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Dear Delegates, Welcome to the IMO of YMUN 2014! My name is Lien Tran, and I am extremely excited to be chairing a committee which has very direct influence over the politics of my own country—Vietnam. However, over the years it has been a fortune of mine to live in a total of 4 completely different countries. I was born in Moscow right around the fall of the USSR, brought up for several years in the very cold and very liberal Kingdom of Sweden, lived most of my life in hot and humid Hanoi, and finally set foot for the first time in the United States just last year. I cannot tell you how much I love learning about different cultures as a consequence of this. The United States, especially, is proving to be such an adventure for me as there are so many distinct regions and communities to explore. YMUN has been an immense source of fun for me because of how it exposes me not only to different countries but also because it gives me the opportunity to meet students from all over the world. Therefore, do not hesitate to come and say hi to me (or be alarmed if I come and say hi to you!). I’m more than happy to answer any questions that you have about the topics of the conference, especially if you’re wondering how often the South China Sea dispute comes up in daily conversations of the Vietnamese. I can’t wait to see you all in January! Lien Tran, SY ‘16 Hello everyone! My name is Abhishek Chandra and I’m a freshman at Yale from New Delhi, India. I’m torn between Computer Science, Physics, Economics and, of course, Global Affairs and would gladly major in all of them if I could. I have a great passion for Model UN, an activity that I have been actively participating in for five years now, and this the fourth country that I will be chairing in. I sincerely hope that my fellow Yalies and I are able to give you a memorable and educational MUN experience during committee, and friends to remember when we leave. If at any point, any one of you has any questions regarding the MUN, international admissions and living in the US, the subjects I study, or just a random urge to talk to someone with a hard to pronounce name, I will be genuinely disappointed if you think twice before approaching me. See you soon! Abhishek Chandra, SY ‘16
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TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee South China Sea Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider Arctic Ocean Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider "##$%#$&'! ! ! !
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History of the Committee
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A specialized agency of the UN, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was formally established in Geneva in 1948 and convened the first time in 1959 after the IMO Convention came in effect. The organization currently consists of 170 members states. The IMO’s governing body—the Assembly—meets biennially. Between Assembly sessions, a Council of 40 Member Governments is elected to manage the organization. It has a number of committees and subcommittees to carry out its technical work. The IMO has develops legislations, enacts them and ensures proper their proper implementation. Safety is the IMO’s most important responsibility. Although this primarily involves shipping and environmental regulations, the IMO is empowered to develop treaties and legislations for international waters where safety is concerned. The IMO is therefore an excellent forum for dialogue on the administration of trade routes and fishing activities in the South China Sea with respect to sovereignty disputes. In addition, its expertise in handling maritime security issues in the past such as piracy is a great asset to contribute to the management of recent aggressive operations on fishing and oil exploration vessels carried out by military forces, all of which have offset serious confrontations between littoral states in the South China Sea.
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IMO 6 Topic I.
South China Sea Topic History ! The South China Sea is a vast water body semi-enclosed by China, Taiwan, and a number of Southeast Asian statesi. It contains significant reserves of oil and gas, provides fishing ground for multiple developing countries, and constitutes one of the busiest trade routes in the world, connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean. By 2012, the South China Sea provides 10% of the world’s fisheries and half of the tonnage of annual global ship-borne trade. For these reasons, control over vast territories in the South China Sea is highly desirable to its surrounding states as such power would grant them huge economic potential and strategic advantage. Multiple surrounding states have laid claims over parts of the South China Sea as a result. However, the territorial boundaries asserted by these states overlap each other and territorial conflicts consequently arise between many countries. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, the infamous Nine-dashed-
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line marks virtually all of the South China Sea as Chinese territory, bringing China to the center of the dispute as the primary state infringing upon others’ sovereignty. The issue has remained unsolved for decades. This political impasse is quickly turning the South China Sea into a region of military tension and political hostility. The current strain that the South China Sea dispute puts on relations between China and other involved states calls for immediate attention and settlement, before its consequences can harm regional economic cooperation, or worse, lead to military confrontation. Thus it is the delegates’ responsibility to communicate, discuss and arrive at a resolution for the dispute as soon as possible. Be it incorporating bilateral and multilateral agreements, arriving at code of conducts, or seeking jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal—the resolution would prove crucial to the peace and development of Asia and the world.
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The history of the South China Sea lies at the heart of debates over the dispute as states like China and Vietnam base their sovereignty claims on historic title over the region. In other words, these countries use evidence of their discovery of and activity in various parts of the South China Sea in the far past to substantiate their territorial claims. Arguments in many discussions over disputed islands also hinge themselves on historical events and agreements in the first half of the twentieth century when most South East Asian states endured colonial rule, and their territorial boundaries came under control of Japanese and various Western powers. There are four distinct periods of development to be inspected: until late 19th century, late 19th century-1970s, 1970s-1992, and 1992-present. Before the surge of Western imperialism in South East Asia at the end of the 19th century, the South China Sea was an abundant fishing ground to many surrounding states. The acknowledgement of these waters and discoveries of the islands within before the 19th century greatly affect current sovereignty debates. China and Vietnam contend each other in the age and amount of their historical evidence for activity in the South China Sea. China claims that the region had been unknown to Chinese fishermen from time immemorial, and that references to the southern seas and islands in geographical and literary works could be dated back to the 3rd century AD. Vietnam, on the other hand, possesses various documents from as far as the 16th century which map and designate Paracel and Spratly islands as part of Vietnam, as well as record the country’s administrative efforts over them. The vali and significance of these historical records
