BENVGEPC: Learning from Dharavi Redevelopment Project

Group 1: Li Bin Toh | Nasser Alhamer | Tove Asztely | Zi Yue Chen | Hoi Ting Chung | Abraham Halim | Wai Lee | Paul Modu | Chinnakit Silakong

Learning from failure: lessons from

Dharavi Redevelopment Project Mumbai, India

BENVGEPC: A recommendation brief in mega urban project management prepared for the Greater London Authority as refer1 ence for the Old Oak Common Regeneration Project. Word Count: 5995

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Executive Summary

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Setting the Premise

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Discussion

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2.1. Examining the case for mega urban projects 2.2. The client: Overview of the Old Oak Common Regeneration Project 2.3. The case study: Introducing the Dharavi Redevelopment Project 2.4. Rationale

3.1. Defining the focus areas 3.2. Analysis and recommendations in: A) Project governance B) Context sensitivity C) Management of public vs. private interests

Conclusion

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Executive Summary

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In recent decades, mega urban projects (MUPs) have become a popular urban development strategy. However, the complex nature of MUPs means that they require careful governance and management throughout the project process, from planning to design to final delivery. There are many critical areas in which missteps may result in project failure or unsuitability.

This report hence draws upon a failed MUP – the Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) of Mumbai – to give recommendations on the management of the Old Oak Common Regeneration Project (henceforth referred to as Old Oak Common). Due to the focus on project management, the analysis and recommendations are focused specifically on governance and development approach. Along with the case study analysis, it will also draw upon a wide range of literature relating to the management of MUPs in general and critical analysis of the DRP. From our analysis, we have found three critical areas that directly affected the DRP’s success – project governance, context sensitivity and the management of public versus private interests. These are hence areas that Old Oak Common should take special note of to avoid making similar mistakes.

Our analysis revealed that the DRP lacked sufficient institutional capacity that then led to a weak project governance structure, had an undemocratic planning process that discounted the voices of weaker stakeholders, employed foreign strategies unsuitable to the local context and was overly driven by profitmaking ambitions. We hence recommend for Old Oak Common to ensure a clearly defined governance structure with strong partnership ties between all stakeholders, including the local community, thoroughly understand the local context to ensure strategies are suitable and ensure that public interests are not overshadowed by private interests.

By managing these carefully, we believe that Old Oak Common can be successfully implemented and achieve its aim of transforming the West London region.

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Setting the Premise

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2.1. Examining the case for mega urban projects A brief overview of the general discussion surrounding MUPs Mega urban projects

Critique

At present, there is no widely accepted definition of an MUP (Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Fainstein, 2008; Shatkin, 2011). Nevertheless, Fainstein (2008) describes them as an urban development strategy through which cities have responded to the competitive pressures of the global economy. These costly schemes involve the development of specific urban localities through new construction and/or substantial rehabilitation, and are often based on mixeduse developments. Due to scale of their development, they often require several years of planning and implementation and the involvement of multiple stakeholders (Flyvbjerg, 2014).

Increasingly, MUPs are being criticised for their lack of integrative and persuasive planning as well as their unequal benefit shares (Gualini & Majoor, 2007). For instance, Patel et al. (2015) noted how the neoliberal nature of India’s MUPs have reshaped the urban physical and social landscape and triggered contestations between the privileged and the poor. Additionally, Gualini and Majoor (2007) argue that MUPs cause the fragmentations of space by turning public spaces into privatized, controlled worlds. The reasons for this are linked to institutional fragmentations between public and private actors. According to Doucet (2012), MUPs are “places where the forces of globalization become rooted (…) [and] entrepreneurial and growth-oriented goals art the primary objectives” (p.4). Hence, project planners are put in a difficult situation where they need to balance economic targets with physical and social-economic objectives.

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Report focus This report focuses specifically on project management through the dimensions of governance and development approaches. This is because the general discussion indicates that these aspects are crucial in determining project success.

