Ferial Massoud - First Year HTS Term 2
Concrete Economy The 6th of October Bridge in the Formulation of a New City
March 21st, 2018
The Race
“Two World Bank experts writing on development in the Middle East explained how since 1930, “the popular imagination has been captured by the idea of the development of entire river systems.””1
Out of anecdotal moments such as these comes the potential to alter the course of natural processes, to turn vivid imagination into efficient productivity. The Cairo of the twentieth century adhered to this undertaking and was sold a dream to enter the modern world. The city became a playground for markets, a machine, constantly steaming, working for “the extraction of surplus value.”2 From river systems, Egyptians expanded to develop other systems, any system, which would allow them to constantly generate, generate more, in true capitalist style. The 6th of October bridge, built starting in 1974, was part of this frantic race to nowhere, this eternal process which promised modernity, yet did not admit modernity was unobtainable, so tied in was it with capitalist processes which relied on unending growth. Indeed, “for the developper, to stop moving, to rest in the shadows, [...] is death.”3 In the following essay, I argue that the bridge is fundamental in transforming Cairo into a capitalist machine, channeling flows of capital both in its prestressed concrete and along its path. In doing so, the object of the bridge becomes agentive in producing this modernity, a modernity unattainable because destructive in its construction.
Fig. 1: The Bridge as main artery, with daily traffic jams which extend into the city underneath.
1
Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2002, P. 44. First Year History and Theory Lecture, Pier Vittorio Aureli, 19 February 2019 3 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air, London: Verso Books, 2010, P. 69. 2
The Bridge in the Egyptian Imaginary The construction of the 6th of October bridge majorly redefined the Cairene urban landscape. In doing so, it participated in the formulation of a “modern” Egypt state. The longest bridge on the African continent, at the time of its construction, it hung over most of the city: starting in the district of Agouza along the West bank of the Nile, it slices through the entire eastern bank of the city, making it the foremost transportation line. While construction started in 1974, its total length as of completion in 2005 is over twenty-one kilometers. Close to half a million Cairenes use it daily, hence earning it its surname as ‘spinal cord of Cairo.’4 23 inlet and outlet ramps dip into the city beneath, ramps which selectively connect the “sub-city” deemed relevant enough to the bridge’s frenzied race across the city. The construction of such a large scale project drastically altered the ethos of the city, and demonstrated Egypt’s capacity to fashion itself as a “techno-economic power,”5 The nature of this technocratic modernity can be understood as the refashioning of the country to fit what Mitchell calls the “character of calculability.”6 In this new city, processes and performances must be measurable - made prim for the generation of capital. In this context, modernity meant the imposition of legibility. As such, industrial (read: measurable) processes were used in the construction of Capitalist Cairo, better facilitating its control. From the introduction of caissons, shipped to Egypt, driven up the Nile, floated and pulled to specified locations with the aim of erecting piers under the bottom of the Nile, to the elimination of shutterings which would hinder traffic underneath, most useful when spanning squares and railway crossings, to the construction methods which made use of the latest technologies from cantilever carriages to launching truss systems, to the bridge’s monumental height of 22 meters built upon foundations of precast concrete dug 28 meters under the ground, the list of technological feats goes on. This new desire to quantify was inherent to the modern project, to measure and evaluate progress, forcing Egypt into a teleological paradigm: indeed, where numbers were present, there was always possibility to improve them. The language of marketing surrounding the bridge project also served as a potent formulator of this redefinition. Indeed, there is much acclaim for the latest technological methods used, some for the first time in Egypt. Michel Bakhoum, founder of the Arab Consulting Engineers responsible for carrying out the project, is described as “master of prestressed concrete,” in a relentless, absurd fetishization of tecnologico-industrial processes. Educated in the US, his innovative spirit is attributed to foreign influence, an influence which permeates implications of modernity in the Egyptian imaginary. Indeed, inherent to the construction of the bridge was the shift to an american model of urban planning, centered around the car dreamt up in post-war America. Indeed, in the 1970s, as a consequence of the economic opening, the car as mode of transport became more affordable, and hence increasingly widespread among the Egyptian middle class.7 State urban policy generally tended to favor private mobility: the aggressive development of major road infrastructures did not cater to public transport. 8 By 1969, 65 thousand vehicles wandered the streets of Cairo, while an additional 3000 licenses were issued
4
