The Evolution of A Resistance Movement: The Case of Hamas

Madelyn Evans Edited by Ilona Metais

Hamas’ electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections definitively marked the group’s entrance into the political sphere, impacting the internal political scene as well as regional dynamics.

ABSTRACT This paper will explore two crucial moments in Hamas’ history, which mark monumental changes in the evolution of Hamas as an organization and a movement. Firstly, this paper will analyze Hamas’ milestone electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which marked Hamas’ formal entrance as a political actor in the region. Hamas’ electoral triumph was due to disillusionment with the corruption of Fatah, popular legitimacy established through its economic and social programs, and the platform’s emphasis on a secular – rather than ideological or religious – agenda. Secondly, this paper will examine Hamas’ unprecedented rebranding in its 2017 charter, which reflects the movement’s ideological shift and an upgraded political program. The group decided to adapt its image because of exacerbating constraints from the situation in Gaza, the prospect of reconciliation with Egypt, and a need to gain legitimacy on the global level. Finally, this paper will discuss prospects for the future of Hamas, explaining how Hamas’ previous patterns of adjustment and adaptation to the needs of the Palestinian people signal the likelihood of a continuation of similar shifts. Overall, this paper seeks to demonstrate that over the course of Hamas’ existence, adaptation has become a defining characteristic of Hamas as a movement.

INTRODUCTION In December of 1987, shortly after the First Intifada erupted, a group of Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the Gaza Strip established Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). Best known by its Arabic acronym “Hamas,” (meaning zeal), the Islamist militant group declared its commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel, to the rejection of a twostate solution, and to the liberation of all of Palestine. 1 Since its founding, Hamas differentiated itself from other Palestinian groups by its refusal to join the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and through its strategy of embracing armed struggle over peace treaties. As a religious-nationalist liberation movement, Hamas fiercely renounced negotiating with Israel diplomatically on the premise that doing so would act as a formal recognition of the state’s existence and legitimacy. Over the course of Hamas’ existence, its strategies, agenda, and ideology have evolved significantly. This paper will explore two crucial moments in the group’s history which mark monumental changes in the evolution of Hamas as an organization and a movement. First, this paper will analyze Hamas’ milestone electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. These elections marked Hamas’ formal entrance into politics and established the group as a player within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which could no longer be ignored. In order to assess how Hamas achieved such an unanticipated political triumph, this paper will examine the main factors which led to this electoral victory including the failings and corruption of Fatah, the establishment of charitable grassroots networks, and Hamas’ broad, secular platform. Next, this paper will examine Hamas’ unprecedented rebranding in its 2017 renewed manifesto, which reflects the movement’s ideological shift and showcases its upgraded

political program. The factors that led to Hamas’ shifting trajectory will then be assessed, and these include mounting pressures from the worsening conditions in Gaza, the need to better relations with Egypt, and a desire to improve its international standing. Finally, this paper will discuss prospects for the future of Hamas. Overall, this paper seeks to demonstrate that through Hamas’ decision to become a formal political actor in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections and renewal of its charter in 2017, adaptation has become one of the defining characteristics of Hamas as a movement. Furthermore, this paper argues that Hamas’ actions demonstrate that the group has evolved into a rational political actor who adapts to the changing demands of the Palestinian people and the regional status quo.

