Mirrors. Rawabi, Nation-Building and Ambiguity by AA School

Lior Ramon

Mirrors Nation-Building and the Ambiguities of Affordable Housing

First inhabited in 2015 and still under development, Rawabi is the first planned city of modern Palestine. The city was established as a national project for affordable housing in the West Bank and is intended to increase the supply of apartments for the Palestinian middle class. In accordance with the Palastinan Authority’s (PA) policy, the city was established in a public-private partnership between the PA and Bayti – a real estate company co-owned and managed by the Palestinian entrepreneur and Rawabi’s founder Bashar Masri, with a financial backing from Qatar. The city is built as a uniform compound of apartment buildings, organized around a commercial, cultural and entertainment centre, which frames and supports the new Palestinian middle-class lifestyle and ideology. Its vision is to be an “oasis of normality” in the West Bank, and to foster values of modernity, and progress; a cosmopolitan city that aligns with the universal neoliberal economy and culture. It aims to set precedent and lay a path for future similar cities to arise. As a housing project that is incorporated in the Palestinian nation-building efforts, the story of Rawabibi reveals a plausible future, or a vision of Palestine. Architecture in the Israeli-Palestinian domain, by virtue of the intricate political reality, is interwoven with a national and ideological narrative that mould it into a political identity. Rawabi, is a nation-building governmental policy, an agency for social and cultural structuring, and an object that resonates local symbols. Through the perspective of each of these objectives, Rawabi’s political identity is ambiguous and contradictory. This paper attempts to expose the ideological, social, and symbolic paradoxes embodied in Rawabi through analysing the city as a policy and as an object, and in comparison to Israeli public housing projects.

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Opposite Page: Figure 1: Lambert, Léopold. “Rawabi from the Village of Ajul”. 2017. The Funambulist. https:// thefunambulist.net/ editorials/palestine-report-part-4-rawabi-architectural-prophecy-unequal-palestinian-state.

i. The New Middle Class

was protected and endorsed by the local government.

The Oslo Accords of the mid-1990s led to a fundamental change in the political and social system in the West Bank. A series of agreements between the Israeli Rabin’s government and the PLO led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from cities in the West Bank and Gaza, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA): a temporary body for self-government, to perform civilian functions in its territory. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were divided into an archipelago of three types of territories: areas under Palestinian administration and security (“Area A”), areas where the Palestinian Council has civilian control, but security control remains in the hands of the State of Israel (“Area B”), and areas under Israeli administration and security (“Area C”). The interim Palestinian government, headed by Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, has been set for an interim period of about 5 years, during which the final details of the peace agreement with Israel were meant to be settled and finalized. However, Rabin’s assassination, change of Israeli governments, public criticism, and acts of violence, led to a stagnation of the peace process. More than twenty-five years later, the “temporary” Palestinian Authority still exists, and the “final issues” remain unresolved.

1. Taraki, Lisa. 2008. “Urban Modernity On The Periphery”. Social Text 26 (2): 61-81 2. Ibid

The establishment of the PA had far-reaching implications for the social and urban systems in the PA. At the eve of the Oslo accords, the Palestinian urban space was in crisis, a combined result of “the first intifada, the Gulf War and its extended curfews, and a general state of neglect and breakdown of civic life”1. However, soon after the departure of the Israeli presence, the landscape began to transform. In Ramallah, the de facto capital of Palestine, the establishment of the PA political institutions and international aid organizations spawned an economic prosperity propped by the return of Diaspora elites and the internal migration in the west bank to the city. The economic relief, as well the optimism and euphoria from the peace agreements led to a construction boom where “Virtually every empty plot of land within the areas allowed Palestinian building in accordance with the land-use regulations put in place after Oslo has been engulfed in multistorey apartment buildings, independent villas, and one gated community”.2 The residents reoccupied the city with a thirst for consumerism and urban pleasures, opening a market for new Restaurants, café’s, hotels , luxury gyms, swimming pools and night life discos. After years of disciplined austerity and self-sacrifice imposed by the Palestinian leadership prior the agreement, a new liberal lifestyle swept Ramallah and importantly

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The 2000s’ were turbulent years which reshaped once again the politics of the PA. The failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, the second intifada that followed, Operation Defensive Shield, and lastly the Israeli disengagement from Gaza marked the collapse of the peace negotiations, and a set a trajectory for regression in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Internally, the death of Yasser Arafat, the historic leader of the Palestinian people from 1967, led to a leadership crisis and to a growing tension between the Fatah and Hamas. This ultimately resulting in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, and gavi rise to a political, social and territorial rift of Palestine.

3. Taraki (2008) p. 61-81 4. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization affiliated with the UN which provides long-term loans to Third World countries. 5. Rabie, Kareem. “Palestine Is Throwing a Party and the Whole World Is Invited: Capital and State Building in the West Bank”. Durham: N.C., 2021: p. 3 6. Rabie (2021) p. 17 7. Anani, Yazid. “Pacification By Cappuccino.” Essay. In Dialectic II: Architecture between Boom and Bust. The School of Architecture University of Utah, 2015. 8. Taraki (2008). The name Iskan, ‫ السكان‬in its meaning of a specific housing typology resembles in its Semitic root and structure to the hebrew word with a similar meaning: Shikun, ‫שיכון‬

In 2007, in the midst of the struggle and the split between Fatah and Hamas, former IMF4 official Salam Fayyad was appointed the minister of finance and later that year the PA prime minister. Within the framework of state building, Fayyad marked a new era of market-centric rhetoric and practice in the West bank.5 His ideology, later dubbed as ‘Fayyadism’, points that for Palestine to emerge as a functioning and free state, it must build an independent economy on which to base itself. Therefore, during his term “Fayyad focused on calling in capital and encouraging investment and reform at the national scale. He established an economic agenda based on the need for profit and growth and worked toward a national economy that would encourage stability, investment, and ultimately the state”6. Fayyadism was clearly manifested in the transformation of the Palestinian cities. Yazid Anani notes: “Fayyad’s economic plan has operated based on the ongoing flux of donor aid money for some five years. It has involved not only a transformation of urban infrastructures, but also the construction of a new way of life and urban persona. Ramallah has become the ‘liberal city,’ the great centre of consumption, tourism and pleasure, cafes, shopping malls, and cultural institutions. All this has induced changes in the urban experience and facilitated the absorption of vast fiscal surpluses through consumerism”.7 Unlike the unplanned, locally funded construction that characterized the 90’s post-Oslo building boom, developments past the Millennium follow recognized global models of middle-class residential neighbourhoods of high-rise apartment buildings, known as Iskan8, built by public-private and international companies with large investment from the gulf.9 Through its culture and new architecture, Ramallah pursue the image of an “oasis of normality” within occu-

9. Anani (2015)

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pied Palestine. As a “vibrant, liberal and modern” city, Ramallah’s middle-class citizens wish to join the trans-Arab middle-class culture club and align with their class-equivalents in the “global” Arab cities such as Dubai, Cairo, Beirut or Amman. Under this political, cultural, and urban settings, rose the largest and most ambitious housing project in the history of modern Palestine.

ii. The First Planned Palestinian City Rawabi, the first planned Palestinian city, is an urban scale housing project in the West Bank, aiming to provide affordable housing for the new Palestinian middle class. The city’s’ municipal boundaries, encompass 6,300,000 sqm, with the built-up areas comprise 850,000 sqm, housing 22 neighbourhoods, with a commercial centre and public facilities. The masterplan comprises 6,000 housing units for an estimated future population of 40,000 people. Located within Area A, on the hilltops between the Palestinian village of Attara and the Israeli settlement of Ateret, 9 km northwest of Ramallah, and 20 km north to Jerusalem. After formally approved by the PA Higher Planning Council, construction took off in 2009, and 6 years later in 2015, buyers officially started moving in. As of this time, the first two neighbourhoods are sold out and fully occupied, and new residents are currently moving into the third one,10 as Rawabi continues to expand vigorously.

