Arabization: Towards an Exclusive National Identity

Arabization: Towards an Exclusive National Identity

Florence Harvey-Hudon Edited by Ender McDuff

From colony to Arab territory: A discussion on the lasting effects of colonialism on Algerian and Moroccan identities

ABSTRACT This paper contrasts the experiences of Imazighen communities in the neighbouring countries of Algeria and Morocco, who share similar histories and political demands. While both groups have mobilized for language recognition, the teaching of Tamazight and history in schools, and repayment for the injustices inflicted against Imazighen communities during the colonial and independence eras, the Amazigh fight is more tenacious in Algeria than in Morocco. Looking at pre-colonial national identities and building on anthropological work from colonial periods, this paper assesses the effects of colonialism on national identity and reconstruction in both countries, as seen through Arabization policies. Finally, this paper draws parallels to the findings of Daniel Posner regarding size of sects, demography and regime type. Ultimately, the most significant factor explaining the varying degrees of mobilization in Algeria and Morocco is the former’s profound colonial experience, which resulted in the extremely exclusive nature of post-colonial nation-building efforts.

INTRODUCTION

The Imazighen — commonly known as Berbers — refer to the many tribes that have inhabited North Africa for thousands of years, regrouping in various locations throughout the expanse of the Atlas Mountains and now living in the vast area of the Maghreb. 1 These Berber tribes have known the Phoenicians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Spanish and French. 2 Today, the largest Berberophone communities are concentrated in six main groups: The Rif, Braber, Shluh, and Soussi in Morocco, as well as the Kabyles and Shawiya in Algeria. While it is widely acknowledged that “almost all Algerians [and Moroccans] are Berber in origin (not Arab), only a minority identify themselves as primarily Berber.” 3 Furthermore, the self-identified Berbers have long been denied recognition as the indigenous populations of the Maghreb, in which nations have rather tended toward “a fanatical stand about Arabism.” 4 As such, the Imazighen are now demanding to be recognized “in theory as the original inhabitants of North Africa and in practice as distinct components of its society.” 5 As presented in the official Berber Manifesto published in 2000, Imazighen demands include: the recognition of Tamazight as an official language enshrined in the countries’ constitutions, the teaching of Tamazight and history that includes the Berbers in schools, 6 and repayment for the injustices inflicted on Imazighen communities during the colonial and independence eras. 7 Historically, the Berbers have ensured the survival of their cultures and languages, with efforts tracing back to the colonial era 8 that have since catalyzed in pro-Imazighen advocacy, protests that led to violence and mass arrests, and the formation of organizations and political parties in both countries, respectively. 9 10 11 As a whole, the Amazigh movement has reached global visibility through organizations such as the World Amazigh Congress, and the Imazighen have sent delegations to the annual meetings of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. 12 Despite these shared backgrounds and demands, Amazigh identity has manifested itself more saliently in Algerian politics than in Moroccan politics. This

paper argues that this difference in political mobilization between Amazigh groups in Algeria and Morocco can ultimately be traced back to Algeria’s weak pre-colonial identity and transformative colonial past, which resulted in the formation of a reactionary national identity centered around a return to the Arab world, Islam, and Arabic — the ‘true’ pillars of Algerian identity. As a direct consequence, this exclusive national identity offers no room for Amazigh identity, resulting in a resurgence to protect it. In contrast, while colonial rule affected Morocco, it did not succeed in transforming the pre-existing Moroccan identity. As such, post-colonial Morocco ultimately returned to its pre-colonial self, resulting in less oppression of Amazigh rights and demands. As this paper concludes, these factors are moreover paired with a much higher political competitiveness and relative size of Berber groups in Algeria, which further explains a stronger Amazigh movement in Algeria.

COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

As neighbours, contrasting the colonial experience of Morocco and Algeria enables a better understanding of how the legacies left by the colonizers have shaped formation — or reaffirmation — of national identities. Specifically, a crucial distinction must be highlighted between the two territorial regimes to which the countries were subjected. While both were colonies de peuplement (settlement colonies), 13 Morocco was only a protectorate, while Algeria was “incorporated legally into Metropolitan France.” 14 This divergence brought great variance in the lived experience of each population, and translated into distinct colonial legacies that can be seen both resurfacing and facing opposition in the formation of national identity and within its affirmation through time.

I. Morocco For 44 years, from 1912 to 1956, Morocco was in protectorate relationships with both France and Spain, which controlled separate areas of the country. 15 However, Morocco’s history and the implementation of its protectorates created circumstances that helped it retain relative independence. Firstly, by the time French and Spanish colonization began, “Morocco had a thousand-year tradition of independence,” having never been completely subject to Ottoman rule. 16 Secondly, brutal military violence in Algeria not only kept the French busy (especially during the 1954-1962 liberation war), but it also served as a warning for the French, who decided to mitigate violence in Morocco. 17 Consequently, the French decided not to disrupt traditional Morocco; the sultanate continued, traditional state bureaucracy was left largely untouched, and traditional society was preserved. 18 Although the government was under supervision, no constitutional changes were made to restrain the powers of the sultan, which also retained symbolic importance. 19 Lastly, being under the control of two countries surprisingly worked to Morocco’s benefit, as France and Spain disagreed on various issues, most notably the 1953 dismissal of the sultan and the subsequent 1956 granting of independence, both issued by France without consulting Spain. 20 Additionally, this division meant Spain and France were ruling areas differently, with Spain dedicating fewer resources than France. 21 This resulted in more liber-

al policies in areas under Spanish control, which undermined the more invasive Jacobin methods of the French, who notably instated French education and engaged in divide and rule tactics between the Imazighen and Arabs. 22 Ironically, the result was “just the opposite of French intentions: it provoked a Moroccan nationalist reaction and forced the administration to modify its proposals,” also leading to the institution in 1933 of ‘Throne Day,’ which celebrates the sultan’s accession to the throne. 23 In this sense, French divide and rule tactics not only failed to be fruitful, but also revived Moroccan unity, which is centered around the figure of the sultan, their rightful ruler. As Brown highlights, “only Morocco arrived at independence with traditional forces still very much intact if not, indeed, in stronger position than the modernizers”. 24 Overall, despite the colonization of approximately eight per cent of Morocco’s most productive lands 25 and a settlement population that constituted between six and eight per cent 26 of Morocco’s population, the country nonetheless managed to maintain its integrity.

II. Algeria With 132 years of colonial rule and an eight-year bloody liberation war, Algeria has known one of the most bitter colonial experiences ever seen under the French. Indeed, as summarized by Mostefa Lacheraf, a well-known Algerian sociologist, historian, writer and politician, “if ever a colonial relationship may be said to have been born, lived and died in violence, it is French Algeria.” 27 This translates into multiple periods of violence: repressive pacification efforts that spluttered from 1830 until the 1850, the 1871 revolt of el-Mokrani, the disturbance of 1945, and the long revolution (1954-1962) that achieved independence. 28 As for assimilation policies, the official integration of Algeria to Metropolitan France 29 as a département français 30 resulted in a concrete effort to make Algeria an extension of French territory, characterized by intensive colonizer settlement and social re-engineering. 31 By 1954, the French settlers made up almost 10 per cent of Algeria’s population 32 and occupied up to 40 per cent of cultivable land. 33 Moreover, a thorough destruction of the Algerian aristocracy allowed for “complete colonial dominance of the Algerian administration” 34 and “radical destruction of native society and institutions.” 35 While the French developed communications, health, and educational infrastructure, 36 those were widely reserved for European French speakers. In employment, public sector jobs were concentrated — and mainly reserved — for the French in urban settlements, while “underemployment and chronic unemployment disproportionately affected Muslims, who lived mostly in rural and semirural areas.” 37 As such, European settlers gradually “established nearly total political, economic, and social domination over the country and its native inhabitants.” 38 Simultaneously, the French practiced favouritism of certain societal groups, following classic divide and rule tactics. The promotion of the Kabylian Vulgate, “which posited that Kabylian Berbers were really European in origin and only nominally attached to Islam,” 39 resulted in préjugé favorable 40 (favouritism) toward the Berbers. This, juxtaposed with the Jacobin political system that was transplanted to Algeria, “left no room for Berber identity to develop” 41 after indepen-

