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Hola (Hello) everyone and welcome to the Organization of American States! I’m Sasha, and I’m one of the staffers for YMUN XL in charge of the OAS committee! I’m a sophomore in Calhoun College, and am interested in majoring in Economics or Global Affairs. I’m originally from Baltimore, Maryland, so I love to eat crabs and spice up any meal with some Old Bay. Aside from working as a staffer at YMUN, I’m also a Security Council Simulation at Yale (SCSY) USG, and I am a Secretary on the board of the Yale International Relations Association (YIRA). To continue the international trend, I am also an undergraduate liaison for the Yale World Fellows Program. Outside of my international activities, I am a Master’s Aide for Calhoun College and enjoy spending my free time watching 30 Rock, eating fruit salad, or snowboarding. I am unbelievably excited to be running the OAS committee this year, and am looking forward to seeing how my OAS delegates deal with the issues Billy and I have laid out! It should be a weekend of spirited debate, exciting challenges and innovative solutions. Get thinking, because climate change and the drug trade are now on you! If you have any questions or just want to chat, feel free to email me at: alexandra.frankel@yale.edu. - Sasha Frankel, Yale ’16 Bom dia and welcome to the OAS! My name’s Billy, and I’m the other staffer in charge of the OAS! I’m a sophomore prospective Economics major in Pierson College, and I just returned from a summer abroad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I grew up just outside Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota— hometown of Post-It Notes, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and deep-fried candy bars on a stick—and actually find New Haven in January to be comfortably warm. In addition to staffing YMUN, I’m also an active member of the Model United Nations Team at Yale (MUNTY), and I’m on the secretariat for Yale Model Government in Europe (YMGE), this year in Budapest, Hungary! Outside of Model UN, I’m involved in both the Yale Concert Band and the Yale Precision Marching Band, and I’m the Public Relations Director of the Minnesota Club at Yale (a very important position). I’m really looking forward to meeting all of you this January; I think we’re going to have an amazing weekend. Sasha and I have been planning this committee for a long time, and we can’t wait to hear your ideas for how to address these two pressing concerns! In the meantime, if you have any questions about the committee, the topics, or the best state in the union (Minnesota), please feel free to shoot me an email! (billy.thomas@yale.edu"! ! ##!!"##$%&'()*+,%-*#.%/01%
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TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee Gangs and the Drug Conduit Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider Climate Change Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider Suggestions for Further Research Role of the Committee Structure of the Committee Footnotes
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5 6 11 20 21 24 30 31 32 33 34
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History of the Committee !
The Organization of American states is the world’s oldest regional organization. The Organization was established in order to achieve "an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence."$ It utilizes a fourpronged approach to achieve this goal, based on its four main pillars: democracy, human rights, security, and development. In 1889, the American States decided to meet periodically to discuss common issues and concerns. From October 1889 to April 1890, the First International Conference of American States was held in Washington, DC.$$ The OAS came into being in 1948 with the signing of the Charter of the OAS, where it consisted of the United States and 20 Latin American nations. The Conferences of American states then met at various points until in 1970, they were replaced by the OAS General Assembly, which now includes all 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere.$$$
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Initially, the United States prevailed as the most powerful voice in the assembly, by virtue of its economic, political and military power. Now, however, because many Latin American countries have experienced economic growth, grown more confident in addressing their own challenges, and diversified their diplomatic relations, they seek to gain larger voices within the OAS and establish their own policies.$% Over time, the OAS has expanded its activities into areas beyond border disputes and regional security. During the 1960s, the OAS greatly expanded its development programs, and created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1978 and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission in 1986. The OAS also emphasized its commitment to democracy by adapting the Inter-American Democratic charter in 2001. % As global issues continue to develop and the OAS grows, new committees and powers are bound to develop. However, the OAS will always strive to use political dialogue, inclusiveness, cooperation, and legal and follow up instruments to maximize its work in the Hemisphere.%$
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TOPIC I.
Gangs and the Drug Conduit Topic History ! The Latin American drug trade has permeated the global market, and with its power now deeply entrenched within both Latin America and the world, it remains a driving force behind Latin America’s social, cultural, and economic problems. Much of the political problems facing Latin America in the 1980s have faded away, only to be replaced by a new onslaught of drug-related issues. In the early 20th century, cocaine was legal throughout the world, causing the rise of Andean cocaine production. Between 1910 and 1945, a multi-faceted cocaine policy remained, with some nations (like the United States) banning nonmedicinal cocaine use, and others openly accepting the drug.%$$ However, after World War II, UN drug agencies and the United States worked together to criminalize cocaine and other drugs: in Peru by 1948 and Bolivia by 1961. %$$$ Following the criminalization of cocaine, the illicit drug trade
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grew out of the already established cultivation practices in Latin America. There are several steps to drug trafficking, beginning with the cultivation of the crops and ending with the distribution and active usage of the final product throughout the globe. The Andean countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are the world’s main drug producers, while Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean remain the main terminals through which the drugs are transported on their way to the United States of America or to Europe.$& Though Colombia and Mexico are perhaps the most infamous drug-trafficking countries, Peru and Bolivia were the two principal suppliers of coca leave and refined cocaine from the middle of the nineteenth century through the mid 1980s. In 1985, Bolivia produced 25 percent of the world’s coca leaf supply, and Peru 65 percent.
