Global Report: Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency - The Fight Against Corruption

Page 303

PART II KEY INSTRUMENTS FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Corruption is intrinsically linked to tax crimes, as corrupt persons do not report their income from corrupt activities for tax purposes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) includes tax crimes in the set of designated predicate offenses for money laundering purposes, explicitly recognizing the linkages between tax crimes and money laundering. Moreover, the extensive level of corruption related to tax has serious implications for government revenues and thus economic development, as indicated in Box 10.1. Inter-agency collaboration strengthens the efforts of tax administrations to combat corruption. In its 20101 recommendations, the OECD advocated greater cooperation and better information sharing between different government agencies active in the fight against financial crimes both domestically and internationally. Agencies, including financial intelligence units (FIUs), anti-corruption units, police, customs authorities, and the public prosecutor’s office are also involved in countering corruption. While most of the administration for prosecuting tax crimes related to corruption can be undertaken by tax authorities, they often require support in the form of information sourcing or expertise from other agencies who are also combating corruption. Entering into inter-agency collaboration may substantially enhance the efforts of a tax administration and other agencies combating corruption. Guidance on how this can be achieved is given in Case Study 20, along with references from Africa and other regions of the world. Investigating and prosecuting alleged corruption requires robust evidence, which is often scattered across agencies that are accustomed to working independently. Data sharing is an initial gateway for collaboration. In general, inter-agency cooperation between tax administration, financial intelligence units

CHAPTER 10 EXCHANGE AND COLLABORATION WITH TAX ADMINISTRATIONS

(FIUs), financial institutions, anti-corruption authorities, and other enforcement agencies can strengthen efforts to uncover cases of corruption through the sharing of information. The variety of expertise, skills, knowledge and experience offered by cooperation, not only provides joint teams with significant resources, but it also ensures that all offenses are properly identified, investigated and prosecuted. As the OECD has noted, many countries are looking at ways to enhance interagency cooperation so that they are working toward a common goal.2

There are multiple benefits that can be gained from a joint effort to prosecute tax evasion and other financial crimes including: • Ensuring evidentiary standards are met for all charges through cooperation with the prosecuting authority; • Access to mutual legal assistance from foreign law enforcement agencies; • Access to specialized tribunals, including tax tribunals and anti-corruption tribunals, giving rise to a greater likelihood of success where the judicial process may take more time; and • Prevention of any duplication of effort and any likelihood of compromising the actions of one agency. Case Study 21 explores the basic requirements for effective prosecutions of financial crimes, the role of the tax administrations, and the limitations that must be overcome for them to happen. Experiences are highlighted from South Africa and Brazil.

BOX 10.1

The Extent of Corruption “...in countries perceived to be less corrupt; the least corrupt governments collect 4 percent of GDP more in taxes than those at the same level of economic development with the highest levels of corruption.....and if all countries were to reduce corruption in a similar way, they could gain $1 trillion in lost tax revenues, or 1.25 percent of global GDP ” - IMF

Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption

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Box 13.6 Trade of Influence in the Judiciary

55min
pages 362-386

Box 13.5 Court User and Multi-Stakeholder Justice Surveys

3min
page 361

Box 13.3 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts in the Philippines and Indonesia

2min
page 358

Box 13.4 International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA

6min
pages 359-360

Box 13.2 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts: Political Commitment or Implementation Gaps

2min
page 357

Box 10.1 The Extent of Corruption

2hr
pages 303-354

Box 13.1 Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA

6min
pages 355-356

Box 9.2 The Beneficial Ownership Data Standard (BODS

5min
pages 291-292

Box 9.3 Key Data Questions for Policy Makers to Consider

25min
pages 293-302

Table 7.4 AP’s Transformational Technologies

53min
pages 251-270

Box 9.1 What is a Beneficial Owner?

15min
pages 286-290

Figure 8.2 Final Findings of ANI Reports between 2008 and 2019

15min
pages 279-285

Table 7.2 Major Technology Trends for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

16min
pages 243-247

Box 6.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI

13min
pages 219-223

Table 7.3 Navigating GovTech for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

8min
pages 248-250

Box 7.2 Singapore’s SkillsFuture Program and Fraud Detection

2min
page 241

Box 7.1 Brazil’s Tribunal of Accounts Robots

2min
page 240

Box 6.1 What Does Open Data Have to Do with Open Government?

9min
pages 216-218

Figure 6.1 Unpacking Open Government

1min
page 215

Table 5.1 Corruption in Public Services: Estimating the Magnitude of the Problem

2min
page 190

Box 4.1 Standard Operating Procedures and Internal Audit Capacities in Latin America

2min
page 166

Figure 4.3 ACD Presence and Main Transit Trade Routes

1min
page 178

Box 4.3 Donor Support to Afghanistan Customs Department

2min
page 179

Box 2.5 Transparency in Renegotiation for Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 117

Box 3.1 About Empresas Públicas de Medellin

6min
pages 140-141

Box 3.3 The Impact of Operation Car Wash across Latin America

2min
page 145

Figure 2.7 Causes of Renegotiation, based on 48 Projects that experienced Renegotiation

5min
pages 115-116

Figure 1.2 Change in Corruption Risk Indicators as a result of the e-GP Intervention

55min
pages 75-93

Box 2.4 The Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS

6min
pages 102-103

Box 2.1 IFC’s Integrity Due Diligence (IDD

10min
pages 94-97

Figure 2.6 Making Infrastructure Data Useful for Planners, Implementers and Policy Makers

19min
pages 106-113

Figure 2.5 Multi-Stakeholder Working at the Project Level

2min
page 105

Box 2.2 The Evolution of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Accountability in Infrastructure

2min
page 99

Box 2.3 The Role of the CoST Secretariat

1min
page 100

Box 1.1 Timeline on Somali National Army Rations Re-tendering

16min
pages 68-73
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