dence and eventually “rendered any particularist assertion of Kabylian Berber identity extremely suspect in nationalist eyes.” 42 More generally, the favouritism that Algerian upper bourgeoisie benefited from also resulted in more deeply transformative changes, effectively turning these elites into ‘Europeanized Algerians.’ 43 Through education and Westernization, these individuals became “more the product of the French educational system than of their own societies.” 44 Considering French to be their mother tongue and deeply attracted to France’s ideology of liberté, fraternité, égalité, some were even willing to renounce their Muslim faith in exchange for French political citizenship. 45 Parallelly, Algeria’s title of department français allowed for greater mobility of Algerians, especially after World War II, when France granted le droit à la libre circulation 46 (the right to circulate freely). Indeed, this resulted in the greatest portion of the Algerian diaspora being located in France, with approximately 900, 000 Algerians currently officially living in France (some estimates including sans papiers and refugees go as high as 5 million). 47 Altogether, French divide and rule techniques resulted in a tripartite separation of Algerian society, which translated into three distinct groups at the rise of the nationalist movement during the 1950s. While all groups fought for better conditions for Algerians, they fundamentally disagreed on how to achieve their goals. 48 From the pro-French to the anti-French extremes, the groups were also divided along class lines and religious ideology. 49 First, the Young Algerians or assimilationists were “Algerians who had gained access to French education and earned their living in the French sector,” pursued gradual reformist tactics and “were prepared to consider permanent union with France if the rights of Frenchmen could be extended to native Algerians.” 50 The second group comprised of Muslim reformers who were inspired by the religious Salafi movement and formed the Association of Algerian Muslim ʿUlamāʾ in 1931 under the leadership of Sheikh ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badis. 51 Not political in nature, the group nonetheless encouraged “a strong sense of Muslim Algerian nationality among the Algerian masses.” 52 The third group was formed in the 1920s by Algerians working in France and preached a “nationalism without nuance,” fueled by proletarian circumstances and radical ideologies. 53 Tangibly, this tripartition is a testament to the lack of unity that characterized Algeria at the time of independence. As a result, not only did colonialism deeply transform Algeria’s demography, but it also established deep divisions within Algerian society that made it nearly impossible to achieve national unity after independence.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Assessing the national identity of both Morocco and Algeria is vital for understanding the roles of Berber identities in politics. Examining the particular national identities in terms of their relative strengths can help deduce their effectiveness in bringing successful political order and unity. As Fukuyama notes, national identity carries out several functions in assuring the wellbeing of political entities; it ensures physical security, encourages quality of government, facilitates economic development, promotes a wide radius of trust within society, mitigates economic inequality, and fosters liberal democracy. 54 As “national identity begins

with a shared belief in the legitimacy of the country’s political system,” 55 it sets the foundation for long-term societal development.

