The Failure of the Second Reconstruction: Black Deprivation in the Post-Civil Rights Era

Leina Gabra Edited by Kennedy McKee-Braide

If the true goal of the civil rights movement was to achieve collective advancement for all black people, then it can be concluded that the

Second Reconstruction failed to meet its objective.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the ways in which the United States’ civil rights movement failed to bring about lasting change for the majority of African Americans. This paper argues that while the outcomes of the movement removed legal barriers for individuals, this has mostly benefited upper-class black Americans rather than bringing about collective equality for all African Americans. Building on Crutchfield and Pettinicchio’s theory of cultural inequality and Gerschwender’s interpretation of relative deprivation theory, this paper explores why society grew hostile towards black advancement and thus restricted the majority of black Americans from achieving substantial progress. This hostility electorally incentivized politicians to make policy decisions and use political rhetoric that marginalizes African Americans. Through this analysis, this paper claims that compared to their white counterparts, black Americans have been unable to make substantial gains in wealth or social status, which continues to underscore black interests in the United States today.

INTRODUCTION African American history in the United States is inextricably intertwined with the history of the nation itself. From the Civil War to the civil rights movement, there is no doubt that black civilians and their allies have fought long and hard for racial equality. Though official racial inequality was outlawed over fifty years ago with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, black Americans continue to be systematically marginalized and discriminated against through a multitude of political, economic, and social channels. The successes and publicity of the civil rights movement in the 1960s aggravated white Americans who felt neglected or even threatened by African American mobilization and political power. Subsequently, as the movement declined throughout the 1970s and on, many politicians and individuals embraced a colour-blind outlook on race, which treats race as though it is no longer a factor that restricts minorities’ opportunities and freedoms. The combination of factors prompted a conservative shift in American politics, which resulted in the contraction of federal efforts to ensure true racial equality. American political parties thus neglect the particular grievances and adversity faced by black people in favour of their broader white electorate, which tends to attribute these hardships to black individuals rather than the institutionalization of racism. This paper does not aim to undermine the progress of black Americans following the Second Reconstruction. It instead seeks to highlight that while the civil rights movement’s succeeded in granting full citizenship rights to African Americans, they continue to be disproportionately disadvantaged in the United States. Thus, this paper will argue that this is a result of white backlash to the civil rights movement resulting in policy decisions and political rhetoric that continues to marginalize African Americans in the post-Civil Rights era.

LITERATURE REVIEW By evaluating theoretical approaches posited by several authors, this paper

seeks to achieve a better understanding of the current state of racial inequality in the United States. For one, in assessing the success of the Second Reconstruction, one must identify what the goals of the movement were in the first place. William Chafe identifies two perspectives on the purpose of the civil rights movement: the attainment of individual liberties versus the achievement of collective equality. 1 Most may consider the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act as the primary accomplishments of the movement in that they outlawed racial discrimination. If one were to view the civil rights movement as a fight for individuals’ ability “to secure personal gains previously denied on the basis of race,” 2 then it can be considered a success. Conversely, Chafe emphasizes that the movement intended to do much more than this, as evidenced by the rhetoric of its leaders. Many prominent figures of the civil rights movement clearly stated their hope that all black Americans would have access to the same freedoms and opportunities as white Americans, 3 rather than just the eradication of legal racial inequality. Notably, the goals of the civil rights movement can be interpreted differently based on varying normative theories of social movements. For those that believe that social movements should only seek to remove legal barriers for the individual, the notion of collective advancement may seem like an overextension. However, this paper aims to assess the longterm results of the Second Reconstruction based on the goals embraced by the leaders of the movement itself, rather than the normative beliefs of the public. If the true goal of the civil rights movement was to achieve collective advancement for all black people, then it can be concluded that the Second Reconstruction failed to meet its objective.

There exists significant research in the field of modern American racial inequality, which demonstrates how African Americans remain disadvantaged as a result of political decision-making. In the United States’ two-party system, politicians have a strong incentive to create broad electoral coalitions for their party leaders to be elected into office. Paul Frymer expands on this to say that because of the electoral system, parties have an incentive to appeal to the “median voter,” or the ideologically moderate in the United States. 4 This group consists of a mostly white electorate that is largely responsible for the backlash movement against the civil rights movement. Crutchfield and Pettinicchio hypothesize that this is a product of an entrenched culture of inequality in American society. 5 The authors, therefore, argue that American society tends to place the blame for issues such as poverty, crime, and unemployment on individuals rather than structural inequality. 67 James Geschwender’s affiliation between the impetus of the civil rights movement to the theory of relative deprivation helps to interpret the issues that persist for black Americans. His theory posits that the necessary conditions for political mobilization develop when individuals or groups perceive their circumstances to be worse than they are for others. 8 He argues that although black people were able to make some gains in the pre-civil rights movement era, they were insufficient in relation to the progress of their white counterparts, leading to black mobilization. Although this hypothesis intends to explain the rise of a social movement, it can also apply to the post-Civil Rights era trajectory of black ad-