10. According to Rawabi’s official website: “Live in Rawabi.” Rawabi. https://www.rawabi.ps/ en/live-in-rawabi. 11. Palestinian Authority, “Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)”, United Nations. 2007. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206297/. 12. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) is Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund. 13. The Masri family is one of the largest employers in the West Bank, and one of the biggest business owners in Nablus.

Rawabi is a product of a coalition of capitalists, multiple governments, and NGOs. As outlined in the 2007 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)11, “Affordable Housing” in the west bank is implemented primarily by the private sector, while the PA commits to financially support the off-site infrastructure and public services. In correspondence to the PRDP Rawabi comprise a public-private partnership between the PA and Bayti Real Estate Investment Company, Rawabi’s owner and sole developer. Bayti is jointly owned by Qatari Diar, property investment company controlled by QIA12 and Massar international, a holding company owned and ran by the Palestinian entrepreneur and the founder of Rawabi Bashar Masri. Masri is a renown Palestinian born multimillionaire businessman, a member of the Nablus’ elite family,13 who returned to Palestine from America following the establishment of the PA. As the visioner and founder of Rawabi, Masri manages and oversees every aspect of the project, from finance, design, construction, and marketing. And although Rawabi is a shared effort of many, with no

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Opposite Page: Figure 2: A Rendered aerial view of Rawabi, 2009. From: Rawabi home, Summer Edition, 2009. https:// www.rawabi.ps/downloads/1525785601.pdf

doubt Masri is a principal driving force to the establishment of the city through his power, connections, management, and politics. If Rawabi is a reflection of Masri’s persona, then it is the ultimate capitalistic model to aspire to: of economic success, internationality, and social mobility. The social identity of the Middle class is defined by its aspiration, however under the Palestinian context of Israeli occupation, this aspiration expands from categories of capital and cultural norms to a more rudimentary desire for stability and normalcy. Normalcy strongly attracts many Palestinians, and in Rawabi’s case, it is translated into a framework that interwind class aspiration, consumerism, and property.14 Rawabi fosters a global ethos of the urban middle class that entails the elaboration of modern and western concepts of domesticity by social constructs of self, family, and community. These ideas are given shape in the architecture of the city and its self-image.

14. Rabie (2021): p. 147 15. Goadby and Doukhan (1935) from Mahrok (1995). 16. Mahrok, Abdel Rahman. “Physical Planning System and the Physical Spatial Structure of the Human Settlement. 1995. p. 61 17. For further reading about the history of Palestinian urban planning see: Mahrok (1995) 18. (Cohen, 2002; Pete, 2005), from Allweil (2018) 19. Allweil, Yael. “Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860-2011”. Routledge, 2018. Chapter 7

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Historically, the Palestinian urban space is unplanned, and based on a local organization of vernacular construction, corresponding to both regional urban and rural typologies. Before the colonial times, town planning law did not yet exist in Palestine.15 Although the physical planning system in Ottoman Palestine worked within a general system of Ottoman administration, there was no coherent guidelines for the urban and architectural forms of Palestinian settlements. During the British mandate, “for the first time, a codified and comprehensive system for the control of settlement development and growth was established”.16 However, in the Palestinian case, the British planning system focused merely on negative development controls. A similar lack of clarity continued to exist in the West Bank under Jordanian rule until 1967.17 Under the Israeli authority, the Palestinian urban space remained unplanned, though for other reasons. Israel’s War of Independence and the Palestinian Nakbah, resulted with the Israeli control of most of mandatory Palestine, and the displacement of about half of Palestine’s Arab population. That refers not only to Palestinian refugees who were exiled to neighbouring territories, but also internally displaced Palestinian families who remained in what to become the Israeli state.18 After the war, the State of Israel aspired to concentrate the remaining Arab-Palestinian population in as few settlements as possible, both to claim as much absentee land as possible and to facilitate control.19 Over the years, due to the natural growth of the population, Israeli restrictions on the expansion of Arab settlements, and the Palestinians’ desire to keep their sons in the village under the community framework, there has been a rapid process of

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Opposite Page: Figure 3: Nablus Urban space, West Bank From: Arafat, Naseer. The Electronic Intifada. 2013 https://electronicintifada. net

20. Roy, Arpan. “Reimagining Resilience.” City 20, no. 3 (2016): 368–88. 21. Prior to the establishment of Rawabi there were Middle-Class housing developments with a similar character in the Palestinian territories, but not in that scale. 22. Samach is a Jewish American Architect based in New York, the co-founder of SAMACH+SEO and previously a Design Principal at AECOM 23. AECOM is an American multinational design and engineering firm, and one of America’s largest companies. 24. Rabie (2021) p. 139 25. Ibid p. 60 26. Following Palestinian critiques Bayti stopped presenting Modi’in as an inspiration to Rawabi’s design and minimized their references to Safdie on their Website. (Rabie, 2021). In a conversation with Masri, he rejected Rawabi’s direct connection to Modi’in, emphasizing the project’s diverse international sources of inspiration. 27. Although Samach claims that Israeli-Palestinian Politics didn’t impact Rawabi’s design he is nonetheless quoted that it was important for the design “not to look like a settlement“. (Rabie, 2021) 28. Rawabi’s officail website is well designed, informative, and importantly available in full in English - a testament to the international orientation of this project.

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densification in the Palestinian urban space. While the Israeli government turns a blind eye to the violations of planning regulations, the Palestinian settlements (both historical and modern) expanded unrestrictedly, with illegal building additions and the exploitation of any land reserve. Hence, Palestinian urban and architectural form is more of a modern vernacular, utilitarian architecture; an overgrown version of the Arab village, determined by unplanned, subcultural forces.20 From a global perspective, Rawabi as an architectural object resembles any contemporary commercial housing project, designed according to ‘modern’ values of comfort and privacy. However, in the Palestinian urban context, Rawabi sets a historical precedent.21 Rawabi’s architectural vision was to establish a “new” urban environment for Palestine. In a conversation with Kareem Rabie, Raphael (Raffie) Samach22 of the New York firm AECOM23 the main planner of the city Said: There are two “old ways of life”: the village life that no one wants to return to and the current urban life that needs to be fixed. “Ramallah has no urbanism, Ramallah is chaos,” there is no place to walk, to park, to engage in “the urban experience.” And this kind of “chaos” is a “universal problem.” “What is needed is a move from the street life that is not urbanism” to a “flowing” kind of urbanism in the new town.24 Samach figured that Palestinians would need a “community-driven” plan. He recognized the sociological and cultural challenge involved in introducing new ‘modern’ architectural forms into the Palestinian space and conducted fieldwork to tailor aspects of the design to the needs of the target audience.25 Rawabi’s design team is nourished by many consultants and has been inspired by various projects around the world, the Middle East, and without doubt Israel. An important mention is the renown international architect Moshe Safdie, the planner of the city of Modi’in and the Mamilla neighbourhood in Jerusalem, projects whose inspiration is evident in Rawabi.26 Yet despite the comparisons, political associations and criticism of Rawabi’s architectural space, the planning ideology, at least for Samach, purports to dissociate with Israeli-Palestinian politics, and operate in global, apolitical terms.27 The website of Rawabi28 gives an insight to the city’s masterplan. The city is designed as a uniform complex and organized in a concentric setting around the commercial centre located at the top of the hill. The residential buildings are

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Opposite Page: Figure 4: Lambert, Léopold. 2017. The Funambulist. https://thefunambulist. net/editorials/palestine-report-part-4-rawabi-architectural-prophecy-unequal-palestinian-state.