Moreover, the specific articulation of national identities in Algeria and Morocco can provide crucial insights for understanding how and why Berber mobilization manifests itself differently in both countries. Indeed, the fundamental nature of national identities can help determine if they ultimately create unity or division between Arabs and Berbers. Since identity is rooted in thymos — “Plato’s term for the aspect of the human soul that is experienced emotionally through feelings of pride, shame, and anger and that craves recognition of dignity” 56 — it follows that an important part of national identity is derived from the population’s shared historical memories and, importantly, “their expectations about what it takes to become a genuine member of the community.” 57 Seeing how these national identities are “embodied in formal laws and institutions that dictate, for example, which language(s) will be considered official, or what schools will teach children about their country’s past,” 58 will provide concrete ways to assess their relative inclusivity. This is crucial, as while national identity mostly refers to communal sentiment, it is still formed by individuals, who also search for their personal identity. As such, national identities that aim to homogenize heterogenous populations often face strong resistance, as people “want their specific selves to be recognized and celebrated, not suppressed […] They want to feel a connection with their ancestors and know where they came from.” 59 This paper will focus on Arabization policies, as they symbolize a clear aftermath of the ‘politics of resentment’ that arise when “a political leader has mobilized followers around the perception that a group’s dignity has been affronted […] or otherwise disregarded.” 60 While national identities in both countries are formed around the pillars of Islam, Arabic, and Arab identity, Islam is not a point of tension between Arabs and Berbers, as Berbers were effectively converted during the Muslim Arab invasion of North Africa in 7 th Century CE. 61

I. Morocco As a political entity whose cultural and political identity had been established since the 17 th Century CE, 62 Morocco’s Islamic Monarchy has fostered one of the most stable national identities in the region. Indeed, while the country has mostly identified as Arab, Muslim, and Arabophone over time, Morocco’s elites promote the prevalence of Moroccan identity as first and foremost Moroccan; this is done, for example, by prohibiting parties based on religious, ethnic, or regional identities. 63 As such, extensive focus is placed on the monarchical figures of the Alawite dynasty, who have symbolized strong leaders for centuries. These figures have “often used their prestige as religious leaders to contain internal conflicts,” 64 whether caused by competition among tribes, attitudes toward religious beliefs, or language policies.

While colonial rule affected Morocco in significant ways, the country’s thousand-year tradition of independence allowed the monarchy to serve as an anchor of Moroccan culture and political identity throughout the oppressive rule. Indeed, while the monarchy may have lost influence during the French and Spanish occupations, the symbolic “fiction of the sultan’s sovereignty” 65 was

maintained, allowing for a certain continuity in national identity. Additionally, the sultan did play a role in defending Moroccan interests in key moments, such as in 1940 when he “signified his independence by refusing to approve anti-Jewish legislation.” 66 Overall, the sultan’s ability to protect Morocco as much as possible during colonial rule resulted in fewer deeply transformative consequences for the country. Consequently, post-independence rule was less reactionary than that in Algeria, as Morocco largely returned to its past identity. While measures to promote Moroccan identity as Arab-Muslim were made, the relatively progressive ruler — whose hand was also forced by political pressure and attempts on his life 67 — allowed for more inclusive post-independence policies, which were more accepting of multiculturalism than those in Algeria, as a direct result of the salience of Moroccan identity.

II. Algeria As compared with Morocco, Algeria is a much ‘newer’ country whose identity was only solidified post-independence. Indeed, Algeria’s geography and topography had resulted, before Ottoman rule, in “the western part of the country [being] associated more closely with Morocco while the eastern part held closer ties with Tunisia.” 68 Furthermore, the mountainous region of the Atlas, hosting a significant minority of Tamazight speakers, made Algeria “more resistant to Arabization as compared with North African countries to the east.” 69 As a consequence, Ottoman Algeria failed to develop strong political nationalism, which gave more room for the 132 years of colonial rule to transform Algeria. This meant that only a “transient, nearly rootless society” 70 emerged from the divisive colonial rule, resulting in the creation of an identity that relied on a “cult of the martyr” — the collective feeling of being “subjugated to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon [a] group consciousness […] and chang[es] their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways 71 — as a direct response to the cultural trauma. 72 Thus, as a direct reaction to colonial rule, post-independence ideolgues of the National Liberation Front (FLN) political party promoted the “construction of an Algerian ‘new man’ […] culturally and spiritually liberated by a ‘decolonisation of the mind’ (decolonisation des esprits) based in a fusion of Arab nationalism and socialism.” 73 Meanwhile, the Berbers promoted Algérie Algérienne as secular and multicultural, which stood in stark contrast to the FLN’s Algérie arabo-musulmane (‘Arab-Muslim Algeria’), 74 causing their exclusion from the nationalist movement — a phenomenon known as the Berberist crisis 75 — and subsequently from high-ranking positions in national government. 76 This paper will now demonstrate how Arabization policies, which presented Arabic as the “martyr language,” 77 further promoted the exclusive national identity defined by the FLN and resulted in Amazigh resistance to such exclusion.