THE MILESTONE 2006 ELECTIONS: HAMAS’ TRIUMPH

On January 25, 2006, Hamas shocked the world with its landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. In an election with 77 percent voter turnout, Hamas won 42.9 percent of the vote, giving it a parliamentary majority with 74 of the 132 seats. 2 The rival party, Fatah, received only 41.43 percent of the vote. Consequently, the results of the 2006 parliamentary elections overturned forty years of Fatah’s domination. 3 The election was judged by international observers to be “competitive and genuinely democratic.” 4 By virtue of its victory, Hamas formed a government and became the leading force in Palestine for the first time since its founding. 5 The 2006 elections were for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the legislature of the Palestinian National Authority which embodied Palestinian political legitimacy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 6 Fatah, a secular political party, was the preferred ruling government by Israel, the United States, Europe, many Arab regimes, the United Nations, and various other regional and international players. Governments across the globe were stunned: a “terrorist organization” (as it had been labeled in the West) could emerge as a victorious popular political power. 7 Between 2000 to 2005, Hamas was responsible for more than 40 percent of Israeli fatalities through its repeated violent attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers. 8 The Islamist militant group emphasized that its participation in the 2006 elections was part of its broader strategic goal of resistance to Israel and expressed its standing commitment to the liberation of Palestine and rejection of the Oslo agreements. 9 In spite of the group’s claims of consistency in its goals, however, Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 legislative elections signaled a significant shift in its approach to the political status quo. 10 Up until 2005, Hamas had refused to participate in national elections because it would have been an endorsement of the Oslo agreements. 11 The provisions of the 1993 Oslo Accords stipulated that the Palestinian leadership recognized Israel’s right to exist and were willing to commit to finding a peaceful solution. Hamas rejected participation in the 1996 legislative elections, because it perceived the elections as an outcome of the accords. 12 Hamas’ entrance into the political process hence raised questions about the group’s fundamental stance. 13 In the lead-up to 2006, Hamas justified its decision to participate in the elections by claiming the Oslo Accords, for all

intents and purposes, “terminated with the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000” and that Israel had recognized this termination by violating its provisions. 14 The reasoning held little weight, however, since Hamas’ participation in the election was an implicit acceptance of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

In late 2004, Hamas made the decision to participate in the Palestinian municipal elections. Though these elections signaled Hamas’ increasing disposition toward the political realm, they were of lesser significance because the municipalities were primarily in charge of mundane matters of daily life. 15 Hamas’ engagement in the 2005 elections thus did not spark doubts regarding the group’s commitment to its founding principles laid out in its 1988 covenant. Participation in legislative elections, contrastingly, necessarily required Hamas deal with Israel, the international community, and various political compromises. 16 The party understood that participating in the legislative elections entailed a new political idiom and terminology; such changes were reflected through their more moderate rhetoric in the election manifesto. 17 At the level of its internal make-up, Hamas became more politicized – somewhat at the expense of its characteristic militarism. 18 Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections had far-reaching implications. In the wake of the electoral results, Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia from the Fatah party and his cabinet resigned. While Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas successor for prime minister, called for a political partnership between Hamas and President Abbas, several Fatah leaders voiced that they had no intention of forming a coalition with Hamas. 19 Consequently, the 2006 legislative election ushered in a murky period of transition within the Palestinian Authority (PA). The institutional fragmentation and instability within the Palestinian arena in the aftermath of the elections marked the intensification of tensions between Fatah and Hamas – tensions which would escalate into civil war just one year later.

Hamas’ parliamentary victory also had momentous policy implications for Israel. Hamas’ triumph reinforced the credo that violent resistance against Israeli occupation was popular among the Palestinian people. Israel responded by vowing to reject dealing with Hamas politically unless it disarmed and renounced its commitment to the destruction of Israel. 20 Additionally, Israel, along with the United States and its Quartet partners (Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) cut off contact with and halted assistance to the PA. 21 Israel began withholding approximately $50 million in monthly tax and customs receipts it collected for the PA. 22 Furthermore, banks around the world refused to deal with the PA, suspending its access to banking services and loans for fear of conflicting with U.S. anti-terrorism laws and being cut off from the U.S. banking system. 23 Accordingly, Hamas’ decision to take part in the 2006 elections profoundly impacted the nature of the movement, the Palestinian political scene, and regional dynamics at large. 24

FACTORS OF HAMAS’ 2006 ELECTION VICTORY Hamas’ unanticipated victory in the 2006 elections can be traced to several fundamental factors, one of them being the pervasive failings and corruption

of Fatah. Since the mid-1990s, Fatah had earned the reputation as a “corrupt, divisive, and unresponsive” governing body. 25 Having dominated the Palestinian movement for decades, Fatah “had arrogantly come to view itself as the natural and indisputable leader.” 26 Fatah’s numerous scandals and inability to provide basic services or address high unemployment left many Palestinians impatient with the endemic corruption of the regime. Moreover, much of the population was further disillusioned with Fatah’s cynicism and lack of strategy. 27 Fatah had demonstrated an inability to win any concessions with Israel; meaningful negotiations between the two sides were consistently undermined, reflecting poorly on Fatah’s diplomatic capabilities. Many Palestinians viewed the unilateral nature of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 as a decision that former prime minister Mahmoud Abbas had nothing to do with and that perhaps was triggered by Hamas. 28 The culmination of Fatah’s shortcomings thus created a large gap in effective, popular leadership. Through a cleverly organized campaign, Hamas was able to fill that void in Palestinian governance.