Firstly, MUPs involve multiple stakeholders across the public and private sectors, as well as the local community. All of these have differing objectives and opinions, yet for a project to be successful, they must all be aligned towards a common vision (Priemus and van Wee, 2013). This then calls for cooperation and partnership, but as they often have conflicting objectives, extensive negotiation is required (Akintoye et al., 2001). MUPs must hence have a good governance structure to manage it, with an effective and well-organised legal framework where critical decisions and sound strategies can be made.

Secondly, private developers and investors generally only participate in a project if it is within a healthy political environment and is well-governed (Badshah, 1998). It is hence argued that good project governance and management is one of the most critical factors for successful projects (Frilet, 1997; Qiao et al, 2001; Zhang et al, 1998).

Finally, MUPs are generally built based on a series of public-private partnerships (PPPs). Although these suggest shared responsibility, Mustafa (1999) argues that policymakers should play the dominant role in overlooking the development process. Good governance also includes transparency and communication between both public and private sectors.

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Old Oak Common & Park Royal City

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old

Oak

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2.2. The Client

Overview of the Old Oak Common Regeneration Project Project profile Old Oak Common is a regeneration project targeting the old industrial areas of Old Oak and Park Royal. It aims to create 24,000 homes and 65,000 jobs over the next 15 years (GOV.UK, 2015). The site has been identified as a key opportunity area to strengthen London’s economic competitiveness. Indeed, it is expected to contribute £7.1bn annually to the UK economy through its development, such as through commerce, residential lettings and retail (Bates and Mio, 2015).

strengthen the outer-lying areas. Also, with the intersection of the upcoming Crossrail and HS2 developments in Old Oak, it is an opportunity for the government to catalyse urban growth through transport-led densification, and for private developers to capitalise on the area’s enhanced accessibility and resultant raised land values by investing in real estate. Old Oak Common is hence being redeveloped through a property-led approach, in which private investments are brought into property development. This is accompanied by public investments into infrastructure, such as the rails and roads.

The project is driven by the Greater London Author ity (GLA)’s ambition to re-brand West London and thus

We identified Old Oak Common’s critical concerns (bolded) via the following SWOT assessment:

STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES

- Regeneration of an old industrial area

- No confirmed plans for provision of affordable housing

- Private and public investments into improved infrastructure and urban development

- Termed a ‘second Canary Wharf’ – too Americanised for the local context?

- Public consultations held

SWOT Analysis Old Oak Common THREATS - Gentrification: influx of high-valued developments may price out low-income residents and small businesses - Community concerns may differ from economic ambitions of government and private developers

OPPORTUNITIES

- Capitalise on potential land value increases from enhanced transport accessibility - Stimulate regional economic growth

3.2 The Case Study: Introducing the Dharavi Redevelopment Project 3.2.1 Project profile:

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Dharavi 2.3. The Case Study

Introducing the Dharavi Redevelopment Project Project profile The DRP is similarly a regeneration project, but with the added dimension of slum rehabilitation. It is located in central Mumbai, close to the new Bundra-Kurla financial complex. The 240ha site is currently occupied by slums, but like Old Oak and Park Royal, has been identified as a key opportunity area by the state.

The DRP is part of a state initiative to transform the region from an informal manufacturing and residential zone into a modern metropolis through a series of redevelopment projects. In particular, this project aims to redevelop the slums into a modern district with proper infrastructure, residences and high-value commerce and retail, hence contributing to the re-branding of Mumbai. It also aims to densify the space by transforming the low-rise slums into high-rise residential and commercial buildings.

The DRP is officially intended as a rehabilitation project for not only the space, but its existing community as well.

By rehousing residents and providing basic public services such as sanitation, the DRP aims to enhance quality of life and address urban poverty.

Despite such social objectives however, the DRP’s proposed plans are heavily economically oriented. It takes on a neoliberal redevelopment approach, bringing in private developers to not only build replacement housing but also intensively densify the site to make space for high-valued commerce, retail and luxury residences so as to recapture the innate value of the area’s prime location. It also aims to attract in private investments to fund the project entirely, without requiring any government contribution.

However, the DRP was a failed project. First initiated in 2004, it fell apart by 2010, and is currently being restarted again.

Project Timeline: Global tenders for expression of interest invited for the Dharavi project. 19 consor:ums are selected.

