IR India China Relations

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I N D I A - C H I N A R E L AT I O N S

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P R E S E N T E D B Y: A A D I T YA M I S H R A

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Collection: International Relations •

Graduation from NIT, Bhopal- 2015

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Wrote Mains

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Pdf of this lesson is available at ISSUU.COM (link in the description below)

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Follow me: https://unacademy.in/user/ AadityaMishra

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About me:

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DIMENSIONS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS Background of India-China relations (from 1950’s to 2016) Issues ranging from

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Border Dispute Trade disputes, Massod Azhar issue,

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OBOR initiative,

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Water sharing issue,

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NSG membership,

Geopolitical flux in the regions and India’s strategy to deal with China

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History of India China Relations

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Post Independence Indian strategic community lead by PM Nehru had assessed that India had following needs-

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India needed to develop and for that we needed peace and stability in our neighbourhood India was clear that it has to protect it’s hard earned sovereignity and hence had to be out of any power blocs of the Cold war era.

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India needed technology, aid and trade and hence we were not in a position to go against Western Bloc led by USA

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India had a communist neighbour (China) hence we cannot jeopardise to go against Communist Bloc led by erstwhile USSR

What India did ?

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India took a pragmatic approach by coming out with a foreign policy based on

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Non Alignment Panchsheel

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Non Alignement ensured that India was able to protect it’s interests and reap benefits from both the blocs.

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Panchsheel ensured peace with our neighbours (albeit till 1962 with China)

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India China 1947-1962- Phase of Panchsheel

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Spearheaded by JL Nehru India wanted Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. It was considered friendship of 1billion people.

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India-China were to develop it’s civilisational ties. It was based on Rabindranath Tagore view that there can be mutually beneficial interactive relationship between the two great civilisations of China and India.

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The establishment of the first Sino-Indian Cultural Society, and then, “Cheena Bhavana” at Santineketan were corner stones for this cause.

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Relations leading to 1962 War

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Tibetan issue and Chinese claims of India’s forward policy and aggression.

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Relationship now were to have a “Cold Peace” ( away from the warrant of the Panchsheel) Issues with regards to border between India China (Chinese claims of Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang area became more prominent)

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Indian establishment understood the need of pragmatic foreign policy towards China.

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1980’s - Decade of Change

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1980 - Mr. Vajpayee went to China as External affairs minister which led to

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starting of meetings on various issues

1987- India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh

incursions increased on the border and tensions escalated

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1988 - PM Rajiv Gandhi's visit broke the ice

first time China recognised that border dispute was a real issue

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Joint working group(JWG), Hotline was established,

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1993-Agreement of Peace and Tranquility on borders

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N. Rao signed the agreement which had following clauses Not to alter the status quo at the borders not to use force at border

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if any country moves across the LAC then peaceful callback

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2003- Strategic Partnership

PM Vajpayee visited and led to starting of Confidence Building measures (CBM)

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Recognition of Sikkim by China, setting up of special representative mechanism

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2010- Border defence Cooperation Agreement PM Manmohan Singh’s visit was mainly in the backdrop of increased incursions on the border (2008 Dalai Lama contraversy)

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Outcomes included re-establishment of hotline

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Flag post meetings at the borders Policy to maximum restrain and no tailing to be followed

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PM Modi’s visit and Xi Jinping’s visit

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PM Modi and Xi Jinping met at the sidelines of Fortaleza Summit of BRICS where Xi Jinping said- “border dispute is a historical legacy and most complex issue” but gave a 5 point approach

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Constant strategic communication Cooperation in multilateral forum

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Harness each others strength

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Increase People to People contact and culutral ties Accommodate the difference of each other

InCh towards Miles A R India China Millennium of exclusive Synergy

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every inch we cover can rewrite history of humanity and every mile we cross will go a long way in making this planet a better place India and China increases, the lives of almost 35% of the world’s population undergoes qualitative changes.

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Boder disputes is “historical legacy but we have responsibility towards future also”

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M BORDERADISPUTE Y T I D A A

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History of Border Dispute A Chinese Position in three sectors

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Western Sector- China supports Mac Donald’ line and claims Aksai Chin region; 1963 Agreement with Pakistan Shaksgam Valley taken over

by China.