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remain ambiguous, however, and further inspection and interpretation is needed to understand the actual history and how it impacts the dispute today. The arrival of the world’s great powers in South East Asia toward the end of the 19th century meant even more documented control over the sea and islands, meaning that more solid evidence of activity in disputed areas can be found during this period. Of significance is the Treaty of Paris in 1898 where Spain surrendered to the United States its control over the Philippines, but the territory of which excluded areas to which the Philippines claims sovereignty today (ie. The Scarborough Shoal), thus providing legal loop holes for criticism from China. Control over Paracel and Spratly Islands during early 20th century was passed between multiple states as a consequence of Vietnam’s colonization by the French and Japanese military expansion in the East. These historical events have become important bases for arguments over sovereignty in the dispute. A crucial moment that truly marks the origin of the dispute is the publication of a map by the Chinese government in 1947, depicting an eleven-dashed-line demarcating virtually all of the South China Sea as Chinese territory. It was later revised in 1949 and became the renowned Ninedashed-line. Then, 1960s witnessed the discovery of vast natural energy resources off Paracel and Spratly Islands. The combination of China’s bold assertion and the South China Sea’s economic potential quickly sparked strong interests in surrounding states, which quickly gave rise to rapidly escalating tension. Serious territorial claims took place beginning in the 1970s. The Philippines,
IMO 8 Malaysia and other countries began to declare possession and control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China clashed with South Vietnam in a naval battle in 1974 in the Paracel Islands, and once again with a united Vietnam in 1988 at the Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys, both of which ended with China’s victory and expansion. Many countries began energy exploration, resulting in severe Chinese criticism and protests. These conflicting claims and interests contributed to the organization of a third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1973. The convention ended in 1982 with a heavily revised international agreement, creating guidelines for the status of islands, continental shelves, exclusive economic zones, enclosed seas and territorial limits. Yet its resolving effects on the dispute did little to assuage growing tension in the region. According to UNCLOS, the countries with overlapping claims must settle the dispute via discussion and cooperation between themselves. The year 1992 marked the first cooperative efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to manage, but not yet resolve, the dispute. Though the treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976 had set blueprints for efforts of conflict avoidance between the ASEAN states, the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea put forth an informal code of conduct specifically to exercise self-restraint and peaceful
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measures in dealing with conflicting claims in the South China Sea. In November 2002, China consented to strengthening regional cooperation with ASEAN by agreeing to the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, adding confidence-building measures, maintenance of freedom of navigation at sea and air and conduct of negotiations in accordance with international law. These agreements were significant milestones, but they by no means serve to resolve the conflict. In fact, they function as informal, conflictmanagement (as opposed to conflict-resolution) measures. Neither China or any of the ASEAN states showed any intention of receding from their claims at this point, and the road to resolving the dispute still remained difficult and out of sight. Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted their delimitations to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on May 6th, 2009 because the CLCS issued a deadline for claimant states of South China Sea territory to do so if they intend to claim for a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This event sparked intense Chinese reaction on May 7th 2009, whereupon they claimed “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters,” and even caused disquiet from the Philippines because the claims overlap with their territory. This was quickly followed by a series of note verbales—or diplomatic exchanges—from all
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states involved in the dispute in a heated debate that quickly attracted international attention. Hereupon Indonesia entered the debate with a critical position against China despite then not being a claimant of South China Sea territory; Vietnam, the Philippines and China persisted their claims for sovereignty; the US declared interests in the dispute and offered to help ease tensions, though which was taken as an offense to the Chinese government. The CLCS has yet to make any recommendations to the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia, however, because multiple states—including Vietnam and the Philippines— requested that the Commission refrain from doing so until the countries have resolved their disputes. It is also according to the rules of procedure of the Commission that disputes must be settled between the countries themselves.
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Current Situation Energy exploration Freedom explore vast natural resources in the South China Sea is the primary incentive driving the South China Sea dispute. With Asia’s rapid economic growth in recent years, fuel consumption is bound to rise while fuel reserves and production will more or less stay level or decrease. Securing the unexplored reserves in the region—11 billion barrels of oil and 190 billion trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to the US Energy Information Administration—then becomes a crucial objective. It is an extremely significant factor that would affect any country’s economic stability and development in the future. China and the ASEAN states have long shared common interests in exploring the aforementioned energy resources in the South China Sea. However, the right to explore these resources rests upon questions of sovereignty. The fact that China needs and demands absolute control over them—as it claims ownership of virtually the entire sea and therefore all the reserves—means that any attempts at joint development between China and other contesting states have largely been unsuccessful. Such a joint development had been attempted before. In 2005, oil companies from China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed “A
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Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea,” agreeing to engage in joint resource pre-exploration activity. It stated that though each country’s basic position on the dispute would not change, the agreement hoped to promote peace, stability, cooperation and development. It did not mention rights to the use of those resources, however. The tripartite expired by 2008 but was never renewed. The Philippines’ reasoned that the agreement “sold out” their territory and resources, while China accused both Vietnam and the Philippines of ignoring their position, rights and claims by signing contracts with Western companies to explore oil. Essentially, China opposes any unilateral or multilateral resource exploration in the South China Sea that does not include China. But as natural energy resources become a necessity for economic development and extensive exploration corresponds to further assertion of sovereignty, many littoral ASEAN nations still continue to offer tenders to foreign companies in contested waters. The result of this conflict is multiple warnings, protests and military confrontations involving not only China and the ASEAN states but also great global powers such as the US, Russia, India and Japan.