ARABIZATION POLICIES Arabization policies came as a sine qua non of post-colonial periods in both Algeria and Morocco. Indeed, Arabization served not only to disavow colonial legacies, but also as a central part of identity affirmation. Concretely, Arabization encompasses efforts aiming at the adoption of the Arabic language in

countries of the Maghreb following their independence. 78 Arabization, while being adopted to varying degrees and in distinct manners in Morocco and Algeria, was central to the reinvigoration of national identity in both countries. More precisely, Arabization presented both national identities as enshrined within the Arab world and as opposed to belonging with France or the West, making the policies an expression of pan-Arabism, 79 which was at its peak during Morocco’s liberation. Additionally, a strong desire to resist Western influence and meddling was also present in the Ba’th Party, 80 thus giving momentum to these Arabization policies, namely in Algeria. 81 As a direct consequence of these policies, however, Amazigh languages in Morocco and Algeria were worse off, because the Amazigh movement as a whole was categorized as “hindrances to unifying the countries under the political power of the Arab rulers.” 82

I. Morocco As a French protectorate, Morocco was subjected to francisation of its population and education system, but to a much lesser extent than that which occurred in Algeria. Indeed, as the protectorate was not attempting to foster des citoyens français, the colonial authorities were more accepting of Arabic and other Amazigh languages in education and other governmental spheres. This meant that in Morocco, “Arabic never disappeared as a language used for literacy by the elites.” 83 As a consequence, a hierarchical educational system emerged, in which Europeans and Moroccan Jews were taught exclusively in French, Moroccan elites were taught the same curriculum with 10 hours of Arabic per week added, and middle-class Moroccans were taught in ‘private schools,’ paid by nationalist networks, where they were taught 20 hours of Arabic per week. 84 While French francisation policies were not forcing Moroccan children to be educated in French, they were creating a deep cleavage between the French-speaking elites and the Arabic-speaking lower classes. Consequently, once independence came, the Arabization process was torn between the dissimilar interests of political actors in Morocco. On one hand, “Morocco’s first political party, Istiqlal, sought an immediate and complete Arabization of the educational system,” while, on the other hand, the Monarch defended more progressive linguistic policies. 85 Ipso facto, Arabization policies have been implemented following ‘cycles,’ as described by anthropologist Gilbert Grandguillaume. 86 As summarized by Strengholt, great efforts to Arabize education and the civil service were made between 1959 and 1966, at which point massive problems were endemic in all schools. 87 Not only was the government not able to provide free education for all, but Arabization had been implemented without careful preparation and had resulted in underperformance. 88 From then on, Arabization policies were halted, until the opposition organized and petitioned for radical action in 1973. 89 The monarch, faced with these demands, complied, and thus continued the cycles of implementing and halting Arabization. These cycles were finally brought to an end in 1994, when 55 per cent of Moroccans were still illiterate. 90 The monarch, eventually faced by the humble reality of the lacking education system as well as the discontent of the French and Amazigh speaking groups, decided to adopt a more progressive attitude toward Arabization, even calling for Amazigh educa-

tion. 91 Eventually, this translated into many ‘setbacks’ for Arabization; in 1997, literacy in Arabic and French was made mandatory for acceptance to university, and in 1999, a National Charter for Education and Training acknowledged the need for students to study foreign languages. 92 In 2011, Amazigh was even finally recognized as an official language in the constitution. 93 Overall, Arabization policies have proven relatively successful in Morocco, although their implementation has been slow and inconsistent. This can be explained partly by the more progressive, all-pleasing attitude of the monarch, who was restrained in implementing these policies.