In the lead-up to the 2006 elections, Hamas launched a political crusade against corruption. Monopolizing on Fatah’s weaknesses, Hamas ran under the party name “Change and Reform,” distinctly framing the election as a vote for the rampant corruption of the current regime versus a vote for change. Throughout its campaign, Hamas was able to construct an effective dichotomy between itself and Fatah in the public sector primarily through its network of social and economic programs. Fatah sorely lacked in these sectors and thus appeared “deficient and seemingly incapable of remediation.” 29 By underscoring the services it provided via its charitable institutions, Hamas advanced the perception of itself as the only viable political faction challenging the inadequacy of Fatah. 30 In 2004, a woman at an NGO meeting in Gaza stated, “We support Hamas because they take revenge for us, because they are strong and honest.” 31 Her views co-align with many of the attitudes among the population at the time. Many Palestinians indicated that despite voting for Hamas in 2006, they did not support Hamas’ Islamic platform or its focus on violent resistance. There was an overwhelming perception among Palestinians, even among Hamas’ enemies, that the group was “clean” in comparison to Fatah. 32 Therefore, the majority of Palestinians voted for Hamas because they wanted “change and reform in a dysfunctional system.” 33 Another significant factor which led to Hamas’ election victory was its successes in establishing charitable grassroots networks addressing social, economic, and political needs. 34 The electoral campaigns in 2004, 2005, and 2006 which Hamas participated in were key to expanding its reputation as a charitable social welfare organization. 35 These elections provided Hamas with opportunities to channel its power to the local level. Throughout these campaigns, Hamas often ran candidates on the basis of their charitable and social service work. 36 After its success in the local elections of July 2005, Hamas broadly expanded its legislative platform. It committed to providing social welfare, building a strong civil society, instilling viable institutions, and implementing financial management and accountability. 37 Hamas’ platform also promised economic reform, including free market initiatives, foreign investment, and reducing unemploy-

ment. 38 The group delivered on many of its welfare promises. By 2005, Hamas and its affiliated Islamic charities were supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial donations in Gaza. 39 The social welfare sector provided some form of assistance (such as emergency cash, food assistance, and medical care) to one in every six Palestinians. 40 It also dispensed need to struggling families, schools, hospitals, and orphanages, and youth programs. 41 Hamas’ focus on improving Palestinians’ lives was a party line which appealed to much of the public suffering from the economic conditions under Fatah’s inept governance. For years the PLO had failed to administer social services in the Palestinian territories or cater to the demand for jobs. In the face of enduring economic hardship, Hamas’ social programs offered the promise of aid and comfort many Palestinians sought. 42 Islamic notions of zakat, the social justice and charity aspect of Islam, also coincided with the appeal of Hamas’ platform. As one of the Five Pillars of Islam, zakat consoled many Muslims at a time when many in Palestinian society were turning increasingly to religion for solace, support, and solidarity. 43 Overall, it is evident that Hamas’ expansive social services network proliferated the movement from below and expanded Hamas’ strength throughout the public sector, ultimately leading to its victory in the 2006 elections.

A final critical factor of Hamas’ milestone victory was the group’s broad, secular platform and its capability to adapt to changing popular perceptions. Throughout the electoral campaigns leading up to 2006, Hamas demonstrated its ability to adapt to the needs of its constituency. Its platform was versatile, mobilizing a new discourse which stressed social, economic and governance issues above Islamic and bellicose matters. 44 In order to reach a broader scope of voters, Hamas limited its ideological language and branded itself as a pragmatic political party and welfare provider. By doing so, Hamas expanded its appeal to Palestinians who were not affiliated with the movement and may not have necessarily agreed with its radical militant line. 45 Its emphasis on a more secular program allowed Hamas to build a broader support base beyond followers of Islam. In its legislative electoral platform, religious references amounted to only “a page and a half out of the document’s fourteen pages.” 46 This demonstrated Hamas’ more flexible interpretation of its religious principles and allowed for the prioritization of its constituents’ socioeconomic and political concerns. The group’s reduced religious agenda also enabled Hamas to form alliances with non-believers and non-supporters such as Christians, Marxists, and secularists. 47 The majority of its legislators and municipal councilors were in fact “professionals and community leaders with a secular as opposed to a strictly religious education.” 48 Overall, these strategies enabled the party to attain a broader form of civic and political engagement. Thus, the stress on a secular program rather than on ideology or religion was an additional component essential to Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006.

