United Nations Security Council

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LETTER FROM THE DAIS Dear Delegates, Welcome delegates!

Hello everyone!

My name is your Wendy and I,SC along withI’m Emily, am to your I’m Miranda Melcher, one of YMUN officers! thrilled be senior part of staffer this exciting committee cannot waiton to the meet and work with you all. I am aI’m student of Branford College YMUN 39’sand Commission Status of Women.

Currently, a sophomore at Yale, in the Class 2016, and am international focusing China-Middle East majoring in of Psychology withstudying a Neuroscience tracksecurity, with plans to go on to graduate school. relations. I grew up in Beijing, China and attended a British school where MUN became my main extra-curricular activity. my six years MUN, I haveMock participated 20 conferences Outside of the classroom and Over YMUN, I am alsoinpart of Yale’s Trial team, a mentor in as a delegate, Chair, Director.

One of the reasons I’mfor so local looking WYSE (Women andSecretary-General, Youth Supportingand Each Other), a mentoring group middle forward to YMUN 2014 is that the Security Council has always been my favourite committee school girls, and I am running a non-profit, Codi’s Hats. (even as SG...shhhh, SGs aren’t supposed to have favourites). Outside of YMUN, I’m involved experimentalpolicies theatre,on thereproductive Party of the Left, therights Slifkaand Center for Jewish Life, With thein ever-evolving health women’s rights, I’mthe exWomen’s Leadership Initiative, and will experience Model Congress for the first time at cited to see the different stances and cultural clashes that the topics may bring out. I look YMC 2013. look forward meeting youinall, your position papers, and hearing your forward to Iseeing how youtoall respond thereading committee.

See you soon! speeches. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to email me at. See you in January!

- Wendy Cai, Yale ‘15 - Miranda Melcher, Yale ’16 Hi guys! I’m Emily, and I will also be working as one of the directors for CSW. A Northern California native, I’m currently a sophomore at Yale in Branford College, majoring in Hello, delegates! I’m Jonathan Rajaseelan, also one of the YMUN SC officers, and I am so Economics with a possible double major in East Asian Studies. After graduation, I hope looking forward to meeting you all! I’m Class of 2015, in Saybrook College, and am doubleto live andinwork in China several before pursuing degree, between possibly in majoring chemistry and for music.

I amyears particularly interestedaingraduate the intersection business or law. global health, and foreign policy. MUN has been a significant extramedical science, curricular for me since high school; I have served in the Secretariat and as a Chair in When not going to classes orattended preparing for YMUN, also serve astoa mentor in ReadySetlocal/school conferences, and THIMUN 2011Ias a delegate the General Assembly.

Launch, an organization providing college counseling services to low-income students, At Yale, I work in a chemistry lab that focuses on drug and vaccine synthesis, sing in the Glee participate in Danceworks, a dance Yale,Institute and I serve on the alumni Club and ISM Recital Chorus, study group organ at at the of Sacred Music, amfundraising involved in board for my high school.

I also enjoy cooking, baking, and playing softball.

Yale’s Cru ministry, and conduct the Berkeley College Orchestra here on campus. Please feel free to email me at any time with questions, concerns, or even if you just want to introduce Iyourself! can’t wait to hearforward your thoughts theintopics we have prepared for committee this year.

Looking to seeingon you January!

Women’s rights remain a hotly debated topic globally, and I know you all are going to come up with informed, solutions to these pressing problems. Please don’t hes- Jonathan Rajaseelan, Yaleinnovative ’15 itate to email either Wendy or me with any questions or concerns. the best, -All Emily Harris, Yale ‘15 Miranda Melcher (miranda.melcher@yale.edu) Jonathan Rajaseelan (jonathan.rajaseelan@yale.edu)!

All the best, Wendy Cai (wendy.cai@yale.edu) Emily Harris (emily.harris@yale.edu)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee Situation in the Sahara Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider Question of Civil Wars Topic History Current Situation Questions to Consider Role of the Committee Structure of the Committee Country Positions Suggestions for Further Research Footnotes

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5 6 11 18 19 25 32 33 34 35 39 40

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History of the Committee !

The UN Security Council, the body tasked with maintaining international peace and security, held its first formal session on January 17, 1946 at Westminster House, Londoni. The international community was worn and fractured by the shadows of the Second World War, and the stark reality was that the League of Nations had failed in its most important mission: to prevent future world wars. It was time for a new international body to be formed to deal with the situation. The League was dissolved in 1946 and its mission handed over to the UN. For many, the founding of the United Nations sparked a new hope for a more peaceful, united, and stable world. Specifically, the UN Security Council was given both the authority and the means to accomplish this; from declaring sanctions, to creating peacekeeping missions, to authorizing military action, the SC shouldered the enormous responsibility of promoting and preserving international peace and security. By the end of its first year, the council had passed 15 resolutions dealing with issues ranging from Iran to the International Court of Justiceii.

The structure of the committee is clearly outlined in Chapter V of the UN Charteriii.

There are 15 members in total. The Five “permanent members” – the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and France – hold veto power and were the victorious powers post-World War IIiv. The remaining ten members are elected on a biannual basis by the General Assembly according to a formula based on UN regional blocs.

For YMUN 2014, the countries sitting on the SC are: US, UK, France, PRC, Russian Federation, India, Qatar, Czech Republic, Rwanda,

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Algeria, Nigeria, Peru, Colombia, Turkey, and the Netherlands.

2011 meeting of the UNSC over Syria. Photo credit: Reuters.

TOPIC I.

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Situation in the Sahara Topic History !

The Sahara region of Africa has long been of economic, religious, and political interest. Even before the discovery of the New World, Timbuktu (now in northern Mali) was a center for trade and Islamic thought. Various trans-Saharan trade routes have long been important in linking West Africa with the Middle East, Asia, and East Africa. The term “sahara” has more to do with geography than politics, and covers quite a few countries including: Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, Western Sahara, and Tunisiav. As the topic is to do with the entire region and not one country in particular, of special interest are the countries involved or affected by transborder issues, conflicts, and disputes.

Unsurprisingly, because the UNSC does have a history, duty, and responsibility of tackling the most difficult and complicated of issues, this region has a lot of international issues to be resolved.

Many of these problems arise out of the nature of the term “Sahara” itself; the word is derived from the Arabic word for “desert” and the definition is even more accurate all these centuries later. Due to climate change, increased urbanization and modernization as well as expanding resource

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exploitation, desertification worldwide has been on the rise. For many countries this is problematic, but for countries that are comprised either mainly or entirely of desert, it becomes an insurmountable problem that gives rise to many morevi.

Map of the Sahara desert region. Photo credit: http://enviromap.com/sahara-desert-map

While some of these countries, such as Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia have natural resources and industries that are developed enough to generate income from them, in Libya and Egypt especially, recent political and military eventsvii caused by the “Arab Spring” have superseded economic concerns leading to financial difficultiesviii.

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Despite this, however, if political stability and physical security can be improved, these four countries and Morocco have the ability to increase revenue and thus deal with economic issues caused by poverty.

Other countries in the region are not as lucky. Mali, for example, is the 11th poorest country in the world while Niger is the 7thix. Both of these countries are faced with a multitude of complicated problems; from ethnic tensions to political instability to very poor economies. In fact, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) for neglected crises currently uses its funds on Niger, as well as Chad and Mauritania.x Mali suffered decades of dictatorship following independence from France, but after 1991, the country entered a period of stability and democracy with repeatedly free and fair elections.

Despite this, Mali is one of the poorest countries partially due to the fact that its landlocked and yet must rely on exports for its economy. With the help of the International Monetary Fund, Mali was able to develop its iron ore industry, but farming remains the key revenue generator for the entire country. As 65% of the country is desert and thus unsuited to farmingxi, this industry has not been able to move Mali out of the ranks of poorest countries in the world and food security remains a concern.xii Niger is quite similar to Mali in that it was ruled for decades by a military dictatorship, but unlike Mali, Niger’s history of democracy is more or less stable. Following a number of coups from 1991 onwards, Niger has been faced with a very politically involved military as well as rising Tuareg ethnic tensions in the North. Niger’s economy rests

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almost entirely on subsistence agriculture and the government has insufficient revenue to develop the significant oil, uranium, and ore resources or fight desertificationxiii. After Mali’s former president tried to change the constitution to keep himself in power in 2009 and during the rule of the military coup that deposed him in 2010, most international aid was cut off from Niger, greatly harming the economyxiv.

Map of Mali. Photo credit: CIA World Factbook

Chad and Sudan are the 31st and 41st poorest countries respectively, but face different challenges than Mali and Niger. Chad and Sudan have significant environmental problems, as the northern portions of the two countries are firmly Saharan, whereas the southern portions are nearly tropical, and thus much more agriculturally sustainable. In both countries, however, the ruling body and power is all located in the north, exacerbating pre-existing social, religious, linguistic, and political barriers between north and south. Chad, which has been ruled by the military

UNSC 8 dictator President Idriss Deby since 1990, has a barely functioning economy and few resources.

Furthermore, many of the problems in Chad can be attributed to the decades long Sudanese civil war that is still going on in the Darfur region that borders Chadxv. Tensions between the two countries escalated in 2003, when the Sudanese government support for the Janjaweed (a Sudanese militia group officially independent from the Sudanese governmentxvi) to allow raids on the eastern Sudanese region of Darfur to encompass Chad as well. Chad harbors nearly 300,000 Sudanese refugees and has nearly 100,000 of its own people who have been forced to flee their homes due to these raids. The overall lack of economic opportunity and physical security has compounded Chad’s human trafficking problem as well.

Despite all of these issues, Chad has one of the best-trained militaries in Africa, and has routinely provided assistance to other African countries. For example, Chadian soldiers were the most effective part of the African Union mission in Mali in 2013, but following the death of over 20 Chadian soldiers; President Deby decided to start pulling all 2,000 of his troops out starting in April 2013.xvii Chadian soldiers, however, may be contributed to the UN mission in Mali.