radially extended from the centre along the topographic lines of the lot. The city’s commercial Centre branded ‘Q Center’ is the physical and ideological heart of the city. As described on the website: “Q Center combines the best of all worlds in a hip new urban core. A perfectly balanced blend of upscale residential housing, office space, shops, restaurants, cultural attractions and entertainment”. The centre hosts various businesses such as Rawabi Tech Hub, “Modern office buildings; ... from which businesses can engage with the global economy”; A luxury shopping centre, “introducing more than 100 international brands” such as ARMANI, CALVIN KLEIN, LEVIS, etc.; Casual and Fine Dining, with a French café and Jordanian Smoothies; Family Entertainment Indoor Facility; and yet to be built a 7-Screen Movie Theatre, Convention Centre and Luxury Hotel and Spa. In addition to the centre, convenience stores such as mini marts, pharmacies and dry cleaners will be available in each neighbourhood, providing the residents with convenient access to basic amenities. From the urban core, a wide pedestrian promenade leads to the surrounding neighborhoods. The residential area of the city is divided to 22 apartment building neighbourhoods, and a separated one for luxury villas. The apartment buildings are of various housing typologies, all stand-alone and similar in style. Each building is 7-9 stories high with 2-3 apartments per floor; The size of the apartments ranges from 60 sqm one bedroom apartment to 400 sqm 4 rooms for a large family. The apartments are based on a modern global ‘Western’ model, which includes a master bedroom for parents with private toilets, separated children’s rooms, and an open kitchen. The general layouts of the apartments are quite generic, but in some cases one can find traces for of specific local requirements. For example, an extensive space for hosting, and the separation of the common space into two living rooms, an official one for guests and a more casual one for every-day family use with a TV.

29. Funded by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), Rawabi’s mosque is one of the largest in the West Bank. Covering up to 8,400 m2, the mosque has five floors, and can accommodate up to 3,000 worshippers.

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The master plan designates a number of areas for public space, services and services. To the west of the centre, one can find a medical clinic and a designated education zone, which includes a private elementary school and high schools. Additional public institutions and services such as a mosque29 and a church will be scattered in different areas around of the city. Green areas and public recreation zones are planned to be integrated into the urban fabric both on a neighbourhood scale and on an urban scale. Each neighbourhood is guaranteed a local playground, green balconies, wide sidewalks and outdoor walking trails and pocket parks. On the urban scale, large public park strips are being prepared

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Opposite Page: Figure 4: Two types of apartments for sale in Rawabi. From: Correspondence with Senior architect Shifa Salah

on the outskirts of the city, and a leisure centre with a neoclassical amphitheatre. Whether there is or isn’t a discrepancy between Rawabi’s ambitious masterplan as it is branded, and its reality (present or future), there is no doubt the city is formulated to fulfil itself as a neo-liberal dream, a paradise for the middle class. Nevertheless, one cannot seem to notice that the affluent descriptions of culture of comfort, abundance, consumerism, and luxury, cast a shadow over an essential and primary aspect of the city - affordability.

iii. For-Profit with no profit The question of affordability in Rawabi brings to light the juxtaposition of value systems in which the project operates - social, commercial, and national. Rawabi acts as an agency for all three, and its intricate identity unfolds the relationship between public, private, and state. In a short interview I conducted with Masri,30 I asked him for his motivation for the construction of Rawabi, or in other words what comes first: Profit, or ideological, national agenda. Masri answered emphatically: “the ideology”. In fact, “the project is not intended to make profit”. “If that’s the case”, I asked, “then what determines the prices of the houses?” Masri answered, “It is not philanthropic either, we are trying to cover our costs”. Simply, in economic terms, “a return of 2 billion dollars over 20 years is not profit”. He explained that the apartments prices are in relation to the market, and in fact the houses alone are profitable, though the huge expenses on the infrastructure and services are the ones which will take time to cover. “Palestine is in a state building process”, Masri stressed, and Rawabi is built to create a precedent for an “advanced city” and lay a path for future investors to build other “Rawabi’s”.

30. The interview with Bashar Masri was conducted by phone, on November 5, 2021 31. Perman, Stacy. “A Shining City on a Hill - Intelligent Cities” 2011, http://www.time.com/time/ specials/packages/article 32. Rabie (2021) p. 106

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Rawabi is considered the largest private sector investment is Palestine’s history,31 with an ongoing cost of 1.4 billion USD. Most of this investment, comes from Qatar, through Bayti co-owner company Qatari Diar. Qatar is providing this funding as part of a larger policy of supporting Palestine through financial aid, through which it can assert its regional influence. Essentially the PA, through Rawabi, separates foreign aid from the logic of humanitarian development and redirects it to support privatization in development aid.32

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Another essential source of Rawabi financing is home mortgages. In the West Bank, the PA along with pro-privatizations funds and NGOS are working to es-

From: Weiken, Oliver. 2014. EPA/Corbis https:// time.com/4018306/rawabi-bashar-masri/

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Figure 5: Bashar Masri, with Rawabi in the backdrop.

33. Rabie (2021) Chapter 5 34. Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) is the Palestinian sovereign wealth fund. It is an independent investment company established in 2003, as part of a transfer of assets previously managed by the Palestinian Authority. 35. For For further information see: U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Foreign Assistance: U.S. Programs Involving the Palestine Investment Fund.” United States Government Accountability Office. 2013 https:// www.gao.gov/products/gao-13537. 36. Founded in 1938 during the Great Depression, The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), commonly known as Fanny Mae, is a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise that by expanding the secondary mortgage market, makes mortgages available to low and middle-income borrowers. 37. Al-Reehan residential neighbourhood is an affordable housing project near Ramallah, owned and ran by the PIF’s national program. According to plans, the project will be comprised of 2,000 housing units for 10,000 Palestinians. 38. Segel, Agarawal, Brandt, Kuhagen, and Reithinger. “Rawabi.” HBS Case Collection No. 9-214008. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing. 2014 39. McMullen (2015). See footnote 42 40. The interview with Shifa Salah was conducted in a Zoom meeting, on November 4, 2021. 41. ‘Rent to Buy’ policy offers the collection of rent fees for the duration of 2 years as a 15% down payment, to become applicable for a mortgage loan.

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tablish a lending and debt market that will set the foundation for a finance sector in Palestine. Due to land scarcity and expense, a mortgage financing system will supposedly drive down immediate development costs and stimulate the housing sector.33 The Affordable Mortgage and Loan Program (AMAL) is a 500 USD million Palestinian non-bank housing finance company that group local and international development agencies such as the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF)34 U.S.-backed non-profit Middle East Investment Initiative (MEII), the Overseas Private Investment Corp (OPIC), and several banks.35 AMAL’s is a Fannie Mae-style36 institution established as part of PIF’s larger housing policy, and its mission is to provide comfortable mortgages for low and medium-income borrowers in the West Bank. Through the provision of loans to large-scale housing developments, starting with Rawabi and Al-Reehan,37 AMAL aims to reach 60 percent of households in need. According to PIF and AMAL only 10% of households in the West Bank can currently afford a home within the existing supply of apartments. A Harvard Business School study on Rawabi and West Bank housing, states that an average mortgage on a 110,000$ apartment, entails a 16,500$ down payment and monthly payments of 1,028$ on a 10-year loan, and 638$ for 20 years.38 Corresponding to the PIF’s prospect, under AMAL terms such apartment would be available for about 20% of the population, more than double than current numbers. In Rawabi, apartments prices range from $70,000 to $180,000 with an average of 95,000$.39 According to the graph, that makes Rawabi available to close to 30% of the population. Shifa Salah, a senior architect of Rawabi, has described to me the forms of affordability in Rawabi since its inception.40 Initially, Rawabi’s offered apartments that are lower by 25% from the prices of Ramallah. Over time, the prices have been compared to the market price of Ramallah, and the modes affordability were limited to modes of payment. Namely, reliance on AMAL’s mortgage system, or special payment methods such as “Rent to Buy”.41 Salah concluded: “We are trying to be affordable. People are saying that Rawabi is expensive, for luxury, very Elite. Okay, we like this reputation but it’s not very true, because we have plans [available that ranges] from middle income to high income.” She added, “It’s not for low income actually because low income can’t afford apartments like that. I mean they can live in their villages, maybe make savings”.