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Eastern Sector - claims keep on changing but it does not accept Mac Mohan line and claims Large parts of Arunachal as Southern Tibet.

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Middle Sector- small claims in Sikkim region

History of Border Dispute A

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Indian Positions based on equality, geographical markers, historical claims.

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Western Sector- claims Johnson line and Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh region

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Eastern Sector- MacMohan line is accepted according to which Arunachal Pradesh belongs to India.

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Middle Sector- Sikkim state has been recognised by China also.

Why China Claims these areas ????

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Tibetan and Xinjiang

Eastern Sector

Fertile area of this region

Hydroelectric potential

Spiritual angle

Chicken’s Neck and Mallacca Dilemma

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Progress so far in Border Dispute resolution

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1960’s China gave a “package proposal” —> it would be prepared to accept an alignment in the Eastern Sector, in general conforming to the McMahon Line, but India would have to concede Aksai Chin to China in the Western Sector.

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Deng Xiaoping in 1982 again reiterated this offer

1985 Chinese Re-interpretation - same as before + an explicit demand was made for the “restitution” of Tawang as indispensable to any boundary settlement.

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Why such change ?

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Increasing power asymmetry between the two nations Decreasing importance of Aksai Chin because now China had already build its infrastructure in Xinjiang region

Any “Out of Box Solutions” ??EAM Why it is needed ?

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power asymmetry going to increase in the near future and China’s stand would harden

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Adversarial position on border affects the other areas of relationship.

India might accept as Ama “Shyam Saran” states

LAC plus Solution —whereby the status quo in the Eastern Sector would be maintained, while China would make some, admittedly undefined, territorial concessions in the Western Sector ( this was proposed once thru backchannel talks in 1980’s)

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Indian side allow free movement of Tibetan pilgrims to the monastery town. In return, China could extend the same facility to Indian pilgrims going to Kailash – Mansarovar.

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India China Water Issue

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China as a HYDRO HEGEMON

FACTS UNIQUE TO CHINA A

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It has established a hydro-hegemony unparalleled on any continent by annexing in 1951 the Tibetan Plateau, the starting place of major international rivers.

Another sprawling territory Beijing forcibly absorbed, Xinjiang, is the source of the transnational Irtysh and Ili Rivers.

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Its refusal to accede to the Mekong Agreement of 1995, for example, has stunted the development of a genuine basin community.

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It also asserts a general principle that standing and flowing waters are subject to the full sovereignty of the state where they are located.

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It thus claims “indisputable sovereignty� over the waters on its side of the international boundary, including the right to divert as much shared water as it wishes for its legitimate needs.

FACTS UNIQUE TO CHINA A No country in the world is bigger dam builder than China.

1949 it had just 3 dams

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2015 biggest (3 gorges) + total building capacity more than world combined.

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China’s Tibet is source of more rivers than any state in world.

China does not agree to water sharing arrangement and claims “total sovereignty� over the water in its territory.

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Saheli river (Kazakhstan, Amur (to Russia), Mekong (S.E Asian states) What about India China Brahmaputra data sharing

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it is not water sharing but only a data sharing arrangement which is like a commercial contract and China charges Rs. 82 lakh per annum for that.

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Why we should be worried ??

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Because of Chinese next five year plan — China is now moving towards Mega Dam building (> 40k Mw) on Intl. rivers like Mekong and Brahmaputra.

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Motou Dam at India China border on Yarlung Tsangpo river is major cause of concern for India.

Ecologically sustainability of these areas which is geologically active is major concern.

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China plans to lift water by making barrages under its plan of GREAT WESTERN ROUTE or Great South North Water Diversion Project from 3 Intl rivers including Brahmaputra.

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Consequences - thinking the rationale for such diversion North vs Pollution of the Northern river

South China agricultural differences

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Using Overcapacit -y in steel, cement etc.

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Projecting it’s strength in engineering marvels

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A India’s concerns R H S I M A Y T I D A A

areas is EQ prone- geological fault line — giant MEDOG at syntaxial bend- 49 GW; greater total than all proposed projects in India - recently 2016 LARGER LALHO project a tributary of Brahmaputra was blocked. ecologically - may use much of the silt which make NE fertile; Brahmaputra is veritable lifeline and core part of cultural life; may affect flow in Bangladesh (depends 70% on this water)

Water deficit- forced migration in NE and may lead to water wars in IndBangladesh.