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Not only that, the possibility of deepening economic and military ties between various of these nations is a strained undertone to the fight over natural resources on the surface. As a result, this uncooperative nature between different nations states could severely encumber the economic development of the region. Although sovereign is central to the dispute, previous joint-developments of resource exploration without yielding of legal rights over territory have been made, such as with Thailand and Malaysia in the Gulf of Thailand. Delegates must therefore revisit these episodes and reconsider plans and strategies for economic improvement. It is essential to ask whether or not cooperation is possible regardless of sovereignty disputes, and what measures should and could be taken in each case. The Question of Sovereignty Seven countries currently claim parts of the sea as being under their control: China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The key of the conflict is that all claims made by the countries above overlap each other. China, especially, claims almost the entire South China Sea as its territory and cut across the claims of every other nation state in the dispute. China’s claims as demarcated by the Ninedashed-line were initially based upon centuries of historic reference. China demands historic title over vast areas of the South China Sea due to evidence of past occupation and activity of the seas and islands to the south. Vietnam presents a similar case, using ancient written documents and maps dating back to
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the 16th century to found its sovereignty. The Philippines’ claim of the Spratly Islands can be traced originally to a Filipino adventurer who discovered them in 1956. However, insufficient legal regulations prevented any clear lines to be drawn, quite literally, onto the South China Sea and designate various areas as national property to these countries. The UNCLOS III established an international agreement 1982 with the intent of alleviating the situation by providing clear and quantitative demarcation of national marine borders. On the contrary, however, it only resulted in more boundary overlaps and prompted more countries to chime into dispute to claim their prizes as designated by international law. The Paracel Islands, the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands are three primary geographical features in the South China Sea that govern sovereignty debates. China has controlled the Paracel Islands ever since the battle with South Vietnam in 1974, but Vietnam still strongly contends for legal ownership of the islands according to the UNCLOS despite the islands being around 180 nautical away from both Vietnamese and Chinese coasts. The Scarborough Shoal is claimed by China and the Philippines, with the Philippines relying largely not on the UNCLOS but, apparently, other principles of public international law regarding acquisition of territorial sovereignty (even though it still lies within the Philippines’ 200 nautical mile EEZ, 124 nautical miles from Philippines’ territory). The Spratly Islands are the most disputed of all the archipelagos—between China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Indonesia, with the exception of Indonesia only claiming for maritime
IMO 12 rights. Vietnam currently occupies most of the island or rocks, followed by China, the Philippines, and Malaysia, though each country claims the archipelago either in whole or in parts—different from what they actually control. The Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Islands are also important sites of ongoing disputes and delegates are encouraged to research them for further understanding, but preference is given for focus on the Paracels, the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal since they require more immediate attention considering the historical context and recent chain of events. Although most of China’s claims rely on historical evidence, a different interpretation of the UNCLOS has been put forward which could provide China with legal basis for establishing the Nine-dashed-line. Since China possesses control over parts of the Spratly islands, it could potentially extend its sovereignty based on the UNCLOS if these “parts” qualify as “islands” and grant it an extra 200 nautical mile radius EEZ (as opposed to uninhabitable rocks and islets which can only be entitled to 12 nautical mile territorial waters). Nevertheless, this basis does not solve the overlapping boundaries between claims. Failure to resolve the issue up until this point is impeding economic development, building political tension and causing serious confrontations, such as the cutting of cables of marine vessels between Vietnam and China (December 2012) or the shooting of a
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Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippines Coast Guard (May 9th 2013) on disputed waters. Delegates need to take immediate, decisive steps to arrive at a peaceful and effective resolution before the conflict further escalates to military action. Security on Disputed Waters Security on the South China Sea is a growing international concern. As dispute resolution measures refuse to progress, China and the ASEAN states involved have steadily strengthened their administrative and military power to assert and protect areas of claimed sovereignty. There has been a gradual increase in air and naval military forces, including those of non-littoral states. China’s economic boom has enabled it to substantially boost its defenses and boldly warn countries that are not involved directly in the sovereignty issue to back out. The ASEAN states on the other hand, have teamed together and pushed persistently for international support to make up for their economic inferiority. The principal power to which they turn is the US—both for legal and military support. To rival China’s build up of military power, the US has been patrolling and carrying out joint military training with Southeast Asian nations, besides India, Japan and Australia. The past few years has also seen an increase in number and severity of military
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responses and direct confrontation between different states. This is the result of continued and increased exploration of oil and gas in the South China Sea, where one country is bound to aggravate another when it comes to disputed areas. This includes the Reed Bank incident in March 2011, where two Chinese patrol boats aggressively approached and forced a UK-based survey ship on contract with the Philippines to retreat from disputed waters; the Scarborough Shoal standoff in April 2012 initiated by the Philippines’ capture of eight Chinese fishing ships; the firing at Vietnamese fishing boats by Chinese navy in March 2013 near Paracel islands after the boats refused to retreat. The most hostile military offensive so far was the shooting of a Taiwanese vessel by the Philippine Coast Guard in May 2013, resulting in one death. With such critical military tensions building especially between China and the Philippines, treaties and agreements in 1976, 1992 and 2002 which established informal, nonbinding code of conduct in Southeast Asia concerning management of disputed waters are no longer effective. Thus it is of crucial importance now that all the ASEAN states, China and proponents of peace to come together and reach an international agreement on conflict management. Suggestions have been made for a binding code of conduct with China, but could it really be effective? Would China be convinced to sign even if all of the ASEAN states stood together? What measures can be taken to minimize the economic and human toll before its too late? Arbitration There are four alternative ways to settle international disputes over marine territory
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according to the UNCLOS when involved parties cannot come to legal agreements themselves. A state party can choose between: o o o o
Approaching the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Approaching the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Seeking an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the UNCLOS Seeking a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with the UNCLOS
However, in order for a dispute to be considered by the ITLS or ICJ, all parties involved must agree for that procedure of dispute settlement. Otherwise a state party can only submit the case to an arbitration. In July 2011, China had refused the Philippines’ request of bringing their sovereignty conflict to the ICJ. Early 2013, the Philippines challenged China’s claims in a request for arbitration to the UN regardless of China’s reaction. An international arbitral tribunal is currently being set up to consider the case. Under Annex VII of the UNCLOS (closer inspection of the actual text as referenced is encouraged for all delegates), an arbitral tribunal: o o o o
Shall consist of five members Shall determine its own procedure for dispute settlement Make decisions by majority vote Confine the award (or final outcome) of arbitration procedures to the subject matter as put forth by the party instituting the proceedings
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The award shall be final and complied with by parties of the dispute
With the Philippines pioneering the request for UN interference, the question arises for other countries: Should we also seek arbitration? Bilateral negotiations with China so far have not had conclusive effects. In addition, ASEAN plans to group together and take a single stand against China’s claims and reach mutual, binding agreements. Would arbitration improve or worsen prospects of this plan to succeed?
