Global Report: Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency - The Fight Against Corruption

Page 358

PART III ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION

CHAPTER 13 JUSTICE SYSTEM

If the commitment at the political level exists, it requires an adequate communication strategy as well as sound technical solutions to translate it into tangible improvements. Putting in place an adequate normative framework to fight corrupt practices is often a starting point, but it is at the level of implementation through justice institutions where the rubber really hits the road to translate the political commitment into results on the ground. In the case of the Philippines, such results have not materialized and in the case of Indonesia these results, while initially promising, are disappointing (Box 13.3).

The overarching goal is for the entire justice system to work properly, and in today’s world, this requires international cooperation. Domestically, the justice system is based on the mandates of the police, prosecution service and the courts within the given jurisdiction. But in an increasingly interconnected world, mutual legal assistance and other forms of international cooperation between jurisdictions are crucial to effectively fight against cross-border corruption, as Box 13.4 explains.

BOX 13.3

Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts in the Philippines and Indonesia The Philippines’ Sandiganbayan is the oldest specialized anti-corruption court in the world. It has operated since 1979 without interruption and witnessed several amendments since its creation. Sandiganbayan is at the level of a Court of Appeals, but functions as a court of first instance. It has original jurisdiction over anti-corruption cases provided they are (1) brought against a senior public official; and (2) involve a sufficiently large amount of money. Its decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court. The Office of the Ombudsman has exclusive authority to bring cases to the Sandiganbayan. In addition to the political signal to the population, the main declared rationale in creating Sandiganbayan was to expedite anticorruption cases. They have struggled to meet that objective. Sandiganbayan experienced, over the years, substantial inefficiencies and delays in deciding anti-corruption cases, in part due to limitations at the Office of the Ombudsman. 20 In 2002, Indonesia’s specialized anti-corruption court, known as the Tipikor, was established at the same time as the Corruption Eradication Commission, known as the KPK. Due to a Constitutional Court ruling in 2006, criticizing the legal dualism established by these specialized institutions, the entire anti-corruption judicial system underwent a major legal reform in 2009. Initially, there was one Tipikor court in Jakarta. Only the KPK had competence to bring cases before this court, while the public prosecution brought cases only before the general courts. The Tipikor had a conviction rate of 100% in 250 cases, while only 51% of cases prosecuted by the public prosecution resulted in a conviction. The 2009 reform decentralized the system by creating 34 Tipikor courts, one in each Indonesian province. Both the KPK and the public prosecution can bring cases. Prior to the 2009 reform, the integrity of the specialized judges before the Tipikor was not questioned. They were perceived as rather overzealous in achieving a 100% conviction rate. With the decentralization and the convictions of several specialized judges for corruption, the belief that these judges are clean and trustworthy outsiders to the system has been undermined. 21 The recent KPK law risks reducing the institution’s effectiveness at attracting high-quality employees and its independence in gathering information. This could partly reverse the remarkable progress in controlling high-level corruption since the institution’s establishment.

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Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption


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Box 13.6 Trade of Influence in the Judiciary

55min
pages 362-386

Box 13.5 Court User and Multi-Stakeholder Justice Surveys

3min
page 361

Box 13.3 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts in the Philippines and Indonesia

2min
page 358

Box 13.4 International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA

6min
pages 359-360

Box 13.2 Specialized Anti-Corruption Courts: Political Commitment or Implementation Gaps

2min
page 357

Box 10.1 The Extent of Corruption

2hr
pages 303-354

Box 13.1 Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA

6min
pages 355-356

Box 9.2 The Beneficial Ownership Data Standard (BODS

5min
pages 291-292

Box 9.3 Key Data Questions for Policy Makers to Consider

25min
pages 293-302

Table 7.4 AP’s Transformational Technologies

53min
pages 251-270

Box 9.1 What is a Beneficial Owner?

15min
pages 286-290

Figure 8.2 Final Findings of ANI Reports between 2008 and 2019

15min
pages 279-285

Table 7.2 Major Technology Trends for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

16min
pages 243-247

Box 6.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI

13min
pages 219-223

Table 7.3 Navigating GovTech for Public Sector Fraud and Corruption

8min
pages 248-250

Box 7.2 Singapore’s SkillsFuture Program and Fraud Detection

2min
page 241

Box 7.1 Brazil’s Tribunal of Accounts Robots

2min
page 240

Box 6.1 What Does Open Data Have to Do with Open Government?

9min
pages 216-218

Figure 6.1 Unpacking Open Government

1min
page 215

Table 5.1 Corruption in Public Services: Estimating the Magnitude of the Problem

2min
page 190

Box 4.1 Standard Operating Procedures and Internal Audit Capacities in Latin America

2min
page 166

Figure 4.3 ACD Presence and Main Transit Trade Routes

1min
page 178

Box 4.3 Donor Support to Afghanistan Customs Department

2min
page 179

Box 2.5 Transparency in Renegotiation for Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 117

Box 3.1 About Empresas Públicas de Medellin

6min
pages 140-141

Box 3.3 The Impact of Operation Car Wash across Latin America

2min
page 145

Figure 2.7 Causes of Renegotiation, based on 48 Projects that experienced Renegotiation

5min
pages 115-116

Figure 1.2 Change in Corruption Risk Indicators as a result of the e-GP Intervention

55min
pages 75-93

Box 2.4 The Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS

6min
pages 102-103

Box 2.1 IFC’s Integrity Due Diligence (IDD

10min
pages 94-97

Figure 2.6 Making Infrastructure Data Useful for Planners, Implementers and Policy Makers

19min
pages 106-113

Figure 2.5 Multi-Stakeholder Working at the Project Level

2min
page 105

Box 2.2 The Evolution of Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Accountability in Infrastructure

2min
page 99

Box 2.3 The Role of the CoST Secretariat

1min
page 100

Box 1.1 Timeline on Somali National Army Rations Re-tendering

16min
pages 68-73
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