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Disarmament and Security Committee Yale Model United Nations Korea May 17 - 19, 2013
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Table of Contents History of the Committee 3 Topic I: Jus Post Bellum History 4 Current Situation 9 Bloc Positions 15 Questions to Consider 20
Suggestions for Further Reading
22
Topic II: Proliferation of Small Arms History 23 Current Situation 26 Questions to Consider 35 Bloc Positions 36
Suggestions for Further Research
37
Structure of the Committee 38 Role of the Committee 39 Glossary 40 Notes 41
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History of the Committee
The First Committee of the General Assembly – the Disarmament and International Security Committee, or DISEC – concerns itself with matters of world peace and security. As one of the six main organs of the UN General Assembly, the committee’s mandate can be summarized by Article 26 of the UN Charter, “promot[ing] the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.” Disarmament has a rich political-intellectual tradition; its origins can be found in the thought and speeches of Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. DISEC serves as the primary form for discussion of a wide variety of issues relating to global security; past agendas have included topics spanning the reduction of military budgets worldwide, to the ongoing debate over nuclear proliferation, to the weaponization of space. A wide variety of prominent international documents relating to international disarmament – not least of which include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conventions on chemical and biological weaponry – have found their origins in
the First Committee. DISEC receives annual reports from agencies like the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to assist in their evaluations and decision-making. Though the committee’s resolutions are not binding, it can refer individual areas of concern to the UN Security Council for further action. Every UN member nation enjoys equal representation on the committee – this distinguishes DISEC from bodies such as the UNSC, and implies that its resolutions enjoy a broad basis of support which makes them an extremely valuable baseline for global action.
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DISEC convenes every October along with the rest of the UN General Assembly to discuss threats to international peace and security; all 192 member- nations are welcome to voice their opinions within the committee. DISEC coordinates with different bodies, both UN and non-UN affiliated, and coordinates with the Secretariat through the Department for Disarmament Affairs.
Topic I: Jus Post Bellum Topic History Just War and DISEC’s Role in Jus Post Bellum Just war theory, which consists of three parts, discusses why and how states conduct war. Jus ad bellum (justice before war) considers reasons a state may use for entering into war. Jus in bello (justice during war) covers how a state conducts war and the actions of its troops. Jus post bellum (justice after war) concerns states’ actions once the war has ended. The United Nations has done considerable work to solidly address jus ad bellum and jus in bello but has yet to develop concrete guidelines for jus post bellum. Seeing as demilitarization is often
integral to rehabilitation following a conflict, DISEC will have the responsibility of submitting recommendations on how to govern disarmament in the post-war phase. The UN’s Approach to Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello Article 2 of the UN Charter addresses jus ad bellum. The UN considers all of its member states as equals, and it expects them to settle disputes among one another by peaceful means that harm neither international security nor justice. Article 2 states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” (UN Charter). In other words, if one country threatens to invade or actually invades a second, an act of aggression in opposition to the UN’s principles has occurred. Members shall not assist states against which the UN “is taking preventive or enforcement action.” Significantly, the UN does not authorize intervention in domestic conflicts (conflicts concerning a single country, not multiple ones). Historically, this provision has caused disagreements over whether or not the UN should allow armed interventions for humanitarian purposes. Disarmament and Security Committee 4
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International humanitarian law acts as the legal framework of jus in bello. It includes the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 and 2005. Together, these documents lay out three principles: • Distinction: Fighters should recognize the difference be tween civilians and combatants, and they should minimize civil ian casualties. • Proportionality: Fighters should not carry out attacks that result in small military gains yet cause massive damages to civil ians.
• Necessity: Fighters should only use as much force as needed to achieve their goals, and they should not act with excessive violence or destructiveness.
Historical Examples of Jus Post Bellum While international community has developed clear principles for entering war and instructions for behaving during war, it has neglected rules for acting after war. Instead of following clearly defined standards, countries have created solutions as conflicts come and go. Approaches to the disarmament of states that lose wars have varied over the years, and some strategies have proven more successful than others. Disarmament of Germany after WWI After WWI, the victorious Allied nations drafted the Versailles Treaty as their peace agreement. The war, which the Versailles Treaty blamed on Germany, had caused the wounding of 21 million people, the deaths of 8.5 million people, and the destruction of swaths of Europe. Many individuals living in Allied countries sought vengeance. France’s George Clemenceau advocated for the complete Disarmament and Security Committee 5
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The Germans reacted angrily to the Versailles Treaty (and particularly its disarmament clauses). Firstly, they
resented that the Allies had not negotiated much with the Germans before presenting the treaty. Germans saw the treaty only a few weeks before it went into effect in June of 1919. Moreover, German citizens disliked that the treaty blamed all Germans, not just previous government officials, for starting the war. Germany sidestepped the treaty’s disarmament provisions without directly disobeying them. For example, the country only maintained a standing army of 100,000 fighters, as promised. However, it put many more soldiers on reserve. Banned from operating submarines or fighter planes, Germany sent its submariners and pilots abroad for training. Even though the treaty denied Germany more than six battleships, countries were coming to rely more on smaller vessels and aircraft carriers, so this provision did little harm. Germany’s reaction to the Versailles Treaty shows the consequences of treating a losing nation too harshly after war. As Brian Orend notes, the Treaty of Versailles not only limited Germany’s military capabilities but also saddled the nation with humongous debt. The treaty created animosity between Germany and the victorious nations and sowed the seeds of World War II. A wise framework for Disarmament and Security Committee 6
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jus post bellum should consider how heavy consequences may upset a losing country and lead to future conflict. Disarmament of Germany after WWII Just as after WWI, the world faced the formidable challenge of recovering from widespread destruction after WWII. Many European cities were in ruins. Japan had received blows from two nuclear bombs. Some countries fared better than others. The USSR, while suffering damage in the west, had a large and powerful military presence throughout Eastern Europe. The US, isolated across the ocean, suffered little physical damage and dominated the world economy. WWII’s victors partitioned Germany into four zones. France, the UK, the US, and the USSR each occupied one zone, and they all desired to prevent Germany’s military from regaining the massive power that allowed it to carry out WWII. For this reason, the US and the UK signed the Morgenthau Plan in September of 1944. (France and the USSR approved of the plan.) It split Germany into two separate states, East and West Germany. It sought to reduce Germany’s economic capacity by 50% (returning the market
to its 1938 level) so that the country lacked the capital to maintain a huge army.