HAMAS’ IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT: REBRANDING IN THE 2017 MANIFESTO On May 1, 2017, Hamas released a new manifesto – the first since its found-

ing charter of 1988. The new charter, issued by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Doha, Qatar, unveiled a strategic rebranding of Hamas as an organization. 49 The document attempted to present a “softer and more moderate face” of the Islamist militant group broadly known for its violent campaigns against Israel. 50 In the document Hamas, for the first time, accepted the idea of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in the six-day war of 1967. 51 This was a notable shift from Hamas’ former stated position, which rejected any territorial compromise. 52 Hamas’ previous refusal to accept the 1967 borders has been a “major sticking point” in failed negotiations between Israel and Palestine. 53 Such a shift in an ideological stance was a culmination of years of Hamas’ evolving agenda. For years Hamas had been strategically adjusting its political program and sending signals it might “be ready to begin a process of coexisting with Israel.” 54 While previous Hamas leaders hinted at the potential to accept a Palestinian state on 1967 lines, such ideas were never explicitly proclaimed in an official document. May of 2017 thus marked an unprecedented articulation of the progression of Hamas’ political strategy and its aim to distance itself from its former, more radical agenda. 55 The document has been described by some as the “contemporary summary of Hamas beliefs and aims” and has the potential to guide the group toward a more peaceful path as negotiations advance in the future. 56 Although the document may not represent a revolutionary departure from Hamas’ worldview, the substantive changes made in the new charter show there is at least the potential for a peace settlement – a potential which did not exist before. Hamas’ new charter thus marked a significant turning point at which the group sought to update its principles, policies, and evolving ideological goals to meet the external pressures of its geopolitical environment. 57 In the new policy document, Hamas softens some of its stated positions and uses more measured, pragmatic language. Although in the new charter Hamas does not explicitly disavow its aim to destroy Israel articulated in the 1988 Covenant, its language regarding its stance towards Israel is notably different. Rather than include its traditional discourse on the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state, the new document instead insists on armed resistance. 58 The new document offers no recognition of Israel (referring to the nation as the “Zionist entity”), but makes the noted differentiation that Hamas opposes Israel on national rather than religious grounds. 59 Interconnected with this modified attitude towards Israel, the new charter distinctively shifts away from using anti-semitic language. The 1988 charter was condemned for its frequent use of anti-Jewish rhetoric, criticized by many as racist. 60 At the May 1 press conference, Hamas leader Meshaal stressed a change in the group’s approach to the Jewish faith, affirming that “Hamas believes our struggle is against the Zionist occupation, the Zionist enterprise. It’s not a struggle against Jews or Judaism.” 61 Explicitly underscoring his statement was Article 16 of the new charter, which states, “Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion.” 62 Such terminology is a stark contrast to Hamas’ 1988 covenant, which is rife with anti-Semitic language and compares Jews to Nazis. 63 Article 7 of the former charter quotes the Prophet’s hadith: “The [Day of Judgment] will not come until Muslims will fight