vancement. In terms of absolute gains, African Americans have succeeded at an extraordinary rate in the last half-century. The number of registered black voters in the U.S. increased more than threefold between 1960 and 1980 and black enrolment in colleges grew from 83,000 in 1950 to 666,000 in 1975. 9 However, this progress has not matched that of white Americans, especially in terms of economic growth. In fact, as King and Smith note, the wealth gap between white and black Americans has grown since the 1980s. 10 They also present statistical evidence that African Americans continue to fare worse than whites in areas such as health, incarceration rates, and education.

A combination of interconnected factors perpetuate the inequities that black Americans face today. Litwack notes how race-based disparities in income and residence impede access to education. In the 1970s, a “white exodus into the suburbs” 11 eroded the integration of public schools, creating a new system of educational segregation as white Americans moved to homogeneously white neighbourhoods. For the most part, impoverished black people remained in cities, facing deteriorating conditions and limited access to resources. The decline of public schools in urban areas correlates with the acute downturn in ambitious students’ enrolment at HBCUs throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 12 Public perception of black people has also had a significant impact on their ability to advance. Paul Frymer emphasizes that political parties can “shape people’s ideas about politics, their level of involvement, and the kinds of policies that are pursued in government” 13 rather than acting only as catchall organizations for voters with fixed preferences. In this way, the rhetoric of political leaders since the civil rights movement have played a critical role in shaping societal views and policies that disregard black interests. Carter looks at this concept as well, emphasizing how criminal justice reform resulted in the disproportionate incarceration of minorities and a growing societal perception that “crime [is] synonymous with supposed black pathology.” 14 Another example of growingly negative societal outlooks on black advancement has been the contraction of affirmative action and welfare policies.

Lastly, a crucial outcome of the Second Reconstruction has been the creation of an intra-racial cleavage in the black community based on class. Keegan-Yamhatta Taylor explains that economically successful black Americans in positions of power do not experience racial inequity in the same way as poor and working-class black Americans. 15 Thus, politically and economically powerful African Americans have perpetuated the legacy of white backlash by supporting harmful policies and adopting colour-blind rhetoric. The complex, but highly correlated, processes that undermined the civil rights movement are therefore expanded upon through the use of theoretical approaches and evidence explored by the aforementioned literature.

THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND WHITE BACKLASH For many white and black Americans alike, the historic enactments of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 marked an end to the civil rights movement. However, black organizers sought to maintain the

movement’s momentum. As leaders such as Stokely Carmichael and Ella Baker scrambled to keep the movement alive, they realized that “the profound problems which remained – institutional racism, unemployment, absence of capital – did not lend themselves to simple slogans or easy solutions” 16 like in the first phase of the movement. Leaders of various organizations could not agree on a united message, method, or goal. For example, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) rejected nonviolence and interracialism, while the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) continued to use nonviolent tactics to advocate for policy changes. 17 As several leaders of the civil rights movement grew disillusioned with Martin Luther King Jr.’s vision of nonviolent mobilization following his assassination in 1968, the Black Power movement grew. Its militant, separatist ideology reinforced divides between the SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), contributing to groups’ lack of direction and coherence. 18 White Americans failed to understand Black Power’s combative attitude. Per Chafe’s two perspectives on the movement, many white people had incorrectly viewed the movement as a demand for individual freedoms rather than collective uplift, leading them to believe that the end of Jim Crow should have been the end of black mobilization. When it continued and grew combatant, they began to resent the movement altogether, justifying their opposition through their support for Nixonian “traditional American values.” 19 In fact, journalist Carl T. Rowan attributed the return of African Americans to “their most vulnerable, hopeless position in half a century” 20 to black militancy for provoking the white backlash. This white backlash was, and continues to be, demonstrated in a variety of manners. White Americans began to feel increasingly threatened by the economic advancement and growing number of minorities, perceiving that African Americans’ upward mobility came at their expense. 21 This sentiment is a revealing example of Crutchfield and Pettinicchio’s theory of culture of inequality. Accustomed to the retention of some level of inequality in American society, white Americans resented the notion that black people demanded more after the end of Jim Crow. 22 The decades after the assassination of Reverend King exhibited that white support for civil rights had a limit. The desegregation of public spheres was within this realm of acceptance, but threats to “the sanctity of the neighbourhood school, the racial composition of the neighbourhood, or a competitive job that paid decent wages” 23 were not. Thus, the pervasion of desegregation into all sectors of white neighbourhoods led to the aforementioned ‘white exodus’ from cities to suburbs, the repercussions of which were felt mostly by black people. As white Americans left urban areas, cities’ tax revenues began to decline. This process caused cities to lose “high-quality educational opportunities, good-paying jobs, and political attention,” 24 disproportionately affecting impoverished African Americans living in these areas. Without opportunities in education or employment, relative black poverty continues to increase. King and Smith demonstrate this: between 1984 and 2007, white families’ wealth rose “from a median value of $22,000 to $100,000 in constant dollars, while the median wealth holdings of African American families went from $2,000 to roughly $5,000 — increasing the gap from $20,000 to $95,000.” 25 In this way, the mechanisms of white backlash have perpetuated