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Map of Chad. Photo credit: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/chad.html

Sudan’s modern history has been rife with conflict. Following independence in 1956, Sudan was ruled by one military-Islamic dictatorship after another. The southern part of the country rebelled against the more powerful north and Sudan endured decades of civil war. The conflict was finally ended in 2005, and the peace agreement eventually led to the creation of South Sudan in July 2011xviii. Since then, however, hostilities have not ended though full-scale war has not broken out. While issues between Sudan and South Sudan are more pertinent to Topic 2, the

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conflict with South Sudan has exacerbated existing problems in Sudan. Sudan lost most of its oil fields through the creation of South Sudan, greatly weakening the economyxix. Starting in 2005, Sudan played reluctant host to a UN Peacekeeping Mission (UNMIS)xx to help resolve the civil war and the creation of South Sudan. But when it was proposed that the mission extend its duties to Darfur, the Sudanese government demanded that any mission working in Darfur included the African Union as wellxxi. The mission was established, but the Sudanese government’s relationship with the rest of the world is not very stable. One reason for this is that the International Criminal Court wants the President of Sudan for war crimes and crimes against humanityxxii. He has evaded arrest so far, but his ability to travel and influence the rest of the world is limited. Following the implementation of two UNSC resolutionsxxiii, in 2006, the US implemented sanctionsxxiv against the Sudanese government, finances, and oil industry most of which are still in place todayxxv.

Map of Sudan. Photo credit: http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/destinations/traveler/none/sudan

Algeria’s 20th century history has mainly involved warfare; first against the French to gain independence, and then between the Islamists and the military. The civil war started in 1991 and ended

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in 2000, but the problems did not stop there. In 2006, an anti-government Salafist group allied with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and started launching terrorist attacks on the governmentxxvi. Algeria’s economy is heavily based on oil exports and is mainly controlled by the government. This economic environment gave rise to protests in 2011 when Egypt and Tunisia were starting the Arab Spring. Despite these protests, Algeria did not experience a change of power during the Arab Spring, though the government (under the 11 year presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika) did undergo a few reforms such as lifting the decades old emergency law to pacify protestersxxvii.

For two decades, Mauritania was ruled by a military dictator who was deposed in a bloodless coup in 2005. Although free and fair elections put a democratic president in charge in 2007, a 2008 military coup came to, and remains, in powerxxviii.

One of Mauritania’s biggest issues is to do with its mixed population and the tensions between the Arab-Berbers and Afro-Mauritaniansxxix.

Mauritania is also involved in the situation of Western Sahara, although Mauritania’s control over the territory was only for three years from 19761979. Like Algeria, Mauritania faces a threat from AQIM. Mauritania’s economy relies heavily on iron ore exports and other minerals, though the government has been working with the IMF to expand and diversify the economyxxx.

Morocco, unlike the other Saharan countries, is a constitutional monarchy and the royal family dates back to the 17th century. Also unlike other North African countries, when protests started in 2011 calling for more transparency and reform, the king responded quickly with early

UNSC 10 elections and a new constitution. Following the July 2011 election, more power was transferred to the prime minister and legislature, which was won by an Islamist partyxxxi. Morocco’s economy is doing quite well and is very stable, mainly due to the diversified nature and long-term efforts to create good trade relationships. Morocco has a Free Trade Agreement with the USxxxii and favourable trade agreements with Europe.

Morocco’s source of conflict, however, comes from the disputed territory of Western Sahara. While the UN recognizes the territory as self-governing and the AU recognizes it as a country, it has been de facto controlled by Morocco since Spain gave up control of the territory in 1975.

Moroccan royal family. Photo credit: http://rudebutgood.blogspot.com/2011/12/mohammed-vi-ofmorocco.html

The Western Sahara is not a formally African Union, which counts the SADR as a member, but not Moroccoxxxiii. The conflict started

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in 1975 when Morocco gained control through a mass demonstration called the Green March the territory from Spain, causing around 165,000 people in the area to flee to Algeria where they remain todayxxxiv. A ceasefire agreement was enacted in 1991 and a UN peacekeeping mission was set up.

Although a referendum on independence or assimilation was agreed upon, due to arguments about voter eligibility, the referendum has never been held and the peacekeeping mission remainsxxxv.

Western Sahara is entirely desert, and thus the territory must import the majority of its food and relies heavily on Morocco for employment and revenue. Although Western Sahara does have natural resources, Morocco and the Polisario Front cannot agree on who owns the rights to them and thus the resources have not been touched.

Map of Western Sahara. Photo credit: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/westernsahara.html

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Current Situation The current situation in the Sahara region is quite complicated as most of the countries are involved in both domestic and international disputes and problems. One of the biggest sources of tension is the on-going Arab Spring process that started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and to some extent Algeria as well.

Southern Saharan states are being forced to deal with much of the fall out of the Arab Spring, especially from Libya, which is leading to increased ethnic tensions and violence that cannot be contained by already porous borders. The situation of Western Sahara is an on-going problem that has not be helped by Arab Spring-related instability in the Moroccan government, and the situation within Sudan and between Chad and Sudan is being negatively affected by Sudan and South Sudan’s fractious relationship.

UN peacekeeping missions are key to this region; there are already three in place, in the Western Sahara, Darfur, and as of April 2013, a mission in Mali. The African Union (AU) also has a presence in Western Sahara as well as in Chad.

However, as mentioned in the above histories, not all of the violence in these countries is easily solved; there are many underlying problems and factors that must be addressed for a sustainable solution.

One of the key things needed for creative solutions to be developed is accurate information about both the historical and current problems in these Saharan countries. While the following information is accurate as of summer 2013, this is a constantly changing situation and will require follow-up research.

Until 2011, Libya was under the rule of an oppressive, eccentric, and power-hungry dictator,

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Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Following protests triggered by the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt and in Tunisia, a widespread rebellion broke out against Gaddafi leading to an all-out and brutal civil war.

After the UNSC approved an intervention, the rebel government quickly gained control of the country in October of 2011. With the help of NATO, the newly formed rebel government succeeded in defeating the dictator, who was killed during the violence. However, despite the new government coming to power, the establishment of a parliament and elections, as well as a UN peacekeeping mission (UNSMIL)xxxvi, problems remain for Libyaxxxvii. One of the biggest issues is the lack of security as insurgent attacks by Gaddafi loyalists persist mainly because the new government does not have a coherent security force of their own. The majority of the civil war was fought by civilian militias, formed in individual villages and not organized in any formal matter until after the war was over. But the strong loyalties and ideological differences between the different militias has made it essentially impossible to form a state security apparatus, thus leading to the prevalence of violencexxxviii and extrajudicial security measuresxxxix. This massive security challengexl was highlighted when the American ambassador to Libya was killed in an attack on the Benghazi consulate in September 2012xli. Furthermore, political assassinations have increased, as have car bombsxlii. Aside from security problems, the Libyan civil war also resulted in a lot of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countriesxliii and an increase in violence and illegal arms pouring into other countries. In fact, it was weapons from former

UNSC 12 Gaddafi soldiers that emboldened members of the Tuareg ethnic group in northern Malixliv to attempt to create a breakaway state that resulted in a French intervention that is now being taken over by the UN. Libya’s economy struggled in early 2013 as oil production (Libya’s main source of revenue) had stopped during the warxlv, but trade and investment are increasing rapidlyxlvi.

Former Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Photo credit: http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/qaddafis-legacy/32584

Like Libya, in January 2011 Tunisia was under the 23-year rule of a dictator. Following the

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public suicide of a street vendor, protests over economic and political conditions began and eventually forced the president to resign and the former ruling party to be bannedxlvii. Unlike Libya, however, there was no civil war, and following free and fair elections in October of 2011, the Islamist party Ennahda came to power. Despite their religious nature, the party stated in March 2012 that sharia will not become the basis of Tunisian law and instead will stay a secular governmentxlviii. Since then, there have been some protestsxlix, but the country was relatively stable until an opposition leader was assassinated in July 2013 igniting massive protests and the writing of a new constitutionl. Tunisia is being forced to deal with repercussions of Libya’s civil war including refugeesli, smugglinglii, and a potential increase in attention from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)liii.

Map of Tunisia. Photo credit: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/tunisia/

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Before the Arab Spring, Algeria’s government and foreign relations were productive and stable. Since the fall of Libya’s former dictator, however, Algeria has been suffering from the increased violence and arms spreading throughout the region. In January 2013 terrorists captured a gas field and held over 37 foreign workers hostage before eventually killing them allliv.

Following this attack, the Algerian government has committed to working even more closely with its neighbours and Western powerslv to stop terrorist attackslvi. The rebel movement in Mali has also adversely affected Algeria although the government tried placating the Islamist groups at first, this backfired and helped contribute to the terrorist attackslvii.

Given Morocco’s timely answer to their Arab Spring protests and little development in the situation in Western Sahara, the current situation in the country is much like its neighbours. A willingness to work together to stop terrorist threats encouraged by the fall of Gaddafi’s Libya, a desire to increase stability and economic conditions (especially employment) and also a distinct preference to continuing the status quo in Western Sahara while Algeria in particular is occupied with stopping terrorists and the situation in Mali.

Domestically, there are some in Morocco who are worried that the recent government changes may lead to a rise of Islamism in Moroccolviii.

The current situation in the Western Sahara is mainly unchanged; the territory is still split between the Polisario Front and Morocco, with the UN peacekeeping mission in the middle.

Riots in late 2010 have led to worries over increased violence in the arealix. An increase in terrorist attacks against the Moroccan government seems to justify

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this fear, especially as the suspects who were arrested are thought to have ties to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)lx. The UN mission in Western Sahara has an on-going mandate from the UNSC, but Moroccan allies France and the US has repeatedly blocked the Council from expanding the mandate to protect, for example, human rightslxi.