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Bloc Positions China Gaining sovereignty and the power to explore natural energy reserves in the South China Sea is of paramount importance for China. China’s recent economic growth projects a very high demand for oil and gas in the next decade, and any resource that could alleviate China’s dependency on the currently unstable Middle East is extremely desirable. For this reason, there is little surprise for China’s aggressive claim for ownership of the South China Sea. The geographic and military advantage of having control over Asia’s busiest maritime trade route is also crucial for the development and maintenance of its massive population and staggering economy. China’s Nine-dashed-line puts it at the center of the South China Sea dispute. Its claims conflict with those every other country. The crux of its sovereignty is based on its historical evidence that Chinese people have known occupied the waters and islands of the South China Sea for centuries. With the establishment of UNCLOS’ agreement in 1982, China also supports the interpretation that geographical features under its control in the South China Sea qualify as “islands,” thus giving China an extension of 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone. In terms of negotiations, China has persistently demanded bilateral negotiations with each country whose boundaries are violated by the Nine-dashed-line. This is primarily a consequence of China’s regional economic and political influence. In bilateral discussions, China would have a much stronger stance and be able to use its power to steer them in its favor. On top of this preference is the resistance to international
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interference, especially from the ‘US. It blatantly warned the US from giving support to the ASEAN states and refused requests from the Philippines to bring the dispute to international forums. China’s strategies aim at consolidating its own claims, meanwhile deterring other states from strengthening their claims. Its principal weakness is the lack of legal basis to its claims. Thus reliance on economic and political power is China’s trump card as it searches for more satisfactory backup. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum witnessed for the first time in history its inability to arrive at a joint communiqué because of widening divisions within the group, namely between claimants of the sea and non-claimants whose development are strongly dependent on Chinese economy. Until legal bases for the Nine-dashed-line are properly enforced, China must manage its relations carefully. There is too much at stake when it comes to energy resources and global trade for a world power like China to retract its claim, but the current stand does not put China in good terms with its rapidly developing neighbors. Taiwan Taiwan’s involvement in the dispute is heavily overlooked on global forums. It currently controls the largest and most significant island in the Spratlys—Taiping Island— and thus has immense strategic and military potential. The fact that Taiwan’s claim is identical to China’s is the primary reason for which it is often ignored. Moreover, Taiwan’s history and ties with China do not particular distinguish it from China. China claims Taiwan as part of its own despite more than 60 years of division. Many suggest that
IMO 16 it is among China’s policies to use the dispute as a means to diplomatically isolate Taiwan and put pressure on it to unite with China as one country. Taiwan faces a difficult dilemma in the dispute. On one hand, Taiwan must handle pressure and threats from China, rendering it ideal for Taiwan to side with the ASEAN countries, the US and their allies. However, it basically claims the area within the Nine-dashed-line. Any moves on Taiwan’s part will either threaten relations with the ASEAN or China, leaving it at a political deadlock. Philippines To the Philippines, the South China Sea is the West Philippine Sea. Their main struggle is for sovereignty over various maritime boundaries, the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Besides from referring to the UNCLOS as their legal basis, the Philippines also employ concepts of res nullius and acquisition of sovereignty in public international law to strengthen their grasps on the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, respectively. The Philippines currently occupies almost a dozen features in the Spratly Islands including islands, reefs, and shoals. It aims to claim rights over navigation and oil exploration in maritime regions that have been violated by China under international law. Unlike China, the Philippines have legal advantages over its claims. Thus its constant push for the dispute to be presented at an international legal institution such as the ICJ or
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ITLOS. The Philippines’ have also turned to other countries such as Japan and India for support. Its policies over the South China Sea have grown progressively more aggressive over the years as tensions rise on economic and military fronts with China, including its recent refusal to hold any bilateral negotiations. The Philippines have seen the US’s support in many of its claims. The US have jointly performed military exercises in disputed areas with Filipino troops and supplied the Philippines with arms. However, the US-Philippines alliance could potentially deteriorate because of the two countries’ Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951. The terms of military support from the US in case of military confrontation is ambiguous under the treaty. The Philippines expects the US to take its side, while US officials seem to prefer a more neutral position. Needless to say, the Philippines is a most belligerent party in the dispute against China. Its singular drive is a major concern for the ASEAN states where countries try to stand united and establish a mutual code of conduct; overly aggressive behavior from any one country may prompt China into complete refusal of any further multilateral agreements. Military tension is escalating the Philippines’ uncharacteristic aggression toward China is quickly changing its image on international fronts. Besides, it must also put significant effort into crafting its case for arbitration. China could easily disregard the
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outcome of the upcoming arbitration just as it ignored articles in the UNCLOS. The key is how to benefit from the arbitration, regardless of what China decides to do. Vietnam Crude oil is leading Vietnam’s export, making up approximately 30% of Vietnam’s export earnings. It has oil and gas exploration deals with US, Russian and Indian companies. This means that without the sovereignty over certain regions of the South China Sea, and consequently the right to oil and gas exploration, Vietnam’s economy would suffer incurably. Vietnam depends on both historical evidence and the UNCLOS to claim its sovereignty. However, its long history with China and the resulting ties and similarities between the two countries complicates Vietnam’s position in the dispute. The Vietnamese government is still largely communist despite the country’s growing open market and capitalist economy—not unlike China— making Vietnam heavily dependent on Chinese politics and economy. Though the Vietnamese’ nationalistic attitude severely denounces China for its boisterous claims, the government must walk a fine line of both asserting its sovereignty and maintaining a strong relationship with China if it wants a stable economy and political system. As a result, Vietnam continuously seeks partnership in making claims or assumes the position of a supporter of other countries’ tactics. It actively eludes direct confrontation without supporting allies. For example, Vietnam made a joint submission for limits of the continental shelf to CLCS with Malaysia in 2009; it seeks the US’s
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legal and military assistance; it signs oil exploration contracts with India—a country has long sustained with difficult relationships with China. Top on Vietnam’s list is to internationalize the dispute. Internalization means increased cooperation and partnerships, where Vietnam would be able to assert its claims without standing out as particularly difficult and provocative to China. US The concern of most non-littoral states in the dispute is freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. This is one of the US’ primary reasons for involvement. It states that the UNCLOS does not govern freedom of navigation of military vessels in EEZ, a strong stance to protect US-led order at sea, especially in the South China Sea. It specifically involves China’s EEZ and is met with fierce Chinese opposition. The US is also actively involved in the dispute to protect the interests of its allies such as the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, especially concerning the control of maritime routes. Multiple US investments in oil and gas exploration add another reason to the list. Growing Chinese threats and military capabilities also puts US forces in the South China Sea at risk of conflict, therefore potentially endangering the stability of US-China relations—one of the most important partnerships in the 21st century. The ASEAN nations regard the US as key supporter and player in the dispute, since as a global power it stands on a par with China’s increasing influence.