II. Algeria Alternatively, Arabization policies have been more pervasive in Algeria, which has adopted an aggressive attitude toward their implementation. This difference in intensity can partly, once again, be attributed to more invasive French colonial rule and its persisting legacy, where the French language had become extremely widespread within government communication and education facilities. 94 This can be seen as a direct result of centralized Jacobin practices, which could not tolerate the presence of another language acting in rivalry with the ‘great tradition.’ 95 Tangibly, colonial legislators even issued a decree declaring Classical Arabic as a ‘foreign language’ in March 1938, 96 thereby denying the primacy of Arabic and its central role in Algerian history altogether. Symbolically, this colonial attitude equated to the denial of an Algerian polity before France’s arrival, as if to erase Algeria’s history and provide France a blank canvas with which to start. This can be seen as similar to the ‘discovery of the New World,’ wherein the indigenous populations were seen as savages roaming on land that awaited French occupation and utilization.

In Algeria’s case, this repressive French imposition was met by equally aggressive regulations for Arabization after independence. Acting not only as a rejection of France’s legacy, Arabization was also pivotal in the formation of post-colonial Algeria. As explained by Mohamed Benrabah, Algerian elites have used Arabization as an ideological process to gain political legitimacy after independence. 97 Through the top-down approach of Arabization, elites could use language simultaneously in the service of self-legitimation, nation building, and the creation of a “new Algeria.” 98 In this sense, they aimed to emulate the assimilationist language policies the Chinese and Americans had implemented, in the belief that monolingualism would bring greater unity to the country. The elites’ promotion of monolingualism was implemented foremost through education — which was the first institution to be Arabized — when the religio-conservatives took control of the Ministry of Education in July, 1965. 99 The importance of this change cannot go unnoted, as it is believed that “schools function as major socializing agents that can reflect and (re)produce the dominant social order or the order that the dominant group(s) aim(s) to set up.” 100 Through the imposition of Arabic in education, officials believed they had not only found a way to get rid of French as a language of instruction, but also found a “solution to the problem of the Berber language.” 101 An FLN party cadre even stated on the record that through a disassociation between child and family, by which children could not

understand their parents and vice-versa, the strategy would eventually help eradicate Berber language(s). 102 Such statements clearly demonstrate that Arabization in Algeria also created a diglossia, which Ferguson describes as a “social context in which two clearly distinguished languages coexist, one High and one Low.” 103 Further evidence of this antagonism of Berber language(s) can also be noted, such as in 1996 when “the National Council of Transition prohibited the use of any language other than Arabic after 1998 in government, commerce, and civil organizations, and after 2000 in the higher education system.” 104 Predictably, this decision was met by popular unrest and “drew strong protests in Kabylia, and among French speakers in general.” 105 Hence, it can concluded that Arabization policies in Algeria not only failed to provide Algerian authorities legitimacy, but also added fuel to the already existing Berber insurrection by further denying its rights. The reluctant recognition of Tamazight as a national language in 2002 demonstrates the inability of the Algerian officials to effectively suppress their Amazigh constituents, while also serving as a clear sign of the policies’ failure.