2004

2007

First Dharavi Redevelopment Project ini:ated by the state government following a proposal from private architect Mukesh Mehta

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Redevelopment plans con:nue to be stalled By various hurdles and implementa:on problems (e.g. community protests, loss of investors)

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2015

Following complica:ons from the global ďŹ nancial slowdown, more then 10 bidders walk out of the process ci:ng lack of clarity and delay in implementa:on Redevelopment plans revived; Government invites fresh bids

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2.4. Rationale

Rationale for choice of case study Although the DRP failed, we identified it as a valuable case study for two reasons:

Fig 1. Park Royal Industrial Estate is home to over 2,000 businesses. The project site has a population of 76,000.

Relevance There are many similarities between the DRP and Old Oak Common. Both are in designated opportunity areas, and are large-scale regeneration schemes of brownfield sites that involve negotiating with existing residents and industry (Fig 1 and 2). It is thus a suitable case study to draw lessons on managing socio-spatial tensions and competing demands between economic growth and social needs.

Both employ a public-private partnership model to manage project development, and both are based on propertyled redevelopment approaches focused on attracting in private investments as a means of project financing (Fig 3 and 4). Lessons can hence be drawn on management of stakeholder interests and governance.

Fig 2. Dharavi has an estimated residential population of up to 1 billion, and hosts a variety of light industries

Fig 4. The DRP is divided into 5 sectors to be individually tendered out to developers

Opportunity to learn from failure

When conducting a SWOT analysis to identify why the B) Opportunity frompoints failure DRP failed, we found thatto it learn had several relevant to the concerns of Old Oak Common (bolded). Thus, by 3 (left).

Private developer Essential plan. Old Oak examining where and whyathe DRP analysis failed, wetocan make whyFig When conducting SWOT identify the DRP failed, we found that itLiving’s had several recommendations to Old Oak Common on critical areas in Common is earmarked as an opportunity for investors to earn points relevant to the concerns of Old Oak Common (bolded). by examining where through sale of Thus, developments and lettings; Fig 4 and (right). The project development to take note of, such as what should DRP is divided into 5 sectors to be individually tendered out to why the DRP failed, we can make recommendations to Old Oak Common on critical areas in be avoided and what can be done better.

project development to take note of, such as whatdevelopers should be avoided and what can be done better.

WEAKNESSES

STRENGTHS

- Lack of consideration of local socioeconomic context

- Aims to improve quality of life for Dharavi’s population and rehouse all residents

- Lack of community involvement

- Funding for improved infrastructure

- Weak and disorganised governance structure

SWOT Analysis THREATS

DRP

- Dominated by private interests OPPORTUNITIES

- Unlock inherent high land values owing to prime location

- Gentrification: displacement of poor inhabitants and local industries

- Economic catalyst

- Community opposition from neglected groups

- Regeneration of derelict urban space

- Contestations of space between competing social and economic demands

- Revitalising and re-branding of the city

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Discussion: Analysis and Recommendations This report will present its recommendations in three focus areas: Project governance, context sensitivity and the management of private versus public interests. These areas were identified, through a literature review, to have a strong determining factor on the success of megaurban regeneration projects.

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3.1. Defining the Focus Areas A) Project Governance

C) Management of Private versus Public Interests

MUPs are highly complex due to their size, cost and involvement of multiple stakeholders with differing objectives and opinions (Tasan-Kok, 2010; Priemus and van Wee, 2013). Similarly, Old Oak Common spans across three different boroughs, and involves many stakeholders across the public sector, private sector and local community. Having an effective governance structure to co-ordinate the project is thus essential for its successful implementation. Two aspects of governance are highlighted – the need for sufficient institutional capacity to deal with challenges (Dahl, 1994; Fiedler and Wendler, 2015) and the careful management of stakeholders to ensure a democratic planning process (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003)

Old Oak Common is a key development with strong economic ambitions to generate employment, draw in investments and thus reinforce London’s global competitiveness. To achieve this, it is being developed through a property-led regeneration approach, which focuses on the attraction of private-sector investments into property development as a means of transforming the built environment (Healey et al., 1992). However, the private sector is primarily profit-oriented and hence tends to focus on creating high-value developments (He and Wu, 2005).