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Opposite Page: Figure 6: U.N. Habitat/ PIF presentation on affordability, apartment cost, and financing. From: un-Habitat, in Rabie (2021) p.100

Salah’s remark unfolds the ambiguity and flexibility of the concept of affordability. Affordable is for those who can afford it. Rawabi as a city and a policy indeed expands the supply of apartments and produces mechanisms that broaden the group of potential buyers, but those remain within a limited socio-economic framework.

and efficient housing solution for the Jewish growing population; and the Ideological compatibility between Modernism and Zionism. Modernism became the equitable domestic agency through which Zionism anchored its ideological foundations among the Jewish population; That is - the formation of a New Jewry of an egalitarian society, through progress and “land redemption”. According to Homi Bhbha, “Identification is a process of identifying with and through another object, an object of otherness”.44 Following that notion, the New Jewry and its Modern architecture can be read as a rejection of the Jewish Diaspora, of the Bourgeoisie and of the Orient. The latter, stands out in the case of the conquest of Lod.

In a documentary by the BBC,42 Masri confirms this argument. “This project is about enhancing a genuine long lasting, self-depended middle-income people. Young couple making a little bit higher than minimum wage should be able to afford this [i.e an apartment].” Later he withdraws: “Low-income homes should be supported by the government also... Unfortunately, we haven’t gotten any financial support from the government.”

During 48’ war, some 600,000 Palestinians were displaced from their homes. In dealing with these abandoned properties, the Israeli authorities have adopted two parallel strategies to strengthen their hold on the new conquered territories: Extensive demolition; and repopulation of houses with Jewish immigrants. In both cases, Palestinian refugees were denied the ability to return to claim their homes.45

This point concerns precisely the malfunction of the Palestinian Authority’s private-public affordable housing policy. Bashar Masri, is a man of vision, which invests his name and fortune in a project that is not profitable per se; Yet, to paraphrase his own words, he is not a philanthropist. Masri, as well as economic institutions such as AMAL and PIF represent an ideology that promote Palestinian national interests, provided however, that they align with the grand scheme of neoliberal economy.

42. McMullen, Jane. “The Billion Dollar Gamble.” BBC’s Our World, February 7. 2015 http:// www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/ b052qxwv. 43. For further reading see: Miller, Elhanan. “In Rawabi, the Brand-New Palestinian City, Both Sides Win.” The Times of Israel, February 19, 2014. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ in-rawabi-the-brand-new-palestinian-city-both-sides-win/.

It is a self-feeding cycle of interests - the PA wants to prove its potency, but due to its limited political and economic capacity, it brings in independent external capital; Developers depend on funds and banks, through the buyers’ mortgages; The funds count on interest rates and create opportunities for market expansion, which are formulated into policies later to be approved and affirmed in law by the PA. International NGOs, Qatar, USA, and Israel, help in keeping this cycle running, as advocators for progress and social stability. Ostensibly it is a “Win-Win” mechanism which benefits all parties involved. It even manages in its way to mediate conflicting political interests.43 However, as far as the socio-political groups in the periphery of this system are concerned, it’s a “Lose”. Like any cycle, those who find themselves in the margins of common interests are pushed out by the centrifugal force of the spin.

iv. The Modern Way The appropriation of modernism by the Zionist and early Israeli architects is traditionally attributed to two main factors: the desperate need for a rapid

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44. Rutherford, Jonathan. “The Third Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha.” In: Ders. (Hg): Identity: Community, Culture, Difference. ldentlty London: Lawrence and Wishart, 207-221. 1990. 45. Allweil (2018) p. 173 46. See: Yacobi, Haim. “The Architecture of Ethnic Logic: Exploring the Meaning of the Built Environment in the ‘Mixed’ City of Lod - Israel.” Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography 84, no. 3 &amp; 4 (2002): 171–87. https://doi. org/10.1111/1468-0467.00122.

Lod (Lydda), an ancient city and a historical Palestinian urban hub, was conquered in July 1948.46 Consequently, 95% of the city’s residents fled or deported. The remaining residents, about 1000 people, were concentrated in the “Sakhna” or the “ghetto” , i.e. Lod’s old city neighbourhood. In accordance with the state’s strategy, all Lod’s Arab properties were listed under the Trustee of Absentee’s Property and the Development Authorities, to be reconfigured and rented out cheaply to Jewish immigrants. Soon, Lod’s demographics was replaced by a wide range of Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Balkans, Iraq, and North Africa, with a small Arab minority. However, vis a vis the National resettlement project, a phenomenon of illegal squatting began in the Palestinian “ghetto”. Immigrant Jews from Arab countries, who were fed up with the harsh living conditions of the immigrant camps in the outskirts of the country, invaded and settled in the abandoned Sakhna’s houses. The neighbourhood which the Jews invaded is the ancient part of the city; vernacular clusters of houses of diverse sizes, connected by narrow alleys. It was the antithesis to modern urban space, both in its physical and bureaucratic characteristics. It had no modern infrastructure for electricity, water and sewage, and its residences were outside the jurisdiction of the authorities. However, precisely this “non-Zionist” urban settings were the bed of a creation of a unique phenomenon. The Sakhana has become an Arab-cross-religious hybrid ex-territory, with social constructs of solidary.47

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For the Israeli authorities, the Sakhna undermined the hegemonic conceptions of the Eurocentric Zionism. The Sakhna became a threat not only due to the lack of administrative control, but also because it emphasized the contradiction between Jewish nationalism and Arab-Jewish ethnicity. The Arab-Jews have blurred the perception of the self in relation to the Arabic-Palestinian otherness. Criticism of the Sakhna illustrate the fears of Zionist hegemony, as well as the racist and orientalist discourse against the Arabic-countries Jews. Journalist and politician Yosef Galili wrote:48 “When you walk around the Sakhna ghetto and see the degenerate life of its dwellers and their dark basements, without minimal sanitary conditions (…) you have a feeling that nothing has changed in the lives of these people who were transferred from the infamous dark ghettos of Morocco. The same social conditions in which the lumpenproletariat, which is the social bacterium, breeds, from which black forces and fascism feed in our country”

47. See: Nurieli, Beni, “Foreigners in the National Area: The Arab Jews in the Lod Ghetto 1950-1959” Issue 26, Theory and Criticism, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2005. And: Yaacobi, Haim. “The Third Place: Architecture, Nationality and The Post-colonial Perspetive” Issue 30, Theory and Criticism, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2007. 48. Galili, Yosef. Al Hamishmar Newspaper, 1954. From Nurieli (2005) 49. For further reading see: Eyal, Gil. “Between East to West: The Discourse on the Arab Village.” Essay. In Coloniality and the Postcolonial Condition Implications for Israeli Society. Yerushalayim: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2004

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The evacuation of Lod’s Arab space, and of the Sakhna in particular, became an urgent objective for the authorities. In the mid 50’s, Lod has aligned itself with Israeli urban standards, according to a modernist master plan by architect Michael Bar; The city underwent a fundamental transformation with an intensive demolition of the Arab fabric and the construction of modernist social housing blocks in its place. By 1959, all Jewish residents of the Sakhna had been gradually evacuated to the new national housing estates, and with government directive, every evacuated Palestinian house was immediately demolished. The story of Lod’s Sakhna, sheds light on the Israeli national urban strategy of using social housing as an instrument for educating multicultural immigrants for a singular “modern lifestyle”. Israel introduced to its citizens a new urban order of modern special and cultural homogeneity, that fed itself with colonialist conceptions of an advanced, hygienic, and orderly West, as opposed to a backward, dirty, and chaotic East.49 Rawabi is organized around the idea of introducing modernity to the Palestinian people through new forms of urbanity. This idea is of course a result of the wider Palestinian new middle-class ethos, which wishes to identify itself as modern and progressive. Yet, progress as a notion is relative, and defined as the process of improving from a certain state. Namely, Rawabi’s idea of progress relates to a universal norm of modernity but literally represents the purpose of moving forward from previous Palestinian modes of life and perceptions.

