompted intra-EU comparisons and competition in swiftness and solidity of measures and in COVID-19 statistics. But it has also reinforced the “fortress Europe”, making it much harder for non-EU residents to enter the Union.

In this light, the pandemic both resembles the sovereign debt crisis – since it endangered the Eurozone stability and reproduced the core-periphery divide – and is different in several respects. Firstly, it is not attributable to the EU, which enters the debate as a mechanism “to level a playing field between member states” – not an authority enforcing its mandate and punishing for non-compliance (BénassyQuéré & Weder di Mauro, 2020: 207). Secondly, for the first time in the Union’s existence, COVID-19 directly evoked the language of an existential threat and matters of life and death – emanating the feeling that cohesion and unity must prevail over “usual” disagreements. Additionally, given that “national institutions are a sort of proxy for Europeanism”, higher satisfaction with domestic governments should, unless they run an anti-EU policy, generate pro-European sentiments (Serrichhio et al., 2013: 60).

Lastly, in the South European context, discontent with national governments should not undermine Europhile feelings and might even boost the EU’s credibility (Real-Dato & Sojka, 2020: 4).

Spanish political system and COVID-19 Spain only partially confirmed the tendency of governmental stabilisation in the pandemic spring of 2020. Ostensibly, “rallying around the flag” was not observable as high political polarisation continued well into the crisis, while citizens’ approval of national anti-COVID-19 policies in March 2020 ranged, according to different estimates, between 46 and 27 % of the population, i.e., below world averages (Garrido Rubia et al., 2020: 535-536). Power centralisation aggravated the national-regional cleavage as, especially with the “de-escalation” of confinement, misunderstandings arose between the national and autonomous governments (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2020: 12).

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The crisis nevertheless “induced a strong national bias coupled with higher demands for technoauthoritarian decision making” (Amat et al., 2020, in Bol et al., 2020: 2). Spanish citizens demonstrated “readiness to give up their freedoms for the sake of containing the virus” (López-García, 2020: 2). Trust in the Prime Minister grew by 10 % during the first lockdown, alongside with support for the pro-governmental parties. Conversely, ratings of right opposition declined – probably indicating popular dissatisfaction with the confrontational style they had adopted in discussing and voting emergency measures (Garrido Rubia et al., 2020: 537-538).

The government emphasised overcoming political conflicts, framing the emergency as a “war” (describing it in such terms as “battle”, “fight”, “war economy”) (López-García, 2020: 13). The metaphor was extended to the European level: the executive hailed European solidarity as “one of the best tools to fight against the virus” and “for the idea of Europe in which we believe” at the united “European front”. (Sánchez, 2020b). Moreover, identifying European integration as an effort to avoid the repetition of the world wars and comparing that situation to the COVID-19 emergency, Sánchez mentioned “a European response that would be a Marshall Plan” (Sánchez, 2020a) The EU featured prominently in the official narrative: already in March, Sánchez referred to the necessity for “Europe” to deal with the pandemic and back up the public debt the states were accruing (López-García, 2020: 12). COVID-19 was a crisis “putting the European project to the test” but also “the hour of the European Union”, of which Spaniards were loyal and dutiful citizens. Speaking of the limits of the European response to the 2008 crisis, the Prime Minister highlighted Europe’s “innocence” of attracting the novel coronavirus (Sánchez, 2020a). The need for a “coordinated response at a European level” was reiterated in May 2020, when European financial aid (the very agreement on which was represented as a Spanish diplomatic achievement) was considered an element of the national anti-COVID-19 strategy (Sánchez, 2020b).

Pro-Europeanness was upheld by the main opposition force – the People’s Party, whose speaker in the European Parliament also evoked the early stages of European integration stating that “if 70 years ago Robert Schuman achieved this [reindustrialisation and returning to citizens the pride of belonging to Europe that guarantees stability and development], so must we today” (Partido Popular, 2020).

Harsher critic of the EU came from Vox, that warned Europe against “signing its death sentence” through egoism and abandonment of “certain nations that make its part” (Vox Europa, 2020). However, despite denouncing the “machinery of Brussels and separatist communities” and claiming that Spain could only be saved by Spaniards, Vox also used the EU as a benchmark to blame the government for underperformance (Molpeceres, 2020; Vox, 2020).

Discussion The COVID-19 crisis had aggravated contestation within the national political system and allowed the opposition to discredit the governmental coalition. Nevertheless, the EU seemed to be once again “left aside from the domestic struggle”, continuing to be a “point of reference” even for the most Eurosceptic (in the comparative Spanish landscape) political actors (Cavallaro, 2019: 145).

It must be cautioned, however, that the present analysis is limited to the first months of the COVID-19 crisis. As the pandemic continues, new developments may change the dynamics. As the latest stage, the ongoing vaccination campaign in the EU countries has provoked a new circle of debates on intraEuropean solidarity and cohesion.

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Besides, attitudes to the EU may be affected by independent variables not related to COVID-19: since autumn 2020, the immigration crisis at the Canary Islands has become a source of political tensions which, encompassing Spain’s relationship with the EU and popular protests against refugee arrivals, provide a fertile ground for right-wing Euroscepticism.

REFERENCES • Alonso-Muñoz, L. & Casero-Ripollés, A. 2020. Populism Against Europe in Social Media: The Eurosceptic Discourse on Twitter in Spain, Italy, France, and United Kingdom During the Campaign of the 2019 European Parliament Election, Front. Commun., 5:54, DOI: 10.3389/ fcomm.2020.00054.

• Bénassy-Quéré, A. & Weder di Mauro, B. 2020. European Pandemic Recovery: An Opportunity to Reboot, Intereconomics, 4, DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0903-3.

• Bol, D., Giani, M., Blais, A. & Loewen, P. J. 2020. The effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on political support: Some good news for democracy?, European Journal of Political Research, DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12401.

• Brack, N. & Startin, N. 2015. Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the margins to the mainstream, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 239–249, DOI: 10.1177/0192512115577231.

• Bürkner, H.-J. 2020. Europeanisation versus Euroscepticism: Do Borders Matter?, Geopolitics, 25:3, 545–566, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1723964.

• Cavallaro, M.E. 2019. The Persistence of the Myth: Europeanism in Spain from the Late Francoism to the Outbreak of the 2008 Economic Crisis. In: Cavallaro, M., Kornetis, K. (eds).

Rethinking Democratisation in Spain, Greece and Portugal, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 123-149.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11108-3_6.

• Cirillo, K. 2020. Coronavirus: World Bank confirms deepest recession since World War Two (Online), UN News, 8 June 2020, URL: https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1065902 (accessed 6 February 2021).

• Demeter, M. & Goyanes, M. 2020. Antecedents of leaving the European Union: The role of nostalgia and attitudes towards diversity in Spain, Italy, and Greece, Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2020.1741914.

• Garrido Rubia, A., Martínez Rodríguez, M. A. & Rodríguez, M. 2020. El gobierno de España y el coronavirus: «rally round the flag» y sus efectos, Revista Ibérica de Sistemas e Tecnologias de Informação, 35, 535-545.

• Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. & Plaza-Colodro, C. 2018. Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian party systems, Politics, 38:3, 344–360, DOI: 10.1177/0263395718762667.

• Heisbourg, F. 2020. From Wuhan to the World: How the Pandemic Will Reshape Geopolitics, Survival, 62:3, 7-24, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2020.1763608.

• López-García, G. 2020. Vigilar y castigar: el papel de militares, policías y guardias civiles en la comunicación de la crisis del Covid-19 en España, El profesional de la información, 29:3, e290311, DOI: org/10.3145/epi.2020.may.11.

• Molpeceres, D. 2020. Abascal vincula al gobierno con “narcosocialismo” y afirma que la Unión Europea retoma el proyecto de Hitler (Online), La Política Online, 21 October 2020. URL: https:// www.lapoliticaonline.es/nota/85850-abascal-vincula-al-gobierno-con-el-narcosocialismo-yafirma-que-la-union-europea-retoma-el-proyecto-de-hitler/ (accessed 7 February 2021).

• Niccoli, F. 2017. Hard-line Euroscepticism and the Eurocrisis: Evidence from a Panel Study of 108 Elections Across Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55:2, 312–331, DOI: 10.1111/ jcms.12463.

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• Partido Popular, 2020. Dolors Montserrat defiende que el fondo de recuperación de la UE contra el coronavirus beneficie a todos los europeos, Bruselas, 13 de mayo de 2020 (Online), Partido Popular, URL: https://www.pp.es/actualidad-noticia/dolors-montserrat-defiende-que-fondo-recuperacion-ue-contracoronavirus-beneficie (accessed 7 February 2021).

• Pirro, A. & Taggart. P. 2018. The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: A framework for analysis, Politics, Vol. 38:3, 253–262, DOI: 10.1177/0263395718770579.

• Real-Dato, J. & Sojka, A. 2020. The Rise of (Faulty) Euroscepticism? The Impact of a Decade of Crises in Spain, South European Society and Politics, 1-28, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2020.1771876.

• Saad-Filho, A. 2020. From COVID-19 to the End of Neoliberalism, Critical Sociology, 46:4-5, 477–485, DOI: 10.1177/0896920520929966.

• Samadashvili, S. 2020. A brave, post–COVID-19 Europe, European View, 19:2, 122-130.

• Sánchez, P. 2020a. Comparecencia del presidente del Gobierno sobre medidas frente al Covid-19, La Moncloa (Online), La Moncloa (Gobierno de España, Presidencia del Gobierno), 28 March 2020, URL: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2020/prsp28032020.aspx (accessed 7 February 2021).

• Sánchez, P. 2020b. Comparecencia del presidente del Gobierno en el Congreso de los Diputados solicitando la prórroga del Estado de Alarma, Congreso de los Diputados (Online), La Moncloa (Gobierno de España, Presidencia del Gobierno), 20 May 2020, URL: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/intervenciones/ Paginas/2020/prsp200520.aspx (accessed 7 February 2021).

• Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M. & Quaglia, L. 2013. Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis, JCMS, 51:1, 51–64, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02299.x.

• Tamesberger, D. & Bacher, J. 2020. COVID-19 Crisis: How to Avoid a Lost Generation, Intereconomics, 4, 232-238, DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0908-y.

• Teperoglou, E. & Belchior, A. M. 2020. Ιs ‘Old Southern Europe’ Still Eurosceptic? Determinants of Mass Attitudes before, during and after the Eurozone Crisis, South European Society and Politics, 1-26, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2020.1805878.

• The Economist, 2020. Paying for it; Europe's response to covid-19 (Online), The Economist, 435: 9189, 41 (US), 11 April 2020, Gale Academic OneFile, URL: link.gale.com/apps/doc/A619851835/EAIM? u=glasuni&sid=EAIM&xid=8ef568c8 (accessed 3 January 2021).

• Treib, O. 2020. Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections, Journal of European Public Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1737881.

• Vallespin, F. 2020. Helft dem Süden, tut es euch zuliebe! (Online), Zeit Online, 25 April 2020, URL: https:// www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2020-04/coronavirus-italien-spanien-europa-wirtschaftskrise-gesundheitssystem (accessed 11 December 2020).

• Van Uden, A. & Van Houtum, H. 2020. Beyond coronativism: the need for agape, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 111:3, 333-346, DOI:10.1111/tesg.12438.

• Vasilopoulou, S. 2013. Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51:1, 153-168, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02306.x.

• Verney, S. 2011. Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective, South European Society and Politics, 16:01, 1-29, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.570124.

• Verney, S. 2017. Losing loyalty: the rise of polity Euroscepticism in Southern Europe, in B. Leruth, N. Startin & S. Usherwood (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism, Routledge: London and New York, 168-185.

• Vox Europa. 2020. Si la Unión Europea quiere apostar por el egoísmo o desentenderse de algunas de las naciones que forman parte de ella, estará firmando su sentencia de muerte, Tweet, 1 April 2020, URL: https://twitter.com/vox_europa_/status/1245276096792350721 (accessed 13 January 2021).

• Vox. 2020. La gestión de Sánchez provoca que una veintena de países interpongan restricciones a las personas que viajan a nuestro país (Online), Vox España, 7 September 2020, URL: https:// www.voxespana.es/actualidad/la-gestion-de-sanchez-provoca-que-una-veintena-de-paises-interponganrestricciones-a-las-personas-que-viajan-a-nuestro-pais-20200907 (accessed 12 January 2021).

• Zahariadis, N., Petridou, E. & Oztig, L. I. 2020. Claiming credit and avoiding blame: political accountability in Greek and Turkish responses to the COVID-19 crisis, European Policy Analysis, 6, 159– 169, DOI: 10.1002/epa2.1089.

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The Rise of French Strike Funds : Financial Solidarity and the Mass Strike of December 2019 Gabriel Rosenman (École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) (Paris, France)) During the winter of 2019, France was shaken by a mass political strike (Gall, 2013) directed against a new reform of the pension system : for 45 days, public transports (especially in Paris) were paralyzed on a scale unseen since 1995. This strike triggered a massive display of financial solidarity towards the strikers : in a matter of days, hundreds of on-line strike funds sprouted, raising more than 5 millions euros worth of donations, for the first time in French history1.

Strike funds are a rather common element in the American unions' "repertoire of contention" (Tilly, 1984) (the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Auto Workers or the Communication Workers of America have large ones and use them frequently), but they are very rare in France : to an American eye, « French unions are weak in terms of members and strike funds » (Yale Law Journal, 1973).

And the history of the French workers' movement is indeed one of mass political strikes but weak and divided unions2 (Tilly, Shorter, 1973). The Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), the main union in French history, has always opposed the idea of a wealthy union providing services for its members. Thus, the only permanent union strike fund in France belongs to a christian union, which later became the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) : it is the largest union now, but it is very moderate and didn't take part in the recent strike.

Furthermore, the strike funds that multiplied in december 2019 are of a different kind : unlike permanent union strike funds, dedicated to union members' and financed by their dues, these new funds are ephemeral, intended for any striker (unionized or not, and whatever the union) and financed by external donations. They thus rely on collecting money during demonstrations and through on-line crowd-funding.

Made possible by the rise of the internet and social media, these new tools of financial solidarity illustrate the "tactical interdependance" (Dobry, 1986) of three different actors : strikers, donors and organizers. But while the mass strike of december 2019 allowed such funds to multiply, it also confronted these actors with specific dilemmas.

Did these funds encourage new professional sectors to take action ? Or did they rather offer workers an alternative to strike action whenever taking action seemed impossible or useless in their workplace, thus facilitating a form of "strike by proxy", a delegation of their own agency towards the key sectors already on strike?

The present contribution will try and clarify the motives and rationales of each of the three groups of actors at play, and the tactical dilemmas that each had to face in december 2019.

In addition to my professional and militant experience resulting from 10 years of work and trade union organizing in the French railroad company, it is based on a Ph.D research that combines ethnographic observations of strikes, interviews with union leaders, exploitation of union archives and statistical analysis of donations.

1 2 PAGE 17

The only similar experience is the national miners' strike in 1963 that raised the equivalent of 2 millions euros.

Only 10% of the workforce is unionized and divided between 8 competing confederations.

Holding on The first protagonists are the workers engaged in long strikes. Their main constraint is financial: in order to defeat their opponents, they have to go on with the strike despite the absence of salary. They must therefore find resources that are sufficient to prevent them from resuming work too soon: the strike fund is what enables them to "hold on".

Similarly to the creation of the LAB union's strike fund in the Basque Country in 2010 (Las Heras, Rodriguez, 2020), the recent rise of strike funds in France represents a tactical answer to the way governments and management have handled industrial conflicts since the last economic crisis, using several means in order to put "the labour repertoire under pressure" (Vandaele, 2016).

For example, over the last few years, we have seen the end of a traditional compliance with long strikes: the post-poning or even partial payment of strike days by the company. In railroad, subway or postal companies, strikers now receive empty pay slips and are therefore immediately faced with the threat of poverty.

As implied by the concept of "repertoire of contention", resorting to a strike fund also results from the resilience of the strikers' opponents. To grasp the conditions of the employers' capacity to resist, a material element proves to be decisive: the possibility of reducing economic losses due to the strike, by ensuring the continuity of production thanks to the systematic replacement of strikers.

In order to avoid breaking the law, management has systematically used three methods in recent years: creating dedicated « strike-breakers » departments, training managers to fill in rank-and-file positions, and recruiting new employees. Launching a strike fund is therefore a form of response to these measures on the part of strikers, most often after several unsuccessful experiences of long strikes : the sectors that have made the heaviest use of strike funds in recent years are also those that have most intensely resorted to strike actions.

Extending ?

The winter of 2019 therefore represents an important change. Within a few weeks, several hundreds of rank-and-file committees and union locals launched strike funds without having been previously involved in long strikes. However, while strike funds have spread within mobilized sectors, these sectors have remained few in number. And in order to challenge the government, strikers were thus confronted with the double imperative of holding on and extending the strike to new sectors. It explains their main tactical dilemma: should they invite non-strikers to finance the fund, or to join the strike?

Since the context of interprofessional strikes turns every employee into a potential striker, giving money to strike funds is sometimes perceived as a "dispensation from striking", an attitude that would contradict the need to extend the strike. But opposing strike funds can easily turn around in the course of the movement : strike funds can represent a form of aknowledgement of the difficulties encountered in extending the strike.

Supporting The second group of actors consists of the donors. Making a donation constitutes a gesture of material and moral support to the strikers. But if it is always based on a form of identification with their struggle, it must however be clearly distinguished from a link based on mutual acquaintance. According to a questionnaire sent to the donors of the main recent strike fund3, only 4% of respondents personally knew a beneficiary.

Donating to a strike fund differs fundamentally from making a personal donation to a striker : whereas the latter implies either a counter-gift or a form of inferiorization of the beneficiary, donations to strike funds rely on the existence of a "matching device" (Steiner, Naulin, 2016) between donor and beneficiary.

3 The strike fund launched by the "Info'Com CGT" union local raised over 3 millions euros, thanks to 39.000 donors (5.000 of which filled our on-line questionnaire).

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Surprizingly, the lexicographical analysis of the 10,000 messages pinned with donations to this main fund shows that, if 2,700 messages encouraged the strikers, the word most frequently used in addressing them was "Thank you" (3,700 occurrences). Such thanks turn around the meaning of these donations, since we see the donors thanking the beneficiaries. In fact, they see their donation not as a gift but as a "counter-gift" (Mauss, 1925). The money they spend is only a response to another gesture: the strikers' sacrifice of their salary.

Finally, the questionnaire completed by donors also sheds light on some of their social features.

Above all, they have a particularly high level of education: 69% declare a Bachelor's degree4, which is much higher than the strikers' level of education.

And the same goes for their income: more than 60% of the donors belong to the top half of the national income classification, while strikers belong to much lower layers.

Delegating?

According to the same questionnaire, 94% of the donors never benefited from a strike fund, only 35% participated in a long strike and 32% belong to a union: a large majority therefore seems to be unfamiliar not only with intensive strike action but also with organized labor. Does all this make it legitimate to describe donations to strike funds as a form of "strike by proxy"?

This question has been much discussed in the French union movement since the strike of 1995, and it only becomes an issue during interprofessional strikes : donations could then correspond to a form of delegation, where donors would rely on strikers to fight in their stead. But donors to the main strike fund are in fact characterized by an involvement that goes beyond their donation: 59% define themselves as activists, and 66% participated in demonstrations or rallies to support the strike. For the majority of donors, donating to a strike fund thus represents only one side of a multisided activism.

Obtaining The last actors are the strike funds' organizers (often union organizers or designated rank-and-file strikers), those responsible for setting them up and accumulating money. In order to do that, they must present the issues at stake to potential donors in such a way as to attract their donations. The various devices they use posters, leaflets, social networks publications – belong to an overall narrative that expresses "conscious strategic efforts [...] to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996). These "frames" can therefore vary greatly from one strike to the other. For instance, a fund supporting sub-contracting roommaids on strike encouraged people to help these migrant working women uphold their legitimate rights. Whereas a few months earlier, the strike fund for railroad workers rather invited donors to defend public transports, drawing on a common interest between railroad workers and passengers.

Embodying ?

The winter of 2019 allowed strike funds to muliply and spread both horizontally and vertically. And this dual dynamic created a strong tension between the multiplication of local funds on the one hand, and the centralization of donations on the other. While this proliferation showed the strong determination of rankand-file strikers and their desire to control the financial aspects of the strike, it also resulted in the dispersal of money and the difficulty of making the extent of this financial solidarity visible. But at the same time, there has been a dynamic of centralization towards a few national union funds : among the 380 funds indentified on-line, the 10 main ones drew 75% of the money. And this centralization is what allowed financial solidarity to get a strong political impact on the strike: the visibility of the collected amounts drew media attention and gave the strikers confidence to continue the strike.

4

This high proportion probably also results from a methodological distortion due to the on-line questionnaire.

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But this situation also involved these funds in a fierce competition : the issue was not just one of collecting money to help strikers, but also one of converting these funds into a certain form a symbolic capital, one that was highly valuable in the internal struggles within the union field. Due to the CGT's traditionnal opposition to strike funds and to the CFDT's being not involved, most strike fund organizers actually belonged to radical and marginalized sectors of the trade-union movement. The size of their strike fund served as a symbol of their influence, and it gave them an opportunity for expressing harsh criticisms towards the union executives' "bureaucracy".

A solidarity of the subalterns I would like to conclude this intervention by addressing one last question: how can we explain the solidarity between strike funds' beneficiaries, donors and organizers ? What is their alliance based on? To answer that question, I will draw on Bourdieu's theory of social fields, and more specifically on his idea of "homologies of position" (Bourdieu, 1984) : although the three types of actors are located in different social fields, they seem to hold homologous positions in each. If strike funds' beneficiaries most often posess a professional capital, guaranteed by their contract in public companies, they nonetheless hold dominated positions in society as a whole. As for the donors, their cultural capital is certified by academic degrees, but they hold a subordinate status, illustrated by their relatively modest incomes and by the strong presence of depreciated professions (teachers, civil servants). Finally, strike funds' organizers hold an indisputable militant capital but they also suffer from a strong marginalization in the trade-union field. The alliance between these three types of actors could thus be explained by their belonging to the subaltern upper layers of their respective fields ; by a paradoxical combination of a dominated situation and significant ressources.

References • Bourdieu, P. (1984). Espace social et genèse des "classes". Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 52-53.

• Dobry, M. (1986). Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des mobilisations multisectorielles.

Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques.

• Gall, G. (2013). Quiescence continued ? Recent strike activity in nine western european economies.

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 34-4.

• Las Heras, J., Rodriguez, L. (2020). Striking to Renew: Basque Unions’ Organizing Strategies and Use of the Strike-Fund. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7-1080.

• Mauss, M. (1925). Essai sur le don. L'Année Sociologique, 2.

• McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D., Zald, M. (1996). Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.

Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Naulin, S., Steiner, P. (2016). La solidarité à distance. Quand le don passe par les organisations.

Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Midi.

• Tilly, C., Shorter, E. (1973). Les vagues de grève en France, 1890-1968. Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 28/4.

• Tilly, C. (1984). Les origines du répertoire d'action collective contemporaine en France et en GrandeBretagne. Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire, 4 (4).

• Vandaele, K. (2016). Interpreting strike activity in western Europe in the past 20 years: the labour repertoire under pressure. Transfer, 22(3).

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Abortion and the Political Capacity of the Catholic Church: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Ireland and Poland Abigail Skalka (Harvard University) Poland has been marred by upheaval in recent months as demonstrators took to the streets to protest the recent near-total ban on abortion issued by the country’s highest court. The Constitutional Tribunal eliminated protections for abortion in the case of debilitating fetal defects, making abortion illegal in Poland except in instances of rape, incest, or risk to the life of the mother. Just four years earlier, in 2016, the parliament pursued a bill that would impose similar restrictions on abortion access, but it was abandoned after demonstrations much like 2020’s. Given increasing secularization among young people and a national history of civic unrest in the defense of reproductive rights, it seems surprising that the Polish Church would continue to press this issue, let alone succeed. This essay explores the status of abortion politics in Catholic strongholds and subsequently brings the issue into focus by outlining the divergent paths of Poland and Ireland. It also demonstrates why the Polish Church has been to some extent immune to the forces that have decreased the influence of its Irish counterpart and how this policy area underscores the democratic deficiencies of Poland relative to Ireland.

The Church & Policy-Making in Poland The Catholic Church has historically enjoyed a privileged position in the Polish national psyche, but generational shifts are calling the resilience of that privilege into question. Popular wisdom has long held that to be Polish was to be Catholic, and as such any attack on the Church was akin to an attack on the Polish nation itself. When Poland was partitioned in the late eighteenth century, ethnic Poles, seeking a mechanism to define themselves independent of territorial borders, focused “above all on religion” as a mainstay of the Polish national being1. During the communist era the Church identified itself as an “ally and representative of the nation,” preserving a national identity in the face of assaults by the communist leaders, who “were widely seen as Soviet stooges and lackeys of the historical enemies of Poland.”2 The institution offered physical protection for dissidents, sent food to the imprisoned, and hosted resistance meetings in its basements.3 By the late 1980s, 80% of polling respondents said the Church worked in the public interest.4 This legacy, combined with the Church’s role as mediator between the communist ruling party and the Solidarity labor union which eventually toppled the regime, has meant that the Church has been able to go relatively unchecked when it ventures into the political arena. Polling data suggests that the time for that free reign may be coming to an end, however, as a younger generation with a different perspective on faith and religious institutions comes of age.

An analysis by Pew Research Center in 2018 found that young adults in 40 countries surveyed were less likely to identify with religion than older adults, and Poland was no exception. In fact, with regards to weekly religious service attendance, the age gap in Poland was the largest of any of the countries surveyed: “26% of Polish adults under 40 say they attend religious services weekly, compared with 55% of their elders.”5 1. Bociurkiw, B. R., Dunn, D. J., Hoffman, G. W., & Ramet, S. P. (1985). Eastern Europe: religion and nationalism. Washington, D.C.: East European Program, European Institute, the Wilson Center. p 44.

2. Grzymała-Busse, A. (2015). Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 151.

3. Grzymała-Busse, A. (2015). Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 153 4. Borowik, I. (2002). The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: The case of Poland. Social Compass, 49(2), 242.

5. Young adults around the world are less religious. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/young-adults-around-the-worldare-less-religious-by-several-measures/

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This age divide is further supported by a number of regression analyses conducted on questions of religion and morality.6 Adults under 35 were less likely to believe in God, regularly practice religion, or believe that the Church should get involved in politics. Those respondents rated religion as less important in their lives compared to the older segment of the survey’s sample population. They also held more permissive views on the questions of gay marriage and abortion rights. Some scholars have hypothesized that the Polish piety gap in particular may be due to the fact that young people did not experience firsthand the association with nationalism and resistance during the communist period, in contrast to their parents.7 Another possible explanation for the increased distance between young people and the Church as compared to older generations is the deluge of information that has come out in recent years detailing abuses by priests. Young people now associate the Church less with defense of human rights––as was its reputation in the 1970s and 80s––and more with the heinous acts that members of the cloth perpetrated against children and which higher-ups in the institution worked painstakingly to cover up. Those stories have not only permeated media outlets but have also made their way into visual culture, namely film, in the form of 2018’s “Kler” (“Clergy”) and the 2019 documentary film “Tylko nie mów nikomu” (“Do not tell anyone”), which data indicates was viewed by at least 36% of adult Poles in the first year of its release.8 The sins of the Church are therefore becoming clear to the public, and young people may be less forgiving since they tend to consume more media than older demographics and thus are all-too-familiar with the gory details. The damage to the Church’s trust and reputation is reflected in CBOS survey data, which found that 67% of respondents consider the Church’s disclosure of information “insufficient” and as a result, the percentage of respondents assessing the Church’s activity well dropped from 57% in March 2019 to 48% in July of that same year.9 Survey data also demonstrates that Poles did not want to see abortion access further restricted.

Poland previously only allowed abortion in the cases of a threat to the life of the mother, debilitating fetal defects, or if the pregnancy with the result of a crime like rape. While the public did not necessarily seek to broaden abortion access beyond those scenarios, they did not seek to see it further limited, either. 80% of respondents in 2016 believed that abortion should be permitted if the mother’s life was at stake, while 71% approved of the practice in the case of rape and 73% in the case of incest.10 The proportion of those who accepted abortion in the case of fetal abnormalities––the very circumstance that is no longer permitted under the Tribunal’s judgement––was comparatively smaller at 53%, but still represented a majority.11 The Irish Case Similar trends––that is to say, decreased trust in the Church as a result of abuse scandals and popular support for liberalization on the topics of abortion and LGBT rights––in Ireland in recent years led to precisely the opposite outcome seen in Poland. 78% of Ireland’s population consider themselves Catholic and 91% of children attend a church-run school.12 The Church is woven into every part of society, as much if not more than it is in Poland. Yet since 2015 Ireland has liberalized on a number of issues that have historically been opposed by the Catholic Church.

6. See Appendix 7. Mandes, S., and Rogaczewska, M. (2013). “‘I don’t reject the Catholic Church—the Catholic Church rejects me’: How Twenty- and Thirtysomethings in Poland Re-evaluate their Religion.” Journal of Contemporary Religion. 28:2, 259-276, DOI: 10.1080/13537903.2013.783338 8. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - CBOS (2019) July 2019 [Data set]. Retrieved from https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/ public_opinion/2019/07_08_2019.pdf 9. Ibid 10. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - CBOS (2016) April 2016 [Data set]. Retrieved from https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/ public_opinion/2016/04_2016.pdf 11. Ibid 12. The liberalisation of Ireland. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2019/12/18/the-liberalisation-of-ireland

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Journalists and scholars studying the phenomenon in Ireland have pointed to the “pragmatization” of Irish religious life to the disillusionment that, for many, accompanied news of clerical abuses in the 1990s. In the mid-90s numerous individuals began to come forward with stories of their own rapes at the hands of clergy members when they were children, and a government inquiry opened thereafter found just under 100 priests had sexually assaulted Irish children between 1975 and the mid-2010s, though advocacy groups believe that estimate to be far too conservative.13 As a result of the deluge of horrific accounts, trust in the Church dropped precipitously along with weekly mass attendance.

The results of this pragmatization are clear. In 2015, Ireland held a referendum to decide on the question of gay marriage. With 62% of the vote, gay marriage was legalized. A few years later in 2018, voters repealed the eighth amendment to the constitution in a referendum that made abortion available in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; the repeal vote was at 66%. Both referenda drew high voter turnouts, too, at 60% and 64%, respectively.14 The trend continued with the further liberalization of divorce code in 2019, divorce having only been legal in Ireland since 1995. Ireland’s progressive turn seems far from a one-off.

Differences Between the Cases Given the developments out of Ireland, one has to wonder if the Polish Roman Catholic Church has failed to see the blood in the water, or if it simply does not care. There are, to be fair, a few aspects which differentiate the Irish case from the Polish one to the extent that the Polish Church may not have to fear identical developments on its home turf. These include differences in gay marriage opinions, attitudes toward Pope Francis––Poles are generally more critical of his progressivism––and the timeline of the release of news on Church sexual abuses, an area in which Ireland is decades ahead of Poland.

But the most important distinction when addressing the question of democracy is the means by which abortion regulations were approved. In Ireland, changes to existing law were made through popular referenda, meaning that individual voters made the final decision. This may be regarded as the most democratic route, as it allows constituents to directly craft policy. In Poland, two different avenues were explored.

In 2016, anti-abortion politicians backed by the Church sought to pass a law through the parliament to limit abortion access. That effort was met with immediate and intense backlash by protestors in what became known as Black Monday or the Umbrella Strike. 30,000 people dressed in black and poured into the streets of Warsaw on a rainy Monday marching for reproductive rights; the symbolism of the black umbrellas came to represent the protests. Cumulatively, participants in the Polish marches numbered between 100,000 and 200,000 and there were marches in solidarity across the European continent.15 As a result of the protests, public opinion shifted not only to oppose the total ban, but to liberalize the existing law further.16 When faced with these protests, Jarosław Gowin, the minister of science and higher education, said they had “caused us to think and taught us humility.”17 In response, leaders from the ruling Law and Justice (Polish: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) Party conceded that this was not the right way to go about reforming the country’s abortion laws and parliamentarians ultimately backed away from the legislation. PiS lawmakers went back to the drawing board, with party leader and de-facto most powerful man in Polish politics Jarosław Kaczyński suggesting a compromise 13. Ibid 14. Ibid 15. Król, A., Pustułka, P., (2018). Women on strike: mobilizing against reproductive injustice in Poland. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(3), 373-374 16. Davies, C. (2016). Poland's abortion ban proposal near collapse after mass protests. Retrieved 8 December 2020, from https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/polish-government-performs-u-turn-on-total-abortion-ban 17. Ibid

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wherein, instead of a complete ban, terminations motivated by a congenital fetal disorder would be criminalized, but those as a result of rape or incest would remain permitted. Demonstrators made it clear that this was not a satisfactory compromise, but this does not appear to have deterred PiS or the Church.

When the issue arose again in fall 2020, it was introduced through the judicial system instead. The Constitutional Tribunal––itself the subject of controversy when PiS tried to purge many of its judges and replace them with party loyalists in 2018––declared that the part of the law that allowed abortion when the fetus was shown to have debilitating handicaps was in fact unconstitutional, thus effectively rewriting the law while side-stepping the legislature. Because they chose this route rather than a referendum, the Church did not have to worry that the 53% of Poles who continue to support the right to an abortion in these cases would bring that opinion to the ballot box and tank their efforts. This was not by accident. In fact, fearing the result, Polish bishops had specifically lobbied against a referendum on abortion in 1989 after a petition in favor of one gathered 1.3 million signatures.18 The Church knew that if it followed the most democratic procedure, they would fail. Furthermore, since the change came from the Tribunal and not the parliament, no politicians needed to fear being held accountable for their vote, which is likely what kept the 2016 law from coming to fruition.

In short, while the stance of the Catholic Church on abortion has not shifted since the 1990s, the capacity of national Churches to influence policy has, as a result of forces like youth secularization and the backlash toward clerical abuse scandals. While in Ireland this diminishing political capacity has meant its failure on a series of key moral issues, the Polish Church has managed to side-step this phenomenon and even tighten the existing statutes by employing extra-legislative means. The divergent outcomes of abortion policy in each nation speaks less to prevailing public opinion as much as it does to the health of their respective democracies, as this essay has demonstrated.

Works Cited Bociurkiw, B. R., Dunn, D. J., Hoffman, G. W., & Ramet, S. P. (1985). Eastern Europe: religion and nationalism. Washington, D.C.: East European Program, European Institute, the Wilson Center.

Borowik, I. (2002). The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: The case of Poland. Social Compass, 49(2), 239-252.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - CBOS (2016) April 2016 [Data set]. Retrieved from https:// www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2016/04_2016.pdf Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - CBOS (2019) July 2019 [Data set]. Retrieved from https:// www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2019/07_08_2019.pdf Davies, C. (2016). Poland's abortion ban proposal near collapse after mass protests. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/polish-government-performs-u-turn-on-total-abortionban

18. Szelewa, D. ( 2016). Killing ‘unborn children’? The Catholic Church and abortion law in Poland since 1989. Social & Legal Studies, 25(6), pp 741-764

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Grzymała-Busse, A. (2015). Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Król, A., Pustułka, P., (2018). Women on strike: mobilizing against reproductive injustice in Poland.

International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(3), 366–384.

Mandes, S., and Rogaczewska, M. (2013). “‘I don’t reject the Catholic Church—the Catholic Church rejects me’: How Twenty- and Thirty-somethings in Poland Re-evaluate their Religion.” Journal of Contemporary Religion. 28:2, 259-276, DOI: 10.1080/13537903.2013.783338 Szelewa, D. , 2016. Killing ‘unborn children’? The Catholic Church and abortion law in Poland since 1989. Social & Legal Studies, 25(6), 741-764 The liberalisation of Ireland. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/christmasspecials/2019/12/18/the-liberalisation-of-ireland Young adults around the world are less religious. (2018). Retrieved from https:// www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/young-adults-around-the-world-are-less-religious-by-several-measures/ Appendix

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II. The Thin Line Between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Europe 2020 Chair: Nadia Kalisiak (University of Cambridge) Anna-Dobrawa Kicińska (University of Cambridge) Carla Montigny (University College London) Céleste Pagniello (University of Cambridge) Discussant: Milan Svolik, Professor of Political Science (Yale University)

Architecture and democracy: The enclosing of the Parliament Buildings’ Complex in Warsaw Anna-Dobrawa Kicinska, University of Cambridge Introduction Since the 2015 parliamentary election, Warsaw has been a site of repeated protests, the biggest since the overthrow of communism. Ever since, the government has introduced a series of temporary barriers steadily restricting access to the Parliament Buildings’ Complex, which had been a semi-public space since 1945. In February 2021 the government hired a constructor to build a 3-meter-tall gate and fence securing the Complex. Such a barrier would be a physical embodiment of growing separation between the government and the people.

In times when the state of democracy in Poland is questioned by its citizens, a fence is a symbol of the growing conflict between the government and the people. This essay argues that such architecture undermines the values of democracy.

This paper describes the historical architectural premise of the Complex, and studies the government’s consecutive attempts to construct a physical enclosure around it. The consecutive sections elaborate on the symbolic meaning carried by the barriers permanency and the separation they create between the government and the citizens.

Figure 1: Pre-war state of the Complex

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Figure 2: 2019 visualisation of a permanent gate

The Parliament Buildings’ Complex The Parliament Buildings’ Complex in Warsaw was established at Wiejska Street in 1918, when Poland regained its sovereignty. It was set within dense urban tissue of the capital, and enclosed by hoarding (Figure 1). Following Second World War and Warsaw Uprising, the Complex shared the fate of the rest of the city, as it was mostly reduced to rubble. It was rebuilt and extended according to plans by architect Bohdan Pniewski. His vision, even when seemingly adopting rules imposed by social realism, still reflected Polish democratic values (Kłosiewicz 2015). The post-war Complex was more open and connected to its surrounding than its predecessor. The question of security of the main buildings was not resolved by constructing a fence, but rather by withdrawing their entrances into the inner courtyards of the Complex.

Ever since, architecture of the Complex has been extended to better meet parliament’s changing requirements, as well as to adapt to society’s contemporary values. As described by architect and heritage conservator Lech Kłosiewicz, the very nature of the Complex’s architecture has always been fluid, its identity ever-evolving. Currently, the Complex is formed by over a dozen architectural blocks which shape a variety of green outdoor spaces. While access to the buildings is restricted, spaces in-between have been publicly accessible to pedestrians, although guarded and closely monitored by the Parliament Guard.

The extent of publicness of that space is, however, rather vague. The case is illustrated by one of incidents that sparked the intense discussion on security of the parliament buildings. In November 2016, four citizens entered the Complex during a protest and refused to leave, acting against the Parliament Guards’ direct instruction. They were accused of trespassing and infringement of privacy, and soon prosecuted. In 2017, all four were acquitted of the charge. The judge, although having had expressed disapproval of the defendants’ actions, deemed accusation of trespassing unfounded as the considered area was not enclosed.

This verdict exemplifies the impact of physical design on the political and civic debate in Poland. The discussion held during the case in the courtroom and in the media was far more elaborate, raising a lot of issues concerning civic rights and responsibilities. One of the defendants testified: “I was acting for the public good. I do not deny having entered. I deny having broken in.” (Kinasiewicz in Jałoszewski and Mikołajewska 2017) In the end however, this complex problem regarding the right to protest and hold the authority accountable was reduced to a binary question of an existence of a physical barrier.

To enclose or not to enclose The case proved that an enclosure around the Complex would not only impact its security and aesthetics, but also have juridical consequences. Ever since, the government doubled the efforts to introduce s permanent barrier in front of the Complex.

The idea has been brought up before. The parliament debated it in 2007, 2010 and 2013, considering a fence a protection against possible terrorist threats. After baffling one of such threats in 2013, the security of the Complex has been reinforced gagainst vehicle attacks. It was done through measures which were aesthetically subtle and rather inconspicuous – such as mobile obstacles hidden in the road pavement. A notion for an additional fence was dismissed by the metropolitan heritage conservator. The complex was secured from terrorist attacks. However, in the next years, the citizens were unexpectedly recognised as a new threat to the parliament.