This could thus come into conflict with the interests of the local community, creating a contestation of space that requires negotiation.

B) Context Sensitivity As regeneration projects like Old Oak Common involve existing residents and industry, they cannot proceed on the assumption that they are building upon a blank canvas.

However, MUPs have often been described as top-down, involving only powerful stakeholders in their planning and bypassing public participation (Gualini and Majoor, 2007). However, such disengagement causes the project to be insensitive to its local social, cultural and economic context, such as the needs of the existing population. As a result, many MUPs tend to reproduce generic planning concepts that might not be suitable, affecting their liveability and causing public dissatisfaction (ibid., Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

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3.2. Analysis and Recommendations This section will analyse the DRP vis-à-vis Old Oak Common in the specified focus areas, examining the weaknesses of the former to draw recommendations for the latter.

A) Project Governance 1) Institutional Arrangement DRP’s weaknesses 1) Insufficient institutional capacity The DRA was set up as just a small, single-purpose agency within the state’s slum authority. As a result, its institutional capacity was stretched too thinly to manage the DRP effectively (as observed by Mukhija, 2001). Due to the public sector’s incapacity, the bulk of the project was handed to private developers, including planning, design and construction. This hence means that the government’s role of negotiating stakeholders’ interests has not been fulfilled, and decision-making was heavily skewed towards private interests. Furthermore, due to their central role, the project collapsed upon the departure of the private sector bidders.

ments are mostly unavailable to the public. The DRP has hence been criticised as elitist due to its lack of public engagement (Boano et al., 2011).

3) Lack of co-ordination During the tendering process, each developer had produced their own master plan for their respective sector, but the DRP had no platform to co-ordinate amongst them and form a coherent plan to link up their proposals (Arputham and Patel, 2007). Thus even if the DRP had proceeded, its outcome would have been fragmented and disorganised.

2) Lack of democracy The DRA is comprised entirely of public sector actors, who then negotiate with private developers. Plans and docu-

Table 1. Comparing the co-ordinating institutions of DRP and Old Oak Common

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Relating to Old Oak Common In comparison, the OPDC has a much stronger institutional structure. Legal documents bind it to its responsibilities and accountability to the people of London. As an MDC, it is vested with the necessary power to co-ordinate development across the three boroughs, plan and acquire land, and negotiate with the private sector under PPP arrangements. Additionally, the inclusion of representatives from various sectors allow for strong planning democracy. As these qualities address the critical areas where the DRA was lacking, we believe that the OPDC is currently in a good position to provide strong governance and public sector leadership to Old Oak Common. It should hence aim to maintain and strengthen this position, paying particular attention to the above-identified critical areas.

Key Learning Points • MUPs require large institutional capacity and power to manage • The leadership role of the co-ordinating public institution is crucial to oversee decisionmaking and maintain project coherence and direction, and thus ensure that project aims can be met

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2) Stakeholder Management Assessing Old Oak Common

Partnership

Govern

Guidance

Old Oak Common

- Biggest Transportation hub, connecting West London

Major development opportunity

- 25.500 Homes, 65.000 Jobs - Protecting and improving local areas and communities Fig 5. Organisation of stakeholders for Old Oak Common

As Fig. 5 shows, Old Oak Common’s stakeholder network is well-structured, with the OPDC reporting directly to the GLA and gaining guidance and planning powers from the Mayor of London. Alongside, it has strong partnership ties with other public agencies such as TfL, as well as with private sector stakeholders like real estate developers.

The OPDC thus holds a clear position as the main project co-ordinator and is embedded in the center of all strategic planning decisions. Additionally, the OPDC has conducted a number of public consultation sessions and has more

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planned for the future, indicating that it has good partnership ties with the local community as well.

Thus, in terms of stakeholder management, we find Old Oak Common to be in a strong position for effective project implementation. We will now consider that of the DRP to identify the critical areas for Old Oak Common to be aware of.