the Jews (and kill them).” 64 In the new charter, the lack of anti-Jewish sentiment can be seen as a response to the criticism it previously received and a tactic by Hamas to improve its international standing. Hamas’ desire to broaden its global appeal is an important factor which will be later discussed. It partially explains why, in 2017, Hamas chose to offer a framing of the struggle against Zionism and Israel as having nothing to do with religion. 65 Perhaps more consequential than the manifesto’s modified attitude towards Israel and the Jews is the significant adjustment in Hamas’ relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. The new document abandons past references claiming Hamas is part of the Brotherhood, marking a crucial departure from a founding component of the group. 66 Initially emerging as an outgrowth of the pan-national Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ founding was intrinsically linked to the ideals and religious guidelines of the Islamist organization. The Hamas Covenant of 1988 explicitly states the link between Hamas and the Brotherhood in Article Two: “The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine.” 67 In the 2017 charter this association was abandoned, suggesting Hamas’ effort to portray itself as a local Palestinian movement which stresses the “necessity of building Palestinian national institutions,” rather than pan-Islamic objectives. 68 Throughout the document, the nationalist and resistance aspects of the group’s purpose are emphasized far more than the religious ones. 69 These changes are notable because they demonstrate that the movement’s policies and positions have shifted away from Islamism and dogma and are now closer to spheres of pragmatism and nationalism. 70 Cutting ties with the Brotherhood was also significant for its potential to improve Hamas’ strained relations with Egypt and other Arab states. 71 Considered a terrorist organization by many Middle Eastern nations, numerous Arab leaders view the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to their authoritarian rule. In Egypt, in particular, the group has been systematically targeted by the government especially since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s bloody crackdown beginning in 2013. 72 Related to Hamas’ abandonment of its Brotherhood linkage, the new document also insists that Hamas “opposes intervention in the internal affairs of any country.” 73 The reassurance that the group is not a revolutionary force which pursues foreign interference is a commitment which was welcomed by other states in the region. 74 Such distinctions in the 2017 charter are further indications of the movement’s shift in strategic thinking.

The impact of the changes Hamas made in its 2017 manifesto are broad-reaching and have the potential to influence future actions taken by the group. The movement’s ideological shift entails another major implication: a direction towards reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. As noted earlier, a key element of the new document was Hamas’ acceptance ofestablishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the first time in the group’s history, Hamas accepted the same goal as Fatah. 75 The fundamental difference previously dividing Hamas and Fatah was Hamas’ commitment to Israel’s destruction versus Fatah’s engagement in peace talks with Israel. Their divergence in goals had caused prior efforts to reconcile the two Palestinian factions to fail. Now that Hamas no longer calls for the demolition of the Israeli state, there

is the wider possibility the two parties can amend their differences. 76 The new charter brings both sides closer “to the same negotiating objective.” 77 Such steps towards reconciliation and a unified Palestinian objective are crucial in the long term goal of achieving some type of peace settlement with Israel and establishing Palestinian sovereignty. Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could facilitate peacemaking because Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas would be able to ensure Israel that a treaty in Gaza would be honored. 78 Thus, the fact that this charter has begun, at least in theory, to bridge the gap between two major Palestinian groups is largely significant in the broader context of the conflict.

Overall, Hamas’ new manifesto exhibits several pivotal shifts in the movement’s development. It adopts a nuanced tone, softer rhetoric when discussing Israel, calls for national unity, and cuts its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mustafa Barghouti, an independent Palestinian politician, noted the document was “the outcome of a political dialogue that has been held over a very long time,” and called it “a sign of maturity and a sign of political development.” 79 Such comments reaffirm the document’s importance in reaching a point of progress in the movement and an upgraded political program. Though the document does not radically undermine every element of the founding charter, it represents the legitimate potential for a more peaceful Hamas and an improvement of regional geopolitical relations in the future.

FACTORS OF HAMAS’ IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT IN THE 2017 CHARTER

The significant changes reflected in Hamas’ new manifesto and the timing of its release can be largely traced to the mounting pressures that the group faced (and continues to face) in the Gaza Strip. The revised charter was issued amid a continuing Egyptian and Israeli blockade of Gaza which had been in effect since June of 2007. Following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, Israel imposed a land, sea, and air blockade on the territory on the grounds of preventing militant attacks. 80 Over the past decade, conditions in the area under Hamas’ control have dramatically worsened. The blockade has crippled Gaza’s economy, cut people off from the outside world, and left its 1.9 million inhabitants suffering daily hardships. 81 As of mid-2016, the unemployment rate was almost 42 percent – one of the highest in the world – and over 70 percent of the population was receiving some form of international aid, the majority being food assistance. 82 By 2016, over 95 percent of the water was undrinkable and the surrounding sea was polluted by sewage. 83 In 2015, a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development warned that “the Gaza Strip could become ‘uninhabitable’ by 2020 if current economic trends persist.” 84 The worsening conditions in Gaza have increasingly constrained Hamas’ political choices, placing increasing stress on the group to find some sort of solution.