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Figure 3: Blockade in 1989

Figure 4: Barriers in 2016

Since the 2015 parliamentary election, won by right-wing populist party Law and Justice (PiS), Warsaw has been a site of recurring protests, many of which were held in front of the buildings of the parliament. In response to those, the authority introduced a wall of temporary barriers, reminiscent of the solutions used during the revolution in 1989 (Figure 3 and 4). Over the last 5 years, those have slowly become a recognisable element of the Wiejska Street’s landscape (Grzędziński 2020).

New designs for permanent fences or gates have been emerging ever since. Their timeline is interrelated with anti-government protests: one in 2016 triggered by the Polish constitutional crisis, the 2018 protests defending women rights, the 2020 LGBTQ protests. In all but one case, the plans were banned by the metropolitan heritage conservator, who emphasized that the openness of the Complex was crucial to the post-war concept of Bohdan Pniewski.

In October 2020, Warsaw was a site of the Women’s Strike, the biggest protests since the overthrow of communism in 1989. In response to unprecedented crowds gathering around the Complex, the Chancellery of the Parliament presented a design for a gate securing the Northern access to the site. It would be 3m tall, accompanied by fence and two pedestrian gates (Figure 2). A tender for the gate was announced in November, following the peak of the Strike. The protests continued and the government signed a contract of service for the gate in February 2021, requiring the contractor to complete the construction within 6 months. While the barriers located along Wiejska Street remain temporary, the gate (and the fence surrounding it it) will become a permanent element of the Complex.

Temporality and permanency Firstly, the act itself of replacing the movable barriers with permanent construction is representative of the government accepting the occurrent separation as the new reality. To take such position is to admit that a compromise is unlikely to be reached in the future. Rather than focusing its effort on ensuring that the parliament’s actions would not lead to fierce protests, the representatives accept this possibility as inevitable and decide to prepare for it in advance. A fence is a reaction to a proximate outcome of the issues currently disturbing public peace in Poland, and not a solution to their ultimate cause. As expressed by Peter Marcuse any walls are “a second-best solution to the problems of our societies. They have always been.” (1997) Moreover, constructing permanent barriers against the people normalises perceiving citizens as dangerous, instead of regarding any volatile conduct as an effect of extraordinary and unfortunate circumstances. The line between a demonstrating crowd and a riot can be, of course, very thin. The 2020 storming of the United States Capitol made this evident to the authorities around the world.

However, adopting a perspective from which any protest is a mob is not an approach associated with democracy, but rather with tactics used by authoritarian governments (Fromm 1994).

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Transparency and accessibility The fence, symbolising government’s fear of its own citizens, constitutes a departure from democratic ideals expressed in Pniewski’s post-war vision for the Complex. Journalist and art historian Jerzy Majewski describes openness and accessibility as crucial for that vision. The openness of the Complex symbolises transparency of the parliament’s decision-making process, while the citizens accessing the outdoor spaces remind the politicians that their work is public service, and not privilege. Majewski calls enclosing the Complex a “malevolent announcement of abandoning the principles of democracy.” (2017) The qualities of transparency and accessibility have become the foundation of modern governmental architecture - even in projects which aim to, above all, withstand terrorist threats. Nordic Office of Architecture and Haptic redesigned Norwegian government headquarters, damaged in a terrorist attack in 2011, as set of buildings with glass facades, situated in open-access urban setting (Block 2017b).

Architectural firm Kieran Timberlake received a tremendous budget of £750 million to construct new American embassy in London that, while following extremely strict security regulations, would also “reflect the core values of democracy – transparency, openness, and equality.” (Block 2017a) The completed building is a glass cube situated in a public-accessible park. The transparency is also crucial for one of the most famous examples of modern governmental architecture - Norman Foster’s dome for New German Parliament. It was created to allow citizens to, quite literally, “get up on the roof and tell off their politicians.” (Monninger 2009) Modern democracies are recognising the symbolic value of architecture as just as important as its security.

Impact of the separation In a book on the relationship between architecture and democracy, Deyan Sudjic and Helen Jones highlight the value of transparency as allowing citizens to be involved with the political decisions made by their elected representatives (2001). The openness of the Parliament Buildings’ Complex in Warsaw allowed for such involvement. Citizens could walk in between the governmental buildings, marking their presence in a place of democratic debate. One could, of course, argue, that linking it to Sudjic and Jones’ definition would be an exaggeration, as the citizens, even if demonstrating within the Complex’ outdoor spaces, were actually participating in the parliament’s debate. They did, however, manage to express their support or disapproval in a space that ensured they were recognised by those in charge.

Pushing citizens outside the Complex created a clear separation between the two groups. Such separation undermines people’s most fundamental democratic right to “see themselves in the cooperative character of their shared humanity, their society, and their community.” (Welzbacher 2009) This concept of civic agency was also used to defend the four citizens prosecuted in 2016 for refusing to leave the Complex’ premises. Their attorney explained that they had simply enforced their fundamental law to “come to the place where the law is made, to say that this law is created against the Constitution.” (Dubois in Jabłoński 2017) Constructing a physical barrier between themselves and the citizens, the government is not only ensuring legal exclusivity to the premises. Symbolically, it also conspicuously turns its gaze and attention away from the people – those who would oppose it, but also those who would wish to advice it (Majewski 2017).

Furthermore, the societal division introduced by any walls constructed without reciprocal consent do not establish both sides as equal. Their two sides symbolise superiority and inferiority, domination and subordination (Marcuse 1997). The opposition criticised the gate and the fence as creating an unprecedented symbol of division establishing the government as a sovereign, and the citizens as its subjects (Jabłoński 2017).

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Urban planner Engelbert Lütke Daldrup offers an insight into such relationship: “Democracy (…) is based on human being and must not erect any barriers between the >>rulers<< and the >>ruled<< not must it demonstrate any superiority or condescension. For this reason, the demonstration of power in architecture is alien to the concept of democracy as a builder.” (2009) Conclusion Sudjic and Jones said that “symbolically successful parliament buildings capture the spirit of the people they exist to serve.” (2001) Since 1945, the Parliament Buildings’ Complex in Warsaw has been evolving to indeed better represent the aspirations and values of Polish society. However, the plans to enclose the premises mark the end of this tendency. The fence is simultaneously a symbol of the government’s fear and disregard of its own citizens. It undermines the democratic meaning of the architecture of the Complex.

While providing security is undoubtedly crucial in governmental architecture, one should not disregard the symbolic meaning carried by fences and gates. It is important to consider what could be the unwanted consequences of introducing such structures. Urban researchers agree that because of their symbolic and psychological meaning, walls often do not contribute to a feeling of security, but to its depreciation (Marcuse 1997; Jasiński 2009). As expressed by the parliamentary representatives opposing the idea of the enclosed Complex: “The higher the fence, the bigger society’s determination to overthrow it.” (Gawkowski in Grzędziński 2020) Bibliography • Block, India. 2017a. ‘Kieran Timberlake Completes £750 Million “Crystalline Cube” for US Embassy in London’. Dezeen, 2017. https://www.dezeen.com/2017/12/18/kieran-timberlake-usembassy-london-nine-elms-american-architecture-uk/.

• ———. 2017b. ‘Winning Design Chosen for Norwegian Government Headquarters Following 2011 Terrorist Attack’. Dezeen, 2017.

• Fromm, Erich. 1994. Escape from Freedom. 1st Owl book ed. New York: H. Holt.

• Grzędziński, Dariusz. 2020. ‘Potężne Ogrodzenie Pod Sejmem. Jest Protest. „Ludzie Będą Chcieli Obalić Mur”’. Wprost, 2020. https://www.wprost.pl/polityka/10391870/potezne-ogrodzenie-podsejmem-jest-protest-ludzie-beda-chcieli-obalic-mur.html.

• Jabłoński, Marcin. 2017. ‘Sąd Uniewinnił Oskarżonych o Naruszenie w 2016 r. “Miru Domowego” Sejmu’. Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 2017. https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/ artykuly/1079715,sad-uniewinnil-oskarzonych-o-naruszenie-w-2016-r-miru-domowegosejmu.html.

• Jałoszewski, Mariusz, and Bianka Mikołajewska. 2017. ‘Proces Obywateli RP Za Akcję „Tych Klientów Nie Obsługujemy”, Czyli Naruszenie Miru Domowego Sejmu’. OKO.Press, 2017. https://oko.press/proces-obywateli-rp-akcje-tych-klientow-obslugujemy/.

• Jasiński, Artur. 2009. ‘Metropolitan Dilemma - Public Space or Safe Space’. Przestrzeń i Forma, no. 12: 321–54 • Kłosiewicz, Lech. 2015. ‘Kompleks Budynków Sejmu RP’. Architektura Murator, 2015. https:// architektura.muratorplus.pl/krytyka/kompleks-budynkow-sejmu-rp_5179.html.

• Lütke Daldrup, Engelbert. 2009. ‘The Federal Government’s Commitment to Baukultur: The Architecture of Democracy’. In The Architecture of Democracy: Federal Buildings 1990 - 2010, edited by Martin Seidel and Allison Plath-Moseley. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.

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• Majewski, Jerzy. 2017. ‘Płot Wokół Sejmu. PiS Nie Ma Monopolu Na Takie Pomysły.’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 2017. https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/1,34862,21216836,plot-wokol-sejmupis-nie-ma-monopolu-na-takie-pomysly-komentarz.html.

• Marcuse, Peter. 1997. ‘Walls of Fear and Walls of Support’. In Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin, 1st ed. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

• Monninger, Michael. 2009. ‘Federal Buidlings and What They Communicate’. In The Architecture of Democracy: Federal Buildings 1990 - 2010, edited by Martin Seidel and Allison Plath-Moseley.

Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.

• Sudjic, Deyan, and Helen Jones. 2001. Architecture and Democracy. London: Laurence King.

• Welzbacher, Christian. 2009. ‘The Federal Government in the Role of Builder: Public Building between Transition and Continuity, Representation and Ethics’. In The Architecture of Democracy: Federal Buildings 1990 - 2010, edited by Martin Seidel and Allison Plath-Moseley.

Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.

List of Figures • Figure 1: Photograph, Biblioteka Sejmu, Accessed March 26, 2021.

• https://nowawarszawa.pl/sejm-buduje-potezne-ogrodzenie.

• Figure 2: Kamiński, Piotr. Tak może wyglądać płot przed Sejmem - na zdjęcie budynku nanieśliśmy projekt ogrodzenia z pozwolenia na budowę. 2019.

• https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,24942573,radni-pis-naciskaja-nadopuszczenie-3-5-metrowego-plotu-wokol.html.

• Figure 3: Stachowicz, Radosław. Blokada Sejmu podczas manifestacji Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej. 1989. https://dsh.waw.pl/3135-przelom-w-kadrze-1989,wys.

• Figure 4: Pietruszka, Radek. Sejm. 2016.

• https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/raporty/raport-kryzys-sejmowy/aktualnosci/news-kolejny-dzienkryzysu-w-sejmie-relacja-na-zywo,nId,2324694

Vox populi or instability? Contrasting past and present attitudes to protests and popular movements in Eastern Europe and in the West Carla Montigny (University College London) Protests and marches are often seen as an integral part of political culture in European and Western history. From May 2020 onwards, the US and Europe have faced a wave of protests, from the Black Lives Matter marches to protests against the abortion ban in Poland. Government attitudes towards these popular movements, as well as their impact, have differed greatly. This essay will argue that the differences in handling civil rights protest are linked to historical understandings of civil society in the authoritarian and democratic context, which follow an East-West divide, reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Firstly, we will discuss and define the concepts of democracy, authoritarianism and civil society, in order to establish a theoretical background for our case studies. Then, we will compare Western approaches to civil unrest from the latter half of the 20th century to the present day, with references to the US Civil Rights movement, France’s May 68 strikes, and the BLM movement, before focusing on the East European context, through the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, the Belarusian revolution of 2020-2021, and the protests against the abortion ban in Poland. Due to the recent nature of the events we will focus on, the case study part of this essay will be less reliant on academic sources than the theoretical background.

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Concepts such as democracy and authoritarianism tend to be blurry and difficult to define.

According to Landman, democracy is based on the principles of accountability, individual liberty, free and equal representation, participation, and non-violence (Landman; 2018). These principles are very broad; there is therefore no universal list of democratic and non-democratic countries. Similarly, there is no universally accepted definition of authoritarianism; while Levitsky & Way define it as a “civilian regime in which formal democratic institutions exist (...) but in which competition is unfair” (Levitsky and Way; 2010 as cited in Przeworski; 2019), it could be argued that not all authoritarian states choose to maintain this façade of domestic institutions (Miller; 2012). The term “electoral authoritarianism”, used to refer to countries with a hybrid system such as Russia or Singapore (Miller, 2012), helps fill this theoretical gap; but these three terms are far from being able to explain the diversity of political systems around the world. According to Wesolowski, the key difference between authoritarian and democratic systems is the relationship between the state and society. In authoritarian systems, the state “stands above all other forms of social organisations (...) and uses violence when needed”; however, in democratic systems, the state is socially created to represent the will of the society, while various checks and balances ensure the freedom of speech, thought and protest of the population (Wesolowski; 1990). This distinction is crucial, as it puts the conception of the role of the people at the core of the analysis; it therefore highlights the differences between considering citizens and civil society as a political actor or as a more passive object. The concept of civil society has no universal definition, but according to Mati, Silva and Anderson, it is “the arena, outside the family, the state and the market which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.” This is a non-exclusive conception of civil society, as it includes both individuals, organisations and institutions (Mati, Silva and Anderson; 2010 as cited in Miller; 2012).

Protests and popular movements are a central part of 20th and 21st century American and European politics. In the West, which in this essay will refer to North American and Western Europe, the protests of the 1950s onwards had a durable impact on society. In the US, the Civil Rights Movement, featuring decades-long protests and acts of civil disobedience, had a significant impact on American society. Rulings such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which banned employment discrimination on the basis of race, among other criteria, were direct consequences of popular action and protests. In this case, civil society acted as a central institution of democracy, instrumental in pushing formal institutions in the direction of social progress. In France, the 7-week long protests of 1968 which came to be known as May 68 had a similar effect. What started as student protests and university occupations escalated into general factory strikes, which involved up to 22% of the population, paralysed the French economy and made the government fear a revolution. Although the formal consequences of the protests were minor, as the main change was an increase in minimal wage, the aftermath of the protests remains central to modern France. May 68 effectively pushed the country out of the postwar restriction era and into modern times, and paved the way for social liberation from traditional norms. In both these cases, while police repression was indubitably present (41 people were killed in the US during the movement, and 7 people died similarly in France), the governments in power allowed the protests to impact political life and have a long-lasting legacy. The movements have represented a progressive shift, creating a ‘before’ and an ‘after’.

Arguably, the same mechanisms applied to the BLM protests of 2020, in the United States and in Western Europe. While police repression was undoubtedly present, the protests certainly sparked political discussion. In the United States, nation-wide protests started conversations about the impact of institutional racism and about the role of the police. Minneapolis, the city where George Floyd was killed, implemented changes to its police department, encouraging other American cities such as New York to do the same. The Justice in Policing Act of 2020 was introduced in June, PAGE 33

facilitating police prosecution for misconducts; chokeholds were banned in many police departments in states such as Nevada, Texas or California (Ankel; 2020). In France, they led to increased awareness of police brutality and racial profiling, which the Interior Minister at the time, Christophe Castaner, acknowledged by promising actions from the French Senate (York; 2020). Despite racism being extremely taboo in France, the protests helped push issues of racial inequality into the public eye, and attracted the attention of some politicians. The BLM movement, while it did not have the same amount of legal effects everywhere, was therefore mostly perceived by governments as the expression of a large part of the popular opinion, that needed to be listened to by policy makers rather than crushed, at least in appearance.

In Eastern Europe, however, the history of popular protests is quite different. After the Second World War, authoritarian Communist regimes were established throughout the region. Despite remaining independent countries, the Soviet-allied nations remained under the USSR’s influence. The new postwar governments followed the Soviet model, therefore excluding party competition and establishing authoritarian systems dominated by the country’s Communist party. However, in 1956, Hungary saw what has been referred to as the “first modern anti-totalitarian revolution in Europe” (Rainer; 2010). While it initially began as a student protest, it soon escalated when the police shot protesters; as discontent spread in the frustrated Hungarian society, the Stalinist government soon collapsed (Rainer; 2010). The country saw mass protests, with the October 23 demonstration gathering about 250,000 people. The main demands were the dismantlement of the Communist system and free elections (Rainer; 2010). However, on 4 November, the Soviet government decided to intervene and invaded Budapest and other regions; by January 1957, the Revolution had been fully crushed. Despite the fact that the 1956 revolution had a lasting impact on Soviet and East European politics, it was not seen by the Soviet regime as an expression of a desire for progress, but rather as a hindrance to their rule. The revolution was therefore violently repressed, as swiftly as it could be. In this instance, while the Hungarian government initially resisted the protests, it fell quickly; the Soviet government then took over and carried out most of the repression.

Comparably, in August of 2020, after months of rising tensions preceding the elections, Lukashenko was re-elected president of Belarus for the sixth time. When the results were announced, stating that he had won 80% of the votes, civil unrest broke out. Over the course of the following months, tens of thousands of people took to the streets, demanding free and fair elections and Lukashenko’s step down (Krawatzek & Sasse; 2021). At least 30,000 people have been detained since the protests began, and thousands of protestors have been injured. Instead of discouraging the protesters, the many acts of police violence initially encouraged people to march and boosted popular support for the movement. However, after months of violent protests, Tsikhanovskaya, the main figure of the opposition, admitted in an interview that her movement had “lost the streets” – the disproportionate use of violence had discouraged the participants (Nowak; 2021). In this case, instead of seeing the protests as a push towards a looser system of electoral authoritarianism, which could have satisfied a part of the population and eased the growing popular frustration (Miller, 2012), the Belarusian government interpreted the expression of civil society as a threat to their existence, and a hindrance to their rule; violent repression was therefore, in their eyes, needed.

The case of the abortion ban in Poland is however a little different. While the Polish stance on abortions had long been among the most restrictive in Europe, they were still legal, albeit relatively difficult to obtain. However, on 22 October 2020, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled that abortions in the case of severe foetal defects were unconstitutional, effectively outlawing them.

Thousands of protesters took to the streets in an effort to reverse the ban.

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The protests soon spread to the rest of Europe, with meetings organised in front of the Polish embassy of various countries such as the UK. As a member of the European Union, the Polish government found itself under significant pressure, from their citizens but also from European institutions. Unlike Belarus, Poland is technically considered to be a democracy in the EU, although authoritarian tendencies have often been pointed out (Jaskiernia, 2019). Therefore, the country could not react with the same amount of violence as the Belarussian government, as such outbursts would further spark the disapproval of the European Union and the international community. The protests succeeded in delaying the passing of the law, but after a few weeks, international attention faded away. On 27 January, nearly four months after the first protests, the ruling was passed, officially banning abortions in the country. This time however, while there were protests nationally, the ruling did not garner nearly as much international attention, and after a few days, popular unrest died down. This case is very interesting, as it is an example of a middleground approach to civil society; in the case of Poland, civil society was seen as a part of political life, like in most democracies, but not one that needed to be listened to. Therefore, instead of fighting back, the Polish government delayed the passing of the law to appease popular unrest, before implementing the ban once they were no longer in the spotlight.

There is a continuity of differences in the states’ relations to civil society and public unrest, which can be interpreted as a Cold War-like East-West divide. While in the West, protests are and have been mostly considered as a clear indicator of the vox populi, embodying a widespread call for reforms and progress, Eastern European governments retain a rather authoritarian attitude to civil unrest. Under Communist rule, protests were violently repressed by the states, as they were considered to have a potentially dangerous impact on the country; today, it seems that the official attitudes to civil society have not changed. This is highlighted by the case of the Belarusian revolution; the case of Poland, however, is a good example of a more hybrid approach. Wesolowski (1990) writes that the main distinction between authoritarian and democratic states is the way they perceive civil society and the will of the people; according to this conception, work remains to be done to place the people at the centre of politics in countries such as Poland and in Belarus.

Bibliography • Dörner, W. & List, R. A. (2012) “Civil Society, Conflict and Violence: An introduction”, in Civil Society, Conflict and Violence: Insights from the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project, Bloomsbury Academic, London, pp. 1-14.

• Fillieule, O. (1997) Stratégies de la rue : les manifestations en France, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.

• Jaskierna, J. (2019) “Authoritarian Tendencies in the Polish System”, in New Authoritarianism – Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen.

• Landman, T. (2018) “Democracy and Human Rights: Concepts, Measures, and Relationships”, Politics and Governance, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 48-59.

• Lavric, M. & Bieber, F. (2021) “Shifts in Support for Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Western Balkans”, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 17-26.

• Rainer, J. M. (2010) “The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Causes, Aims, and Course of Events”, in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution – Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives (ed. Adam, C. et al.), University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, pp. 12-31.

• Robnett, B. (1996) “African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965: Gender, Leadership, and Micromobilization”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 6, pp.

1661-1693.

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• Saurugger, S. (2004) Representative versus participatory democracy? France, Europe and civil society, University of Uppsala, Uppsala (Sweden).

• Upchurch, M., Taylor, G., Mathers, A. (2009) “The Crisis of ‘Social Democratic’ Unionism - The ‘Opening up’ of Civil Society and the Prospects for Union Renewal in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany”, Labor Studies Journal, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 519-542.

• Wesolowski, W. (1990) “Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy”, Wlodzimierz Social Research, vol. 57, no. 2.

• Wiatr, J. J. (2019) “New and Old Authoritarianism in a Comparative Perspective”, in New Authoritarianism – Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen.

Newspaper articles referenced • Agence France Presse (2020) “Thousands join Poland protests against strict abortion laws”, The Guardian, 24 October < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/24/thousands-join-polandprotests-against-strict-abortion-laws> • Agence France Press (2021) “Poland abortion law: Protesters take to streets again as near-total ban comes into force”, Euronews, 29 January <https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/27/ poland-s-banon-most-abortions-to-come-into-force-sparking-fresh-protests> • Ankel, S. (2020) “30 days that shook America: Since the death of George Floyd, the Black Lives Matter movement has already changed the country”, Business Insider, 24 June < https:// www.businessinsider.com/13-concrete-changes-sparked-by-george-floyd-protests-so-far-2020-6> • Krawatzek & Sasse (2021) “Belarus protests: why people have been taking to the streets”, The Conversation, 4 February < https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-beentaking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494> • Nowak, A. (2021) “Svetlana Tikhanovskaïa: Loukachenko ne laissera derrière lui que des ruines”, Le Temps, 29 March < https://www.letemps.ch/monde/svetlana-tikhanovskaia-loukachenko-nelaissera-derriere-lui-ruines> • York, J. (2020) “Sanctions promised for French police racism”, The Connexion, 4 June < https:// www.connexionfrance.com/French-news/Sanctions-promised-for-French-police-racism-afterblack-lives-matter-protest>

American Insurrection and Belarusian Resistance: A Dangerous Comparison Céleste Pagniello (University of Cambridge) Electoral fraud in Belarus has been a known secret since Alexander Lukashenko was first elected President in 1994, but up until now has never caused more than slight agitation amongst the country’s people. Since August 2020, however, Belarusians have been peacefully protesting the surely falsified results of the country’s sixth presidential election that saw Lukashenko declare himself victor once again despite overwhelming support for his opponent, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. On the other side of the globe and in a turn of events that shocked the world, the United States of America joined the list of nations where democracy was threatened, following its most recent presidential election that saw Democrat Joe Biden defeat incumbent Republican Donald Trump. It was this same claim of electoral fraud that pushed the Trumpist base into action. While surface-level comparisons of Belarus’ and the United States’ respective uprisings might seem appropriate, with citizens objecting to what they believe was a stolen election, a fundamental difference remains: evidence of electoral fraud is abundant in Belarus, but negligible in the United States.

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Despite this, supporters of Trump stormed the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021, at the behest of Trump himself. In the aftermath, however, a concerning trend in online reactions emerged, equating the events in America to those in distant Belarus. This paper will discuss the misconceptions that have led to the perceived alignment of these movements, focusing on the various perils of democracy in both its leading champion and in a country that never fully embraced it. It will examine why this comparison between the United States and Belarus is ultimately a dangerous one, threatening to delegitimize months of protests in Belarus, as the United States attempts to move past one of its darkest days.

Belarusian Resistance While Belarusian elections have not yet been free or democratic in the country’s post-Soviet history and have often led to protests and mass arrests, this has never been more apparent and has not captured the world’s attention more than in 2020. In past elections, when Lukashenko claimed over 80% of votes, an understanding remained that, although he was certainly adding at least 30% to his tally, none of his opponents had garnered the support to surpass him and many of them were state-sponsored centrists put in place to give the illusion of legitimate democracy (Wilson 2021, 196). The elections in 2006 and 2010 did cause riots, but these were quickly suppressed within a few days. As Lukashenko himself believed, Belarus would never see political agitation on the scale of Ukraine in 2004 and 2014, or Georgia in 2003 (Bohdan 2015).

The 2020 election began much like the others, with a number of Lukashenko’s opponents immediately barred from candidacy or imprisoned, but took an unexpected turn when Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the wife of imprisoned candidate Siarhei Tsikhanousky, decided to run for President in his place. She was backed by Maria Kalesnikava, the campaign manager for Viktar Babaryka, another imprisoned presidential candidate, and Veronika Tsepkalo, the wife of Valery Tsepkalo, who fled the country after he was denied registration as a presidential candidate. Her rallies, to which supporters flocked by the tens of thousands, were characterized by the slogan “Verym. Mozham. Peramozham.”1 , loosely translated as “We Believe. We Can. We Will Win.”, and the presence of the white-red-white flag of the short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic, the first attempt at a free Belarusian state from 1918 to 1919. As Tsikhanouskaya and her compatriots travelled the country, it became quite clear that her supporters would outnumber Lukashenko’s come Election Day. While an official poll put his approval ranking at 24%, already low, an unofficial poll put it as low as 3% (Kulakevich 2020). Despite these figures, on Election Day, Lukashenko was declared the victor, by once again over 80% of the vote, with Tsikhanouskaya taking only 10.1% (TUT.by 2020). Outside investigations began, and poll workers came forward with evidence of substantial electoral fraud. Precincts in the more liberal Minsk had Tsikhanouskaya with ten times more votes than on the official count, while in the traditionally more conservative and Russian-leaning eastern provinces, she still remained ahead of Lukashenko (Manenkov and Litvinova 2020). She believes she won the election with 60% to 70% of the total vote (Cassady 2020).

There was no clearer example of electoral fraud in the country’s history, and the Belarusian people, oft described as “struck by political apathy” (Bedford 2017, 381), took to the street in never before seen numbers, with some observers putting the crowds at over 250 thousand in Minsk (Viačorka 2020). These demonstrations, however 1

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«Верым. Можам. Пераможам»

peaceful, have been met with significant police violence and the images circulating of detained protesters once released from the Akrestina prison are nothing short of horrifying. The state police, with their faces hidden with helmets and balaclavas to protect their identity, are now responsible for four deaths and thousands of counts of torture, rape, and abuse. These protests are on-going to this very day without a solution in sight: Tsikhanouskaya is in exile in Lithuania; Tsepkalo in Latvia; and Kalesnikava has been in a Minsk prison for over 200 days.

American Insurrection Unlike in Belarus, electoral fraud on such a scale is not a common occurrence in the United States. The 2020 election, however, marked new ground for American politics, as sitting President Donald Trump cast doubt on his willingness to leave the White House should he lose to Joe Biden (Kapur 2020). As Trump’s defeat became imminent, claims of electoral fraud followed; a familiar tactic for defeated American politicians. As David Litt (2020) writes, “[f]alsely claiming voter fraud is a tradition nearly as old as American democracy itself.” A fear of electoral fraud comes from American political history, despite the fact that no claims have ever been proven factual on the same scale as Belarus (Litt 2020).

The 2020 claims followed suit, proven baseless by a number of independent observers and by vote recounts across the country. While US Attorney General Bill Barr did open an investigation, his office found no widespread evidence that could overturn the election’s results (Balsamo 2020).

As notable Republicans such as Ted Cruz, Lindsay Graham, and Mitch McConnell supported these claims, however, the Republican base was convinced of their legitimacy. A number of Republicans also planned to vote against the certification of Biden’s victory due to this non-existent fraud. Coupled with Trump’s words to a crowd of supporters in Washington, DC on the morning of January 6th, “[i]f you don't fight like hell you're not going to have a country anymore,” (BBC 2021) it is hardly surprising that disenfranchised Trump voters chose to break into the Capitol Building to disrupt Biden’s certification, parading through the halls while members of Congress and the Senate barricaded themselves in their offices. These rioters carried zip-ties, erected a noose, and overwhelmed police, leading to the deaths of five people, including one Capitol Police officer.

The Comparison Although Belarus has not received excessive media attention in the West, what has been reported has accurately described the events. Despite this, the Twitter reaction to the storming of the US Capitol was permeated with mentions of Belarus and the alleged similarities of the two situations. Many users asked whether the unfolding scenes were taking place in Belarus or the United States, with Tweets such as, “[i]s Capitol Hill in USA or Belarus?” (Lobo 2021), “[t]hese are scenes I expect to see in Belarus, not the USA!” (De Freitas 2021), and “[a] reminder this is NOT Belarus but Washington DC” (Hawkins 2021). This is only a sample of Tweets featuring this comparison, and the total sorted through for this study number in the thousands for the period of January 6-7, 2021. Most of these tweets were directed to Michael McFaul, former US Ambassador to Russia, and to Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. McFaul directly addressed the comparison, writing “[t]o the idiots comparing the brave democratic demonstrators in Belarus to these lawless autocratic thugs in the Capitol, I will block you if I have the energy to go through my feed” (McFaul 2021). While a number of the responses to his Tweet thanked him for his solidarity with Belarus, others took offence to his message, claiming instead that the “brave democratic demonstrators” were in the United States, while the “lawless autocratic thugs” were in Belarus. Ocasio-Cortez, on the other hand, did not mention Belarus in the aftermath of January 6th, but her previous record of supporting pro-democracy protestors around the world drew ire from users who believed that both groups of protestors were simply standing up for fair and free elections.

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Irina Çetin, for example, replied to Ocasio-Cortez with the following: “When it comes to Ukraine or Belarus, or any other post Soviet union [sic] country this is a protest and you are all about support.

When it comes to USA -this is a riot…” This sentiment was shared by a number of Twitter users, claiming a double standard on the part of Democratic supporters so supportive of Belarus’ plight while horrified by the events in America. These opinions are sadly not the isolated work of a few trolls and bots, but a more widespread misunderstanding of both situations; the previously mentioned Lobo is a Spanish war correspondent, with 145 thousand Twitter followers, De Freitas is an actress, with 1500 Twitter followers, and Hawkins is a BBC reporter, also with 1500 Twitter followers.

Key Differences The American expectation of riots and violence on behalf of protestors in Belarus is curious, as Belarus does not have a history of violent protests (Koziura and Bystryk 2020). Any violence at demonstrations in Belarus comes solely from the state police, not from ordinary people. This attitude stems from an American willingness to believe that these types of events only happen in other countries, despite what the facts might state, and its falseness is most accurately described in Sinclair Lewis’ 1935 novel It Can’t Happen Here, which describes the rise of an authoritarian leader similar to Adolf Hitler in the United States. Malcolm Harris (2015) drew a comparison between the novel and the rise of Trump, claiming in an article titled “It Really Can Happen Here” that Trump’s campaign made Lewis look prophetic. Fascism and authoritarianism are, to Americans, foreign concepts, a belief so strong that the country seems unable to detect these types of politics, even when they are found in their own backyard (Vials 2011, 13).

An important distinction must be made between Belarus and the United States: protestors in Belarus are fighting not only against a leader they dislike, but for democratic and honest elections, as the results were confirmed as falsified. In the United States, on the other hand, protestors were indeed also fighting against a leader they dislike, that is, Joe Biden, but also against democratic and honest elections, as they refused to accept the results of the election even after they were proven not fraudulent by numerous investigations. There is a key difference between simply disliking the results of an election and actual falsification, and fighting against a fair election threatens to undermine the very democracy America has fought wars to defend.

Consequences and Conclusion As Belarus is not a country that often finds itself on the West’s radar, the widespread misinformation about the country’s plight on accessible platforms such as Twitter is dangerous. Social media, one of the easiest platforms on which to spread misinformation, dominates public conversations, particularly on political matters. While we cannot expect everyone to be knowledgeable about events around the world, we should at least maintain a standard where direct comparisons are only made with full knowledge of the facts. Anything less leads to public misunderstanding and the continued spread of this misinformation. In order for the situation in Belarus to break from the current stale mate between the Lukashenko regime and the people, Western support, mostly through sanctions, is paramount.

Allowing it to be compared to an anti-democratic event most Americans would like to forget, then, risks taking support away from the Belarusian fight for democracy. Thankfully, new US President Joe Biden has expressed solidarity towards the Belarusian protestors and vowed to back the Belarusian opposition in removing Lukashenko from power, in contrast with his predecessor’s silence on the matters (Reuters 2020). This support will surely be crucial in Belarus’ attempted escape from authoritarianism and subsequent move towards a free and democratic future.

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Recent events, in Belarus, in the United States, and in many other countries around the world, have shown that democracy is fragile and relies on the external support of other democracies to survive. The United States, long the self-proclaimed defenders of democracy, must therefore move past the dark day of January 6th and continue in its support of fair elections, human rights, and peaceful protests. The success of democracy worldwide depends on it.

Bibliography • Balsamo, Michael. “Disputing Trump, Barr says no widespread election fraud.” The Associated Press. December 1, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/barr-nowidespread-election-fraudb1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d (accessed March 27, 2021).

• Bedford, Sophie. “‘The Election Game:’ Authoritarian Consolidation Processes in Belarus.”

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 25, no. 4 (2017): 381-406.

• Bohdan, Siarhei. “A Revolution is Impossible in Belarus.” The Guardian. March 25, 2015. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/25/belarus-revolutionimpossible-alexander-lukashenko (accessed March 26, 2021).

• Cassady, Daniel. “Belarus Protests: Exiled Opposition Leader Calls For More Protests As Factory Workers Threaten Strike.” Forbes. August 14, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ danielcassady/2020/08/14/belarus-protests-exiled-opposition-leader-calls-for-more-protests-asfactory-workers-threaten-strike/?sh=66519b3c1aa4 (accessed March 27, 2021).

• De Freitas, Alana. Twitter post. January 6, 2021, 7:54 p.m. GMT.https://twitter.com/alanadefreitas.

• Harris, Malcolm. “It really can happen here: The novel that foreshadowed Donald Trump's authoritarian appeal.” Salon. September 29, 2015. https://www.salon.com/2015/09/29/ it_really_can_happen_here_the_novel_that_foreshadowed_donald_trumps_authoritarian_appeal/ (accessed March 27, 2021).

• Hawkins, Paul. Twitter post. January 6, 2021, 7:34 p.m. GMT. https://twitter.com/paulejhawkins.

• Kapur, Sahil. “Trump has signaled he won't accept an election loss. Many of his voters agree.”

NBC News. October 29, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020election/trump-hassignaled-he-won-t-accept-election-loss-many-n1245304 (accessed March 26, 2021).

• Koziura, Karolina and Aliaksandr Bystryk. “Protests from Belarus: Dignity, Solidarity, and the Reclaim of Public Space.” Public Seminar. November 9, 2020. https://publicseminar.org/essays/ strategies-of-protests-from-belarus/ (accessed March 27, 2021).

• Kulakevich, Tatiana. “Belarus’s president looks for his sixth election victory on Sunday. He has a well-used playbook to win.” The Washington Post. August 8, 2020.https: www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/08/belarus-president-islooking-his-sixth-electionvictory-he-has-well-used-playbook-win-aug-9/ (accessed March 27, 2021).

• Litt, David. “Claims of 'voter fraud' have a long history in America. And they are false.” The Guardian. December 4, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/04/trumpvoter-fraud-america-false (accessed March 26, 2021).

• Lobo, Ramon. Twitter post. January 6, 2021, 7:35 p.m. GMT. https://twitter.com/ramonlobo.

• Manenkov, Kostya, and Daria Litvinova. “Belarus Poll Workers Describe Fraud in Aug. 9 Election.” The Associated Press. September 1, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/ internationalnews-ap-top-news-europe-72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb (accessed March 26, 2021).

• McFaul, Michael. Twitter post. January 7, 2021, 8:04 a.m. GMT. https://twitter.com/McFaul.

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• No author. “Capitol riots: Did Trump's words at rally incite violence?” BBC. February 14, 2021. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-55640437 (accessed March 26, 2021).

• No author. “CIK oglasil okonchatel'nye itogi vyborov. Za Lukashenko progolosovalo 80,1%, za Tsikhanovskuyu — 10,1% [The CEC announced the final results of the elections. 80.1% voted for Lukashenka, 10.1% - for Tsikhanouskaya].” TUT.by. August 14, 2020. https://news.tut.by economics/696655.html (accessed March 26, 2021).

• Reuters. “Joe Biden accuses Donald Trump of silence on 'dictator' Lukashenko in Belarus.” NBC News. September 26, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/joe-biden-accuses-donaldtrump-silence-dictator-lukashenko-belarus-n1241177 (accessed March 26, 2021).

• Viačorka, Franak. Twitter post. August 23, 2020, 1:31 p.m. GMT. https://twitter.com/ franakviacorka.

• Vials, Christopher. “What Can Happen Here?: Philip Roth, Sinclair Lewis, and the • Lessons of Fascism in the American Liberal Imagination.” Philip Roth Studies 7, no .1 (2011): 9-26 • Wilson, Andrew. Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.

III. European Economic Recovery Chair: Aniket Sangwan (University of Cambridge) Despoina Georgiou (University of Cambridge) Dan Mocanu (University of Cambridge) Discussant: David Cameron, Professor of Political Science

The ‘Uberification’ of the European Labour Market and the Future of Work: Challenges and Opportunities Despoina Georgiou (University of Cambridge)* Introduction Recent market structural trends like the globalization and digitalization of the modern world, the growing importance of the service sector, and the evolution of contractual arrangements in favour of franchising and outsourcing, have left many European workers standing uncomfortably in the ‘grey area’ between employment and self-employment (Perulli 2003, Supiot 2001). As shadow economies emerge, online platforms that arguably exercise labour-brokering functions become outlaws in a hightech Wild West, circumventing labour and social protection legislation and shifting the risks of running a business to workers (Aloisi 2016, Kuhn 2016). Are these quasi-subordinate persons ‘independent contractors’ or are they ‘employees’? In other words, should they be entitled to EU labour and social protections and how do we decide? * University of Cambridge, dg542@cam.ac.uk. This paper was supported by the Onassis Foundation (Scholarship ID: F ZQ 016-1/2020-2021) and the Cambridge AHRC. PAGE 41

Responding to these questions, the aim of this paper is to examine the challenges the ‘Uberification’ of the European labour market poses to EU judges and legislators apropos labour protection. After giving a brief overview of the European social acquis in the area (Part II), I demonstrate how it has been superseded by recent changes in market structures (Part III). In Part IV, I examine the European Court of Justice’ (ECJ) recent case law and highlight the dominant trends in jurisprudence. Finally, in Part V, I discuss recent regulatory developments that indicate a way forward.

II. The European Social Acquis In the European legal order, despite the fact that the free movement of workers constituted one of the main preoccupations of the Treaty of Rome, the EU did not attempt to create a technical term out of the concept of ‘worker’. Instead, the founding Treaties, as well as the labour law Directives issued thereafter, either refrained from defining the personal scope of their provisions in any substantial way or expressly reserved that task for domestic jurisdictions (Countouris 2017).

The ‘worker’ definition we currently use was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the seminal case of Lawrie-Blum. There, the Court held that a ‘worker’ is any person who “performs services for and under the direction of another in return for which he receives remuneration” (C-66/85, para 17). Using an argumentatio a contrario, the European judges have adjudicated that any person who performs services outside a relationship of subordination is ‘self-employed’ (C-268/99, Jany).

Hence, a very hard binary divide has been created; as far as the European provisions are concerned, one is either a ‘worker’, entitled to labour and social protections, or an ‘independent contractor’, subject to the harsh laws of supply and demand.

III. Changes in Market Structures While this binary taxonomy might have been effective in classifying individuals in the past, it is no longer capable of dealing with modern-day workers. While the standard contract of employment still remains the predominant form of work-organization, its social importance has been declining.