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Opposite Page: Figure 8: Concentration of Palestinian residents in Lod during the conquest of the city, 1948. The Palmach archive Figure 9: Almagor, Michael, “Cattle market in Lod” 1950. Israel free image collection project

It should be noted that the act of planning itself cannot be perceived as a negation of a Palestinian identity. While the lack of planning may have been a historical urban characteristic of Arab settlements before the establishment of Israel, the chaotic nature of Palestinian cities today is not a continuation of that heritage, but a consequence of the occupation.50 However, perhaps it is precisely for this reason that Rawabi’s “object of otherness” through which it identifies, is the existing Palestinian urbanity. This argument is not a personal critique, but an ideology that finds public expressions. A striking evident for it is the description of “Day-to-Day Life in Rawabi” in the city’s website: “Rawabi’s neighbourhoods are clean, green and perfect for raising a family. Parents are comfortable allowing children to play outdoors and explore the city’s pedestrian-friendly streets, something rarely found in other local cities.”51 This description reveals Rawabi’s self-image within urban characteristics that meet the definition of a “modernity” under contemporary global middle-class norms: cleanliness, green spaces, and a safe environment for raising children. But more importantly, as deliberately mentioned in the text, these qualities are lacking in the existing Palestinian cities, to imply not only that they are not modern but that they do not provide a decent standard of living. Rawabi as a national project is trying to prove that Palestine can overthrow the chaotic, rough image of its cities, which was essentially forced upon them by the occupation.

50. For further reading on the develoment of Arab-Palestinian housing and urban space in israel after 1948, see: Allweil (2008), chapter 7. 51. “Day-to-Day Life in Rawabi.” Rawabi. https://www.rawabi. ps/en/day-to-day-life-in-rawabi. Emphasis made by author. 52. For further reading on Palestinian nationalism and class distinction through housing, see: Allweil (2008), chapter 3.

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Yet Rawabi contrasts an even more fundamental aspect of Palestinian existence. One of the cornerstones of Palestinian national identity is the idea of the pre-colonial rural life of the Palestinian people. This narrative binds the Palestinians with their land and promotes claims for indigeneity and ancestral merit. It was used by the Palestinian National Movement to articulate a national identity that links different classes and sub-cultures under a common history52. The figure of the Fallah (the peasant), became a national symbol that signifies the sense of persistence, Struggle, Steadfastness, and austerity under the forces of occupation. The new middle-class shifts away from the traditional discourse of peasantry and reformulates the national identity under new values of urbanity. The Fallah’s persistence, austerity, and rurality, are replaced by the mobility, affluence, metropolitanism of the middle class. Instead of struggle, they seek normalcy, which translates to class aspiration, consumerism, and property. Rawabi is the physical

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Opposite Page: Figure 10: Residents in the public plaza near the amphitheater. From: Rawabi’s official Facebook page: https://m.facebook. com/RawabiCity/

embodiment of this new ethos, which is formulated into an urban typology.53

Sebastia, Caesarea and Jerusalem, are according to the Israeli narrative proofs of the historical Jewish right to the land.55 This point illustrates how national narratives are central in the assessment of Rawabi’s architecture, as its design and planning decisions translate into national symbolism. The reading of Rawabi as architectural object produces dual and often contradictory meanings hence subjective and ambiguous.

Typology as a term is important here because it classifies the architecture as a system. Like in the modernist Israeli social housing blocks of Lod, Rawabi’s architecture was mobilized as a national educational tool designed to reconfigure Palestinian society. Although in a completely opposite political and architectural context, Rawabi mirrors the Israeli nation-building mechanism by enforcing “modernity” through special and cultural homogeneity. The uniform apartment buildings of Rawabi mould a singular mode of living, of a cosmopolitan, consumerist middle-class culture.

In 1918, the first British military governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, enacted a municipal bylaw, according to which the exterior walls of every building in the Jerusalem must be cladded with local limestone (later named as “Jerusalem stone”). This regulation was in line with the concept of “colonial regionalism”, which, in accordance with the ideas of the arts and crafts movement, sought to preserve and integrate local building traditions, crafts and materials into modern construction. In 1967, following the Six Day War, Jerusalem was conquered and the western and the eastern parts were united under Israeli rule. A year after, the Mandatory bylaw was re-validated by the Israeli municipality.56 According to Weitzman:

As an important note, Rawabi is fundamentally different from the Israeli case of Lod; By no means it involves a forceful act of erasure of other cultures. Rawabi’s residents live there voluntarily and at great expense, out of sympathy to the ideology and lifestyle it represents. Here, the national desire to produce a new neo-liberal social order is based on legitimate socio-economic and political tools. In Rawabi’s case, “building a future on the ruins of the past” comes down mostly to a sentiment. Quoting Bashar Masri, on new constructions in Nablus:54

“By emphasizing and reinforcing the power of the bylaw, stone cladding was used to authenticate new construction on sites remote from the historical centre, giving the disparate new urban shards a unified character, helping them appear as organic parts of the city. ‘The value of the visual impression that is projected by the stone’ … is that it carries ‘emotional messages that stimulate other sensations embedded in our collective memory, producing … strong associations to the ancient holy city of Jerusalem’“.57

One of the things the Palestinian did that is in my opinion terrific - they demolished it all and rebuilt. and I think that’s nice. I don’t think we should get hooked to the past. Also, I don’t think we should be hooked to places, to stones. By demolishing, someone like me who’s emotionally attached to it, will have to let go.”

v. 53. For further reading see: Grandinetti, Tina. “The Palestinian Middle Class in Rawabi.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 40, no. 1 (2015): 63–78. And: Taraki, Lisa. “Urban Modernity on the Periphery.” Social Text 26, no. 2 (2008): 61–81. And: Roy, Arpan. “Reimagining Resilience.” City 20, no. 3 (2016): 368–88 54. Tan, Shuchen “Rawabi, promised Palestinian city” VPRO documentary, 2012. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=otGAcXjH3yc&t=2047s

Lost in Translation

In a conversation with Masri, I asked him how Rawabi’s Architecture reflects the Palestinian identity: “What is Palestinian architecture? Is it Roman ruins all around Sebastia, or Caesarea or is it the old city of Nablus, or the arches of Jerusalem? We decided that it is all of that. We are doing it in a proper way”. Masri’s answer reveals two important issues in Rawabi’s design vision. First - following on from the previous chapter – in the formation of a new Palestinian architectural identity, Rawabi does not draw from contemporary Palestinian architecture, but places itself within a collection of local symbolic historical architecture. Second, the architectural objects that are woven into Rawabi’s identity are nationalized through a Palestinian narrative. In fact, the same antiquities of

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55. Sebastia and Caesarea were both built by Herods, the Roman client king of Judea in the 1st century BC. Old Jerusalem has a history dating back to biblical times: The religious monuments that exist today have been built over the last two thousand years; the current street plan dates mostly from the Byzantine period; and the walls and embankments date to the 16th century under Mameluke Rule. 56. Weizman, Eyal. Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. London: Verso, 2017. p. 27

Following the war, a government policy launched the establishment of large residential neighbourhoods orbiting Jerusalem centre, to create a continuum of Jewish territory, that would enforce the Israeli hold of the city and preserve a demographic balance of Jewish majority. The policy has defined the new neighbourhoods as affordable housing solutions for young couples, new immigrants, and the middle class. Throughout the 1970s, the five “ring neighbourhoods” were built, all under the “Jerusalem stone” building bylaw. Thus, completely modern satellite neighbourhoods, built for political and demographic reasons, were forged through the Israeli narrative’s translation to the Jerusalem stone, with the spirituality and holiness of Jerusalem Old city.58 Jerusalem is under Israeli rule, but this does not mean that its sanctity is exclusive to the Jewish people. Palestinians see Jerusalem as the future capital

57. Ibid

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of the Palestinian state - a precarious clause in the peace negotiations between Israel and the PA. The same historical architecture of the Old City and in particular its Muslim-Ottoman motifs, through the Palestinian narrative provide evidence of their historical right to the city. Moreover, an examination of Palestinian pre-colonial residential typologies shows that stone was a major means of construction all over the country, particularly in urban spaces.59 Thus, the “Jerusalem stone”, as an architectural carrier for notions of Holiness and heritage, effectively supports both Israeli and Palestinian narratives. Therefore, Rawabi’s design that entails cladding of all its buildings with ‘Jerusalem stone’ is open for a subjective translation. From an Israeli point of view, Rawabi can supposedly be interpreted as a new suburban city of Jerusalem, planned according to its bylaws. But in fact, the Jerusalem stone bylaw also exists in the Palestinian Authority’s building regulations. Moreover, and absurdly, the ‘Jerusalem stone’ cladding was in fact stemmed from an aspiration to differentiate from Israeli architecture: According to the city’s architect Rafie Samach, one of the main planning requirements that arose prior the design Is that Rawabi will not look like a settlement” but instead “as part of the environment, rather than placed on top of it”.60 The stone cladding was meant to assimilate the architecture in its local natural environment.