A India’s Response R H S I M A Y T I D A A India had unveiled 2 dam building projects @ Arunachal Pradesh (Kameng hydroelectric project, 600MW); Subansiri Hydroelectric project 2000 MW.

Our territorial and resource claim fusion - we have Arunachal Pradesh which strengthens our case under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation which is a part of Intl customary laws.

2006 India-China water data sharing group created but no results.

India has tried to create institutions by having sharing arrangements like Indus treaty, Ganga water sharing treaty.

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Coalition of like minded countries like Bangladesh, Mekong river states and try to create institutions like those existing in Europe. key will be effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and agreement on more transparent water-sharing arrangements. Asia can build a harmonious, rules-based water management system.

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M TRADE RELATIONS A Y T I D A A

India China Trade Relations A

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Strongest points in the relationship - moved from 3 bn $ in 2000 to more than 70 bn $ in 2015-16 but remain short of 200 bn $ expectation.

The major imports from China include telecom instruments, computer hardware and peripherals, fertilizers, electronic component, project goods, chemicals and drug intermediaries.

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Exports to China are ore, slag or ash, iron and steel, tin, raw hides, leather, plastics and cotton. 


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The different comparative advantages of the two countries provide grounds for strong economic exchange.




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India's trade deficit with China has swelled to $52.68 billion in 2015-16, from $48.48 billion in the previous fiscal - its largest with any country.

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Source: Business Standard

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Reasons for Skewed Trade deficit

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Internal factors - weak manufacturing sector, which in turn stems from restrictive labour, land and tax laws, poor infrastructure, and inadequate power supplies.

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Lack of entry of Chinese investments in Indian markets; Red Tapism in our export promotion schemes;

External factors - China does not provide access to areas like IT and related services, pharmaceutical products, agriculture bovine meat etc. where India has edge.

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Lack of quality roads around ports, insufficient warehouses, high tariffs and visa restrictions have contributed to a lopsided and lacklustre trade relationship. I

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India’s response

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Short term measures - anti dumping duty, countervailing duties, better connectivity, reciprocal access to markets etc.

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Medium term measures - ease of doing business, Sagarmala, diversification of trade basket (The Commerce Ministries of both the countries have signed a Five-year Development Programme for Economic and Trade Cooperation in September 2014 to lay down a medium term roadmap for promoting balanced and sustainable development of economic and trade relations. )

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‘Invest in India’ Business Forum meeting in Beijing in June 2016 which was attended by a large number of top Chinese bankers and wealth fund managers.

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Other way to help eliminate the trade deficit is to get China's manufacturers to start making goods in India.

the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (SED) themed “Development, Innovation, Cooperation and Mutual benefit” presently has five working groups — infrastructure, energy, environment, new and renewable energy and high technology cooperation.

ex- In August 2016, state-run China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRCC)— the mainland's largest high speed train maker—began operations at its $63.4 million joint venture plant to repair and manufacture railway locomotive engines in Haryana.

Collaborate in RCEP for increasing intra regional trade links.

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OBOR-CHINA’s CHARM OFFENSIVE

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MAGNITUDE OF OBOR

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 Korean scholar Jae Ho Chung, when completed, the OBOR will include 60 countries, with two-thirds of the world’s population, 55% of the global GDP and 75% of global energy reserves.

It will consist of 900 infrastructure projects, valued at about $1.3 trillion.

Much of the funding is expected to come from Chinese banks, financial institutions and special funds.

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OBOR

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The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) is the continental dimension of this geo-strategic realm. It consists of a network of rail routes, overland highways, oil and gas pipelines and other infrastructural projects, stretching from Xian in Central China, through Central Asia and Russia to Venice.

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The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is the maritime dimension and consists of a network of ports and other coastal infrastructure from China’s eastern seaboard stretching across South East Asia, South Asia, the Gulf, East Africa and the Mediterranean, embracing Greece and Venice and ending at Rotterdam.