New casual forms of employment have emerged or have become more prevalent, such as employeesharing, ICT-based mobile work, voucher-based work, interim management, portfolio, and zero-hours work (Eurofound 2015). It is not an uncommon phenomenon, for instance, for previously standard workers to be asked to set up a limited company as the legal vehicle for the supply of their services in order not to lose their jobs completely (Davies 2010). The data is revealing: half of all the new jobs created in the last 10 years have been non-standard, leaving over 25% of the EU-28 workforce engaged in short and casual forms of work (Impact Assessment 2017).

The situation is even more precarious for those engaged in the so-called ‘collaborative’ or ‘gig economy’. Millions of ‘on-demand workers’ are now channeled through online platforms for the execution of all kinds of tasks. The providers exert considerable control over working activities (monitoring workers, setting minimum quality standards for service, strict branding requirements and terms of reimbursement) and yet they claim to be nothing more than mere labour market intermediaries, bringing together demand with supply (Prassl 2018). By qualifying as ‘information society services’ instead of ‘service companies’ operating in a particular sector, they are able to circumvent not just EU labour and social legislation but also antitrust and tax provisions, gaining thus significant profits for themselves while depriving the state of funds and workers of their labour and social security rights (De Stefano 2016, Irani 2015).

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IV. The ECJ’s stance The issue of whether gig workers are ‘entrepreneurs’ or ‘employees’ has preoccupied the courts in many domestic jurisdictions. Courts in France (Mr X. v Uber BV, Mr B. v Take Eat Easy), Spain (Asociación Madrileña del Taxi v Uber, Rider v Glovo), Belgium (Dossier), Italy (R.G. 35445/2015 e RG 36491/2015 v Uber, Foodora, Yiftalem Parigi v Just Eat Italy), the Netherlands (Deliveroo v FNV) and other European countries have not hesitated to re-classify Uber drivers as ‘workers’. The ECJ, on its part, has yet to pronounce itself on the issue. The two Uber cases that have come to Court (C-434/15, Elite Taxi; C-320/16, Uber France) did not concern employment status but rather the classification of Uber as an ‘information society service’ or a ‘transportation company’ under Article 56 TFEU and Directives 2006/123 and 2000/31. In his Opinion, AG Szpunar gave a detailed description of how the Uber platform operates. As he said, viewing Uber as an intermediary is “an unduly narrow view of its role. […] Uber exerts control over all the relevant aspects of an urban transport service [and] while this control is not exercised in the context of a traditional employer-employee relationship, one should not be fooled by appearances. […] Indirect control based on financial incentives and decentralised passenger-led ratings makes it possible to manage in a way that is just as — if not more — effective than management based on formal orders given by an employer to his employees and direct control over the carrying out of such orders” (paras 51-52).

Taking into account the ‘decisive influence’ exercised by Uber on its drivers, the Court sided with the AG and classified Uber as a transportation service.

A more modest stance, however, was adopted in B v Yodel (C-692/19). The case concerned the classification status of a parcel delivery courier for the Yodel platform under the Working Time Directive. There, the ECJ held that a person will be deemed ‘self-employed’ if he has discretion: (a) to use substitutes; (b) to accept or not to accept the tasks offered by the platform; (c) to provide his services to third parties and; (d) to fix his own hours of ‘work’. At the same time, a caveat was introduced. Relying on its previous jurisprudence on bogus self-employment arrangements (C-413/13, FNV Kunsten, C-256/01, Allonby), the Court clarified that a person can lose his status as an ‘independent trader’ “if his independence is merely notional” (para 30). This would be the case, in particular, if the person “acts under the direction of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, place and content of his work [and] does not share in the employer’s commercial risks” (para 31).

V. Regulatory Developments: Towards a More Social Europe In 2016, the Commission launched the European Pillar of Social Rights with the view to modernize its labour and social framework. In this context, the Commission has taken a series of legislative initiatives. In 2019, after 30 years of inactivity in the social field, the Commission adopted a new Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions (2019/1152). The adoption of a new legally binding instrument was viewed as proof that social policy was ‘back on the agenda’ (Bendnarowics, 2019).

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As Enrique Calvet Chambon, the Spanish Rapporteur responsible for the negotiations, noted: “[t]his is for the people of on-demand contracts, zero-hour contracts, Uber, Deliveroo, Cabify, these kinds of new jobs. The clickers for instance that work at home (or) at different times […] Thanks to this Directive […] all these workers who have been in limbo will now be granted minimum rights [and], from now on, no employer will be able to abuse the flexibility in the labour market” (BBC News, 2019). While the personal scope of the Directive remains unclear (making it difficult to distinguish how far the protection extends), the instrument undoubtedly boosts workers’ protections by providing them with a comprehensive set of day-one rights. The Directive enhances, inter alia, the rights of zero-hour workers, prohibits the establishment of widespread exclusivity clauses and long probationary periods, and introduces a right to redress.

The same year (2019), two more instruments were adopted. The first was the revised WorkLife Balance Directive (2019/1158). The Directive was adopted in an effort to address women’s under-representation in the labour market. It modernizes the EU legal framework in the area of familyrelated leave and flexible working arrangements, enabling parents and carers to better balance their work and family lives. Among others, the Directive introduces the following rights: (i) nontransferrable two months’ parental leave for each parent; (ii) five days’ carers’ leave for workers providing care to a relative; (iii) a minimum of ten days’ paternity leave for new fathers and; (iv) an extension of the right to request flexible working for carers and working parents of children up to eight years old.

Another instrument that was adopted the same year was the Council Recommendation on Access to Social Protection for Workers and the Self-Employed (2019/C 387/01). As the Commissioner for Employment, Marianne Thyssen, noted: "This is another important step towards a fairer and more social Europe. In the new world of work, we see more and more different types of work and more frequent job changes. We need to ensure that no one is left behind and everybody has the right to adequate benefits if they fall ill, have an accident or enter parenthood, become unemployed or retire. With this Recommendation, Member States commit to extend the coverage of social protection systems to ensure this. This is key to maintain trust in social protection systems, but also to ensure a level playing field on the labour market and avoid a race to the bottom”.

Overall, the adoption of these three instruments should be welcomed as a big accomplishment.

They constitute proof that the European Pillar of Social Rights, albeit not binding, is “not an empty set of profound Eurojargon” (Bendnarowics 2019: 622) but instead has ‘teeth’ capable of effectively addressing the displacement of the Social Policy Title. This is further evidenced by the Commission’s recent initiative to open a public consultation, in the context of the Digital Services Act Package, to address the issue of collective bargaining for the self-employed.

VI. Conclusion In a world where work is becoming increasingly digitalized and commodified and where humans are treated ‘as a service’, it is vital to revisit the EU framework to ensure that it promotes economic development through fair competition. The advent of the ‘collaborative economy’ might represent an entrepreneurial renaissance for some but it simultaneously poses serious challenges to EU judges and regulators apropos labour and social protection. In recent times, the Commission has started to display a more ‘social’ face, moving away from the hard ‘flexicurity agenda’ and the strong neoliberal discourses that have dominated its policies over the last three decades. It remains to be seen whether it will continue down this worker-protective path or whether any attempts to introduce more worker-protective legislation will remain nothing more than a Sisyphean task.

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The Post-Pandemic Entrepreneurial Union?

The Role of the EU in Fostering Venture Capital Markets Dan Mocanu (University of Cambridge) Abstract This paper seeks to unpack the politics of EU support for high-risk entrepreneurial ventures by reviewing the role of the EU as regulatory architect and financial catalyst in the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, which have been reinforced in the context of the COVID-19 recovery agenda. I argue that the recent paradigmatic shift in EU venture capital policy from signaling, catalysing, and derisking investments to ‘picking winners’ directly through equity participations in startups should be read within the context of the broader revitalisation of the EU industrial policy. The success of the EU’s entrepreneurial turn will be shaped by institutional responses to the highly disproportionate distribution of VC benefits across the West/East innovation divide, the growing geopolitical competition at the technological frontier, and the slow progress in building the Capital Markets Union.

I. Introduction Over the past years, the European Union has accelerated its industrial upgrading by multiplying the modalities of economic steering beyond previous regulatory doctries of public management (European Commission 2011, 2014, 2020; Majone 1997). Although the EU has limited fiscal space, the European Commission and the European Council have increasingly leveraged capital markets, publicprivate financing techniques, and quasi-fiscal actors, such as the European Investment Bank, for boosting public investment in response to the financial crisis, the climate urgency, and geopolitical competition at the technological frontier, falling within the analytical ambit of what has been described as a rising European “investment state” (Mertens and Thiemann 2018, 2019). The recent recovery plans in response to the pandemic have reinforced the deployment of public investment policies geared at speeding up the delivery of industrial policy goals (Council of the European Union 2021).

A key component of the EU public investment strategy prompted by COVID-19 is the role of venture capital (VC) in claiming European technological sovereignty, fostering innovation capacities, and spearheading the twin green and digital transitions. VC is often neglected in policy discussions presumably for its small investment volume. However, its economic impact outstrips its scale.1 The EU has the world’s 2nd largest VC market, increasing from 2.5Bn ECU (3bn Euros) in 1990 to €11bn in 2019 (Axelson and Martinovic 2013:18; Invest Europe 2020:37). Although VC markets are often celebrated as the epitome of laissez-faire, a growing stream of literature has emphasized the role of public support in incubating VC ecosystems (Klinger-Vidra 2013; Lerner 1996; Mazzucato 2011).

Similarly, the EU has built a consistent, albeit discreet, track record in fostering a pan-European VC market.

II. The Legislative Road to the European Venture Capital Market The role of the EU in institutionalising the European venture capital market can be traced back to the mid-1980s (Commission of the European Communities 1985). However, venture capital has been elevated on the policy agenda only in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 Amsterdam, Cardiff, and 1. For example, although in the United States only 0.5% of firms founded each year are venture-backed, they account for almost half of the US firms that file for IPOs and half of the total R&D budget of publicly listed companies (Gornall & Strebulaev 2015; Lerner and Nanda 2020).

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Luxembourg summits against the backdrop of eroding EU industrial competitiveness and the American VC exuberance prior to the dotcom bubble. Although pioneering American VC investors have capitalised on government research for breakthrough technology, public funding schemes, cuts in capital gains tax rates, and liberal prudential rules for institutional investors, the policy space of the EU has been more limited (OECD 2003; Gompers and Lerner 2001; Janeway 2018). Nevertheless, the EC has resorted to the subsidiarity principle, deploying value-adding regulatory devices and institutional innovations to scale up and steer national VC policies.

In regulatory terms, the landmark EC’s 1998 Risk Capital Action Plan has laid the regulatory foundation of the market by removing institutional and regulatory, improving financial transparency, diversifying exit venues, and incentivising pension funds to increase their VC exposure (European Commission 2003).2 More recently, the landmark 2013 Regulation on European Venture Capital Funds, which aimed to mitigate regulatory fragmentation and facilitate the scale up of cross-border investments, allowed VC funds to market themselves and raise capital across the EU under a harmonised set of rules (European Commission 2013). By 2018, over 40% of the EU-backed VC funds had a multi-country focus (ECA 2018: 25). Since 2015, the Capital Markets Union (CMU) plan has also re-invigorated EU efforts to create the legislative infrastructure for governing through capital markets, repurposing financial instruments for policy goals (Braun et al. 2018). Such political exercises aim to multiply financing choices beyond bank-based financing, incentivise cross-border investments, and create pan-European equity vehicles.

The EU as Venture Capitalist The EU has also emerged as the industry’s largest institutional investor through its risk capital arm, the European Investment Fund (InvestEurope 2020: 1). Although the EIF has never invested directly in startups, it takes minority stakes in VC funds and funds-of-funds, providing them with capital, reputational validation, and strategic advice. Since the EIB acquired the majority stake and restructured the institution in 1998, the EIF has assumed the role of a countercyclical investor, catalyst of private funding, knowledge-broker, advisory service, and trustee for its mandators, primarily the EC, EIB, and national authorities.

Across the six VC-focused financial instruments centrally managed by the EU between 1998 and 2020, most notably the EFSI SME Window, InnovFin Early Stage Equity Facility, and the High Growth and Innovative SME Facility, the EU committed over €3bn for VC investments (ECA 2019: 12). The EIF has also built a portfolio of capacity-building and advisory services, as well as a network of institutional partners across the EU, which reflect its “embedded autonomy” in the European VC landscape (Evans 1995). Given the countercyclical role of the EIF, VC commitments have considerably increased since the onset of the eurozone crisis. Overall, EIF investments over the last decade across all its mandates have totalled €12 bn, increasing from €0.3bn in 2010 to €1.2bn in 2019 (author’s calculations based on EIF data). For comparison, governmental agencies across the EU have raised €15bn during the same period, averaging 20% of the total EU VC fundraising (ECA 2019:10; InvestEurope 2020:10).

In sum, the EU has played a catalytic role in the evolution of the European VC market, which has grown steadily over the past two decades, albeit it has never reached the level prior to the dotcom bubble, when the market peaked at €34 bn (EIF 2006). In light of its aspirational goal of matching the US market, the industry as a whole still lags behind.

2. E. g. the 2003 Pension Fund Directive, the 2003 Prospectus Directive, the 2004 Transparency Directive, the 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, and the 2002 IAS Regulation.

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The US vs EU gap in 2019 still amounted to around €30bn, the industry records relatively low rates of return on investment, and national disparities in fiscal, corporate, and labour laws continue to deter many private investors (InvestEurope 2020:9; NVCA Yearbook 2020:24). Furthermore, although the market failure in financing gaps has been the primary rationale underpining EU interventions, external studies have found limited evidence of the quantification of market needs, which questions the market’s absorption capacity, leading to potential anomalies in the coordination between supply-side and demand-side interventions (ECA 2019).

From Stakeholder to Shareholder After two decades of horizontal industrial policies and supply-side interventions through financial intermediaries, the EU’s has recently made an unprecedented shift from being a stakeholder to being a direct shareholder in startups, complementing its old stategy of derisking investments with a novel mechanism of ‘picking winners’ directly through equity investments. By updating its approach, the EU has improved its traditional market failure framework by adopting a missionoriented rhetoric in justifying its venture capital initiatives (see Mazzucato 2018). The landmark initiative which captures this shift is the €10bn European Innovation Council officially launched in March 2021 (European Commission 2021).

The role of the EIC is to identify, prepare, and scale-up innovative startups working on “breakthrough, market-creating innovations” (EIC 2021). In the words of the EIC’s vice chair of the advisory board, “Europe doesn’t have a start-up problem . . . We produce more start-ups than the U.S. Europe has a scale-up problem and a deep tech finance problem” (Hauser for CNBC 2021). The initiative consists of a grant-based programme for research into emerging technologies, a transition fund for commercialising research outcomes, and a €3bn equity fund which will acquire stakes of up to €15m in innovative start-ups and help them scale-up globally. The structure of the EIC inscribes into a recent trend of EU industrial statecraft to intervene more directly in support of ‘European champions’ competing at the technological frontier, such as the European Battery Alliance (Financial Times 2019). The initiative also echoes public debates about use of public venture funds to improve the conversion of innovation dividends into broader social dividends (e. g. Rodrik 2015).

The Entrepreneurial Turn: Challenges Ahead Although the role of VC in the EU’s economic recovery plan will likely become more salient as the EU has started to govern the VC market directly through equity stakes, the success of the EU’s ‘entrepreneurial turn’ will be influenced to a large extent by its ability to address several challenges.

First, although the role of the EU is to create a pan-European VC ecosystem in line with the subsidiarity principle, the EU’s venture capital policy over the last two decades has reproduced an innovation divide that could be further amplified by current initiatives. As of 2018, three EU countries accounted for 50% of the EU-backed VC commitments, which hardly contributes to fostering a truly pan-European market (EVA 2019:25). The geographical concentration of funds has already also led to overlapping interventions and mandates, risking to crowd-out private investors (ECA 2019:35).

In the case of the EIC, during the 2018-2021 pilot phase of the initiative, the top five countries benefitted from 55% of the allocated funds and won over 60% of projects (author’s calculations based on EIC data). Indeed, such disparities could be due to the low number of applications from underrepresented states. However, the current demand-driven strategy in the distribution of EU venture capital does not seem to sufficiently address the innovation divide, reinforcing harmful disbalances despite the formal equality of access.

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Secondly, venture capital has increasingly globalised, leading to an atrocious competition with geopolitical undertones for the best deals. For example, an industry report estimates that between 2012 and 2016 US companies were responsible for 44% of startups acquisitions in Europe (Mind the Bridge and Crunchbase 2016:3). Furthermore Atomico (2019) also estimates that 90% of the European deals involving US and Asian investors are large-scale funding rounds of over €100 targeting the most successful companies with a proven track record. As the EU and national authorities steadily invest in startups, there is a rising concern among EU policymakers that public money are channeled into risk ventures which, once the business model is proved viable, are acquired by foreign investors that relocate businesses before the EU manages to reape the benefits from its investments. Therefore, ensuring that EU innovative startups have favourable conditions at home for the expansionary phase is a key challenge.

Thirdly, given that insufficient access to finance for equity growth and is widely recognised as an obstacle in the development of innovation systems, the EU’s progress in integrating capital markets is also an essential condition for improving the venture capital ecosystem (S&P Global 2020). The CMU aims to alter the incentives of actors to allocate more savings for equity commitments, reducing the dependency on bank-based financing. In the wake of COVID-19, the EU has already proposed a capital markets recovery package to facilitate access to finance. Future actions in this area will continue to have strong effects on the evolution of the venture capital markets.

Conclusion This short paper has highlighted the EU’s role as a regulatory architect and financial catalyst in the European VC ecosystem, spotlighting recent EU efforts in the context of the pandemic to govern innovation through venture capital markets. The EU’s recent bold policy actions, which deviate from previous liberal models of industrial statecraft, have been driven by a persisting financing gap in equity-financing for risky ventures, the geopolitical competition in emerging technologies, and the relegitimisation of the EU’s role as a grand mission-oriented actor. I argued that the EU’s recent ‘entrepreneurial’ turn faces three challenges that could define to a large extent its outcome: (1) the reproduction of the innovation divide, (2) foreign competition for successful innovative startups and (3) the slow progress in building the capital markets union. A fruitful avenue for future research concerns the role of member states in shaping EU interventions in the VC ecosystem, as well as more research into the trade-off between policy steering, in line with the EU industrial strategy, and financial risk that characterises EU policy efforts to govern through financial markets.

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IV. Europe and Global Governance Chair: Ryan Nabil (Yale University; Sciences Po (Paris, France)) Ivana Damjanovic (Australian National University) Ryan Nabil (Yale University; Sciences Po (Paris, France)) Pedro Schilling de Carvalho (University of Cambridge & Harvard Law School) Discussant: Richard Balme, Professor in Political Science (Sciences Po (Paris, France))

The ‘geopolitical’ EU and the rule of law: An opportunity or a challenge in a changing world trading order?

Dr Ivana Damjanovic, Assistant Lecturer (University of Canberra)/Visiting Research Fellow (Australian National University) 1. Introduction The EU was created with a vision of multilateralism within own borders in order to counterbalance power politics of the major European States (Germany, France, the UK). Political cooperation through rules was the ideal that the EU promoted not only internally but also externally. EU foreign policy has sought to promote multilateral rules-based order in international relations as one of its core values and objectives.1 With its liberal vision of the world order, the EU played a crucial role in promoting multilateralism in trade through the WTO, but also in other policy fields, such as environment, health, development cooperation.

The EU’s international status has been further enhanced through an array of bilateral agreements, embracing trade and foreign aid as a means to achieve development, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in particular in the EU’s neighbourhood. This engagement at the bilateral level is focused on complementing multilateralism by establishing frameworks of cooperation based on rules. EU values, objectives, and regulatory standards are promoted through its many bilateral agreements, in particular in the area of trade.

However, in a more hostile multipolar and less multilateral world, the EU narrative is also shifting towards ‘strategic autonomy’. The EU ‘geopolitical’ Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, envisages to strengthen the EU’s global position through coherent policies, and more strategically focused engagement in foreign relations. Nevertheless, the EU as a strong geopolitical player in a global rules-based order is not without its challenges – internal and external. This paper explores how the new EU’s geopolitical approach is particularly reflected in EU trade policy and how it seeks to reconcile conceptual contradictions between geopolitics and the ‘rule of law’ in international trade relations.

2. The EU and international trade: through bilateralism towards multilateralism Unable to facilitate a WTO reform consensus, the EU’s approach in the new millennium has shifted towards bilateralism, envisaged to complement rather than undermine the multilateral trading system.2 New generation of EU agreements, while ‘fully compatible with WTO’, aimed at ‘deep integration’ difficult to achieve at a multilateral level, particularly focusing on addressing regulatory barriers to trade in non-trade policy areas. While sufficiently flexible to recognise different levels of trading partners’ 1. Article 21 TEU 2. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Global Europe: Competing in the World, COM(2006) 567, 4 October 2006.

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development and the desired relationship with the EU, new agreements endorse a general trend towards greater uniformity.

The Post-Lisbon generation of EU agreements range from more typical free trade agreements (South Korea, Canada, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, forthcoming agreements with Australia and New Zealand) to Association Agreements with modernised trade provisions (Central America, forthcoming agreements with Chile, Mexico, Mercosur).3 Some of these agreements also include investment protection provisions in the same (Canada, Chile, Mexico) or in a separate investment agreement (Singapore, Vietnam). Association agreements still embrace a broader political agenda, while in the case of free trade agreements, political cooperation is ensured in an accompanying framework agreement. New Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreements concentrate on harmonising trade rules of the countries in the EU neighbourhood with the EU acquis (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, forthcoming updated agreements with Morocco and Tunisia), while Economic Partnership Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries focus on their economic development. The relationship with the Western Balkans, which envisages potential EU membership remains formalised in the existing Stabilisation and Association Agreements.

EU trade agreements strongly focus on the compliance with the existing international rules (ILO labour standards, Paris Agreement), while also promoting EU regulatory standards (geographical indications, food safety standards). Association agreements and economic partnership agreements with developing countries in addition promote European vision of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

However, the main idea behind all agreements is the same: supporting a rules-based order in the sphere of international affairs and reinforcing already achieved multilateral commitments through bilateral treaty mechanisms.

3. EU’s geopolitical strategy for trade: what is ‘new’ in the EU’s mixed bag?

At the start of 2020, the new EU Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, presented itself as ‘geopolitical’, emphasising the need to strengthen the coherence between internal and external EU economic policies in order to build more strategic power in external relations. It introduced the European Green Deal (EGD) as its core policy, envisaging that Europe would become the world’s first climate neutral continent by 2050.4 The Commission’s new trade agenda named ‘Open, Sustainable and Assertive’, presented in February 2021, is an expression of both the green and geopolitical strategy in EU external trade relations.

The EU’s geopolitical tools in the field of international trade continue to be envisaged at different levels – multilateral, bilateral and if necessary, autonomous. The new approach is nevertheless, to be ‘more strategic’ in building alliances that will drive global change, in particular with respect to sustainability.

At the multilateral level, the new strategy envisages the reform of the WTO by focusing on digital and sustainable trade, transatlantic cooperation and restoring the WTO dispute settlement body.5 At the bilateral level, new trade agreements should, on the one hand, contribute to achieving the EGD objectives externally, and on the other, address unfair trade practices and level the playing field by levelling up social, labour and environmental standards globally.6 ______________________________________________ 3. For overview of different EU agreements in the field of trade, see European Commission, Negotiations and agreements, 21 January 2021, <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/> 4. European Commission, A European Green Deal (2019), <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en> 5. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Trade Policy Review, COM(2021) 66/2, Brussels, 18 February 2021, 11 and Annex I. 6. Ibid, 10, 12

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The narrative heavily focuses on competitiveness and equal treatment internally and externally, thus serving to emphasise technical (i.e. economic and legal) rather than political aspects of the new strategy.

Strategic autonomy is in any case envisaged to be ‘open’, assuming that others will play according to international rules, as opposed to resorting to protectionist measures contrary to those rules.

Compared to its earlier ‘trade for all’ policy, which emphasised the promotion of EU values through political persuasion, the new strategy focuses more profoundly on the promotion of EU values DQG LQWHUHVWV through more assertive means, including autonomous measures and more effective enforcement. This means that the EU will be willing to go alone if necessary, when facing challenges in finding the common ground with ‘like-minded’ partners. The EU’s unilateral approach with autonomous measures, if successfully implemented, could influence global regulatory standards. For example, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) could enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s internal climate change policies by addressing carbon leakage. Although envisaged as an autonomous measure, it could also attract other EU trading partners. Other possible initiatives, possibly less attractive to others, include EU legislation on deforestation, sustainable corporate governance and mandatory environmental, human and labour rights due diligence, product requirements.

4.

Why a new strategy?

The international context in which the EU trade policy operates has been significantly changed, thus prompting the EU to adopt the new strategy. International economic law has failed to keep pace with rapid global changes. In the new COVID-19 reality, legal uncertainties in international trade and investment have only been further increased due to economically invasive State measures and emerging political divisions. The EU clearly understands that the emergence of new regulatory powers (China) has reduced the ‘Brussels effect’ globally. Trend towards protectionism in international trade and trade hostilities with China (between the US, but lately also with countries such as Australia) have increased pressures on the multilateral trading system. A world divided between these two powers is not in the EU’s interest. Some current EU negotiating partners, such as Australia, share the same challenges in the Pacific region, which explains the EU-led coalition of ‘like-minded’ partners in protecting the ‘rulesbased’ global order.

In relation to China, the EU has realised that China is both its ‘systemic rival’ and a partner and has taken steps to address China’s uncompetitive practices. In this regard, the EU and the US share the same goals. The EU is seeking multilateral solutions through the WTO reform, and has condemned the US’ unilateral approach to trade during the Trump era. At the same time, in the field of investment the EU has endorsed a more cautious stance through the new EU Foreign Investment Regulation. ______________________________________________ 7. Hans van Leeuwen, ‘Australia out of the “climate club” as EU advances carbon border tax’, 7 February 2021, <https://www.afr.com/world/ europe/australia-out-of-the-climate-club-as-eu-advances-carbon-border-tax-20210205-p5703j> 8. Trade Policy Review, above n 5, 13-14.

9. Brussels effect refers to the process of de facto externalisation of EU regulation outside its borders through market mechanisms. The scholarly authority on the topic is the monograph by Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (OUP 2020).

10. Gunnar Wiegand, ‘EU and Australia: Like-Minded Partners Facing Challenges Together’, Australian Outlook, 29 May 2018, <https:// www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/eu-and-australia-like-minded-partners-facing-challenges-together/> 11. European Commission, ‘EU foreign investment screening regulation enters into force’, Brussels, 10 April 2019, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2008>

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The European Commission has also warned the Member States about the increased potential risk to strategic industries beyond the public health care sector, and the need to protect critical European companies from foreign takeovers.12 These measures have been seen as primarily targeting the rising Chinese investment in some Member States.

Post-Trump, the EU strongly counts on transatlantic cooperation in bringing the WTO back at the centre of international trade. It is also likely that the focus of the EU-US like-mindedness in levelling the playing field with respect to China will expand to other issues, such as the concern over human rights and forced labour.13 The recently concluded Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China is a step in that direction on the EU side.14 At the same time, the EU’s conclusion of this agreement without developing a more coordinated approach towards China with the new Biden administration demonstrates the EU’s readiness to be ‘autonomous’ in determining its own policies towards China.15 More generally, the new geopolitical strategy is needed to tackle challenges in a number of policy areas related to trade, which could have significant consequences for the EU if not addressed. The EU lags behind in research and technological development including robotics and artificial intelligence, risking becoming dependent on China or the US. At the same time, some of its more advanced policies, such as climate change and protection of privacy, put pressure on EU companies competing abroad.

With respect to these policy areas, multilateralism led by the EU can achieve more efficient results.

The new trade policy is also seen to support Europe’s post-COVID-19 recovery, which is based on a vision of green and digital transformation.16 Therefore, EU foreign trade policy, just as the broader vision of the geopolitical EU, will seek to achieve policy integration between EU’s internal and external action, as envisaged in the EU founding treaties.17 5.

Opportunities and challenges Geopolitics implies foreign policy that is focused on power dynamics stemming from distribution of economic and military power. The vision of the EU as the geopolitical power implies investment (financial power) and rules (EU regulatory standards) rather than military means.18 Geopolitical action also requires linking relevant internal policies into a coherent and strategic external EU action. This remains the EU’s crucial challenge, albeit not an insurmountable one. After lengthy budgetary negotiations, the final outcome provides for the most ambitious financial program in EU’s history, worth in total €1.824 trillion over the period 2021-2027. ______________________________________________ 12. European Commission, Communication from the Commission Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) 2020/C 99 I/01, OJ C 99I, 26 March 2020, 1–5.

13. European Commission, ‘Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis on the Trade Policy Review Communication at the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee’, 24 February 2021, Brussels.

14. CAI includes explicit reference to ILO Conventions No 29 (Forced Labour Convention) and 105 (Abolition of Forced Labour) with the commitment of parties to ‘make continued and sustained efforts on its own initiative’ to pursue ratifications of these conventions: see Article 4, Sub-Section 3, Section IV. 15. The EU has downplayed the relevance for the agreement by emphasising that on the one hand, it does not give to the Chinese companies anything more than the US companies already have in the EU market, and on the other, that it achieves for the EU an agreement with China that its other strategic partners already have (US Phase 1 deal, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Australia).

16. Ivana Damjanovic and Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘The EU Coronavirus Recovery: Between Political Realities and "Next Generation" Aspirations’, Australian Outlook, 7 August 2020, <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/eu-coronavirus-recovery-political-realities-next-generation-aspirations/> 17. Article 21 TEU 18. Ivana Damjanovic and Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘Could the Coronavirus Strengthen Rather Than Threaten Geopolitical Europe?’, Australian Outlook, 11 June 2020, <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/could-the-coronavirus-strengthen-rather-than-threaten-geopolitical-europe/>

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Its novel component is the Next Generation EU amounting to €750 billion of temporary recovery funds to be borrowed on international markets by the European Commission. A significant portion of the package is dedicated to investments into green and digital transformation of Europe. The budgetary compromise adopts more ambitious climate change targets, envisaging to cut EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels – an increase from an earlier reduction target of 40%.19 Given the successful outcome of the budget negotiations, the EU might have more financial power, but it will still be constrained by its internal institutional setup in the decision-making and implementation.

Some objectives are more easily achievable given the high level of policy integration at EU level, in particular agriculture and food safety, environment and climate change, ocean governance, protection of privacy, energy efficiency. In the absence of an internal consensus, other policy goals will be more difficult. The requirement of unanimity within the Council of Ministers is likely to dither the adoption of different tax arrangements.

Importantly, new revenues for repaying the recovery package borrowing rely on measures linked to digital and green reforms. A new levy on non-recycled plastic packaging waste has been introduced from 1 January 2021. By mid-2021, the Commission envisages to put forward additional proposals for raising revenues – through a CBAM, a digital levy, and the modifications of the EU Emissions Trading System. This is to be complemented by a Financial Transaction Tax and measures related to the corporate sector (financial contribution and a common corporate tax base), which are to be proposed as new sources of revenue by June 2024.20 While internal, these measures will have significant external effects.

In external trade, the EU will seek to regain its geopolitical ground in influencing new green and digital standards through FTA regulatory dialogues with ‘like-minded’ countries, particularly in the AsiaPacific and Latin America.21 These regions are obviously considered important for supporting (rather than projecting) EU’s geopolitical interests.22 On the other hand, the Brussels-Washington dialogue will be crucial in shaping global technological standards, and offsetting the ‘Beijing effect’.23 At the same time, the EU’s competitors will also seek an advantage in pursuing the climate agenda, with Boris Johnson declaring an ambitious UK target of at least 68% reduction in greenhouse gas emission by 2030 in order to boost post-Brexit economic growth.24 ________________________________ 19. ‘EU agrees on tougher climate goals for 2030’, Deutsche Welle, 11 December 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-agrees-on-tougher-climategoals-for-2030/a-55901612> 20. European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 10/20, 21 July 2020, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45109/210720-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf>; See also, European Commission, ‘A recovery plan for Europe’, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en> 21. Trade Policy Review, above n 5, 16.

22. Cf. EU’s vision of strengthening partnerships with neighbouring and enlargement countries and Africa: Trade Policy Review, above n 5, 17-18.

23. European Commission, ‘Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis on the Trade Policy Review Communication at the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee’, above n 13.

24. UK Government, ‘UK sets ambitious new climate target ahead of UN Summit’, Press Release, 3 December 2020, <https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-sets-ambitious-new-climate-target-ahead-of-un-summit>

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‘Geopolitics of mutual interests’,25 or rather multilateralism led by the EU, is still the preferred pathway for the EU in creating a ‘level playing field’, although it will most likely face the implementation challenges of political realism. To overcome this, the EU’s vision of the WTO reform should allow easier negotiation of new ‘plurilateral’ agreements to respond to emerging trade issues, which can later be integrated into the WTO framework of rules. This approach should also allow the EU to pursue cooperation through smaller coalitions in which it can assume the leading role and utilise its bilateral allegiances with ‘like-minded’ partners as leverage in reforming the multilateral trading and investment system.

6.

Conclusion The EU’s geopolitical strategy retains its multilateral orientation and the vision of a ‘rules-based’ global order. However, it envisages a more assertive role of the EU in shaping the global rules. It is based on the idea of stronger integration between the EU’s internal and external policies, so that the EU can benefit rather than loose from its more progressive standards. The EU’s geopolitical vision in its essence envisages the resumption of the EU’s normative power, which has been weakened due to power politics in international relations.

The new EU’s ‘Open, Sustainable and Assertive’ trade policy seeks to address global challenges, such as climate change, while allowing the EU to position itself geopolitically and geoeconomically in influencing the development of green standards and securing energy resources in the post-COVID-19 world. It seeks to promote investments in clean energy, and responsible and sustainable value chains.

Geopolitical advantages are thus to be achieved through new legal standards in emerging areas of trade (green and digital) and through the insistence on a level playing field in those areas in which the EU’s competitors (most importantly China) have gained advantages by circumventing the rules (e.g. labour rights).

The geo-politicisation of the EGD could lead to important advantages for Europe. The EU’s leading position in the global race towards decarbonisation would give the EU more normative power in setting the regulatory standards for clean technology. The move towards renewable energy could also make the EU less energy dependant on foreign sources and thus generally more independent from foreign interference.

Nevertheless, challenges remain. While Washington and Brussels might be united in levelling the playing field through existing and new rules to offset the influence of China, they also differ in their regulatory approaches. For the EU, which is not a federation nor a unitary state, strong external action demands internal unity. Ultimately, the success of the EU geopolitical strategy will depend on how the EU works ‘at home’ in order to achieve its goals abroad. ________________________________________ 25. Beatriz Rios, ‘Von der Leyen wows a green, digital, geopolitical EU in Davos’, Euractiv , 23 January 2020, <https:// www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/von-der-leyen-vows-a-green-digital-geopolitical-eu-in-davos/>

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UK-EU Security Cooperation in a Changing World Order Ryan Nabil (Yale University; Sciences Po (Paris, France)) I.

Introduction1 As Europe reels from the challenges of the novel coronavirus (Covid-19), the old continent faces new security challenges from both inside and outside Europe. On the one hand, European countries and the EU face growing security threats from a resurgent Russia and its ambitions in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, European leaders need to develop a strategy to deal with China’s growing economic presence on the continent and China’s growing hold on critical European infrastructure and acquisition of dual-use technology.2 Meanwhile, with an unstable Middle East and Northern Africa, European countries remain vulnerable to future instability and refugee crises.3 Amidst emerging security threats, European nations have for long underinvested in their military capabilities while relying upon Washington for security.4 As a result, continent remains woefully illprepared to defend itself against growing security challenges.

Against the backdrop of a changing international security environment, it is critically important to enhance security cooperation between Britain, the EU, and EU member states. Despite Britain’s crucial role in European security, the public debate around Brexit largely ignored Brexit’s security implications for British and European security, and potential for UK-EU security cooperation.5 Instead, both pre- and post-Brexit public policy debate has primarily centered around the economic consequences due to Britain’s exit from the EU.6 While the UK is a key commercial partner of the European Union, Britain’s role in European security should not be overlooked.7 Given Britain’s position within the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the country’s strength in military operations, defense research, and intelligence, the UK has traditionally played a crucial role in ensuring European security. Given the increasing challenges that Europe faces, strong security cooperation between the UK, the EU and EU countries is crucial to European security.8 II.

Mechanisms of British Involvement in European Security To understand how policymakers can promote UK-EU security cooperation, it is essential to understand the mechanisms of British involvement in European defense and security. Given Britain’s complicated relationship with the EU, Britain has developed complex mechanisms for contributing to European security affairs. Britain participates in European defense and through four primary mechanisms: 1) British representation at the UN Security Council and other security initiatives; 2) EU initiatives like the CSDP and non-EU European programs like the European Intervention Initiative (EI2); 3) bilateral security cooperation with individual EU states like France and Germany; and 4) British participation in NATO. In this section, we briefly discuss each of these mechanisms. _____________________________________________ 1 The author thanks Ambassador Yuriy Sergeyev, the former Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations and lecturer at the Yale MacMillan Center, for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.

2 For more information, please see Munich Security Conference [Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz], Munich Security Report 2020: Westlessness (Munich: Munich Security Conference, 2020), 24–53, https://securityconference.org/assets/user_upload/MunichSecurityReport2020.pdf; Nabil, “Master’s Thesis: Europe- China Relations: Implications for European Economic Policy auropeend Foreign Affairs” (Odd Arne Westad), Yale University, Spring 2020, 126.

3 Munich Security Report 2020, 36–39, 40–49.

4 James D. Bindenagel, “In a Dissolving World Order, Europe and Especially Germany Need a More Strategic Outlook," German Marshall Fund, February 14, 2020, www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/02/14/dissolving-world- order-europe-and-especially-germany-need-more-strategic-outlook.

5 Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee, European Defence: How to Engage the UK after Brexit? (The Hague: Clingendael, July 2017), 10, https:// www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017- 07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf.

6 Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, European Defence: How to Engage the UK after Brexit?.

7 Ibid.

8 Munich Security Report 2020, 5–23.

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A.

British Participation in the UN Security Council and Regional Multilateral Initiatives

Due to Britain’s membership in the UN Security Council and its prominent role in regional security initiatives, London has played a crucial role in representing the European voice in multilateral security initiatives.9 Although several European countries—like Germany and Poland—often participate in the Security Council as rotating members, only Britain and France are two European countries with permanent representation on the Council.10 Consequently, coordination between Britain, France, and the EU is key to representing a unified European position on security issues.11 Such a unified stance has played Europe to speak with one voice on multiple occasions. For instance, France and the UK—along with the United States—played a crucial role in voicing concerns with human rights violations in Syria, especially in the aftermath of the Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.12 Britain— along with France, Germany, and the EU—are signatories to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was designed to moderate Iran’s nuclear capacity.13 British cooperation with France and Germany were especially crucial in saving the JCPOA alive despite the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the agreement.14 B.

British Participation in European Security Initiatives

Despite Britain’s reservations about European security initiatives, it has nevertheless participated in several programs, notably the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). As of 2018, the EU maintained six military missions and ten civilian missions, in which the member states and several third-party countries deployed “more than 4,000 people.”15 These missions include the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine.16 Unlike NATO missions, the “CSDP missions and operations are relatively limited in scale, and tend to focus on lower-intensity crisis management, such as capacity building, reform and training.”17 Furthermore, many of the CSDP civilian and peacekeeping missions also take place in difficult circumstances and volatile situations, like Georgia and Somalia, meaning that such operations often do not result in concrete and speedy results.18 ______________________________________________ 9. Agence France Press and Euractiv, "Will Brexit see European division at the UN Security Council?" Euractiv, January 27, 2020, https:// www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/will-brexit-see-european- division-at-the-un-security-council/ 10. Agence France Press and Euractiv, "Will Brexit see European division at the UN Security Council?"

11. For instance, see Reuters, " After Brexit, Let's Formalise the 'E3' European Security Trio - German Minister," November 7, 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-defence/after-brexit-lets-formalise-the- e3-european-security-trio-german-minister-idUSKBN1XH15X 12. Michelle Nichols, "U.S., France, Britain propose U.N. resolution on Syria gas attack," Reuters, April 4, 2017, reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-resolution-idUSKBN17702K; also see Nabil, “Europe-China Relations,” 62.