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Colombia, on the other hand, only cultivated 10 percent or less. However, the United States soon got involved in the Andean drug trade as part of its “War on Drugs,” causing coca cultivation to shift to Colombia in the mid to late 1990s. Under President Victor Paz Estensoro, the United States financed crop eradication programs in Bolivia’s Chapare region after 1986. Additionally, the United States supported in the interruption of the “air bridge” between the coca region in Peru and the cocaine laboratories in the mid 1990s. Eventually, production in Peru and Bolivia shrunk drastically, and by 2000, Columbia was cultivating approximately 90 percent of the world’s coca leaf. &
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Both Peru and Bolivia have experimented with alternative development programs to eradicate their drug problems. Peru’s program began in 1995, and aimed to provide incentives to encourage farmers to stop coca cultivation. Bolivia’s began in the mid-1970s, with extensive international support. However, it is clear that neither Peru nor Bolivia’s incentives have enabled the economic value of alternative products to reach that of illicit crops.&$
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Colombia One of the most affected countries is Colombia, which has achieved notoriety on the world stage in the past few years for the business dealings, political scandals, and guerilla warfare surrounding its underground drug economy. However, Columbia only began to develop a presence in the cocaine market less than 50 years ago.&$$ In the mid 1970s, marijuana traffickers in Colombia began exporting small amounts of cocaine into the United States. They discovered that by simply hiding small amounts of cocaine into suitcases and then traveling into the United States, they could process cocaine in jungle labs for 1500 per kilo and turn around to sell it on the streets for 50,000 per kilo.&$$$ The profits were lucrative, and people began to flock to the burgeoning industry. The Medellín cartel was among the first Colombian cocaine smuggling cartels, and remained one of the most powerful until the 1990s. Its charismatic and determined leader, Pablo Escobar, joined with Carlos Lehder, a wellknown marijuana smuggler. Lehder convinced Escobar that cocaine could be flown directly into the United States on small airplanes, thereby bypassing the need for frequent trips to the United States, with cocaine smuggled in suitcases. Huge profits led the Medellín cartel to re-invest their money in new labs, airplanes, and an island in the Caribbean. Until the early 1990s, Medellín controlled 80 percent of the cocaine trade. However, in the 1980s, Escobar found himself in a fight with the Colombian government, which eventually led to a stand-off. The Colombian government threatened to extradite the traffickers to the United States, leading the Medellín cartel to revolt, and therefore contributing to its own
OAS 8 internal decomposition. Between 1989 and 1990, Medellín-related homicides spiked from 730 to 5,300 yearly.&$% Additionally, the United States financed a drug war against Pablo Escobar, leading to Escobar’s Death in 1993. The cartel began to self-destruct, and with the majority of its leaders either arrested or dead by the mid-1990s, the Medellín cartel collapsed. &%
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However, the Medellín cartel was not Colombia’s only drug powerhouse. In the Columbian city of Cali, the Cali cartel formed, and was the main rival of the Medellín cartel until Medellín collapsed in the 1990s. The Cali cartel saw smuggling as a sophisticated business, and chose to reinvest their profits in legitimate businesses, rather than in their own smuggling efforts. They dominated the cocaine trade by running their cartel with precise efficiency. They separated workers into cells to protect confidentiality, hired lawyers to study the moves of international prosecutors, and hired engineers to create equipment that could not be bugged. As their business grew, they Cali cartel began working to destroy Pablo Escobar’s Medellín cartel. They formed “People Against Pablo Escobar,” which was a group solely dedicated to ensuring Escobar’s downfall, and they began supplying information about Escobar to the Colombian government. As they grew, they shipped more cocaine into Asia and invested in political protection, but Cali’s leaders were eventually tracked down and arrested. By the mid1990s, Columbia’s Cali cartel had also fallen.&%$
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After the destruction of the Cali and Medellín cartels, the Colombian cocaine business began to fragment. Younger traffickers realized that large organizations were more visible and therefore more vulnerable to attack, so smugglers began to form smaller, more controllable groups with specialized tasks. For example, one cartelito only smuggled drugs from Colombia to Mexico, while another cartelito was solely responsible for jungle labs. Over 300 cartelitos formed to fill the vacuum left by the absence of the Cali and Medellín cartels.&%$$ As Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerillas and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (UAC) militias grew, they took over coca cultivation and processing in Colombia. By the late 1990s, the majority of rural Colombia was controlled by these two factions. As a result, drug-fueled violence spiraled out of control in the late 1990s and early 2000s, causing Colombia to become one of the most dangerous and violent countries in the world. &%$$$ Despite the relative success of the US backed “Plan Colombia,” a plan meant to reduce drugs’ influence in Colombia, as of 2010 Colombia remained the principle source for cocaine, and violence was again on the rise.&$& Mexico Additionally, the United States crackdown on trafficking routes in Colombia caused a shift north, to Mexico. As drugs were seized and cartels dismantled in Colombia, Mexico’s narcotraficantes shifted their role from postmen to wholesalers. Border towns like Tijuana, Nogales and Juárez have participated in drug trafficking activities since the early 1900s, concentrated mostly on alcohol and patent drugs, and later on opiates and marijuana. In 1989 a third of the cocaine intended for the US market entered via Mexico, and by the
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late 1990s, that figure reached 75 to 85 percent.&& The Sinaloa Cartel, led by Felix Gallardo, became the initial major player.&&$ By the early 1990s, the Mexican Sinoalan cartel surpassed Medellín’s peak profits. However, the Mexican Juarez cartel also began to grow in power, with the real transition beginning in the mid 1980s. Like Cali, Juárez groups exploited the government’s drive against their rival, the Sinoalan cartel, and became the top drug-trafficking cartel.&&$$ The growth and stabilization of Mexico’s drug trafficking networks occurred during the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled in Mexico for 71 years. Because the government was centralized and protected some drug production in certain regions, Mexican drug production became an entrenched establishment. Widespread corruption beneath the PRI government also created a “working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug lords” through the 1990s.&&$$$ However, with the decentralization of Mexican political power in the 1990s, the stability of the trafficking system began to fray. Officials no longer regulated competition among the cartels, and violence subsequently grew. By the late 1990s, the Tijuana/Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) was one of the most powerful drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. It competed with the powerful Juárez organization, as well as the Sinoalan cartel. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared an open war on drugs just days after being sworn in to office. He sent over 50,000 troops onto Mexico’s streets, invested billions into new equipment and improved training, and strengthened the partnership with United States’ anti-drug forces.&&$% The government was highly successfully in capturing drug leaders, with 25 of
OAS 10 the 37 most wanted captured during Calderon’s time in office. However, some observers have noted that the Mexican kingpin strategy created more instability and violence in Mexico. Past OAS Action The OAS established the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) in 1986. CICAD is a policy forum for discussing and dealing with the current Latin American drug problem. Its core mission is “to enhance the human and institutional capacities of its member states to reduce the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, and to address the health, social and criminal consequences of the drug trade.”&&% In 2010, the Hemispheric Drug Strategy expressed the commitment of member state to deal with the consequences of the drug trade. The strategy chose to focus on several key areas to combat drug trafficking, including institutional strengthening, demand reduction, supply reduction, control measures, and international cooperation. Within these points, CICAD has established several programs to enhance their progress and assist Latin American countries in meeting their goals.&&%$ The OAS has historically ruled out any possible experimentation with legalization and/or decriminalization.&&%$$
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Current Situation ! Despite extensive international effort and support for new multilateral anti-drug programs, much remains to be done to combat illegal drug production and trafficking in the Americas. After the most recent OAS meeting in June 2013, OAS nations released a declaration that stated that the drug problem should be treated “with an integrated, strengthened, balanced and multifaceted approach, with full respect for human rights and individual liberties, incorporating public health, education and social inclusion.”&&%$$$ International efforts to promote several variations on drug and cartel eradication programs have met with limited success, and it appears that drug trafficking is once again on the rise.&&$& South America is the sole producer of cocaine for the global market, and marijuana and opium poppy also remain prevalent throughout the region. The major coca bush zones are consistent with historical precedent: Andean countries, like Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, are the world’s main source for cocaine. Opium poppy is generally grown in Mexico and Columbia, and cannabis is cultivated virtually everywhere. Production, however, is only one small gear in a larger drug trafficking machine. In order to refine the raw products into hard drugs, drug manufactures need the appropriate chemicals. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico provide these chemicals.&&& There are several factors that make the Andean region uniquely suited to be the world’s major drug source. First and foremost is Latin America’s proximity to the United States, which remains the largest and most lucrative illicit drug market in the world. Additionally, poverty, lack of viable alterative careers, corruption, weakness in law enforcement, presence of insurgent groups
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and geographical impediments to interdiction are all obstacles the international community faces when trying to combat drug trafficking. Finally, uneven political support for counterdrug efforts makes it difficult to establish a cohesive, joint policy applicable to the entire region.&&&$
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Additionally, there is much ongoing discussion on the “balloon effect,” and the best methods to eradicate drugs throughout the Americas. When the United States backed Plan Colombia and other efforts to deconstruct the drug trade throughout Latin America, rather than decreasing the quantity of drugs overall, traffickers just shifted to a new location, much like air does in a balloon when pressure is applied.&&&$$ The OAS
OAS 12 must work together to develop a new framework to avoid this effect in order to efficiently and effectively reduce drug trafficking. Finally, there is significant debate about the best policy to promote OAS interests throughout the world. Though drug abuse and addiction remains a greater problem in Northern countries, the drug trade’s impacts on the economy, social fabric, governance and security are larger in the production countries in the Andes.&&&$$$ According to the most recent OAS report, “a public health approach is necessary to address drug use,” and “the drug problem requires a flexible approach, with countries adopting tailored approaches that address individual concerns.”&&&$% Supply and Demand Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Bolivia are the Latin American countries that play the largest role in the illicit drug economy. Since overtaking Peru and Bolivia in drug production in the late 20th century, Colombia’s role in the global drug trafficking market has continued to grow. As of 2001, the area under cultivation in Colombia was 62 thousand hectacres, with overall coca leaf/cocaine production well above the levels of the 1990s.&&&% An estimated 300,000 people in Colombia are currently exclusively dependent on the coca economy.&&&%$ However, The World Drug report has registered a 10 to 20 percent decline in coca production in Colombia from 2008 to 2009.