58. Weizman (2007) p.28 59. For further reading on Palestinian housing typologies see: Fuchs, Ron. “The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic ‘Primitive Hut.’” Muqarnas 15 (1998): 157. And: Allweil (2008), chapter 3 60. Rabie (2021) p.60

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The question of duality is present not only by architectural motifs, but also in planning strategy. A dominant feature of Zionist and Israeli town-planning is the arrangement of residential houses in a concentric and compact layout that circles a community or ideological centre. This layout stems from two objectives: ideology and security. Ideologically, the shape of a circle around a centre symbolizes an egalitarian ideology that characterized the socialist spirit of the Zionist enterprise. In terms of Security, settlements were constructed as an illustration of a citadel - at the top of a controlling topographic dome, in a density that prevents hostile infiltration and in radial strips which allow a gradual retreat to the core of the settlement in the event of an attack. These principles were developed over the history of early pioneering Zionist settlements such as kibbutzim and moshavim and were integrated into Israeli planning, eventually making their way into the Israeli settlement enterprise. After the Six Days War, the territory of the State of Israel tripled with the conquest of Sinai, the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Since official annexation of the Occupied Territories to the State of Israel could have provoked international opposition, the Israeli government supported by acqui-

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Opposite Page: Figure 10: Sakkab, Annie. “A Palestinian construction worker at the new city of Rawabi”. MEI Middle East Images.

escence the establishment of settlements by religious-Zionist-right-wing organization Gush Emunim. The settlements were founded as temporary settlements in order to strengthen control of the territory and to create bargaining opportunities for the expansion of the State of Israel in a future territorial agreement. 1977 marked a dramatic political change in Israel with the election of the first right-liberal government, after decades of hegemony of the socialist parties. As part of advancing their right-wing agenda, the government accelerated the settlement enterprise through state policy. In 1978, a new city was declared in the West Bank, to be established a few kilometres east of Jerusalem, in place of a Jewish “Workers’ camp” outpost established three years earlier. The city, named “Ma’ale Adumim”, was planned to be an urban settlement conjoined with an industrial area that would provide affordable housing and work for hundreds of people. The planning of the city, was entrusted to Thomas Leitersdorf, an AA (Architectural Association) graduate architect, politically affiliated with the Liberal Party. In general terms, Leitersdorf described his plan for Ma’ale Adumim as a “Garden city”. This prominent but vague concept in Israeli architecture is based on a model of a 19th-century British designer, Ebenezer Howard, of suburban working towns designed to provide services and professional benefits of city life, with the well-being and space of village life.61 Practically, Leitersdorf plan followed the concentric layout described earlier, but with an adjustment to the mountainous topographic conditions of the Judean Desert to “reflects the morphological structure of the mountain”. The neighbourhoods of equal repetitive parcels were designed along the mountain ridges, and “because of the morphology are integrally connected to the centre, with the valleys between left open and untouched, leading directly to the heart of the town”. As an objective, the plan was designed so that all residents would be within walking distance of 250 meters from community and public services. In terms of infrastructure, for utilitarian reasons the topographic route also led the lines to roads, water, sewage, electricity, etc. In line with government expectations, Leitersdorf’s plan was a success. It became a planning model for future settlements in the west bank and was further validated by government building recommendations and regulations for Mountainous towns all over the country.62

61. See: Weizman (2007), Chapter 1

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Whether accidentally or intentionally, Rawabi’s master plan de facto overlaps with Leitersdorf’s design principles. As described in Chapter 2, the city is planned in a concentric layout that follows the topography lines around a public centre of commerce and services, available within walking distance from every

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Opposite Page: Figure 11: Masterplan of Ma’ale Adumim. From: Leitersdorf Ben Dayan Architects offical website: http://www.lb-arch. co.il/en/%D7%A4%D7%A 8%D7%95%D7%99%D7 %A7%D7%98%D7%99% D7%9D/maale-adumim/

house. Hence, since the Rawabi’s plan mirrors Israeli planning, then it can be assessed by the same terms, meaning through the “concentric planning strategy” main objectives: ideology and security.

land was defined as private ownership (“Miri”) provided it was cultivated for ten years. On the other hand, if the land has not been cultivated for three consecutive years, the plot has passed to the sovereign (“Mahlul”). Hence, the title of land in the West Bank was determined by a logic based on the hilly and rugged local topography. The fertile slopes and valleys remained privately owned, while the exposed barren hilltops were passed to the Sovereign. Thus, through this system, Israel expropriated enclaves in the West Bank, on which settlements were erected. These Jewish outposts, under the auspices of military defence, often prevented Palestinians from accessing and cultivating their adjacent privately owned land, and as a result after 3 years, these lands were expropriated as well. As a result, within just more than a decade, Israel managed to annex about 38% of the west bank.65

Rawabi’s ideological objective is straight forward. The heart of the city, the Q Center, is the focal point of the community. It is the banner of the city, the bonfire of the middle class, where the community connect through commerce, culture, and leisure. The rows of radial houses by no means meet the definition of “socialist” but they certainly have an egalitarian character: All buildings are accessible to the city centre via a main boulevard; the various neighbourhoods have equal conditions in terms of public parks and amenities; the buildings are designed in a similar style; each building offer several types of apartments, meaning demographic heterogeny throughout the city; and lasty due to the radial terraced layout down the topography, each building gets an equal degree of light and view. To be more critical, and following the discussion from the previous chapter, Rawabi with its “Citadel” look and plan, produces a social mechanism that promotes a particular cultural order. Referring to Weizman, the arrangement of the houses and roads as rings descending the peaks produces two axial views: out and down, towards the backdrop; And in and up, towards the common public spaces in the centre of the community. The introvert view aims to strengthen community values. Since the public areas are under the constant observation of the community, an ‘unconscious policing’ is created, and enforces an acceptable public behaviour. Moreover, “The social and physical cohesion of its cul-de-sac environment” of the settlement, “closed off to its surroundings … promotes a communal coherence in a shared formal identity”.63

Rawabi’s planning team most likely did not see the planning as a strategic or defensive objective. The land on which the city was established is in Area C, i.e. under the full jurisdiction of the PA, therefore was protected from Israeli expropriation even before construction began. However, the strategic and territorial matter is very evident in the discourse around the project. For example, Amir Dajani, the project manager of Rawabi, stressed the fact that Rawabi will create a territorial link between Ramallah and Nablus66. According to another Rawabi former employee, the city will contribute to the national goal by “saving the hilltops” from the settlements. Masri himself was perhaps not as explicit but his words echo the same spirit. In the BBC documentary68, he declared the Jewish community Ateret on the top of the hill opposite Rawabi – “I am 100% sure that this land, this settlement, which is on our land will be a suburb of Rawabi one day”. In other instances, Masri was using rhetoric that forcefully suggests the notion of territorial presence, such as “we are here, and we are here to stay” or “There will be a fact on the ground for them to deal with”.69

Moving on to the second objective of Rawabi’s concentric planning - what is the security strategy behind the planning? The answer is that the plan, using military terms, meets strategic goals rather than tactical ones.