Originally, all four occupying nations obeyed the plan. However, Germany’s reduced economy dragged down all of Europe’s wellbeing. So the US issued the Marshall Plan and funded any European nations that requested assistance. The USSR viewed the US’s support of Germany’s economy as a strategy that would undermine Germany’s demilitarization. Tension mounted between the USSR and the US, UK, and France, deepening the split between East and West Germany. Unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the Morgenthau Plan used economic measures to enforce the demilitarization of Germany. However, as shown by the Marshall Plan, countries disagreed about the benefits and costs of limiting
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Germany’s economy. On one hand, the USSR thought Germany would use its money to rebuild its military. On the other hand, the US thought an economically stable Germany would be more peaceful. Guidelines for jus post bellum should consider whether or not reducing a country’s economic wellbeing is a good way of enforcing demilitarization.
Japan Self Defense Forces Source: Torin Boyd
Disarmament of Japan after WWII Upon surrendering in 1945, Japan emerged from WWII in ruins. All large cities besides Kyoto sustained severe damage, and the nation suffered from a food shortage. The country fell under international control, and US General Douglas MacArthur acted as the supreme commander of the occupation. He oversaw the creation of a new, more democratic constitution
that included an extreme stance on armed forces. It stipulated that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” In other words, Japan completely renounced war, but the exigencies of the Korean War led the Americans to change policy. At the command of MacArthur, Japan developed a 75,000 strong police force to defend the islands in 1950 in the absence of U.S. troops on the islands at that time. In 1951, Japan signed a treaty allowing US forces into its territory to provide for Japan’s defense to further supplement its self-defense capacities. In 1954, Japan regained some control over its own fighting forces by forming the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Although the JSDF are considered part of the police force due to the constitution’s restrictions, they have fought in the Middle East as part of the War on Terror, and according to constitutional rulings by the Japanese Supreme Court, have full rights to defend the country in the event of outside aggression. Today, the US still stations troops in Japan. In 2011, the two countries held a Security Consultative
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Meeting to reaffirm their military alliance, discuss their joint goals, and think of ways to bolster their current efforts. Guidelines for jus post bellum should consider whether or not to make complete demilitarization the norm. As long as other countries provide security for the losing nation, is it just to deny the losing nation the right to have troops for its own self-defense? Is the international community responsible and cohesive enough to provide defense for the losing nation? What countries or organizations in particular should provide defense?
Current Situation Why the World Need Rules for Jus Post Bellum As shown by the historical examples of demilitarization and security maintenance after war, the world has approached jus post bellum on an experimental basis. Countries implement solutions using a trial-and-error method; they try a strategy and cross their fingers, hoping that the method will succeed. This experimental approach has seen varying degrees of success. On the one hand, when the Germans
sidestepped their demilitarization after WWI, the experiment failed. On the other hand, when Japan reacted peacefully following its complete demilitarization (and subsequent partial re-militarization) after WWII, the experiment succeeded. This committee is optimistic that history has taught humankind well. After using this trial-and-error method since the dawn of warfare, hopefully the international community has figured out what solutions work best in particular situations. The committee must recognize that each conflict brings a unique set of challenges and needs. Nonetheless, the committee aspires to set down basic guidelines governing disarmament and security maintenance following war. In this way, the world can avoid the mistake of sowing the seeds for future conflict, like it did by treating Germany too harshly after WWI. The United Nations and the General Principles of Disarmament This committee focuses on disarmament specifically after conflict, but in the past, the UN has not addressed this issue. The UN has preferred to focus on disarmament in general. So the committee will have to formulate rules for disarmament
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after conflict based on the UN’s general projects advocating disarmament at any point in time. While the UN lacks concrete rules governing disarmament and security after war, it does have a clear attitude towards these topics in general. For example, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (which works closely with DISEC) seeks to minimize all weapons, whether massively destructive (like nuclear bombs and biological weapons) or conventional (like landmines and small arms). Moreover, the “UNODA supports the development and implementation of practical disarmament measures after a conflict, such as disarming and demobilizing former combatants and helping them to reintegrate back in civil society.”
Source: United Nations
Presumably, guidelines for jus post bellum should reflect the UNODA’s goal of reducing weaponry. However,
complete obliteration of war-making abilities may not be necessary. The UNODA notes its opposition to “[w] eapons of mass destruction, along with excess stocks of and illicit transfers of conventional arms.” DISEC will have the responsibility of determining how much military strength could be called excessive. Is it possible to apply the same standards to every country? Or should there be a system for deciding how strong a country’s military can be? Bodies That Deal with Disarmament and Security The following bodies have dealt with disarmament and security on an international scale, whether before, during, or after conflict. Delegates may draw on decisions made by these bodies in the past when devising suggestions for jus post bellum: • The Conference on Disarma ment • The International Atomic En ergy Agency • The UN Department of Peace keeping Operations • The UN Disarmament Com mission • The UN Office for Disarma ment Affairs • The UN Security Council Disarmament and Security Committee 10
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fought in the conflict had “a confusion of objectives and interests.” Despite their variety, all of the groups depended on “steady supplies of arms and other military equipment.” The international community attempted to mediate the violence in the DRC and the surrounding region. Measures to address the violence included: Bin Laden Poster Source: Filip Spagnoli
The War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo The conflict that began in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s and spread to surrounding regions reveals some of the many difficulties that the international community faces when planning and implementing disarmament strategies. Political power struggles and ethnic tensions fueled the fighting in the DRC, and the most notable wars occurred from 1996-1997 and 19982002. Laurent Kabila overthrew dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, and then rebels turned against Kabila and assassinated him in 2001. Regional rebel groups fought for control over natural resources, and battles between the warring Tutsi and Hutu ethnicities raged as well. The various groups that
• Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999: This agreement called for signatories to disarm all armed groups participating in the con flict. Countries of origin of the armed groups’ members should handle former combatants’ repa triation and reintegration into society. • UNSC Resolution 1279, 1999: The resolution created the UN Organization Mission in Congo (MONUC), a force dedicated to implementing disarmament. It also outlined a plan for voluntary Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRRRR). • Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), 2002: This deci sion set up a transitional govern ment in the DRC. It urged volun tary disarmament but noted that, under Chapter 7 of the UN Disarmament and Security Committee 11
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Charter, the international com munity could use force if neces sary. • UNSC Resolution 1493, 2003: The resolution stipulated that the DRC should stop its people from transferring weapons to armed groups in any region, and it calls on other nations to place an arms embargo on the DRC. The UNSC issued a report in 2006 encouraging nations to reinforce the embargo. Disarmament in the DRC has faced a variety of challenges. Firstly, MONUC has lacked sufficient troops to accomplish its goals in a large territory, and people have accused MONUC of misconduct. The public’s lack of confidence in the troops lessens MONUC’s
Child Soldiers in the Congo Source: Pace Butler
effectiveness, and armed groups are less willing to cooperate with them. Secondly, the international community shut armed groups out of the planning and implementation of disarmament. Feeling disenfranchised and ignored, armed groups have hesitated to comply with voluntary disarmament. Thirdly, disarmament in African nations has historically tended to make armed groups desire to retain their weapons. They fear losing power to harsh punishers, so they hoard their firearms in self-defense. The experience in the DRC has produced several lessons. Firstly, disarmament should target both combatants and civilians. Armed civilians may victimize or injure former combatants, making the reintegration process difficult. Secondly, the international community should involve armed groups in negotiations and implementation of disarmament, and countries should always follow through on their promises. Confidence among various groups and governments will lead to more effective, peaceful disarmament.xv Thirdly, disarmament will require both human and material resources, and the international community should cooperate in gathering these resources.