Imam Hamam, “Asleep at the Wheel” MadaMasr, (Octobre 2014) Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2002, P. 21. 6 Ibid, 8. 7 “Urban Mobility: Greater Cairo History of Patchwork Solutions.” Accessed March 20, 2019. 8 Hubert Metge, “World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review: The Case of Cairo Egypt,” World Bank. November 2000. Accessed February 25th, 2019. 5
in that year alone.9 The city also allowed its tramway network to deteriorate into disuse, while trolley-bus lines were incrementally shut down. Yet only a small portion of the population could afford cars. A household survey indicates that while close to 60% of Cairenes earning over £2000 could pay for private cars, households earning under £300 mostly favored shared taxis over the rundown buses and incomplete metro line. The privatization of urban transportation networks refashioned Egypt into a modern state in which individual wealth could be measured by the size of your car, exacerbating social fragmentation, the wealthy protected behind tinted glass. By dreaming in american, Egypt adopted a modern trope built on individualism ill-fitted to the needs of the country. This extended beyond the transportation system, however. The bridge reorganized the city to meet the demands of the market. Indeed, cars and monumental highways meant residential neighborhoods could develop without fear of exclusion from the business center, hence further segregating the population. Nasr City and Heliopolis, built on the outskirts of the city as bourgeois suburbs, sprouted at the mouth of the bridge, their inhabitants efficiently shuttled to the center for day jobs in banking or finance. Just beyond, the airport served to usher in foreign capital, which similarly was thrown along this route to arrive to the banks centrally located. No need to interact with the rest of the city - it served only as potential yet to be unlocked by those on the bridge, who could make plans for its exploitation without dirtying their hands. The layering of the city, therefore, existed both physically in this bridge and in the movement of capital both within Cairo and internationally. Billboards quickly swarmed the view from the bridge, making consumption possible even in transit. Officials however, also made weak attempts to bridge (!) this gap, advertising the bridge as an “open-to-all observatory tower for citizens.”10 During their daily commute, they could take pride in their country’s monuments, the Maspero television building, the Cairo Tower, the Egyptian Museum, the Nile river, visible from this aerial view, selling these as national artefacts, objects of veneration. In so doing, Cairo transitioned into a capitalist playground, the bridge an active participant in this development.
Fig. 2: The billboards create a skyline of their own, another type of potential consumption for those above.
9
Moustafa Daly, “The Tale of October 6th Bridge, Africa’s Longest Flyover,” Cairo Scene, July 2017. Ibid.
10
Liberalizing the economy The era of the bridge construction was defined by aggressive economic restructuring. With the accession of Anwar Sadat to the presidency in 1970 following the death of socialist president Nasser that same year, the country experienced a major existential shift, transforming from a centrally planned system to a mixed market economy. Indeed Sadat introduced a period of economic opening, referred to as the “Infitah” (opening), aggressively removing barriers to foreign investment. He reversed many of Nasser’s policies, paying indemnities to the British whose properties had been nationalized in the 1960s, or establishing free trade zones on the Egyptian territory, exempting foreign investments from income taxes for at least five years.11 Major financial institutions, most notably the World Bank and IMF penetrated the country, introducing forced restructuring as conditions for loans. In 1976 the IMF decreed Egypt cut subsidies and devalue its pound,12 which, coupled with an increase in production would make Egyptian goods cheap for an international market. Sadat also reduced import substitution to force competitivity of domestic companies.13 The 6th of October bridge sat at the intersection of these new forces, a domestic project which would make use of the resources the state was attempting to promote. Development needed a client, and the bridge was more than happy to oblige. The Infitah, in the form of the bridge, signaled the “awakening of a nation into the universal consciousness of modernity.”14 Beyond a shift in language, as Mitchell argues, “the international development industry proposed and funded two complementary methods for the solution of Egypt’s problems, the technological and the managerial. One required large capital resources from the West, the other its expertise.”15 The World Bank was financially instrumental in the shaping of Egyptian modernity. Indeed, through a series of weighty loans, it imposed conditions, structural adjustment policies, so that the government act according to its guidelines. Public funds thus prioritized asphalt and road projects which included the bridge, while the cement industry was assisted through new loans.16 However this strategy was ultimately detrimental to the Egyptian economy: the surplus in concrete served only to decrease the value of the cement and increase reliance on exports to maintain a profit. Intrinsic to this technical assistance was the nefarious