Aside from the conflict itself, Western Sahara still have thousands of refugees in Algeria and an unstable economic system that is supported almost entirely by Morocco.

Map of Morocco. Photo credit: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/morocco.html

Following Libya’s revolution in 2011, thousands of people originally from Mali fled the country and returned to Mali. This sparked longstanding ethnic tensions in the north of Mali, especially as the civil war in Libya provided rebels in northern Mali with weapons. In early 2012, Tuareg Islamists in northern Mali declared the northern part of the country to be a new state called Azawadlxii. Mid-level soldiers in the capital city of Mali say the government’s failure to repress the rebellion and staged a military coup in March 2012, deposing the fairly elected president. Following indepth mediation led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the civilian

UNSC 14 government (with a new interim president) came back to power in April 2012, but the problems of Mali were far from over. The rebels expanded their hold on the north, causing thousands of Malians to flee to the south and to neighbouring countries. At the urging of its former colony, France launched a military mission in January 2013lxiii and took back the north with the help of African forces such as Chadian soldiers. A UN mission (UNUSMA) took overlxiv from the French-AU mission in April 2013lxv, and following a ceasefire agreement in May 2013lxvi elections are scheduled for later in 2013lxvii, which may not be possible due to security concernslxviii and inabilities to accommodate the thousands of Malian refugees in timelxix. The UN mission has troops from a wide range of countries including permanent member China; Nigerialxx has pulled some their troops from the missionlxxi.

Despite the success of the military intervention, Islamists remain in the north and are very difficult to find as the entire northern part of the country is desert, thus a main concern of the mission is counterterrorismlxxii. Chadian soldiers in particular have been helpful as they are some of the best-trained troops in desert warfare, making their withdrawal worrying. As one of the poorest countries in the world, Mali’s recent instability has exacerbated food securitylxxiii and malnutritionlxxiv concerns. The thousands of refugeeslxxv that Mali’s

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poor neighbouring countries have been forced to take in have also hindered regional support for Mali. While billions in aid have been pledged by outside donorslxxvi, these problems remain to be solved and stand the best chance of success if done with regional cooperationlxxvii.

Flag of Azawad. Photo credit: Wikimedia

Niger’s biggest issue, aside from being one of the poorest countries in the world with an undeveloped economy, has to deal with spill over from the conflicts in Libya and in Mali. Niger is currently hosting around 50,000 Malian refugeeslxxviii, and violence in the north of Niger is being fuelled by instability in Libya. Violence from religious extremists in Nigeria has also been an issue, though Nigeria’s recently launched military campaigns against Boko Haram will likely mitigate the effect on Niger. In July 2013, terrorists in league with the terrorists who attacked Algeria in early 2013 launched Niger’s first ever suicide attack,

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causing more worries in this incredibly poor countrylxxix. Security for Niger’s two main sources of income - a uranium mine and a few oil facilities rests in the hands of foreign companies, who may flee if the violence worsens, greatly harming Niger’s economylxxx. The country has the fastest growing population in Africalxxxi, yet suffers crippling lack of electricitylxxxii and povertylxxxiii.

to problems later if the forces are not integrated with UN, AU, or ECOWAS forces. For example, Chadian troops are only allowed to join the new UN mission in Mali after its forces have been screened for child soldierslxxxviii.

Chadian soldiers. Photo credit: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/05/264551.html

Malian refugees in Niger. Photo credit: http://www.unhcr.org/4fc8dfa26.html

Chad is currently facing problems caused by a huge influx of returneeslxxxiv, former Chadian refugees who are now being forced to flee back to Chad following conflict in Darfur, Mali, Niger, and Libya. But as Chad is already suffering from poverty and malnutrition, these returnees are greatly straining Chad’s resourceslxxxv and hampering the government’s ability to assist neighbouring countrieslxxxvi. Despite this, Chad was the only regional country that sent troops into Mali with the French, where they proved their desert training and became indispensablelxxxvii. Given that Chad is ruled by an authoritarian dictator, this new military prominence is a good sign for regional cooperation on violence in the area, but could lead

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Despite the successful establishment of South Sudan in 2011, conflict within Sudan has barely decreased. Border skirmishes with South Sudan over disputed territories are common, and fighting in Darfur has gone on unstopped (despite a UN peacekeeping mission) for a decadelxxxix. Ongoing and increasingly violent fighting against peacekeepers in Darfur and on the border with South Sudan have stretched the two UN peacekeeping missions to their limits, and often leave them unable to execute their mandatexc. The continued fighting in Darfur has repercussions for the entire country as it greatly threatens Sudan’s food securityxci.

Furthermore, the conflict in Darfur has recently seen increases in ethnic violence and a continued prevalence of rape as a weaponxcii. Sudan also hosts thousands of refugees from neighbouring

UNSC 16 countries and over two million Sudanese are internally displaced in their own countryxciii.

Sudan’s economy is suffering as South Sudan now has most of the formerly united country’s oil facilities, and disputes between the two countries have cut off Sudan’s supply of oil. The ICC’s arrest warrant for Sudan’s president has caused him to either not attend or leave early from regional meetingsxciv, making it difficult for Sudan to contribute regionally to anything.

Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. Photo credit: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2957965/Sudan-launched-freshattacks-on-Darfur-villages-rebels-say.html

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Aside from facing similar threats of terrorism from its neighbours, Mauritania also faces enormous domestic issues rooted in a regional tradition of slavery. Despite laws passed against all forms of slavery (the most recent one of which was passed in 2007), rights groups have accused the government of not enforcing these laws for political reasons.

Although there technically is no longer slavery in the country, there is widespread discrimination by Arab/Berber Mauritanians against southern Afro-Mauritanians that has led to forced marriages and lack of social mobilityxcv.

Inspired by the Arab Spring protests in Libya, Mauritanians tried to protest against the government on the issue of slavery, but were unsuccessful. Mauritania is also host to 200,000 Malian refugees and 26,000 refugees from Western Saharaxcvi. However, Mauritania’s agrarian economy is suffering by the inability to go into northern Mali to graze cattle, as has been done for hundreds of years. Thus, refugees in the country face an increasingly worse situation, as Mauritanians near refugee camps are so poor that they are trying to register as refugees to obtain international aid packagesxcvii.

As has been widely reported for the past few years, Egypt has been experiencing a very tumultuous path following Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow in 2011. Following military rule from

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February 2011 until elections in June 2012 when an Islamist president named Mohamad Morsi was electedxcviii. However, despite campaign promises of secular inclusiveness, Morsi quickly turned against the public by, giving himself emergency powers in November 2012. After the largest protests in the country’s history in June 2013, Morsi was overthrown by the military, who as of July 2013 is still in charge, casting grave doubts on Egypt’s hope for democracyxcix. Riots and attacks have occurred across Egypt and seem to be getting worse. Egypt’s economy is failing, and without a massive International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, is unlikely to recoverc. Due to the military coup, Western economic aid may be withdrawn, making Egypt as a whole more desperate despite pledges of aid from Arabian Gulf countriesci. Egypt’s instability is threatening to spill over into neighbouring states including Sudan, Libya, and Israelcii. It is also preventing Egypt, long an Arab and Maghrebi leader, from influencing any regional events positively. As of July 21, 2013, Egypt’s new cabinet was formed and met for the first time.

However, concerns have been raised over the fact that many prominent leaders under Mubarak’s regime are on the new cabinetciii.

Protests in Tahrir Square, Cairo. Photo credit: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/01/ahdaf-soueifegypt-protests

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Overall, the Sahara region as a whole is facing unprecedented security concerns that transcend national boundariesciv. As many of these problems have been caused or exacerbated by ethnic and economic tensions and in some cases already involve UN peacekeeping troops, resolutions will have to rely heavily on innovative and regional solutionscv.

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Questions to Consider! ! !

As has been made clear in the previous sections, this topic is quite complicated and will require detailed and wide-ranging ideas for clauses. Delegates should be thinking about the following areas (though this is not an exhaustive list) for clause development.

How can UN, AU, and ECOWAS cooperation and military involvement contribute and enhance a regional solution? What other existing or nascent organizations have a role to play?

What solutions can be devised that both contribute to better border control but do not alienate neighbouring countries? How does human trafficking and weapons trafficking fit in to regional security?

How can transnational solutions for food security and poverty alleviation be implemented in politically unstable countries? How can these countries achieve economic development that benefits the masses, does not lead to corruption, and is not exploitative? What can be done for the millions of refugees in the region?

What is the best way forward for Western Sahara? How can the negative consequences of the Arab Spring be reduced?

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TOPIC II.

Question of Civil Wars Topic History !

While the United Nations is an international body with nearly every country in the world as a member, the purpose of the organization is still very much to prevent international conflict; wars between two member states or even just sovereign states. The UN was not created to prevent or resolve civil wars. In fact, Article 2 of the UN Charter states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Chartercvi. As civil conflicts have become more and more likely to affect neighbouring countries, however, civil wars of this kind can fall under the purview of the United Nations and specifically the Security Council.

Thus, the task is to devise and implement measures that can be applied across conflicts so as to contain, mitigate and potentially improve the situation of the people and government of any country embroiled in civil war as well as any countries affected by the conflict.