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The OBOR project also includes a Digital Silk Road and a Silk Road in Cyber Space. There is a proposal for a cooperative Internet plus Plan which would link the OBOR countries to a super-fast broadband network.

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With 58 countries involved along the “One Belt and One Road”, it accounts for the economic aggregation of $US 21 trillion, with share in the global trade 29 per cent.

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Geostrategic dimension 1. Counter India’s strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 2. Long term projects- would help in estb. Dependency 3. Counter Pivot to Asia of USA, 4. Remove the Choke (malacca dilemma) as alternate ports including Gwadar etc to Indian Ocean 5. Energy and Trade security by reducing dependency on Middle east and connectivity through Central Asian Republics Economic dimension 1. Industry overcapacity, increasing labour cost so wants to shift manufacturing outside.

2. Exports for maintaining its own growth, new normal of its economy which is services sector development, 3. balanced regional development as it would lead to development of less developed regions like Xinjiang, Yunnan etc.

4. 16000 km distance reduced to Gulf and Africa so better for trade and economic ties.

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Why should India join the OBOR ?

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Isolationism would not help us and India’s own capabilities are not at par with that of China.

India also gets access to “prospective markets” in areas like CAR, European markets, Africa etc.

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Convergence with projects like “Make in India” & “Sagarmala” can be accelerate with OBOR and India can seek Chinese investments for our infrastructural projects.

India by being a part of the project can also influence the rules and the dimensions of the project.

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Spice route, Project Mausam etc. can be collaborated with OBOR so as to be more effective.

BCIM if becomes of part of OBOR can help in developing of our North East and also effective agent in furthering India’s Act east policy.

Probable impact on India

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Economic - trade diversion, economic manifestation of string of pearls and the economic ‘threat’ of low cost Chinese goods ‘swamping’ the Indian hinterland

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Strategic - Increased military presence in backyard as China would then move it’s security forces to protect its establishments & Security considerations related to China’s presence in the BCIM which traverses India’s sensitive Northeast

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Geopolitical - PoK CPEC de-facto recognition to PoK; railway link in CPEC can mobilise forces;

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What should India do ??

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S. Jaishankar has articulated India’s position in the following - whether we will build our connectivity through “consultative processes” or more “unilateral” decisions.

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Our preference is for the former and the record bears this out quite clearly.

Wherever that option is on the table, as most recently it did in the AIIB, we have responded positively.

But we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices. This should be discouraged, because particularly in the “absence” of an “agreed security architecture” in Asia, it could give rise to “unnecessary competitiveness”.

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Connectivity should diffuse national rivalries, not add to regional tensions.

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India should move ahead in the following manner

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Global level - promote rule based and customary law bound architecture ( see in ref to South China Sea)

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Regional level - connectivity through Chabahar port and Zaranj Delram Highway, INSTC. Act East policy through Kaladan Mutlimodal project, Thailand trilateral highway etc.

Formulate an open, transparent and inclusive security architecture in IoR (PM Modi’s visit to Seychelles, Sri Lanka etc.)

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India can counter China's economic ingression with the help of other regional powers like Japan and South Korea. India can collaborate with Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) in Asia.

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Promote regional economic integration through establishing FTA’s with ASEAN, LAC, African countries, CAR.

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CHINA-PAK-INDIA

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"higher than the mountains, deeper than

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China’s close ties with its ‘all-weather ally’ Pakistan constitutes a serious challenge to India’s security and diplomacy.

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China’s clandestine help to Pakistan in terms of military supply & technology as well as nuclear technology is an open secret.

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China has strategically used its strong ties with Pakistan to box India within the subcontinent and thwart its aspirations to play a larger role in International affairs.

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Recently Chinese tacit support to Pakistan’s nefarious designs were revealed in its stand over two issues(1) NSG membership claim of India (2) Cross-border Terrorism especially Masood Azhar issue.

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WHY CHINA NEEDS PAKISTAN ??

Historical linkage during Cold War era Countering USA’s presence in the region

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Asymmet Afghanistan issue -rical Terrorism issue Balancing India

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Middle East Issue

Reducing Malacca dilemma through ports in Pakistan

China would like India and Pakistan to have a relationship of “managed mistrust”, a version of China’s own relationship with India.