black poverty at an alarming rate, heightening relative deprivation.

White resentment towards African American enrichment was also a critical influence in the changing face of American politics since the civil rights movement. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968, who won by appealing to disgruntled members of the white working-class, marked a change in the American social fabric that impaired the possibility of concerted efforts to address institutionalized inequality in the future. 26 Once Nixon became president, black activists were largely shut out of national politics, exacerbating the decline of the movement as African Americans lost their voice in policymaking. 27 The rhetoric of white activists relies solely on the sentiment of threat based on the American culture of inequality, but it has been a dangerously effective tool in the interference of black advancement. For example, proponents of this point of view have been instrumental in the contraction of affirmative action policy in the last few decades. However, King and Smith indicate that “affirmative action programs in employment and admissions often cause very little harm even to poorer whites,” 28 illustrating the power of exploiting white fears even when the fear is based on fabricated threats.

ELECTORAL INCENTIVES AND POLICY DECISIONS

As white backlash spread throughout the 1970s, political leaders adjusted their platforms and policymaking decisions to appeal to this sentiment. Frymer’s analysis of electoral incentives helps explain this process. Scholars such as Anthony Downs have argued that political parties have an incentive to appeal to the policy interests of marginalized groups to create broader electoral coalitions and win elections. 29 Frymer argues that this is not the case; instead, party leaders often overlook and neglect potential black voters to be elected into office. 30 Notably, Frymer states that “parties do not seek election to promote policies; they promote policies to win elections.” 31 This proposition encompasses the policy decisions of political leaders in the post-civil rights movement era.

This mechanism has been demonstrated by almost every American president since the 1968 elections, resulting in the systematic erosion of the successes of the movement. To win the presidency and retain support for a second presidential term in 1972, Nixon employed a tactic often referred to as the ‘Southern Strategy.’ This term refers to Nixon’s ability to appeal to the racial fears of working-class whites in the South. According to Chafe, Nixon “denounced busing, sought judicial appointments that would please conservative white southerners, and mobilized an electoral constituency based upon loyalty to traditional values of law and order” 32 to do this, implicitly scapegoating black Americans for the loss of these ideals. Despite this, Nixon was a supporter of the Philadelphia Plan, an affirmative action program that would establish quotas of minority workers in federally funded construction projects. 33 That said, throughout Nixon’s presidency, it was clear that white hostility towards black advancement was on the rise.

The most pervasive effect of the Southern Strategy was its ability to bring about a reactionary shift in politics and society. Ronald Reagan employed the Southern Strategy to win two presidential elections in the 1980s, making policy

decisions to retain white support for electoral purposes. Crutchfield and Pettinicchio credit Reagan with cementing a culture of inequality in modern American society. 34 These values are reflected in Reagan’s policies. Unlike Nixon, Reagan vehemently opposed affirmative action, as evidenced by the 75 percent reduction in affirmative action enforcement between 1982 and 1986. 35 Furthermore, Reagan resisted calls for him to reauthorize section five of the Voting Rights Act, which stipulates that state legislatures could not amend voting laws and procedures without getting approval from a federal judge beforehand. 36 This position is a clear demonstration of conservative forces’ attempts to undercut the successes of the civil rights movement. The political attack on welfare originated through Reagan’s Southern Strategy, too. For many voters, welfare politics were implicitly racialized, and Reagan’s strong hostility towards such policies represents his and his supporters’ hostility towards poor African Americans by the 1980s. The contraction of the welfare system made upward social mobility increasingly difficult for low-income black people, perpetuating a harrowing cycle of poverty in black America.