The civil war in Sri Lanka, fought between the Sri Lankan government (mainly of Sinhalese ethnic origin) and the Tamil-separatist group the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), is considered one of the longest on-going conflicts of the last half-century, lasting upwards of 26 yearscvii. Ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority had been heated since the country gained independence from Britain in 1948, and the ensuing three decades of violence killed more than 70,000 people and left many thousands more internally displaced in extreme povertycviii. The official start of the conflict in July of 1983 is now infamously remembered as

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“Black July.” After the LTTE had killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, there were anti-Tamil pogroms all over the country. For seven days mobs of mainly Sinhalese attacked Tamil targets, burning homes, looting shops, raping women and killing many innocent people. Estimates of the death toll range between 400 and 3,000. 8,000 homes and 5,000 shops were destroyed, and 150,000 people were made homelesscix. In short, the devastation was incalculable. The economic effects were also severe: when the riots and violence broke out there was massive unemployment across the country and foreign investment steeply declinedcx. Most significantly, the riots forced thousands of nowhomeless Tamils to either flee the country and go to Tamil-Nadu in India or to live in refugee camps (where conditions were so bad that many died of malnutrition and other diseases)cxi.

Fighting in Sri Lanka. Photo credit: http://newshopper.sulekha.com/sri-lanka-civilwar_photo_816879.htm

Yet, the effects of Sri Lanka’s civil war stretched beyond its own borders. India was drawn into the conflict, seeing itself as a potential mediator between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. However, when Indian troops marched

NATO 20 onto Sri Lankan territory, they ended up killing many civilians in the northern and eastern regions of the country and failed in all their attempts to negotiate a peace agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTEcxii. The LTTE, in response to the violence the Indian army had afflicted on the Tamils of the land, assassinated the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991cxiii.

Tensions continued only to escalate, leading to thousands of deaths on both sides.

During the conflict, the LTTE was involved in arms smuggling and drug trafficking in places as far-reaching as Canada. They were also found guilty of numerous human rights violations; they recruited over a thousand child soldiers and used torture against prisoners of war though they had earlier agreed to abide by the Geneva conventions. Most significantly, however, the LTTE is credited with the first-ever use of a suicide bomb, a form of extreme terrorism soon exported to many other regions of the world, particularly the Middle Eastcxiv.

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Flag of the LTTE. Photo credit: http://www.lankaeagle.com/?p=5994

Yet the Sri Lankan government was certainly not without fault; at the official conclusion of the war in 2009, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon formed a special commission to look into the question of whether Sri Lanka had committed acts of genocide against its own Tamil people. The report concluded the Sri Lankan government was indeed guilty of many human rights violations throughout the

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duration of the conflict, especially in the final months of 2009cxv. These include intentional killing of civilians, ethnic cleansing of nonSinhalese minorities, abolishing Habeas Corpus, and abominable conditions in the Tamil refugee camps such as extreme rationing of food and medicine, leading to many deathscxvi. Even today, although the fighting has ceased, more than 70,000 people have died and hundreds of thousands are left internally displaced. Thousands of civilians have fled the country, and Sri Lanka’s economy is shattered.

Unfortunately, for the duration of the conflict the international community was largely silent about the atrocities committed in Sri Lanka on both sides. Had the UNSC intervened to try to stabilize the situation and maintain Sri Lanka’s internal security, much violence, weapons smuggling, poverty, and civilian deaths may have been prevented.

Another major conflict dominating headlines in recent decades was the civil war in Rwanda. Like Sri Lanka, ethnic tensions reached a boiling point between two tribes: the Hutus and the Tutsis. In 1959, while Rwanda was still a Belgian colony, the Hutu majority group overthrew the ruling Tutsi king. Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were killed and over 150,000 Tutsis were driven into exile in neighbouring countriescxvii.

In response, the children of these refugees and exiles subsequently formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and began a civil war against the Hutu government in 1990. The violence of the civil war only served to exacerbate ethnic tensions, culminating in 1994 in a stateorchestrated genocide, in which mainly HutuRwandans killed up to a million of their fellow citizens, including approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population. The genocide ended several months later when the predominantly Tutsi

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RPF, operating out of neighbouring Uganda and northern Rwanda, defeated the Rwandan national army and Hutu militia groupscxviii.

Rwandan refugees. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

They then established an RPF-led government of national unity. At this point, approximately two million Hutu refugees -fearing Tutsi retribution for past atrocities – fled the country to neighbouring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Conditions in the refugee camps were deplorable, and many thousands of people died in epidemics of cholera and dysenterycxix. Still, the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda, composed of Hutu troops and militia members, began to militarize the camps, using them as bases to overthrow the new RPF-dominated government. While some refugees eventually returned to Rwanda, several thousand stayed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and formed an extremist group with the goal of retaking Rwanda (in the same fashion as the RPF’s takeover in 1990). The Rwandan government later partnered with the DRC army to rout out and destroy pockets of this Hutu extremist insurgency. The war ended “officially” in 2003cxx.

After the signing of the Arusha accords between the Rwandan government and the RPF to end the civil war, the United Nations Assistance

NATO 22 Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established on October 5, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 872 (1993). Its mandate included "ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitoring the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitoring the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assisting with mine-clearance; and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations"cxxi.

The violent clashes that followed the establishment of the new government, including the assassinations of two major political leaders and the ambush of UNAMIR-led RPF forces led the UNAMIR forces to shift from offence to defence. UNAMIR lent its support to the military and civilian authorities in Rwanda, while the UN continued to place pressure on President Habyarimana and the RPF to return to the principles clearly set forth in the Arusha Accords.

On April 5, 1994 the UN voted to extend the mandate of UNAMIR to July 29,1994 after

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expressing "deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly" and "concern at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali”cxxii.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying two leaders – President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi – was shot down near Kigali. What followed was utter devastation: the collapse of the unstable peace in Rwanda and a resulting genocide, which is estimated to have claimed between 800,000 and 1,017,100 Tutsi and Hutu lives over the course of a mere 100 dayscxxiii.

The initial targets of the genocide campaign included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian soldiers who were part of UNAMIR. These troops were murdered after handing over their weapons to Rwandan government troops (they were told to do so by their battalion commander who was unclear on the legal premise regarding self-defence and the use of violence, even though they had already been under fire for approximately two hours)cxxiv.

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This confusion regarding legal limits and protocols exemplified the ineffective reaction of UNAMIR to the rapidly escalating chaos. The mission's vague mandate, created under Chapter VI of the UN Charter was ambiguous concerning the right to use force, particularly in defense of civilianscxxv. The mission's original intention was to oversee the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement; however, by the time of the genocide, the peace agreement had become completely irrelevant and UNAMIR was, essentially, legally powerless.

After the withdrawal of several nations' contingents due to fear of losing troops, UNAMIR was left with only 270 soldiers supported by less than 200 local authorities. Head commander Lieutenant-General Dallaire, despite orders to withdraw immediately from Kigali, refused to abandon the country to the genocide and remained to lead what little forces remained in the country.

UNAMIR did the best it could with what little resources remained. UNAMIR forces did manage to save the lives of thousands of Tutsis in and around Kigali and the few other areas under UN control. Dallaire requested the immediate insertion of approximately 5,000 troops, but his request was promptly deniedcxxvi.

For the next six weeks, UNAMIR coordinated peace talks between the Hutu government and the RPF that amounted to nothing. Eventually, on May 17, 1994, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that would deliver nearly 5,500 troops and other equipment to UNAMIR. However, this and subsequent resolutions were still unclear on the right to use force in stopping the genocide. The UN force, for the duration of the conflict, was rendered almost completely ineffective on the groundcxxvii.

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All in all, UNAMIR is looked on as a failure of the UNSC to preserve security in the region of Rwanda (and its neighbours) and prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. There are many lessons to be learned from the situation, and the UNSC must be cognizant of the failures of UNAMIR in Rwanda if there is to be hope at making any positive difference in the numerous conflicts that plague the globe today.

UNAMIR Peacekeeper. Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/4417555428/

Such current conflicts are many, and they spread instability and violence not only internally but also to many neighbouring states. Examples include the long-standing civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the wars in Mali, Liberia, and Burundi. Domestic conflicts that are not quite a full on civil war can also have international repercussions, such as the split between Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan and its affect on Syria and Turkey. Consider also the situation in Afghanistan, stretching for longer than thirty years, which now quite obviously includes

NATO 24 Pakistan as well. A May 2013 coup in the Central African Republic, a history of violence in Sudan’s Darfur, and Somalia’s decades of insurgency are other examples. Finally, perhaps the case receiving the most notoriety in the international press is the war in Syria; from the deaths of almost a hundred thousand civilians, to arms smuggling, to the use of nerve-agent chemical weapons by the Assad regime, Syria and the surrounding region has been plunged into utter chaos.

The problem is no longer one of local security but of international security. The UNSC has a duty to tackle these problems with every resource it has at its disposal.

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Current Situation The civil wars in Rwanda and Sri Lanka are now over, but that does not mean that there are no more civil wars. In fact, some of the bloodiest conflicts in the world right now are civil wars. For example, the Middle East has yet again descended into turmoil with the complication of the Syrian crisis.

Religious rebels in Syria. Photo credit: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3723912.ece

People searching through the debris of destroyed buildings in the aftermath of a strike by Syrian government forces, Jabal Bedro, Aleppo, Syria. Photo credit: AP Photo/Aleppo Media Center AMC

As of June 2013, the death toll in Syria exceeded 100,000 according to a United Nations reportcxxviii. Of these casualties, about half were civilianscxxix. Additionally, this number includes approximately 61,000-armed combatants consisting of both the Syrian Army and rebel forcescxxx, up to 1,000 opposition protesters (many of whom were tortured to death) and 1,000 government officialscxxxi.

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By October of 2012, 28,000 people had been reported missing; including civilians forcibly abducted by Syrian government troops or security forcescxxxii. Over 1.8 million civilians have fled to other countries, and millions more are left in refugee campscxxxiii. In fact, according to the United Nations refugee agency, the rate of Syrians fleeing the country is the worst since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In addition, tens of thousands of protesters have been imprisoned and there are reports of widespread torture and terror in an “archipelago� of state prisons and torture centers built by Assadcxxxiv. International organizations have accused both government and opposition forces of severe human rights violations, including using children as shields and deploying chemical weaponscxxxv.