IMO 18 India India’s insecurity about having a strong dependence on oil and gas imports from the Middle East has driven it to diversify its energy resources. Trade routes through these waters—which connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans—contribute significantly to India’s trade. India also shares a long and difficult relationship with China, especially on territorial ownership fronts. All these factors explain India’s interests in the dispute. India has strengthened ties with a number of ASEAN nations. Particularly, India’s has developed oil and gas exploration deals with Vietnam, eliciting strong objection from China in 2011. India’s response was a readiness send military support into the South China Sea to protect its energy interests. Japan Japan’s interest interests in the issue primarily stems from its dependency on the South China Sea for oil trade routes, and its similar fight for territory with China in the East China Sea over the Senkaku islands. Like the US, it is a proponent of freedom of navigation. Any development in the issue of the South China Sea dispute could also easily be reflected in the Senkaku Islands and influence the dynamics of Japan’s struggle with China.
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Up until this point, Japan has engaged in military and legal support for ASEAN claimants. Strengthening ties with ASEAN countries seem to be one of its top objectives.
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Conclusion Essentially a fight over natural energy resources, the South China Sea dispute has been unresolved for several decades. No country seems to have receded from their claims, or have any intentions of doing so. The resulting conflict has escalated quickly in the past couple of years and now demands immediate attention and action before there are severe consequences. Conflict management have governed most diplomatic efforts until this point as military tension rises, but the parties involved need to quickly overcome this impasse and tackle the issue directly with conflict resolution. Casualties from the conflict are increasing, the ASEAN’s plans to unite under a European Union-like economic community are hindered, and the region’s economic health as a whole is at stake. Therefore China, the individual ASEAN claimants and interested non-littoral parties need to engage in rigorous dialogue to arrive at international agreements as soon as possible. There are many results to hope for: the ASEAN’s intentions of signing a code of conduct with China, the Philippines’ approach to a UN tribunal; other bilateral or multilateral negotiations. But these take time—whereas time is something that the world cannot afford to waste with a military time bomb stationing in the South China Sea.
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Questions to Consider 1. 2.
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4. 5. 6. 7.
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Is the dispute only a fight against China’s Nine-dashed-line? Should the ASEAN states pay more attention to their own bilateral conflicts that do not involve China? Should the ASEAN states support the Philippines’ challenge to China’s Nine-dashed-line when they plan to stand united against China’s claims? Would this threaten the possibility of having agreements for a code of conduct with China? Should geological features—reefs, shoals, perhaps even islands—in disputed archipelagos be given rights to grant their owner states 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone? Should there be revision of the UNCLOS for islands to have only 12 nautical mile of territorial waters anyway? Could joint development projects for oil and gas exploration between China and other ASEAN states be carried out regardless of sovereignty? Would this mitigate the current tension? What does “freedom of navigation” really mean? Should countries be able to freely administer military vessels or conduct military activities in another country’s exclusive “economic” zone? What could be done about security issues? Could a binding code of conduct alleviate the situation, or would it be ignored just as previously established, though informal, agreements? Is an arbitration truly helpful to solving the dispute, considering China’s disregard of international law anyways? How could it be used effectively to manage or resolve the conflict?
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TOPIC II.
Arctic Ocean Topic History
The Arctic has become a key region in global politics in the recent past. Several nations have laid claim to vast tracts of the Arctic, including the North Pole, and the resources that lie therein resources that are a huge proportion of the world’s remaining oil and gas. Climate change has only intensified the race for the region. Waters frozen since centuries are becoming ice free in the summer, opening up new shipping routes which are of keen interest to even non-Arctic shipping states. Yet States’ sovereign rights over these routes and resources is neither easily established nor easily challenged. In an assertion of these rights, alarmingly aggressive “Arctic roadmaps” have been released, which outline plans for opening Arctic airbases, military training for Arctic combat and setting up infrastructure to exploit the Arctic as a primary resource base by as soon as 2020. Alongside these larger claims are a number of bilateral territorialdisputes between the Arctic states. These issues, while not quite at the limelight, will set the tone for cooperation and negotiations in the Arctic.
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In this backdrop of rising tensions in the region, the Arctic Council has been elevated to the status of supreme mediator. An intergovernmental body with the eight Arctic states as its members, the Arctic Council is the only dedicated forum for dialogue on environmental, cultural and sovereignty disputes in the Arctic. Were the council to fail as a mediator, the Arctic could well become, literally and figuratively, the arena for the next “cold” war. On the matter of sovereignty, the history of the Arctic can be broadly talked of over three periods. The first, starting right from the first voyages to the Arctic Circle circa 300 B.Cii up to as far as the 19th century, while being of least immediate importance, is crucial to understand the roots of the claims and sentiments of the Arctic states. The exploration of the Arctic moved at an extremely slow pace, given the harsh conditions and lack technological advancement. During this period (starting from the late 15th century, around which Columbus made the first recorded search for a westerly passage from the Orient to Europeiii), the primary importance of the Arctic was as a potential route between Asia and Europe, a long-unfulfilled fantasy of explorers over the centuries.iv However, in the 20th century, increasingly so during and after World War II, the Arctic became a strategic arena for the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies. Throughout the cold war, the Arctic was heavily militarized, with frequent submarine sightings by both sides, and air bases being set up in locations as remote as northern Greenlandv.The beginning of the
IMO 22 militarization of the Arctic marks the second period of Arctic history.
Finally, two developments towards the end of the 20th century irrevocably transformed the dynamics of the Arctic and set apart the recent history of the Arctic: the adoption of an international agreement on water bodies and resources across the globe called the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the global acceptance of climate change. Subsequent sections will discuss these two landmark events in detail and analyse the consequences of the same.
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ARCTIC
Climate change, in particular global warming, is now a widely accepted and recorded phenomenon. Organizations such as the UNFCC are concertedly working on understanding its negative consequences and how to mitigate them. In the Arctic, ice is melting at an accelerated rate of between 2.2 to 3% and some models predict a
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complete loss of ice in the summer by the latter half of this centuryvi. No scientific evidence suggests that the Arctic has ever been ice-free in as far as the last several hundred thousand years. This poses a variety of environmental issues that are the major focus of bodies monitoring the Arctic, including the Arctic Council. Yet the human nature is ever ready to find opportunity in the face of adversity, and the Arctic is a classic case in point.