Movement restrictions imposed by Israel since the 1990s have rendered Palestinians in Gaza unable to access the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory and the outside world. 85 The isolation of Gaza was exacerbated by Egypt’s closure of the Rafah crossing in October 2014. Under Egyptian President

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the Egyptian government tightened security along the Gaza border, closed many of Hamas’ tunnels, and targeted Gazan fishing boats which strayed into Egyptian waters. 86 The loss of the tunnels in particular presented a serious logistical challenge for Hamas due to the critical role they played as an underground passage for smuggling combatants, weapons, and goods. 87 The volume of trade which traveled through the tunnels was up to “$700 million dollars a year,” highlighting the substantial damage the loss cost Hamas. 88 Each of these factors underscored Hamas’ incentives to adopt a new stance to attain reconciliation with Egypt and an alleviation of Israeli restrictions. It is evident that the extreme conditions of Gaza placed increasing pressure on Hamas to create a more flexible, moderate political and diplomatic framework in order to implore external powers to ease the blockade. 89 The exacerbating humanitarian crisis situation in Gaza has also served as an impetus for Hamas to seek to regain its declining support among its civilians. As of mid-2015, opinion polls found a high level of frustration among Gazans, with only one third expressing satisfaction with the performance of the government. 90 A positive evaluation of conditions in Gaza stood at a mere 14 percent, and 60 percent of Gazan youth between the ages of 18–28 expressed a desire to emigrate. 91 Hamas’ failures in providing services for the inhabitants of Gaza thus undercut its popular legitimacy among the Palestinian people. In the 2017 manifesto there is an important emphasis on nationalism and upholding the “aspirations of the Palestinian people,” underlining a stronger commitment to improving the societal issues Palestinians face. 92 It is evident that the pressure to improve its reputation among Gazans led Hamas to formulate a new nationalistic framework.

Another factor which explains the shift in Hamas’ ideology, as promulgated by the 2017 manifesto, was Hamas’ need to improve its relations with Egypt. These relations were interconnected with the situation in Gaza; the longer Hamas failed to reconcile its differences with Egypt, the longer the blockade would persist and exacerbate the conditions there. The new charter’s more moderate tone demonstrates an effort to alleviate economic pressure in Gaza from the tight border restrictions imposed by Israel and Egypt. 93 Such objectives also explain why Hamas sought to distance itself from the Muslim Brotherhood. As previously discussed, cutting ties with the Muslim Brotherhood offered the potential for Hamas to gain Egypt’s favor. Especially in recent years, Hamas felt the heavy burden and cost of its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of its impact on its international reputation. 94 In the context of the regional atmosphere at the time, Hamas realized abandoning its association with the Brotherhood could benefit the movement’s standing. Numerous Arab states, particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, were engaged in an offense against the Brotherhood and were suspicious of Hamas’ association with terrorist groups. Egypt had frequently accused Hamas of collaborating with the Brotherhood in planning terrorist attacks within the country. 95 . In abandoning the linkage, Hamas aimed to present itself as a group completely independent from other transnational organizations, reassuring those countries wary of the Brotherhood. 96 This aimed to facilitate the “opening of channels to dialogue

with Cairo” without the lingering affiliation of the Brotherhood. 97 Such efforts have proved relatively effective; relations between Hamas and Egypt started to improve the summer of 2017, just several months after Hamas’ new charter was published. 98 A final crucial factor of the ideological changes displayed in Hamas’ new charter was a desire to improve its international standing. Due to years of failures in gaining legitimacy on the global level and being characterized by much of the West as a “terrorist organization,” Hamas sought to reshape its image internationally. Traditionally, Hamas has been shut out of the peace process. In an attempt to distance itself from its terrorist label, Hamas utilized the 2017 charter to present itself as a responsible political partner capable of speaking both the language of politics and resistance. 99 It welcomes “the values of cooperation” and seeks to build international legitimacy by engaging in political and financial relations with various state actors. 100 As Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman in Gaza, argued, “To the world, our message is: Hamas is not radical. We are a pragmatic and civilised movement.” 101 The group’s desire to garner broader international support explains why the new document removes all anti-semitic language, cuts its linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood, and abandons its call for the destruction of Israel. Hamas’ new branding efforts thus offer a more moderate face to a group seeking to improve its standing among the international community.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR HAMAS The 2006 Palestinian elections and the revised 2017 manifesto demonstrated that adaptation has become one of the main characteristics of Hamas as a movement. Throughout its history the group has adjusted to the changing circumstances in order to meet the political reality of the region. Hamas has repeatedly abided by the desires of the Palestinian people, demonstrating remarkable flexibility in its ability to adapt to the status quo. In its efforts to continue to soften its image to the world, Hamas’ military wing has decreased in importance while its political wing has expanded. Hamas’ previous patterns of adjustment signal the likelihood of a continuation of similar shifts.