13. Harold Hongju Koh, Trump Administration and the International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 61–70; Times of Israel.

“EU, China Vow to Uphold Iran Nuclear Deal,” June 2, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/eu-china-vow-to-uphold-iran-nuclear-deal/, Mehreen Khan and Henry Foy, “EU, Russia and China Agree Special Payments System for Iran,” Financial Times, September 25, 2018, https:// www.ft.com/content/4aa03678-c0a7-11e8-8d55-54197280d3f7; Nabil, “Europe-China Relations,” 119.

14. See note 13.

15. See "Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operation" in UK House of Lords, Brexit, 10.

16 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), EU Training Mission in Mali (Brussels, EEAS, last modified July 16, 2019),1, www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm- mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf ; European Council, Council of the European Union, “Press Release: EUAM Ukraine: New Head of Mission Appointed,” June 4, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press- releases/2019/06/04/euam-ukraine-new-head-of-mission-appointed/; "Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operation" in UK House of Lords, Brexit, 18.

17 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3.

18 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3.

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Notwithstanding Britain’s participation in several CSDP missions, the UK’s interests in the CSDP remain limited.19 Whereas the UK tends to specialize in high-end military operations, most CSDP missions focus on peace-keeping activities and low-end military operations.20 However, in cases where CSDP interests align with Britain’s strategic interests, like in the Gulf of Aden, London plays a more active role.21 For instance, because “65% of UK gas and oil supplies pass through the Gulf of Aden,” piracy off the coast of Somalia is a key British concern.22 As a result, Britain contributed more personnel to Somalia-related CSDP operations than any other CSDP mission in 2018.23 Furthermore, the CSDP has traditionally been a mechanism through which the UK calls upon its European partners to increase defense expenditure and help enhance European security—an objective that will likely remain important for post-Brexit Britain.24 As a result, Britain has not only participated in CSDP missions but have also sought to shape the CSDP’s strategy to advance UK strategic interests in Europe.25 In addition to the CSDP missions and operations discussed above, Britain has also contributed to several EU battlegroups, which are battalion-sized military units of approximately 1,500 troops under the broad umbrella of CSDP.26 For instance, in support of the EU’s defense goals, Britain established and maintained an EU battlegroup, which consisted mostly of British troops.27 Similarly, Britain and the Netherlands also created a joint amphibious battlegroup, which became operational after 2007.28 However, despite conflicts in southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Sahel region, neither the EU Battlegroup nor the UK-Dutch Battlegroup was deployed.29 These developments suggest a general reluctance on the EU to partake in military operations, which has been a key reason why Britain and France were dissatisfied with the CSDP.30 In March 2020, the UK government informed the EU that Britain would no longer participate in future EU battlegroups, despite an initial offer to the contrary.31 However, the UK government suggested that Britain could still become a part of the EU defense framework in the future if Brussels offered London a more favorable arrangement.32 Nevertheless, the current EU framework does not allow for third countries to be in charge of leading and planning EU battlegroups missions.33 Therefore, without significant adjustments to the existing structure, it is unlikely that Britain will partake in the EU battlegroups and similar military operations under the CSDP platform.34 _____________________________________________ 19. See “Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operation” in UK House of Lords, Brexit, 18.

20 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3.

21 “Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operation” in UK House of Lords, Brexit, 18.

22 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 55.

23 “Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operation” in UK House of Lords, Brexit, 18.

24 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 41.

25 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3–4.

26 EU External Action Service, EU Battlegroups (Brussels: European Union, October 9, 2017), 3, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/33557/EU%20Battlegroups. Also see Gustav Lindstrom, Enter the EU Battlegroups (Paris: Institute for Security Studies (Chailott Paper, no.

97), February 2007), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp097.pdf 27. Tom McTague and David M. Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force,” Politico, March 19, 2018, last modified March 20, 2018, https:// www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-uk-military-britain-pulls-out-of-eu- defense-force/; 28 UK Parliament, Select Committee on European Union, “EU Battlegroups,” February 19, 2005, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ ldeucom/16/16100.htm; also see UK Ministry of Defence, “UK/Netherlands Battlegroup Sets Benchmark in EU," June 22, 2005, www.defenseaerospace.com/articles- view/release/3/59165/uk%2C-netherlands-update-battlegroup-mou-%28jun-23%29.html 29 Reuters, “Britain Withdraws Offer to Lead EU Military Force after Brexit,” March 20, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-military/britainwithdraws-offer-to-lead-eu-military-force-after-brexit- idUKKBN1GW1RK 30 Koutouzi, 7. For this citation, the author cites: Niklas Nováky, “France’s European Intervention Initiative: Towards a Culture of Burden Sharing,” EuropeanView17, no. 2 (2018): 238–238. See also Government of France, "European Intervention Initiative," Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, last modified April 17, 2020, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/ei2/ei2.

31 McTague and Herszenhorn, "Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force;” Also see Tom McTague and Nicholas Vinocur, "UK slated to lead EU military mission — after Brexit," Politico, July 4, 2017, last modified July 10, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-slated-to-lead-eu-military-mission-after-brexit/ 32 McTague and Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force.”

33 House of Lords, Brexit, 51–52.

34 McTague and Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force.”

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Despite British participation in the CSDP, Westminster has refused to participate in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).35 To pursue closer defense integration, 25 EU countries signed PESCO in 2017, which paved the path for increased collaboration.36 As UK Parliament researchers describe, “[u]nder the PESCO concept a smaller group of eligible, willing, Member States would be able to adopt decisions regarding greater military cooperation, therefore moving forward in certain areas without the full approval of all EU Member States.”37 Given Britain’s reluctance towards close defense integration and the country’s plan to exit the European Union, it did not join PESCO in 2017—along with Denmark and Malta—which also remained outside of the framework.38 Since Britain is not a PESCO member, it exercises “no powers or voting rights over projects or the future strategic direction of the initiative.”39 However, Britain— along with the United States—might still be allowed to participate in future PESCO projects as a third country on “a case-by-case basis”—although the conditions for such partnership remain unclear.40 Despite high expectations for PESCO, some European countries think that the initiative has failed to bring close defense integration. In particular, French leaders believe that PESCO framework failed to remove “the reluctance of the EU member states to intervene in crises and use force when required.”41 Consequently, in 2018, France launched a new initiative—called the European Intervention Initiative— and invited “nine European countries to join.”42 As the leader of this initiative, France has asked both Britain and Germany to be part of the initiative, along with “Belgium, Denmark…, Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain…and Italy.”43 Although this project has “a clear European focus,” it takes place outside of the EU framework.44 Consequently, unlike the CSDP and PESCO, Britain can continue to play an important role in shaping the strategies and operations of the EI2 Initiative even as it leaves the European Union.

C. Bilateral Defense Cooperation with EU Members Given the ineffectiveness of the EU’s defense projects under the CSDP and PESCO, as well as Britain’s reluctance towards EU-led defense integration, the UK has increasingly relied upon bilateral mechanisms to bolster security ties. In this context, Britain’s bilateral ties with France are particularly important to the UK’s security objectives, especially in post-Brexit Europe.45 Notwithstanding some divergences in approaches to European security, Britain and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010 and committed to deepening bilateral defense and security cooperation.46 Furthermore, as Europe’s two nuclear powers, Britain and France have sought to enhance cooperation in nuclear technology and the development of unmanned _________________________________ 35. Claire Mills, EU Defence: The Realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (London: House of Commons Briefing Paper, no. 8149, updated September 23, 2019): 3, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8149/ 36 Koutouzi, 6.

37 Mills, EU Defence: The Realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 3.

38 Mills, EU Defence: The Realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 3.

39. Mills, EU Defence: The Realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 3.

40 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 55; Mills, 12–3; Jacopo Barigazzi, "UK and US Will be Allowed to Join Some EU Military Projects," Politico, October 1, 2018, last modified April 19, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/pesco-military-uk-and-us-will-be-allowed-to-join-some-eu-military-projects/; Douglas Barrie, "The EU’s PESCO: here to stay?" IISS Military Balance Blog, December 19, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/12/eu-pesco-hurdles.

41 Koutouzi, 7. For this citation, the author cites: Nicholas Novaky “France’s European Intervention Initiative: Towards a Culture of Burden Sharing,” European View17, no. 2 (2018): 238–238. See also Government of France, "European Intervention Initiative.”

42 Koutouzi, 7.

43 Koutouzi, 7; PRP Channel, “Italy joins the French EI2 initiative. New Strategic Military Axis of European Countries,” n.d., accessed April 25, 2020, https:// www.prpchannel.com/en/litalia-adheres-to-the-French- ei2-initiative/ 44 Note that this initiative is also not part of NATO. See Government of France, "European Intervention Initiative;” Koutouzi, 7.

45. See Jane's [IHS Markit], “Brexit Unlikely to Affect Bilateral UK-France Defence and Security co- Operation,” Jane's Intelligence Review (2018), janes.com/images/assets/349/85349/Brexit_unlikely_to_affect_bilateral_UK-France_defence_and_security_co- operation.pdf; Peter Ricketts, National Security Relations with France after Brexit (London: Royal United Services Institute, January 2018): 3, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/briefingpaper-franceuk-2017.pdf 46 Ricketts, 6; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic, Treaty relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities [Lancaster House Treaty], London, November 2, 2010, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/228571/7975.pdf.

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aircrafts.47.48 Finally, as part of bilateral security cooperation, Britain and France also seek to deploy armed forces together in pursuit of common security objectives.49 To this end, the two parties have developed a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), whereby London and Paris now possess “a highly trained pool of forces capable of a wide range of missions up to high- intensity combat.”50 Due to such initiatives, the two countries have seen greater cooperation, for instance, in Mali, where the Royal Air Force provided logistical support to “the French counter- terrorism operation” there.51 In the future, Britain and France may deploy joint forces either bilaterally, through a multilateral UN- or NATO-led coalition.52 While Britain has long-established defense and security ties with France, British leaders have also sought to pursue closer military ties with Germany.53 Berlin and London have signed a joint vision statement, which lays out the framework for future UK-German security cooperation, especially in capability development and cybersecurity, where the two countries remain vulnerable to foreign attacks.54 Furthermore, the two countries also seek to pursue further cooperation in the context of the E3 format (including Britain, France, and Germany), the EI2, and NATO.55 In this context, Britain’s bilateral security relations with Germany could help reduce divergences between the UK and EU countries in European platforms like the EI2.56 In addition to France and Germany, Britain has developed close bilateral ties with several other European countries—like Poland and the Netherlands—which the UK seeks to strengthen after Brexit.

For instance, following the 2016 NATO Summit, Britain agreed to deploy its “Light Dragoons” troops in Poland as part of the “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Europe.”57 To ensure that Brexit does not disrupt bilateral security ties, the UK and Poland signed a Defense and Security Treaty in 2018.58 Under this Treaty, the two Parties committed to strengthening high- level security and defense exchanges, strengthening collective defense in the cyberspace, and _________________________________ 47 Ibid.

48 Ricketts, 2, 10.

49 Ricketts, 2, 9.

50 Ricketts, 2, 9 51 Henry Jones, "Three Royal Air Force Chinooks arrive in Mali," UK Defence Journal, July 19, 2018, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/3-rafchinooks-arrive-in-mali/ 52 Ricketts, 9.

53 George Robertson and Bernard Cazeneuve, "The UK-France Alliance is Crucial to Europe’s Security.

Brexit Must not Threaten it," Guardian, November 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/08/uk-france-europe-securitybrexit;” Ministry of Defence and Gavin Williamson, "UK to Maintain Military Presence in Germany," UK Defense and Armed Forces, September 30, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-maintain-military-presence-in-germany.

54 Deutsche Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Ministerin zeichnet mit britischem Amtskollegen Joint Vision Statement” [“Minister signs Joint Vision Statement with British Counterpart”], October 8, 2018, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ministerin-zeichnet-mit-britischem-amtskollegenjoint-vision-statement-28180.

55 Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Speech by the Minister of Defence,” January 16, 2020.

56 Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, "An Overlooked Alliance: A Case for Greater UK-German Defence Cooperation," European Leadership Network, June 4, 2019, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/an-overlooked-alliance-a-case-for-greater-uk-german- defence-cooperation/.

57 Ministry of Defence and Sir Michael Fallon, “UK Personnel Arrive in Poland and Estonia,” UK Government, April 5, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-personnel-arrive-in-poland-and-estonia 58 United Kingdom and Poland, "Treaty on Defense Security Cooperation," Warsaw, signed December 21, 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705414/CS_Polan d_1.2018_Defence_and_Security.pdf

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exchanging “[d]efence and military intelligence.”59 Similarly, Britain also maintains close bilateral defense ties with the Netherlands, which has, in turn, strengthened British-Dutch security cooperation in the context of NATO and EU CSDP programs like the UK-Dutch Battlegroup.60 Following Brexit, British and Dutch leaders will need to find alternative venues to pursue stronger cooperation, for instance, through bilateral mechanisms, NATO, and the EI2, to which both Britain and the Netherlands are parties.61 D.

British Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) In addition to Britain’s participation in the CSDP and EI2 and bilateral security relations with individual European countries, the UK also plays an important role in European security through NATO. Experts estimate that Britain currently provided around ten percent of NATO’s overall budget and between twelve to fourteen percent of NATO’s total capacity.62 As one of the three nuclear NATO powers, Britain has played a key role in numerous Allied missions and operations, from NATO’s 1999 intervention in the former Yugoslavia to its missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.63 In the context of Europe, the UK helps provides a crucial role in NATO by leading and contributing to several missions and operations and hosting several NATO bases.64 To reduce the security concerns that these countries face and to provide a deterrent to Russia, Britain played a leading role in establishing NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.65 Under this initiative, Britain deployed 900 soldiers in Estonia, along with additional personnel from Iceland and Denmark, who are ready for engagement in the case of Russian intervention.66 Although such numbers are much smaller compared to the number of troops deployed by Russia in Kaliningrad and near the Baltics, such deployment nevertheless reaffirms Britain and NATO’s Article 5 commitments to Estonia and acts as a deterrent against Russian aggression.67 Elsewhere in Europe, Britain has also used its role within NATO to advance European security. As climate change conditions in the Arctic worsen and Russia and China expand their presence there, the UK is increasingly strengthening its presence in northern Europe.68 To this end, in 2010, the UK “Ministry of Defence established the Northern Group (NG),” 69 which brings together defense ministers from 12 Baltic and Nordic countries and seeks to promote security cooperation between these countries.70 The UK also established the Joint Expeditionary Force with eight Nordic nations, which can deploy “up to 10,000 personnel” for “combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations,” both in Northern European waters and elsewhere.71 _______________________________________ 59 UK-Poland Treaty on Defense Security Cooperation, Art. 2 60 UK Parliament, "EU Battlegroups," Select Committee on European Union (Fourth Report), February 19, 2005, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm.

61 The French Sénat, "Défense européenne : le défi de l'autonomie stratégique (version française)," April 24, 2020, , www.senat.fr/rap/r18-626-1/ r18-626-113.html.

62 House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations, Eight Report of Session 2017-2019, June 19, 2018, 25, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/387/387.pdf 63 House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies, 6–7.

64 House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies, 25–27.

65 House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies, 25; Reeve, The UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force, 6.

66 Duncan Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North," Royal United Services Institute November 27, 2019, https://rusi.org/commentary/britainestonia-and-wider-north.

67 Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North;” Yuriy Sergeyev, “Class Discussion,” Security and Stability in Central and Eastern Europe, Yale University, Spring 2019.

68 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Duncan Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North," Royal United Services Institute, November 27, 2019, https:// rusi.org/commentary/britain-estonia-and-wider-north; Richard Reeve, The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, June 2019), 1, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=e4ce8d69-7d62-47f0-9096- 364ea19d5dc2; 69 Kennedy-Pipe and Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North.”

70 Richard Reeve, The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force, 1; Ministry of Defence and Mark Lancaster, "UK leads Northern Group response to disinformation," UK Government, November 14, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-leads-northern-group-response-to-disinformation 71 Reeve, The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force; Kennedy-Pipe and Depledge, "Britain, Estonia.”

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III.

Policy Recommendations for Post-Brexit UK-EU Security Cooperation Given the multiple avenues through which Britain pursues security cooperation with European countries, it will be challenging to develop a comprehensive strategy for post-Brexit UK-EU security cooperation. However, given the multiplicity of UK-EU security cooperation, British leaders should pursue a multi-pronged approach, which consists of four interrelated and self-reinforcing goals for security interactions with European countries.

A.

Negotiate CSDP and PESCO Participation on a Case-by-Case Basis Britain should not prioritize the EU-led CSDP and PESCO missions for at least three reasons. First, most of such projects are low-end civilian or peacekeeping missions, where British military assets and capabilities are underutilized.72 Consequently, many of these missions are not a key priority for the UK.73 Second, the EU’s reluctance and the lack of operational expertise means that EU battlegroups and similar forces are often not deployed despite the need for deployment in areas such as the Middle East and Sahel region.74 Finally, even if Britain were to participate in the CSDP or PESCO, the current EU framework does not allow a third-party country, like Britain, to plan and shape the strategy of such operations.75 Consequently, Britain could only join in the later phrases involving operational planning and implementation of the project.76 Therefore, British participation in CSDP and PESCO is unlikely to influence the outcomes of CSDP and PESCO missions, which is a fundamental objective of British security policies toward the EU.77 Therefore, as the UK government has rightly done, Britain should not seek to join the CSDP and PESCO as a third-party country under the current framework.78 Instead, the UK should identify the few priority areas in which CSDP and PESCO projects can help advance British security interests. For instance, the most important recent CSDP missions for the UK have been the anti-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa, which is a key route for British imports of oil and gas.79 More generally, the CSDP’s anti-piracy and maritime missions in the Mediterranean and Africa are useful for British security objectives.80 In these cases, Britain should seek to negotiate a case-by-case deal with the EU, in which both Britain and selected EU countries can be involved in both the planning and execution of joint projects.81 In this context, it should also be noted that, despite the reduction in its capabilities, the Royal Navy is still one of the two most capable European navies.82 Given Britain’s expertise in maritime issues, the UK could negotiate a favorable deal with the EU that will allow reciprocal British participation in planning and implementing joint maritime missions.

B.

Enhance British Participation in Multilateral European Security Initiatives Britain should prioritize emerging European security programs, like the European Intervention Initiative, instead of EU-led initiatives like the CSDP, for several reasons. First, unlike the CSDP and PESCO, the EI2 falls outside the purview of the European Union.83 Consequently, Britain’s exit from the European Union will have little impact on Britain’s ability to shape policy within the EI2 framework.84 Second, the CSDP focuses on lowend military operations and peacekeeping projects, while EU battlegroups are operationally inactive.85 Therefore, due to the EU’s reluctance and its lack of operational expertise, Britain’s ability to project military power overseas and pursue rapid deployment within the EU framework remains limited.86 ______________________________________ 72 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3.

73 Ibid.

74 Reuters, "Britain withdraws offer to lead EU military force after Brexit," 75 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 70 76 UK House of Lords, 12–14, 51–52.

77 UK House of Lords, 12–14, 51–52.

78 Tom McTague and David M. Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force.”

79 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 29–32, 54–56, 72.

80 Ibid.

81. For a list of recommendations on UK-EU security cooperation, see UK House of Lords, Brexit, 53–74.

82 Axe, “Commentary: What the U.S. Should Learn from Britain’s Dying Navy.”

83 Koutouzi, 7–9.

84 Koutouzi, 7–9.

85 UK House of Lords, Brexit, 3; Reuters, "Britain withdraws offer to lead EU military force after Brexit.”

86 See note above.

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In contrast, the EI2 and the Joint Expeditionary Force, are designed to be operationally active.87 Therefore, these projects are more likely to suit Britain’s long-term strategic interests outside of the continent.

Finally, as several international relations scholars and policymakers point out, Britain has traditionally “acted as a bridge” between the EU and NATO.88 If Britain finds itself shut from the EU’s main defense-related decision-making processes, continuing such a role will be difficult.89 However, by playing a more active role in the EI2 and other emerging defense initiatives, Britain can elevate the profile of such initiatives. This strategy will help the EI2 become the main Europe- wide platform for high-profile military missions while limiting the CSDP to low-profile operations and ensuring that PESCO remains operationally ineffective.90 Since Britain is still represented in the EI2 and major European defense initiatives except for the CSDP and PESCO, such a strategy will make sure that Britain continues to play its traditional role as a bridge between NATO and European countries.91 Therefore, by limiting participation in the CSDP while enhancing participation in new European initiatives, Britain can minimize its loss of influence in the EU’s key defense and security institutions.

C.

Bolster Bilateral Security Ties with European Countries As the British government seeks to develop a strategy for post-Brexit security relations, it should prioritize bilateral ties with European countries for several reasons. First, bilateral ties with individual countries will help reduce the impact of Brexit on UK influence in security establishments within European states. Second, while ties with all European countries are important, ties with particular European countries are especially important. More specifically, Britain needs to prioritize its military ties with France, Germany, and Poland, which are among the leading European nations in terms of military capabilities and ambitions.92 In this context, the British government has been right to strengthen its defense cooperation with France and sign a defense treaty and joint vision statement, respectively, with Germany and Poland.93 Britain must continue to work with these countries to exchange intelligence, hold joint exercises, and work on the development of emerging technology, as Britain has sought to do with France under the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties.94 Furthermore, Britain should seek to increase bilateral relations with the Baltic and Nordic countries, which seek to strengthen military capabilities in light of growing Russian security risks.95 Third, bilateral relations with individual European countries will also help expand British influence in multilateral initiatives. For instance, Franco-British security ties have been key to the French invitation to Britain to join the EI2, where Britain should seek to play an active role.96 Similarly, Britain should leverage its bilateral relations with France and Germany and expand the E-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) platform to bolster trilateral security cooperation.97 ________________________________________________ 87 Koutouzi, 7–9; Richard Reeve, The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force.

88 See Ian Bond, NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining Forces? (London: Centre for European Reform, July 5, 2016), 4, cer.eu/sites/default/files/ insight_ib_5.7.16.pdf 89 Ibid.

90 UK House of Lords , Brexit, 3; Koutouzi, 7.

91 Bond, NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining Forces, 4; Koutouzi, 7.

92 See "Table 1. The 40 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2018" in Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018 (Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2018): 2, https:// www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019- 04/fs_1904_milex_2018_0.pdf; Associated Press, "Macron: Poland, Germany and France to lead Europe after Brexit," EuroNews, last modified February 3, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/02/03/macron-poland- germany-and-france-to-leadeurope-after-brexit.

93 Ricketts, 6; Deutsche Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Ministerin zeichnet mit britischem Amtskollegen Joint Vision Statement; UK and Poland, “Treaty on Defense Security Cooperation (2017).”

94 See UK and France, Lancaster House Treaty.

95 Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North.”

96 Koutouzi, 7.

97 Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Speech,” LSE, January 16, 2020.

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In this context, Britain should also bolster its bilateral engagement with the Baltic and Nordic countries to pursue multilateral security partnerships, like the Northern Group and the Joint Expeditionary Force.98 Finally, the British government should also seek to use bilateral mechanisms to replace several projects—like the joint UK-Dutch Battlegroup—that were formerly under the jurisdiction of CSDP.99 As Britain finalizes its post-Brexit arrangement with the UK, such projects will likely be canceled.100 However, by bringing such initiatives under a UK-Dutch inter-governmental framework, Britain could ensure the continuation of such programs even without participating in CSDP as a third country.

D.

Promote NATO as the Cornerstone of European Security101 Finally, Britain must continue to promote NATO as the cornerstone of European security and advocate increased U.S. and European involvement in the organization.102 To successfully promote NATO as the main platform for trans-Atlantic security cooperation, London must follow several steps.

First, although Britain is still a key player in European security affairs, successive budget cuts have meant that the country’s stature as military power has diminished.103 For instance, whereas Britain's defense expenditure accounted for 4.1 percent of its gross domestic product in 2010, Britain's defense expenditure represented only 2.5 percent of its GDP by 2010.104 To recover Britain’s role as a superior military power, the UK must increase its investment in defense and security.105 In this context, Britain needs to expand defense programs in emerging sectors, for instance, preventing cyberattacks, applying artificial intelligence to defense and security technology, and developing more sophisticated anti-nuclear and antichemical proliferation detection tools.106 Second, against the backdrop of growing U.S. unilateralism, Britain must ensure continued U.S. interests in NATO and European security.107 To do so, Britain must not only increase its defense expenditure, but also ask its security partners—notably France, Germany, and Poland and Baltic and Nordic countries—to increase their defense budgets and expand military capabilities.108 Finally, Britain must continue to engage actively in emerging new initiatives, like the EI2 and Enhanced Forward Presence.109 Furthermore, the UK should also continue to play an active role in countering cyberattacks and ensuring the security of the Arctic, especially as China and Russia expand their presence in the region.110 In the future, Britain should also seek to lead NATO efforts if the United States seeks to refocus NATO’s priorities on the security threats that China poses.111 _____________________________________________ 98 Richard Reeve, UK's Joint Expeditionary Force; Ministry of Defence and Mark Lancaster, "UK leads Northern Group response to disinformation;” Kennedy-Pipe and Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North.”

99 UK Parliament, “EU Battlegroups,” Select Committee on European Union (Fourth Report), February 19, 2005, https:// publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm.

100 Tom McTague and David M. Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force,” Politico, March 19, 2018, last modified March 20, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-uk-military-britain-pulls-out- of-eu-defense-force/; 101 Also see House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies, 3, 31–34.

102 House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies, 3, 31–34.

103 David Axe, “Commentary: What the U.S. Should Learn from Britain’s Dying Navy,” Reuters, August 10, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-uk-military-navy-commentary/commentary-what-the-u-s-should-learn- from-britains-dying-navy-idUSKCN10L1AD 104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Britain has already expanded research in some of these fields under the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty. See Ricketts, 6; UK and France, Treaty relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities [Lancaster House Treaty], 2010.

107 Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, "Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia," New York Times, January 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html.

108 See also House of Commons Defence Committee, Indispensable Allies 3, 25–34.

109 Ministry of Defence and Sir Michael Fallon, "UK personnel arrive in Poland and Estonia.”

110 Reeve, UK's Joint Expeditionary Force; Ministry of Defence and Mark Lancaster, "UK leads Northern Group response to disinformation," Kennedy-Pipe and Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North.”

111 Robbie Gramer, “Trump Wants NATO’s Eyes on China,” Foreign Policy, March 20, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/uswants-nato-to-focus-on-china-threat-critical-infrastructure-political- military-huawei-transatlantic-tensions/.

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Ultimately, to continue playing the role of a bridge between European and NATO members, Britain must also develop its cooperation outside of NATO.112 To this end, Britain should continue to strengthen bilateral security relationships with major European powers—like France and Germany.113 At the same time, Britain needs to play a vital role in emerging European initiatives, especially the EI2.114 Furthermore, Britain should continue to lead and create new European frameworks, like the Northern Group.115 By playing a leadership role in these initiatives, Britain should seek to promote these platforms as an alternatives to EU platforms like the CSDP and PESCO. Such a strategy will help reduce the shortterm impact of Brexit and Britain’s absence from these EU security institutions. Ultimately, such a multipronged strategy will not only reinforce Britain’s global role and its special relationship with the United States, but it will also go a long way toward ensuring European security.

IV.

Conclusion

As post-Brexit UK continues its strategy of global engagement, it needs to realize that Britain needs a stable Europe to engage with the rest of the world.116 That is why British leaders need to develop a diversified strategy for post-Brexit UK-EU security cooperation. To this end, Britain must maintain relations with the CSDP on a case-by-case basis, strengthen the UK’s bilateral security relations with European countries, and participate in non-EU security platforms like the EI2. At the same time, the UK must reaffirm its commitment to NATO, advocate greater U.S. engagement in Europe, and play a leading role in emerging NATO initiatives like the Enhanced Forward Presence.117 By taking these steps, British leaders can make a much-needed contribution to European security as the Vieux Continent reels from Covid-19 and faces growing security risks to the east and south of its borders.118 _______________________________________________ 112 Bond, NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining Forces?, 4.

113 Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Kramp-Karrenbauer in London: Speech by the Minister of Defence.”

114 Koutouzi, 7–9.

115 See Reeve, UK's Joint Expeditionary Force; Ministry of Defence and Mark Lancaster, "UK leads Northern Group response to disinformation," Kennedy-Pipe and Depledge, "Britain, Estonia and the Wider North.”

116 Sophia Gaston, “The Post-Brexit Paradox of ‘Global Britain,'" The Atlantic, June 10, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2019/06/post-brexit-paradox-theresa-may-global-britain/591244/ 117 Kundnani, "To Preserve NATO, Britain Must Help Reinvent It;” UK House of Lords, Brexit, 55 118 See Munich Security Report 2020, 5–23, 34–49.

Leading Through Expertise?

The Role of the EU in International Finance Governance after Brexit Pedro Schilling de Carvalho (University of Cambridge & Harvard Law School) 1.

Introduction

Is financial regulation at a crossroads? As finance expanded – somewhat ignoring borders and increasing the interconnectedness of various jurisdictions, amplifying market access while also sharing risks – domestic regulation faced more constraints to advance its goals. Networks and international standards were touted as the solution, and even after the 2008 global financial crisis, the overall rationale of the system stayed very similar. However, the increased diversity of regulatory preferences within a greater number of countries capable of fighting for influence, the aversion to multilateralism demonstrated by key players, and the growing fragmentation of markets bring challenges to a system that already had inherent limitations.

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As networks face greater constraints, it is fundamental to look at what domestic regulators can do to expand the toolbox to achieve cross-border coordination; for managing fragmentation and divergence. This article argues that the EU provides a blueprint for such a new variant of global governance through its equivalence frameworks.

2.

International Financial Regulation: Towards Managing Fragmentation?

The context for the rise of financial networks is well-documented and generally attributed to changes in how finance is structured.1 Authors have tried to summarise this transformation referring to the “end of geography” of financial systems, signifying that the rules that govern transactions and the behaviour of market participants “are no longer developed and enforced purely at the level of the nation-state”.2 The most significant changes are traced to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the increasing financial liberalisation rounds of the same period.3 Firms, banks, and financial institutions became increasingly multinational; the end of fixed exchange rates created novel cross-border banking risks; capital markets were used as conduits to structure these operations,4 with both issuers and investors becoming more active in multiple jurisdictions.5 As the integration and interconnectedness of markets increased, so did the demand for coordination between different frameworks and cooperation among various authorities, as well as the burdens for achieving those goals,6 considering how limited strictly nationally oriented regulation became in some instances.7 For market participants, compliance with different rules in multiple jurisdictions represented additional costs, reduced market access, and hindered legal certainty.8 For regulators, territoriality-based rules and regulation faced more limitations, and purely domestic oversight became insufficient to contain financial stability risks and provide adequate investor protection.9 __________________________________ 1. Christopher Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press 2015) 6–16.

2. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, ‘The New Interdependence Approach: Theoretical Development and Empirical Demonstration’ (2016) 23 Rev Int Polit Econ 713, 715.

3. Ross P Buckley and others (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2016) 28, 31– 32.

4. John Armour and others, ‘International Regulatory Coordination’ in Principles of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2016) 617.

5. Hannah L Buxbaum, ‘Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation of Cross-Border Derivatives’ (2016) 1 UC Irvine J Int Transnatl Comp Law 91, 92.

6. Eilís Ferran, ‘Regulatory Parity in Post-Brexit UK–EU Financial Regulation: EU Norms, International Financial Standards or a Hybrid Model?’ in Kern Alexander and others (eds), Brexit and Financial Services: Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2018) 20.

7. Rolf H Weber, ‘Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and Supervision’ (2010) 13 J Int Econ Law 683, 696.

8. Chris Brummer, Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft (Cambridge University Press 2014) 4; Chris Brummer, ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’ [2010] Calif Law Rev, 54.

9. John Armour, ‘Brexit and Financial Services’ (2017) 33 Oxf Rev Econ Policy S54, 4; Howell E Jackson, ‘Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory Paradigm’ (2015) 1 J Financ Regul 169, 170; Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J Peterson, ‘A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework’ (2007) 48 Harv Int Law J 31, 41–42.

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Starting in the 1970s, regulatory networks became the central answer10 for dealing with these issues across the banking, capital markets, and insurance industries. Regulatory networks are “relatively loose, cooperative arrangements across borders between and among like agencies that seek to respond to global issues' and that manage to close gaps through coordination among governments from different states”.11 There are roughly three main phases of their development – each initiated and accelerated by crashes and crisis and followed-up by incremental improvements in-between these events.12 Each phase has similarities: from the 1970s – and strengthening after the 2008 global financial crisis – the demand for coordination was met through harmonisation.13 This was perceived to reduce regulatory arbitrage14 and competition15 while minimising externalities.

In the last five years, contextual changes introduced even more preference heterogeneity among traditional rule-making countries, thus lessening the possibility of agreement around a harmonised approach. At the same time, they also increased the number of actors willing to become rule makers in international financial regulation (“IFR”).

The US – historically the de facto standard-setter for preferences due to its market size, regulatory capacity, and embeddedness within networks – has seen a decrease in its influence, which, albeit still relevant, has no longer been characterised as hegemonic.16 Brexit is also consequential. Most authors have identified an increase in EU influence as a financial legislator, especially after the global financial crisis,17 although its effectiveness in exporting preferences varies depending on the market segment.18 When it comes to the UK interacting with the EU, its participation has been characterised as “highly influential in the legislative process”19 due to its “strong technical capacity and its long experience in regulating the EU’s largest financial market”,20 with an overall reluctance to “deviate from international standards”.21 However, its influence is not static: most authors view the pre-crisis period as marked by a stronger influence of the market-making EU Member States, whereas greater compromises with market-shaping countries happened after it.22 Structurally, the UK continues __________________________________ 10 Ferran, ‘Regulatory Parity’ (n 6) 6.

11 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2009); Weber (n 7) 688.

12 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation’ (2013) 88 Indiana Law J 1405, 1408–09.

13 Eilis Ferran, ‘Crisis-Driven EU Financial Regulatory Reform’ in Eilís Ferran and others (eds), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2012) 8; Hilary J Allen, ‘What Is Financial Stability - The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial Regulation’ (2013) 45 Georget J Int Law 929, 936; Annelise Riles, ‘Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach’ (2013) 47 Cornell Int Law J, 8; Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law J 72.

14 Frank Partnoy, ‘The Law of Two Prices: Regulatory Arbitrage, Revisited’ (2019) 107 Georgetown Law J; Riles (n 14) 9–12; Artamonov (n 9) 208.

15 Matthias Lehmann, ‘Legal Fragmentation, Extraterritoriality and Uncertainty in Global Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37 Oxf J Leg Stud 406, 413.

16 Brummer, ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’ (n 8) 4–5, 30; Ferran, ‘Regulatory Parity’ (n 6) 7; Daniel W Drezner, ‘Club Standards and International Finance’ in All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press 2008) 4.

17 Niamh Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity: EU Financial Regulation With and Without the UK’ (2017) 40 Fordham Int Law J, 31; Anu Bradford, ‘Exporting Standards: The Externalization of the EU’s Regulatory Power via Markets’ (2014) 42 Int Rev Law Econ, 8–9; Patrick Müller and others, ‘EU–Global Interactions: Policy Export, Import, Promotion and Protection’ (2014) 21 J Eur Public Policy 1102, 1102–19.

18 In this sense, see: Kenneth A Armstrong, ‘Regulatory Alignment and Divergence after Brexit’ (2018) 25 J Eur Public Policy 1099, 1111– 12; Abraham L Newman and Elliot Posner, ‘Putting the EU in Its Place: Policy Strategies and the Global Regulatory Context’ (2015) 22 J Eur Public Policy 1316, 1316–35; Lucia Quaglia, The European Union and Global Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014).

19 Armour (n 10) 6.

20 Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity’ (n 18) 9.

21 Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance after Brexit: The Rise of Technocracy and the Absorption of the UK’s Withdrawal’ in Kern Alexander and others (eds), Brexit and Financial Services: Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2018) 91.

22 There are several characterisations of UK’s participation: it has been described as “a facilitative agent of change or a more obstructive veto player”, “meeting in the middle”, and “a grit in the oyster”. See: Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity’ (n 18) 1338, 1346–47, 1352; Ferran, ‘Crisis-Driven’ (n 14) 15–19; David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, ‘Brexit and the Single European Financial Market’ (2017) 55 JCMS J Common Mark Stud 149; Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance after Brexit’ (n 22) 63–68.

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to dominate segments such as wholesale, leading to “agglomeration externalities and significant complementarities” with the EU.23 Although there is no consensus on what will happen after Brexit, an overall trend towards some level of divergence between the UK and the EU has been identified.24 On the UK side, some suggested that divergence is unlikely to favour more regulation25 and that more inconsistent preferences throughout different sectors could arise, as market participants have distinct priorities.26 The UK’s ability to directly influence networks could also decrease, as fewer influence channels will be available.27 In the EU, there seems to be a continued move towards harmonisation and uniformity, supported from the bottom-up by the ESAs, a strong technocratic presence, and an awareness that exerting global regulatory influence is relevant.28 Increased centralisation29 of regulatory processes has been deemed to boost the EU’s capacity to diffuse its standards globally.30 In any case, Brexit means the creation of an additional influence pole: while, in the past, divergences with other Member States were resolved within the EU, now they tend to happen directly at the network-level.31 The rise in importance of some emerging economies also has implications. With some oversimplification for the sake of argument, IFR has evolved from a more US-UK hegemonic-based system to a US-EU-UK32 club-like system. Although these remain dominant players, the increase in market size and systemic relevance of emerging economies should not be disregarded,33 with China providing the clearest example.34 _______________________________________ 23 Armour (n 10) 3–4.

24 David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, ‘Brexit and the Battle for Financial Services’ (2018) 25 J Eur Public Policy 1118, 1120–21; Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance after Brexit’ (n 22) 81–82; Niamh Moloney, ‘Brexit and EU Financial Governance: Business as Usual or Institutional Change?’ (2017) 42 Eur Law Rev 15, 21; Georgina Wright and others, ‘Influencing the EU after Brexit’ (Institute for Government 2020) 125; International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Market Fragmentation & Cross-Border Regulation’ (2019) 16.

25 As this could increase costs for smaller and larger UK-based companies vis-à-vis EU-based companies, while the latter might be less inclined to bear additional costs to guarantee market access. See: Armstrong (n 19) 1110–11.

26 Examples that illustrate this assertion are the differences between banking (where domestic financial stability is a priority) and insurance (where there is lobby to reduce the burdens of Solvency II). See: Scott James and Lucia Quaglia, ‘Why Does the United Kingdom (UK) Have Inconsistent Preferences on Financial Regulation? The Case of Banking and Capital Markets’ [2017] J Public Policy 1, 20; Howarth and Quaglia (n 23) 164.

27 Niamh Moloney, ‘Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An Uncertain Future for the City?’ (2016) 17 Ger Law J 6, 7.

28 Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance after Brexit’ (n 22) 65–85; Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford University Press 2020) 24.

29 Daniel Mügge, ‘The European Presence in Global Financial Governance: A Principal–Agent Perspective’ (2011) 18 J Eur Public Policy 383.

30 Kern Alexander, ‘The UK’s Third-Country Status Following Brexit’ in Kern Alexander and others (eds), Brexit and Financial Services: Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2018) 132.

31 Giovanni Barbieri, ‘Regionalism, Globalism and Complexity: A Stimulus Towards Global IR?’ (2019) 4 Third World Themat 1, 7; Luk van Langenhove and Ivaylo Gatev, ‘Regionalization and Transregional Policies’ in Diane Stone and Kim Moloney (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Global Policy and Transnational Administration (Oxford University Press 2019).

Emily Jones and Peter Knaack, ‘The Future of Global Financial Regulation’ [2017] Glob Econ Gov Programme Work Pap 25, 26; 32 Lucia Quaglia and Aneta Spendzharova, ‘Post-Crisis Reforms in Banking: Regulators at the Interface Between Domestic and International Governance’ (2017) 11 Regul Gov 422, 433.