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Though this is an estimate, it is likely that recent eradication efforts (to be discussed in a later section) have met with some success. On the other hand, the balloon effect is fully visible, as officials have seen increases in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia.&&&%$$ In 2009, the UNODC recorded a 7 percent increase in Peruvian output. Additionally, Evo Morales, the current president of Bolivia, sanctioned the production of 40 thousand acres of coca to meet indigenous demand, and suspended all cooperation with the United States’ Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008.&&&%$$$
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The balloon effect also caused the rise in drug trafficking in Mexico, which is now has one of the largest drug economies in the world. 95 percent of cocaine destined for the United States flows through Mexico, and it is the largest supplier of marijuana and methamphetamine to the United States’ market.&&&$& Finally, though Mexico only supplies a small portion of heroin for the global market, it supplies the majority of heroin destined for the United States.&' In regards to demand, though the demand for cocaine in the United States is on the decline, Columbian traffickers are adapting to the constant flux of the drug market to ensure steady profits. As such, they are looking to new markets to fill the void left by somewhat declining United States demand. Officials in Europe, including in Spain and the United Kingdom, have noticed an increase in trafficked cocaine. According to the European Police Organization (EUROPOL), 250 metric tons of cocaine enters the European market annually.&'$ Additionally, Colombians are moving into the Asian markets, specifically China and Thailand, with Hong Kong as the gateway.&'$$ It is estimated that in 2007 and 2008, 16 to 17 million people used cocaine worldwide. Of this, North America accounted for 40 percent of global consumption, while the European Union accounted for more than 25 percent. These two regions in total accounted for more than 80 percent of the worldwide cocaine market, which in 2008 was estimated to be US$88 billion.&'$$$ Cocaine use in Latin America has also increased over the past decade, and is now estimated to be a 2.6 percent usage rate in Argentina and a 2.4 percent usage rate in Chile.&'$% Though these levels are relatively low, they represent a major increase in Latin American usage of the past few years.
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Officials note that cocaine consumption in particular has increased along transit pathways en route to larger consumption markets. Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and the Honduras have also seen a rise in drug use. Due to major increases in consumption, market demand has exploded, leading to a proliferation of new organizations, trafficking routes, and suppliers.&'% Drug Trafficking Organizations As drug supply, demand, and policy has evolved over the past several years, so have the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) responsible for the production, transit, and sale of illicit drugs. In Colombia, FARC retains control of the drug trade, with 9,000 combatants, control of seven regional blocs and 71 fronts across the country. FARC is involved with every aspect of the drug trade, and is thought to earn between US$200 million and US$300million per year.&'%$ FARC originally used this money to sustain an insurgent war against the government, but in recent years the insurgency has fallen by the wayside, and the organization has turned towards the narcotic sector as an economic endeavor. Colombia’s drug economy also sustains several other DTO’s, including several paramilitaries that have since combined under the UAC and morphed into a dedicated trafficking entity. As part of a government brokered deal in 2006, many traffickers surrendered their weapons, but the government was overwhelmed by the number of participants and unable to follow through on incentives promised, thereby causing the disillusioned traffickers to reconfigure into new entities that also focus exclusively on the drug trade. Another infamous Colombian group, Norte
OAS 14 del Valle, was powerful after the fall of Medellín and Cali, but is now weakened by infighting and arrests.&'%$$ Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN), once notorious for its kidnappings and ‘disappearances’, is now moving away from kidnappings and into the drug trade, inspired by the drug trade’s far more lucrative profits. Finally, there are an estimated 300 to 350 smaller syndicates in Colombia that operate on a highly specialized level to produce and move drugs. &'%$$$ In Peru and Bolivia, where drug production is once again on the rise, there are several amorphous, nonspecific groups that traffic illicit drugs. Locals cultivate the fields, and all processing is done in Brazil and Argentina.&'$& In Peru, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, appears to be reviving drug activities. Its members are reestablishing relationships with coca growers, and it is beginning to tax the coca industry in its area of control.' The situation in Peru and Bolivia will have to be closely monitored in the coming years, as worldwide drug policy can have a huge impact on the trajectory of these developments. In Mexico, seven powerful DTOs occupy different regions: the Gulf cartel, La Familia, Los Zetas, the Beltrán-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Tijuana Catel, and the Juárez Cartel.'$ The Gulf Cartel was historically the most powerful, but after the efforts of the Calderón administration and the defection of Los Zetas in 2010, the Gulf Cartel’s leadership structure
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collapsed and power diminished.'$$ La Familia emerged in 2006 to fill the security void left by the central government, but has since become systematically involved in drug trafficking. They now have over 4,000 members, with a confirmed presence in 77 cities in Mexico.'$$$ Los Zetas was founded by a group of deserters from the Mexican Army’s Special Forces. It was originally an elite group beneath the Gulf Cartel, but since its defection, its individual influence remains strong. It has, however, encountered some recent setbacks, including the arrest of its top four commanders. The Beltrán Leyva Organization broke from the Sinoala Federation in 2008, but has proved itself capable of resisting Sinaloa competition and control ever since. Although the group remains prominent, its influence has diminished slightly due to the loss of some of its senior members. The Sinaloa cartel is one of the most active players on the Mexican narcotics scene. Sinaloan distribution cells can be found throughout the United States and Latin America. The Juárez Cartel was thought to be responsible for half the drugs entering the United States, though that number has likely waned in recent years. Its members are most famous for their excessive violence. The Tijuana cartel, once one of the biggest and most violent cartels in the country, has also had its power diminish in recent years, specifically as a result of the elimination of its highest leaders. The Sinaloa federation has moved in and begun to control
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some of Tijuana’s previous turf.'$% The result of this instability has been a proliferation of smaller and more specialized gangs, like Colombia after the fall of Medellín/Cali.'%