Electoral incentives also drove some Democrats to abandon black interests, proving that this backsliding was not divided among party lines. Democratic president Bill Clinton’s policymaking exhibits the strength of white backlash in its ability to push the entirety of American politics further to the right. In alignment with Frymer’s theory of policy support and electoral incentive, Carter notes that political leaders’ behaviour is often opportunistic. 37 Clinton was able to win presidential elections by maintaining a careful balance between liberal ideals and elements of the Southern Strategy. An archetype of this method is Clinton’s 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Instead of identifying the roots of crime, such as poverty and a lack of opportunity, Clinton’s crime bill enacted harsher punishments and expanded the prison industry. 38 This exacerbated many issues within the black community, including police brutality and the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans, both of which continue to plague the U.S. today. There is a significant body of research supporting this claim. Black people are incarcerated at a rate “about eight times that of the white race,” 39 despite being a relatively small minority in the United States. Imprisonment reinforces poverty by severely limiting job prospects for felons, disproportionately affecting black men. The crime bill also perpetuated stereotypes of black criminality. According to Carter, cable television often portrays black people as criminals while depicting white people as their victims. However, criminal reports indicate higher rates of white crime than shown on TV. These portrayals have grievous implications; stereotypes of black criminality place African Americans in greater danger of police brutality, which in many instances has been fatal. Clinton’s crime bill was backed by both liberal and conservative individuals, allowing him to maintain the support of a broad coalition of voters. However, its ramifications have been disastrous for the working-class black community.

THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL RHETORIC Political leaders have historically and systematically endorsed policies and

employed narratives that would ensure the support of majority electoral coalitions at the expense of minority interests. Generally speaking, political leaders’ rhetoric on race relations has ranged from apathy to hostility in the post-civil rights movement period. The three presidents discussed earlier –Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton – are useful in demonstrating this. Following the dismantling of Jim Crow segregation, politicians began to espouse colour-blind rhetoric to justify the abandonment of black interests. As mentioned previously, proponents of colour-blindness reject the notion that race continues to restrict individuals from certain opportunities and the ability to succeed in the United States. This belief stems from the nation’s commitment to the ‘American Dream,’ which is based on a system of meritocracy characterized by individuals’ ability to succeed based on their achievements and ambition rather than their class, wealth, or in this context, race. After the government broke down its racialized legal barriers, political and social discourse began to place “the onus […] on blacks to make the most out of the new ‘opportunities.’” 40 Advocates against colour-blindness have accused its supporters of “[producing] a nation still marked by harsh, intractable racial inequalities in numerous arenas of American life” 41 through their opposition to race-conscious policies. In many instances, colour-blindness is simply used as a facade to justify blatant racism. It has permeated the rhetoric of leaders in both political parties in the last five decades, which has, in turn, shaped social perceptions and political decisions that have negatively impacted African Americans.

Richard Nixon’s rhetoric in the context of his Southern Strategy deepened American racial cleavages by manipulating and exacerbating white racial fears. During his 1968 campaign, Nixon promised voters that he would restore the status quo and decelerate the advancement of civil rights, 42 a narrative that was so popular that it ultimately resulted in his election. In his 1972 campaign, Nixon called busing – federal spending used to transport children to certain schools to reduce educational segregation – “poisonous” 43 and adamantly opposed the practice. Nixon “used the ethnic, working-class, and suburban anger” 44 to fuel anti-government, pro-states’ rights sentiments, which he could then direct towards the opposition of federally funded affirmative action rather than explicitly endorse racism. As such, this may be considered one of the earliest instances of colour-blindness on such a large scale. Nixon’s political rhetoric introduced the phenomenon of widespread American acceptance of a culture of inequality by rejecting the notion that the federal government should facilitate black advancement, even after centuries of legal discrimination.

Similarly, Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric throughout his presidency relied heavily on the exploitation of working-class white anger by steering it against black people and policies that would support them. Reagan “[linked] crime to blacks and blacks to Democrats through a campaign of at best thinly veiled racial symbolism” 45 to garner support for crime policies that targeted impoverished black people. Reagan’s War on Drugs, which expanded the prison system and enacted harsher penalties for drug-related offences, reinforced stereotypes of black delinquency and served as a basis for his successors’ solutions to ‘urban’ crime. Reagan perpetuated more negative black stereotypes through his use and

popularization of the term ‘welfare queens,’ which portrayed African American women as dishonest dependents of the welfare system. 46 In reality, the chief recipients of the American welfare system are not low-income black people, but middle to upper-class whites. 47 Reagan’s rhetoric further alienated black people politically and socially by normalizing damaging stereotypes and by justifying them with colour-blindness. Additionally, Reagan is often credited with universalizing political colour-blindness in conservative politics by harnessing the valid class-based worries of impoverished whites and converting them into racial anger. Reagan told his supporters that “if you happen to belong to an ethnic group not recognized by the federal government as entitled to special treatment […] you are the victim of reverse discrimination,” 48 planting the perception in the minds of white Americans that when black people advanced, they became victims. This was despite the fact that black Americans were, and continue to be, significantly disadvantaged relative to whites on nearly every socioeconomic indicator, including income and wealth. 49 Reagan made “colorblindness […] the order of the day” 50 by painting the relative deprivation of African Americans as the failings of inferior individuals.