33 Quaglia (n 19) 180–82.

34 Different examples have been used to illustrate that, especially the growth in size of the Chinese banking market and, more broadly, the increasing number of IPOs based on emerging markets. See: Senator Christopher Murphy and others, ‘The Danger of Divergence: Transatlantic Financial Reform & the G20 Agenda’ (Atlantic Council 2013) 73–74; Elliot Posner, ‘International Financial Regulatory Cooperation: An Experimentalist Turn?’ in Extending Experimentalist Governance? (Oxford University Press 2015) 23–24; Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari, ‘The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda’ (2011) 65 Int Organ 169, 175, 186.

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The historical elements that enabled the rise of IFR – crashes in a context with a handful of powerful regulators with shared preferences – and led to its main traits – allowing the export of rules via harmonisation at the international level – are at odds, as the interface between the domestic and international level has changed. IFR scholarship has been slow to appreciate the change. Thus, two facets need to be explored to remedy this issue. First, there have been calls for “flexibility”35 and “softer forms of cooperation”36 , considering that “in a world in which power is becoming increasingly diffused and the ability to impose preferred solutions on others correspondingly constrained, cleverer and more subtle ways of exerting influence need to be pursued”.37 Second, that there are multiple paths to achieve coordination and cooperation, “all of which can operate in parallel”,38 and that “global regulation does not necessarily imply a shift of the whole regulatory process to the global level”.39 EU equivalence could represent an interesting blueprint in that sense.

3.

From Regional to Global: Equivalence’s Flavours Equivalence is a managed and conditional act of comparability, whereas the adequacy of a third country’s regulation – including rules, supervision, and enforcement40 – is deemed as a substitute for the host country requirements.41 Equivalence has been described as having “a dynamic potential to mediate between divergent regimes in a form of decentralised horizontal coordination”,42 avoiding the “weaknesses of extraterritoriality”43 via a “bottom-up alternative to top-down international financial regulation”.44 However, equivalence is not a singular framework even within the EU. Instead, there are multiple variants of equivalence introduced at various points in time to achieve different objectives.45 To balance the often-contrasting preferences of market-shaping and market-making EU Member States, some flexibility was coded into equivalence rules to allow them to have a “strategic framing that appealed to both coalitions”.46 Therefore, some elements that emphasise financial stability – stressed by market-shaping countries – coexist alongside bits that reflect liberalising and competitiveness aspects – championed by market-making jurisdictions.47 As a result, we can roughly group equivalence frameworks based on the degree of market access that they provide.48 The best example of a segment with broad coverage is derivatives. EMIR also has one of the equivalence frameworks with the highest number of equivalence decisions, so the broad coverage has been used by countries. MiFID II/MiFIR are equally an interesting example, as the coverage is quite high for transactions with professional clients, including services such as _____________________________________ 35 Murphy and others (n 35) 131.

36 Donald Langevoort, ‘Global Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 13 J Int Econ Law 799, 800–01.

37 Eilís Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (Oxford University Press 2014) 27–28.

38 Bradford (n 18) 3.

39 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press 2009) 2–3; Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government’ (2005) 68 Law Contemp Probl 55.

40 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘Mutual Recognition in International Finance’ (2011) 52 Harv Int Law J 54, 62; Brummer, Soft Law (n 1) 54–56; Alexander (n 31) 116– 17; Armour (n 10) 10.

41 Domestic authorities and networks adopted similar approaches, resorting to concepts of equivalence that are also broad enough to accommodate most flavours of the mechanism. For instance, IOSCO describes equivalence recognition as outcomes-based, which contrasts with some of the original frameworks. In the EU level, equivalence is used to indicate “an assessment at a jurisdictional level” and recognition signifies “an assessment at an entity level”. See: European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Financial Regulation’ [2019] 20, 20; International Organization of Securities Commissions (n 25) 22.

42 Armstrong (n 19) 1113.

43 Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Regulatory Competition in Global Financial Markets – The Case for a Special Resolution Regime’ [2016] Oxf Leg Stud Res Pap, 40.

44 Verdier (n 41) 98, 106.

45 Scott James and Lucia Quaglia, The UK and Multi-Level Financial Regulation: From Post-Crisis Reform to Brexit (Oxford University Press 2020) 28; Niamh Moloney, ‘Brexit, the EU and Its Investment Banker - Rethinking Equivalence for the EU Capital Market’ [2017] LSE Leg Stud Work Pap 56, 69.

46 Lucia Quaglia, ‘The Politics of “Third Country Equivalence” in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union’ (2015) 38 West Eur Polit 167, 169, 173, 181.

47 Howarth and Quaglia (n 23) 153–54; Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity’ (n 18) 34.

48 The most relevant applicable rules and regulations are listed on Annex I.

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brokerage, underwriting, market-making, and proprietary trading. Finally, some frameworks are broad on paper – such as AIFMD – but still do not have equivalence determinations.

Solvency II is a good example of intermediary coverage. The provisions allowing for market access are limited to the reinsurance industry and do have equivalence decisions for a number of countries. Although narrow in terms of the financial service it covers, the Prospectus regime also facilitates market access and eases continuing obligations for non-EEA issuers.

Areas with limited coverage are related to equivalence frameworks that facilitate supervisory coordination and the comparison of prudential rules to avoid duplicative regulation that ends up being more costly for both the EU and the third country involved. CRD IV/CRR illustrate that, as they do not allow for market access and their equivalence provisions mostly ease risk assessment.

Equivalence’s development in waves has a relevant consequence, illustrated by the range of coverage across sectors: it is surrounded with uncertainty.49 For instance, Andrew Bailey described the regime as a “patchwork”50 to indicate that equivalence has significant variations in depth and procedures.51 Studies in international political economy provide initial clues for constructing a clearer understanding of the impacts of those variations.

While discussing equivalence-like regimes, Newman and Posner suggested that current frameworks have been used in four distinct ways: (i) for mutual recognition – i.e. both countries remained with different line-by-line rules, but deferred to each other and allowed market access; (ii) for regulatory export – i.e. the home country was able to export its rules to the third country; (iii) for coalition-building – i.e. a certain set of countries adopted similar rules and used their equivalence regimes to export preferences to third countries; (iv) for first-mover advantages – i.e. countries exported preferences in areas which still did not have rival sets of rules.52 Newman and Posner’s insights are relevant as they acknowledge that equivalence works along a spectrum of outcomes (that goes from deference to policy export) and serve as a starting point to overcome the difficulties discussed in the last section, both to facilitate coordination53 and to diffuse preferences54 outside of multilateralism.55 The regulatory discourse seems to stress that flexibility further. In the US, substituted compliance has always been associated with market access and focuses on investor protection via risk and asset diversification.56 In the EU, the prevailing overarching equivalence objectives changed as equivalence decisions intensified and more complex regimes were introduced. Whereas in the 2017 Reports57 controlling risks and reducing regulatory overlaps composed most of the rhetoric, the 2018 Resolution58 and 2019 Report59 instead place greater emphasis on promoting convergence and diffusing policy. _________________________________________ 49 James and Quaglia (n 46) 3–5; Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 38) 24.

50 House of Lords, ‘Select Committee on the European Union - Oral Evidence: Financial Services After Brexit - Wednesday 12 February’ (2020) 5.

51 Which often also reflect the particularities and risks of a given market segment. See: European Commission, ‘EU Equivalence Decisions in Financial Services Policy: An Assessment’ (2017) 7; European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation’ [2017] 12, 13; European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Financial Regulation’ (n 42) 22; Armstrong (n 19) 1112; Eilís Ferran, ‘The UK as a Third Country Actor in EU Financial Services Regulation’ (2017) 3 J Financ Regul 40, 56.

52 Newman and Posner (n 19) 1327–30.

53 Daniel W Drezner, ‘A Typology of Global Governance Processes’ in All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press 2008) 13–19.

54 Alexander (n 31) 133; Newman and Posner (n 19) 1321; Quaglia (n 47) 168; Moloney, ‘Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit’ (n 28) 8.

55 Moloney, ‘Brexit, the EU and its Investment Banker—Rethinking Equivalence for the EU Capital Market’ (n 46) 89.

56 Tafara and Peterson (n 10) 56; John C Coffee, ‘Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home’ (2014) 99 Cornell Law Rev, 36–38.

57 European Commission (n 52); European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation’ (n 52).

58 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 11 September 2018 on Relationships Between the EU and Third Countries Concerning Financial Services Regulation and Supervision’ (2018).

59 European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Financial Regulation’ (n 42) 20.

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To conclude, there are two warnings that seem appropriate.

First, the EU established that equivalence is a unilateral, conditional, and discretionary act during adoption and withdrawal, which must be reviewed periodically.60 As a result, there is no right to compel the European Commission to conduct the assessment and render a decision, even when the criteria is very clearly met.

Second, the equivalence process has been very opaque, and there have been instances where politics intruded into decisions, as even the European Parliament acknowledged.61 The most obvious example – at least prior to Brexit – is Switzerland, which received a conditional, one-year equivalence determination that was abruptly revoked .62 These could impose significant limitations on what the equivalence regime could achieve – especially as countries become wearier of how EU authorities might act.

4.

Conclusions Financial regulation seems to, indeed, be at a crossroads. For regulators, the limitations of balkanisation are contrasted by a greater set of tools that enable coordination (not necessarily through harmonisation) while allowing for a greater variety of spectrums to arise, ranging from deference to exporting preferences. To clarify what road should be taken, it is fundamental to understand the new roles of initiatives such as the EU equivalence regime and how they can change the interface with the international level.

Annex I – EU Equivalence Regimes63

60 See: European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 11 September 2018 on Relationships Between the EU and Third Countries Concerning Financial Services Regulation and Supervision’ (n 59); European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Financial Regulation’ (n 42).

61 European Parliament, ‘Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Financial Regulation’ (n 42) 21.

62 European Commission, ‘Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2441’.

63 Eilís Ferran and Pedro Schilling de Carvalho, ‘Written Evidence Progress of the Negotiations on the UK’s Future Relationship with the EU – Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union – UK House of Commons’, available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/ writtenevidence/10108/default.

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V. EU and Great Power Diplomacy Co-Chairs: Marc Ibáñez Díaz (Yale University) and Jesslene Lee (National University of Singapore) Alessia Caputo (University at Albany; Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)) and Martina Spatuzzo (Rockefeller College; Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)) Claude Ewert (University of Cambridge) Senni Mut-Tracy (University of Helsinki) Discussant: Julio Guinea Bonillo, Professor (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (Madrid, Spain))

Stepping out of US-China Power Play by Stepping Towards European Green Leadership Alessia Caputo (University at Albany; Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)) & Martina Spatuzzo (Rockefeller College; Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)) Abstract. Since its admission as a member of the World Trade Organization, China started challenging the American power in the international arena. Europe lays in the midst of this power play, torn between the historic alliance with the United States committed to safeguarding democratic values, and the opportunities China embodies as a rising economic power.

First, the paper analyses how the evolution of this three-party relationship has affected the European economic power. The European Union has faced a negative trade shock resulting from protectionist trends and a negative technology shock stemming from the slowdown of the manufacturing industry.

The paper argues that the future of EU foreign policy in response to the US-China strategic competition is to establish a new green leadership. However, a green new leadership will translate into strategic autonomy only by securing fair competition, especially concerning technology and intellectual property. In conclusion, the paper recommends the European Union enhance multilateralism and reform certain existing international institutions.

The impact of the China-US relationship on the European economic power Since the Cold War, Western powers sought to impose their values in the international arena. The rules- based order that resulted from the transatlantic bond relied on the connection between the development of the market economy, the integration into the international system, and the enhancement of liberal democracy (Perissich, 2020).

But promoting a universalistic credo proved unachievable.

Indeed, China prospered while finding a viable solution to the ideological clash between communism and capitalism that had been the hallmark of the Cold War. Since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Chinese exports have increased tenfold (Creutz et al., 2019), making up nearly 2.5 trillion in U.S. dollars in 2019 (Statista, 2019). From then on, China ascended to be the U.S. primary economic and political competitor. “The U.S.-China rivalry will almost certainly become the defining characteristic of this decade and possibly the next one” (Lehne, 2020) since the “US-China trade war is here to stay for the foreseeable future” (Basedow, 2019).

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Technological and trade dominance is the key dimension of the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S., which goes beyond economic hegemony (Ortega Klein, 2020).

China’s entering the international market led to declines in U.S. manufacturing employment due to fierce import competition (Crowley, 2019). The U.S. laments that China takes advantage of the international trade system but does not play by the rules (Basedow, 2019), misappropriating intellectual property, endlessly subsidizing State-Owned Enterprises, and limiting market access to Western companies. Conversely, for a period, the European Union had looked at China paying attention solely to the advantages, tempted by the lure of renewed wealth. However, this perspective has lost momentum, mainly due to the unfair competition in the fields of technology and intellectual property (Perissich, 2020).

To arrest the Chinese rising power, the U.S. administration initiated a modern trade war mediated through Trump’s Twitter-diplomacy. In 2018, the U.S. levied import tariffs for approximately $283 billion, with rates ranging between 10% and 50% (Amiti et al., 2019). Among the other war weapons, it employed free trade agreements with Asian and Oceanian countries market closures to Chinese companies such as Huawei. To limit American investment flows into Chinese equities, Trump barred Americans from investing in a Pentagon blacklist of companies linked to China (Kynge, 2021). Also, the 2020 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act contributed to limiting access for Chinese firms to U.S. capital (Kynge, 2021).

China has retaliated mirroring U.S. strategy. It imposed tariffs on the U.S. for $100 billion (Crowley, 2019). It has increased third parties’ dependencies on its economy, and it has started anti-American propaganda. More recently, the Chinese economic coercion toward the U.S. and other countries has exacerbated to counter the Wuhan lab allegations. The vast boycott of Australian goods, universities, and tourism, along with punitive tariffs is an example (Hackenbroich, 2020).

Three years after the first restrictive trade policy measure neither the U.S. nor China has emerged victorious. The size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, which together constitute almost two-fifths of global GDP, means that the stakes are high for the entire world. ECB President Christine Lagarde estimated the U.S.– China trade war could reduce the global GDP by US$455 billion in 2020 (Goulard, 2020). The OECD (2019) projected growth and global business investment would be only 1.7% in 2019-2020 compared to 3.5% of 2017-2018, due to the uncertainties associated with trade disputes.

The effect on third economies remains complex to estimate. On the one hand, they suffer from the negative demand shock resulting from the overall showdown of globalization and trade. Also, the technology shock stemming from the restriction of investment affects supply. Ultimately, the rising skepticism towards the global institutions following the 'America First' Trump's policies contributed to a climate of uncertainty. On the other hand, a horizon of opportunity opens up for third parties, assuming that both powers engaged in the conflict have lost competitiveness. Moreover, the American positioning as a net energy exporter, independent of the Middle East energy, contributed to lower oil prices, thus triggering a positive supply shock.

Europe could gain from trade diversion benefits (Plummer 2019). UNCTAD estimates that EU exports would capture $50 billion - $70 billion of Chinese exports to the United States and $20 billion of U.S. exports to China (Plummer 2019).

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Both the parties in the conflict are precious economic allies for Europe. The U.S. is the first European trading partner, and China the second. However, the trade balances differ. Europe is a net importer from China and an exporter in the U.S. In 2018, the European Union and the UK exported an average of 2.5% of their GDP to the U.S., while the share exported to China was 1.3% (Karnfelt, 2020). Since there is a political bias to favor exports over imports, the current trade position suggests policymakers will be more inclined to side with the U.S. The relationship between Europe, and in particular the European Union, and China is even more intricate. To have an idea of its complexity, Ursula Von Der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, defined China as a “cooperation partner”, a “negotiating partner”, a “competitor”, and a “systemic rival” (Gewirtz, 2020). However, the deterioration of the relationship with the United States increased Chinese interest in the euro area. China lowered charges on import from the 19 European countries and has established a significant presence on the European continent through investments in Belt and Road Initiative and the 17+1 forum.

Nevertheless, the negative hit to business sentiment and demand offset the trade-war positive effects for the eurozone (McHugh, 2019). “Like a sleek Mercedes crunched between two freight trucks, Europe’s economy is being knocked off course by the conflict between the U.S. and China over trade” (McHugh, 2019). Europe has experienced a slowdown in manufacturing industries, especially automotive, due to the U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and those expected on automobiles. This is a significant concern in Germany (Plummer, 2019) for which export amounted to 47% of the economy, led by cars and industrial machinery (McHugh, 2019). Unsurprisingly, in June 2019 German annual export fell by 8% and monthly industrial production by 1.5% (McHugh, 2019).

Despite German trade with the U.S. and China holding up pretty well, investment in new plants and equipment across the eurozone has weakened in 2019 due to the uncertainties related to the trade dispute. Both Daimler - Mercedes-Benz cars’ maker-, and BMW have reported losses in the first quarter of 2019, for the first time since 2009.

Seeking European Green Leadership Rebuilding European competitiveness around sustainable innovation responds to the negative supply and demand shocks coming from the US-China dispute and the recent impact of COVID-19. Restoring competitiveness through a green strategic positioning will allow Europe to take a step back from the U.S.- China power play, and a step forward towards (green) new political and economic leadership.

Europe has the potential and aspiration to “become a global innovation powerhouse in energy, mobility and construction technologies” (Gili, 2020) through three mutually necessary actions presented by Gigli (2020). First, the EU members must invest coordinately and strategically in innovation to avoid duplication costs and take advantage of economies of scale. Second, the Union has to rethink public procurement as a tool to boost innovation and sustainability. Finally, completing the EU internal market will unleash innovation potential. This translates into policy measures such as shared environmental standards, energy taxation rates, and subsidies for clean technologies (Gigli, 2020).

At the global level, the green leadership will empower Europe's role as an export market, a partner for technological development of other countries, and a facilitator in negotiating agreements for European firms to access the still protected Chinese sectors such as financial services, infrastructure, or utilities (Basedow, 2019).

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For instance, Europe can use its financial power to provide developing countries with the resources to phase out fossil fuels. Besides, being the EU the biggest trade bloc in the world, President Macron envisions binding clauses aligned with the Paris Climate Agreement in trade agreements, and “the access to the European market in exchange of more stringent policies on greenhouse gas emissions and sustainable development” (Gili, 2020). This strategy presents Europe as the moral leader that prevents the Paris Agreement from being a green-washed multilateral framework and calls the signatory countries to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change (Gili, 2020).

By increasing its technological leadership, Europe will increase its political influence that can be gamechanging in mediating the conflict between Beijing and Washington.

Relaunching Multilateralism The “union” is the principal European Union’s asset in this struggle. Firstly, because it is a network of actors by its very nature (Creutz et al., 2019), and its existence relies on the connectivity and interdependencies between various states and citizens. Furthermore, given the decreasing willingness of the United States to safeguard international institutions, the EU is the only global player still committed to the rules-based order (Creutz et al., 2019). However, it is imperative not to adopt a top-down manner to leadership. The EU must take advantage of its strategic network of alliances that share the same commitment to multilateralism, such as Japan, Canada, Australia, the UK, and India. (Creutz et al., 2019). French President Macron claimed that the EU must foster European Sovereignty to counterbalance the harmful effects of the trade war. The idea is not to serve as a third party in this polarized conflict, but rather as the guardian of a new era of multilateralism.

A filo-Chinese strategy or a pure filo-American strategy is not viable a route.

Strengthening cooperation with China will require equal treatment in the market and China’s concrete willingness to open to foreign competition (Klein, 2020). However, Beijing aims to develop a world that undermines Europe economically, strategically, and ideologically (Schuman, 2021). It seeks to exploit this partnership to siphon advanced technology and know-how (Schuman, 2021). Recent developments on the Uyghurs issue and the Coronavirus crisis have put a strain on the EU-Chinese relationship. Europe has imposed travel bans and asset freezes on four Chinese officials and a security organization over the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang in a coordinated step by the EU, US, Canada, and the UK. Beijing replied with sanctions in retaliation. Valdis Dombrovskis, the EU’s trade commissioner, commented on the trade agreement between EU and China – China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment - stating that “the ratification process cannot be separated from the evolving dynamics of the wider EU-China relationship” (Brunsden & Yang, 2021). This cherry-picking strategy China has employed concerning the Western rules-based order is not sustainable.

As far as the alliance with the United States is concerned, Biden’s election provides an opportunity for a unified western scenario. The new President is poised to reboot the transatlantic cooperation, as his presence at the summit the European Council confirmed (The White House, 2021). However, there are significant differences between the U.S. and the EU concerning China. The EU is far more dependent on trade and investment with China than the United States (Gewirtz, 2020). Besides, since the U.S. has opted for a non- market bilateral approach with China, siding with the U.S. might require giving up its rules-based principles, which is its core value, leading to internal political distress (Klein, 2020). Indeed, Biden’s administration intends to keep up the pressure on Beijing, although the strategy is still unclear.

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In light of its strategic positioning in the green sector, the EU must ensure that players aiming to take the lead on climate issues, in particular China, respect the rules of international competition and protection of intellectual property. Developing and renewing the multilateral trading system is crucial to make this happen (Crowley, 2019).

First of all, the U.S. and Europe should de-escalate their trade disputes and design a common strategy for China that does not involve regime change but rather seeks dialogue (Klein, 2020).

Secondly, revising multilateralism is a key priority for the EU, especially by reforming the WTO. Reforms will entail modernizing the rules, settling the monitoring and notification function, securing the dispute resolution mechanism, and improving the overall functioning of the organization (European Parliament, 2021), especially to tailor the digital age.

References • Amiti M., Weinstein D., Redding S. J. (2019). The impact of the 2018 trade war on U.S. prices and welfare. Nber working paper series. Nber working paper series. Retrieved at: https:// www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25672/w25672.pdf • Basedow, R. (2019). The US-China trade war: Risks and opportunities for the EU and the United Kingdom. London School of Economics Blog. Retrieved at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ europpblog/2019/10/17/the-us-china-trade-war-risks-and-opportunities-for-the-eu- and-theunited-kingdom/ • Brunsden, J., & Yang, Y. (March 24, 2021). Sanctions row threatens EU-China investment deal.

Financial Times. Retrieved at: https://www.ft.com/content/6b236a71-512e-4561-a73cb1d69b7f486b\Creutz, K., Iso-Markku, T., Raik, K., & Tiilikainen, T. (March, 2019). The changing in the global order and its implications for the EU. Finish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). Retrieved at: https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ report59_changing_global_order_and_eu.pdf • Crowley, M. A. (2019). Trade war: The clash of economic systems threatening global prosperity: A new eBook | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal. Voxeu.org. Retrieved at: https://voxeu.org/article/tradewar-clash- economic-systems-threatening-global-prosperity-new-ebook • European Parliament. (2021). Legislative train schedule | European Parliament. European Parliament. Retrieved at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-strongereurope-in-the-world/file- wto-reform • Gewirtz, P. (June 26, 2020). The future of trans-Atlantic collaboration on China: What the EUChina summit showed. Brookings. Retrieved at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2020/06/26/the-future-of-trans-atlantic-collaboration-on-china-what-the-eu-china-summitshowed/ • Gili, A. (2020). Towards a New, Sustainable Paradigm: pillars and trends of the European green transition. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. Retrieved at: https://www.ispionline.it/ it/pubblicazione/towards-new-sustainable-paradigm-pillars-and-trends- european-greentransition-27801 • Goulard S. (2020). The Impact of the US–China Trade War on the European Union. Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies. DOI: 10.1177/0974910119896642. Retrieved at: https:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0974910119896642 • Hackenbroich, J. (2020). China, America, and how Europe can deal with war by economic means.

European Council on Foreign Relations 2021. Retrieved at: https://ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_china_america_and_how_europe_can_deal_with_war_by_economic_ means/

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• Karnfelt, M. (May 25, 2021). Europe’s position in the US-China trade conflict: It’s the exports, stupid. Merics. Retrieved at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/europesposition-us-china-trade-conflict-its- exports-stupid • Klein, A. O. (April 23, 2020). The U.S.-China Race and the Fate of Transatlantic Relations. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-race-and-fatetransatlantic-relations-0 • Kynge, J. (2021). US-China investment flows belie geopolitical tensions. Financial Times.

Retrieved at: https://www.ft.com/content/b3dcc262-a153-4624-bc1d-156179d6e914 • Lehne, S. (2020). Securing the EU’s Place in the World. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/11/17/securing-eu-s-place-in-world-pub-83246 • Mattoo, A., Staiger, R. W. (2019). Trade wars: what do they mean? Why are they happening now? What are the costs? National Bureau of Economics Research, Working Paper 25762. Retrieved at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w25762 • McHugh, D. (2019). US-China trade war leaves Europe as collateral damage. ABC News. Retrieved at: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-china-trade-warleaves-europe-collateral-damage- 64918834 • OECD. (2019). OECD Economic Outlook. Volume 2019 Issue 1: Preliminary version, No. 105, Paris, OECD Publishing.

• Ortega Klein, A. (2020). The U.S.-China Race and the Fate of Transatlantic Relations.

CSIC. Retrieved at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-race-and-fate-transatlanticrelations-0 • Perissich, R. (September 15, 2020). Europe’s China Question. ISPI. Retrieved at: https:// www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/europes-china-question-27316 • Plummer, M. (2019). The US-China Trade War and Its Implications for Europe.

Intereconomics Review of European Economic Policy. Retrieved at: https:// www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2019/number/3/article/the-us-china-trade-war-andits- implications-for-europe.html • Schuman, M. (February 16, 2021). Europe can’t stay neutral in US-China standoff.

POLITICO. Retrieved at: https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-cant-stay-neutral-in-uschina-stand-off/ • Statista. (2019). China: export of goods 2019. Statista.com. Retrieved at: https:// www.statista.com/statistics/263661/export-of-goods-from-china/ • The White House. (March 25, 2021). President Biden Participates in European Council Summit. The White House. Retrieved at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements- releases/2021/03/25/president-biden-participates-in-european-councilsummit/

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From Flexible to Flawed: How the Common Commercial Policy changed EEC-USSR Trade Relations* Claude Ewert (University of Cambridge) It might appear odd, even peculiar, to discuss relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as early as 1960. The date usually associated with the official establishment of these relations is situated in 1988, after the conclusion of a trade agreement between the EEC and CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Other historians saw a semi-official recognition by Brezhnev in 1972, at the 25th of Soviet Trade Unions, or the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Whether officially recognised or not, the Soviet Union had to deal with the EEC from 1958 onwards, when it came to trade with the latter’s member states. Trade deals or other agreements had to be discussed at the Council of Ministers, and the official texts to be signed contained clauses stating or alluding at the EEC. European integration up until the 1970s had mostly affected the Community’s internal affairs, but the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) also aimed to harmonise the import tariffs of member states. Furthermore, it would give the European Commission the power to negotiate trade agreements. This was a fundamental change in foreign trade policy as agreements with third countries were no longer bilateral but multilateral.

This paper will give brief examples of how trade with the USSR was handled bilaterally until the implementation of the CCP. This change in East-West trade proved to make things far more complicated than anticipated. With the EEC imposing a multilateral dimension from its side, Moscow did the same by making international trade now the dealings of the CMEA, leading to an impasse up until 1988. Given that countries like France, Italy and West Germany were keen to keep trade flowing (because trade channels remained an option for communication when the political ones shut), this was a flawed situation. The Commission did not improve the situation by making the CMEA wait for an official reply for months, triggering the same inaction by Moscow in return. The sluggish bureaucracy of both the EEC and the CMEA led to very little progress on the matter in the 1970s. This was further amplified by internal arguments in the Commission on how to interact with Moscow, slowing down the process even further. The following few pages will show the flexibility of the EEC member states and the Council until the Commission’s handling of the CCP flawed the previous achievements; achievements which had played an essential part in contributing to détente. __________________________________ * This paper draws on research conducted during my MA studies at the University of Luxembourg, and more recent research done for my PhD dissertation at the University of Cambridge. The PhD project is supported by the National Research Fund Luxembourg (FNR).

1 Wolfgang Mueller, ‘Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 13.4 (2011), 79–100 (p. 98).

2 Hélène Seppain, Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917-91: Politics by Economic Means (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).

3 Hannes Adomeit, ‘Soviet Perceptions of Western European Integration: Ideological Distortion or Realistic Assesment’, MIllenium: Journal of International Studies, 8.1 (1979), 1–24 (p. 1).

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Trade for Talk An agreement on the exchange of knowledge on nuclear energy between France and the USSR was the first time the latter was confronted with a Community clause in an official document. However, it was not referring to the EEC, but Euratom. The agreement stated that all Euratom member states would have free access to the Soviet knowledge accessible to France. How the USSR manoeuvred around the community clause was that the agreement was not signed by the heads of state but the heads of the atomic energy research institutes of France and the USSR.4 Things would not always go as smoothly, though, especially when the signatory’s responsibility lay with state officials. A community clause (hinting at the establishment of the CCP) was also included in the trade deal that Italy negotiated with the USSR in 1961.5 However, this time, it was met with strong opposition from Moscow, and the other EEC member states suggested alternatives to the clause, such as that the Soviet negotiators would only have to recognise the EEC clause, but not the EEC itself. This led to the signature of the deal in June 1961.6 When France was in the middle of negotiating a new Franco-Soviet trade deal in 1962, they were faced with new accusations: France disrespected the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. An odd accusation as Franco-Soviet trade profited from the MFN status,7 but Moscow argued, since it did not recognise the EEC, the low tariffs between its member states discriminated against third countries (which was undoubtedly true) and that the USSR wanted the same low tariffs as within the EEC.8 This can be seen as a paradox, as acknowledging the low intra-EEC tariffs was also acknowledging the EEC to a certain extent. The negotiations were halted, and Moscow introduced punitive tariffs, targeting several French products, which were of little to no importance to EastWest trade.9 The problem was only resolved ten days before the expiration of the previous trade agreement when the USSR suggested that tariffs should be lowered on products with high popular demand in France (wristwatches, furs, vodka, caviar, canned fish). The punitive tariffs were scrapped, and the flow of Soviet luxury products to France increased.10 ___________________________________ 4. HA (Historical Archives [of the EU]), CM (Council of Ministers) 2/1960, N°550: Accord entre le Commissariat français à l'énergie atomique et l'organisation soviétique Glavatom sur des échanges de connaissances et de stagiaires notamment dans le domaine de la fusion contrôlée: “Extrait du procès verbal de la réunion restreinte du comité des représentants permanent” (Brussels, 7 April 1960), p. 6 (the page number refers to the actual page number of the pdf file).

5. HA, CM 2/1961, N°290: Documents concernant la négociation des accords commerciaux Italie-Union soviétique et Italie-Portugal: Letter from A. Cattani to Joseph van der Meulen (Brussels, 16 February 1961), p. 9.

6. Ibid., ‘Informatorische Aufzeichnung’ (Brussels, 17 February 1961), p. 25-26.

7. E. T. Usenko and Arlo Schultz, ‘Most-Favored-Nation Status in Soviet-American Trade Relations’, Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade, 11.1 (1975), 43–56 (p. 46).

8. Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), BAC 250/1980, N°1507: ‘URSS – CEE et Clause de la Nation la plus favorisée’ (Geneva, 28 April 1962), p. 108 and also in Bernard Dutoit, L’union soviétique face à l’intégration Européenne, (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 1964).

9. HA, CM 2/1962, N°813: Documents concernant le tarif douanier à double colonne établi par les gouvernements soviétique, hongrois et bulgare: ‘Communication’ by Christian Calmes (Brussels, 18 May 1962), p. 168-170.

10. HA, CM 2/1962, N°775: Documents concernant les négociations commerciales entre la France et l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques (URSS): ‘Note de la Délégation française’ (Brussels, 20 December 1962), p.

16-17.

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All these negotiations occurred bilaterally; however, they were amply discussed within the Council of Ministers. There, objections could be made by member states if they considered a trade agreement unbalanced. These objections were generally sparse, but when in 1963 Italy was about to conclude a new trade agreement with the USSR extending to 1969, it was met with heavy criticism from within the EEC.11 The Italian delegates in the Council of Ministers had informed their counterparts in the very last minute of the negotiations, and by the time the working group for East European trade met in Brussels, the trade negotiations had already been concluded.12 Such hasty, at times even partially covert, practices made the Commission realise that a better flow of information was needed inside the EEC, but also that the CCP would be tough to implement.13 It also showed that the flexibility offered by the EEC in the 1960s could be exploited by member states, and more coordination was required.

However, member states were willing to accept unbalanced trade deals with the USSR as long as it kept communication channels open. The German saying ‘Wandel durch Handel’ (change via trade) summarises the EEC members’ trade practices in the 1960s quite well.

The Commission in Charge The CCP was implemented from 1970 onwards, and by 1973, trade negotiations with third countries were supposed to be a matter of the Commission.14 This meant that the USSR could no longer handle its trade with EEC members bilaterally, which had led to a change of tone from Brezhnev, who refrained from an official (and juridical) recognition of the EEC, but labelled it a ‘new reality’ which would also affect trade; by doing so the Kremlin hoped to benefit from lower import tariffs.15 However, speaking of a new reality also had a reciprocal meaning for Moscow: the EEC should also accept the CMEA as the Eastern bloc’s official negotiator for trade instead of handling things with individual states bilaterally. For the Commission, this was unacceptable. The CMEA lacked the jurisdictions of handling international trade and could not be treated as an equal to the EEC.16 The fear was also that this would strengthen the USSR’s grip on the satellite states, although they had pressured the USSR to reach out to the EEC.17 By analysing the trade agreement between the CMEA and Finland, the Commission’s trade experts concluded that this was a superficial umbrella agreement, wherein trade was still handled bilaterally between Finland and the individual CMEA states. However, deals could be concluded in a multilateral fashion for a specific type of import.18 This did not convince the Commission, though, to take EEC-CMEA negotiations as an acceptable way to improve East-West trade. ____________________________________ 11. HA, CM 2/1963, N°555: Pièces au sujet des négociations commerciales entre l'Italie et l'Union soviétique: ‘Note introductive’ (Brussels, 7 October 1963), p. 8-9.

12. Ibid., ‘Einleitende Aufzeichnung’ (Brussels, 5 November 1963), p. 31-35.

13. Ibid, ‘Note’ (Brussels, 11 December 1963), p. 56-59.

14. HA, CM 2/1961, N°288: Décisions du Conseil du 09.10.1961 relatives à [1] une procédure de consultations sur les négociations des accords relatifs aux relations commerciales des États membres avec les pays tiers et sur les modifications du régime de libération à l'égard des pays tiers, [2] à l'uniformisation de la durée des accords commerciaux avec les pays tiers et [3] avec les pays à commerce d’État, p. 191.

15. HAEC, BAC 250/1980, N°1438, Note for Soames (Brussels, 8 January 1973), p. 736.

16. Ibid, Structural Differences between the EC and CMEA (Brussels, 18 September 1973), p. 642-646.

17. Suvi Kansikas, Socialist Countries Face the European Community: Soviet-Bloc Controversies over East-West Trade (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang, 2014); —, ‘Acknowledging Economic Realities. The CMEA Policy Change Visà-Vis the European Community, 1970–3’, European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’histoire, 21.2 (2014), 311–28; European Socialist Regimes’ Fateful Engagement with the West: National Strategies in the Long 1970s, ed. by Angela Romano and Federico Romero (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).

18. HAEC, BAC 250/1980, N°1438, Structural Differences between the EC and CMEA (Brussels, 18 September 1973), p.

650.

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In 1973, Christopher Soames had become the vice-president of the Commission for external relations, including trade. East-West trade was not prioritised in his agenda because when the Commission received an invitation for talks with the CMEA, it took him eight months to answer.19 This sluggish response was then set to become the norm for official epistolary exchanges between Brussels and Moscow. Member states grew weary of the Commission’s handling of East-West trade: rumours suggested that West Germany might conclude trade agreements with the CMEA on its own,20 and Italy’s prime minister Aldo Moro made a public case for bloc-to-bloc relations.21 In a letter to Roy Jenkins, Renato Ruggiero, then general director of regional policies,22 inquired if the former knew what Soames was hoping to achieve by turning a blind eye towards the USSR and the CMEA.23 One might deduce that Ruggiero suspected Soames to further the disinterest of the UK government towards East-West trade (because of the UK’s negative trade balance therein), thus pushing a national agenda into that of the Commission. It also showed that the CCP was not the actual problem, but those handling commercial policy on behalf of the member states now.

A reaction by the Commission would follow in late 1974 when its president Xavier Ortoli wrote the CMEA’s general secretary, Nikolai Fadeyev. It was agreed that a first meeting would happen in 1975, but not between both men but other representatives. EEC officials arrived in Moscow in February 1975, where they stayed at the Intourist Hotel on Gorky Street. The outcome of the meeting was more than meagre, with The Economist labelling it ‘From Russia with Indifference’.24 The EEC officials resented that the Soviet officials made very little overtures for further talks, but a look at the Commission’s priorities for the talks made clear that any progress was doomed from the start: the ‘primary goal’ was to conduct East-West trade bilaterally between the EEC and the individual CMEA states. Bloc-to-bloc relations were not to be prioritised. (although they could lead to the primary goal, the official document acknowledged).25 These somewhat contradictory priorities of the Commission show its internal divisions. Some officials favoured increasing trade and a rapprochement to the USSR, whereas others were strictly opposed to that. This slowed down the decision-making process substantially. A rather peculiar example of how far this could go was a greeting card sent from the Hungarian embassy. The card expressed well wishes for the new year and well wishes to the former general director of external relations, Edmund Wellenstein, who had embarked on a new post. A note which would have required a simple ‘thank you’ as an answer burst into a debate on how to react to this ‘ominous’ message from behind the Iron Curtain. For Roland de Kergolay, this ‘thank you’ seemed too much and would send a sign of weakness of the EEC to the USSR.26 That a simple card for new year’s with an added congratulatory note for an EEC official triggers such a train of thought shows that some members of the Commission had a near-paranoid stance on EEC-USSR relations. ______________________________ 19. Ibid, Note for Klein (Brussels, 6 August 1973), p. 685.

20. Ibid, Letter from Hannay to Wellenstein (Brussels, 30 January 1974), p. 273.

21. Ibid, Note for Klein (no place indicated, 1 March 1974), p. 249.

22. AEI (Archive of European Integration of the University of Pittsburgh), UNSPECIFIED (1111), Biographical Note about Renato Ruggiero.

23. HAEC, BAC 250/1980, N°1438, Letter from Ruggiero to Jenkins, Brussels, 18 January 1974, p. 263-264.

24. ‘From Russia with Indifference, The Economist (London, 15 February 1975), p. 60.

25. HAEC, BAC 250/1980, N°1438, Secret Note on EC strategies towards the CMEA, Brussels, 8 January 1975, p.

131.

26. HAEC, BAC 250/1980, N°1444, Note for Wellenstein (Brussels, 8 January 1976), p. 199-200.

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Adapting the CCP for East and West The Commission’s passivity from 1973-1976 on relations with the Soviet Union ended with Roy Jenkins becoming the Commission president. EEC-USSR trade also changed from 1977 onwards by focusing more on agricultural overproduction within the EEC, which resulted in colossal butter and wine sales to the USSR.27 These would trigger a considerable backlash in the press, mainly in the UK, and many angry reactions by British politicians. This debate about subsidised butter sales would preoccupy the EEC until the 1980s when it became even more politicised because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The flexible trade approach towards the Soviet Union from the 1960s led to member states exploiting loopholes in the EEC trade rulebook; this led to a tightening of trade rules. The Commission’s passive stance on East-West trade in the mid-1970s resulted in a standstill of trade communications between the Commission and the Soviet Union and the CMEA, respectively. There is no doubt that the latter was not the adequate partner to negotiate multilateral trade agreements, but the stubbornness of the Commission on that matter led to EEC member states considering options for bilateral trade again, which would have flawed the CCP. To maintain the CCP, the Jenkins Commission opted for a more flexible trade flow again, targeting the products that were overly abundant in the Community. The Commission had to face a negative backlash in the press and by most conservatives sitting in the European Parliament and in the member states’ governments, something the Ortoli Commission had avoided at all costs. However, Jenkins’ take on East-West trade proved fruitful for overall EEC-USSR relations, with the latter speaking of a de facto recognition in late 1977.28 It would also mark the year that an employee of the Soviet embassy in Brussels would set foot into the Berlaymont for the first time.29 However, he got lost, no longer finding his way out; an inside look into the EEC can be confusing.