China-Pakistan relations are today even more important to China than they ever have been before. As China seeks to shape the Asia-Pacific, Pakistan’s utility to her increases.

“Now Pakistan is a central part of China’s transition from a regional power to a global one”.

Pakistan is at the heart of the network of One-Belt-One Road, China’s strategic Marshall Plan; Karachi and Gwadar are critical for China’s take-off as a naval power; and, ISI is vital to Chinese intelligence on jihadis and to China’s initiatives in the Islamic world.

For Pakistan, China is the key to her future and only country which might support its misadventures.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

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NSG is a 48 member grouping that was formed with the aim of ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology.

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NSG was established in the wake of India's Pokharan tests in 1974.

NSG is not an international treaty.

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The guidelines were evolved in 2001 at Aspen for admitting new members to the organisation. Amongst them, membership of NPT is only a guideline, a consideration, and not a mandatory requirement.

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India’s nuclear doctrine - NFUl; Non use against non nuke countries + Voluntary moratorium on further testing.

It was civil nuclear deal with US, concluded in 2008, that paved the way for India’s application as a member of NSG. India’s commitment to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes and its impeccable non proliferation record along with its ratification of an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) add to India’s credentials for NSG membership.

India also changed its export laws and now in line with the guidelines of NSG.

India's track-record in observing the provisions of NPT and NSG while not being a member of either body is impeccable.

If NSG was able to grant waiver to India in 2008 on the basis of its past performance, it should have no objection to admitting it as a member this time.

BENEFITS

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Access to technology for a range of uses from medicine to building nuclear power plants for India

India committed to reducing dependence on fossil fuels and ensuring that 40% of its energy is sourced from renewable and clean sources,

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Membership of NSG will provide greater certainty and legal foundation to India's nuclear regime.

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India would like to move into the category of international nuclear commerce rulecreating nations rather than stay in the ranks of rule-adhering nations.

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India can commercialize the production of nuclear power equipment. This in turn will boost innovation and high tech manufacturing in India

China’s arguments A

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Statements maintaining that no single country waiver should be granted to India.

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It stated that India, in any case, is not eligible to become a member of NSG as it is not a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), adherence to which is necessary for the entry.

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China has also averred that for non-NPT members some definite criteria should be evolved rather than granting country specific waivers.

would disturb the nuclear-arms balance in South Asia as India will engage in a massive nuclear weaponisation programme.

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Beijing stated that Pakistan too has similar credentials to join the NSG .Chinese diplomats insist that NSG entry to be norm-based — in other words, whatever rules govern Indian entry should apply to others too

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Arguments against Chinese stand

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Pakistan - AQ Khan network; Chinese help in Pac nuclearisation; not even separated civilian and military reactors; China’s own record is dubious and itself lacks credential and hence from 2004 it has not been able to gain membership to MTCR.

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India maintains that rather than evolving criteria, its performance should be the basis on which the decision on its application should be taken.

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M Geopolitics in NSG entry A Y T I D A A

Indian policy shiftR??

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During the Cold War, India had been critical of these regimes — condemning them as mechanism to deny technology to developing countries In the run up to the 2008 waiver, India began to modify.

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Agreeing to formally join the NSG and the other export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement reflects a policy shift by the Indian government.

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India had a fundamental position that our objective is disarmament and not merely non-proliferation.

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Its position and demonstrate its credentials as a responsible nuclear weapon state.

Analysing Chinese posture !!

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Some believe that China is just posturing, taking a hard stance against India, only to sacrifice its position later in the hope of muting global opposition to its moves in the South China Sea.

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There is also hope that China may trade-off its opposition in return for its own membership into the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR).

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China has a more aggressive outward posture and it is seeking ambition that it will not allow the US to write the rules of the international order according to its wishes.

Pakistan’s application to join the NSG, made just days after India’s request, was clearly part of a coordinated strategy with China to block India’s admittance.

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China is an Asian regional power, aspiring to global primacy, and it is not about to give India, a regional state with some geoeconomics and military heft, a leg up.

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Chinese statements that India’s entry into the NSG would upset the balance in South Asia also revealed Beijing’s preference to keep India hyphenated with Pakistan and locked into regional frameworks.