The United States Geological Survey reports that a staggering 22% of technically recoverable resources lie in the Arctic, and 84% of those offshore. There are 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas alone in the Arctic.vii With the Arctic melting, these resources are fast becoming ripe for the plucking. The melting of ice has also opened up sea routes that are frozen for most part of the year. The two main sea routes of the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, can radically reduce the distance between parts of Asia and Europe. The Northwest Passage is a sea route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Canadian Arctic archipelago (the group of islands in the northern part of Canada). It connects
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Western Europe to the West Coast of the US through a much shorter route than the current one through the Panama Canal. The Northern Sea Route is a similar shipping route roughly along the coast line of Northern Russia and Europe that shelves the distance between opposite ends of Europe and Asia by as much as 7,000 kilometres. These routes were previously unnavigable due to thick ice in the region, but that is changing. In 2011, 22 ships were able to make passage through the Northwest Passage –higher than all years on record put together. So why can’t all ships start using this route for shipping in the future? They cannot because Canada claims that the waters are their own internal waters, a claim contested by other nations. Similarly, the US, EU and most shipping nations disagree with Russia’s view that parts of the Northern Sea Route close to the Russian coast are their internal waters. States such as China would like both these passages to be considered international straits so that unrestricted movement through them is possible. What decides whether a route is an international strait or not is in many ways ambiguous (though the UNCLOS does try to define the rights of States bordering straits or having internal waters passing through them in Part III). Consequently, a dispute of sovereignty has also become a matter of economic interest to nations, leading to an increasing militarization of the Arctic. THE LAWS OF THE SEA TREATY “The oceans had long been subject to the freedom ofthe-seas doctrine - a principle put forth in the seventeenth century essentially limiting national rights and jurisdiction
IMO 24 over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation's coastline. The remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none. While this situation prevailed into the twentieth century, by midcentury there was an impetus to extend national claims over offshore resources. There was growing concern over the toll taken on coastal fish stocks by long-distance fishing fleets and over the threat of pollution and wastes from transport ships and oil tankers carrying noxious cargoes that plied sea routes across the globe. The hazard of pollution was ever present, threatening coastal resorts and all forms of ocean life. The navies of the maritime powers were competing to maintain a presence across the globe on the surface waters and even under the sea….. …The oceans were generating a multitude of claims, counterclaims and sovereignty disputes. The hope was for a more stable order, promoting greater use and better management of ocean resources and generating harmony and goodwill among States that would no longer have to eye each other suspiciously over conflicting claims. ” viii Conflicts over marine resources and territorial rights forced nations to convene in New York in 1973. Negotiations and discussions lasted for nine years, resulting in a massive constitution of the sea- the UNCLOS. With 320 articles, extensive annexures and ratification by 163 nations, this hefty instrument has become customary international law
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(though there is some controversy over this). This treaty effectively defines how far from the coastline a country can claim sovereignty and resources, the rights that they and other nations have over these waters, military practices in the oceans, responsibilities for conservation of marine ecology and answers every conceivable question on the seas. Delegates are not expected to understand and remember the ideas of every single article. The most critical aspects of the treaty concerning the Arctic debate shall be explained at some length in this guide. However, to get a basic sense of the exhaustive nature of this treaty, it is recommended that delegates quickly read through the index (i.e. the contents guide) of the treatyix. The full text of the treaty may be found here. KEY IDEAS FROM THE TREATY The UNCLOS defines fundamental boundary lines of the sea: 1. The first is the area defined as territorial waters which extends up to 12 nautical miles from a certain baseline of the mainland (generally speaking, from the coastline). These waters are as much a part of the nation as its land.x 2. Ships of all states have the right to “innocent passage” through the territorial waters of a country free of charge. That is, a ship can pass through territorial waters freely, given that it does not pollute, utilize
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resources of the waters etc. Under conditions of safety and documentation being maintained, even military and nuclear powered ships may pass. 3.
Beyond this is another 12 mile zone called the contiguous zone, where the state can exercise some special control (though not as much as over territorial waters) for preventing “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory…punish infringement of the above laws and regulations”.xi
6. of the mainland submerged underwater far into the ocean. Part VI, which deals with continental shelves, gives complete rights over the resources to the state, such as fishing and drilling. 7. All other waters are high seas, and part of the global commons. It is on the basis of continental shelf that nations such as Russia and Denmark lay claim to vast parts of the Arctic, including the North Pole. Clearly, there needs to be some body that verifies and approves these claims.
4. Then comes the now widely known exclusive economic zone (EEZ), an additional 200 mile zone from the baseline where the State has absolute control over all resources in the waters and seabed (and assumes responsibilities such as controlling pollution). Other nations must seek out permission before using the resources of these waters.xii 5.
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Finally there is the continental shelf which can offer certain special sovereign right up to an extra 150 miles beyond the EEZ. For legal purposes, the continental shelf is defined by Article 76 as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin”. In layman terms, it refers to the projection
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) In the third and final round of discussions of the UNCLOS, the CLCS was set up to verify all claims made regarding a state’s continental shelf. As per Annexure II article 3, the purpose of the CLCS is as follows:
IMO 26 “(a) To consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; (b) To provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during preparation of such data. In accordance with article 76(8), the Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. “xiii Every nation, after ratifying the UNCLOS, gets a period of 10 years to gather the data required to file its claim. This is an extensive period of research for the ratifying state as it tries, through bathymetric analysis (drilling, collecting and examining seabed samples) to prove that underground ridges, plateaus and other reliefs are indeed a part of their continental shelf. It is worth noting that the review of the information by the CLCS is a closed and often controversial process,
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raising important questions that need to be answered about their accountability. xiv And the debate over where the Arctic states’ continental shelves end is where we find ourselves in the present day. Claims and Submissions So Far To date, each of the Arctic states have ratified the UNCLOS with the notable exception of the United States (the reasons for which delegates are encouraged to explore. Since 2009, especially in 2012, there has been significant renewed debate in the US senate on the subject). Many of them have already presented their claims to the CLCS. Russia, for example, ratified the UNCLOS in 1997 and made a submission to the CLCS in 2001, claiming an enormous sector of the Arctic extending till the North Pole. The international response to Russia’s submission gives a true sense of the tension in region- consider the United States’ reply- pointing out “major flaws” in the Russian submission, the US summarizes a number of reasons why they find Russia’s position untenable. At the same time, Canada and Denmark intensified their research, culminating with Denmark making its submission in June 2012 and Canada nearly on the verge of the same.