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The War in Afghanistan The War in Afghanistan provides a modern example of jus post bellum. After Al-Qaeda attacked the US on September 11, 2001, the US launched a campaign against Al-Qaeda and its defenders in Afghanistan’s Taliban government. Numerous countries teamed up with Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban factions to overthrow the government. In December of 2001, the Taliban surrendered, and the king recognized Hamid Karzai as the head of a new transitional government. Rather than disarming the army of the fragile new government, the international community has tried to help it maintain security. In 2001, Security Council Resolution 1386 created the International Security Assistance Force to provide peacekeeping in Kabul. In 2003, NATO took control of ISAF and expanded its mission, growing the forces from 5,000 to 65,000 troops. Meanwhile, countries also took individual actions. In 2005, the US and Afghanistan declared a strategic partnership. The US gained access to Afghan military bases. The declaration stipulated that the US “help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces.” Later, in 2009, President
Obama responded to growing violence in Afghanistan with a surge of 30,000 troops. However, he also revealed plans to start bringing home US soldiers in July 2011. Both NATO and the US aim to give Afghanistan complete control over its own security by 2014. Rather than disarming Afghanistan, the international community has taken partial control of the country’s military resources. The international community aims to defend the new Afghan government while training its troops. Eventually, the international community hopes that it can return full control of the military and its resources to the Afghan government. The strategy in Afghanistan has had some downsides, and tensions continue to this day. Recent sources of conflict include soldiers accidentally killing Afghan civilians, US troops burning Qurans, and a US soldier murdering 16 villagers. Karzai has pressured foreign troops to remain on military bases; a tactic which analysts admit could speed up the process of giving Afghanistan control over its own security. Guidelines for jus post bellum should consider whether this strategy – letting a country maintain its army
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and training the army to act responsibly – is more effective than partial or complete disarmament, as was practiced with Germany and Japan during the World Wars. If so, what countries or organizations should be responsible for arming and training the military of the losing nation? Should the international community try to keep the military from gaining “too much” power? The Nature of Conflict Today Conflict has changed during the years following the World Wars, bringing about new challenges in disarmament. Nowadays, fighting may occur within one country rather than multiple ones. According to its charter, the UN lacks the ability to interfere with domestic conflicts, raising the question of whether or not foreigners have the right to confiscate combatants’ weapons in a nation that is working out its own struggles. A similar question about sovereignty also arises in the post-conflict situation. If the UN cannot intervene in a country during a civil conflict, may it intervene after the conflict ends? Or should individual countries that have experienced civil conflict take responsibility for the disarmament of their own people following the fighting?
Moreover, terrorism has risen as a serious threat to international security. Terrorist organizations may work small groups within a country. After national or international skirmishes with terrorists, disarmament may be tricky, since individual terrorists cells may or may not be associated with a specific government. If one or more countries defeats a group of terrorists, who should disarm the terrorists? If the defeated terrorists received support from a specific government, should the UN promote the disarmament of that government’s military as well as the terrorist organization? Independent guerilla and rebel groups present a similar obstacle as terrorists. Following a conflict, how should countries disarm a group not associated with an official government? In light of the ever-changing nature of fighting, the international community will have to come up with innovative disarmament methods that respect national sovereignty.
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of individuals and states, as well as good governance.” Conflicts between governments and rebel groups have sapped countries’ resources, since “governments turn to building of strong national armies at the cost of national development.”xvii While African governments desire to advance national development, they also desire to maintain security and deter rebels. As a result, governments would likely support the demilitarization of enemy rebels following conflict. However, they would probably want to maintain governmental armed forces to guard against future threats. Effective disarmament after conflict in African nations could follow a multilateral approach, using the
Source: US Mission to the UN
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resources of the concerned government, the African Union and the U.N. To prevent rebel groups from getting hold of the government’s weapons (as occurred in the DRC), officials could carefully monitor the trade and use of their stockpiles, especially at ports. They could create legislation regarding gun ownership by civilians. The AU and UN could monitor arms embargoes. Governments could pursue disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to incorporate former combatants back into society. Bodies that have monitored disarmament in Africa in the past include the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa as well as the African Union Defense and Security Division. Asia Since regaining membership in the U.N. in 1971, China has played an active role in disarmament. The nation has called for the complete destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as the reduction of conventional arms. In China’s view, all countries (not just a few big powers) should plan and carry out disarmament, since weapons can affect any nation. In the 1980s, the nation sponsored U.N. resolutions championing nuclear and conventional
disarmament. China even cut one million troops from its forces in 1986, as well as another 500,000 troops in 1997. Broadly speaking, China favors “complete and thorough disarmament.” India also “has a long-standing commitment to the goal of general disarmament based on the principles of universality, non-discrimination and verification.” It maintains a minimum amount of nuclear weapons. India is committed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which attempts to ensure that arms “have a greater prospect of making a meaningful impact on the ground.” Due to these considerations, India may not agree with complete disarmament, but it recognizes the need to limit weapons and monitor those arms. As the only country to have suffered the destruction of nuclear bombs, Japan seeks peace, and it strongly advocates for disarmament and non-proliferation. To provide for its security, Japan uses diplomatic measures, and it tries to maintain stability among the nuclearized states in the surrounding region (like China and Russia). The Japanese desire to avoid arms races anywhere in the world. Based on these considerations, following conflict, Japan would likely Disarmament and Security Committee 16
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advocate disarming a nation as much as possible without compromising its ability of self-defense. Europe The French take a collective approach to world peace and believe that security depends on multilateral cooperation. France has advocated for cooperation in nuclear disarmament. In terms of conventional weapons, France hopes to one day create global, legally binding legislation regarding the trafficking of small arms. It also supports the adoption of the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty to limit the weapon supply and standardize the transfer of arms. While France may not push for complete disarmament after a conflict, it would agree that the world should reduce its weapons stocks. Countries should use common, universal practices when it comes to amassing and regulating arms. Like France, Britain has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has played a major role in negotiating over the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. It has approved multiple U.N. resolutions regarding both conventional and nuclear disarmament. Britain favors a world that progresses toward lowering its weapons stocks,
and it would base its post-conflict disarmament policies on this view. Russia perceives an imbalance between its own weapons stocks and those of NATO due to NATO’s recent expansion in Eastern Europe. This tension has blocked negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons, since Russia wishes to avoid Western domination. In 2007, Russia broke away from other nations (particularly NATO members) by suspending the Treaty on Conventional Disarmament in Europe. Russia no longer reveals certain military information, and it bans inspections of Russian territory by other treaty signatories. Nonetheless, Russia recently signed a new START Treaty with the United States to limit their arms and allow inspections of weapons facilities. Due to its difficulties with NATO, Russia clearly appreciates the significance of weapons in maintaining the balance of power. The nation has shown that it may support arms reduction but not necessarily complete demilitarization. For any country, Russia would likely choose a path of disarmament after conflict that would benefit its own position of power.