conditionality which only exacerbated the cycle of dependency. Indeed, the contract regarding the loan to Egypt cement company Tourah, approved in 1974, year of the start of construction of the bridge, directed that “the Company shall employ [...] engineering consultants whose qualifications, experience and terms and conditions of employment shall be satisfactory to the Bank.17 Ultimately, this meant hiring European and American engineers, as with the German consultants Fritsch, Chiari & Partner Ziviltechniker used for the bridge,18 hence co-opting jobs which could be distributed to Egyptians, but also maintaining the latter in a position of subservience within specialists fields. “Knowledge” remained in foreign hands. This was further emphasized by the clause stating that “the Company shall enable the Bank's representatives to examine all plants, 11
Ali Hillal Dessouki, “Policy Making in Egypt: A Case Study of the Open Door Economic Policy,” Oxford University Press, April 1981. Ibid, P.36. 13 Heba Handoussa et al, “Productivity Change in Egyptian Public Sector Industries after ‘The Opening,’ 1973-1979,” Amsterdam: Journal of Development Economics, 1986. PP. 53-73. 14 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2002, P. 13. 15 Ibid, 222. 16 World Bank, “Egypt Appraisal of Tourah Cement Expansion Project,” The World Bank Group: Industrial Projects Department, 30 December 1974. Accessed 25 February 2019. 17 World Bank and Société Egyptienne de Ciment Portland Tourah, “Project Agreement: Tourah Cement Expansion Project - Loan Number 1085,” The World Bank Group, 10 February 1974. P.4. 18 “6th of October Bridge (Cairo, 1996).” Structurae. Accessed March 20, 2019. 12
installations, sites, works, buildings, property and equipment of the Company and any relevant records and documents.”19 Maintaining an open door meant that foreigners, for whom the cement was ultimately destined, could benefit from mixing it to the ratios they so desired without needing to pay the high prices in their own countries. For Egypt, however, it signalled a more frightening reality, that of the coming into being of a neo-colonial state.
Reading Violence in Modernity While the efficiency of technology promotes an irreproachable image of modernity, the bridge’s history is marred by episodes of violence, inflicted on the level of the built environment, the inhabitants, and the ecology. Indeed, a bridge of that span, with its omnipresent layout in the city, had to pave its way through destruction of obstructing objects. Nothing was important enough, or overrode its importance. Many people were displaced from beneath its pillars, their homes destroyed, in most cases with no compensation and no relocation scheme.20 Neighborhoods were split. The All Saints Cathedral, the main congregation space for Egyptian Copts, stood on its route to Ramsis square, the main bus terminal which (of course!) needed to connect to the bridge. The church was thus demolished in 1978, the year of its centennial. The logic of this new urban network surpassed the human in this city - surpassed conceptions of the city as palimpsest of human experiences. As Mitchell explains, “the logic or rationality attributed to modernity: [...] technology [...] tends to produce a certain restricted understanding of violence. Violence is thought of as the opposite of these forms of reason or logic.” The bridge, sold as this propeller into modernity, was seen as an obvious necessity, the most rational move a city could make. Destruction was thus deemed justifiable for the construction of this new order. What, then, was the underlying nature of this order? The bridge acts as physical embodiment of the nefariousness of modernity, revealing its dark side. It makes manifest the character of calculability described earlier, making the city, and its inhabitants, readable, digestible. Indeed, it erases complexity, redesigns the city as legible to authorities and capital, granting them access to, and control over, the entire territory. The bridge spans neighborhoods impossible of access to cars, with roads too narrow, paving too wobbly, streets too busy with people to allow for cars to circulate efficiently. Floating above, one is no longer subject to the confusing maze, but on the contrary can survey the entire landscape. This smoothing out of the city is also akin to an Haussmannian redesign. The forced reliance on that particular bridge makes it the main artery connecting the muscles of the city. Human flows become prescribable, predictable, and thus controllable. In the event of a protest, or as was the case during the revolution in 2011, the bridge acts as “potential ‘clogging points’ that can’t be dodged.”21 During that time, the bridge indeed became a sniper bed, from which government led agitators could fire at the protestors below. However, it also holds potential for emancipation, reclamation of the city: “block the bridge, as the protestors did in Turkey during the army coup, and suddenly it becomes very difficult to control the rest of the city - the tanks can’t get around etc.”22
19
World Bank and Société Egyptienne de Ciment Portland Tourah, “Project Agreement: Tourah Cement Expansion Project - Loan Number 1085,” The World Bank Group, 10 February 1974. P.5. 20 Miller, Catherine. “Réseaux et territoire: migrants de Haute Egypte à Guizah (Grand Caire),” n.d., 9. 21 Imam Hamam, “Asleep at the Wheel” MadaMasr, Octobre 2014. 22 Ibid.