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Syrian refugees. Photo credit: http://www.voanews.com/content/un-reports-1-3-million-syrianrefugees/1637851.html

The refugee problem, however, is not contained within the borders of Syria itself; for example, hundreds of thousands have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan. For those that fled to Egypt, however, UN officials are concerned with the detention of these Syrian refugees given growing anti-Syrian sentiment in Egyptcxxxvi.

Yemen has also absorbed many Syrian refugees into an economic and political climate that is not very promising to begin withcxxxvii.

Syria currently possesses one of the world’s largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, which were allegedly used against the Syrian

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population, according to British, French, Israeli, and US intelligence sources, in a March 19 attack on Aleppocxxxviii. This fact, coupled with the instability of the region, the unknown location of Assad’s chemical arsenal, and the possibility of extremist rebels or terrorists acquiring these weapons represents an urgent, direct threat to the Syrian people and the security of its neighbours in the region.

Syria is one of only six states not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weaponscxxxix. On July 23, 2012 Syria admitted to having a stockpile of chemical weapons to be used “strictly and only in the event of external aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic”cxl. Syria allegedly produces chemical agents including mustard gas and nerve agents (VX, Sarin, and Tabun), classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) under UNSC Resolution 687cxli. Most of the weapons are binary chemical agents, which makes moving the stockpile relatively easy and safe (e.g. using mobile labs), ensures the longevity of the chemical species, and makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact location of Assad’s arsenal at any given time.

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Chemical weapons in the hands of Assad pose one of the most direct threats to Syria’s populace and any peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Assad government insists that these stockpiles are secure, but this claim is widely doubted in the international community and cannot be verified until UN inspectors are allowed into the country. Further concerns arise given the possibility of the arms being stolen by extremist rebel groups, or transferred to terrorist groups such as Hezbollahcxlii. Cooperation between Syria and Iran in WMD development is also a serious concern. The UNSC is obligated to deal with the threat of Syria’s chemical arsenal in a swift and decisive manner.

Animal carcasses lie on the ground, killed by what residents said was a chemical weapon attack, in the Khan al-Assal area near the northern city of Aleppo. Photo credit: George Ourfalian/Reuters

Yet, human rights violations and chemical weapons stockpiles are only one part of the problem. Syria’s internal conflict is rapidly spreading from within its own borders to the rest of the region, threatening to cripple the already fragile stability of the Middle East as a whole. And despite the immense slaughter and torture of innocents in Syria, the conflict is much more than just a humanitarian crisis.

The spread of terrorism as a result of the Syrian conflict is rampant. Al Qaeda forces in Syria and Iraq have already united, and Hezbollah has

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As Syria continues to crumble, Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds are being drawn into a regional web of sectarian allegiances. Iran poses a grave threat to the already dire situation; in its quest for increasing power in the region and a possible nuclear weapon, it is desperately trying to spread its influence among Shiites, uniting them under the banner of Tehran and destroying the integrity of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Lebanon.

Iran uses terrorist groups, specifically Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in southern Iraq, to do its bidding. Syria is essentially the “linchpin” into the Arab Middle East for Irancxliii. Iran’s security forces are already working in Syria to prop up Assad. In this context, Tehran’s sprint toward a nuclear weapon is a problem not just for its traditional enemy – Israel – but the region as a whole.

In response, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other neighbouring powers are turning to arm and support Sunni factions. The Turks are also being drawn into the conflict, desperately fearful that the Kurds will break away in Syria and incite the same reaction in Turkey. Missile and mortar strikes are increasingly common across the borders of both Israel and Turkey147.

The Syrian civil war has also spread to neighbouring Lebanon, with numerous incidents of sectarian violence in the northern part of the country between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government, and armed clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripolicxliv. Additionally, fighting between the Syrian rebels and Assad’s government forces has spilled over across the border into Lebanon on several occasions.

The Syrian Air Force has also conducted air strikes on targets in Lebanon, while rebels have

NATO 28 launched rockets on Hezbollah targetscxlv. At least 15 Lebanese army soldiers have been killedcxlvi.

There is clearly a wider regional war spreading from Syria to Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and beyond, creating a corridor of instability. This “bleeding out” – so to speak – has its own set of unique consequences: porous borders, illegal drug trafficking across these borders, and the smuggling of arms to terrorist and militia group.

The conflict will most likely spread further, linking to similar areas of violence to the east (in Afghanistan and Pakistan) or to the west to the mess in the Saharacxlvii.

Map of Syria and surrounding countries. Photo credit: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/syri a/map.html

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The UNSC must deal with the situation in Syria immediately not only for the sake of violence and human rights abuses inside Syria’s borders, but to prevent the entire Middle East region from collapsing into war.

Moving from the Middle East to Africa, there are numerous on-going civil conflicts in the region that the UNSC has the responsibility to address. In Nigeria, for example, many civilians are caught in the crossfire in a violent struggle between the Nigerian military and an Islamic militant group called Boko Haram. At least 20,000 refugees have fled the country, and there have been reports that Nigerian troops have, on multiple occasions, indiscriminately targeted civilianscxlviii. However, Boko Haram has also been accused of killing upwards of 1,600 civilianscxlix.

Boko Haram has also been linked to Al-Shabab (a militant group in Somalia) as well as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), making Nigeria a hotbed for terrorism in the regioncl. The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is heavily polarized between its Muslim-north and Christian-south; the conflict has only served to exacerbate those religious tensions. Most civilians are terrified of both sides and face imminent food shortages (many farmers have been evicted from their fields by the militant groups in the middle of harvest season), a problem the government is doing little to effectively remedycli.

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Boko Haram, Nigeria. Photo credit: http://www.onislam.net/english/news/africa/455146-nigeriasboko-haram-profile.html

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has had a long history of war; including a brutal five-year conflict that officially ending in 2003, the deadliest war in modern African history, over four million people were killed. Yet the fighting still continues, and the consequences of the war are far reaching. In the years immediately after 2003, thousands of people died daily in the DRC due to malnutrition and easily preventable diseasesclii. Additionally, there was widespread trade of conflict minerals, a blatant humans rights violations against the miners, as well as the depletion of the DRC’s reserves of natural mineral resourcescliii. The DRC is facing massive security problems and human rights abuses, yet with weak government institutions and general political instability, the country is hardly poised to deal effectively with the situation. Additionally, the rebel group M23 (which is fighting against the Congolese government) has committed many atrocities against the people of DRC and are quietly supported by the Rwandan government. It is this support that has sustained numerous

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human rights abuses including torture, rape, and murder by the M23 rebels.

Specifically, M23 rebels have executed at least 44 people and raped at least 61 women and girls since March 2013 in the eastern part of the DRC. Also, the rate of sexual violence against women and girls has rose at an alarming rate from June to July of 2013 in the northeastern region of DRCcliv. Furthermore, DRC residents and rebel deserters reported recent forced recruitment of men and boys by M23 in both Rwanda and the DRCclv. In July 2013, fighting between M23 and the Congolese military escalated to unprecedented levels, prompting upwards of 66,000 refugees to flee the country to Ugandaclvi. Most are living without food or adequate shelterclvii.

The UNSC has sent peacekeeping missions to the DRC to deal with the situation; most recently, UNSC Resolution 1925 authorized the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO). As of July 2013, blue helmets were on the ground in DRC and for the first time was authorized to use lethal force against the rebels in order to protect and defend civiliansclviii.

The brigade’s priorities were to neutralize armed groups, reduce the threat posed to the state authority and civilian security and make space for stabilization activitiesclix. Yet there is already controversy regarding the mission, still in its infancy. Rwanda accused the United Nations' new intervention brigade (MONUSCO) in eastern Congo of discussing collaboration with Hutu rebels linked to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, thereby jeopardizing peace efforts in the regionclx.

Many are alleging that unless safeguards and preventative measures are imposed, that the use of

NATO 30 violence by the UN’s intervention brigade in DRC will only worsen the human rights crisis, not improve itclxi.

UN peacekeepers (“blue helmets”) in DR Congo. Photo credit: MONUSCO, United Nations.

Fixing the problems with the current mission, dealing with the refugee problem, the spread of terrorism, and stabilizing governmental institutions must be top priorities in dealing with the current situation in DRC. Aside from the situation in the DRC, the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) emphasizes the need to stabilize governmental institutions for the sake of preserving internal security and limiting violence.

State institutions in the CAR remain “close to

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collapse” and security is “virtually non-existent” in the countryclxii. Violence first erupted in December of 2012 in the CAR – a country with a history of decades of instability and fighting – when the Séléka rebel coalition launched a series of attacks against the government. A peace agreement was subsequently signed in January, but the rebels again seized the capital, Bangui, in March, forcing then-President François Bozizé to flee the country.

As a result, the transitional government that was set up remains extremely weakclxiii and even the rebel prime minister admits that his country is in crisisclxiv. The institutions of government and government control simply do not exist outside of the capital and there is no rule of law throughout the country.

The recent fighting has further eroded even the most basic services in the country and worsened an already dire humanitarian situation, affecting the entire population of 4.6 million people, half of whom are children. Currently, there are over 200,000 identified IDPs and 20,000 refugees who have been affectedclxv. There are no social services for these people, nor any security or judicial systems in the entire country. The following statement was issued by UN human rights experts: “We are seriously concerned over reported acts of killings, torture, arbitrary

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detention, gender-based violence, enforced disappearances, 'mob justice' and the pervasive climate of insecurity and the absence of the rule of law which have prevailed in the country in the last five months�clxvi. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court has recently stated that they are worried about the possibility of war crimes in the CARclxvii.