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The Mexican DTOs can essentially be split into two competing blocs, as a result of recent alliances and familial debts. The Sinaloa federation, Gulf Cartel and La Familia formed ‘The New Federation’ in February 2010. The remaining four syndicates have a general pattern of allegiances. Total Mexican DTO earnings in North American alone are estimated to be between US$13.6 billion and US$48.4 billion annually.'%$ Robert Stutaman, a former DEA agent, noted “The average drug trafficking organization, meaning from Medellín to the streets of New York, could afford to lose 90% of its profit and still be profitable.”'%$$ DTOs also contribute to the funding of terrorist organization, as it is believed that both Hamas and Hezbollah have raised funds through South American DTOs.'%$$$
Combatting the Trade: Crop Eradication and DTO Deconstruction Throughout the history of the modern drug war, countries, governments and organizations have tried several methods of crop eradication in an attempt to stem drug trafficking at the source. Manual removal, mechanical removal and aerial removal (done by spraying herbicides) have all been tested, to varying degrees of success. Though the benefits of a successful eradication effort are obvious, there are many critics that argue that eradication does not fulfill its goals. Manual and mechanical eradication require time and human resources and aerial is not always legal or feasible and is expensive. Recently, despite claims to the contrary, the OAS concluded that herbicide used for aerial fumigation in Colombia has not damaged humans or wildlife. Nonetheless, eradication is a high-risk operation, with the potential for losses of thousands of dollars. Eradication efforts also often nudge farmers to adapt, as one might adapt to changing weather or other organic conditions. In Colombia, farmers developed coping mechanisms and did not reduce the total crop size.'$& In general, eradication, alternative development and interdiction are most effective when implemented together rather than independently.'&
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OAS 16 As discussed above, Mexico’s previous President, Felipe Calderón, waged a violently aggressive war against Mexico’s drug cartels. Inciting violence and riots, and leaving thousands dead in its wake, this effort has inspired debate about how to best tackle drug trafficking organizations. Currently, the majority of the globe’s effort to deconstruct DTOs is taking place in Mexico, where cartels hold the power. Mexico’s new President, Enrique Peña Nieto, who took office in December 2012, is expected to take a hard stance against drug trafficking, put perhaps in different ways. It is expected that reducing criminal violence will be Peña Nieto’s top priority, as opposed to Calderón’s focus on dismantling gangs.'&$ Calderón’s administration has left a society with less powerful drug cartels, but more disorganization in the criminal world and a more unstable security environment.'&$$ The OAS will have to contend with changing perspectives on drug trafficking organizations when evaluating international illicit drug trafficking and developing multilateral guidelines. Crime and Violence Crime and violence are inexorably linked to the illicit drug trade, and remain a major problem despite international effort to combat increasing violence. Latin America and the Caribbean have among the highest crime rates in the world, as drug trafficking criminality has
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replaced political conflicts as a major source of violence in many Latin American countries. Additionally, DTOs corrupt and undermine local police institutions and law enforcement officials, so the population loses respect for the importance of the law. Much of the violence is concentrated in the production and transit nations (Colombia and Mexico), though it is increasing in Belize, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, and more.'&$$$ It is estimated that a 10 percent increase in the price of cocaine triggers an increase in the homicide rate in drug trafficking countries of 1.2 to 2 percent.'&$% Though many consider Plan Colombia to have failed in drug eradication and its plan to stem drug supply, it has met with several successes in regards to Colombia’s crime rates and violence. Security has significantly improved throughout Colombia, in correlation with the loss of power and decrease in size of Colombia’s major DTOs. The number of homicides has declined substantially, as have the number of kidnappings. It is estimated that the government of Colombia now has full or partial control over 90% of the country, up from 70% in 2003.'&% Nevertheless, independent drug organizations either collude with or fight with FARC, leaving large swathes of rural land controlled by FARC vulnerable to gang violence. In addition, there is a distinct lack of police security in rural areas, as one or two policeman may be in charge of an area of several
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hundred square kilometers.'&%$ Furthermore, small, competing gangs create disorganized crime rather than “doing what would be good for businesskeeping murder rates low and attention at a minimum.”'&%$$
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Violent crime in Central America, particularly in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, is also on the rise. Stuck between major drug produces in South America and major drug consumers in North America, Central America is uniquely (and unfortunately) perfectly positioned to encounter the negative side effects of the spillover of illicit drug trafficking. High poverty rates ensure a supply of willing recruits for trafficking cartels, and the Central American region is overrun with weapons and highly trained gunmen working for DTOs.'&%$$$ As future policies are developed, the world must consider the spread of violence into new regions, and the effects this increase may have on the region’s economy, political structure, and social fabric. The current situation in Mexico has improved dramatically, given the excessive crime and violence of the past few years. Most estimates put the number of people killed in drug related violence at around 60,000.'&$& During 2012, the
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number of murders was down 8 percent from the same period in 2011, and in Ciudad Juárez, homicides have fallen 90 percent since their 2010 peak.'&& However, most analysts project that a decline in organized crime killings will occur much more slowly than their rise during Calderón’s administration, despite Peña Nieto’s call for reducing organized crime related homicides by as much as 50 percent.'&&$ Peña Nieto has emphasized a lower profile approach to combating drug violence in Mexico, though it remains to be seen how his specific policies develop.'&&$$ Additionally, since 2010 the previously concentrated violence has dispersed to new areas and included more municipalities.'&&$$$ Pervasive corruption within government-funded law enforcement officials remains a problem, as exemplified in Mexico, where in 2010 “nearly one-tenth of the officers in the federal police force were dismissed for failing to pass anticorruption tests.”'&&$% In May 2013, following the OAS report on drugs in the Americas, OAS secretary-general Jose Miguel Insulza called for a continued debate on drug related violence.'&&% Though it is hard to measure the precise, statistical correlation between drug production and usage and violence, it is clear that one exists. With increases in drug production and proliferation of drug cartels comes a rise in general crime and violence. As exemplified by Latin American countries, drug-related violence is firmly entrenched within the fabric of the illicit drug underworld, and is an issue that will face many OAS sessions to come.