Historical precedents show that processes for militant organizations to change their ideology or disarm take years. It is significant to note the amount Hamas has evolved in the last thirty-two years and especially in the past decade alone. Up through 2006, Hamas considered the land of Palestine as indivisible and not something they would negotiate with. However, as the 2017 manifesto demonstrated, Hamas now accepts a Palestinian state at the 1967 borders. While a once more extremist Hamas entirely rejected the Oslo Accords, the group later amended its stance by engaging in the Palestinian electoral process. These changes demonstrate that Hamas has compromised on some of its founding principles in order to adapt to the regional and political status quo. With the direction the movement is currently heading, there is the possibility that Hamas will compromise more of its harder stances for the sake of attaining full Palestinian sovereignty. Hamas no longer seeks an escalation of violence and has not ruled out the possibility of joining the Palestinian order. The group will likely

continue its apparent willingness to explore the possibility of coexisting with Israel because it has recognized that its current strategies have failed.

Additionally, given the realities of the status quo in Gaza, it is highly foreseeable that Hamas will seek to pursue a more viable future for the territory. 102 As the situation continues to worsen without any prospects for improvements on the near horizon, Hamas may make some sort of concession to Israel and Egypt. Hamas is struggling under the strained financial situation and its legitimacy is diminishing in the eyes of its people. The conditions of poverty and environmental hazards continue to mount in severity and the Palestinian population living there cannot afford to wait any longer. The external pressure placed on the group by the nearly thirteen-year long blockade of Gaza already proved to be a large factor behind Hamas’ decision to rebrand itself to the world in its 2017 manifesto. The increasing pressure the situation in Gaza mounts on the population may drive Hamas to finally agree to a cease-fire.

It is expected that the Israeli government will continue to refuse to establish contact or negotiate with Hamas unless the movement demonstrates it is no longer the same movement it was founded as and that it does not seek to destroy Israel. If Hamas makes substantive, genuine, and repeated efforts to signal its willingness to work for peace negotiations with Israel, there is the possibility Israel might be willing to cooperate. Additionally, if Hamas were to reconcile its differences with Fatah and accept a coalition government, it might be more welcomed into the negotiating process. Many regional powers, including Egypt, are proponents of Hamas and the PLO joining together to restore unified Palestinian sovereignty. While Hamas cannot turn back the clock and reverse its former days of championing a military struggle and encouraging suicide bombing, it can look towards a future of negotiations, reconciliation, and possibly, one day, peace. 103

CONCLUSION Over the course of this paper, two critical moments in the evolution of Hamas as a movement were examined. Hamas’ electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections definitively marked the group’s entrance into the political sphere, impacting the internal political scene as well as regional dynamics. Its victory was traced to disillusionment with the shortcomings of Fatah, well-developed social welfare programs, and its emphasis on a more secular platform to garner broader support among the Palestinian population. Hamas’ publication of its revised charter in 2017 was another significant milestone in the group’s history, representing a point of political development, the culmination of several ideological shifts, and, moreover, further proof of the group’s ability to adapt. Its rebranding was traced to internal pressures from the situation in Gaza, external pressures from Egypt, and a desire to increase its international legitimacy. Since its founding, the trajectory of Hamas as a movement has shifted profoundly from radicalism to pragmatism, demonstrating remarkable adaptability. In the years to come, the world will witness the far-reaching reverberations as the Hamas agenda continues to adapt.

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