Finally, the situation in Somalia presents a number of issues that are especially relevant to the theme of international repercussions of civil conflicts. The main militant group in Somalia, AlShabaab, is an Al Qaeda linked terrorist group fighting for a fundamentalist Islamic Somali stateclxviii. The export of terrorism (explosives, arms, suicide bombers, etc.) and support from Al Qaeda has had devastating consequences in terms of loss of human life and human rights abusesclxix.

Furthermore, there is the problem of piracy; since the beginning of the 21st century when the Somali civil war broke out, piracy off the coast of Somalia has been one of the most potent threats to international shipping. Perhaps the incident of most notoriety occurred on April 8, 2009, when four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama and took hostage its captain, Richard Phillips. Four days later, United States Navy SEAL snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostageclxx. All in all, over half a million people have lost their lives as a result of the bloodshed in the Somali civil warclxxi.

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Somali Pirate Flag. Photo credit: http://blowmy900.info

These are only a small sampling of ongoing civil conflicts around the world and their devastating consequences. Yet all of these conflicts ultimately present the international community with a similar set of issues: civilian deaths, torture and rape, other human rights abuses (especially relating to children), refugees/IDPs, poverty, exacerbation of ethnic and religious tensions, the spread of terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, porous and insecure borders, and unstable governments and regimes. The task is not only to end the violence and abuse, but also to rebuild these countries from the ground up, and to prosecute those responsible in a weak ICC/judicial apparatus. The list is certainly daunting, but the UNSC is directly tasked with dealing with these problems head-on.

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Questions to Consider!

Civil wars and the violence they perpetrate leave millions of civilians without homes, basic necessities, and millions more are dead. These conflicts also often tend to strengthen the worst forces in the world and weaken the good. The United Nations Security Council is the international body best equipped to tackle the global consequences of civil conflicts head-on; for this topic especially, delegates are encouraged to pursue creative, bold, out-of-the-box, and vigorous solutions to these very complex problems. The chairs anticipate that clauses will focus the following general topics and problems (though this is by no means an exhaustive list).

How can peacekeeping missions become more efficient and effective? What can be improved upon and what lessons can be learned from past mistakes?

What is the best way to deal with human rights violations without violating the UN Charter? How can negotiations be structured so as to gain the best possible outcome to conflict? What types of solutions create the best post-conflict results?

What can be done about border security and various forms of illegal trafficking? How might this affect refugees? How can civilians in war zones (both refugees and IDPs) be guaranteed access to food, medical aid, and shelter?

How can the international community better respond to civil wars? How can terrorism in civil wars or from civil wars be mitigated?

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Role of the Committee!

The United Nations Security Council is one of the most powerful organs in the whole United Nations apparatus, and is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. The UNSC is the only body within the UN that can pass resolutions binding to all of its member states; its influence therefore extends over assisting in the peaceful settlement of disputes (through establishment and oversight of peacekeeping services) and enforcing compliance between member states through the authorization of military action as well as various types of international sanctionsclxxii. Since its inception in 1946, the council has operated under an open agenda; its scope is therefore ever expanding.

The Security Council is capable of investigating any situation at hand to satisfy their queries as well as any others that member states may address to them. It may recommend methods of settling an issue to member states and the international community at large, or the committee may itself formulate the plans necessary to establish sanctions which it can also call on member states to impose - in order to coerce the recalcitrant nation they are dealing with to comply with their demands. Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council is capable of referring the individuals they deal with to the International Court of Justice, or taking military action against their aggressors if there is no alternative method of compromiseclxxiii.

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Structure of the Committee The general schedule of the committee will roughly follow the order laid out here. When the committee first gathers, each delegate will give a short (maximum 90 second) opening speech regarding their country’s position on the issues to be discussed. Points of information will not be in order for these speeches. Following this, time will be allotted for an informal lobbying caucus in which delegates will collaborate to write clauses for the resolution. Completed draft clauses will be submitted to and reviewed by the Chairs at this time. Once lobbying is over, debate will start and will move clause by clause through the resolution.

The YMUN 2014 SC will use standard parliamentary procedure, with some modifications. For example, due to the small size of the committee, there will be no speakers’ list.

As clauses are submitted, the submitter of the clause will give the first speech, answer points of information, and then have the option to yield to a colleague. Following this speech, the floor will be open for speeches for or against the clause. Once time on the clause has elapsed, the Chair will call a vote before the committee proceeds to debate the next clause. Clauses may be submitted in note form at any time, but can only be moved once the previously submitted clauses have been debated. Amendments to the first and second degree will be allowed, though no abstentions on amendments entertained. Preambulatory clauses will be added and debated on following the vote on the last clause of the resolution. This general structure will be used for both topics with the goal of passing preferably one resolution on each issue over the course of the conference.

In terms of general debate style, the Chairs highly encourage concise and precise delegate speeches, and will likely be implementing a time limit on speakers.

Points of information are at the discretion of the Chairs, but delegates always have the option of yielding to each other, unless they themselves were just yielded to. Right to reply and vetoing are allowed, but discouraged in the name of constructive debate. Experts can be called as needed; delegates who wish a particular country or organization representative to come in as an expert should inform the Chairs during the initial lobbying period; other experts will be brought in by the Chairs as necessary.

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Country Positions!

United States of America (P5): As a permanent member with veto power and

their former colony of Egypt. Unlike other P5 members, the UK does not contribute a large number

as one of the foremost countries in the world, the US is

of forces to UN peacekeeping, but is in the lead in

heavily involved in resolving other countries’ disputes.

pushing for more effective and efficient UN

However, particularly since the 2008-2009 financial

peacekeeping operations as well as the responsibility to

crisis and the ending of the wars in Iraq and

protect doctrineclxxix. The UK intervened on the side of

Afghanistan, the US has been putting more of a

the rebels in the Libyan civil war, and has supported

priority on international and regional solutions that do

other interventions in civil conflicts such as in Kosovo

not see the US as the primary intervening countryclxxiv.

and Cyprusclxxx though the UK has hesitated to become

For example in the case of the Libyan revolution, the

involved in Syriaclxxxi.

US was involved with French and British support as well as full UN and NATO backingclxxv. The US was not primarily involved with the initial or UN mission in Mali, and has not (as of July 2013) significantly

France (P5) France is heavily involved with the Saharan region, as many of the countries there were formerly

involved themselves in the civil war in Syria. While the

French coloniesclxxxii. Thus, the French led the charge to

current US Ambassador to the UN is a strong

fight the rebels in Mali and have been monitoring the

proponent for the “responsibility to protect” doctrine,

Arab Spring effects closely. France has demonstrated

it is unclear how this stance will translate into military

in the past that they are quite willing to intervene and

or even economic actionclxxvi.

assist former African colonies, and besides sending

The US is hesitant to stay deeply involved

troops to Mali, also sent troops as part of the UN

with Afghanistan following the 2014 finish of the

missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, and Liberia. France

American war there, the US actions in Iraq in many

was also involved in helping the rebels in Libya

ways actually exacerbated current tensionsclxxvii, and the

overthrow Qaddafi, and has been arguing, with the

US seems to be allowing regional actors such as

EU for more assistance in Syria. As for other conflicts,

ECOWAS and the French to take the lead on problems

France is among the Top 20 contributors of troops for

in the Sahara-Sahel region. In terms of UN

UN peacekeeping missions, and, together with the

peacekeeping, the US generally does not send a large

UK, has led the push for increased cooperation

number of personnel, but is one of the largest budget

between UN forces and increased effectivenessclxxxiii.

contributorsclxxviii.

Russian Federation (P5) United Kingdom (P5) The UK has not been especially involved with the Saharan region in the past, with the exception of

The Russian Federation does not have a history of being very involved in the Sahara, and this looks unlikely to change in the near future. Russia does however have a strong respect for the principle of

!

NATO 36 national sovereignty and has historically been reluctant

dispatching 400 troops to be part of the new UN

to become involved, or allow the UNSC to become

mission in Maliclxxxix. This signals an increased desire of

involved, in conflicts that the Russian Federation see

the PRC to become more involved in far-flung issues,

as being purely domestic concerns. Also, civil conflicts

to promotecxc and consolidate their own international

in Russian allied countries like Syria further encourage

political influencecxci. On the issue of civil wars, the

the Russian Federation to call off intervention

PRC (along with the Russian Federation), have been

attempts

clxxxiv

. As one of the Syrian government’s

the two most influential countries against the

biggest allies, Russia is strongly against attempts to

“responsibility to protect” doctrine, and have opposed

intervene in that conflict. For other civil wars, such as

stronger UNSC measures regarding intervention in

increasing unrest in Iraq, Russia has called for

Syria. In this respect, China’s policies are still quite

international support, but what form that should take

firmly affixed to the idea of respecting national

clxxxv

is unclear

. Where Russian interests are not

sovereignty.

especially involved, the principle of national sovereignty remains a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy, as Russia does not want to create a precedent for intervention

clxxxvi

. Russia has never really had a

As the site of a horrible civil conflict that led to genocide, Rwanda has intimate knowledge of how civil

strong presence in terms of number of UN

disputes can evolve into region-disrupting conflict. In

peacekeeping troops; as of May 2013, Russia currently has deployed 80 people to eight UN missions

Rwanda

clxxxvii

.

fact, the Rwandan conflict in the mid-1990s affected many of its neighbours, and particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still feeling the

People’s Republic of China (P5)

repercussions. Many Rwandans in opposition to the

The PRC’s interests have always been in

post-genocide government fled to the DRC to start

stability and respect for national sovereignty. In the

resistance groups. To further complicate matters,

cases of these two topics, however, those stances

Rwandan government forces have also been involved

become more nuanced. In fact, China’s has broken

in the civil war in the DRC. In fact, the UN has

from a long-standing tradition of only sending non-

accused Rwanda of backing the M23 rebels, though the

clxxxviii

combatants on UN peacekeeping missions

!

by

government denies all claimscxcii. The Rwandan

UNSC 37

government, however, has fiercely opposed the new

in Algeria, the government is preoccupied with

UN mission in the DRC, saying it undermines

consolidating power, particularly as the president

progress towards peace in the region.