62. Weizman (2007), chapter 4 p.131 63. Ibid

In 1979, the Begin government began a national program to map and register land in the West Bank, with the purpose of discovering land that Israel could claim ownership of. Every Palestinian public land, i.e. a plot on which no ownership could be proved, or any unused privately owned land, was declared “state land” and was expropriated. This expropriation strategy was based on the 1858 Ottoman land reform law. The law was intended to modernise the traditional agrarian economy through a new taxation system, which increased imperial revenue by commodifying state land and landed labour.64 According to the law, that remained in effect in the West Bank throughout the changes of regimes, a plot of

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64. Allweil (2008) p.37. For further reading on the Ottoman land reform see: Fields, Gary. “Enclosure: Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror.” Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017. 65. See: Weizman (2007) Chapter 4 p.116-122 66. Rabie (2021) p.55 67. Ibid. p.135 68. McMullen, BBC (2015)

Objectively, Rawabi poses physical facts on the ground. It is a huge, robust, expensive project, and its uniform fortified appearance exudes notions of control and power. Rawabi’s regional ambitions, meaning its own growth, and the construction of other future “Rawabi’s”, pave the way for strengthening the PA’s control over its land, and oppose the Israeli settlement enterprise by parallel measures. The narrative that Rawabi is defying the occupation is a central point that Masri and the Palestinian Authority are promoting with great effort. Criticism and public debate about Rawabi revolve largely around this very point. One of the derogatory

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names of the city, is the “Palestinian settlement”. This epithet clearly concerns the appearance of the city and its foreignness in the Palestinian landscape, and also hints at the project’s ostensibly improper political and commercial ties with Israel. However, the term “Palestinian settlement” embodies precisely Rawabi’s subjective identity in its strategic goal. Is Rawabi, which supposedly uses Israeli architectural tools for the colonization of space, doing so under the auspices of Israel or against it?

vi. A Commercial Issue Architecture is always political, but sometimes it seems that in the Israeli-Palestinian context, architecture is politics. Any architectural object, by virtue of the land, style, or sources of inspiration, can immediately be framed under a national narrative and power relations between the colonist and the colonized. Often the architectural analysis becomes so saturated with the politics that it overshadows any other aspect of the discussion. As previously argued, a political reading of Rawabi’s architecture produces an identity paradox, which can be resolved through subjective reading of a national narrative. Perhaps then, an objective, utilitarian reading of the architecture will make it possible to unravel this Gordian knot and resolve Rawabi’s identity crisis. An economic understanding of the architectural “protagonists” of the previous chapter reveals an interesting picture. One of the absurd results of the enactment of the ‘Jerusalem Stone By-Law’ on the new Jewish neighbourhoods around Jerusalem was that, by the growing demand, the Palestinian quarry industries became one of the most important branches of the Palestinian economy.70 In Rawabi’s case, Bayti company saw this as an economic opportunity and incorporated an on-site independent stone quarry into the project. That clearly significantly reduces the cost of production and transportation, but also adds marginal savings, through the recycling of residual stone for other uses such as road’s retaining walls, or an aggregate for concrete.71 Moreover, the additional financial cost of stone cladding during construction pays off in the long run because it reduces maintenance expenses.

69. Tan, VPRO (2012)

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Rawabi’s concentric and homogeneous plan works under a similar logic. First, the layout of the buildings, and the setting of the infrastructure along the topography lines, reduces the construction costs, as minimal intervention is required in levelling the ground to the terraces. Moreover, the radial spread down

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Opposite Page: Figure 12: The largest Palestinian national flag in the West Bank at Rawabi’s viewpoint with the Israeli settlement Ateret in the backdrop. From: Nasser, Nasser. 2016, AP

the ridge gives houses a view of the external landscape, a valuable feature that translates directly into economic terms. Lizendroff put it accurately: “We were selling something that did not cost us a penny.”.72 The accessibility to the commercial, cultural and leisure centre in the heart of the city also translates into economic figures, as accessibility encourages use and nourishes the local economy, as well as saves an investment in public transportation expenses and appropriate infrastructure for it. In terms of the buildings - first, most of the city is built in highrise buildings in a dense urban compound hence the supply of houses increases immeasurably from detached houses. In addition, their homogeneous character means similar construction solutions and material, which lower the building costs, accelerate the speed of construction, and generate a high uniform standard for the city.

under Masri’s directorship, many of the city’s architectural sources of inspiration, architects, members of the planning team and the construction consultants were Jewish or Israeli. This point might indicate two separate issues: Palestinian imitation, in the form and / or ideology of Israel; As left-wing Rawby’s critics claim, the normalization of the occupation and the relations to Israel or in Palestinian terminology — tatbia.76 Like Rawabi’s identity paradox, this issue may also have an economic resolution. In a Dutch documentary, Masri addresses Palestinian internal criticism against the project’s collaboration with Israel: “They attacked me because I work with Israeli companies, everybody who builds [in Palestine] works with Israeli companies, you have to anyway. [But] I don’t do it because I have to, I do it because I like to, of course. If they give me the right price, then at the end of the day it’s a commercial issue. Of course, I favour Palestinian suppliers if I can, but within reason.”78

Architecture as a medium that operates in civic space is exposed to subjective interpretation which does not necessarily align with the intention of the architect or planner. So far, there seem to be three parallel interpretations: the Palestinian narrative, the Israeli narrative, and the economic narrative. What was Rawabi’s “author’s” intention? Starting with the team of architects - Raffie Samach, the chief planner of Rawabi testified that the planning was hardly affected by political matters, and if so, only on a cosmetic level. For him, since long histories of colonial vernacular have overwritten “traditional Palestinian architecture” he had more freedom to design. Urbanism in general, for Samach, “is a global phenomenon . . . practically universal.”, a problem that should be addressed in broad terms, detached from local politics.73 Shifa Salah, a senior architect of Rawabi, described Rawabi’s architecture as “eclectic”, “universal architecture with motifs”. That is, indigenous or cultural architectural themes that are incorporated into global contemporary-commercial architecture style in a postmodern fashion, in order to paint the project with a local identity. In the case of Rawabi, it comes down to the stone cladding, and the integration of arches or Mashrabias74 in some of the buildings. 70. Weizman (2007) p.33 71. “Palestine’s First Green City.”. Rawabi, https://www.rawabi.ps/ en/news/1524753530. 72. Weizman (2007) p.134 73. Rabie (2021) p. 61footnotesfootnotes

Masri’s approach is more complicated. He sees the integration of “national” architectural motifs, albeit symbolically, as a projection of Palestinian identity and a link to the historical roots of Palestinians in the country. Moreover, for Masri, Rawabi not only offers a new model for the Palestinian people, but also supports the national aspiration for independence, by “progressive”, “professional”, “humane” and “modern” means of combating the Israeli occupation.75 On the other hand, critics point out that throughout the development of Rawabi,

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74. A mesh window, common in traditional Muslim architecture. Oddly, the Mashrabia is not common in traditional Palestinian typologies. 75. Tan, VPRO (2012) 76. “Normalization” (or “Tatvia” in Arabic) is a very loaded nickname in Palestinian politics. This term is often used to stigmatize joint Palestinian-Israeli activity. 77. Tatbia ‫ تطبيع‬is a very loaded term in Palestinian politics. It is often used as a derogatory term for joint Palestinian-Israeli activity. 78. Ibid. 79. Referring to the quote from Masri’s interview in chapter 2.