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The Americas & the Caribbean As shown by its previous involvement in disarmament, the U.S. has shaped policies for regulating the world’s weapons. Nowadays, the U.S. considers “rogue states” and terrorists as the most serious threats to peace. Generally, the U.S. supports multilateral approaches to disarmament (so long as these approaches work in its interest).xxii The country has the world’s highest military budget, and it has contributed to disarmament in conflicts ranging from the World Wars to Afghanistan and beyond. In all of these conflicts, the U.S. has seemed to try to disarm aggressive countries so that they can no longer pose a threat
but still have some means of defense. Either the country can provide for its own protection, or (like with Japan in WWII) the U.S. and the international community provide defense. Given its wide involvement in disarmament in the past, the U.S. will have to take an active role in crafting standards for disarmament after conflict. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.N. assists with “arms control, armed violence reduction, the privatization of security, confidence-building measures, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It assists countries in destroying their surplus weaponry and regulating their arms stockpiles.
Source: US Mission to the UN Disarmament and Security Committee 18
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For example, a German-funded project in Central America will help El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico to control small arms by better managing their weapons. As a country plagued by drug cartels, Mexico recognizes that the proliferation of illicit arms perpetuates violence. Drug traffickers use weapons to maintain dominance and look out for their own security. Mexico supports a U.N. Arms Trade Treaty that will regulate the flow of weapons and keep them from falling into the hands of non-state actors. Following conflict, Mexico would likely support a disarmament plan that keeps arms firmly in governments’ control. However, it would not necessarily call for the complete destruction of a nation’s armaments. After all, Mexico is concerned mostly with weapons falling into the hands of drug lords, not the government’s armed forces.
In recent years, Venezuela has focused on disarmament of its civilian population. U.N. representatives praised Venezuela’s recent plan for citizens to voluntarily surrender their illegal firearms to the government. Generally speaking, Venezuela recognizes the destabilizing effects of weapons, and so like Mexico it would support a disarmament plan that keeps governments firmly in control of armaments.
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Questions to Consider Keep in mind these questions: • Following an armed conflict, how much disarmament is just? Why? • Who should decide how much disarmament is appropriate? The conflict’s victors? The conflict’s losers? A completely independent body? Or should the same amount of disarmament be appropriate in all situations, so that no discussion is necessary? • Should all countries follow the same standards and rules of disarmament? If not, how should the international community craft disarmament plans for a country? • Under what circumstances, if any, can the international community demand that a country demilitarize either partially or completely? • How does the right to self-defense relate to disarmament following conflict, and how can the international community promote disarmament while still allowing countries to protect themselves? • Should the international community focus on specific weapons or branches of the military when planning for disarmament after conflict? For example, should demobilizing an army take precedence over demobilizing a navy? • Which countries, organizations, and individuals should plan and implement disarmament strategies? Why?
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• Will harsh disarmament strategies that eliminate many weapons create tension and lead to more fighting, or will they bring about peace more quickly? • How do emerging trends in modern conflict affect disarmament? Some trends to consider may include: a. Civil wars and domestic conflicts b. Terrorism by non-state actors c. New technologies (like cyber-war and biological weapons) • Should other measures, like economic or political changes, always accompany disarmament? Is it within DISEC’s purview to even mention these measures?
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Suggestions for Further Reading Brian Orend’s “Justice after War” provides an overview of how morality and justice play into disarmament. The article is available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/ resources/journal/16_1/articles/277.html/_res/id=sa_File1/277_orend.pdf. Other writers who have considered jus post bellum include David Walzer, Stephen J. Cimbala, Paul R. Pillar, Stuart Albert, Edward Luck, A.J.P. Taylor, and Fen Osler Hampson. For a classic text on justice and war, try Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica: http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html. Multiple international bodies have dealt with disarmament in the past. These organizations, and their websites, are listed below in alphabetical order. When researching, figure out how your country has viewed these organizations’ efforts at disarmament. • DISEC: http://www.un.org/ga/60/first/ • The International Atomic Energy Agency: http://www.iaea.org/ • The U.N. Conference on Disarmament: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/ (httpPages)/2D415EE45C5FAE 07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument • The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations: http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/ • The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ • The U.N. Security Council: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ Also consider whether your country is a member of any regional organizations that have created legislation about disarmament. These organizations may include the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the European Union, among others.
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Topic II: Proliferation of Small arms Topic History The history of human civilization is a history of warfare. Humanity’s oldest recorded works, across all cultures and spanning the world from East to West – the Iliad, the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Mahabharata, the History of the Peloponnesian War – all concern themselves with conflict on grand or minor scales, serving as a testament to the constant presence of martial strife in the collective psyche of humanity. Perhaps that is why these works have survived for so long; more than any other human activity, war pervades all societies from within and without, and no civilization can remain unexposed to conflict for long. The stories relayed by these great works – involving universal themes such as great individual heroics and staggering betrayals, acts of great courage and immense depravity, incredible strategic feats and dismaying tactical failures – remain relevant to this day. Though the themes of war have remained constant through the centuries, what has changed are the
weapons used to undertake conflict. Even as other areas of technology develop in fits and starts, the implements of war are constantly honed and improved. From the stone-tipped club, often recognized as the first true weapon of war, through the primitive spears of the Copper and Bronze Ages, through the intricate siege engines of the Roman Empire, through to the sub-machine guns and laser-guided munitions of the modern day, arms are as often as not the first area in which scientific advances are applied and tested.