(who has been in power since 1999), is facing health problemscxcv. The Arab Maghreb Union, which had

Nigeria

potential to strengthen

Nigeria has been contributing forces to UN

ties in North Africa never really got off the groundcxcvi

peacekeeping since 1960, starting with the mission in

due to Algeria’s support for the Sahwari Democratic

the DRC. Nigeria has contributed to many African

Arab Republic’s independence despite Morocco’s de

peacekeeping missions, and currently trains police

facto controlcxcvii.

forces for AU, UN, and ECOWAS missions. Given Nigeria’s involvement with the missions in Rwanda,

Qatar

Yugoslavia, Cote d’Ivoire and DRC, it is clear that Nigeria supports intervention in the case of long-term civil strife

cxciii

. Nigeria’s contributions to missions in

Qatar’s position on the world stage has been changing since the start of the Arab Spring. As protests, revolutions, and wars developed, it became

Sudan, South Sudan, and Western Sahara show

clear that Qatar was financing nearly every Arab

commitment to the Sahara region as well, but

Spring movement. Qatar has long been publically on

Nigeria’s recent troubles have led to issues with their

the side of the Syrian rebelscxcviii and seems to have few

ability to provide regional help. Nigeria is currently

qualms about interventioncxcix. Qatar has been sending

suffering from an Islamic insurgency called Boko

billions of dollars in aid to the new regimes in Libya,

Haram in the north of the country, and due to the

Egypt, and Tunisiacc and looks to continue to do socci.

declared state of emergency, Nigeria has had to

In terms of the Sahara, Qatar seems mostly interested

withdraw its peacekeepers from Mali

cxciv

. How long the

insurgency will last now that there are multiple civilian

in assisting fellow Arab states, but has the potential to be a major aid donor to other countries as well.

and police forces fighting in northern Nigeria is unclear, but it is likely to affect Nigeria’s foreign policy greatly.

India India has long been the third largest contributor of UN peacekeeping forces, and has had a

Algeria While nominally supportive of its fellow

strong contingent of forces on the various missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the 1960s.

Saharan countries, Algeria is very consumed with

India also contributed troops and police forces for the

domestic worries at home as well as a decades old

UN mission in Liberia, showing India’s willingness

disagreement with Morocco over the status of Western

and ability to contribute to interventions in civil wars.

Sahara. Due to the unsuccessful Arab Spring uprising

As for the Saharan region, India has not been too

!

NATO 38 heavily involved lately, but does have a major deployment of forces in the UN mission in South ccii

Colombia Unlike Peru, Colombia has never been heavily

Sudan . India has been pushing for more interaction

involved in peacekeeping and has so far

between the P5 and troop contributors like themselves,

only contributed significantly to the controversial

and is eager to become more involved with the

mission in Haiticcvii. Colombia has publically stated

development of UN peacekeeping mandatescciii.

that it wants further collaboration within the UN and peacekeeping missionsccviii.

Czech Republic The Czech Republic (and the former Czechoslovakia) has contributed to a number of UN

Turkey Turkey has not been a large contributor to UN

peacekeeping missions, though mainly in Europe. For

peacekeeping, but has been heavily involved with UN-

example, the Czech Republic was involved in

authorized missions that were carried out by the EU or

peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia from 1992-

NATO. In fact, it is because of these other

1995. The Czech Republic has contributed to the

organizations that Turkey does not contribute more

mission in Western Sahara, and currently is involved

than a few police units to UN missionsccix. The

with the mission to the DRCcciv. Aside from Egypt,

exception is Turkey’s deployment of over 600 troops

with whom the Czech Republic has had formal

to UNFIL, the peacekeeping mission in Lebanonccx.

relations with since 1920ccv, the Czech Republic does not have significant relations with any other Saharan country.

Netherlands Like Turkey, the Netherlands has lately been focusing more on UN-authorized EU or NATO

Peru

missions. Due to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, the The first contributor to UN peacekeeping

Netherlands has been reducing the size of their

from Latin America, Peru has been involved in over ten

contributions to UN peacekeeping and the current

missions to date, and is currently involved in Western

government looks to continue to do soccxi.

Sahara, DRC, Sudan, and Darfurccvi.

!

UNSC 39

Suggestions for Further Research UN Office for West Africa: http://unowa.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=706 United Nations Peacekeeping: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ Independent university project on UN peacekeeping: http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/ UN Peacebuilding Commission: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs’ Program on training peacekeepers: http://english.nupi.no/Activities/Programmes2/Training-for-Peace

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UNCSW 40 NOTES

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History of the UN. accessed July 17, 2013. http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/1941-1950.shtml.

Security Council Resolutions. accessed July 17, 2013. http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1946.shtml. iii UN Charter. accessed July 16, 2013. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml. iv The UN Security Council. accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/theun-security-council.html. v EncyclopĂŚdia Britannica Online, s. v. "Sahara," accessed July 02, 2013, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516375/Sahara. vi Renewal, Africa. "Desertification a Threat to Africa's Development." BBC (2012). Published electronically Oct 2 2012. http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/desertification-threat-africa%E2%80%99s-development. vii "Arab Spring Economies Face Difficulties in the Wake of Anti-Us Protests." Albawaba Business (2012). Published electronically Sep 19 2012. http://www.albawaba.com/business/arab-spring-economies-442795. viii Sidahmed, Alsir. "Arab Spring Economic Fallout Worries Most of the Population." Arab News (2013). Published electronically Jun 23 2013. http://www.arabnews.com/news/455879. ix Finance, Global. "The Richest and Poorest Countries in the World - 2013." x Center, UN News. "Un Emergency Fund Allocates $72 Million for Life-Saving Aid in Neglected Crises." UN News Center (2013). Published electronically Jul 16 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45421&Cr=emergency%20response&Cr1=#.UeVo7G26nD5. xi CIA. "Mali." In The World Factbook, 2013.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html xii DeCapua, Joe. "Conflict Threatens Mali Farming." Voice of America (2013). Published electronically Feb 15 2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/mali-food-security-15feb13/1604505.html. xiii CIA. "Niger." In The World Factbook, 2013. xiv Thurston, Alex. "Niger, Foreign Aid, and the Dilemma of (Certain) Coups." Sahel Blog (2011). Published electronically Jun 30 2011. http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/niger-foreign-aid-and-the-dilemma-of-certain-coups/. xv Hanson, Stephanie. "Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic." Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders (2007). Published electronically Jan 2 2007. http://www.cfr.org/sudan/sudan-chad-central-african-republic/p12309#p3. xvi Ray, Michael. "Janjaweed." In Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013.http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1003597/Janjaweed xvii Associated Press, Bamako. "Chad Pulls Its Troops from Mali." The Guardian (2013). Published electronically Apr 15 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/15/chad-pulls-troops-from-mali. xviii CIA. "Sudan." In The World Factbook, 2013. xix "Oil in Sudan and South Sudan." Sudan Tribune (2012). Published electronically Apr 24 2012. http://www.sudantribune.com/+-Oil-in-Sudan,037-+. xx UNMIS. "Unmis Background." UNMIS (2011). Published electronically Jul 2011. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml. xxi UNAMID. "African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur." UNAMID (2007). http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/. xxii "ICC Maintains Position on Sudan's President." United Press International (2013). Published electronically Jul 16 2013. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/07/16/ICC-maintains-position-on-Sudans-president/UPI26131373980907/?spt=hs&or=tn. xxiii Council, United Nations Security. "Resolution 1672." In Adopted by the Security Council at its 5423rd meeting, on 25 April 2006. United Nations Documents, 2006. http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/326/77/PDF/N0632677.pdf?OpenElement xxiii Council, United Nations Security. "Resolution 1591." In Adopted by the Security Council at its 5153rd meeting, on 29 March 2005: United Nations Documents, 2005. http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/287/89/PDF/N0528789.pdf?OpenElement ii

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Control, Office of Foreign Assets. "Sudan: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions." United States Department of the Treasury (2008). Published electronically Jul 25 2008. http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/sudan.pdf. xxv Wilson, Megan. "Treasury Loosens Sanctions on Sudan." The Hill (2013). Published electronically Apr 15 2013. http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/293947-treasury-loosens-sanctions-on-sudan. xxvi "Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb." Global Security (2011). http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gspc.htm. xxvii

CIA. "Algeria." In The World Factbook, 2013.

CIA. "Mauritania." In The World Factbook, 2013. xxix Sagna, Souleymane, and Romana Cacchioli. "Mauritania Fights to End Racism." NPR (2008). Published electronically Mar 6 2008. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=87940096. xxx "Mauritania Economic Outlook." African Development Bank Group (2013). xxxi CIA. "Morocco." In The World Factbook, 2013. xxxii USTR. "Morocco Free Trade Agreement." United States Trade Representative (2004). http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta. xxxiii "Country Profiles." African Union (2011). http://www.au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles. xxxiv UNHCR. "Algeria." UNHCR (2013). http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485e16.html. xxxv CIA. "Western Sahara." In The World Factbook, 2013. xxxvi "Unsmil Background." UNSMIL (2011). http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3545&language=en-US. xxxvii Shah, Anup. "Crisis in Libya." Global Issues (2011). Published electronically Apr 4 2011. http://www.globalissues.org/article/793/libya. xxxviii Eljarh, Mohamed. "Libyans to Militias: Get Lost." Foreign Policy (2013). Published electronically June 12 2013. http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/12/libyans_to_militias_get_lost. xxxix Group, International Crisis. "Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya." Middle East/North Africa Report (2013).