Beyond the violence however, the bridge ultimately failed in being what it perhaps never truly intended to be: a bridge. By prioritizing the car as form of transport, the bridge bears responsibility in introducing a major influx of cars to the roads and absurd levels of traffic, making walking along it more efficient than driving as was proscribed by its design. Not only did more private cars join the roads, but for those with less economic capital, the development of microbuses accompanied the bridge construction, shuttling people to and from the outskirts.23 With no formalized network or fixed bus stops, buses could make frequent and random stops near important landmarks: over El Galaa street, El-Azbakeya police station, simply pulling up to the side to drop off and pick up passengers. Processions of red microbuses could thus clogg entire lanes. The city bus network also extended in space without becoming more regular or sufficient. In the design of the road, it was not taken into account - it has no segregated lanes of its own, a major oversight. The predictable inefficiency of this bridge transpired - by becoming an essential component of the Cairene landscape, it becomes a choked route, overburdened, now that it has convinced everybody to depend on it, “synonymous with all day rush hours and unbearable traffic congestion.24 Pollution levels soared in Egypt in the late 20th century, and continue to do so, in part because of the helpless reliance on cars, as the metro line inches towards completion. The World Bank continues to “study” Egypt, issuing reports on the gross inefficiency of traffic and the toxicity of pollution.25 Foreshadowing of new managerial strategies soon to be implemented? Most probably. In any case, the bridge project stands as testament to the inefficiency inherent in this method of implementing technological processes.
Conclusion What, then, is an artifact? Is it the self-proclaimed success the bridge purports to be? An engineering feat, an essential artery? Or is it rather an urban nerve, which, if pressed too hard, hurts, collapses? The bridge, as we have seen, is built out of the confluence of many forces, yet, as object it is also an agent in determining the character of this new Cairo. As Mitchell writes, “one can locate any number of episodes, elements, and forces that disrupt the effect created by the final artifact.”26 Perhaps the true artefact then lies in the margins of the success story, in the unwritten failures, the perpetual traffic jams.
23
Moustafa Daly, “The Tale of October 6th Bridge, Africa’s Longest Flyover,” Cairo Scene, July 2017. Ibid. 25 “Pollution Management and Environmental Health Program.” Text/HTML. World Bank. Accessed March 20, 2019. 26 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2002, P. 13. 24
Bibliography 1. Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2002. 2. Daly, Moustafa. “The Tale of October 6th Bridge, Africa’s Longest Flyover.” Cairo Scene (July 2017) Accessed March 20, 2019. http://cairoscene.com/In-Depth/The-Tale-of-October-6th-Bridge-Africa-s-Longest-Flyover.
3. Hamam, Imam. “Asleep at the Wheel.” (Octobre 2014) Accessed March 20, 2019. https://madamasr.com/en/2014/10/06/feature/culture/asleep-at-the-wheel/. 4. Hillal Dessouki, Ali. “Policy Making in Egypt: A Case Study of the Open Door Economic Policy.” Oxford University Press. April 1981. 5. Metge, Hubert. “World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review: The Case of Cairo Egypt.” World Bank. November 2000. Accessed 25 February 2019. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANTRANSPORT/Resources/land_use_cairo_catram. pdf 6. Handoussa, Heba, Nishimizu, Mieko, Page, John. “Productivity Change in Egyptian Public Sector Industries after ‘The Opening,’ 1973-1979.” Amsterdam: Journal of Development Economics, 1986. PP. 53-73. 7. World Bank. “Egypt Appraisal of Tourah Cement Expansion Project.” The World Bank Group: Industrial Projects Department, 30 December 1974. Accessed 25 February 2019. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/664481468037495664/pdf/multi-page.pdf 8. World Bank and Société Egyptienne de Ciment Portland Tourah. “Project Agreement: Tourah Cement Expansion Project - Loan Number 1085.” The World Bank Group, 10 February 1974. Accessed 25 February 2019. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/664481468037495664/pdf/multi-page.pdf 9. “6th of October Bridge (Cairo, 1996).” Structurae. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://structurae.net/structures/6th-of-october-bridge 10. “Pollution Management and Environmental Health Program.” Text/HTML. World Bank. Accessed March 20, 2019. http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/pollution-management-and-environmental-health-progra m 11. Aureli, Pier Vittorio. The Grid and The Parcel. F irst Year History and Theory Lecture. 19 February 2019. 12. Berman, Marshall. All That is Solid Melts into Air. London: V erso Books, 2010.
Image Credits Figure 1: “6 October Bridge is Closing down for two Months.” Cairo Scene. July 2016. http://cairoscene.com/Buzz/6th-of-October-Bridge-Is-Closing-Down-for-Two-Months Figure 2: Mardini, Yasmin. “Privatization and Placemaking: Cairo in Practice.” Volume Project. September 2017. http://volumeproject.org/privatization-and-placemaking-cairo-in-practice/