Global Report: Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency - The Fight Against Corruption

Page 216

PART II KEY INSTRUMENTS FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION

CHAPTER 6 OPEN AND INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT

Theoretical and empirical underpinnings Open government is a broad and holistic concept that has gained significant momentum and widespread usage, driven in part by digitization. Using open government approaches to tackle corruption arises in part from a perceived failure of more “direct” anti-corruption strategies in the 1990s (such as the formation of anti-corruption agencies) and the search for indirect approaches that mainstream prevention measures. 2 Moreover, technologies and digital tools have created new ways to engage citizens in anti-corruption efforts, giving impetus to the open government movement. The theory of change posits that openness can lead to a stronger relationship between government and citizens, increasing levels of trust and social capital and generating more effective government policy and service delivery. An open government involves citizens in the workings of government by providing relevant information, creating opportunities for citizen engagement, and implementing mechanisms that strengthen accountability. Over time, due to the increasing risks associated with corruption (because of the higher likelihood of detection), officials should be

less likely to engage in corrupt behavior, contributing to a more ethical and citizen-centric government where social norms shift and corruption is less likely to thrive. While the logic may be straightforward, as with other kinds of governance reforms, it is a challenge to make an empirically-grounded causal link between open government measures and specific impacts, such as reduced corruption, as the evidence base is still somewhat limited. Nevertheless, a growing body of case studies, as well as cross-national and experimental evidence, demonstrates that well-designed open approaches can lead to positive change. For example, the idea of participatory budgeting—that is, involving citizens in decisions about how to spend public funds— originated in Brazil, and has since been implemented in many countries. One study found that Brazilian municipalities with participatory budgeting have, on average, 39% higher tax collections than those without, and that the correlation is stronger the longer participatory budgeting has been in place. 3 The findings suggest that over time participatory institutions may strengthen trust and generate tangible financial benefits, which could potentially include indirect effects on corruption.

BOX 6.1

What Does Open Data Have to Do with Open Government? The term “open data” occurs frequently in discussions about open government. Open data is data that is freely accessible and reusable by anyone; the term also implies technical openness, meaning that the data is machine-readable and available in bulk. 8 Many governments, wishing to become more open (in the sense of embracing transparency, participation, accountability, and responsiveness), have usefully committed to publishing open data. However, as explored by Yu and Robinson9 , a government can theoretically be open using low-tech approaches, while open data efforts (e.g. releasing public bus schedules in an online, machine-readable format) can be undertaken by governments that remain politically closed and unaccountable. It is therefore worth keeping the distinction between openness of data and openness of government in mind. There are many instances of governments claiming a mantle of openness based on data provision without taking politically meaningful steps toward open government. Open data reforms may accelerate a transition to open government in some contexts, but assessing their potential to reduce corruption requires considering to what extent they address underlying political and institutional issues.

180

Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption


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Box 13.6 Trade of Influence in the Judiciary

55min
pages 362-386

Box 13.5 Court User and Multi-Stakeholder Justice Surveys

3min
page 361

Box 13.3 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts in the Philippines and Indonesia

2min
page 358

Box 13.4 International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA

6min
pages 359-360

Box 13.2 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts: Political Commitment or Implementation Gaps

2min
page 357

Box 10.1 The Extent of Corruption

2hr
pages 303-354

Box 13.1 Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA

6min
pages 355-356

Box 9.2 The Beneficial Ownership Data Standard (BODS

5min
pages 291-292

Box 9.3 Key Data Questions for Policy Makers to Consider

25min
pages 293-302

Table 7.4 AP’s Transformational Technologies

53min
pages 251-270

Box 9.1 What is a Beneficial Owner?

15min
pages 286-290

Figure 8.2 Final Findings of ANI Reports between 2008 and 2019

15min
pages 279-285

Table 7.2 Major Technology Trends for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

16min
pages 243-247

Box 6.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI

13min
pages 219-223

Table 7.3 Navigating GovTech for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

8min
pages 248-250

Box 7.2 Singapore’s SkillsFuture Program and Fraud Detection

2min
page 241

Box 7.1 Brazil’s Tribunal of Accounts Robots

2min
page 240

Box 6.1 What Does Open Data Have to Do with Open Government?

9min
pages 216-218

Figure 6.1 Unpacking Open Government

1min
page 215

Table 5.1 Corruption in Public Services: Estimating the Magnitude of the Problem

2min
page 190

Box 4.1 Standard Operating Procedures and Internal Audit Capacities in Latin America

2min
page 166

Figure 4.3 ACD Presence and Main Transit Trade Routes

1min
page 178

Box 4.3 Donor Support to Afghanistan Customs Department

2min
page 179

Box 2.5 Transparency in Renegotiation for Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 117

Box 3.1 About Empresas Públicas de Medellin

6min
pages 140-141

Box 3.3 The Impact of Operation Car Wash across Latin America

2min
page 145

Figure 2.7 Causes of Renegotiation, based on 48 Projects that experienced Renegotiation

5min
pages 115-116

Figure 1.2 Change in Corruption Risk Indicators as a result of the e-GP Intervention

55min
pages 75-93

Box 2.4 The Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS

6min
pages 102-103

Box 2.1 IFC’s Integrity Due Diligence (IDD

10min
pages 94-97

Figure 2.6 Making Infrastructure Data Useful for Planners, Implementers and Policy Makers

19min
pages 106-113

Figure 2.5 Multi-Stakeholder Working at the Project Level

2min
page 105

Box 2.2 The Evolution of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Accountability in Infrastructure

2min
page 99

Box 2.3 The Role of the CoST Secretariat

1min
page 100

Box 1.1 Timeline on Somali National Army Rations Re-tendering

16min
pages 68-73
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