Published electronically Apr 17 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/northafrica/libya/140-trial-by-error-justice-in-post-qadhafi-libya.aspx. xl Zelin, Aaron. "The Terrorist Threat in North Africa: Before and after Benghazi." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2013). Published electronically Jul 10 2013. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terroristthreat-in-north-africa-before-and-after-benghazi. xli Kirkpatrick, Patrick. "Libya Attacks Brings Challenges for Us." The New York Times (2012). Published electronically Sep 12 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/world/middleeast/us-envoy-to-libya-is-reported-killed.html?pagewanted=all. xlii Eljarh, Mohamed. "The Deepening Crisis in Libya." Foreign Policy (2013). Published electronically July 29 2013. http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/29/the_deepening_crisis_in_libya. xliii UNHCR. "Unhcr Country Operations Profile - Libya." UNHCR (2013). http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html. xliv Johnson, Glen. "Libya Weapons Funneled to Tuareg Rebellion in Mali." LA Times (2012). Published electronically Jun 12 2012. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/12/world/la-fg-libya-arms-smuggle-20120612. xlv IMF. "Oil, Stability Threaten Libyan Economy." UPI (2013). Published electronically May 24 2013. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/05/24/IMF-Oil-stablity-threaten-Libyan-economy/UPI38331369397499/. xlvi Ventures-Africa. "Building the Economy of Post-Qaddafi Libya." Ventures (2013). Published electronically May 2 2013. http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/05/building-economy-post-qaddafi-libya/. xlvii "The Spark That Started It All." Cornell University Library Guides (2012). http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163144. xlviii "Tunisia's Ennahda to Oppose Sharia in Constitution." Reuters (2012). Published electronically March 26 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-tunisia-constitution-idUSBRE82P0E820120326. xlix "Tunisia News - Breaking World News." The New York Times (2013). http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.html. xxviii

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"Tunisia Crisis: Tens of Thousands Join Protest." BBC News (2013). Published electronically Aug 6 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23597308. li UNHCR. "Hundreds in Limbo at Camp on the Tunisian-Libyan Border." IRIN (2013). Published electronically Jan 16 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/97254/hundreds-in-limbo-at-camp-on-the-tunisian-libyan-border. lii Nouihed, Lin, and Tarek Amara. "Smuggling Stirs Trouble on Tunisia's Libyan Border." Reuters (2012). Published electronically May 2 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/02/us-tunisia-smuggling-idUSBRE8410UL20120502. liii Zelin, Aaron, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Andrew Lebovich. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's Tunisia Strategy." CIC Sentinel 6, no. 7 (2013). Published electronically July 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Zelin-20130723-CTCSentinel.pdf. liv Nossiter, Adam. "Chad Said to Have Killed Mastermind of Algerian Attack." The New York Times (2013). Published electronically March 2, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/africa/chad-claims-to-have-killed-algeria-hostagecrisis-mastermind.html. lv Gordon, Michael, and Eric Schmitt. "Us Officials Propose Sharing Drone Surveillance Data with Algerians." The New York Times (2013). Published electronically Feb 26 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/world/middleeast/john-kerrydiplomatic-trip.html. lvi Schmitt, Eric. "International Efforts Seeks to Counter Jihadists in Africa." The New York Times (2013). Published electronically June 26 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/africa/nations-focus-antiterrorism-efforts-on-westand-north-africa.html. lvii Nossiter, Adam. "Algeria Sowed Seeds of Hostage Crisis as It Nurtured Warlord." The New York Times (2013). Published electronically Feb 1 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/world/africa/hostage-crisis-exposes-flaws-in-algiersantiterror-policy.html. lviii Daley, Suzanne. "Moroccans Fear That Flickers of Democracy Are Fading." The New York Times (2012). Published electronically Dec 10 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/africa/moroccans-fear-that-flickers-of-democracyare-fading.html. lix Worth, Robert, and Souad Mekhennet. "Desert Land in Limbo Is Torn Apart." The New York Times (2010). http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/africa/09morocco.html?ref=westernsahara. lx Goodman, David, and Souad Mekhennet. "Morocco Says It Foiled Terror Cell in Sahara." The New York Times (2011).

Published electronically Jan 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/world/africa/06morocco.html?ref=westernsahara. lxi Patel, Khadija. "Western Sahara: Will Obama and Zuma Agree to Disagree?", The Daily Maverick (2013). Published electronically June 28 2013. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-06-28-western-sahara-will-obama-and-zuma-agreeto-disagree/#.Ue1Rm226nD5. lxii Jacobs, Frank. "All Hail Azawad." The New York Times (2012). Published electronically April 10 2012. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/all-hail-azawad/. lxiii UN News. "In France, Un Chief Praises Peacekeeping Contributions, Urges Political Progress in Mali." UN News Center (2013). Published electronically Jul 15 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45411&Cr=secretarygeneral%20&Cr1=#.UeRILm26nD4. lxiv Diarra, Adama. "UN Takes over Mali Peacekeeping Mission, Doubts after Vote." Reuters (2013). Published electronically Jul 1 2013. lxv UN news. "International Assistance Force for Mali Transformed into Un Peacekeeping Mission." UN News (2013).

Published electronically July 1 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45310&Cr=+Mali+&Cr1=#.Ue1Y0226nD6. lxvi News, UN. "Ceasefire Accord "Significant" Step Towards Stability in Mali, Says Un Sahel Envoy." UN News (2013).

Published electronically June 19 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45221&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.Ue1aUW26nD6. lxvii "Managing Mali's Elections: A Short Term Delay Would Pay Long Term Dividends." International Crisis Group (2013).

Published electronically June 26 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/mediareleases/2013/africa/managing-malis-elections.aspx.

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Arbour, Louise, Gilles Yabi, and allAfrica. "Mali: Elections Threaten to Exchange One Crisis for Another." International Crisis Group (2013). Published electronically July 9 2013. http://www.myendnoteweb.com/EndNoteWeb.html?func=new&. lxix UNHCR. "Ahead of Polls, Un Urges Mali Officials to Expedite Electoral Procedures for Refugees." UN News (2013).

Published electronically July 23 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45482&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.Ue7HDm26nD4. lxx Campbell, John. "Nigeria Winds Down Peacekeeping." CFR (2013). Published electronically July 22 2013. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/07/22/nigeria-winds-down-peacekeeping/. lxxi "Nigeria To "Withdraw Some Troops from Mali"." BBC World (2013). Published electronically July 19 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23369865. lxxii Omestad, Thomas. "Mali Ceasefire Is a Good Sign but Uncertainties Remain." United States Institute of Peace (2013).

Published electronically June 24 2013. http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/mali-ceasefire-good-sign-uncertainties-remain. lxxiii UN News. "UN Food Relief Agency Struggles to Cope with Mali's Lean Season." UN News (2013). Published electronically July 5 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45351&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.Ue1asW26nD5. lxxiv UNICEF. "Unicef and Partners Sound Alarm over Malnutrition Crisis in Northern Mali." UN News (2013). Published electronically July 24 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45487&Cr=mali&Cr1=#.Ue_1WG26nD4. lxxv Hille, Peter. "Malians: Refugees in Their Own Country." Deutsche Welle (2013). Published electronically June 19 2013. http://www.dw.de/malians-refugees-in-their-own-country/a-16894443. lxxvi Bilby, Ethan, and Adrian Croft. "Donors Pledge About $4.22 Billion to Aid Mali Recovery." Reuters (2013). Published electronically May 15, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/15/us-mali-donors-idUSBRE94E13J20130515. lxxvii Wolf, Amelia. "An Unwritten Definition: Humanitarian Intervention after Mali." CFR (2013). Published electronically July 15, 2013. http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/07/15/an-unwritten-definition-humanitarian-intervention-after-mali/. lxxviii CIA. "Niger." In The World Factbook, 2013. lxxix Equity, Poverty Reduction &. "Niger Poverty Assessment: A Resilient People in a Harsh Environment." The World Bank (2011). http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204600~menuPK: 435735~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html. lxxx Niamey. "Jihad in Niger: Bad Omens." The Economist (2013). Published electronically July 6 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21580498-another-poor-saharan-state-has-come-under-attackviolent-islamists-bad-omens. lxxxi Abdou, Ali, and Katrin Herms. "High Birth Rates Are Causing Poverty in Niger." Deutsche Welle (2011). Published electronically Oct 10 2011. http://www.dw.de/high-birth-rates-are-causing-poverty-in-niger/a-15486353. lxxxii Massalatchi, Abdoulaye. "Niger's Worst Power Cuts in Years Threaten Economy." Reuters (2013). Published electronically June 19 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/niger-electricity-idUSL5N0ET3N020130619. lxxxiii Muhammed, Farahnaz. "Birthrates and Poverty in Niger." The Borgen Project (2013). Published electronically June 27 2013. http://borgenproject.org/birth-rates-and-poverty-in-niger/. lxxxiv Vadlamudi, Jaya. "Chad Faces Severe Hunger Crisis." Reuters (2013). Published electronically July 22 2013. http://www.trust.org/item/20130722170302-63txc/?source=hppartner. lxxxv "Conditions Remain Unacceptable for Refugees in Tissi." MSF (2013). Published electronically June 24 2013. http://www.msf.org/article243/chad-conditions-remain-unacceptable-refugees-tissi. lxxxvi "Chad Returnees Strain Aid Resources." IRIN (2013). Published electronically July 17 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98430/chad-returnees-strain-aid-resources. lxxxvii Zoutane, Martin. "Chad Seeks Regional Clout in Sending Troops to Mali." AFP (2013). Published electronically Jan 22 2013. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ihJ_Mh21QQfn8kFNI4e4RcOvGhNg?docId=CNG.4572cb1b26f541 23c55d1dd40ed4406a.1b1. lxxxviii Boutellis, Arthur. "Chad, Once Forgotten by the Un, Is Back, Front and Center." International Peace Institute (2013).

Published electronically July 12 2013. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=166226.

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