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Bloc Positions ! Guatemala ; Colombia ; Bolivia These nations openly wish to “debate alternatives to the war on drugs.� They wish to consider decriminalization as an option because they believe that it may decrease profitability and open resources to be redirected to other issues of importance. They have defended the traditional use of coca leaves, and President Santos of Colombia has gone so far as to consider decriminalizing all drugs. Ecuador; Costa Rica; Chile ; Panama These nations are supportive of the policy to debate alternatives. They have expressed some support for President Santos of Colombia, though they are not as enthusiastically nor fully in support of decriminalization as other nations. United States ; Canada These nations, while publicly supportive of a debate and discussion around new alternatives to combat illicit drug trafficking, are not ready to support decriminalization.
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United Nations A UN convention, reaffirmed in 2009, imposes a blanket prohibition on drugs. This includes even the traditional use of coca leaves (from which cocaine is extracted) by Andean Indians for chewing and tea.lxxvi OAS Report The report represents the first time any significant multilateral agency has outlined serious alternatives to prohibition, including legal market regulation or reform of the UN drug conventions.'&&%$$
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Questions to Consider ! ! 1.
How is it best that the world’s drug problem be approached? Supply side eradication? Minimization of demand? Treated as a public health issue? A combination of several? a. Delegates will have to consider a myriad of options when deciding how to best approach the drug problem. This question is meant to inspire thoughts about a variety of perspectives.
2. Is it best to have one large umbrella policy for the world, so that nations can be assured of consistency and requirements? Or should there exist many different options for each individual country? a. Previously, the majority of global drug policies have been large umbrella policies that have the majority of the world adhere to their policy. Is it time for greater flexibility for individual situations, or is this too inconsistent and too complicated? 3. Consider decriminalization versus prohibition. Where does your country stand? 4. How does poverty play into the drug problem?
5.
Should drug trafficking organizations be treated differently than regular leaders? What is the best way to reduce their power? a. Essentially, this question is meant to get delegates thinking about human side to drug transit. Should the OAS recommend a military-style policy of violence (think Calderón), or should the OAS try a different approach? Will reconciling with DTOs send the wrong message to other criminal organizations or other DTOS?
6. How can the OAS ensure that countries are following through on whatever requirements or suggestions it puts forth? Should the OAS recommend enforcement or incentive techniques? If yes, what kind? If no, why not?
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Suggestions for Further Research! 1.
OAS official website: http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp
2. CICAD: http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/main/policy/default_eng.asp. 3. OAS Report on Drugs in the Americas: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf 4. Various news outlets for articles on the development of the drug trade (BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, The Economist, The Guardian, etc.) 5.
Drug Policy Alliance’s info on Latin America: http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-trafficking-latinamerica/leaders-views#Santos
6. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas report: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf 7. The Latin American Drug Trade report: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf
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OAS 21
TOPIC II.
Climate Change Topic History ! Over the past century, the average global temperature has risen 1.4ºF. Climatologists— alarmed by such a sudden, unprecedented increase in temperature—have warned of the threatening nature of continued warming. Sea levels are expected to rise, extreme temperatures and weather will become the norm, and arable land could become scarcer, among other dangers. These effects threaten both millions of human lives and the livelihoods of millions more. Meanwhile, scientists have arrived and remain at a consensus that the number one cause of climate change is human activity. Both NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have come to this conclusion, and in 2010, the National Research Council stated that, "Climate change is occurring, is very likely caused by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems.”'&&%$$$ NASA and the NOAA, along with the majority of climatologists, have also concluded that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—especially carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions—hold responsibility for the warming of the atmosphere due to their ability to trap heat in the atmosphere via the greenhouse effect. The Americas find themselves at a unique crossroads in the history of carbon emissions and climate change. Home to the United States, the largest carbon emitter for much of the past century; the Amazon Rainforest, which has absorbed much of the world’s carbon yet also has faced intensive deforestation; and a number of nations experiencing surges in economic development in recent history, the Americas serve as a microcosm of the global history of climate change.
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Emissions
http://www.climatechangeconnection.org/emissions/images/Smok eStacks.jpg
To begin with the United States and Canada, these nations have led the world in carbon emissions for much of the past century. The United States alone, now the world’s secondlargest emitter, after China, produces over 18% of the world’s share of emissions. Historically, North America’s share of the hemisphere’s carbon emissions have largely been tied to energy production and transportation. Latin America, on the other hand, has contributed a more modest share of the world’s carbon emissions. With about 8.5% of the world’s population and GDP and about 12% of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Latin America only contributes a slightly higher-than-average share of GHG emissions. Around 60% of both the region’s GDP and emissions originate in Brazil and Mexico, and unlike their northern neighbors, a large portion of this results from land-use change, largely due to deforestation in regions including the Amazon. In Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
OAS 22 Guatemala, and Peru, land-use change accounts for more than 60% of GHG emissions.'&&$&
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jschmidt/Latin%20American% 20GHG%20Emissions.JPG
Efforts to Reduce Emissions Signed in 1997 and effective in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol was the first major effort to reduce emissions on a global scale. Key elements of the agreement included binding emissions reduction targets for developed nations and the creation of an “adaptation fund” for developing nations that climate change threatens. Unfortunately, neither of the two wealthiest OAS nations are parties to the agreement. The United States notably refused to sign the agreement, and in 2011, Canada renounced the agreement after experiencing dramatic increases in its emissions, instead aiming to create its own “made in Canada” program.'&&& In 2009, the Copenhagen Accord—the document agreed upon by delegates to the United
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—was signed by the majority of OAS member nations. (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela refrained from participating, opting instead to hold their own “People’s Conference”.) Like in its successor, the Kyoto Protocol, developed nations agreed to specific emissions targets; both the United States and Canada agreed to 17% emissions reductions compared to 2005 levels. The agreement also included components encouraging deforestationrelated emissions reductions, with Brazil agreeing to a 37% reduction in emissions compared to “business as usual”. The agreement, however, has been largely criticized for its nonbinding targets and its inability to enforce goals.'&&&$ In 2010, Bolivian President Evo Morales hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in Chochabamba, Bolivia. The conference, which was attended by more than 30,000 participants form over 100 countries (most notably Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), was a response to failed attempts to address climate change at conferences headed by developed countries. After four days of talks and speeches by numerous outspoken Latin American leaders, including Morales and then-Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, the participants agreed upon a “People’s Accord”, which demanded that rich countries pay a “climate debt” to the poorer nations who will suffer the brunt of climate change