DRP’s weaknesses

Fig 6. Organisation of stakeholders for DRP

1) Government disengagement As Fig. 6 shows, governance and planning duties within the public sector was handed down repeatedly to increasingly lower levels of government – from the state government to the SRA to the DRA and finally, to the private developers. Although the state government initiated the project, it has been described as distant from the project, according it little attention and resources in light of their various other undertakings (Weinstein, 2014). Private developers have hence been given free rein to manage all planning and implementation, and the DRA’s role has been relegated to “simply that of a regulatory agency” (ibid.).

Thus, while the DRA holds the same level of authority as the OPDC as project co-ordinator, it does not enjoy the same level of institutional support, affecting its ability to manage the project properly.

2) Lack of community engagement Fig. 6 shows a broken connection between the public sector and civil society. This is because the DRP’s engagement with local Dharavi communities has been done entirely through private developers; and this has not been a direct engagement either but the examination of documents like land ownership records. This top-down, distant approach has resulted in a very poor understanding on the part of

both planners and developers of the local context. For example, the estimated range of the slum’s population is extremely wide, from 300,000 to 1 million (Fernando, 2014), which has then affected the provision of replacement housing.

Additionally, despite their strong ownership claim on the space of Dharavi, the local community do not have representatives with the power to influence decision-making, thus preventing their voices from being heard.

Key Learning Points • Importance of strong institutional support from the state and partnership ties among all stakeholders • Clear organisational structure delineating roles and relationships between various stakeholders, with strong communication and partnership ties between public and private sector bodies and the local community • Need for consistent and genuine public engagement that goes beyond rhetoric; we hence recommend for the OPDC the inclusion of participatory planning to incorporate ideas from the local community on top of regular public consultations

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B) Context Sensitivity As mentioned, the main decision-makers of the DRP were disconnected from the local issues on the ground due to their top-down approach. Moreover, the DRP focused on attracting international developers as a means of bringing in foreign investments, hence the majority of submitted tenders came from foreign companies that were unfamiliar with the local context. As a result, most of the devel-

opers’ designs were conceived based on foreign planning concepts that reimagined Dharavi as a modern Shanghaior Dubai-esque urbanscape, without any semblance to the traditional residential form of Dharavi or Mumbai (Refer to Fig. 7).

Fig.7 Impressions of Dharavi redeveloped, by Chicago firm Adrian Smith + Gordon Gill Architecture (left) and London-based firm Foster+Partners

The DRP was hence criticised for its unsuitability for the local environment and disregard for the slum population it was supposedly built for (Leon, 2013). Indeed, its insensitivity to the local context was a direct cause of its failure as it led to community protests and opposition that then hindered the implementation process. Hence from the

DRP’s example, we would like to highlight a few critical contextual aspects that Old Oak Common should pay attention to in order to ensure its successful implementation and future sustainability.

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1) Socio-Cultural Context

Fig 10. Typical scenes in Dharavi. Such informal market and industrial activity will not be possible in the new developments Source: Business Insider

DRP’s weaknesses One of the primary goals of the DRP was to transform the space from low-rise slums to a high-rise urban district (Fig. 8). This would then open up a huge amount of land in the area for new mixed-use, high-use developments, thus unlocking the prime land-values of the space. To do so, the project planned for each eligible household to be moved from their previous self-constructed dwelling into a new apartment unit located within a high-rise residential block.

Fig 8. Imagined spatial transformation for Dharavi (Mumbai Mirror, May 2009)

However, while this densification strategy is effective in other cities, it does not fit in with the traditional lifestyles of the Dharavi community. Through generations of adaptation, each slum dwelling is strategically organised to facilitate its mixed work-cum-residence functions (Fig 9), with retail, factory and living space stacked upon each other. However, this arrangement would be impossible in the new single-floor apartments.

Hence, by directly transplanting foreign design concepts, the DRP’s plans and architectural design failed to take into account the way its intended inhabitants organised their lives, thus disrupting the local culture, organisation and residents’ daily routines and overall threatening the project’s social sustainability. This has led to community demands for a re-designing of the DRP’s master plans.

Fig 9. Floor plan of a typical Dharavi dwelling (Nijman, J. 2008)

Relating to Old Oak Common Old Oak Common has been described as a second ‘Canary Wharf’, but this in turn has been criticised for being overly ‘American’ in design, contrasting against typical British developments (e.g. Williams, 2004).