Achilles and Hector in the Iliad, Source: Open Culture
However, even centuries ago, there have been attempts by city-states and other institutions to cooperate in
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restricting the use and proliferation of certain weapons – namely, to institute some form of arms control. The following sections will discuss the history of prior attempts at arms control. The scope of this history is not limited to small arms; we will delve into further detail on that particular issue as we move into a discussion of the Current Situation. History of Arms Control: Pre-Twentieth century One of the earliest historical examples of true “international” arms control occurred in the twelfth century, when the Second Lateran Council prohibited the use of crossbows by Christians (against other Christians) in 1139. In these early periods of history, there were few agreed-upon laws governing conduct during warfare (the medieval code of chivalry, bushido in Japan, and a few other examples do exist), and even fewer stipulations on the types of weapons to be used in a given conflict. The advent of firearms changed that paradigm. With the wars of the era growing increasingly brutal due to the swift destructive power of gunpowder-based weaponry, the citystates of the period began to engage in multilateral treaties to limit the use of
the most destructive of these weapons. The landmark Strasbourg Agreement of 1675, brokered between France and the Holy Roman Emperor, was the first international agreement to regulate the use of “chemical weapons” – in this case, poisoned rifle bullets. However, until the late nineteenth century, similar agreements were few and far between.
Washington Naval Conference Source: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
The Hague Convention of 1899 drastically altered the rules governing warfare. Proposed by Russian Tsar Nicholas II and attended by representatives from 26 nations, it was one of the first widely-accepted international treaties to establish concrete rules of law and delineate war crimes. The need for such a treaty had became clear as wartime technologies advanced further, and many of the First Hague Convention’s
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tipulations relate to arms control – including Declaration I, which “prohibited the launch of projectiles and explosives from balloons,” and Declaration III, which prohibits the “use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body”. Though these early treaties placed restrictions on the use of certain weapons, they did nothing to address their proliferation. Restrictions on the trade and transfer of certain weapons would not appear until the early to mid-20th century. Arms Control in the Modern Era The end of the First World War in 1918 saw the inception of a number of naval conferences with a stated aim to work towards disarmament. In the 1920s, the worldwide mood strongly favored disarmament, and the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 stands out as a successful example of modern-day international agreement to limit the use and proliferation of a certain type of armament. Some of the most powerful nations of the day, including Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States, agreed to impose restrictions on the tonnage of warships and institute a full moratorium on new naval construction. In 1925, the Second
Geneva Convention called for a complete ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. Of course, growing tensions in the 1930s derailed the movement towards arms control for the moment, as Germany reconsolidated its military power in defiance of explicit international agreements to the contrary. The decades following the end of the Second World War, however, saw a boom in treaties seeking to reduce the proliferation of broad categories of destructive weapons. The newly-created United Nations provided a venue for hundreds of nations to create, discuss and ultimately sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, while the United States and the Soviet Union worked bilaterally to sign and ratify the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Though global arms control efforts have tended to focus on traditional “weapons of mass destruction,” recent years have seen an expansion in the categories of weapons targeted by international treaties. The Ottawa Treaty of 1997, which entered into force in 1999, prohibits signatories from stockpiling, transferring, using anti-personnel landmines, while the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits the use or transfer of deadly cluster bombs. Both of these weapons have been implicated Disarmament and Security Committee 25
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as culprits in a large number of civilian deaths in conflict zones around the world. Notable nations which have refused to sign either treaty include the United States, China, Russia, and India.
Deployment of Cluster Munitions Source: EmptyWheel
In the past fifteen years, the international dialogue on arms control has finally begun to focus on small arms. A number of regional initiatives have helped set the stage for broader UN action to regulate trade and transfer in small arms, including the 1997 Organization of American States Arms Convention, and a 2000 document on small arms produced by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 2001, the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons was held in New York. As the first true UN meeting on small arms control, the conference had its
share of acrimonious debate; notably, the United States’ John Bolton alienated a number of other countries with his articulation of a number of U.S. “redlines” which were off-limits for negotiation. Nevertheless, the meeting resulted in a non-binding Programme of Action to guide further dialogue on the issue. It is an exciting time in the history of small arms control. Considerable differences remain unresolved in the international dialogue, but more and more countries recognize the urgent need for a comprehensive and effective Arms Trade Treaty. We will discuss more recent developments in the Current Situation.
Current Situation “There are over 550 million firearms in worldwide circulation. That’s one firearm for every twelve people on the planet. The only question is: How do we arm the other 11?” - Yuri Orlov, Lord of War (2005) There is no doubt that globalization has proved a boon for many industries around the world. The world is a much smaller place now than even a decade ago, and many industries have benefitted in some way from the transition, from
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the cell phone manufacturers whose products sit in your pockets, to the cars, planes and buses you will take in order to arrive at this committee in January. So, too, have traffickers in small arms and light weapons (SALW) benefitted from closer ties in commerce and communication between all types of nations. Not since the dissolution of the Soviet Union two decades ago – and the consequent liquidation of an immense quantity of small arms and light weaponry which had been in the armories of the former Soviet nations – has the world seen such a boom in the demand for and proliferation of small arms. The first question that may come to mind is logical: why should the UN focus on small arms and light weaponry? Defined in UN Resolution A/60/88, small arms are “weapons designed for individual use… includ[ing], inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns,” while the category of light weaponry includes a number of larger firearms, including heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, and the like. In a nutshell, these are weapons that can be easily moved and operated by individual combatants.