OAS 23
and the formation of an international tribunal to punish those countries and corporations responsible for much of the world’s climate emissions.'&&&$$
http://www.projectallende.org/archives/cochabamba.jpg
Some nations have even taken specific actions to reduce emissions. Brazil, for example, developed an extensive infrastructure for the use of sugarcane ethanol in its cars. Sugarcane ethanol, which is estimated to produce 70-90% less emissions than gasoline, is sold alongside gasoline at Brazilian gas stations, and almost all Brazilian cars can burn both fuels. Additionally, many Caribbean and Andean nations have developed sophisticated monitoring techniques for their coral reefs and glaciers, respectively.Error! Bookmark not defined.i OAS Commitment Cletus Springer, Director of the OAS Department of Sustainable Development, has expressed the organization’s commitment to addressing climate change concerns. In his words, "Climate change poses perhaps the gravest threat to development prospects of the hemisphere, in particular to small, island developing states [and those] countries with low-lying coastal, arid, and semi-arid areas or areas vulnerable to floods, drought, and desertification."'&&&$$$
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Within the OAS, the Department of Sustainable Development’s Energy and Climate Change division was created to reduce emissions through its Sustainable Energy Partnership for the Americas (SEPA) program. With an aim to make funding for energy projects more accessible to member nations by developing financial mechanisms to enable private and public investment, SEPA laid the first step for the OAS into climate change action.'&&&$%
OAS 24
Current Situation! The Americas also serve as a microcosm of the current climate change debate as the OAS includes members who emit large and small quantities of emissions and who have more and less at stake with regard to climate change’s dangers. On the whole, emissions in the region appear to be decreasing, with the majority of this progress coming from the north. As of 2013, carbon emissions in the United States are at their lowest point since 1994—13% below 2008 levels. To the south, Latin American emissions are not increasing, but at the same time, they are remaining relatively constant, leaving a significant amount of room open for improvement.'&&&% Deforestation Deforestation, especially in the Amazon Rainforest, continues to pose a major threat to the world’s climate. The region is estimated to contain around 10% of the world’s carbon stores, and deforestation—particularly via burning large swaths of forest—releases major amounts of
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carbon into the atmosphere. Today, only 60% of Latin America’s original rainforest area remains, and unfortunately, the situation is only worsening. This major contributor to climate change is continuing at a rate of 2% per year—equivalent to approximately the land area of the entire nation of Panama.'&&&%$
http://www.unique-southamerica-travelexperience.com/images/amazon-deforestation.jpg
OAS 25
Addressing the causes of deforestation, however, remains complicated. Agricultural interests drive much of the deforestation, as logging, soy farming, and cattle raising become more and more lucrative industries every year. Further complicating the issue is Brazilian law. Legally, farmers in the Amazon must preserve at least 80% of the area’s original forest; this law goes largely ignored. Most of the lawbreakers, however, are not wealthy farmers owning huge swaths of land; rather, most turn to deforestation because the land is cheap and because they lack access to expensive agrichemicals and the intensive farming techniques employed in other parts of the country.'&&&%$$ Sea Levels and Temperature To begin with, rising sea levels in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean pose a serious threat to the livelihoods of millions of residents and to the economic development of the region. The increased salinity of lagoons and freshwater reserves is expected to damage wetlands, and vital crops, such as forests and banana trees, risk being lost due to increased levels of soil salinity. By 2080, climate change in Caribbean countries alone will account for a nearly $11 billion loss in GDP, or about 11% of the region’s GDP. Furthermore, rising temperatures in the Caribbean will devastate the sea’s coral reefs. Current models predict the disappearance of all Caribbean coral by 2060 or 2070, destroying the homes to around 65% of all Caribbean species.Error! Bookmark not defined.i This, in turn, will also impact the Caribbean economies, with high estimates adding around $6 billion more to the region’s GDP loss by 2050.
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_Lo wCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf
Water Resources Much of the reduction in rainfall in arid and semi-arid regions, including parts of Chile, Argentina, northeast Brazil, and northern Mexico, has been attributed to climate change, and these reductions show little sign of ending. In 1995, around 22 million Latin Americans lived in waterstressed watersheds, a number that is expected to increase by 6 to 20 million people by 2055. On top of that, the melting of the Andean glaciers will carry a devastating economic impact for the region. Hydropower supplies the vast majority of Andean nations’ electricity, providing 50% of Ecuador’s, 70% of Bolivia’s, and 68% of Peru’s electricity. While short-term melting has increased the flow of water toward hydroelectric stations, long-term prospects for hydropower seem bleak due to the potential for the disappearance of the Andean glaciers.Error! Bookmark not defined.i
Natural Disasters Latin America experiences more climaterelated disasters per capita than any other region of the world. Between 1970 and 2009, more than three million residents of Latin America were directly affected each year by droughts, floods,
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OAS 26 and/or tropical storms—disasters that left an average of 100,000 people homeless and caused an average of $1.6 billion in damage each year. Unfortunately, this situation is expected to only worsen as climate change accelerates over the next few decades.
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/uploads/images/article -images/04mexico.601_.jpg
Flooding is an integral part of Central and South America’s climate. Between 2000 and 2009, 239 floods affected the region, leaving behind large amounts of damage and suffering. Despite these staggering numbers, however, it is not the common occurrence of floods that cause the most damage and fatalities; rather, it is when these floods occur at irregular times—or fail to occur at all—that the most problems materialize. Residents of areas such as the Amazon Basin and the Brazilian Sertão adapt their ways of life to accommodate flooding, but as climate change causes flooding to become less predictable, residents will not be able to predict and prepare the necessary precautions.
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Furthermore, the number of tropical storms affecting the region, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, continues to grow. Between 1970 and 1979, only 19 storms hit the region; between 2000 and 2009, 93 storms impacted the region. This growth has largely been attributed to rising sea temperatures, and these storms pose a major threat to the safety and economic development of the region as each storm can threaten hundreds to thousands of lives and is estimated to lead to a .6% reduction in an affected nation’s GDP per capita.'&&&%$$$ Agriculture Agriculture tends to be extremely vulnerable to climatic changes. Two important crops in the region, maize and coffee, are particularly vulnerable to changes in temperature. Maize, a staple throughout much of the hemisphere, generally requires temperatures below 36ºC—a temperature that cannot be guaranteed as climate change accelerates. Coffee, a crucial cash crop for many Latin American nations, can be even more selective; Arabica coffee, for example, grows best at temperatures between 18ºC and 21ºC with declines in yield approaching zero as temperatures rise to 34ºC.'&&&$&
OAS 27 worst-case scenario, which in turn will lead to dramatic increases in poverty.