Seeing that Old Oak Common’s site is surrounded by a number of old, well-established West London neighbourhoods, it should consider how the development will integrate with the surrounding area in terms of both function and appearance, so as to prevent it from becoming an isolated district disconnected from the surrounding urban fabric.

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Fig 11. Current design of Old Oak Common is in stark contrast to the primarily low-density surrounding neighbourhoods (www.gov.uk)

2) Economic Context

Fig 12. Informal industries in Dharavi include textiles, pottery, recycling and leather.

(Google Images)

DRP’s weaknesses As mentioned, the new plans for the DRP will destroy its residents’ current livelihoods. As the state government is focused on re-creating the entire Dharavi from scratch, it has failed to take into consideration the fact that Dharavi currently has a vibrant informal economy with an estimated turnover value of US$650 million/year (BBC, 2006).

The disruption of this economy hence not only causes a great loss to the wider Mumbai economy, but also removes some of Mumbai’s key production and service industries

and threatens the sustainability of the DRP as residents lose their means of employment. This is considered one of the most critical issues for the DRP as it may cause rehoused slum-dwellers to shift out of their new homes and back into the slums to find job opportunities.

Relating to Old Oak Common The DRP’s case hence shows the need to consider local social and economic demands in the planning of MUPs. Such projects require a thorough analysis of the existing site in the social, economic and environmental dimensions and then shaping plans to suit them, rather than considering the site as an empty void. Currently, the Old Oak Common site is home to many businesses, especially in Park Royal’s large industrial estate. Project planners hence need to consider whether the redevelopment will affect the existing businesses (e.g. through the raising of factory space rents). The existing industries are likely an impor-

tant source of employment for current residents, hence should these be displaced, their livelihoods will be affected as well. We hence recommend taking some measures to safeguard the smaller businesses located within the site, such as SMEs. This could be done through tax relief, grants or rent subsidies.

Factory operations in Park Royal Industrial Estate (Google Images)

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Old dwellings in Dharavi

New homes being erected

3) Rehousing of affected residents DRP’s weaknesses Every regeneration project will require the eviction and relocation of residential communities as existing developments must be removed to make way for the new construction. This process is, in theory, relatively straightforward as affected residents can be identified through official records (e.g. home ownership/tenancy agreements) and public agencies can make arrangements for their resettlement (Gill, 1999).

Accordingly, as a slum rehabilitation project, a large part of the DRP’s plans does involve such re-housing within the Dharavi site. However, the weak institutional capacity of the DRA and a shortage of project space and resources allocated towards this purpose is hindering this process

(Patel et al., 2015). For instance, the uncertain population estimate is likely to cause insufficient units to be built. Additionally, due to the market-driven nature of the project, private developers are keen to keep the mandatory resettlement units they have to build as small as possible so as to reduce costs and keep land for prime developments.

Most significantly however, is that the informal nature of the slums means that most residents do not possess any official documents to prove their eligibility for replacement shelter. Hence, it is estimated that up to 30-40% of the current population will be unable to receive homes or compensation, and will thus be displaced out of the site (Iyer et al., 2009).

Planned new luxury residences in Dharavi

There is also growing concern on the potential of gentrification in the new settlements, as should the affordability gap between the rehoused slum-dwellers and wealthier home-seekers become sufficiently wide, developers are likely to capitalise on the potential profit by redeveloping their properties for higher-end buyers/tenants,

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thus causing gentrification and pricing out the resettled residents (Apte, 2011). The DRP’s plans has hence failed to consider the sheer magnitude of the population that need rehousing and also, to set up mechanisms to protect the rehousing scheme from the profit-driven ambitions of developers.