Further, Bill Clinton sought to portray himself as a racial moderate and often relied on colour-blindness to do so. He did this by relying on economic issues as a uniting platform for all Americans, rather than addressing the growing conjunction between race and class. 51 Clinton’s rhetoric differs from those of previously discussed presidents in a key way; for much of his presidency, Clinton simply remained silent on racial issues. Following several electoral losses, Democrats were able to elect a president by subtracting race from the political conversation altogether. After Reagan’s success, political leaders adhered to the assumption that the white electorate wanted the federal government to exercise as little power as possible, especially on racial issues. 52 According to civil rights activist Derrick Vell, this was especially problematic as by the Clinton era, only a minority of black Americans “had survived the retrogression of civil rights protection” while the majority “were confined to former inner-city areas that had been divorced from their political boundaries.” 53 By combining inaction with the occasional denunciation of black anger towards unjust systems, Clinton struck an adroit balance between Democratic liberalism and the neoconservative legacy of Nixon and Reagan. Clinton’s rhetoric on race, along with that of other liberal politicians, aligns closely with Frymer’s theory of electoral incentives. Clinton figured that “black voters would have nowhere else to go,” 54 or in Frymer’s words were electorally captured by the Democratic Party by the 1990s. Frymer argues that because Democrats could rely on black votes, they could focus their attention on appealing to white voters just as Clinton did by portraying himself as a racial moderate. 55 Bill Clinton’s political rhetoric further reinforced colour-blindness in American society by either refuting a need for black extremism or by saying nothing at all.

Colour-blind rhetoric has also had a significant impact on relationships between African Americans in divergent economic positions. As examined earlier, the civil rights movement was mainly successful for black Americans with economic means and political clout to take advantage of new opportunities. These

individuals were then invoked in the media or political arenas as examples of a colour-blind society where all could prosper regardless of race. This, however, is not representative of reality; the majority of black Americans remain trapped in a cycle of poverty perpetuated by inadequate education, housing, and healthcare. These factors tend to be further aggravated by discrimination and unjust policing. 56 Often, politically and economically powerful African Americans prioritize their loyalty to their class above their race by detaching themselves from the greater black community and adopting colour-blind attitudes. For example, Litwack notes that although black politicians gained local influence following the Second Reconstruction, this did not do much to address black interests. Moreover, “well-educated blacks are more likely than blacks with less formal education to say that the ‘values gap’ within the black community has widened over the decade,” 57 implying that impoverished African Americans are morally inferior to those with higher economic standing. Furthermore, in the 1990s, black officials who had embraced colour-blind values and separated themselves from black America were supporters of Clinton’s crime bill. 58 This paper has already discussed the destructive effects that the bill had on low-income African Americans. Black Congressmen’s support of it in spite of this is evidence of how racial rhetoric has precipitated growing social and economic differences within the black community and disproportionately hurts the poor.

CONCLUSION The Second Reconstruction was undoubtedly one of the most momentous occurrences in the history of American race relations, and arguably, the history of the nation. However, its influence was undercut by the rise of white social conservatism characterized by a backlash based on the notion that the newly granted freedoms for African Americans came only at their expense. The Second Reconstruction’s goal of collective black advancement, therefore, began to lapse as political leaders enacted policies that further alienated the black lower-income classes. Political leaders’ racial rhetoric has reinforced these policies over the last half-century, which has largely portrayed poor, black Americans as a menace to white society through stereotypes and apathetic language. The persistence of black marginalization in the face of increasing social and political hostility has dangerous implications for the future of American race relations. Racial animus has been a primary force in the polarization of national politics; a microcosm of this has been the election of the far-right Donald Trump following the administration of Barack Obama, the first African American president of the United States. The Republican Party today continues to promote colour-blindness along with less federal spending on social services as black communities suffer poverty and unequal treatment in the criminal justice system. This has resulted in the recent resurgence of black activism in response to disproportionate police violence that has led to countless black Americans’ deaths. Race relations continue to deteriorate as Americans, both black and white, become increasingly enraged at the belief that they are victims of state injustice. Should this trend continue, the United States faces the possibility of further political radicalization and racial division at levels similar to that of a century ago.

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