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Bloc Positions Rising tensions, adoption of aggressive policies, and controversial, assertive acts by Arctic States indicate that they cannot all going to be satisfied by the judgement of the CLCS – in whichever party’s favour it happens to be. To compound matters further, the final verdict of the CLCS is years, probably more than a decade away given the backlog they are dealing with. In the meantime, it is necessary that the Arctic states come to a consensus on its policies in the Arctic, especially regarding military and security. However, as per its current mandate, the Council cannot make decisions on issues of security – something which delegates must address early on in the conference if they seek to arrive upon and adopt some form of a military accord.
After roughly a year of reviewing Russia’s research (a sense of which process may be gleaned from here) the CLCS in 2002 decided to neither accept nor reject Russia’s claims, asking them to compile more data and submit their revised findings-which Russia plans to submit in 2013. If the claims of different nations overlap, then it becomes a matter beyond the mandate of the CLCS to be resolved as outlined in the sections on arbitration and bilateral/multilateral negotiations in the UNCLOS.
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Russian Federation Russia’s claim to the Arctic hinges on establishing the Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges are a part of their continental shelf. The Lomonosov Ridge (an underwater relief that projects out of the mainland into the ocean, thereby making it a part of the continental shelf) happens to be particularly contentious as both Denmark and Canada claim at least parts of it to be their ownxv (While most of Russia’s sector is not claimed by any other State, the North Pole is another issue. Even states who have no basis to assert sovereign right over it are quick to suggest that it is and should remain part of the “global commons”). After the CLCS ruling of 2002, Russia launched intense efforts to establish their claim. The Artika Expedition of 2007 saw Russian scientists and submarines dive down thousands of
IMO 28 metres in an attempt to gather bathymetric data. During this time, Russia also planted its flag under the North Pole – an action strongly criticized by the United States, Denmark and Canada. Time and again, Russian scientists have declared they have found conclusive proof to back them and have reaffirmed their confidence in their claim being accepted in 2013. In documents detailing Russia’s Arctic policy until 2020, Russia has mandated an expansion of its military presence in the Arctic, increasing the radius of operation of its fleet of submarines, reopening Arctic airbasesxvi, and spending about $44 billion on projects in the Arctic. Russian naval authorities claim Russia’s aggressive policy is the result of other nations scramble for a “piece of the Arctic pie”. Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, a senior navy official, said in October 2010 regarding the matter, "We are observing the penetration of a host of states which... are advancing their interests very intensively, in every possible way, in particular China," and that Russia would not “give up a single inch”. xvii Russia also faces opposition on the Northern Sea Route front. It considers certain sections of the route to be a part of Russia’s “internal waters”. Internal waters differ significantly from territorial waters in that no ships can travel through internal waters (even innocent passage) without permission. The United States and the European Union contest this claimxviii.
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Canada Canada is the current chair of the Arctic Council, until 2017. Its Northern Strategy and Arctic Foreign Policy Statement both reaffirm its commitment towards “exercising sovereignty” in the region. It will make its submission to the CLCS in 2013 itself, and has been compiling data for several years nowxix. Canada is fending off threats to its sovereignty on multiple fronts- first, with respect to its continental shelf. Second, from the United States in the Beaufort Sea and from Denmark at Hans Island-both of which are bilateral issues that come under the topic of Arctic sovereignty. Finally, and arguably most importantly, is along the Northwest Passage. Canada faces similar problems as does Russia in this regard. The Northwest Passage clearly passes through archipelagic waters of Canada and Canada has enough reasons to feel that the passage constitutes internal waters. However, the United States has persistently denied Canada’s sovereignty in the waters, considering them international waters, and to prove their point, sent ships and submarines through the passage much to Canada’s chagrin. Several other nations have at least tacitly supported the US. Central to this debate are the interpretations of Part III and Part IV of the UNCLOS, which delegates should closely analyse.