Relating to Old Oak Common Firstly, we note there have been no plans announced by the OPDC regarding the rehousing of communities affected by Old Oak Common’s redevelopment. Drawing on the DRP’s experience, we would like to emphasise the importance of considering this issue thoroughly and coming up with suitable plans and mechanisms to rehouse or

Fig 13. Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 for area surrounding Old Oak Common Source: OAPF Framework, Mayor of London

Key Learning Points • MUPs, especially regeneration projects, do not occur on a blank canvas. The surrounding social, economic and environmental context must be thoroughly understood by project planners to ensure that strategies are suitable and address local needs • Avoid a direct copy-and-paste of foreign concepts – consider where they are appropriate and adjust them to fit the local context • Despite the global ambitions of MUPs, they must still address local needs to ensure their benefits are equitably distributed and weaker stakeholders’ interests are not discounted.

compensate affected residents. Otherwise, it is likely that many will be displaced out of the area, threatening the social justice and equity of the project. Ideally, the resettlement developments should address residents’ needs and improve their living quality as well, thus ensuring that the local community will directly benefit from the project.

Secondly, Old Oak Common also faces the threat of gentrification, as the high-valued developments may push rent prices beyond the affordable range of Old Oak’s lowerincome households. This is a critical issue as the project is located within a deprived area of London (Fig 13), indicating that the percentage of low-income households in the area is higher than the national average. Furthermore, by taking a property-led redevelopment approach, it is likely that developers will prioritise profits and build primarily high-value developments that replace older neighbourhoods (as observed by He and Wu, 2005). Thus, besides such high-valued residential and commercial developments, Old Oak Common must also devote space for affordable housing, proportional to the size of the existing low-income community.

• To this end, we propose the following management framework for Old Oak Common throughout its project lifecycle. This framework is designed to ensure a good understanding of the local context and responsiveness to contextual changes that might occur as the project develops.

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C) Management of Private vs. Public Interests This report has emphasised how various stakeholders have differing needs and expectations about the MUP. As these often conflict with each other, it is unlikely for all stakeholders to have their demands fully fulfilled, thus necessitating trade-offs. Project managers hence need to ensure that the project’s benefits are distributed as fairly as possible while costs are not disproportionately borne by disadvantaged parties.

A frequently highlighted area of conflict is between public and private interests. In the case of MUPs, the former is generally interested in social goals such as improved quality of life, equity and socio-economic benefits such as the creation of affordable homes and jobs. On the other hand, the latter, as represented by private investors, real estate developers etc., tends to be more oriented towards more economic-based goals such as profits, investment returns and future business growth. This can result in contestations in how the space is developed. It is thus a critical task for project managers to find the right balance between public and private interests.

DRP’s weaknesses The DRP has been described as a case of “contested urbanism” (Boano et al., 2011). In recent years, government and market pressures have been pushing Mumbai towards becoming a ‘world-class city’, as expressed in its Vision Mumbai document (McKinsey & Co., 2003). To do so, the document proposes increasing economic growth by investing in infrastructure, attracting high-end tertiary industries (e.g. financial services, IT, media) to locate in the city and “(converting) the hinterlands into a manufacturing and logistics hub” (ibid., p.15). However, these strategies necessarily require slum clearance to remove the blight and make space for such developments, resulting in opposition from local citizen groups.

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Such power confrontations have been manifested in the space of Dharavi, where the DRP’s provision of replacement housing and redevelopment for the local residents have been affected by political and market pressures seeking to use the space to generate greater value through luxury residences and commercial developments. This is especially evident in two areas: the appointment of developers and the way the replacement homes are built.

1) Appointment of Developers Under typical redevelopment schemes in India, residents are able to choose their developer on a building-by-building basis. However, owing to the high stakes placed on the DRP as a key project for Mumbai to transform itself into a global city, the government adopted a sectoral development approach for Dharavi, allowing it to privately select the DRP’s developers for each sector through a bidding process (Iyer et al., 2009). Additionally, under the DRP’s PPP framework, the government would not need to give any financial contribution whatsoever to subsidise the redevelopment process. Through market projections, Mukesh Mehta, who first proposed the project, showed how the DRP’s redevelopment would be a highly profitable opportunity for each sector’s developer, making the awarding of bids highly competitive. The government could hence also generate revenue by asking each selected developer to pay

a “premium” for their right to redevelop the land. Hence, as part of their submission, each developer also had to bid a premium amount that they were willing to pay (ibid.).