Bibliography • Adomeit, Hannes, ‘Soviet Perceptions of Western European Integration: Ideological Distortion or Realistic Assesment’, MIllenium: Journal of International Studies, 8.1 (1979), 1–24 • Kansikas, Suvi, ‘Acknowledging Economic Realities. The CMEA Policy Change Vis-à-Vis the European Community, 1970–3’, European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’histoire, 21.2 (2014), 311–28 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2014.893997> • ———, Socialist Countries Face the European Community: Soviet-Bloc Controversies over East-West Trade (Frankfurt am Main ; New York: Peter Lang, 2014) • Möckli, Daniel, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London: Tauris, 2010) • Mueller, Wolfgang, ‘Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 13.4 (2011), 79–100 <https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00167> _______________________________________ 27. HAEC, INV 1/2018, N°985, Exports of agricultural products from Community to U.S.S.R. (Brussels, 30 January 1980). p. 108.

28. HAEC, INV 1/2018, N°1444, Discussion with Oleg Tsarev (London, 3 November 1977), p. 79.

29. Ibid, Note for Phillips (Brussels, 14 May 1977), p. 93.

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• Romano, Angela, ‘Untying Cold War Knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the Long 1970s’, Cold War History, 14.2 (2014), 153–73 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.791680> • Romano, Angela, and Federico Romero, eds., European Socialist Regimes’ Fateful Engagement with the West: National Strategies in the Long 1970s (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020) • Seppain, Hélène, Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917-91: Politics by Economic Means (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992) • Villaume, Poul, and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2010) • Yamamoto, Takeshi, ‘Détente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet Policy Change towards the Common Market, 1970–75’, Cold War History, 7.1 (2007), 75–94 <https:// doi.org/10.1080/14682740701197680>

Missing on the Transatlantic Agenda: Gender Equality Senni Mut-Tracy (University of Helsinki) Introduction In 2019, a group of progressive transatlantic experts argued for “all segments of society [to] be represented in the halls of Washington and Brussels and included in discourse about the future of the transatlantic relationship”.1 The group highlights the marginalization of people of colour from the main stage of transatlantic discourse – a challenge which should be addressed conjointly with the aspect of gender. The few studies undertaken with a focus on women’s presence in the transatlantic realm have already shown that women are currently not equally represented at the ambassadorial level across foreign services and in the transatlantic think tank community, particularly in leadership positions.2 Women also remain underrepresented in politics across Europe and in the US.3 This short paper seeks to widen this critical debate and the transatlantic research agenda by examining whether, and if so how, prominent literature and high-level agendas for cooperation consider the contributions and position of women.

It is well-known that the discipline and practice of International Relations (IR) is heavily masculinised and tends to disregard gender issues. The transatlantic realm appears to be no exception but has to date escaped scrutiny. In this paper, I will argue that there is a need to acknowledge that this arena keeps reproducing a narrow image of actors and substantive issues. ______________________________ B., Tyson, et al, Keeping the Promise of 1989: A Millennial Vision for Progressive Atlanticism. Medium, November 7, 2019. https://medium.com/@progressiveatlanticists/keeping-the-promise-of-1989-a-millennial-vision-for-progressive-atlanticismbd291c0927b 2. L. Schiemichen, Madam Ambassador: A Statistical Comparison of Female Ambassadors across the U.S., German, and EU Foreign Services, EU Diplomacy paper, College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, 2019; C. Wefer, How to Promote Women’s Leadership in Transatlantic Think Tanks, Women in Foreign Policy Blog, [Web blog], n.d., http:// www.womeninforeignpolicy.org/the-zig-zag/women-transatlantic-think-tanks; C. Horst and L. Langeby, On Diversity, European Think Tanks Can Learn from the Biden Administration, German Marshall Fund of The United States, [Web blog], January 25, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/01/25/diversity-european-think-tanks-can-learn-biden-administration 3. IPU, Women in national parliaments. Situation as of 1st February 2019. http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm 1.

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Gendering transatlantic relations Transatlantic relations may refer more broadly to relations across the Atlantic Ocean, but in this paper, I will mainly focus on US-EU relations, including NATO. Approaches to gender equality vary on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, policies on advancing gender equality both domestically and overseas have depended much on each administration’s priorities.4 Hillary Clinton’s time as Secretary of State placed women’s issues visibly at the top of the US’ agenda and she famously declared that the subjugation of women is a security threat to both the world and the US5.6 During the Obama administration, the US signed various memoranda of understanding on women’s advancement, economic empowerment and the promotion of gender equality – but so far no such agreement exists with the EU.7 In turn, the Trump administration took a different approach from its democratic allies, for example in attempts to water down terminology related to gender in international fora and expressing hesitancy to reaffirm the Beijing Declaration.8 In Europe, gender mainstreaming was endorsed as the EU’s official policy approach to gender equality more than two decades ago, but implementation has remained uneven.9 Guiding strategies at the moment include the von der Leyen Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy for 2020-202510 and for external action, the policy framework is set in the EU Gender Action Plan.11 While some states continue to voice opposition over the promotion of gender equality, the European Parliament (EP) has long been pushing for a more transformative vision. Back in 2014, the EP asked the European Commission (EC) to launch a procedure for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention12 - whose objectives the recent Commission strategy now aims to advance and called for accession without limitations. In 2020, the EP also launched a European Gender Equality Week.13 _________________________________ 4. C. Kwauk, The US role in advancing gender equality globally through girls’ education, The Brookings Institution, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-uss-role-in-advancing-gender-equality-globally-through-girls-education/ 5. J. Klein, ‘Women's Rights and the U.S. State Department under and after Hillary Clinton’, Brown J. World Aff. 271 (2016).

6. H. Clinton, Remarks at the TEDWomen Conference. US Department of State, December 8, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/12/152670.htm 7. MoU’s on the advancement of women were for example signed with Afghanistan (on joint efforts to enable the economic empowerment of women and to promote women’s entrepreneurship), Brazil (on the advancement of women), Mexico (for the promotion of gender equality, the empowerment of women and women’s human rights), and Pakistan (on joint efforts to enable the economic empowerment of women and to promote women’s entrepreneurship).

8. C. Lynch and R. Gramer, At the U.N., America Turns Back the Clock on Women’s Rights, Foreign Policy, March 14, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/14/at-united-nations-women-rights-gender-health-trump-diplomacy/ 9. European Parliament, Gender mainstreaming in the EU: State of Play, European Parliamentary Research Service, Rosamund Shreeves, 2019. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/630359/ EPRS_ATA(2019)630359_EN.pdf 10. European Commission, Gender equality strategy, (n.d.), https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamentalrights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en#:~:text=The%20key%20objectives%20are%20ending,gender% 20balance%20in%20decision%2Dmaking 11. European Commission, Gender Action Plan – putting women and girls' rights at the heart of the global recovery for a gender-equal world. [Press release], November 25, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2184 12. European Parliament, EU accession to the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women (‘Istanbul Convention’), Legislative train schedule, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/ theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-eu-accession-to-the-istanbul-convention 13. European Parliament, European Gender Equality Week - October 26-29, 2020, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ committees/en/european-gender-equality-week-october-26/product-details/20201016EOT04981 PAGE 85

Perhaps surprisingly, the EP does not appear to have addressed the topic in meetings with US counterparts (members of US Congress). Neither is this topic present in other high-level agendas for transatlantic cooperation. This being said, transatlantic relations are not limited to interactions at the inter- or transgovernmental levels. They are shaped on multiple levels that cannot be isolated from one another. Therefore, focus must be equally given to transnational movements and the individuals who together constitute this transatlantic space. Firstly, transnational (also global14 ) movements encompass a wide range of actors, including various transatlantic policy networks and NGOs, whose contributions and constellations require further analysis. The operation of women’s organizations across the Atlantic constitutes an important force in pushing for the inclusion of gender equality on the agenda. To name a few, the European Women’s Lobby has created a ‘transatlantic learning community’15 to promote gender equality and bring about societal change, and the German Marshall Fund organizes annual forums16 convening women of colour in transatlantic leadership.

With regard to the individuals on both sides of the Atlantic, more research should be conducted on the gendered effects of transatlantic trade and regulation. The transatlantic marketplace dominates the world economy but still lacks an overall social dimension.17 Sex-disaggregated statistics are publicly available for US employment supported by EU exports: 41% female in 201418, but not the other way around. Beyond statistics, we should find ways to make this marketplace more equal. A study on barriers for women in trade has found various drivers of inequality patterns in EU-based exporting companies: underrepresentation in specific extra-EU export sectors, job segregation, lack of genderspecific policies, to name a few.19 These findings should be brought together in a meaningful way to analyse the gendered effects of transatlantic economic relations.

This paper is divided into two parts: the first analyses how literature and studies on transatlantic relations have considered women’s presence in or the gendering of this arena. In the second, I examine the high-level agenda for cooperation.

Literature Little has been written about women and gender in the context of contemporary transatlantic relations.

The post-World War II transatlantic relationship is often presented as an alliance of male leaders who were guided by the imperatives of containing communism and promoting economic cooperation.

Consider for example how we personify the Marshall Plan, the US’ aid for Europe’s post-war recovery, in General George Marshall and President Harry Truman. A less recognized fact is that First Lady Bess Truman was also an instrumental figure who consequentially guided the financial rescue plan and helped attain bipartisan support for the plan.20 In this regard, archival research would play a crucial role in uncovering the missing or unrecognized contributions. ____________________________ 14. E.g., the Me Too -movement and Black Lives Matter.

15. European Women’s Lobby, xCHANGE: Fostering transatlantic innovation to increase the participation of women in political decisionmaking, October 12, 2016, https://www.womenlobby.org/ExCHANGE-Fostering-transatlantic-innovation-to-increase-the-participation-of 16. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Third Annual Women of Color in Transatlantic Leadership Forum: Changing the Face of Foreign Affairs, [Event site], 2019, https://www.gmfus.org/events/third-annual-women-color-transatlantic-leadership-forum-changingface-foreign-affairs 17. L. Compa, and H. Meyer, A social dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations [Electronic version], London: The Global Policy Institute, 2010, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/35/ 18. I. Arto et al., EU exports to the World: Effects on Employment. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, https:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157516.pdf 19. International Trade Centre, From Europe to the World: Understanding Challenges for European Businesswomen,. ITC, Geneva, 2019, https://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Publications/From%20Europe%20to%20World%20Women% 20EU_final_web.pdf 20. The National First Ladies' Library, First Lady Biography: Bess Truman, [Website], (n.d.) http://www.firstladies.org/biographies/ firstladies.aspx?biography=34

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Editor of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Alan Dobson, has in his review of the study of AngloAmerican relations over the past 50 years noted that “while the study deficit on race identity is being redressed in quite a significant way, the role of women in the relationship is still largely neglected”.21 Only studies on NATO have often incorporated a gender aspect, and the perspectives of transgendered people have also been included.22 It should be mentioned that women’s contributions have been studied moderately in the fields of diplomatic history and foreign policy in the context of US and European research.23 In the transatlantic context, Dana Cooper’s work “Informal ambassadors: American women, transatlantic marriages, and Anglo-American relations, 1865-1945” from 2014 stands out. Still, the historiography of these fields is lacking studies on women’s role in post-WWII transatlantic relations.

In the field of history, a large body of literature analyses phenomena in the transatlantic space from a gender perspective. This includes, but is not limited to, studies on transatlantic sisterhood,24 marriages,25 women’s mobility,26 women in slave trade,27 women’s rights and abolitionism,28 activism against lynching,29 women in literature,30 women’s and gender history as a discipline,31 theatre women and cultural diplomacy.32 To obtain an overview of contemporary literature on the topic, I have examined a handful of books from the past two decades that specifically cover transatlantic relations, along with articles appearing in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies in the past five years (2016-2021). While more literature should still be analysed, I found the prominent works to fall firmly into similar traditions of study, such as trade and military issues. Most books examined only refer to human rights as a transatlantic value insofar as the need to ‘defend’ them,33 and on occasions explicitly advocating for interventions and the use of military force.34 The earliest publication examined,35 from 2003, describes how human rights as a priority was set aside due to the pressing need to address the threat of terrorism. ______________________________ 21. A.P. Dobson, The evolving study of Anglo-American relations: the last 50 years. Journal of Transatlantic Studies (Springer Nature), 18(4), 2020, p.

429.

22. See for example, L. Berg, Transgender Troops: Three Transatlantic Views. German Marshall Fund, [Web blog], August 1, 2017.

23. For the US, see for example R. Jeffreys-Jones, Changing differences: Women and the shaping of American foreign policy, 1917-1994, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995; Papachristou, Changing differences: Women and the shaping of American foreign policy, 1990; E.P. Crapol, Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders, Greenwood Press, 1987; S. Bashevkin, Women as Foreign Policy Leaders: National Security and Gender Politics in Superpower America, Oxford University Press, 2018. In the context of the EU, research has for example focused on analyzing the terms of Mogherini and Ashton as High Representative of Foreign policy of the Union, or compared them as in N. Von Ondarza and R. Scheler, The High Representative’s ‘double hat’: How Mogherini and Ashton have differed in their links with the Commission, [Web blog], March 16, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/03/16/high-representative-mogherini-ashton/ 24. S. Salenius, ‘Transatlantic Interracial Sisterhoods: Sarah Remond, Ellen Craft, and Harriet Jacobs in England’, Frontiers (Boulder), 38(1), 2017, 166– 196.

25. D.Cooper, Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945, The Kent State University Press, 2014.

26. B. Walter, ‘Old Mobilities”? Transatlantic Women from the West of Ireland 1880s–1920s’, Irish Journal of Sociology : IJS, 23(2), 49–68.

27. R. Browne, and J. Sweet, ‘Florence Hall’s “Memoirs”: Finding African Women in the Transatlantic Slave Trade’, Slavery & Abolition, 37(1), 2016, 206–221.

28. K. Sklar and J. Stewart, Women’s rights and transatlantic antislavery in the era of emancipation, Yale University Press, 2007.

29. S.L. Silkey, Black woman reformer: Ida B. Wells, lynching, and transatlantic activism, Athens, The University of Georgia Press, 2015.

30. B.L. Lueck, B. Bailey and L.L. Damon-Bach, Transatlantic Women: Nineteenth-Century American Women Writers and Great Britain, Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire Press; Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2012.

31. I. Blom et al., ‘The Past and Present of European Women’s and gender history: A Transatlantic conversation’, Journal of Women’s History, 25(4), 2013, 288–308.

32. S. Perot, ‘Theatre Women and Cultural Diplomacy in the Transatlantic Anglophone World (1752-1807)’, 2016, Doctoral Dissertations, https:// scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/793 33. A. Dorman and J. Kaufman, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice, Stanford University Press, 2010.

34. S. Simoni, Understanding Transatlantic Relations: Whither the West? (Vol. 107), Taylor and Francis, 2013; and R. Alcaro et al. (Eds.), The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance (1 ed.), Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

35. J. Peterson and M.A. Pollack, Europe, America, Bush : Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century, London:Routledge, 2003. Print.

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Only one work examined acknowledged the normative contestation of US-EU leadership in human rights.36 Books on transatlantic relations generally seem to conform to the prevailing assumptions in mainstream International Relations (IR) theory, which tend to disregard gender issues. Some scholars have described the need to move from poorly applicable IR theory to foreign policy analysis, and the inclusion of domestic politics and networks into the analysis is noteworthy.37 Other scholars38 cover political value orientations on both side of the Atlantic but gender equality only appears within a table of measured values.

The Journal of Transatlantic Studies39 features peer-reviewed research on all aspects of transatlantic relations. In the past five years, articles on race and transatlantic identities are featured, but as Dobson noted, studies on women’s contributions are few. Two articles stand out: one covering a royal friendship between women40 , and another exploring romance and sexuality in film and television41 .

While studies on identities and ideational factors clearly are on the rise, the study of transatlantic relations is still much defined through conventional IR. As an example, when the scope expands to issues of demography and public opinion, it is the link between demography and defence spending42 ; and the public opinion on lethal drone strikes43 that are studied. Finally, the authors over the past five years have predominantly been male. When studying 160 authors of journal articles and book reviews (2016-2021), I found that 71,25% (114) were male and 28,75% (46) were female.

Transatlantic agenda (high-level) It is not seldom that we see the transatlantic community being described as the world’s greatest “defender, and promoter of human rights”.44 Nevertheless, the US and Europe have well-known differences concerning their respective views on human rights, specifically over which are considered to be ‘core’ human rights. In this regard, the US puts strong emphasis on civil and political rights.45 They also choose to promote human rights with different strategies. For example, the EU relies more on multilateral cooperation and treaties, whereas the US promotes human rights bilaterally.

Many global and intergovernmental structures for advancing gender equality already exist. However, issues of gender equality should be brought more visibly into transatlantic discourse in order to advance a necessary change in mindsets. Actors should highlight the importance of gender parity and women’s rights promotion also as part of transatlantic values. _______________________________ 36. E. Lagadec, Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Europe, America and the Rise of the Rest, Routledge, 2012.

37. R. Alcaro et al. (Eds.), The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance. (1 ed.) (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics). Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

38. J. Anderson, G. Ikenberry, and T. Risse, The end of the West? : crisis and change in the Atlantic order, Cornell University Press, 2008.

39. Published by Palgrave Macmillan. JTS is the official journal of the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA).

40. A. Luscombe, ‘Eleanor and Juliana: a right royal transatlantic friendship’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 17(3), 2019, 290–309.

41. S. Edwards, ‘Special relationships: romance, race, and the friendly invasion in film and television, 1941–1996’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 18(3), 2020, 353–381.

42. Z. Selden, ‘Demography, defence budgets, and the transatlantic alliance’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies (Springer Nature), 16(1), 2018, p.59-80.

43. S. Ceccoli and J. Bing, ‘Taking the lead? Transatlantic attitudes towards lethal drone strikes’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 16(3), 2018, p.247–271.

44. See for example, J. Lightfoot and S. Kordosova, The Strategic Rationale for Promoting Transatlantic Values in a Globalized World, Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, March 27, 2012.

45. H. Porsdam, ‘From “Rights Talk” to “Human Rights Talk”: Transatlantic Dialogues on Human Right’ In E.A. Andersen and E.M. Lassen (Eds.), Europe and the Americas: Transatlantic Approaches to Human Rights, Hotei Publishing, 2015.

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At the interparliamentary level, the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) between the EP and Congress could make issues of gender more visible. In joint statements issued between 2004-2021, gender equality was only highlighted in a statement from 2018.46 This statement calls for increased cooperation in common programs promoting, among other things, gender equality. Usually, the agenda comprises of issues related to trade, Russia and the Middle East. Notably, the TLD joint statement from 2020 regarding the pandemic emphasises the need to pay attention to avoid cuts in defence spending, without otherwise taking a stance on spending priorities.47 Recently, however, MEPs and Representatives from Congress issued the “Declaration on racial equity, equality and justice with the goal of reinforcing US-EU parliamentary coordination to combat racism and systemic discrimination.”48 At the highest level of government, the intergovernmental level, gender equality has been put on the agenda in the context of dedicated meetings such as the Women Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, gathering top diplomats to discuss feminist foreign policy and gender-based violence, co-hosted by the EU and Canada.49 Institutionalized settings include G7 and NATO. The intergovernmental organization G7 constitutes an interesting case, both because meetings are held annually and in particular, because its members have recognized the importance of and have mainstreamed gender equality into all policies since 2017.

Another intergovernmental organization strongly committed to gender equality is NATO. Most countries that form part of this study have adopted UNSCR 1325 – including NATO, as allied policy. However, some EU countries still lack National Action Plans for UNSCR 1325, which has been regarded as an impediment for the consistent implementation in the framework of NATO, despite a strong framework of gender policy and strategy.50 In spite of its leading position in implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Lisa Aronsson from the Atlantic Council argues that the agenda risks losing momentum in NATO.51 She has identified pressing challenges, for example, related to the use of gender policies for political capital; organizational challenges in knowledge-sharing and officials mistaking WPS as merely satisfying bureaucratic requirements.52 _________________________________ 46. European Parliament and U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Statement from 82nd Inter-Parliamentary Meeting – Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, Sofia Bulgaria, 30 June 2018, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150381/jointstatement-82nd-tld-30-june-2018-signed.pdf 47. Joint Statement from Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, Brussels & Washington DC, 24 August 2020, https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210904/20200824-tld-jointstatement-final.pdf 48. The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Rights with The United States Congress and the United States Helsinki Commission, Declaration on racial equity, equality and justice with the goal of reinforcing US-EU parliamentary coordination to combat racism and systemic discrimination, Brussels, Washington DC, 22 September, 2020https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/211621/Joint% 20Meeting%20Declaration.FINAL.pdf 49. Government of Canada, Advancing gender equality and empowering women and girls, [Website], Modified August 17, 2020, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equalityegalite_des_genres/empowerment-autonomisation.aspx?lang=eng 50. L. Aronsson, Listen to women, Atlantic Council, NATO 20/2020, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, October 14, 2020.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

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Regarding the future agenda of joint cooperation, recent position papers have been published by the EP’s DG for External Policies of the Union,53 EC and the High Representative,54 the Council of the EU55 and Congressional Research Service (CRS).56 Van Schaik and Dams’ paper for DG EXPO makes a valuable contribution in proposing a thickening of transatlantic dialogue structures, including staff exchanges, and dialogues with think tanks and civil society. In the EC’s recent agenda human rights are only referred to as something being abused around the world. As transatlantic issues to be deliberated in Congress, CRS suggests these to be NATO, climate change, covid-19, and trade liberalization along with foreign policy more broadly. Noticeable absent from these agendas is any mentioning of gender equality. However, the Council stands out with its statement affirming the strategic importance of the transatlantic relations “as the bedrock of […] human rights and gender equality”.

Conclusions This short paper has sought to demonstrate that transatlantic policy discussions, priorities, studies and agendas do not consider gender aspects enough. This is naturally part of a larger global problem.

US-European cooperation on gender equality could be advanced by joint commitments and increased coordination, but also through listening to the wider transatlantic community.

While the pandemic has further exacerbated gender inequalities, it has also made it more visible than ever that societies need to be rebuilt in a more just and resilient way: here, the inclusion of all members is vital. Hence also transatlantic security discourse should start considering inequalities and structural discrimination as threatening the community of values. The relations should also be constructed less against external threats, and more by strengthening fundamental values. In the context of NATO, Aronsson also argues that the provision of equal security could increase societal cohesion and expand the global political reach of NATO.57 A stronger transatlantic stance on gender equality can contribute to the foundation for a long-lasting global structure of genuine security. ____________________________________

53. European Parliament, No way back: Why the transatlantic future needs a stronger EU, In-Depth Analysis, Louise van Schaik and Ties Dams, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/653619/ EXPO_IDA(2020)653619_EN.pdf 54. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: A new EU-US agenda for global change, Brussels, 2.12.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/joint-communication-eu-us-agenda_en.pdf 55. Council of the EU, Council conclusions on European Union – United States relations, Press release, December 7, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/council-conclusions-on-european-unionunited-states-relations/ 56. Congressional Research Service, U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress, Updated January 22, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11094.pdf 57. L. Aronsson, Listen to Women

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VII. Eastern European Migration to Central Europe Chair: Marguerite Bertheau (University of Cambridge) Daniel Gebel (Federal Institute for Culture and History of the Germans in Eastern Europe (BKGE), Oldenburg, Germany) Cristiana Lucchetti (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) Fernando A. Remache Vinueza (University of Glasgow) Discussant: Jannis Panagiotidis, Professor and Scientific Director of Research Center for the History of Transformations (University of Vienna)

Everyday Life and Memory. Russian-German and Jewish "Soviet baggage" after the Emigration Daniel Gebel (Federal Institute for Culture and History of the Germans in Eastern Europe (BKGE), Oldenburg, Germany) At the end of the 1980s, Soviet citizens increasingly migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This “mass emigration” resulted from the liberalization of the Soviet migration process, which occurred under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (*1931). The two largest migration groups from the Soviet Union in 2018 were the Russian-Germans (approx. 2.5 million) and the Soviet Jews (approx. 220,000).1 But who exactly are the Russian-Germans and the Soviet Jews and how did it come about that they increasingly entered the FRG at the end of the 20th century?

1.) History In the course of the early modern “population policy“ Catherine II published a manifesto in 1763, which, by promising numerous privileges, attracted settlers from the smaller German principalities, who increasingly established economically successful colonies in various regions of the Russian Empire over the next few decades. In the second half of the 19th century, the Germans lost some of their privileges as a result of modernization. This went hand in hand with increased Russification. It was only when the anti-German mood in the First World War also resulted in political actions against the Germans, including expropriation and deportation, that the German subjects broke with the Romanov dynasty and welcomed the February Revolution of 1917.2 The German settlers also initially supported the October Revolution. With their liberal nationality policy in the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks succeeded in attracting the non-Russian minorities to their side, e.g. by founding an autonomous German republic along the Volga in 1924. During the "Great Terror" of 1937/38, Germans were persecuted as "enemies and saboteurs". __________________________________ 1.

2.

Panagiotidis, Jannis: Postsowjetische Migration in Deutschland. Eine Einführung, Basel 2021, S. 17-21.

Dalos, György: Geschichte der Russlanddeutschen. Von Katharina der Großen bis zur Gegenwart, München 2014, S. 12- 50.

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With the attack by the Wehrmacht in June 1941, the Autonomous Volga Republic was dissolved by order of Joseph Stalin (1878 - 1953) in August 1941. All Russian-Germans were placed under collective suspicion and around 900,000 of them were deported from the European to the Asian part of the USSR3 as a preventive measure. There they were interned in “special settlements“ and committed to forced labor.4 The situation in the post-war period was characterized by an ambivalence between discrimination and rehabilitation. In 1948 the Supreme Soviet forbade the Germans to return to their original settlements.

During the Khrushchev Thaw the “special settlements“ were dissolved in 1956. In 1964 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (partially) rehabilitated the Russian-Germans by exposing the accusation of collaboration with the enemy as unfounded. In 1972 they were allowed to return to their original settlement areas. Since negative prejudices against Germans persisted in the majority of the Soviet population, the CPSU under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) decided not to re-establish the Volga Republic in the early 1980s. Therefore (and also as a reaction to the worsening economic situation), thousands of Russian-Germans made their way to the homeland of their “ancestors” in the course of “perestroika” and “glasnost”.5 The history of the Jews of the Russian Empire began with the three partitions of Poland (1772 - 1795).

Russia incorporated the former eastern territories of Poland-Lithuania, thus receiving a large number of Jews for the first time. According to a decree of Catherine II from 1791, Jews were only allowed to live and work in the so-called “Pale of Settlement”, a region that stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Life in the shtetl of the “Pale“ was characterized by poverty, and Jews were often only allowed to work in certain professions. The increase of pogroms from the 1880s onwards resulted in mass Jewish emigration to North America.6 The Bolsheviks were the first to fight anti-Semitism on a large scale by lifting occupational restrictions for Jews and even establishing an autonomous Jewish oblast in Birobidzhan in 1928. Around 2.5 million Soviet Jews were murdered in the course of the Holocaust. Around 2.8 million Jews survived the war, many of them serving in the Red Army. The fact that the Jews were the main victims of the National Socialist war of annihilation was deliberately pushed into the background by the Soviet propaganda; instead the suffering of the “entire Soviet people” was thematized. In fact, anti-Semitic propaganda intensified again, only improving after Stalin's death in 1953. Already in the 1970s, the Soviet authorities allowed some “troublesome“ Jewish citizens to leave the country. Rising anti-Semitism in the 1990s ensured that the Jewish population steadily left the USSR for Israel and Germany.7 _________________________________ 3. Around 300,000 Russian Germans in western and central Ukraine came under German occupation in 1941. In 1943-44 they were transported to the German Reich before the advancing Red Army, where several thousands of them received the German citizenship. The majority was repatriated to the USSR after the end of the war, where they were interned in the special settlements, see for further references: Steinhart, Eric C.: The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine (Publications of the German Historical Institute), Washington DC. 2015.

4. Krieger, Viktor: Kolonisten, Sowjetdeutsche, Aussiedler. Eine Geschichte der Russlanddeutschen, Bonn 2015, S. 90-140.

5. Dietz, Barbara: Zwischen Anpassung und Autonomie. Rußlanddeutsche in der vormaligen Sowjetunion und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 22), Berlin 1995, S. 53-88.

6. Zahra, Tara: The Great Departure. Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World, New York/London 2016, S. 3-23.

7. Buwalda, Petrus: „They did not dwell alone“. Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union 1967-1990, Baltimore 1997, S. 5-27.

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2.) Integration The Russian-Germans could enter the FRG as so-called “(Spät-)Aussiedler“ (resetlers), provided they could prove that they were of “deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit“. Soviet Jews were able to enter the FRG under the concept of the “Kontingentflüchtling“ (quota refugee) without having to prove that they were threatened by individual persecution. Both minorities were able to enter the Federal Republic because of their ethno-national affiliation. Both groups had suffered from the actions of the Germans in World War II, which is why Germany saw it as its historical obligation to help these two Soviet minorities. Their immigration was intended to be understood primarily as an act of "reparation".8 Despite the similar admission procedures, the two groups of migrants have a rather different background. The predominantly secularized Jews lived in the urban centres, while the RussianGermans lived in the rural regions of the Asian USSR. When they arrived in the Federal Republic, the (Spät-)Aussiedler received the German citizenship and were accepted as "Germans". On the other hand, the Kontigentflüchtlinge were denied access because they were accepted as "Jews" and therefore remained "foreigners". Nevertheless, when looking at the everyday life of both groups in Germany, one finds that they have a lot in common: e.g. the majority of both groups still speak Russian in their everyday life, or celebrate festivals and weddings according to Russian traditions.9 For this reason, the thesis is put forward that both groups, despite their different backgrounds, show parallel behavioral patterns in their everyday life after their arrival in Germany. This can be described as "Soviet baggage". Also they experienced a “double strangeness" - both in the destination of Germany as well as in their old Soviet homeland. The study of Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews and their “Soviet baggage“ is interesting in that it opens a new perspective on the history of migration in the Federal Republic of Germany and helps to contextualise Russian-German and Soviet Jewish history in the late Soviet Union.

3.1) Experience of ambivalence in Germany The migration of Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews stands in stark contrast to previous migrations to the FRG. In contrast to the treatment of “guestworkers“, the German government controlled the migration process from the Soviet Union by deciding who was allowed to enter. When they arrived in Germany, both groups were viewed as “privileged migrants”: (Spät-)Aussiedler received German citizenship, Kontingentflüchtlinge did not have to prove that they were exposed to individual persecution. As a result, the Federal German society developed excessive expectations of the “model migrants”.

The German side hoped that the new Jewish citizens would be able to revitalize the German Jewish communities. But the majority of Soviet Jews had been strongly assimilated into the Soviet majority society and knew little about Jewish customs and practices. In addition, Jews were viewed as an ethno-national group in the USSR, and one Jewish parent was often sufficient to be classified as a “Jew”. In Germany Jews were perceived as a religious group; ___________________________________ 8. See for a detailed defintion of the terms „(Spät-)Aussiedler“, „deutsche Volkszugehörigkeit“ and „Kontingentflüchtling“: Panagiotidis, Postsowjetische Migration, S. 42-56.

9. Ebd.

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only those who had a Jewish mother were perceived by the Jewish communities in Germany as a “real” Jew. Since this did not apply to the majority of the newcomers, they apparently could not serve to revitalize German Jewry. Instead, large parts of the public perceived them as "Russians".10 There was also a great deal of ignorance among the German public about the Russian Germans. Even the term “Russian-Germans” is characterized by a strong ambivalence. Legally, they were referred to as (Spät-)Aussiedler, a designation that was introduced as a sub-category of “Vertriebenen” (expellee) in the immediate post-war period. When they arrived in the FRG, the Russian-Germans firmly insisted on being Germans; this manifested itself in their everyday life in the use of old German dialects or the traditional expression of their denominations. The mostly positive connotation Russian-Germans had of national identity, irritated many Federal Germans, who saw it only as “antiquated Deutschtümelei”.

Many of them believed that German society had already overcome this kind of ethnic understanding.

This is all the more paradoxical if one considers that the Federal German society also denounced the “Germanness” of the emigrants and thereby questioned the legitimacy of their immigration, which was conceived on an ethno-national basis in the first place. As a result, Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews found themselves in a situation of “double strangeness”. While they were viewed as “Germans or Jews“ in the USSR and thus repeatedly experienced exclusion from the Soviet majority society, in Germany they were declared "Russians" and once again had to cope with an ambivalent identity experience.11 3.2) Experience of ambivalence in the Soviet Union The fact that many Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews have positive memories of their everyday life in the late-socialist Soviet Union irritates many Federal Germans. This results from a gap in historiography, which primarily dealt with the collective experiences of discrimination of both nationalities under Stalin, as well as with the mass emigration to Germany and Israel that began in the late 1980s. Historical scholars and those affected themselves often ignored the decades in between.

Many public speakers of the Russian-Germans focus on the sufferings of the Stalin times and ignore the decades before emigration, giving the impression that this period plays a rather secondary role in the lives of post-Soviet migrants.

State discrimination was gradually lifted from the 1960s onwards, but negative stereotypes against Germans and Jews persisted in the Soviet majority society. And yet many Germans and Jews often remember this time positively. Under Brezhnev, the Russian-Germans were given the opportunity to return to their old home regions. Soviet Jews, on the other hand, were increasingly able to emigrate to Israel in the 1970s. Although they were also exposed to discrimination in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, many achieved a considerable career advancement, which was often accompanied by assimilation into the Soviet majority society, as well as a fundamental normalization of everyday life.

The fact that Germans and Jews on a collective level, even in the late Soviet Union, often experienced personal success stories, created a strong experience of ambivalence that the respective individuals brought with them to the Federal Republic, including the question why they emigrated, if they had a successful life.12 ____________________________________ 10. Belkin, Dmitrij: Germanija. Wie ich in Deutschland jüdisch und erwachsen wurde (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 10073), Bonn 2017, S. 15-47.

11. Plamper, Jan: Das neue Wir. Warum Migration dazugehört. Eine andere Geschichte der Deutschen, Frankfurt 2019, S. 205-237.

12. Rosenthal, Gabriele/ Stephan, Viola/ Radenbach, Niklas: Brüchige Zugehörigkeiten. Wie sich Familien von „Russlanddeutschen“ ihre Geschichte erzählen, Frankfurt/New York 2011, S. 44-51.

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The ambivalence that Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews have towards the late Soviet Union can be embedded in the larger context of the Brezhnev period, which turns out to be a multifaceted era, for example in the relationship between the centre and the periphery or the pursuit of Communism and the simultaneous creation of a consumer society. While the Brezhnev period was described in traditional post-Soviet historiography as a time of corruption and stagnation that ultimately led to the collapse of the real existing socialist bloc and the fall of the Soviet Union, this time was perceived by many contemporaries as a period of stability and normality, a time that provided many Soviet citizens with a life of assured material prosperity and good opportunities for careerrial advancement.13 4.) Conclusion For the Federal Republic, the migration of post-Soviet migrants meant not only a change in the existing migration policy, but also the development of new expectations of the Federal German society towards the post-Soviet “privileged migrants“. They were only partially able to meet them. The migrants accepted as “Germans and Jews” were labeled “Russians” and had to fight for their place in society between “Germans and foreigners”.

For the post-Stalinist USSR, the investigation of these two groups is particularly interesting because it sheds light on how minorities lived their everyday lives in the Soviet Union between collective discrimination and individual experience of advancement. Furthermore, the experience of ambivalence experienced by the two nationalities can be placed in the larger context of the Brezhnev era, a time between stagnation and stability.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the “Soviet baggage” of the Russian-Germans and Soviet Jews manifests itself primarily in the experience of the “double strangeness”.

5.) Bibliography • Belge, Boris/Deuerlein, Martin (Hg.): Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation? Perspektiven auf die sowjetische Ordnung der Brežnev-Ära (Bedrohte Ordnungen 2), 2014 Tübingen.

• Belkin, Dmitrij: Germanija. Wie ich in Deutschland jüdisch und erwachsen wurde (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 10073), Bonn 2017.

• Buwalda, Petrus: „They did not dwell alone“. Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union 1967-1990, Baltimore 1997.

• Dalos, György: Geschichte der Russlanddeutschen. Von Katharina der Großen bis zur Gegenwart, München 2014.

• Dietz, Barbara: Zwischen Anpassung und Autonomie. Rußlanddeutsche in der vormaligen Sowjetunion und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 22), Berlin 1995.

• Krieger, Viktor: Kolonisten, Sowjetdeutsche, Aussiedler. Eine Geschichte der Russlanddeutschen, Bonn 2015.

• Panagiotidis, Jannis: Postsowjetische Migration in Deutschland. Eine Einführung, Basel 2021.

• Plamper, Jan: Das neue Wir. Warum Migration dazugehört. Eine andere Geschichte der Deutschen, Frankfurt 2019.

• Rosenthal, Gabriele/ Stephan, Viola/ Radenbach, Niklas: Brüchige Zugehörigkeiten. Wie sich Familien von „Russlanddeutschen“ ihre Geschichte erzählen, Frankfurt/New York 2011.

• Steinhart, Eric C.: The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine (Publications of the German Historical Institute), Washington DC. 2015.

• Zahra, Tara: The Great Departure. Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World, New York/London 2016. ___________________________________________ 13. Belge, Boris/Deuerlein, Martin (Hg.): Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation? Perspektiven auf die sowjetische Ordnung der Brežnev-Ära (Bedrohte Ordnungen 2), 2014 Tübingen, S. 1-37.

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Integration, self-perception and identity construction amongst young adults from the former Soviet Union in Germany. A qualitative case study Cristiana Lucchetti PhD researcher at the Institute of Slavic Philology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Visiting scholar at the Institute for the Study of Societal Issues at UC Berkeley 1. Introduction With the beginning of perestroika, Germany came to occupy a key position next to the USA, Canada and Israel as a destination for migrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU).

The political connection between East Germany and the Soviet Union as well as their simultaneous collapse played a major role in the emergence of new migration routes and patterns.

The study of migration phenomena from the FSU has been mainly focusing on two specific groups, i.e. ethnic Germans and Soviet Jews. This research bias didn’t significantly change even after the fall of the Soviet Union and German reunification.

In this paper, I problematize the said bias and present some of the many unexplored facets of migration from the countries of the FSU to Germany, with particular focus on migration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. My study is based on qualitative data from biographical interviews which I carried out in several cities of Germany between May 2019 and February 2021 with Russianspeaking young adults from the FSU. The native or near-native knowledge of Russian is the major criterion identifying my research population. From this linguistic criterion follows that most of the participants are either first-generation, 1.5-generation or second-generation immigrants to Germany.

2. Terminological issues Given the plethora of terms commonly used in research to identify the population on which my study focuses, it is necessary to make a terminological clarification. The labels post-Soviet, Russianspeaking migrants or migrants from the FSU entail different ideological connotations which, in turn, affect the very research process.

The term post-Soviet first appeared in written American English in 1988,1 during perestroika, when a possible end of the Soviet regime was already in sight. A query in the Russian National Corpus shows that the first usage of postsovetskiĭ dates back to 1938 in the writings of anti-Soviet philosopher Ivan Solonevich. In one of his political writings, Solonevich encourages like-minded readers to follow the anti-Soviet White Movement and strive for a post-Soviet time, i.e. a time when the Soviet Union and its ideology will have disappeared.2 After this occurrence, post-Soviet becomes more frequent only at the turn of the millennium, with an absolute peak in 2003. Although there isn’t an official date of birth to post-Soviet nor a proper theorization behind it, it clearly refers to both an historical fact and, even more importantly, an ideological and cultural element. The dissolution of the Soviet Union serves as the historical landmark between life in the Soviet Union and whatever was now coming after it, i.e. the post-Soviet. In its current usage in both English and Russian, however, post-Soviet is mostly used in its ideological-cultural sense: it stands for a multitude of spaces, identities, national narratives, contrasting ideas, beliefs, wishes, political stances, iconographies etc., all in some way related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. ___________________________________ 1. Source: COHA Corpus of Historical American English 2. Source: Ivan Solonevich’s 1938 brochure K sudu ofit͡serskoĭ chesti, k sudu russkoĭ sovesti i russkogo uma, cited in Nat͡sionalʹnyĭ Korpus Russkogo I͡azyka

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During field research in Germany, I was hesitant to employ the term postsovetskiĭ and preferred to resort to other formulas, such as russkogovori͡ashchiĭ, russkoi͡azychnyĭ or iz stran byvshego SSSR3 . This choice stems from a process of reflection which was prompted by the following questions: Would I like it if some researcher attached fancy-looking labels to me, without even asking what I make of them? Would anyone respond to my recruitment ads if I stated that I was looking for post-Soviet people? Who would define themselves as post-Soviet anyway? In the course of field research, I have noticed how the participants never used the term post-Soviet themselves, whereas the terms russkogovori͡ashchiĭ, russkoi͡azychnyĭ and iz stran byvshego SSSR (in order of decreasing frequency) were most commonly used by them as self-identifications. Yet a quick Google search will show how most literature in the humanities and social sciences in the last decades has been using almost exclusively the label post-Soviet to refer to people from and phenomena happening in the countries of the FSU. It would be highly beneficial for researchers and migration policy makers equally to ask themselves where post-Soviet and other related labels come from, what they mean for all parties involved and what consequences their application has both in research methodology and in policy application.