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United States of America The US is an arctic nation through Alaska (which it purchased from the Russian Empire for less than $5 a square km in 1867) and its surrounding waters. It has not ratified the UNCLOS yet, and hence has no timeline for filing any continental shelf claims (and is not likely to have any major oppositions whenever it were to do so). However, it is a key player in many Arctic disputes, and has one of the most alarming Arctic policies. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25 / National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, released during the last month of Bush’s Presidency establish “the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and directs related implementation actions.” They divided the policies section into 7 different areas including • National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic • International Governance, Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues • Economic Issues, including Energy • Maritime Transportationxx The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmapxxi talks about strengthening underwater warfare and strike warfare mechanisms in the Arctic, conducting missile analyses, making investments in weapons , platforms, sensors, command, control, surveillance, and reconnaissance and much else. As of today, the US still has much poorer capabilities and infrastructure than either Russia or Canada, in terms of icebreakers, equipment and soldiers
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trained for Arctic condition. However, these aggressive policies are fast bridging that gap. The US has abrasive relations with most nations regarding Arctic issues – it strongly believes Russia’s claim to be flawed and offered objections when they first made their submission (referenced above). It was one of the first nations to oppose Canada’s rights over the Northwest Passage, though former US ambassador David Wilkins comment that this was not a matter of Canada v. the US, but a dispute between Canada and the worldxxii , is now truer than ever. Interestingly, it can be argued that other nations joining in the clamour makes the US a little less happy about its stance simply because global access to the passage poses possible security threats to it as well. That said, the US is not necessarily so concerned that Canada will not US ships pass or impose harsh shipping regulations given the strength of their bilateral ties. To paraphrase the opinion of Donald McRae of the University of Ottawa, the US probably has little issues with the policies that Canada will implement; rather, it is a matter of principal for the US that Canada recognize the status of International Straitxxiii. The United States is also the reason the reason why the members of the Arctic Council do not refer to the issue of militarization directly. The US said they would only participate in the Arctic Council if there was no discussion on issues of security in the council, leading to 1996 Ottawa Declaration including a clause to that effect. Naturally, the clause has faced severe criticism from both members and external observers, and there is
IMO 30 a growing hope that Canada’s upcoming chairmanship will rectify this gag orderxxiv xxv. China of all non-state actors, China has one of the biggest stakes in the future of the Arctic. Shipping and related industries accounts for a major share of their GDPxxvi, and a share in the hydrocarbon reserves of the region would be more than useful for the massive industrial sector of one of the world’s fastest growing economies. There is no authoritative official Arctic policy released by the Chinese government, but their interests in the Arctic are clear. The Northwest Passage is a possible 7000 odd kilometre shortcut, and along with nations such as South Korea and Japan have advocated the preservation of the Arctic as a “common heritage of mankind” (read as: forget Arctic sovereignty and free access to the Arctic and its routes for everyone). Chinese firms and state actors are investing all over the Arctic – from $400 million in mineral and petroleum projects in northern Canada to a series of agreements on Arctic cooperation with Icelandxxvii. A study on China in the Arctic can be found here. While it analyses these actions in light of Canada’s interests, it effectively sums up the widely perceived view of Chinese interests in the Arctic. European Union The interests of all European Union members are difficult to categorize under a single umbrella and their EU Arctic Policy is a work in progress. According to their introductory page on the europa.eu webpagexxviii (the official EU website where it publishes information from all its
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institutions), The EU Arctic policy is built around three main policy objectives, one of them being “international cooperation”. Their 2008, 2011 and 2013 speeches and communiques (links to which can be found on the same webpage) discuss sustainable use of Arctic resources, fighting climate change, supporting indigenous people and maintaining peace and cooperation between stakeholders. However, EU nations continue to develop robust military policies with the US through the NATO. These scarcely acknowledged undertones of military assertion indicate a truer and less benevolent picture of their interest in the Arctic. CONCLUSION
What was once a barren wasteland of ice has become the energy source of the fast approaching tomorrow. There are overlapping
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bilateral and multilateral conflicts over it, and with the CLCS lagging behind by years, no permanent resolution appears forthcoming even by the end of this decade. Nations are using their militaries to tacitly assert their rights over the region, and the only forum that brings all the parties together on a round table has its tongue tied by a declaration in 1996. In this free for all for resources, it becomes easy to forget that the true target should not be to get the biggest share of the melting Arctic; rather, it should be to minimize the effect of climate change in the first place. It is imperative that states realize the importance of dialogue and cooperation before tensions get any more serious than they already are. To allow territorial conflicts to reach a state where arbitration through international legal mechanisms becomes necessary will be detrimental to international peace and security, and cooperation in the Arctic. The only true way to resolve these conflicts is through open deliberation without any reservations, and the willingness to compromise on some interests to forward others. The attitude with which the participants of the Arctic Council choose to present their interests and demands at this conference will determine whether the Arctic will set a precedent for cooperation or a precedent for conflict.
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Questions to Consider This section highlights a few questions raised and (deliberately) not answered completely in the topic guide. • Should the Arctic Council be allowed to discuss matters of security?
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If so, what were the initial oppositions and how can they be addressed? And if the Arctic council should be able to discuss military issues, how can the militarization of the Arctic be stopped, or at least slowed down?
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Prominent territorial conflicts in the Arctic: o Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges o North Pole o Northwest Passage o Certain sections of the Northern Sea Route o Beaufort Sea dispute (resolved on paper) o Svalbard dispute (resolved) o Hans Island o Ellesmere Island
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Should territorial conflicts that are essentially bilateral issues be discussed in the Council? If so, then what role should the opinion of States not directly involved play?
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Should the North Pole remain a part of the “global commons” regardless of continental shelf claims?
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Taking the previous question further, are the demands of several non-Arctic states for other parts of the Arctic to be declared as global commons justified/feasible? Or perhaps something along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty System?
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Do the Northwest Passage and parts of the Northern Sea Route constitute internal waters? International straits? Or is there a possible middle ground that can appease all parties?
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Regardless of sovereignty, should heavy shipping traffic even be permitted in the region given the fragile Arctic ecosystem?
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Notes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! i
Because China’s and Taiwan’s claims over the South China Sea are essentially the same, later references to these claims will only address China. Taiwan’s position in the dispute will be discussed in detail in a later section. ii Pytheas of Massalia , an Ancient Greek explorer (4th century B.C) wrote extensive records of his travels in the Arctic. Only fragments of his records survive, most notably in Strabo’s Geographica. iii iv
http://geography.about.com/library/misc/ucarctic.htm Exploring Polar Frontiers: A Historical Encyclopedia by Mills, William James ISBN 9781576074220
v
Thule air base, Greenland [video] IPCC Assessment Report, 2007 Image taken from http://visual.ly/arctic-ice-melting vii http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980 viii The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) Originally prepared for the International Year of the Ocean, 1998 vi
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Part II of the UNCLOS Part II section 4 of the UNCLOS xii Part V of the UNCLOS xiii http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm xiv Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor by Anna Cavnar xv http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/09/15/20533385.html xvi http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120530/173757083.html xvii Reuters, ‘Russian navy boss warns of China’s race for the Arctic’, 4 Nov. 2010, xviii Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, Margaret Blunden xix Canada’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea xi
xx
Text of the NSPD 66/HSPD 25 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf xxii http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8S4RN3RUjE (10:40) xxiii http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0xcodrazPw xxiv http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2012/08/canada-and-arctic-council-what-will-change-2013-2015 xxv http://www.sipri.org/research/security/arctic/arcticevents/the-arctic-council-in-transition-nordic-to-north-americanleadership xxvi 46%, according to certain sources [China And the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon, Joseph Spears, China Brief 9, no. 6 (March 18, 2009)] though that figure may be off. xxvii China, Iceland announce deal on oil-rich Arctic (AFP) – Apr 20, 2012 xxviii http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/index_en.htm xxi
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