The developers selected were hence not chosen based on their suitability for the needs of the local residents, but on their ability to bring in private investment, as well as the extent to which their proposals would contribute to the global visions of Mumbai. Foreign developers were hence preferred, despite opposition from the local community on the basis of their disconnection from the local context.

The power of community stakeholders to influence the DRP’s process and outcomes was also suppressed entirely, thus affecting the representation of public interests.

2) Building of Replacement Housing As the main official purpose of the DRP to rehabilitate the Dharavi slums, affordable replacement housing had to be provided as part of the project. Since the project was to be entirely planned and constructed by the private sector, this required the setting up of mechanisms on the part of the government to ensure that the private developers would provide the required units. However, though this was intended as a means of balancing public and private interests, the way the system was set up allowed it to be manipulated by the private sector towards their interests.

The DRA stipulated a specific ratio for the developers – for every 100 square feet of free housing they provided for the slum residents, the developer could build and sell

133 square feet on the open market for a profit (Iyer et al., 2009). This was intended as an incentive to encourage developers to build more replacement units and allow them to cross-subsidise their construction. Additionally, to densify the area, the DRA allowed builders to increase the floor space index in Dharavi from the existing 1.33 to 4. As a result, the developers’ plans ended up concentrating the slum residents into small replacement units within tower blocks, thus fulfilling the necessary replacement floor area with the least amount of space possible while freeing up land for high-value, profitable developments (Carr, 2015). This hence compromised the living conditions of the rehoused residents in favour of private returns.

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Relating to Old Oak Common Thus far, all of the developers appointed for Old Oak Common are locallybased, hence they should be relatively well-acquainted with the London planning context. Public consultations have allowed for a fair representation of public interests as well, thus putting Old Oak Common at a far stronger position than the DRP. However, similar to the DRP, the regeneration of Old Oak Common is also viewed as a means of unlocking the area’s latent land value through its transformation into a transport, manufacturing and commercial superhub capable of producing a £6.2bn boost to London’s economy (Mayor of London, 2014). In light of this, Old Oak Common needs to ensure that such ambitions do not overshadow the public interest, such as reducing the amount of land allotted to affordable housing or the pricing out of smaller businesses in favour of large commercial and industrial companies.

However, it is crucial to note that the agenda for affordable housing in Old Oak Common is different from that of replacement housing provision in the DRP. The DRP’s agenda is to provide free rehousing for slum-dwellers who can prove their residency within the Dharavi site before the year 2000. However, for Old Oak Common, the aim is to provide 25,500 new homes in total, without stipulations for whom. In accordance with the National Planning Policy Framework, a third of this should be allocated as affordable housing, but a recent 2015 report by Cargiant, one of the project’s key developers, states that they have “yet to determine the amount of affordable housing that can be delivered as this will… depend on the decisions made by the public sector”. Old Oak Common thus needs to set clear guidelines on the number of affordable housing units it will provide as well as the land area allocated for this purpose.

Linking to this, as the OPDC is led under the Mayor of London, we note that the 2016 London mayoral elections could significantly influence Old Oak Common in terms of its objectives and priorities as well as its implementation.

Hence, there is a need for Old Oak Common to commit to specific targets independent from political changes and that balance public and private interests.

Key Learning Points • For an MUP to succeed, there must be a strategic management approach to balance public and private interests. Public involvement is necessary to ensure a representation of their interests • Project priorities need to be identified from early on and committed to guide decision-making and prevent disruptive changes to the project.

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Conclusion

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Through a detailed analysis of the DRP, this report has drawn several key learning points on the management of mega-urban projects, and thus made recommendations for how the GLA and OPDC may act moving forward to strengthen the planning and implementation of the Old Oak Common Regeneration Project. The failures of the DRP reveal the vulnerabilities of MUPs, showing how mismanagement during their development, a biased focus on the priorities of powerful stakeholders, and the neglecting of community voices can cause the project to collapse or to be insensitive to local socioeconomic needs. We hence believe that the recommendations made in this report will help Old Oak Common better ensure its success, in terms of implementation as well as the achieving of its goal of becoming a vibrant new urban district that boosts the image, economy and quality of living in the West London region.

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