Should the UN not focus its attention on “bigger” problems, such as nuclear arms or chemical and biological weapons? The Facts: The Role of Small Arms and Light Weaponry in Modern Conflicts Big-ticket weapons such as ICBMs may seem vastly threatening than AK-47s and grenade launchers, and certainly have a place in the UN’s security agenda, but the truth of the matter is that small arms do far more damage around the world on a dayto-day level. In the words of the Small Arms Working Group, “there are around forty wars raging in countries around the world today. These wars are being fought primarily with small arms and light weapons carried by individual soldiers or on light vehicles.” On average, over 400,000 people are killed every year through small arms, both in conflict zones and in crime-ridden areas of cities around the world, and that number is bound to increase – conservative estimates indicate that eight million more small arms are produced per year, along with 16 billion units of ammunition, more than two new bullets for every man, woman and child on the planet. In 2005, then-current estimates
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pegged the number of extant small arms worldwide at 550 million – as of 2011, that number is closer to 900 million. The distribution of small arms-related casualties matters as well. Over 90% of civilian casualties in conflict zones are caused by small arms, and these firearms are undoubtedly the major cause of non-combatant deaths in conflicts around the world. More than any other weapon in modern warfare, small arms are consistently utilized to target and terrorize non-combatants. The impact of small arms extends far beyond the effects of their immediate use or misuse in conflict – societies with high proliferation of arms and insufficient institutional stability to police their use experience drastic long-term consequences for development and economic productivity. The following passage from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is instrumental in detailing the link between small arms and broader repercussions pertaining to security and development: “Small arms are cheap, light, and easy to handle, transport and conceal. A build-up of small arms alone may not create the conflicts in which they are
used, but their excessive accumulation and wide availability aggravates the tension. The violence becomes more lethal and lasts longer, and a sense of insecurity grows, which in turn lead to a greater demand for weapons. Most present-day conflicts are fought mainly with small arms, which are broadly used in inter-State conflict. They are the weapons of choice in civil wars and for terrorism, organized crime and gang warfare. Contemporary armed conflict is the main cause of people fleeing their homes, and is now the most common cause of food insecurity. Armed violence can aggravate poverty, inhibit access to social services and divert energy and resources away from efforts to improve human development. Countries plagued by armed violence are behind in attaining the Millennium Development Goals. High levels of armed violence impede economic growth. According to the World Bank, nothing undermines investment climates as much as armed insecurity.” Once begun, the vicious cycle fueling the proliferation of small arms is incredibly difficult to halt from the inside out. The insecurity caused by the presence of just a few weapons incentivizes other parties to seek out
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counterbalancing firearms, fueling miniature arms races which can utterly ruin already-unstable societies wracked by civil tension. Child soldiers, rampant sexual assault and rape, and the displacement of entire populations are the human consequences of ineffective control of small arms. The damage is such that organizations such as the International Action Network on Small Arms have characterized small arms as “weapons of mass destruction,” while South Africa’s Archbishop Desmond Tutu has characterized the small arms trade in Africa as “the modern day slave trade which is out of control…the world could eradicate poverty in a few generations, if a fraction of the spending here on small arms was spent on peace.” The magnitude of the impact is clear: the national flag of Mozambique, to this day, displays an AK-47 rifle as the centerpiece of its crest. The Source: Legal, Illegal, and in Between The countries in which conflicts occur are rarely the ones in which the weapons used to fuel the conflicts are produced. “Few combatants involved (whether state or non-state actors) produce any, let alone the bulk, of
these munitions. Most light arms being used in these conflicts are imported--either through legal international channels, or through the black market.” Over 1,100 companies in 98 countries worldwide participate in the production of small arms, light weapons or ammunition. Of these nations, a few easily recognizable names dominate in the production of small arms and light weapons – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially the US, Russia, and China, account for just under 90% of the world’s conventional arms exports. Other nations, such as Vietnam and Lebanon, play an important role as transit countries – often bordering conflict zones, arms are imported legally into these nations and are then funneled across the border in defiance of embargoes. In 2005, an estimated $30 billion changed hands in the global arms bazaar in transactions related to conventional arms in the Middle East and Africa alone. However, the dollar value of transactions does not always reflect the magnitude of the issue at hand – “measuring SALW [Small Arms and Light Weapons] transfers by financial value [alone] ignores the potentially huge impact of relatively
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small-value transfers. Assault rifles cost only a few hundred dollars each—but only a few hundred such rifles can lead to major instability, with catastrophic effects for civilian populations.” The majority of these weapons are sold and transferred legally, but the shifting trade landscape of the past few decades has meant that private brokers and other intermediaries often take on roles which were previously filled by state actors. This has led to more difficulty enacting and enforcing controls. These third-parties are often able to exploit legal loopholes – loopholes which are occasionally purposely ignored or even abetted by the
largest arms exporters – in order to violate UN arms embargos and transfer small arms to conflict zones. Other routes of arms trafficking are more blatantly extralegal: according to UNODA, “sources of small arms supplies to areas of crisis and conflict are varied. Domestically, small arms can enter illicit circulation through distribution, theft, leakage, divergence, pilferage or resale. Shipments of small arms to conflict zones from abroad are most often small-scale consignments - a steady trickle of weapons across porous borders. The cumulative destabilizing force of such small-scale trade is not to be underestimated, particularly in unstable regions where small
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arms are traded from one conflict to another.” It seems, therefore, that the issue of small arms finding their way into the wrong hands could potentially be tackled from multiple angles, though the most effective solutions will likely include a combination of remedies. Tightening national legal frameworks on the purchase and transfer of firearms is a logical first step. Simultaneously, however, nations must find a way to hold the semi-legal, gray market operations of private intermediaries accountable. On the ground, physical measures to secure existing stockpiles and porous borders must be enacted by relevant parties. All of these potential solutions, to some degree, necessitate the collection of data as an intermediate step. At the moment, however, there is a dearth of reliable information on small arms proliferation, and attempts to track arms and identity perennial trouble-spots have not been systematized to a sufficient degree. The UN suggests that “reliable data sets on small arms can only be built if countries provide information on production, holdings, trade, legislation and use. But of all transparency measures on weapons systems, those on small arms are the least developed.
According to the Small Arms Survey, ‘more is known about the number of nuclear warheads, stocks of chemical weapons and transfers of major conventional weapons than about small arms.’” Case Study: Colombia Portions of sub-Saharan Africa are often portrayed (perhaps accurately) as the areas in which the proliferation of small arms has the largest impact. However, I have specifically selected a country falling outside of that region to emphasize that this is truly an issue which is global in scope, from source to destination.
Members of the FARQ Source: DefinicionABC
Colombia has suffered from a longrunning internal conflict for more than four decades, and has long been an attractive market for small arms
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exporters and brokers. Wellestablished paramilitary forces such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARQ) and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) are responsible for a large number of civilian fatalities in addition to the deaths suffered in their skirmishes with Colombia’s military. In 2007, a reported 260 civilians died via the actions of guerilla groups, with perhaps hundreds more deaths going unreported. According to UN customs data, the monetary volume of Colombia’s import of all types of armament in 2006 reached $40 million. The four largest exporters are the United States, South Africa, Israel, and France. All four of these nations boast laws which place restrictions on arms exportation to nations where the human rights
impact of said weapons is unclear or clearly negative, or where there is significant risk of diversion from lawful to unlawful recipients. Purely illegal importation of small arms takes place in smaller but still frequent shipments. The table below, illustrating the national origin of a selection of small arms and light weapons confiscated by Colombian authorities between 2005 and 2006, tells an interesting story. Whether these weapons are brought into the country legally or smuggled in illicitly, this data illustrates that nations such as the United States, Russia and Germany are unequivocally the largest suppliers of small arms to guerilla groups in Colombia. A similar story could be of many conflict zones around the world. It is clear that the stakeholders in
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trade of SALW are incredibly varied, ranging from the nations of South Africa to the smallest of sub-Saharan nations to the largest economy on earth. Recent Attempts at International Cooperation There is another reason why the trade in small arms demands more attention than nuclear missiles or biological ordinance – “unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, there are no international treaties or other legal instruments for dealing with these weapons, which States and also individual legal owners rely on for their defense needs.” As mentioned in the Topic History, these has been some non-binding progress in addressing small arms proliferation; in addition to the nonbinding Programme of Action, there is also “the legally-binding Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which entered into force on 3 July 2005; and the politicallybinding International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2005.”