http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/images/LatinAmerica-Land-Value-M3.jpg
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resource s/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf
Irregularities of floods and droughts in certain areas also pose a significant threat to Latin American agriculture. Brazil’s Sertão (the interior region of Brazil’s northeast), for example, experiences consistent cycles of drought and flooding that require complicated watermanagement techniques. Already povertystricken, this region, among others, would face even more suffering should the flooding required for agriculture arrive more irregularly.&( Overall, agricultural prospects under current climate change scenarios look grim. By 2100, agricultural yields are expected to fall by 12% under the best-case scenario and by 50% under the
Average estimates for Brazil by 2050 show a reduction in agricultural productivity of 18%, and it is estimated that this will cause an increase in rural poverty of up to 3.2%.Error! Bookmark not defined.i
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Economies Complicating the situation, however, are the rapid economic growth in Latin America and the fragile economies of many OAS nations. Over the past decade, much of the hemisphere has experienced unprecedented economic growth. Brazil, for example, achieved a 7.2% GDP growth in 2010, and as of 2012, now has a larger economy than the United Kingdom.&($ How to continue this
OAS 28 growth in a sustainable manner, however, remains in question. Additionally, the economic stability of the hemisphere presents a hurdle for climate-change activists. In the north, both the United States and Canada are still recovering from the Great Recession, and in the south, many nations, particularly Argentina, have historically fought high inflation rates when their government increased spending. Any action to address climate change, therefore, must take into account these delicate situations. The Future As a major producer of GHG emissions, the western hemisphere has the ability to significantly mitigate the magnitude of climate change. Conservative estimates from the past few years place Latin America at being able to reduce its electricity production emissions by 10% and its deforestation by 46%, in addition to GHG emission reductions due to adopting more energyefficient technologies. Reducing emissions alone, however, does not appear to be a feasible option for the members of the OAS. Due to their inability to enforce emissions reductions overseas, OAS members must work to adapt to the inevitable climatic changes they will face in the coming century. Many Latin American nations are now looking into new drainage technologies for areas expected to be hit by greater flooding, greater disaster-
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preparedness programs, improved water management, and the creation of marine protection areas. Additionally, experts are calling for social programs to be created to assist those who will be economically affected by climate change.Error! Bookmark not defined.i
OAS 29
Bloc Positions! United States; Canada As the two wealthiest nations in the region, the United States and Canada produce the majority of the hemisphere’s GHG emissions and also possess the greatest resources to reduce their emissions. The United States, in particular, faces conflicting internal political pressures, however, especially related to how necessary emissions reductions are. Additionally, the United States often pursues a protectionist trade policy, which may impede the spread of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. Brazil ; Mexico As the largest economies and GHG emitters in Latin America, Brazil and Mexico find themselves in between the United States and much of the region. On one hand, their more rapid economic growth would allow them to pursue better technologies, but on the other hand, they would face a greater economic burden from any climate agreement than their neighbors— especially Brazil with regard to deforestation. Central America ; the Caribbean These nations, which tend to be less economically developed than Brazil and Mexico, will likely face the brunt of the effects of climate change and therefore feel the greatest urgency to address the issue. Bolivia ; Cuba ; Ecuador; Nicaragua ; Venezuelaxcii Composed of the most staunchly “antiAmerican” members of the OAS, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas formed their own climate conference, the People’s Summit in Chochabamba, Bolivia. Following the conference—a response to
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the Copenhagen summit on climate change— Bolivian president Morales and then-Venezuelan president Chavez demanded that rich nations pay a “climate debt” to poorer nations that face the brunt of climate change and the formation of an international tribunal to punish countries and corporations that produce much of the world’s emissions.
OAS 30
Questions to Consider! ! ! 1.
Whose responsibility is it to reduce emissions? Just developed nations, or every nation?
2. How can Latin American nations reduce their emissions? What types of laws, regulations, or other actions can governments take? And what kinds of cooperation are necessary between Latin American nations in order to ensure the success of those actions? 3. How can nations enforce environmental laws, especially those related to deforestation? How can hemispheric agreements be enforced? 4. How can Latin America balance economic development and emissions reductions? 5.
What steps can Caribbean nations take to adapt to rising sea levels? How can other nations help?
6. How can nations prepare for future, more irregular natural disasters?
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OAS 31
Suggestions for Further Research OAS official site: http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp The World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/ Report on climate change in Latin America: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf Inter-American Development Bank: http://www.iadb.org/ The Economist: http://www.economist.com The Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org Ecologic Institute: http://www.ecologic.eu ! !
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UNCSW 32
Role of the Committee! The OAS General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States and holds one regular session a year. The OAS has seven essential purposes, including providing a common action in the event of aggression, strengthening the peace and security of the hemisphere, seeking the solution of political, economic, and juridical crisis that may arise among member states, preventing possible causes of difficulties between members and ensure the pacific settlements of disputes, promoting cooperation in matters concerning economic, cultural, and social development and strengthening representative democracy with respect for the principles of nonintervention.&($$$ It has a delegation from every member state, and its powers are as follows: To decide the general action and policy of the Organization, determine the structure and functions of its organs, and consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American states; To establish measures for coordinating the activities of the organs, agencies, and entities of the Organization among themselves, and such activities with those of the other institutions of the inter-American system; To strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies; To promote collaboration, especially in the economic, social, and cultural fields, with other international organizations whose purposes are similar to those of the Organization of American States; To approve the program-budget of the Organization and determine the quotas of the member states; To consider the reports of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the observations and recommendations presented by the Permanent Council with regard to the reports that should be presented by the other organs and entities, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91.f, as well as the reports of any organ which may be required by the General Assembly itself; To adopt general standards to govern the operations of the General Secretariat; and To adopt its own rules of procedure and, by a two-thirds vote, its agenda.xciv Today, the OAS serves several roles in Latin America, including providing electoral oversight, assisting in security operations, providing support for disaster management and development projects, and monitoring human rights.xcv Several independent institutions carry out specialized functions for the OAS, in addition to its most basic agenda. The OAS’s General Fund, which supports the General Secretariat, has approximately $80 million dollars yearly. The Special Fund, to which contribution by member states is voluntary, supports specific programs and initiatives with approximately $70 million a year.xcvi
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UNCSW 33
Structure of the Committee The OAS is comprised of the 35 independent states of the Americas, and the General Assembly is its supreme decision-making body. Each member can send one delegate—often the minister of foreign affairs—to the annual meeting, and each delegate receives one vote. Only a simple majority is required to pass most resolutions in the General Assembly. At the disposal of the delegates of the General Assembly are six secretariats and various committees, including: • • • • • • • • •
Secretariat for Political Affairs Executive Secretariat for Integral Development Secretariat for Multidimensional Security Secretariat for Administration and Finance Secretariat for Legal Affairs Secretariat for External Relations Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs Committee on Hemispheric Security
Decisions of the General Assembly tend to be more formal and contain preambular paragraphs. Generally decisions are relatively short, but lengths of decisions can vary significantly. Dialogue also tends to be more formal in the General Assembly; debate, however, does tend to be spontaneous, despite its formal nature. To submit your position papers and for all questions, please contact either member of the senior staff: Sasha Frankel: (alexandra.frankel@yale.edu) Billy Thomas: (billy.thomas@yale.edu)
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Please also make sure you are registered on the delegate forum, your advisors should provide you with a sign up ink. For the latest information, updates, topic guides and more, visit Yale Model United Nations online at: http://ymun.yira.org For the second year, YMUN will be offering a competitive essay competition. For the rules and guidelines visit: http://ymun.yira.org/essay-contest/ Interested in participating in a challenging new program for highly motivated and exceptional delegates? Apply for the Global Exchange Program at: http://ymun.yira.org/global-exchange/ Get connected and download the new Yale Model United Nations iPhone application: https://itunes.apple.com/tc/app/yale-model-unitednations/id721125366?mt=8 or search for Yale Model UN
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Stay up to date and follow Yale Model United Nations both before and during the conference: @YaleModelUN Find the latest pictures on Yale Model United Nations’s Instagram: ymun: http://instagram.com/ymun
UNCSW 34 NOTES i
Who We Are, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp ii Our History, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp. iii Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf. iv Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf. v Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf. vi What We Do, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/what_we_do.asp. vii Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011, https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol42-issue2/Debates3.pdf. viii Ibid. ix Drug Trafficking in Latin America, Drug Policy Alliance, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-trafficking-latin-america. x Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf. xi General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf. xii The Colombian Cartels, PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html. xiii Ibid. xiv Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011, https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol42-issue2/Debates3.pdf. xv The Colombian Cartels, PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html. xvi Ibid. xvii Ibid. xviii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf. xix Ibid. xx Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011, https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol42-issue2/Debates3.pdf. xxi Harvard report xxii Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011, https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol42-issue2/Debates3.pdf. xxiii June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. xxiv David A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2011, http://cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/AboutCICAD/about_eng.asp. xxv Mission Statement, Organization of American States, December 13, 2012, http://cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/AboutCICAD/about_eng.asp .xxvi Ibid. xxvii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf.