3. Emigration beyond the fifth paragraph In spite of the problematic aspects they entail, labels are highly necessary in scientific and administrative practices. Labels play such an important role in the context of migration from the FSU also because of the narrative of the Soviet Union as a multinational state, which gained a prominent position especially under Stalin (Baberowski 2006) and perpetuated itself after the end of the Soviet era. In the Soviet passport, every citizen’s nat͡sionalʹnostʹ – i.e., nationality, with an ethnic connotation – was registered under the so called fifth paragraph (pi͡atai͡a grafa). At the age of 16, every Soviet citizen had to choose a nationality based on their parents’ institutionally registered nationalities (Baiburin 2012:105). The assignment of national identity was only to a limited extent depending on the citizen’s selfidentification; it very often entailed “negotiation with officials who insisted on assigning a given ‘nationality’” (ibid.). This system, which factually institutionalized ethnic segregation, was abolished in 1997.

Of all the “nationalities”, Jews and Germans occupied a particular position in the ethnic policy of the Soviet Union, which is also a reason why research on post-Soviet migration mainly focuses on these two categories. Especially after World War II, a growing amount of people from both ethnic minorities started considering emigration, which became possible on a broad scale with the advent of perestroika.

By establishing strictly regulated migration channels for Soviet Jews and ethnic Germans, Germany sought to provide moral and material compensation to groups of people who had, in different circumstances, both been victims of brutal discriminations. The categories of Aussiedler4 for ethnic Germans and jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge5 for Soviet Jews were based on criteria eventually resembling those of Soviet passport policy.

Approximately 2,7 million ethnic Germans and Soviet Jews have emigrated to Germany since the enactment of the respective migration policies (Panagiotidis 2021). This percentage does, indeed, account for the majority of the at least 3.5 million immigrants from countries of the FSU who currently live in Germany6 . Still, while investigating the phenomenon of what is called post-Soviet migration to Germany, I often encountered people who weren’t willing to ____________________________________ 3. Translation: Russian-speaking, Russian-language and from the countries of the FSU 4. Translation: emigrant, resettler 5. Translation: Jewish quota refugees 6. Source: DeStatis Statistisches Bundesamt, Mikrozensus 2018, Tabelle 2I. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/ Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund-2010220187004.pdf? __blob=publicationFile

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adhere to administrative categories and engaged in a process of finding their own voice in German society. Amongst the people whom I interviewed were some who emigrated to Germany with the status of Aussiedler and Kontingentflüchtling, but also some who came for educational, ideological and professional reasons. Each of them has a story to tell, in which administrative categories play but a marginal role. The common element between all of them is their use of Russian and their attitude towards it. Their stories reveal how, behind administrative and academic labels, lies a reality which is much more hybrid and worthy of being studied in all its complexity.

4. Insights from the case study7 Examples from my interviews with Russian-speaking young adults show that they openly challenge pre-existing administrative categories by construing hybrid identities (Iyall Smith 2008), thus challenging social expectations and stereotypes.

This is well visible in the example of a 22-year-old female informant from a family of Russia Germans who moved to Germany from Yakutsk. When asked whether she would describe herself as russlanddeutsch8 , the informant detaches herself from the ready-made category by stating “my culture is not russlanddeutsch at all, they are way too conservative! I am rather Russian or even Yakutian”.

She goes on to challenge religious stereotypes about Russia Germans, as she argues that her family disagreed to live according to the strict rules of the local russlanddeutsch Mennonite community: Faith is important in my family, but not the russlanddeutsch way. I mean, it’s the same faith, it’s just a different way to experience it. My parents left the community because it didn’t endorse their professional path. People there are very quick at judging She also explains that, in contrast with the widespread stereotype about Russia Germans as proudly and conservatively German-speaking, Russian plays a central role in her family’s life: “Russian is important, especially when talking about private things”. The informant’s statements about Russian provides a hint at the central role of Russian not just as one of many languages which migrants from the FSU speak, but as the language uniting the ethnically diverse Russian-speaking diaspora.

The informant reflects on her place between Russia and Germany and reports often experiencing a feeling of in-betweenness which eventually defines her identity: I felt very much at home in Yakutsk. When I came to Germany, I thought I would mingle pretty fast, because I already knew German pretty well, but there were always moments when cultural differences came up, and then I have to tell Germans that I come from Russia and they’re totally shocked. In Yakutsk there were times when someone would come up to me and ask me, are you the German girl? Can you help me with my German homework? But now that I’m here, I notice how Russian some of my traits are The experience of in-betweenness is common to many participants in my study and to migrants in general (Brunsma and Delgado 2008:339). It is often related to a discrepancy between a migrant’s identity and their citizen status, which brings us back to how problematic administrative categories can be. In fact, the informant from Yakutsk never obtained a Russian citizenship, although she was born and raised in Russia and defines herself as ________________________________________ 7. The examples have been translated from German into English 8. Translation: Russia German, referring to ethnic Germans from the FSU

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Russian; but, as soon as she emigrated to Germany through the channel of the Aussiedlergesetz, she immediately received a German citizenship.

Parallel to this is the case of a 22-year-old male informant, who was born in Moscow and has been living in Germany for over 14 years. Even though he perceives himself as German, he is still struggling to obtain his longed-for German citizenship. He is neither russlanddeutsch nor does he have Jewish relatives. His half-Armenian, half-Russian family decided to emigrate to Germany on professional and personal grounds. His Armenian roots are highly important to him: Language is inseparably connected with one’s roots. My great grandma was Armenian, and I regret that I still haven’t managed to learn Armenian and discover more about my roots there! My great grandma fled from Turkey to escape genocide, so a lot of documents went lost when she escaped His naturalization process runs less smoothly than for the two mainstream categories, which Panagiotidis righteously calls “privileged” (2021:42). The informant describes his identity as follows: I know where my roots are, I know I am still a Russian citizen, but I see myself as German. I tend to avoid people who live in a Russian microcosm in Germany. They came here and profit from Germany, but they live a secluded life. That’s not my thing. It’s really important for me to receive a German citizenship, so that I can say I am 1000% German!

5. Conclusion The informants’ self-identifications as, respectively, Russian-Yakutian and German-Russian with Armenian roots point at a complexity which administrative labels often fail to capture. The example of the girl from Yakutsk, along with many other cases from my data corpus, shows how the role of Russian is way more central to the identity of immigrants from the FSU thank ideological aspects entailed in the term post-Soviet.

In my PhD project titled Language and Culture in the Context of Migration. A Study on RussianSpeaking Communities in Israel and Germany, I analyze in depth some of the issues mentioned in this paper and seek to prompt constructive debates on the importance of the participants’ self-identification for construing instructive labels which, in turn, are essential to equal and respectful migration policies.

References • Baberowski, Jörg. 2006. Stalinizm i nat͡sii͡a. Sovetskiĭ soi͡uz kak mnogonat͡sionalʹnoe gosudarstvo.

1917-1953. Ab imperio 1/2006, 177-196.

• Baiburin, Albert. 2012. Rituals of Identity. The Soviet Passport. In: Bassin, Mark and Kelly, Catriona (eds.) Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities, pp. 91-110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Brunsma, David L. and Delgado, Daniel J. 2008. Occupying Third Space: Hybridity and Identity Matrices in the Multiracial Experience. In: Iyall Smith, Keri E. and Leavy, Patricia (eds.) Hybrid Identities. Theoretical and Empirical Examinations, pp. 333-354. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

• Iyall Smith, Keri E. 2008. Hybrid Identities: Theoretical Examinations. In: Iyall Smith, Keri E. and Leavy, Patricia (eds.) Hybrid Identities. Theoretical and Empirical Examinations, pp. 3-13. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

• Panagiotidis, Jannis. 2021. Postsowjetische Migration in Deutschland. Eine Einführung.

Weinheim/Basel: Beltz Juventa.

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The official narrative of national identity and the emergence of silenced narratives: The case of Lithuania Fernando Alejandro Remache Vinueza (The University of Glasgow, Auronomous University of Madrid and LUISS University of Rome) Lithuania is a Baltic nation, located in northern Europe at the geographical center of Europe.

It is an independent country since 1991 and a member of the European Union since 2004. This post is focused on explaining the development of national identity narratives in post-soviet Lithuania.

Firstly, the factor of official narratives will be explained and then the ignored issues from the mainstream narrative will be analyzed. Moreover, the following question is central to this study: What are the factors that explain the narrative of democratic transition and why some issues has been excluded from the official narrative in the Baltic nation?

The studies on democratic transition in Lithuania There are two different perspectives about narratives of national identity in Lithuanian Transition period. Firstly, a historiographical perspective with scholars such as Savicka that who emphasizes the nationalization of the past as a key factor of Lithuanian narrative in the 1990s for individuals and social groups in order to reconstruct an idealized vision of Lithuania before the Soviet occupation in 1940 (Savicka,2007).

Secondly, there are political scientists such as Steen who analyzes the democratic transition and consider the Lithuanian Transition in term of national identity is a process leaded by political elites who tried to reach a middle point between their private interests and the preservation of state sovereignty (Steen, 1997).

2. The official narrative of democratic transition and national identity The development of a post-soviet national ide itty is Lithuania is defined by two factors. To begin with, state and social organizations had low legitimacy after 50 years of authoritarian regime.

Secondly, despite this fact, these institutions were led by strong elites who defended national interests but also their own personal goals. Finally, this new ruler class had no experience on democratic practice but after the collapse of the Soviet Union they achieved powerful positions with limited institutional regulations. In fact, some institutions from the communist period remained as a part of the new state but they suffered alteration in order to adapt them to a democratic system.

Therefore, elites are the core factor in the formation of new state (Steen, 2019).

On March 1990, the first step was taken by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania which declared the annulation of the Soviet Constitution and the Lithuanian Soviet Constitution. At this point, there were debates between the restoration of the Lithuanian fundamental text of 1938 or the elaboration of a new supreme norm. The latter was the chosen opinion as the 1938 was issued during the authoritarian regime of Antanas Smetona and it had restricted rights for national minorities. In PostSoviet Lithuania, it was not controversial to recognize ethnic minorities as citizens of the new republic, compared to the situation in Latvia and Estonia (Lane, 2014).

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Nevertheless, the nation building process required historical legitimacy and political elites supported the vision of independence of Lithuania as a restoration of interwar Lithuania (1918-1940) and heir of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the new Constitution issued in 1992. More specifically, the preamble of the text proclaims that “the Lithuanian nation have established the State of Lithuania many centuries ago” and “the Lithuanian nation having based its legal foundation on the Statutes of Lithuania and the Constitutions of Lithuania” (Lithuanian Constitution, 1992, preamble).

In addition, the emphasis on an ethnic conception of Lithuania was underlined as the text defined the Lithuanian language as “the state language” (Lithuanian Constitution, 1992, article 14). Nevertheless, minorities defined as “ethnic communities” by the Constitution have been granted cultural autonomy and support from the State (Lithuanian Constitution, 1992, article 45).

The defeat of the nationalist party Sajudis in the 1993 elections by former communists leaded

by Algirdas Brazauskas reshaped the nation building process. This politician projected itself as a reformist with the main goal to improve the quality of life of its citizens, his victory was possible due the support of national minorities as almost all the Lithuanians of Russian ethnicity and about 50% of Lithuanian Poles trusted on his proposals.). The Brazauskas administration introduced a more pragmatic dimension on national identity as the main priority of his government was the integration into Western organizations such as NATO and the EU. Moreover, Sajudis renamed itself as The Homeland Party and moderated its nationalistic rhetoric to guarantee social harmony (Lane, 2014). From this year, the official narrative has been focused on defining Lithuania as a country historically located in Central Europe since the Middle Ages, instead on defending exclusionary positions based on ethnic grounds. Furthermore, Lithuania´s membership of the European Union (2004) has incorporated to the official narrative the perception of the Baltic country as a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe, in terms of economics and promotion of democracy in other Post-soviet countries such as Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia (Tulmets, 2012).

Diagram 1: Official narrative in Post-Soviet Lithuania 1991

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The forgotten issues of official narrative in Lithuania From a historical perspective the role of ethnic minorities in Lithuania has been defined on negative terms in the official narrative due two factors. Firstly, the largest non- Lithuanian communities: ethnic Russians and ethnic Poles are connected period of loss of statehood in the country (see, diagram 1). In the case of Russians, the Tsarist and Soviet periods (1795-1990) and in the case of Poles, regarding the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795) and more recently, the Polish occupation of Vilnius region (1920-1940). Secondly, the role of ethnic minorities in the interwar period and during the Soviet occupation has been overlapped by the official narrative based on glorifying ethnic Lithuanian freedom fighters who fought against communist authorities and the Soviet deportation of ethnic Lithuanian to Siberia. In this regard, as Popovski points out “the Lithuanians have over idealized inter-war Lithuania and overlooked the increasing restrictions placed on national minorities” (Popovski, 2000: 14).

A good example of this narrative is the brief history of Lithuania explained on the governmental website of the Centennial of the Proclamation of the Republic of Lithuania in 2018.

To begin with, the website defines interwar Lithuania 1919-1940 as “period of prosperity” and an era where Lithuania “having withstood the fight for independence against Bolsheviks and Polish invaders, Lithuania settled a parliamentary democracy”. Secondly, it has a section about the Soviet period with the following argumentation “On 15 June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania from 14 June started mass deportations of the Lithuanian population of remote areas of the Soviet Union”. In addition it states that “many Lithuanians joined partisan groups to fight for Lithuania´s independence”.

In fact, this narrative of the nation dated back from the 1990s has played a key role to describe the Soviet period in Lithuania and even aboutt the Tsarist era (1795-1918). Morever, the idea of deportation as a spiritual connection between al living ethnic Lithuanians and their ancestors who suffered these traumatic process has become a core factor of the official discourse of national identity (Davoliute, 2013). On the other hand, the deportation of Lithuanian Polish population from Vilnius in the 1940s and the role of ethnic Lithuanians in the extermination of their Jewish compatriots have been excluded from the official narrative (see diagram 3). At the same time after 1991, the so called “double genocide” theory was quite popular for almost a decade. This argument considers that Lithuanian Jews collaborated with the Soviet invaders in the political repression of Lithuanians and in consequence some ethnic Lithuanians supported the Nazis as an act of revenge against them (Resende and Budryte, 2014).

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In the last decade, some critical approaches have been flourished on the participation of partisans in the Holocaust such as the case of Jonas Noreika, an ethnic Lithuanian who was actively involved in the extermination of Jews in WWII (Vanagaite and Zuroff, 2020: 11-12). Moreover, the promotion of Jewish heritage in the Vilnius region has been supported by the Lithuanian State.

Regarding the massacres and deportation of ethnic Poles from the Vilnius region, this issue has not been included into the national narrative since the 1990s. Nevertheless, Lithuanian Poles has increased their visualization in Lithuania through campaigns in order to have the right to use their names in Polish Latin script and to implement bilingual street signs in some areas across this administrative area (Moore, 2019: 220-232).

Conclusions The official narrative of Lithuania is defined as a process of nationalization of the past focused on an idealized vision of the Lithuanian people as a nation with a long tradition of statehood, a nation historically oppressed by foreign powers: Russia and Poland. Furthermore, this narrative has excluded the positive aspects of non-Lithuanian communities in the historical development of the contemporary Lithuania: Russia, Poland and until recently, the Lithuanian Jews have been considered as the other, the alien factor outside the national narrative.

Since Lithuania has joined the European Union, the recognition of cultural minorities has significantly improved in terms of cultural rights. Nevertheless, they have not been fully incorporated as an integral factor of the official narrative in the Baltic state as they are challenging its core aspects such as the victimization of Lithuania against foreign powers and the democratic perception of Interwar Lithuania.

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Publications

References

• Davoliute, V. (2013). The making and breaking of Soviet Lithuania. London, Routledge.

Lane, T. (2014). Lithuania: Stepping Westward. Abingdon, Routledg • Moore, I. (2019). Linguistic landscape as an arena of conflict: Language Removal, exclusion and ethnic identity construction in Lithuania (Vilnius). In Evans, M, Jeffries, L and O ´Driscoll. The Routledge Handbook of Language conflict, Abingdon, Routledge, • Popovski, V (2000). National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988-1993.

New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

• Resende, E and Budryte, I. (2014). Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, cases and debates. Abingdon, Routledge.

• Savicka, A. (2007). Lithuanian Identity and Values: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V. Washington. Council of Values and Philosophy.

• Steen, A, (1997). Between Past and Future: Elites and Democracy and the State in PostCommunist countries. Abingdon, Routledge.

• Tulmets, E (2012). Identity and Solidarity in Foreign policy: East Central Europe and the Eastern Neighborhood. Prague, Institute of International Relations.

• Vanagaite, R and Zuroff E. (2020). Our People: Discovering Lithuania´s hidden holocaust.

London, Rowman and Littlefield.

Official websites • The official website of the Centennial of the Republic of Lithuania 2018, viewed on May 10th 2020, http://www.lietuva.lt/100/en/discover-lithuania/history • The official website of the Department of Statistics of Lithuania 2011, viewed on May 11th 2020. http://www.stat.gov.lt • The official website of the Money Museum of Lithuania 2020, viewed on May 10th 2020 http://www.pinigumuziejus.lt/en

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VIII. Urban Sustainability and Governance in the North: Perspectives from Europe and Eurasia Co-Chairs: Elena Adasheva-Klein (Yale University) and Morgan Forde (University of Cambridge) Elena Adasheva-Klein (Yale University) Morgan Forde (University of Cambridge) Kelsey Jones (George Washington University) Masha Monakhova (Arizona State University) Discussant: Robert W. Orttung, Research Professor of International Affairs (George Washington University)

What is Severnyĭ Gorod?1 The Urban Nature of the Russian Northern City Elena Adasheva-Klein (Yale University) Abstract: Despite the Arctic often imagined as a place scarcely inhabited by humans, a majority of the Arctic population resides in cities. In Russia, the North is the most urbanized region in the country with the largest northern cities in the world. Examining the phenomenon of Arctic urbanism, scholars point out the unique characteristics of the northern city. Drawing from the notion of Arctic urban nature, this paper examines city-nature entanglements in the scholarship on Russian northern cities. Multiple interrelations between the northern city and the northern environment problematize conventional meanings of urbanity and offer new possibilities for reimagining the city. ***

The Arctic is often imagined as a place scarcely inhabited by humans; nevertheless, northern urban settlements have been rapidly growing for the last century. Currently, a majority of the Arctic population resides in the cities. For instance, the Russian Arctic Zone is the most urbanized region in the country with 89% urban population (Zamyatina and Goncharov 2019: 137). Intense urbanization and industrial development around natural resource extraction took place in the Russian Arctic during the Soviet era. The city of Murmanks grew from 119,000 inhabitants to 468,000 between 1939 and 1989, while the population of Norilsk increased from over 100,000 inhabitants to more than 250,000 between 1959 and 1979. Today, Russia has more cities than any other Arctic nation, and these cities are the largest northern cities in the world: eight of the twelve Arctic cities with populations greater than 100,000 people are located in Russia, including cities with 300,000 inhabitants (Laruelle et al. 2019; Orttung 2020).

Nyseth (2017) argues that Arctic cities represent “different forms of urbanity” (60), going as far as calling them “an urban paradox” (59) that challenges the conventional meaning of the city. Indeed, northern cities do not fit many criteria of their southern counterparts, often occupying an ambiguous conceptual space between urban and rural, marked as a non-city, a “rural-looking” city (Stammler and Sidorova 2015: 586), or “semiurban” (Orttung 2016: 5). _______________________________________ 1. A Russian term ‘northern city’ (северный город) refers to cities in Arctic and Subarctic Russia as a separate category, distinguished from other cities in the south.

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Writing about the growing city of Murmansk in the 1920s, a local historian describes it as “a city – not a city, a village – not a village” (qtd. in Антропология города 2020: 69). According to Kalemeneva (2017), it is difficult to call the city-formation in the Soviet North a full-fledged urbanization (полноценная урбанизация) due to the differences in social practices, scale, spatial design, and migration patterns (155) when compared to ‘regular’ cities.

Many scholars, thus, pose the question, what is a northern city? Considering the particularities of northern urbanism leads them not only to explore this unique phenomenon but also to redefine the very meaning of the urban. Some scholars depart from a fixed definition of the city, based on size and population density; instead, they propose to think of the urban as a process or function (Dybbroe 2008; Nyseth 2017; Orttung 2020; Антропология города 2020, etc.). Nyseth (2017) writes, “Even though many of these towns do not qualify as cities because of their size, some of them still “act” like major cities” (61). Similarly, Schaffner argues that it is important to “think of cities more fundamentally in terms of the functions they serve. In remote regions, such as the Arctic, urban areas with smaller populations are more likely to serve many of these functions because no other city exists in proximity” (Orttung 2020: 23). Dybbroe (2008) offers to consider “centralism” as definitive quality of the Arctic city: “the “urban” is not based in numbers and densities, or in ways of life, but in structures and processes connected to hierarchies of power (economic, judicial, administrative, etc.)” (22).

Dybbroe draws from the “central place theory” elaborated by Anthony Leeds to provide a new framework for thinking about northern urbanism. Interestingly, rethinking the city in the Arctic context repositions the northern city from a marginal place in the urban studies to its very center. Zamyatina and Pilyasov point out an innovative character of the northern city which makes it “more of a city” (“более город”) than a typical city in the south (qtd. in Антропология города 2020: 3).

Additionally, because of a greater contrast between the city and the space outside the city in the North, even a small Arctic town accumulates all roles and functions, usually distributed among urban and rural settlements in other regions (Замятина и Гончаров 2020: 79). This intensification and spatial concentration of social, economic, administrative, and other functions within the northern city, regardless of size and population, allow us to conceptualize the Arctic city as essentially urban, even more “city-like” than a typical large urban center elsewhere.

This paper examines the relations between the northern city and the northern environment as a specific characteristic of Arctic urbanism. Introducing the notion of “Arctic urban nature”, Nyseth (2017) writes, “Arctic cities are located close to nature and are nature to some extent” (63). Considering this proposition as a point of departure, I explore a city-nature entanglement in the scholarship on Russian northern cities. For Nyseth, the urban inhabitants’ intimate relationship to nature and the presence of non-humans (foxes and sled-dogs) in urban networks erase a divide between the urban and the wild. Here, nature not only surrounds the city but also permeates the urban settlement. I develop the notion of “urban nature” further by exploring the multiple ways in which the northern environment shapes and participates in the life of a Russian northern city.

Jull (2016; 2017) and Shiklomanov and Laruelle (2017) demonstrate how northern environment forced Soviet architects rethink urban planning, redefining the nature of cities and buildings.

Shiklomanov and Laruelle (2017) regard Norilsk as “a unique laboratory for analyzing urban adaptations to Arctic environments,” calling it “an improbable, yet truly Arctic city” (253-255). Jull writes, “In the Arctic context, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid consideration of the environment when designing a building or city: survivability is a priority; inattention to environmental and geographic conditions can render a building or city inoperable” (2016: 215).

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Such environmental conditions as permafrost, snow accumulation, strong winds, and light seasonality became architects of the northern city. Soviet builders had to rethink the regular principles of street grid and isolated buildings in terms of a tightly integrated urban system. In 1961, a new General Plan for Norilsk replaced freestanding buildings and city blocks with the microrayon as the primary planning construct. The microrayon consisted of a cluster of buildings organized around the perimeter of each block with spaces in between – this design created shielded enclaves, forming barriers against the wind and snow accumulation while increasing the insolation. For instance, the height and position of buildings considered wind directions to protect occupants from strong winds and prevent snow accumulation in the urban space. This urban design followed a newly developed “closed contour” principle that replaced open squares and grid-like organization of urban spaces, allowing them to better adapt to the Arctic environment. Interestingly, Jull emphasizes that for the long-term viability of the northern city, it is necessary to embed urban space in the northern environment instead of creating an isolated “indoor city.” Jull writes, “the most important principle of planning a northern city is to integrate and not isolate from the winter environment: “living with winter as opposed to in spite of it” (2016: 221).

Similarly, Suter (2019) describes visible signs of environmental impacts on urban infrastructure.

In the town of Labytnangi, buildings are connected by above-ground pipelines carrying water, gas, and communications lines, which is an example of purposeful infrastructural adaptations to the Arctic environment that isolate the heat from permafrost below the ground. Suter points out cracked foundations and walls in the old buildings in Salekhard and Vorkuta as obvious traces of how thawing permafrost affects built infrastructure.

Scholars from the George Washington University’s research project titled Promoting Urban Sustainability in the Arctic2 approach the ‘urban nature’ of Russian northern cities from the perspective of sustainability and climate change (Orttung 2016). Anisimov and Kokorev point out that climate change impacts on the Arctic urban environment are diverse – from thawing permafrost to changing temperatures, snow accumulation, and altering hydrological regimes. Some of the climate impacts increase the city’s vulnerability, resulting in infrastructure failures and flooding; others reduce demand for heating energy, decrease snow removal costs, and intensify incoming labor migration, contributing to the city’s sustainability. Effects of climate change vary from city to city, depending on local ecosystems. Graybill argues that understanding the meaning of climate transformations for Russian northern cities requires close attention to interdependence between human and natural systems. Graybill writes, “Because Russian urban environments are complex socio-environmental systems that are simultaneously human and biophysical, this type of environment is one of the most dynamic and difficult socio-ecological systems to understand, maintain, and predict” (221). Graybill suggests utilizing the urban vulnerability formula that includes exposure or climate stress, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, to examine the consequences of environmental transformations for northern cities.

Another way to address the entanglement between the northern city and the northern environment is through anthropogenic impact, or pollution (Orttung 2020). The Arctic city of Norilsk, home for Russia’s largest mining company and the world’s largest nickel producer Norilsk Nickel, is one of the world’s ten most polluted cities and the number one in Russia. Laruelle points out that the company’s plant releases sulfur dioxide, copper and nickel oxides into the air while the contaminated soil in a 60-km radius creates a technogenic desert (80). __________________________________ 2. https://blogs.gwu.edu/arcticpire/

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Sergunin writes that centers of metallurgical production and machine-building, such as Monchegorsk, Nickel, Norilsk, and Severodvinsk, are heavily polluted. In twenty-seven so-called impact zones pollution caused environmental degradation and increased human mortality. About 15% of Russia’s Arctic Zone is contaminated (219). Drawing from Stephanie Pincetl’s term of ‘urban biome,’ Laruelle et al. (2019) conceptualize Arctic cities as anthropogenic constructions where human-build ecosystems improve human lives by greening and browning the Arctic environment. The Arctic urban heat island (UHI) phenomenon speaks to the effects of the northern city on natural environments. Urban surface and air temperatures are 1-2ºC higher than outside the city, resulting in new vegetation and land-cover patterns and warmer micro-climates (407).

Stammler and Sidorova (2015) examine how the dacha3 movement creates new spaces for human-environment interactions in Yakutsk, simultaneously redefining urban lifeways in the North.

Stammler and Sidorova claim that in the socialist northern city nature represents an “unpopulated pollution sink” that protects residential urban spaces from an adjacent industrial zone. Due to the expansion of dachas, surrounding the city, urban inhabitants populate these green belts, now closely integrated in the city’s life. Dacha combines “the idea of the city with the elements of ‘nature,’” increasing people’s attachment to local landscape and their reciprocal relation with the “giving environment” (581, 587). The dacha movement shapes the organization of urban space. First, every little dacha looks different, reflecting the owner’s personality, skills, and gardening preferences. This diversity, representing some freedom in place-making, creates a stunning contrast with the concrete city blocks of Yakutsk. Second, dachas reshape the urban design of Yakutsk which becomes “more rurallooking within its urban zone.” Dachas also transform the initial idea of Soviet industrial city as a place of work into a place of life (586).

Scholars from the Komi Science Centre look at the relations between the northern city and nature through the lens of cultural space, representation, and identity (Антропология города 2020). Shabaev, Zherebtsov, and Labunova argue that nature constitutes an independent and significant actor in Vorkuta’s local life, dictating people’s lifestyle in the urban environment, including health, wellbeing, clothing, and recreation practices. In poetry, Vorkuta is often described by its climatic conditions, such as long winters and strong winds (45). Zmeeva explains the uniqueness of Murmansk by its “nature personality” (природная индивидуальность) born out of specific climatic and landscape characteristics of the city. For instance, the environmental contradictions of polar night and day, the intersections of cold and warm air currents, mild winters and a non-freezing bay in the Arctic create Murmansk’s unique urban nature. The city’s location on the hills (город на сопках), often inconvenient for locals, allows for postcard-famous panoramic views from various vista points (59).

By examining the scholarship on Russian northern cities, I have demonstrated the variety of conceptualizations around city-nature entanglements in the Arctic. The northern environment is the city’s architect that redefines urban design and the durability of buildings and infrastructure. While the city transforms the northern environment through pollution and by creating new local ecosystems, the warming Arctic climate impacts the northern city in dramatic and often unpredictable ways. The northern environment is deeply embedded in the city’s life, shaping social practices, cultural identities, and human attachment to place. Multiple interrelations between the northern city and the northern environment expand Nyseth’s notion of the Arctic urban nature by problematizing conventional meanings of urbanity and offering new possibilities for reimagining the city. ____________________________________ 3. In Russia, a country house typically with a garden, used as a vacation home during summer months.

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References: • Dybbroe, Susanne. 2008. “Is the Arctic Really Urbanising?” Études/Inuit/Studies 32 (1): 13–32.

• Jull, Matthew. 2016. “Toward a Northern Architecture: The Microrayon as Arctic Urban Prototype.” Journal of Architectural Education 70 (2): 214–22.

• ———. 2017. “The Improbable City: Adaptations of an Arctic Metropolis.” Polar Geography 40 (4): 291–305.

• Laruelle, Marlene. 2019a. “The Three Waves of Arctic Urbanisation. Drivers, Evolutions, Prospects.” Polar Record 55 (April): 1–12.

• ———. 2019b. “Postcolonial Polar Cities? New Indigenous and Cosmopolitan Urbanness in the Arctic.” Acta Borealia 36 (2): 149–65.

• Laruelle, Marlene, Igor Esau, Martin Miles, Victoria Miles, Anna N. Kurchatova, Sergej A. Petrov, Andrey Soromotin, Mikhail Varentsov, and Pavel Konstantinov. 2019. “Arctic Cities as an Anthropogenic Object: A Preliminary Approach through Urban Heat Islands.” The Polar Journal 9 (2): 402–23.

• Laruelle, Marlene, and Sophie Hohmann. 2017. “Biography of a Polar City: Population Flows and Urban Identity in Norilsk.” Polar Geography 40 (4): 306–23.

• Nyseth, Torill. 2017. “Arctic Urbanization: Modernity Without Cities.” In Arctic Environmental Modernities: From the Age of Polar Exploration to the Era of the Anthropocene, edited by LillAnn Körber, Scott MacKenzie, and Anna Westerstahl Stenport. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 59– 70.

• Orttung, Robert W., ed. 2016. Sustaining Russia’s Arctic Cities: Resource Politics, Migration, and Climate Change. New York: Berghahn Books.

• ———, ed. 2020. Urban Sustainability in the Arctic: Measuring Progress in Circumpolar Cities.

New York: Berghahn Books.

• Shiklomanov, Nikolay I., and Marlene Laruelle. 2017. “A Truly Arctic City: An Introduction to the Special Issue on the City of Norilsk, Russia.” Polar Geography 40 (4): 251–56.

• Stammler, Florian, and Lena Sidorova. 2015. “Dachas on Permafrost: The Creation of Nature among Arctic Russian City-Dwellers.” Polar Record 51 (6): 576–89.

• Suter, Luis. 2019. “A Tale of Two Arctic Cities: Vorkuta and Salekhard.” FOCUS on Geography 62. https://doi.org/10.21690/foge/2019.62.2f.

• Zamyatina, Nadezhda, and Ruslan Goncharov. 2019. “Arctic Urbanization: Resilience in a Condition of Permanent Instability - the Case of Russian Arctic Cities.” In Resilience and Urban Disasters, edited by Kamila Borsekova and Peter Nijkamp. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 136-153.

• Антропология города. 2020. Выпуск 2: Северный город: Культурное пространство и культурные идентичности в арктических и субарктических городах / Под ред. Ю.П. Шабаева, И.Л. Жеребцова, М.А. Омарова. М.: РГГУ; Сыктывкар: Ин-т языка, литературы и истории Коми НЦ УрО РАН.

• Волосникова, Е А. 2011. ‘Северный город’: новая трактовка понятия. // Социум и Власть, № 2 (30): 19-23.

• Замятина, Н. Ю., and Р. В. Гончаров. 2020. Арктическая урбанизация: феномен и сравнительный анализ. // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 5. География 0 (4): 69– 82.

• Калеменева, Е А. 2017. Политика освоения Крайнего Севера и критика жизненных условий арктических городов в нарративах хрущевского времени. // Quaestio Rossica. Т. 5, № 1: 153– 170.

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As Foundations Thaw: Climate-Responsive Urbanism in Norilsk, Russia Morgan Forde (University of Cambridge) Abstract: The Arctic city of Norilsk, Russia is one of the northernmost settlements on the planet. Historically a heavy-metals mining town and a corridor for the fossil fuel industry, it is also one of the most polluted.

In addition to the historic degradation of the local environment, the ongoing effects of climate change, specifically thawing permafrost, threatens Norilsk’s very foundations. According to a 2016 estimate, 60% of the city’s buildings are sinking or otherwise facing significant structural damage as the frozen earth erodes underneath them. This paper will contextualize the challenges facing Norilsk in light of Russia’s 2020 National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic and survey the urbanarchitectural interventions put in place to shore up the city’s built environment at present and for the future.

Introduction The Arctic city of Norilsk, Russia is one of the northernmost settlements on the planet.

Historically a gulag, a heavy-metals mining monogorod, and a corridor for the fossil fuel industry, it is also one of the most polluted. In addition to the historic degradation of the local environment, the ongoing effects of climate change, specifically thawing permafrost, threaten Norilsk’s very foundations. According to a 2016 estimate, 60% of the city’s buildings are sinking or otherwise facing significant structural damage as the frozen earth erodes away underneath them.1 Norilsk is a pioneer of modern Arctic architecture and an early attempt at climate adaptive design in the USSR in the mid-20th century. However, the challenges it now faces both as a result of enormous industrial pollution2 and global climate change are compounded by this pioneering design and its flaws. The majority of scholarly analysis of Norilsk focuses on the city from a geochemical industrial or environmental science perspective. Some studies from an urban-architectural view have been undertaken, particularly Andrew Bond’s detailed survey of the city’s Soviet-era construction techniques,3 or Concrete Siberia,4 a photobook produced by Alexander Veryovkin and Zupagrafika in 2020. However, potentially due to northern Siberian architecture’s more niche position relative to geological interests, or Norilsk’s closed status (requiring outsiders to obtain an invitation in order to gain entry), detailed architectural analyses or urban ethnographies remain limited in comparison.

Given the growing interest in and need for climate-adaptive design in global cities however, Norilsk’s case, though it is in many ways unique to its Soviet and Arctic _________________________________________ 1. Alec Luhn, ‘Slow-Motion Wrecks: How Thawing Permafrost Is Destroying Arctic Cities’, The Guardian (Norilsk, Russia, 14 October 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/oct/14/thawing-permafrost-destroying- arcticcities-norilsk-russia>.

2. Alec Luhn, ‘Where the River Runs Red: Can Norilsk, Russia’s Most Polluted City, Come Clean?’, The Guardian (Norilsk, Russia, 15 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/sep/15/norilsk-red-river-russiasmost-polluted-city-clean> [accessed 20 March 2021].

3. Andrew R. Bond, ‘Residential Construction in Northern USSR’, Cities, 1.2 (1983), 120–31<https:// doi.org/10.1016/0264-2751(83)90004-5>.

4. Zupagrafika and Alexander Veryovkin, Concrete Siberia (Zupagrafika, 2020) <https://www.zupagrafika.com/shop/ concrete-siberia>.

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contexts, is instructive for designers and planners with respect to the need for a whole- system evaluation of architectural interventions at the individual building and macro- urban levels. Therefore, this paper aims to survey the existing architectural literature on Norilsk with respect to its planning history and path-breaking architectural approach and situate its current challenges in the broader landscape of the urban crises climate change portends for Arctic cities. The analysis will conclude with commentary on new initiatives on the part of Norilsk Nickel regarding environmental damage, remediation, and financial intervention in the city’s built environment, and survey the urbanarchitectural interventions put in place to shore up the city’s.

From Gulag to Monogorod Norilsk, located in Krasnoyarsk on the Taymyr Peninsula, was first established as a prison camp in 1935. Then called Norillag, it was an anchor in the Soviet Union’s gulag archipelago across Siberia where prisoners were “shipped in” to mine what remain some of the largest nickel, copper, and platinum deposits on the planet. The industrial and military importance of the resources there spurred significant state investment in industrial and rail transportation infrastructure, with 10 million rubles allocated to finance the complex’s development by 1935.5 At this point, the dominant settlements were the wooden huts inhabited by the imprisoned labor force, meaning “the Gulag administration had to start the construction of Norilsk practically from zero.”6 By 1939, Soviet geologists uncovered the vast extent of the mineral deposits in the area, causing design plans for the site to shift from establishing a single plant to developing a large, multi-functional industrial complex.7 That same year, Norilsk was officially declared a town, of which the gulag remained a part, with initial urban plans drawn up by Vitold Nepokoychitskiy.8 According to Matthew Jull and Andrew Bond, “The evolution of development and construction of the city was literally one of in situ ‘trial and error’ and ‘management by crisis’.”9 The goal of Nepokoychitskiy’s General Plan for the city was to accommodate an additional 85,000 civilian residents.

The gulag remained operational until 1956.10 Once the camp was dissolved, many of the prisoners returned South to the materik or mainland as Norilsk residents call Russia proper, leaving a glaring labor shortage in their wake. Some chose to remain and continue on in the mining industry, however the city’s first post-gulag population influx came from the Komsomol, 29,000 members in 1956 alone.11 Throughout this period of massive growth, which saw an even greater spike in the 1960s-1980s, the need to develop not only industrial infrastructure, but urban housing, transportation, and other amenities to retain workers in the region’s unforgiving climate increased. ________________________________________ 5. Simon Ertz, ‘Chapter 7: Building Norilsk’, in The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag (Hoover Institution Press, 2003), pp. 127–50 <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817939423_127.pdf>.

6 Ertz.

7 Ibid.

8. Matthew Jull, ‘Toward a Northern Architecture: The Microrayon as Arctic Urban Prototype’, Journal of Architectural Education, 70.2 (2016), 214–22 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10464883.2016.1197672>.

9 Jull note 14; Andrew Bond, ‘Urban Planning and Design in the Soviet North : The Noril’sk Experience’, Soviet Geography, 25.3 (1984), 145–65.

10 Ertz.

11 Marlene Laruelle and Sophie Hohmann, ‘Biography of a Polar City: Population Flows and Urban Identity in Norilsk’, Polar Geography, 40.4 (2017), 306–23 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2017.1387822>.