Masri’s answer is critical, because it indicates that the economic-consumerist logic is first in priority, only to be followed by the political one. However, this brings us back to another paradox - Rawabi is run by for-profit institutions, but de facto, by virtue of being officially unprofitable79, it operates in philanthropic terms. That to say, the prioritization of the economic logic is a conscious ideological choice. Rawabi, in line with the PA’s Fayyadism nation-building ideology, is working to detach the economy from politics and administration to establish the foundations for a neo-liberal state. It appears, that the national-territorial political debate pushed aside the socio-economic political discussion. Yet a critique of Rawabi as a neo-liberal project raises a dilemma: On the one hand, the main critique of neoliberalism in the context of colonialist relations (and in general) is that it has the power to obscure and tame conflicts; It replaces a discourse of national human rights with a notions of consumption opportunities and individualistic aspiration. In Fanon’s words: “This fight for democracy against the oppression ... will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge … as a claim to nationhood.“80 The Capitalist social construct strengthens and expands the middle class through the aspiration to personal well-being and stability. These concepts outline a hierarchy and social division, while enabling a political stability which denies a culture of rebellion or struggle. The attempt to climb up the neoliberal social ladder obscure the fact that all participants, regardless of class, share a common fate of a colonial operation.

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On the other hand, the Palestinian aspiration to move forward from the traditional values of austerity and steadfastness should not be dismissed or judged. After decades of oppressive occupation, the Palestinian people, and the middle class within it, have the right to self-improvement, to strive for a better, normal lifestyle, and to participate in a global culture. Moreover, in the current situation in which a Palestinian territorial state is unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future, the creation of an independent neoliberal economy enables the organization of ideas, institutions, and practices of a State even without territorial sovereignty.81 To conclude this argument, it should be clarified that the purpose of this paper is neither to criticize Rawabi, nor to reflect a personal opinion of its paradoxical identity. Rather, it is an attempt to expose its apparent political ambiguity. If something, these political contradictions reveal the intricacy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and consequently the complication of any architectural operation within that domain.

vii.

Conclusion: Nation First

The concept of “social class” is ambiguous in both Israeli and Palestinian nations. In the absence of a traditional hereditary class system, such as the Western European or the Indian one, class is framed by different logics. Interestingly, the consolidation of the Israeli and Palestinian class system began quite simultaneously with the results of the 1948 War, and under comparable conditions:82 Both societies, were of refugees that were newly displaced from their homeland, leaving behind their homes,capital and consequently, their social status83. The general conception, of each nation independently, is that a refugee society under a collective struggle would share a cohesive class identity. Reality however is of course more complex.

80. Fanon, Frantz. “The Wretched of the Earth”. New York: Grove Press, 2021. 81. Rabie (2021) p.18footnotesfootnotes

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At the end of the 1948 war, Israel’s two urgent national missions were to provide housing solutions for the new immigrants and settle the frontier areas to stabilize the new borders. “Physical planning in Israel” or better known the” Sharon Plan”84 was a government-initiated program that proposed to distribute the immigrant population in a controlled manner among 24 defined districts across the country. Fearing unrestrained population concentration in the major cities and in the heart of the country, it was decided to establish medium-sized cities in the rural and frontier areas, later known as the “development towns”.

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Opposite Page: Figure 13: Israeli soldiers near the construction site of Rawabi, during a visit by the Minister of the Israeli Ministry of the Environment From: Gideon, Kobi 2016, Flash90

82. That not to say that prior 1949 there was no class structure in Israeli and Palestinian societies, rather that the war and its consequences led to the reconfiguration of the social classes in both nations. 83. In the Israeli case, the question of class ambiguity began even before the establishment of the state. The socialist Zionist enterprise and its mechanisms borrowed the class discourse from Europe. However, in the absence of state organisation and a cohesive society, class definition was forced and framed mainly by external measures. A good illustration for it is the of kibbutzim and moshavim movements prior the independence of the state. Many of these settlements were established and inhabited by young, middle-class immigrants, who abandoned their ‘innate’ social class and adopted a peasant way of life, which in European terms would be consider as “working class”. However, despite their occupation and lifestyle, they were certainly not at the bottom of the social class ladder. First, in national terms, they owned the capital, i.e. the land and modes of production. Second, by virtue of the embodiment of the Zionist enterprise, they became the dominant political hegemony and the ideological model for social aspiration. 84. Named over its designer, the architect Arieh Sharon (19001984) one of the foremoth fathers of Israeli architecture. 85. For further reading see: Efrat, Zvi. “The Israeli Project, 1948-1973.” Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Art museum, 2004. Chapter: Mould 86. For further reading see: Eyal (2004) 87. For further reading see: Allweil (2008), Chapter 6

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These towns were characterized by functional modernist concrete houses, built in rapid and cheap construction, and organized in a rationalist urban layout.85 At this stage, the Israeli government made a critical decision in the history of the class crystallization of Israeli society: Homogeneous groups of immigrants, mainly from Arab countries, were sent to populate the development towns. Although the houses were given to the residents effectively for free, with limited employment opportunities, the towns soon degenerated into slums. Thus, the Zionist modernist housing, the so called architectural “melting pot” designed to educate immigrants for a desirable Israeli culture, was perceived by the residents as anonymous “Procrustean bed”, a symbol of the deliberate social marginalization of Arab countries’ immigrants.86 Here, to add insult to injury, another governmental policy was placed. The Ministry of Housing was looking for ways to attract the “Yishuv veterans” to the development towns, in order to improve them socio-economically. According to the policy, the potential residents were offered land for the construction of detached villas under attractive conditions. Ostensibly, the policy was available to all, but in practice excluded most of the Arab-countries immigrants due to their inferior socio-economic capability. Thus, the Israeli government created categories of social status based on ethnic origin, (ethno-class) and enforced it by differentiated housing typologies and policies.87 Rawabi, risks a similar fate. Framed as a governmental nation-building affordable-housing policy, Rawabi is measured not only by the category of class it seeks to serve, but also in the face of the housing solutions of classes it does not serve. If until now it was possible to assess the Palestinian urban space in general terms through a spectrum of “chaos”, Rawabi evades this definition and operates under a new and opposing category. That relates to the architecture, but equally to the distinct lifestyle it constructs. Meaning, the lack of “modern” housing solutions for the weaker groups in Palestinian society produces a class distinction based on a housing typology. It is important to point out that this housing differentiation is a direct result of a government strategy. The Palestinian resistance against the occupation operates in two parallel modes: The first, traditional mode, operates under “peasantry values” of steadfastness, struggle, and austerity, and aims to sustain a harsh reality of urgency and temporality. This mode is carried mostly by the lower classes, like the residents of the refugee camps and rural villages. The second mode, of the middle and upper classes, offers a new interpretation of resistance, and

Mirrors

Opposite Page: Figure 13: Pridan, Moshe. “A street in the development town of Sderot in the western Negev.” 1965. Israeli National Photo Collection.

strives for a high standard of living. By doing so it defies the occupier’s “monopoly” on modernity and progress88. From a narrow strategic point of view, Palestine could benefit from a wide range of tools to fight for its independence. However, the right to choose between these modes of resistance is not in the hands of the individual but in those of the state, and hence these parallel practices could translate into institutionalized social discrimination. Both Israeli and Palestinian cases show that in social housing projects defined under a national territorial goal, the basic human right to decent housing becomes secondary. The Israeli and Palestinian housing projects were built under opposite conditions - modernist socialist architecture of the occupier vs. neo-liberal postmodern architecture of the occupied; This is an evident that Nation-building Social-housing, regardless of whether it is an Israeli “Shikun” in Arad, or a Palestinian “Iskan” in Rawabi, fulfil a strategic role, but in the process create a collateral damage in the form of a social rift. Throughout this essay, Rawabi was revealed as an ambiguous entity embodying multiple political and social conflicts. However, it must be remembered that just as the cause of Sisyphus’ hard labour is not the stone but his own fate – the ambiguity and confliction of Rawabi does not stem from its architecture or what it represents, but from the national conflict within which it operates. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the poisonous root to the rejection of the “other” by nation or class, and to the violent notion of possession, of land or symbols.

88. Roy (2016)

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