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UNCSW 35 xxviii Fox News Latino, OAS Meeting In Guatemala Ends With No Change In Drug Policy, Fox News Latino, June 08, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/06/08/oas-meeting-in-guatemala-ends-with-no-change-in-drug-policy/. xxix June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. xxx Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. xxxi Ibid. xxxii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf. xxxiii General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf. xxxiv General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf. xxxv Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf. xxxvi Ibid xxxvii Ibid. xxxviii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. xxxix William dean, et al, The War on Mexican Cartels, Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012, http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf. xl Collen W. Cook, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf.xli Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. xlii Steven Hyland, The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking, Origins, September 2011, http://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking/page/0/7. xliii Drug trafficking, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/. xliv Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. xlv Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. xlvi Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. xlvii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. xlviii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. xlix Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. l Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. li William dean, et al, The War on Mexican Cartels, Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012, http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf.
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UNCSW 36 lii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. liii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. liv Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. lv Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf .lvi Steven Hyland, The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking, Origins, September 2011, http://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking/page/0/6. lvii Oriana Zill and and Lowell Bergman, Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving, PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/math.html lviii Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. lix Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. lx Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf lxi Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf. lxii Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf. lxiii Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf. lxiv General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf. lxv Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, Foreign Policy at Brookings, March 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_mexico_ drug_market_felbabbrown. lxvi Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, Foreign Policy at Brookings, March 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_mexico_ drug_market_felbabbrown. lxvii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf. lxviii Michael Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central America, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/world/countering-criminal-violence-central-america/p27740. lxix Q&A: Mexico’s Drug Related Violence, BBC News, July 16, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america10681249. lxx Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf lxxi June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013,
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UNCSW 37 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. lxxii Q&A: Mexico’s Drug Related Violence, BBC News, July 16, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america10681249. lxxiii June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. lxxiv Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf. lxxv Joe Hitchon, OAS Chief Calls for “Long Awaited” Debate on Drug Policy, IPS News Agency, May 25, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/oas-chief-calls-for-long-awaited-debate-on-drug-policy/. lxxvi Let them chew coca, The Economist, January 20th, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/17961902?zid=312&ah=da4ed4425e74339883d473adf5773841. lxxvii Jamie Doward, Western leaders study ‘gamechanging’ report on global drugs trade, The Guardian, May 18, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/18/western-leaders-game-changing-drugs-report. lxxviii Climate Change Facts: Answers to Common Questions. ([2013]). EPA. http://epa.gov/climatechange/basics/facts.htmllxxix De la Torre, A., Fajnzylber, P., & Nash, J. (2009). Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change. World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf lxxx The Kyoto Protocol: key sections and dates. (2005, February 16). The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/feb/16/environment.climatechange lxxxi Key points in the “Copenhagen Accord”. (2009, December 19). Financial Times. http://blogs.ft.com/energysource/2009/12/19/key-points-in-the-copenhagen-accord/#axzz2bssgKxuZ lxxxii Shultz, J. (2010). Latin America Finds a Voice on Climate Change: With What Impact?. NACLA Report On The Americas, 43(4), 5-6. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=52343010&site=ehost-live lxxxiii Kiernan, J. (2010). Climate Change and OAS Commitment. Americas, 62(3), 36. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=50407351&site=ehost-live lxxxiv Kiernan, J. (2010). ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE OAS. Americas, 62(5), 10-11. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=53458846&site=ehost-live lxxxv Goldenberg, S. (2013, February 1). US carbon emissions fall to lowest levels since 1994. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/feb/01/us-carbon-emissions-lowest-levels lxxxvi Grasso, D. (2012). Sustainable Economic Development in the Face of Climate Change in Latin America: A Path Forward. Environmental Engineering Science, 29(8), 731-733. doi:10.1089/ees.2012.2908.op http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=78163243&site=ehost-live lxxxvii Adam, D. (2009, May 31). Amazon rainforests pay the price as demand for beef soars. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/31/cattle-trade-brazil-greenpeace-amazon-deforestation lxxxviii RUBIN, O., & ROSSING, T. (2012). National and Local Vulnerability to Climate-Related Disasters in Latin America: The Role of Social Asset-Based Adaptation. Bulletin Of Latin American Research, 31(1), 19-35. doi:10.1111/j.14709856.2011.00607.x http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=67650818&site=ehost-live lxxxix Perfecto, I., Vandermeer, J., & Lin, B. B. (2008). Synergies between Agricultural Intensification and Climate Change Could Create Surprising Vulnerabilities for Crops. Bioscience, 58(9), 847-854. doi:10.1641/B580911 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=34772286&site=ehost-live xc Arons, N. (2004). Waiting for Rain: The Politics and Poetry of Drought in Northeast Brazil. University of Arizona.xci Inman, P. (2012, March 6). Brazil’s economy overtakes UK’s to become world’s sixth largest. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-largest xcii OFFICIAL SUBMISSION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA ON BEHALF OF CUBA, BOLIVIA, ECUADOR AND NICARAGUA; ALBA - PTT MEMBER STATES, TO THE UNFCCC AD-HOC WORKING GROUP ON LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ACTION. (2010). http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/officialsubmission-of-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela-on-behalf-of-cuba-bolivia-ecuador-and-nicaragua-alba-ptt-memberstates-to-the-unfccc-ad-hoc-working-group-on-long-term-cooperative-action-1/at_download/file
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UNCSW 38 xciii Anne Marie Fitterer, The Organization of American States, Towson University, Spring 1997, http://www.towson.edu/polsci/ppp/sp97/oas/OAS.HTM. xciv General Assembly, Organization of American States, August 9, 2013, http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/overview.asp. xcv Brianna Lee, The Organization of American States, Council on Foreign Relations, April 13, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p2. xcvi Brianna Lee, The Organization of American States, Council on Foreign Relations, April 13, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p2.
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