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The Arctic Microrayon By 1979 Norilsk’s population exceeded 150,000 and by 1989 it reached a peak of over 250,000.12 To house its growing population, Soviet planners needed to develop construction models that would remain stable in the harsh environment and at the required density and scale relative to urban growth. A new General Plan in 1961 adapted the microrayon model and later a local factory mass-produced concrete panel construction methods to quickly build up the city’s urban fabric. The plan operated on a “closed contour” principle, siting the insular neighborhoods such that outer residential buildings formed a “wall,” deflecting wind flows and reducing snow accumulation in the interior areas where communal spaces and services were located.13 Furthermore, utility lines were heavily consolidated at the microrayon level to minimize the dispersal of heat pathways across the city.14 The majority of construction in Norilsk initially centered around the mining complex, the heat generating capacity of which required facilities to be sited on underlying bedrock. By the 1940’s, industrial expansion steadily pushed urban- residential construction into areas with more ice-laden permafrost. There, foundations were excavated to a depth of three meters where a concrete pad would be poured and set with molded concrete piles to support a given building.15 This cost and time intensive method was additionally risky due to the fact that the mounds of excavated permafrost, taliks, could thaw and cause mud slides or cave-ins on the construction site.16 By the 1950’s, the expanding microrayon developments described above required a less time and cost-intensive solution given their height and density. Soviet engineer V.M. Kim is credited with developing a piles-and-grillage foundation system in 1956 whereby holes were drilled directly into relatively warm permafrost (eliminating the prior need to work during the harsh winter season to keep talik melt at bay). The ground would briefly turn to mud before refreezing and bonding to the 16-meter reinforced, pre- cast columns.17 A concrete and steel “grille” was then placed on top of the piles thereby housing the utilities, forming a platform for the building, and allowing enough air flow beneath the structure to keep the permafrost as cold, and solid, as possible. This method was significantly faster, required six to 10 times less labor than the previous approach, and was more geographically versatile.18 As a result, by 1964 a factory to mass-produce specially modified concrete panels was built in Norilsk which enabled the quick production of five and eventually twelve-story housing blocks.19 This innovative urban design paradigm was successfully exported to other Arctic towns across the Soviet Union, which over the course of the ensuing decades presented a significant problem as cracks in its underlying logic began to emerge. The primary challenge of permafrost construction, according to Bond, is not the frozen ground itself “but rather the common presence of large ice inclusions in the form of interstitial crystals, vertical wedges, and horizontal lenses”20 that melt and shift when the soil is disturbed or exposed. _____________________________________ 12. Laruelle and Hohmann.

13. Jull.

14 Nikolay I. Shiklomanov and others, ‘Conquering the Permafrost: Urban Infrastructure Development in Norilsk, Russia’, Polar Geography, 40.4 (2017), 273–90 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2017.1329237>.

15 Shiklomanov and others.

16 Andrew Bond.

17 Shiklomanov and others.

18 ibid 19 Andrew Bond.

20. ibid PAGE 112

A study conducted by Nikolay Shiklomanov et. al.21 details the complex impact road construction, building sites, changes in wind flow, and snow removal have had on permafrost temperature stability in Arctic cities, noting that the coarse and permeable nature of the local soil facilitates the channeling of meltwater to a greater extent than initially accounted for by Soviet-era planners.

When Norilsk’s microrayons were constructed, estimates for permafrost bearing capacity were only modeled out for three to four years into the future and were based on pre-construction readings of the permafrost temperature.22 In actuality, by the time construction infrastructure was in place, digging began, utility lines were connected etc., an urban heat island (UHI) effect had been generated, meaning that the permafrost the new structure was sitting on was already warmer than initial estimates.

Therefore, as Norilsk developed, the permafrost began to thaw and shift within just a few years. “The results are at best cracked and deformed walls, tilted floors, and cracked pipes; at worst, slabs and footings are broken in two, walls and roofs collapse, and pipes rupture,” according to Bond in a 1983 assessment.23 In a 2016 paper, Dmitry Streletsky and Shiklomanov found that ruptures of water and heat pipes in particular cause even further permafrost disruption, melting and creating entirely new pockets of ice that further diminish the integrity of building foundations and critical infrastructure.24 Nornickel and the Future of Norilsk Today Norilsk remains the world’s second-largest city north of the Arctic Circle, after Murmansk, and is nearly as isolated as it was in the late Soviet period due to limited ice road and railto-sea access. Due to the logistical difficulty and expense of Arctic construction, new private housing construction has been minimal, resulting in a supply shortage. Furthermore the majority of Norilsk’s Soviet-era housing blocks are critically undermaintained.25 As mentioned in the introduction, 60% of the city’s structures are threatened by thawing permafrost, and factory facilities,26 restaurants, and homes27 have already taken lives in various collapse incidents. In 2017, “over 90% of the city budget allocated to the operation and maintenance of heating, water, sewer, and electrical lines [was] spent on emergency repair of utilidors, making it impossible to implement systematic reconstruction and upgrades.”28 Recent measures have been put in place to more effectively monitor permafrost temperatures and generate recommendations for repair, and for the buildings that collapse, or are torn down, the city has taken the opportunity to recycle the foundations, strengthening the old grilles and starting afresh with more heat-efficient structures.29 However, by and large these measures amount to mitigating ongoing decline and as of yet fail to address core issues of the permafrost’s declining bearing capacity throughout the city. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has declared thawing permafrost a matter of urgent national security.30 __________________________________________________

21. Shiklomanov and others.

22 Dmitry A. Streletskiy and Nikolay I. Shiklomanov, ‘Arctic Urban Sustainability and Permafrost’, in Urban Sustainability in the Arctic: Visions, Contexts, and Challenges (George Washington University, 2016), pp. 27–33.

23 Andrew Bond.

24 Streletskiy and Shiklomanov.

25. Colin Reisser, ‘Drivers Shaping Russia’s Arctic Cities’, in Urban Sustainability in the Arctic: Visions, Contexts, and Challenges (George Washington University, 2013), pp. 207–12.

26 Reuters Staff, ‘Three People Die in Partial Collapse of Nornickel’s Arctic Processing Plant’, Reuters (Moscow, 21 February 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norilsknickel-plant-idUSKBN2AK07J> [accessed 28 March 2021].

27 Luhn, ‘Slow-Motion Wrecks: How Thawing Permafrost Is Destroying Arctic Cities’.

28 Shiklomanov and others.

29 Shiklomanov and others.

30 Правительствo России, ‘О Стратегии Развития Арктической Зоны Российской Федерации и Обеспечения Национальной Безопасности На Период До 2020 Года’ (Правительствo России, 2013) <http://government.ru/info/18360/>.

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Norilsk Nickel, the megacorporation that inherited the mining operations after the collapse of the USSR, bears significant responsibility for the degradation of the local environment, while facing the negative effects of warming permafrost on its own operations. Factory collapses, facility leaks, and groundwater pollution are among a litany of environmental damages the company has caused due to negligence around building and operational safety.31 In part to make amends, and no doubt to retain its substantial but steadily declining workforce in the city,32 the company announced in 2019 that it is committing 85 billion rubles ($1.37 billion) to fund housing renovations in Norilsk.33 The sum supports half of the operation, the remainder of the funding will be federal, but it will involve demolishing over 300,000 square meters of housing and building 500,000, according to Krasnoyarsk Region’s Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Tsykalov.34 How the city plans to use this opportunity to develop and/or implement climate- adaptive and regenerative urbanism will be key to its future. It is critical to note that all of Norilsk’s pre-existing structural failures are significantly accelerated by, but are occurring separately from, the impact of climate change in the Arctic according to Streletskiy and Shiklomanov’s analysis.35 While temperature rise in the region is at times double the global average, historical permafrost construction techniques and the failure to take the complexity of the local ecosystem into account when determining architectural interventions bears significant fault for the current crisis.36 As such, the failure of Norilsk’s Soviet-era designers to take into account the delicate ecological balance required to maintain the permafrost’s integrity should be instructive for contemporary architects as they design climateadaptive interventions across the globe.

The goal of this paper has been to summarize the extent of architectural and urban scholarly engagement with Norilsk from the Soviet period to present and present the opportunity for a new generation of inquiry as the city charts a path to repair itself despite its primary industry’s very direct role in the climate crisis. It suggests a need for a whole-system ecological view of green building technologies not only at the level of individual performance but at scale across a built environment, taking potential negative externalities into account.

Bibliography • Bond, Andrew, ‘Urban Planning and Design in the Soviet North : The Noril’sk Experience’, Soviet Geography, 25.3 (1984), 145–65 • Bond, Andrew R., ‘Residential Construction in Northern USSR’, Cities, 1.2 (1983), 120–31 <https://doi.org/10.1016/0264-2751(83)90004-5> • Ertz, Simon, ‘Chapter 7: Building Norilsk’, in The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag (Hoover Institution Press, 2003), pp. 127–50 <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817939423_127.pdf> _____________________________ 31. Nornickel, Enabling The Transition to a Greener World (Moscow: Nornickel, December 2020) <https://www.nornickel.com/upload/iblock/6ba/Strategy_Day_Presentation_December_1_2020.pdf> [accessed 28 March 2021].

32 Nornickel, ‘Nickel Plant Closure’, 2016 <https://www.nornickel.com/sustainability/environment/plant-closure/>.

33 ‘Nornickel to Fund 15-Year Housing Renovation Project in Norilsk’, Russia Business Today, 24 December 2019 <https://russiabusinesstoday.com/construction/nornickel-to-fund-15-year-housing-renovation-project-in-norilsk/> [accessed 27 March 2021].

34 ibid 35 Streletskiy and Shiklomanov.

36 Streletskiy and Shiklomanov.

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• Jull, Matthew, ‘Toward a Northern Architecture: The Microrayon as Arctic Urban Prototype’, Journal of Architectural Education, 70.2 (2016), 214–22 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10464883.2016.1197672> • Laruelle, Marlene, and Sophie Hohmann, ‘Biography of a Polar City: Population Flows and Urban Identity in Norilsk’, Polar Geography, 40.4 (2017), 306–23 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2017.1387822> • Luhn, Alec, ‘Slow-Motion Wrecks: How Thawing Permafrost Is Destroying Arctic Cities’, The Guardian (Norilsk, Russia, 14 October 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/oct/14/thawing-permafrost-destroying-arctic- cities-norilskrussia> • ———, ‘Where the River Runs Red: Can Norilsk, Russia’s Most Polluted City, Come Clean?’, The Guardian (Norilsk, Russia, 15 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/sep/15/norilsk-red-river-russias-most-polluted- city-clean> [accessed 20 March 2021] • Nornickel, Enabling The Transition to a Greener World (Moscow: Nornickel, December 2020) <https://www.nornickel.com/upload/iblock/6ba/Strategy_Day_Presentation_December_1 _2020.pdf> [accessed 28 March 2021] • ———, ‘Nickel Plant Closure’, 2016 <https://www.nornickel.com/sustainability/environment/plant-closure/> • ‘Nornickel to Fund 15-Year Housing Renovation Project in Norilsk’, Russia Business Today, 24 December 2019 <https://russiabusinesstoday.com/construction/nornickel-to-fund-15year-housing-renovation-project-in-norilsk/> [accessed 27 March 2021] • Reisser, Colin, ‘Drivers Shaping Russia’s Arctic Cities’, in Urban Sustainability in the Arctic: Visions, Contexts, and Challenges (George Washington University, 2013), pp. 207–12 • Reuters Staff, ‘Three People Die in Partial Collapse of Nornickel’s Arctic Processing Plant’, Reuters (Moscow, 21 February 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norilsknickelplant-idUSKBN2AK07J> [accessed 28 March 2021] • Shiklomanov, Nikolay I., Dmitry A. Streletskiy, Valery I. Grebenets, and Luis Suter, ‘Conquering the Permafrost: Urban Infrastructure Development in Norilsk, Russia’, Polar Geography, 40.4 (2017), 273–90 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2017.1329237> • Streletskiy, Dmitry A., and Nikolay I. Shiklomanov, ‘Arctic Urban Sustainability and Permafrost’, in Urban Sustainability in the Arctic: Visions, Contexts, and Challenges (George Washington University, 2016), pp. 27–33 • Zupagrafika, and Alexander Veryovkin, Concrete Siberia (Zupagrafika, 2020) <https://www.zupagrafika.com/shop/concrete-siberia> • Правительствo России, ‘О Стратегии Развития Арктической Зоны Российской Федерации и Обеспечения Национальной Безопасности На Период До 2020 Года’ (Правительствo России, 2013) <http://government.ru/info/18360/>

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Examining the Challenges and Opportunities for Renewable Energy in Arctic Cities Kelsey Jones (George Washington University) Introduction Arctic cities are on the frontline of the climate crisis. Thawing permafrost and extreme weather events are bringing significant changes to the region. Northern infrastructure is built to withstand freezing cold temperatures, but much of it is outdated and in need of repair. The dilapidation threatens the stability of the electric grid. Arctic cities are experiencing energy security issues due to frequent blackouts, antiquated equipment, unstable grids, and overloaded transmission lines. High fuel costs and expensive utility bills only add to the frustration. One way to address these concerns is transitioning to renewable energy. This paper will examine the challenges and opportunities for renewable energy in Yakutsk, Russia; Oulu, Finland; and Luleå, Sweden. These cities will serve as case studies to understand why certain Arctic cities have made significant progress in renewable energy implementation, while others have not. This research will also look at whether the conditions found in the successful cities can be replicated elsewhere.

Existing challenges to renewable energy implementation in these cities include geography, climate, a lack of community and government coordination, depopulation, and a dependence on fossil fuels. The assets and conditions that make renewable energy development possible include hydropower potential, incentive programs, activism from local leaders, and coordination of implementation plans on the country and city level. The on-going transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy will reshape much of the Arctic economy. In analyzing the challenges and opportunities for renewable energy in these three cities, it is clear that there is no one perfect solution. There are many factors that influence energy transitions and Arctic cities in particular have multiple challenges to contend with.

Literature Review Arctic cities are split over the best approach to managing the intersection between energy security and decarbonization. A significant amount of the research into renewable energy in the Arctic focuses on remote communities and there is little research solely on renewable energy in Arctic cities. In addition, much of the research focuses on individual technologies such as solar photovoltaic (PV) or wind turbines, rather than expanding to encompass a comprehensive overview of the different types of renewable energy found in these specific cities. The isolated nature of many of these cities also leads to limited information, especially when they are dealing with issues beyond just managing their energy transition.

A majority of the existing research examines renewable energy policies and projections on a federal level. There is research on how rural communities can benefit from renewables. In the Arctic there are many extremely isolated and remote communities that are dealing with energy security issues (Marsik). In examining the role renewables can play and are playing in remote areas of the Arctic, there is a distinctive difference in the needs of these communities and the needs of larger cities.

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A majority of the existing research examines renewable energy policies and projections on a federal level. There is research on how rural communities can benefit from renewables. In the Arctic there are many extremely isolated and remote communities that are dealing with energy security issues (Marsik). In examining the role renewables can play and are playing in remote areas of the Arctic, there is a distinctive difference in the needs of these communities and the needs of larger cities. This research suggests that Arctic cities need to be prepared to handle their energy transition differently than remote communities, many of whom are not even connected to the grid. Doing so will require local and federal governments to be prepared with multiple policy approaches and methods of planning. While there do need to be adjustments made, such as the addition of de-icing technology (Wang) or the placement of solar PV on the sides of buildings, wind and solar have consistently shown themselves to be strong candidates for integration into Arctic electricity grids. To ensure full confidence in the grid and an efficient and consistent electricity supply, battery storage and other energy sources can serve as a back-up (Marchenko).

The research about barriers and assets to renewable energy resources in the Arctic puts into perspective the variety of challenges and opportunities for adopting renewable energy in Finland, Sweden, and Russia. Most of the Arctic cities with the highest percentage of renewable resources utilize hydropower and the cities with low percentages are in areas that have hydropower potential.

Several of the studies also dispel the false narrative that it is impossible to successfully operate wind and solar energy in Arctic climates. This study seeks to understand why certain cities have been more successful in implementing renewable energy and what barriers exist in those with a limited renewable energy presence.

Yakutsk Yakutsk, located in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), is approximately 400 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle and one of the coldest cities in the world. The city is extremely isolated, with limited transportation connections or grid security. Yakutsk is built completely on permafrost. Its energy industry is dominated by oil and gas and this trend is likely to continue given that 70% of the undiscovered gas reserves are in Russia (Balashova). The local coal mining industry is thriving.

Kolmar, a local producer, plans to double output in 2021 (“Kolmar”). As of 2019, less than 30% of the federal district’s energy supply comes from renewable energy sources (Sustainable).

There are significant challenges holding the city of Yakutsk back from a successful energy transition.

One of these challenges is the lack of initiative on the part of the Russian government. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke out about the energy crisis in Texas, incorrectly blaming renewable energy for causing the majority of the outages and electricity failures (“Non-Renewable”).

The Russian national target of achieving 4.5% of their electricity from renewables by 2024 (Lombardi) is significantly behind schedule and, without counting hydropower, the country gets less than 0.1% of its electricity generation from renewables (Cordell). Yakutsk does not have its own renewable energy goal, but there are several projects under consideration, especially as the city seeks to move away from expensive diesel fuel and address the issue of depopulation as potential workers leave northern cities to migrate south (Kirsanova).

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Several wind projects have been completed or are under way. These take advantage of the area’s strong wind speeds. Wind speeds in the Republic of Sakha generally reach five-seven meters per second (m/s) and research shows that there is a corresponding sharp drop in electricity costs when the average wind speed is higher than five m/s (Marchenko). The wind speeds in this region are much higher than elsewhere in the country and studies have found that it would be a cost-effective investment, as long as the turbines are properly winterized (Ivanova). Still, in Russia, wind power is seen as a supplementary source of energy, with the main supply continuing to come from diesel.

There are also regulatory barriers that hinder renewable energy development. Most of the energy subsidies in Russia currently go to diesel products and there are perceived challenges in transferring these subsidies to renewable energy sources (Boute 2016). The country has taken some steps to incentivize renewable investments, but the impacts have been minimal. For one, in 2017, Russia set up a Wind Energy Fund to support investment in wind technology (Sternbergh 2019). There was also an auction launched to support construction of a significant number of renewable energy projects.

Due to the decentralization of the power supply in the Republic of Sakha, it is imperative that the grid is able to function and operate around the clock. Unfortunately, a lot of Yakutsk’s infrastructure is old and outdated. In 2017, a power plant fire led to 300,000 city residents losing power and heat in the dead of winter (“Fire”). High costs of electricity and heat are two of the biggest challenges for people living in the extremely cold climate of the far north. A lack of support from the federal government makes it difficult for the residents of Yakutsk to develop their own renewable or clean energy goals. There has been limited research done on implementing renewables and there is no organized system in place to coordinate development of these projects in the Russian Arctic (Kirsanova).

Oulu Oulu, located in northern Finland, deals with many of the same issues as Yakutsk. Oulu’s renewable energy sources include hydropower, solar power, and biomass. The city has a Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plan which had a goal of achieving a 20% reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 (“Oulu”). On the national level, Finland’s renewable goals are supported by the European Union’s overarching decarbonization plan, with the country looking to get 50% of its energy from renewables by 2030 (“Renewable”). Oulu has several assets that enable a successful transition, but there are also financial and regulatory hurdles that make it challenging.

One opportunity that allows Finland to be more successful is the existing federal and local support for renewables. Finland utilizes nuclear power as a source of carbon-free generation and has chosen to invest in additional projects and a nuclear waste repository even as countries across Europe diverge from nuclear power. Solar and wind energy are also viewed positively. A recent study found that individual households in Finland that adopted solar PV were very happy with it and would even add more panels in the future (Karjalainen).

Still, there are regulatory and financial hurdles in Finland that must be overcome to get renewable energy development, such as solar PV, off the ground. Significant challenges to adopting these renewable technologies can be a serious disincentive. There is concern over the stability of solar PV in cold climates. One solution has been to place solar PV on the sides of buildings, rather than on the roof (Wang).

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Oulu’s greenhouse gas emissions are 6.9 tons per capita with the majority being attributed to road traffic and district heating (“Greenhouse”). To address some of these concerns, Oulu has been participating in a pilot program known as the Making-City project which sets up a “positive energy district” within the city (“Low”). In Oulu, the plan is to utilize geothermal heat pumps and solar PV, with a goal of exporting over 1,000 MW/hr/year of thermal energy (Velez). Some of the other energy efficiency measures include reducing the city’s energy consumption by 10.5% by 2025, reducing the use of peat, and expanding biogas use (“Toimimme”). Diversification of the energy supply in Oulu will allow the city to be successful in reaching their goals, while maintaining an efficient and stable grid (Federova).

Luleå Luleå is located in Norrbotten, Sweden’s northernmost county. Sweden has made significant investments in renewable energy and is looking to produce 100% of its electricity from renewables by 2040 (Sternbergh). To support this ambitious goal, Sweden has instituted tax regulations and subsidies that paid off when the country reached its initial goal in 2012, eight years ahead of schedule (Sweden).

In Norrbotten, there is an abundance of hydropower and wind power, along with a stable electric grid that is designed to withstand the harsh environment of the Arctic (Region). Luleå obtained over 100,000 MW/hrs from solid renewables in 2019 (Statistics). The data on liquid renewables is classified, so it is difficult to determine how much of their electricity was supplied by hydropower. In general, little research has been done on renewable energy in Luleå itself, rather the literature has typically looked at renewable energy country-wide.

The perception of climate change and renewables is favorable in Luleå. The region also has extremely low electricity prices. International companies such as Facebook, with its data center in Luleå, are drawn to the renewable energy in the region. While the project was initially celebrated by environmental advocates, organizations like Greenpeace have since brought up concerns about the utility not being a 100% renewable provider (Miller). There are also concerns about the volume of energy needed by these industry giants and the strain they put on what is currently a fairly stable and efficient grid. A lot of industries in northern Sweden do not rely on renewables and thus are responsible for a significant amount of greenhouse gas emissions. The municipality home to Luleå, Boden, wants to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 90% and eventually replace all fossil fuels with clean power sources (“Energy”).

Conclusion There are several key takeaways from this study. First, it is clear that in order to have a successful energy transition, cities need to have the proper policies and programs in place. Since Arctic cities are struggling with extreme temperatures, rundown infrastructure, and the impacts of climate change, it is important for them to be prepared for an energy transition that best suits the needs of the residents.

Population density is a barrier experienced by many Arctic cities. With fewer people residing in the far north, the government may be less incentivized to prioritize projects in these areas, plus there are fewer individuals available to get these projects off the ground and completed. Russia’s failure to adopt policies favoring renewable energy derives from its current dependence on the fossil fuel economy. These structural conditions impose severe barriers to making the energy transition, but they are not insurmountable. Sweden and Finland’s energy transitions are supported by the European Union’s decarbonization goals as well as a positive public perception of renewable energy and the need to cut emissions.

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Geography and local assets are important structural drivers for renewable energy, but the most important thing is how local actors prioritize the energy transition and demonstrate a willingness to take the necessary steps. Having leadership that understands the benefits of renewable energy and the avenues for implementation is critical. Arctic cities that are located in countries with renewable energy goals are at an advantage due to a demonstrated commitment from the federal government. In the far north, many of these cities are dealing with a broad spectrum of issues as a result of a changing climate.

One way to motivate residents around renewable energy is to educate them on potential benefits including lower electric bills and a stabilized grid with fewer blackouts.

Most Arctic cities have hydropower and wind power potential; yet, harnessing this potential can be difficult when there are financial and regulatory barriers in place. Arctic cities that have been successful with their transition can support other cities by sharing information on how they properly leveraged their own available assets and resources. Seeing success in other Arctic environments would eliminate some of the initial concerns and misconceptions and offer urban sustainability efforts a smoother path to grow amidst the many challenges and opportunities that exist in Arctic cities.

Works Cited • Balashova, Elena S., and Elizaveta A. Gromova. "Arctic shelf development as a driver of the progress of the Russian energy system." MATEC Web of Conferences. Vol. 106. EDP Sciences, 2017.

• Cordell, Jake. “Russia's Coronavirus Recovery Plan Has No Space for Renewables.” The Moscow Times, The Moscow Times, 26 Mar. 2021, www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/22/russiascoronavirus-recovery-plan-has-no-space-for-renewables-a70658.

• Energy Becomes an Enabler for Regional Growth in Boden, Swedish Energy Agency, 2 June 2020, www.energimyndigheten.se/en/news/2020/energy-becomes-an-enabler-for-regional-growthin-boden/.

• Fedorova, Elena, et al. “Balancing Socio-Efficiency and Resilience of Energy Provisioning on a Regional Level, Case Oulun Energia in Finland.” Clean Technologies, vol. 1, no. 1, 30 June 2019, pp. 273–293., doi:10.3390/cleantechnol1010019.

• “Fire at Russia Power Plant Leaves 300,000 People without Light, Heat” Asia Times, 18 Feb. 2020, asiatimes.com/2017/10/fire-russia-power-plant-leaves-300000-people-without-light-heat% E2%80%A8%E2%80%A8/.

• “Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Oulu.” Oulun Kaupunki - Www.ouka.fi, City of Oulu, Finland, 2017, www.ouka.fi/oulu/english/greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-oulu.

• Ivanova, I. Yu, et al. "The use of wind potential in the local energy of Yakutia." IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering. Vol. 905. No. 1. IOP Publishing, 2020.

• Karjalainen, Sami, and Hannele Ahvenniemi. "Pleasure is the profit-The adoption of solar PV systems by households in Finland." Renewable energy 133 (2019): 44-52.

• Kirsanova, Natalia, et al. “The Role and Future Outlook for Renewable Energy in the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation.” European Research Studies Journal, XXI, no. 2, 2018, pp. 356–368., doi:10.5593/sgem2018/5.3/s28.087.

• “Kolmar Plans to Double Coal Production in Yakutia in 2021.” TASS, Russian News Agency, 4 Feb. 2021, tass.com/economy/1252731.

• Lombardi, Pio, et al. "Isolated power system in Russia: a chance for renewable energies?."

Renewable Energy 90 (2016): 532-541.

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• “Low Carbon Economy Is Developed in Oulu as Part of an International Project, MakingCity.” Low Carbon Economy Is Developed in Oulu as Part of an International Project, Making-City - Asset Publisher, 16 Nov. 2018, www.ouka.fi/oulu/library/news/-/ asset_publisher/Bg7ybswAAAdc/content/low-carbon-economy-is-developed-in-oulu-as-partof-an-international-project-making-city/840372/pop_up.

• Marchenko, O. V., and S. V. Solomin. "Economic Efficiency Assessment of Autonomous Wind/Diesel/Hydrogen Systems in Russia." Journal of Renewable Energy 2013 (2013).

• Marsik, Tom, and Nathan Wiltse. “A Low Carbon Arctic Energy System? Challenges, Opportunities, and Trends.” Renewable Energy for the Arctic: New Perspectives, edited by Gisele M Arruda, Routledge, 2019. pp. 3-23.

• Miller, Rich. “Greenpeace to Facebook: 100% Renewable Is Not Green Enough!” Data Center Knowledge, 13 June 2013, www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2013/06/13/greenpeacesbizarre-response-to-facebooks-hydro-powered-data-center.

• “Non-Renewable Energy Saved Texas' Frozen Wind Turbines, Putin Says.” The Moscow Times, The Moscow Times, 26 Mar. 2021.

• “OULU.” Making City, makingcity.eu/oulu/#:~:text=The%20city%20council%20of% 20Oulu,carbon%20gas%20emissions%20by%202020.&text=More%20recently%2C%20the% 202018%20%E2%80%9CLight,for%20sustainable%20urban%20energy%20transformation.

• Region Norrbotton, 2019, Strategy Smart Specialization in Norrbotton , www.norrbotten.se/ publika/lg/regio/2020/smart_specialisering_eng_200707_webb.pdf.

• “Renewable Energy in Finland.” Työ- Ja Elinkeinoministeriö, Ministry of Economics Affairs and Employment of Finland, tem.fi/en/renewable-energy.

• Statistics Sweden (2019). Finding Statistics. Statistical Database. Energy. https:// www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__EN__EN0203/SlutAnvSektor/ • Sternbergh, Sarah. “Energy and Arctic Investment”. Renewable Energy for the Arctic: New Perspectives, edited by Gisele M Arruda, Routledge, 2019. pp 121-135.

• Sustainable development goals in the Russian Federation (2020): Statistical handbook.

Rosstat. pp 35.

• Sweden.se. “Energy Use in Sweden.” Sweden, Swedish Institute, 14 Apr. 2020, sweden.se/ nature/energy-use-in sweden/#:~:text=Sweden%20has%20a%20rich%20supply,production% 20and%20bioenergy%20for%20heating.

• “Toimimme Resurssiviisaasti.” Oulun Kaupunki - Www.ouka.fi, City of Oulu, www.ouka.fi/ oulu/ymparisto-ja-luonto/toimimme-resurssiviisaasti.

• Vélez, Fredy, Cristina de Torre Minguela, and Cecilia Sanz. "Cities transformation through Positive Energy Districts: MAKING-CITY project." 2019. http://makingcity.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2020/09/CARTIF_MakingCity_ICSC-CITIES_2019.pdf • Wang, Yibing, et al. “Damage Accumulation Model of Ice Detach Behavior in Ultrasonic DeIcing Technology.” Renewable Energy, vol. 153, 2020, pp. 1396–1405., doi:10.1016/ j.renene.2020.02.069.

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Festivals as a Sustainable Development Tool: Case Study of Teriberka, Russia Masha Monakhova (Arizona State University) Abstract: Northern Regions face rapid global change, but this is not limited to climate change.

Within the Russian Arctic, deindustrialization and the resulting lack of economic development opportunities plague large cities and small villages. Frequently shifting government priorities and lack of government capacity at the local level exacerbate this sustainable development challenge. Though recently, sustainable tourism has emerged as a development approach that brings social, economic, and environmental value to remote Arctic communities. This study examines the Teriberka Festival taking place in a small village of the same name in the Russian Arctic. By utilizing interviews with the primary and secondary festival stakeholders, this research aims to capture how the Teriberka Festival contributes to the village's sustainable development, including economic, social, and environmental dimensions. The festival aims to address all three dimensions, but the community's socio-political and historical context has resulted in the prioritization of economic development. Yet, the direct impact of the festival on Teriberka’s economic development has been minimal. Indirectly the increased tourism associated with the festival has drawn attention to the need for improved infrastructure, potentially leading to more significant impacts in the future.

Keywords: sustainable development, sustainable tourism, sustainable festival, Russian Arctic, Teriberka Sustainable Development in the Arctic Sustainable development in the Arctic builds upon the Brundtland’s (1987) conceptualization, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.” However, there are three additional elements that matter in the context of sustainable development in the Arctic (Young 2010; Petrov et al. 2017): 1) Indigenous communities of the Arctic. Traditional lifestyles of the Arctic peoples run counter to the prevalent economic systems causing lack of economic opportunities, high rates of unemployment, and a broad range of social issues in Russia’s Indigenous communities. 2) A long history of resource exploitation in the Arctic ranging from commercial fishing to oil and gas extraction. Natural resources of the Arctic have always been a critical component that have had a large impact on economy, lifestyle, and settlement patterns. 3) The Arctic is “a zone of peace” that should be treated as a distinctive region free from global tensions and rivalries (Larsen and Petrov 2020).On this basis, sustainable Arctic development means “development that improves the health, well-being and security of Arctic communities and residents while conserving ecosystem structures, functions, and resources” (Graybill and Petrov 2020). Using the lens of Arctic sustainable development, I explore the impact of the Teriberka festival on the local community given its recent history of post-Soviet economic decline and population loss.

Study Area Teriberka is a rural settlement (RST) located on the Kola Peninsula, a peninsula on the northwest of European Russia. The settlement is a part of Kola Rayon (District) and Murmansk Oblast (Region), being situated approximately 132 km away from its administrative center, Murmansk. Due to its geographical location and a natural harbor, the Teriberka region became an important fishing location of the Kola Peninsula.

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By the late 19th century, a permanent settlement inhabited by Pomors, Indigenous people of the European North of Russia, grew up around the fishing port offering various tax benefits and other incentives (Olsen and Vinogradova 2019).

A new stage in the development of Teriberka occurred during the Soviet period, following the formation of kolkhoz, a collective farm, in the second half of 1920s (Olsen and Vinogradova 2019; Vucinich 1949). During this time, development shifted to Lodeynoe, a new locality next to Teriberka.

Lodeynoe had a cod and herring processing plant, a search and rescue station and provided ship repair facilities (Fedorov 2014). Together, Teriberka and Lodeynoe grew to the largest fishing settlement in the Russian part of the Barents Sea coast; in 1957 Lodeynoe officially became a part of Teriberka RST. To compensate for the unfavorable settings, the government was offering increased wages and pensions, longer periods of paid leave, and an opportunity of an early retirement, as well as yearly free vouchers to travel and stay at rest houses in Southern Russia (Zhuravleva 2008; Rasell 2009). Through these fringe benefits, the Soviet authorities encouraged recruitment under very inhospitable conditions weather- and geography-wise for the expanding sectors such as manufacturing, thereby laying the ground for structural change.

Teriberka reached the peak of its development in the 1960s. A significant number of production plants were operating at the time: there were two fishing kolkhozes, two dairy farms, a chicken farm, over 2,000 reindeer husbandry, a fur farm, two fish factories, and several ship repair facilities. It was also peaking at the number of population that reached almost 5,000 people. Then, with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 there was a severe socio-economic crisis followed by multiple economic reforms, including privatization, market and trade liberalization. With this and the introduction of harsh fishing quotas, many of the smaller enterprises could no longer afford to operate (Tropnikova 2018).

Lack of jobs and continual worsening of living standards caused substantial migration of the population from Teriberka to urban, more prosperous and stable regions, such as Severomorsk (Ryabova and Korchak 2013). The urbanization process significantly changed the economic landscape of the Kola Peninsula. The population of the territory had reduced; many fishing villages fell into disuse and simultaneously a network of logging villages appeared in the southern part of Murmansk Oblast, including Tikshozero, Lyagkomino, Pazhma, etc. (Fedorov and Golovach 2012). In 2019, the estimated population of Teriberka RST was 594 (Federal Department of Statistics n.d.) as opposed to 2802 people in 1989 (Soviet Census 1989), 1479 in 2002 (Russian Census 2002), and 957 in 2010 (Russian Census 2010).

The economy of Teriberka is heavily dependent on governmental funding. In 2018, the local budget amounted to 19166 Russian rubles (approximately 300 US Dollars). The main source of revenue are the transfers from other regional and federal budgets of Russian Federation (Federal Department of Statistics n.d.). Almost all entities that are registered and operating in Teriberka village are either governmental organizations or are under the charge of public government. The businesses such as local bakery, grocery and souvenir stores are registered somewhere else and, therefore, do not make a financial contribution by paying taxes to the local budget (Unified State Register of Legal Entities n.d.). Over the last two decades, local services including healthcare and schooling have been significantly curtailed with the closure of a regional hospital and local school (Federal Department of Statistics n.d.).

The Teriberka Festival In 2014, Murmansk Oblast Government partnered with the Moscow eco-farming cooperative LavkaLavka and Bolshaya Zemlya rural development fund to organize a festival that would demonstrate opportunities for sustainable growth and provide the prerequisites for economic recovery of Teriberka village. “Efforts are being made to develop a model of revival for the remote Arctic settlements… I believe that this territory will rise again - not tomorrow, but in the medium term" - said the Deputy Governor of the Murmansk Oblast Grigory Stratiy before the festival’s opening (Murmansky Vestnik 2006).

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The document review indicated that the Teriberka festival was designed as a “sustainable development festival” (Ministry of Construction of Murmansk Oblast 2017). Taking the example of the Barents Spektakel festival that was initiated to diversify the stagnating local economy (Tennberg et al.

2014), its primary goal was to revive the Teriberka village by providing opportunities for development of the host community. Through revealing the natural beauty of the Russian Arctic along with its unique local kitchen to outsiders, the Teriberka festival aimed to trigger socio-economic development through generation of a steady flow of tourists.

At the festival, attendees are offered dishes of the Northern Russian cuisine prepared from locally grown products, such as scallops, sea urchins, cod, cloudberries, northern lingonberries, blueberries and crowberries, as well as a variety of northern plants. Festival’s agenda includes multiple music and art-related events; bands from Murmansk, St.Petersburg, and Moscow along with the international performers share the stage with the local artists, such as the Teriberka Pomor Choir headed by the director of Teriberka’s House of Culture. Along with music and art, rock-climbing, kitesurfing and motorcycling companies also come to Teriberka to offer festival-goers to partake in related activities. The first restaurant in Teriberka called Teribersky Bereg was opened on the first day of the festival along with a new hotel named Ter’; two more restaurants had begun construction (Afisha Daily 2015b).

Every year, the Teriberka festival hosts workshops on environmental issues; in 2016, a new “eco-navigation system” was developed to be implemented in Teriberka. The system included placing “No Open Fire” signs in the village along with the “No Passing Zone” ones in the area where the sources of drinking-water supply are located. It was also decided to install a plaque listing the rules of conduct for tourists and a map showing red-listed plant species in Teriberka at the entrance to the village (Lenta.ru 2016; B-port.com 2016). In 2017, the festival brought together architects and urban development specialists from Russia, United Stated and Netherlands who cooperated with the local and regional authorities and produced a “master plan” providing conceptual layout to guide future growth and development of the urban environment in Teriberka (Murman.tv 2017; Ministry of Construction of Murmansk Oblast 2017).

Interviews Based on interviews, the local people’s views on the festival were as follows: some of them expressed the dissatisfaction, skepticism, and remained hostile towards the festival saying that “Teriberka is decaying anyways” and implying that the festival was not going to change that (Personal Interview with Author, 07/15/2019). The others were of the view that the changes brought by the festival were “only good for the tourists, not for the local people” (Personal Interview with Author, 07/15/2019). Overall, there was a great level of distrust and skepticism among the local residents. The improved infrastructure in the village was the most appreciated contribution mentioned in the interviews. Some positive feedback also included an opportunity to “unwind” (Personal Interview with Author, 07/19/2019), “to have fun with friends and kids” (Personal Interview with Author, 07/15/2019) and “earn extra money on tourists” (Personal Interview with Author, 07/15/2019). One respondent pointed out how the festival contributed to establishing a network with other Arctic communities and exchanging preservation and protection of the Arctic communities’ traditional customs and practices.

None of the respondents mentioned any contribution of the festival to the environment. Nonetheless, some of them pointed out the reduced damage and improved practices of cleaning up after the event.

As for the local authorities, they supported the idea of helping Teriberka to revive economically through the tourism activities: “Tourism should supplement the local budget” (Personal Interview with Author, 07/18/2019). They confirmed that the festival was contributing to the local economy and infrastructure, though it was happening indirectly. Because of the festival, Teriberka is becoming a popular tourist destination, and thus drawing the attention of the government; more money is being allocated to its development.

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However, no job opportunities are being generated for local people as most businesses who come to Teriberka bring their own labor force (for instance, Teribersky Bereg restaurant brings waiters from Murmansk every morning and takes them back in the end of the working day) (Afisha Daily 2015c; Personal Interview with Author, 07/18/2019). Though some villagers make extra money by renting out their houses, helping with fish processing, or electrical work.

Conclusion The study reaffirmed the importance of the context and subject under discussion when interpreting the concept of sustainable development (Pierantoni 2004). Teriberka, after experiencing post-industrial, post-Soviet downfall has arisen as a potential model for Arctic sustainable development. The Teriberka festival was used as a tool to maintain the interest in Teriberka and provide an incentive to visit the place. The environmental aspect is present, but it is of secondary importance. Limited economic development occurs indirectly, through tourism development and drawing the attention of the government to improve infrastructure, such as paving a main road, renovating a three-story residential building in Lodeynoe, removing the “central landfill”, opening of a pharmacy kiosk, and deconstructing the dilapidated buildings.

The environmental impact included an installation of pro-environmental signs and plaques, but the main contribution of the festivals was promoting the green message and use of sustainable practices to the public. The festival-goers, as well as the community members, got an opportunity to be educated about the environmental challenges through discussions and workshops; the “green message” was also sent through promoting organic farming and local produce, as the food sold at the festival was mostly caught/produced and made in Teriberka using traditional Northern recipes (Laing and Frost 2010).

However, there were no sustainable practices implemented at the festival that would minimize the human footprint during the event. Neither did performers make any environment-related statements that could incite the general public to-take actions (Laing and Frost 2010).

The challenge of Arctic sustainable development in post-industrial, post-Soviet remote Russian villages is substantial; the sustainable festival in Teriberka is making an impact, albeit slowly and indirectly by attracting the regional government’s attention, but direct impacts to the community and its residents through festival revenues are more limited.

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