However, the international community has yet to pass an acceptable Arms Trade Treaty, which would comprehensively regulate the multi-billion dollar annual trade in small arms and light weapons as well as other conventional weapons – though they have already expressed the need for such a treaty. “On 6 December 2006 an overwhelming majority of United Nations (UN) Member States voted in the General Assembly to begin work for the elaboration of an agreement on the principle of a legally binding and universal Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Resolution 61/89, adopted by the UN General Assembly with the support of 153 States and only one State against, is a landmark step towards a more effective regulation of the international arms trade.” Elaboration on this foundation, however, has been difficult. Most recently, a highly-anticipated conference in July of 2012 which sought to pass a landmark, binding Arms Trade Treaty regulating trade in conventional arms failed to produce a document acceptable by the majority of countries. The failure of the month-long negotiations over the draft treaty came as a surprise to the many non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders clamoring for an agreement; perhaps Disarmament and Security Committee 33
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unsurprisingly, several major arms-producing nations stood as the largest obstacles to passing the treaty.
Rally in front of the recent conference Source: ControlArms. org
Though a statement released by 90 of the other nations participating in the negotiations said that they were “not discouraged” by the results, one lesson is made perfectly clear by these most recent negotiations – no treaty will be successful without the support of the largest economic and political stakeholders in the small arms trade. At the same time, if too many concessions are made, a “light” version of the treaty will do little to halt either the legal or illicit flows of small arms to regions where they are used to murder thousands of civilians. Achieving that balance is the key to successfully addressing this long-standing problem. There is little time to lose.
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Questions to Consider Keep in mind these questions: • In your country’s view, what are the essential, baseline components of a successful Arms Trade Treaty? • To that end, what is a successful Arms Trade Treaty? What should the goals, and limitations, of such a treaty be? • What can the committee take away from previous UN action (or attempts at action) on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons? In considering previous action, try to identify sources of contention between nations – the details – and consider routes to achieve compromise. • How should countries cooperate with/include private industry in efforts for arms control? • In cases when arms produced legally in one country are smuggled into conflicts through extralegal means, how should responsibility be distributed? What is the burden on manufacturers and state license-givers to ensure that weapons are not traded to the wrong place? • How should we define “the wrong place” – under what conditions should trade in small arms to a certain region be restricted? • How can we accurately trace the proliferation of illegally-trafficked small arms? How can nations cooperate to this effect? • To what extent should individual regions work in concert to combat the proliferation of small arms?
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Bloc Positions The following quote from the Arms Control Association summarizes the situation accurately: “There is enormous support for an ATT among UN member states. For example, 151 states voted in favor of the last UN resolution on an ATT in 2009. However, the five years of talks have shown that there are probably more than 100 different views of what the treaty should look like. As always in these negotiations, the devil is in the detail. Therefore, a key question for the negotiators is whether it is possible to avoid detail in the text of the treaty.” I expect most delegates to determine soon enough that they are in rough agreement on the need for some form of regulation in the trade of small arms and light weapons (of course, some country’s positions may require them to reject even this sentiment). The trick will be formulating the details, and it is here that the committee walks a fine line – too many stipulations, and we may not come to consensus, but too few means that any document we pass will be toothless and ineffective. The complex nature of this issue – fraught with repercussions that span levels from commercial to ethical – demands an uncommon level of nuance on the part of diplomatic representatives. As such, in order to allow delegates the maximum level of freedom to adapt to their individual situations and positions, I will refrain from outlining specific bloc positions. However, this does not mean that delegates should ignore the broad strokes of their country’s positions, some of which are very established. For example, very generally speaking, the largest weapon-producing nations – including the P5 nations and a host of other countries – have proved the hardest to convince on certain specifics of an arms trade treaty. In the end, no effective solution can exist without the support of a wide cross-section of nations, including producers, transit nations, and destination countries.
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Suggestions for Further Reading For an interactive (and enjoyable) introduction to the world of modern small arms and the effect arms trafficking has on societies worldwide, I highly suggest viewing the movie Lord of War (2005 - http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0399295/), starring none other than Nicholas Cage. The film is officially endorsed by Amnesty International and a variety of other organizations for its presentation of an accurate perspective on the realities of the international struggle to control trafficking in small arms. Bonus points to delegates who catch my movie references (kidding, mostly). An excellent collection of resources can be accessed through the portal for the international Control Arms campaign (located at http://www.controlarms.org/index_c.php). The website outlines several provisions which may (or may not, depending on your country’s position) prove critical to an effective global arms trade treaty. In the website’s “Resources” section, you will find a wealth of research papers which focus in depth on many of the specific issues surrounding small arms control. The Arms Control Association is another informative resource – see this feature article (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/SmallArmsFeature) for a useful history of recent international action on small arms control. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provides a thorough and helpful repository for information on actions already taken and past resolutions enacted by the UN on the issue of small arms (http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ SALW/). The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Lightweight Weapons is equally helpful.
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Structure of the Committee As a G.A. committee, DISEC includes representatives from all 193 member states of the U.N.lxv Each member state has the right to exercise one vote. Decisions on important matters require a two-thirds majority vote. In the U.N., important matters include recommendations on the maintenance of international peace and security, and so at YMUN, resolutions and amendments will require a two-thirds majority to pass. Less important matters only require a simple majority vote to pass. The committee will use on standard parliamentary procedure. Position papers are a useful tool for brainstorming ways to address the issues at hand. Position papers should be 1-2 pages long for each topic. The position paper should state the delegate’s position on the topic and include suggestions for how the committee should approach the topic. Delegates will receive feedback on position papers submitted by January 10th. To be eligible for awards, delegates must send in their position papers by the first committee session.
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Role of the Committee DISEC has special duties both as a G.A. body and as a specific committee. Like all G.A. committees, DISEC may “consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament.” DISEC in particular “deals with disarmament and related international security questions.” The committee addresses a range of topics. For example, during the 66th meeting of GA bodies in 2011, DISEC covered “nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, disarmament aspects of outer space, conventional weapons, regional disarmament and security, other disarmament measures, and disarmament machinery.” DISEC must obey limits to its powers. The committee may make recommendations to U.N. member states and the Security Council. It may also approve of and pursue studies necessary to achieve its goals. However, it lacks many capabilities that the Security Council enjoys. For instance, only the Security Council may authorize interventions, whether armed (like operations by land, air, sea forces) or unarmed (like economic sanctions). DISEC may not discuss or make recommendations about topics being covered by the Security Council unless the Security Council requests its assistance. Overall, DISEC’s main duty is to provide recommendations, not to approve of specific actions.
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Glossary • Jus ad bellum (justice before war) - considers reasons a state may use for entering into war. • Jus in bello (justice during war) - covers how a state conducts war and the actions of its troops. • Jus post bellum (justice after war) - concerns states’ actions once the war has ended. • Small arms - a term used by armed forces to denote infantry weapons an individual soldier can carry. • Weapon of mass destruction - a weapon that can bring significant harm to a large number of humans or serious damage to artificial or natural structures. • Disarmament - the act of reducing, limiting, or abolishing weapons.
