Global Report: Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency - The Fight Against Corruption

Page 145

PART I CONFRONTING CORRUPTION IN SECTORS AND FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER 3 STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

BOX 3.3

The Impact of Operation Car Wash across Latin America At their core, the crimes in the Lava Jato cases are connected to public investment contracts involving the main construction groups in Brazil, as well as financing by the Brazilian Development Bank. Among these companies, Petrobras was the most deeply implicated. The company had essentially been used as a slush fund by all politicians and officials to enrich themselves and to finance their political campaigns and gain influence at home and abroad. Investigations into the Lava Jato scandal have led to prison sentences for top executives and politicians. According to the Public Prosecutor’s office, by October 2018, Lava Jato had resulted in more than 200 convictions, including corruption, abuse of the international financial system, drug trafficking, and money laundering. More than a dozen other corporations and multiple foreign leaders have also been implicated in Lava Jato, mainly through Odebrecht, which used the Brazilian system of bribing politicians of many parties, to maintain a patronage relationship. Those caught up in the corruption include Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and four former Peruvian presidents as well as the leader of a Peruvian political party (Keiko Fujimori). The financial losses to Petrobras were huge. Petrobras itself estimated in its 2015 financial report that USD2.1 billion had been paid in bribes. In addition, it proposed almost USD17 billion in write-downs due to fraud and overvalued assets (including wasted investments, which nevertheless produced resources for political financing) which the company characterized as a “conservative” estimate. 40 Due in part to the impact of the scandal, as well as to its high debt burden and the low price of oil, Petrobras was also forced to cut capital investments and announced it would sell USD13.7 billion in assets over the following two years. 41 By mid2018, the corruption scandal was believed to have erased more than USD250 billion from Petrobras’s market value. The oil giant has also lost billions more in legal settlements and other costs related to graft, including a USD853 million settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Brazilian authorities. Petrobras appears to be now recovering modestly as its share price recovered from a low of USD3.8 in 2016 to over USD15 as of November 2019.

Provisions in the new SOE framework to promote transparency and corporate governance The Operation Car Wash investigation exposed many systemic problems in the governance of Brazil’s SOEs. For example, it revealed the complexity of Brazilian SOE ownership arrangements, with a multitude of institutions involved in SOE reporting and oversight leading to information asymmetry and diffuse accountability relationships. In addition, state and local governments’ reliance on a corrupt system of party financing meant that traditional accountability mechanisms were not

effective constraints to corruption and rent extraction. In 2015, the Ministry of Transparency, Monitoring and Control (MTMC) prepared a Guide for the Establishment of Integrity Programs in State Owned Enterprises. The guide recommended that companies prepare their own integrity risk assessments and, on this basis, prepare their own integrity programs. The guide provided ideas and suggested measures to strengthen integrity in SOEs, including in the area of procurement through measures such as rotation of purchasing personnel. In 2016, the government passed the Law on the Responsibility of Federal State Companies, which aimed to strengthen the internal control environment in SOEs through the introduction of fiscal councils and internal

Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption

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Box 13.6 Trade of Influence in the Judiciary

55min
pages 362-386

Box 13.5 Court User and Multi-Stakeholder Justice Surveys

3min
page 361

Box 13.3 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts in the Philippines and Indonesia

2min
page 358

Box 13.4 International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA

6min
pages 359-360

Box 13.2 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts: Political Commitment or Implementation Gaps

2min
page 357

Box 10.1 The Extent of Corruption

2hr
pages 303-354

Box 13.1 Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA

6min
pages 355-356

Box 9.2 The Beneficial Ownership Data Standard (BODS

5min
pages 291-292

Box 9.3 Key Data Questions for Policy Makers to Consider

25min
pages 293-302

Table 7.4 AP’s Transformational Technologies

53min
pages 251-270

Box 9.1 What is a Beneficial Owner?

15min
pages 286-290

Figure 8.2 Final Findings of ANI Reports between 2008 and 2019

15min
pages 279-285

Table 7.2 Major Technology Trends for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

16min
pages 243-247

Box 6.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI

13min
pages 219-223

Table 7.3 Navigating GovTech for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

8min
pages 248-250

Box 7.2 Singapore’s SkillsFuture Program and Fraud Detection

2min
page 241

Box 7.1 Brazil’s Tribunal of Accounts Robots

2min
page 240

Box 6.1 What Does Open Data Have to Do with Open Government?

9min
pages 216-218

Figure 6.1 Unpacking Open Government

1min
page 215

Table 5.1 Corruption in Public Services: Estimating the Magnitude of the Problem

2min
page 190

Box 4.1 Standard Operating Procedures and Internal Audit Capacities in Latin America

2min
page 166

Figure 4.3 ACD Presence and Main Transit Trade Routes

1min
page 178

Box 4.3 Donor Support to Afghanistan Customs Department

2min
page 179

Box 2.5 Transparency in Renegotiation for Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 117

Box 3.1 About Empresas Públicas de Medellin

6min
pages 140-141

Box 3.3 The Impact of Operation Car Wash across Latin America

2min
page 145

Figure 2.7 Causes of Renegotiation, based on 48 Projects that experienced Renegotiation

5min
pages 115-116

Figure 1.2 Change in Corruption Risk Indicators as a result of the e-GP Intervention

55min
pages 75-93

Box 2.4 The Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS

6min
pages 102-103

Box 2.1 IFC’s Integrity Due Diligence (IDD

10min
pages 94-97

Figure 2.6 Making Infrastructure Data Useful for Planners, Implementers and Policy Makers

19min
pages 106-113

Figure 2.5 Multi-Stakeholder Working at the Project Level

2min
page 105

Box 2.2 The Evolution of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Accountability in Infrastructure

2min
page 99

Box 2.3 The Role of the CoST Secretariat

1min
page 100

Box 1.1 Timeline on Somali National Army Rations Re-tendering

16min
pages 68-73
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