CONCLUSIONS ON ARABIZATION POLICIES

It is also important to note that, parallel to Arabization policies, reforms in school curricula have served to reinforce the idea of Arab primacy. For example, history books mention Arab Muslims by calling them the liberators of native inhabitants, and “children are also taught that Berbers completely lost their identity and fused into Islam.” 106 As a whole, Arabization policies and curricula reforms have been implemented with more vehemence in Algeria than in Morocco, where the monarch has allowed for more multiculturalism as a direct consequence of his position depending on his popularity within the population. In contrast, the Algerian FLN has benefited from a rule consolidated by its alliance with the military (known as le pouvoir), resulting in their domination of political affairs that renders them less dependent on popular support than is the Moroccan king. 107

DEMOGRAPHY AND REGIME TYPE

Lastly, structural factors must also be considered in assessing why Berber identities are more salient in Algeria than in Morocco. Demographic factors will be studied through an analysis pursuant to that of Daniel Posner’s work on Chewas and Tumbukas in Zambia and Malawi, which can help explain the political salience of cultural difference. A brief analysis of both countries’ regime types will complement Posner’s approach. Posner’s work proposes a focus on the sizes of groups “relative to the size of the arena in which political competition is taking place.” 108 As such, Posner identifies the necessity for groups to serve as “viable bases of political support” 109 in order for their cultural cleavages to be mobilized and become politically relevant. Undoubtedly, there is an observable parallel between Posner’s study — where Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi 110 — and Berber mobilization in Algeria and Morocco. Much like as with the Chewas and Tumbukas in Zambia, the Moroccan Berbers are formed by three distinct groups, making them multiple minorities in a situation where they cannot become dominant bases of political support

on their own. Furthermore, the competitivenessof the political arena — a vital part of Posner’s condition — is quite decisive in allowing political mobilization of cultural difference. In Morocco, competitiveness is far from exemplary, as the importance of political parties is minimized under the monarchy’s dominance. 111 As such, political demands are not given a proper channel from which to be voiced, unlike the Algerian case where the Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and Democracy fight for Berber rights and representation. 112 Additionally, the Kingdom’s ruling style has long been characterized by co-optation and patronage, and some have argued that small concessions often aim at stalling greater advancements. 113 That being said, Morocco’s regime type is a double-sided blade, as the king is also reliant on popular support. In practice, this translates into a more concessive style of ruling, where the king ‘listens’ to political demands in order to remain in power. As for Algeria, domination from le pouvoir paired with a highly fragmented political party system 114 gives the impression of political competitiveness, while actually serving le pouvoir in solidifying and monopolizing power. As such, Amazigh demands are suppressed outright, which causes greater activism within Berber communities.

CONCLUSION Amazigh communities in Algeria and Morocco share the same fundamental demands for recognition as the original inhabitants of the Maghreb, protection and promotion of Tamazight, and reparations for the inequalities suffered by the Amazigh since colonial times. Nonetheless, national mobilizations of Amazigh movements have evolved in different ways, as mobilization in Algeria has played a more salient role in politics as compared with Morocco. This paper has shown that Amazigh mobilization emerged in Algeria as a direct result of disunity over national identity, a direct consequence of transformative colonial rule, and a lack of cohesiveness dating back to pre-Ottoman Algeria. In contrast, Morocco had enjoyed national unity as a political and cultural entity for over a thousand years, allowing it to present a strong identity before, during, and after French and Spanish colonial rule. This essential comparison between both countries as imagined communities illuminates the motivations of post-independence rulers. While Moroccan leaders rested on solid foundations for post-colonial reaffirmation of identity, Algerian leaders engaged in a (re)construction of Algerianness in the form of a ‘new Algerian man.’ This translated into policies of Arabization and reforms in education that were exclusive in Algeria, while Morocco’s post-independence policies have been implemented laxly and inconsistently, thus allowing more room for Berbers. Structural factors such as demography can also account for Amazigh political relevance being more salient in Algeria. Furthermore, regime type has allowed more liberty for Berbers in Morocco, while le pouvoir has made continuous efforts to maintain its strict views in Algeria. As of today, some progress has been made for Amazigh demands; the Algerian government officially recognized Tamazight in 2002, Tamazight was enshrined in Morocco’s constitution in 2011, and both countries have begun teaching Tamazight in schools. Nonetheless, the Amazigh fight for recognition and reparation is far from over, as groups within both Algeria and Morocco still suffer from inequalities.

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