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Notes “Article 26.” Charter of the United Nations. Accessed 9 August 2012. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ chapter5.shtml> Alexander Moseley, “Just War Theory,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 10, 2009, http://www.iep.utm. edu/justwar/. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations Treaty Collection, June 26, 1945, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf. Thomas Pogge, “War: Justifications for Going to War” (lecture, Yale University, New Haven, CT, April 2, 2012). “IHL Primer #1 – What Is IHL?” International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, June 2009, http://ihl.ihlresearch. org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=2083. “The Treaty of Versailles,” History Learning Site, 2012, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_versailles.htm. Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” Carnegie Council, 2002, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/journal/16_1/articles/277.html/_res/id=sa_File1/277_orend.pdf. “Effects of World War II,” Home Page: Professor West, Social Science Department, http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/ effectww2.html. “Allied Plans for Germany after World War II.” EastGermany.info. http://eastgermany.info/afterWW2.htm. “Japanese History: Postwar (Since 1945),” japan-guide.com, 2012, http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2124.html. “The United States and Japan after World War II,” About.com, 2012, http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/asia/a/TheUnited-States-And-Japan-After-World-War-Ii.htm?rd=1. “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),” UNODA, 2012, http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/about_us/aboutus.shtml. “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),” UNODA, 2012., http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/about_us/aboutus.shtml. “The United Nations, Disarmament and Security,” NGO on Disarmament, Peace & Security, http://disarm.igc.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=86&Itemid=59. Nelson Alusala, “Armed Conflict and Disarmament: Selected Central African Case Studies,” ISS Monograph Series no. 129 (March 2007), http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3394.pdf. “U.S. War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/ p20018. Nelson Alusala, “Armed Conflict and Disarmament: Selected Central African Case Studies,” ISS Monograph Series no. 129 (March 2007), http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3394.pdf. “UNODA,” UNODA, 2009, http://unrec.org/index/. “Peace and Security,” African Union, 2010, http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/node. “China Actively Promotes the International Process of Disarmament to Safeguard World Peace and Security,” CCTV, November 9, 2009, http://www.cctv.com/english/special/60anni/20090911/109995.shtml. “India and Disarmament,” Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament, July 15, 2012, http://www. mea.gov.in/pmicd.geneva/?1017. “Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy: Part I: Overview,” Ed. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0404/part1.pdf. “Disarmament: A Concrete and Comprehensive Approach to Disarmament,” FranceTNP, http://www.francetnp2010.fr/ spip.php?article77. “Disarmament,” UK Mission Geneva, 2012, http://ukmissiongeneva.fco.gov.uk/en/work/disarmament/. “UNGA First Committee,” UK Mission Geneva, 2012, http://ukmissiongeneva.fco.gov.uk/en/work/disarmament/disar-
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Notes “Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security,” Ed. Alexei Arbatov and Alexander Kaliadne, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 2011, http://www.imemo. ru/ru/publ/2011/11003.pdf. “Statement of the MFA on the Adoption of the Russian Law on the Suspension of the Application of the Treaty on Conventional Disarmament in Europe by the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, December 4, 2007, http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/statements/x2007/statement_of_the_mfa_on_the_adoption_of.html. “The New START Treaty: Signed.” The White House Blog. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/02/new-start-treaty-signed. “The 15 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2011,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view. “What We Do,” UNLIREC, 2012, http://www.unlirec.org/qhacemos_eng.aspx. “What We Do: Name of Project: Destruction of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives and Improvement in Stockpile Management,” UNLIREC, 2012, http://www.unlirec.org/FDSM_FaceI_eng.aspx. “Home,” UNLIREC, 2012, http://www.unlirec.org/default_eng.aspx. Katherine Prizeman, “Mexico, Drug Trade, and Illicit Arms,” GAPWBLOG, http://gapwblog.wordpress. com/2012/01/25/mexico-drug-trade-and-illicit-arms/. “Venezuelan Disarmament Plan Begins Pilot Phase,” Venezuelaanalysis.com, February 16, 2012, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6812. “History of Weapons Timeline.” <http://daffodil2010.hubpages.com/hub/History-Of-Weapons-Timeline>. “Medieval Sourcebook: Tenth Ecumenical Council.” Fordham University Library. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ basis/lateran2.asp>. “Laws of War.” Avalon Project. Yale School of Law. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-03.asp>. “Washington Naval Conference.” <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1354.html>. Schroeder, Matt and Rachel Stohl. “Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse.” Arms Control Association. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/SmallArmsFeature Malhotra, Aditi. “Globalisation and the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons.” <http://idraak.blogspot. com/2010/09/globalisation-and-illicit-trade-of.html>. http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarm.html “Control Arms: Campaign reveals arms trade realities behind new Nicholas Cage film Lord of War.” Press Release – 14 October 2005. AI UK. <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16478>. “Crush the Illicit Trade in Small Arms.” UN.org. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW>. McCullum, Hugh. “Small Arms: The World’s Favorite Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Africa Files. <http://www. africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=13824>. Shah, Anup. “Small Arms – cause 90% of civilian casualties.” Global Issues. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/ small-arms-they-cause-90-of-civilian-casualties#SmallArmsareProliferatedThroughBothLegalandIllegalTrade Wolf, Paul. “Evolution of the Colombian Civil War.” <http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/colombiawar.htm>. “Blood at the Crossroads: Making the Case for a Global Arms Trade Treaty.” Amnesty International. <http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Blood-at-the-Crossroads-making-the-case-for-a-global-ATT.-Amnesty.pdf-.pdf>.
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Notes Brooks, Courtney. “UN Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations Fail.” Radio Free Europe. <http://www.rferl.org/content/unarms-trade-treaty-megotiations-fail/24659316.html>. Wood, Andrew. “How to Reach Consensus on an Arms Trade Treaty.” Arms Control Association. <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_01-02/How_to_Reach_Consensus_on_an_Arms_Trade_Treaty>. “Control Arms: Campaign reveals arms trade realities behind new Nicholas Cage film Lord of War.” Press Release – 14 October 2005. AI UK. <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16478>. “Rules of the Procedure of the General Assembly,” United Nations Human Rights, 2008, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.520.Rev.15_En.pdf. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly,” General Assembly of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/ about/background.shtml. “Disarmament and International Security,” General Assembly of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ index.shtml. “First Committee, Concluding Work for Session, Sends 52 Draft Texts to General Assembly Covering Broad Spectrum of Disarmament, Security Concerns,” United Nations Meetings Coverage & Press Releases, October 31, 2011, http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gadis3449.doc.htm. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations Treaty Collection, June 26, 1945, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf.
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