Way Forward A R H S I M A Y T I D A A

China - NSG-specific dialogue mechanism has already been held in New Delhi in September 2016. At the meeting, Beijing supported a “two-step approach” for a non-discriminatory formula applicable to all non-NPT states – the implication being that the group should not consider India’s application on its merits. The first step would be to explore and reach agreement on a non-discriminatory formula applicable to all the non-NPT states and to proceed to take up country- specific membership issues at the second stage.

To convince many friendly states who had legitimate concerns about NPT and the nonproliferation regime, concerns that were not motivated by any balance of power considerations (unlike China’s opposition).

India had to appear motivated so that well-wishers press India’s case with other NSG members and smoothen the way for the application, but now should take a more low profile concerted effort so that consensus can emerge.

India should also ask its existing partners to expand the Malabar naval exercise to include all other countries in the Asia-Pacific that are worried about China.

Finally, India should restart the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue that was suspended because of China’s objections (and Australian reticence) but seek, once again, to include others such as Vietnam, Philippines and even Indonesia.

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INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS in the era of Geopolitical Transitions

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CHI-USA

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China has grown in it’s comp nat power (eco, military etc.) & hence challenges USA’s hegemony; China would not like to play with rules set by USA (see the NSG case); although it claims it’s rise as peaceful but instances show it is willing to flex muscle (S China sea), undertake asymmetrical balancing (agns US in As-Pf), even confront if need be.

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Chinese rise strain the relations( Ind & USA) and stress the existing security arrangements (have undermined the ability of ARF, ADMM plus, EAM) , compel a modernisation of military forces and doctrines, and undermine the current regional institutions ( PCA’s verdict on S China Sea)

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HENCE USA is undertaking

2012- US’s Asia Pivot- rebalancing US military weight to Asia(60%) + strengthen trad alliances + forge new partnerships (India is made linchpin of this new strategy )

Indian Dilemma A R H S I M A Y T I D A A India is faced with more complex dilemmas because

Our celebrated tradition of Non Alignment (see the debate when we signed the LEMOA)

self image of becoming natural leader in region + having a multi polar order and hence would not accept SIno Centric Asian Order.

India needs to balance Chinese rise

but not be sucked into US-Chi rivalry; not loose strategic autonomy;

not starting any confrontation with China;

India’s US relationship to balance China is on one hand inevitable but this put strains in our relationship with Russia.

India on S.China Sea- balancing act

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India's lately has been vocal about the need to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, even raising pointed concerns over the growing state of insecurity in the region.

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New Delhi, however, remains acutely conscious of its official position of neither being party to the disputes nor taking sides.

Regardless of the magnitude of nautical developments in the region, India's security establishment fears that the perception of abandonment of its neutrality might be construed as strategic support for the United States—still the principal source of resistance to Chinese unilateralism in the South China Sea, but whose deterrence strategy, Indian analysts suspect, could spark an intense reaction from Beijing.

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Indian strategists believe that, unless sustained pressure is brought to bear upon China, a negotiated solution to the dispute is unattainable.

In at least three ASEAN-centric forums, Indian leaders have emphasised the need for freedom of navigation, the right to passage and overflight, and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

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In November 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a reference to the South China Sea conflict in two successive events—at the thirteenth ASEAN-India summit and during a public lecture in Singapore—suggesting the need for a mechanism that could enhance cooperation in maritime security, counter piracy, and humanitarian and disaster relief.

India also was widely reported to have taken this issue during the third meeting of the India-Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation in New Delhi.

Indian Options A R H S I M A Y T I D A A

India needs to undertake both internal( increase internal strength) and external balancing ( make strong insts, partnerships )

India at the same time has to deepen cooperation with China because we cannot afford to have a two front rivalry.

India thus needs to 3C’s

Cooperate with China wherever possible (organisations, SCO, ASEAN, bilaterally) Compete economically wherever we can (Africa, LAC, CAR’s etc.)

Contain and Balance China wherever necessary (Act East Asia, Ind-USA statement on Asia Pacific; SP with Japan, Vietnam (oil exploration in S.C. Sea), Indonesia, Aust, visit to Mongolia, Partnership with S Korea)