Fe winter 04

Across Childhood and Adolescence

By Michael Slavkin, PhD, NCC

Investigation of a Psychopathic Criminal’s Behavior as the Wheels of Justice Slowly Turn

By Eric A. Kreuter, CPA, DABFA

Coping with Stress in Terrorism Prevention Work: Combat Veterans Fair Better

By Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, PhD, DABPS, CHS-III

Cognitive Impairment Associated with Habitual Nitrous Oxide Abuse in a 63-Year-Old Health Professional

By Ralph Van Atta, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS

Nigerian 419 Fraud Scams Worth Pursuing

By Joseph Wheeler, CPA, Cr.FA, CHS-III

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Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 3

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AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC NURSING Chair of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Charla Jamerson, RN, BSN, CMI-III Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Michele R. Groff, PhN, MSN, DABFN, CMI-III Chair Emeritus: Cheryl L. Pozzi, MS, BSN, RN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Jerilyn S. Champagne, BA, RN, CMI-III Rose Eva Bana Constantino, PhD, JD, RN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE Renae M. Diegel, RN, SANE, CMI-III Dianne T. Ditmer, MS, RN, DABFN, CMI-III Tara Ferguson, LT, RN, NP, CMI-III Jamie J. Ferrell, BSN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE Renee K. LaPorte, PhD, RN, CMI-III, CHS-III Lo M. Lumsden, ANP, EdD, RN, DABFN Ann K. McDonald-Marchesi, MBA, BSN, RN, CMI-III Yvonne D. McKoy, PhD, RN, DABFN Russell R. Rooms, BSN, RN, CMI-III Suzette Rush-Drake, RN, BSN, PsyD, DABFN, DABFE Mitzi Schardt, RNC, MSN, FNP

AMERICAN BOARD PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECIALTIES Chair of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Michael A. Baer, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Raymond F. Hanbury, Jr., PhD, DABPS, DABFE Chair Emeritus: Carl N. Edwards, PhD, JD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Robert J. Barth, PhD, DABPS Alan E. Brooker, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-III David F. Ciampi, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS Brian R. Costello, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE

Ronna F. Dillon, PhD, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-V, CHS-III Douglas P. Gibson, PsyD, DABPS, CMI-V Raymond H. Hamden, PhD, DABPS, DABECI, CMI-V, CHS-V Thomas L. Hustak, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Richard Lewis Levenson, Jr., PsyD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Philip Murphy, PhD Douglas H. Ruben, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM Richard M. Skaff, PsyD, DABPS Charles R. Stern, PhD, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-V Robin Tener, PhD, DABPS

AMERICAN BOARD OF RECORDED EVIDENCE Chair of the Executive Board of Recorded Evidence Advisors: Thomas J. Owen, BA, FACFEI, DABRE, DABFE Committees of the American Board of Recorded Evidence Forensic Audio: Ryan Johnson, BA James A. Griffin, DABFE Forensic Video: Robert Skye Forensic Voice Identification: Ernst F. W. Alexanderson, BA, MBA, DABRE, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Recorded Evidence Advisors: Michael C. McDermott, JD, DABRE, DABFE Jennifer E. Owen, BA, DABRE, DABFE Mark Schubin, DABRE Lonnie L. Smrkovski, BS, DABRE, DABFE Mindy S. Wilson, BS, DABRE International Representative–Japan: Takao Suzuki, BS, DABRE, DABFE

AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC SOCIAL WORKERS Chair of the Executive Board of Social Work Advisors: Karen M. Zimmerman, MSW, DABFSW, DABFE Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Social Work Advisors: Daniel S. Guerra, PhD, FACFEI, DABFSW, DABFE Chair Emeritus: Douglas E. Fountain, PhD, DABFSW Members of the Executive Board of Social Work Advisors: Susan L. Burton, MA, MSW, CSW, DABFSW, DABLEE Judith V. Caprez, MSW, DABFSW Peter W. Choate, MSW, DABFSW, DABFE Joan Danto, MSW, LCSW, DABFSW, DABFE Ronald L. Eltzeroth, MSW, DABFSW Judith Felton Logue, PhD, FACFEI, DABFSW, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Steven J. Sprengelmeyer, MSW, DABFSW, DABFE Paul E. Stevens, ACSW, DABFSW

AMERICAN BOARD FOR CERTIFICATION IN HOMELAND SECURITY Chair of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: Nick Bacon, CHS-V, Past President of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, Director of the Department of Veterans Affairs for the state of Arkansas

Members of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: David N. Appleby, BS, JD, CHS-V, Colonel (Ret.), Special Forces, U.S. Army Reserve Michael Baer, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS, FAPA, CHS-V Donna Barbisch, MPH, DHA, CHS-V Major General, United States Army Reserve Harold Bengsch, BS, MSPH, REHS/RS, CHS-V E. Robert Bertolli, OD, CHS-V, CMI-V John H. Bridges, III, CHMM, CSHM, CHS-V Brigadier General Robert C. G. Disney (Ret.), U.S. Army, CFSSP, CHS-V Paul P. Donahue, MBA, Cr.FA, CMA, CPP, CBM, CHS-V Paul L. Errico, MS, REP, CHMM, CHS-V Col. Robert Fortin (Ret.),United States Army, CHS-V Ernest R. Frazier, Sr., Esq., DABLEE, CHS-V John P. Giduck, JD, CHS-V James L. Greenstone, EdD, JD, FACFEI, DABLEE, DABPS, ABFE, CMI-I, Lt. Col., CHS-V Brig. Gen. John J. Harty (Ret.), CHS-V Keith Holtermann, DrPH, MBA, MPH, RN, CEN, REMT-P, CHS-V James A. Horty, Jr., MBA, CPA, CVA, Cr.FA, DABFA, DABFE, ABFE, CHS-V Col. LZ Johnson, Special Forces, U.S. Army (Ret.), CHS-V John H. Lombardi, PhD, MBA, NAPS, CST, CSS, CPO, IAPSC, DABFE, DABLEE, CHS-V Herbert I. London, PhD, CHS-V Col. Richard Niemtzow, United States Air Force, MD, PhD, MPH, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DCP, CHS-V Brig. Gen. Patricia Nilo, United States Army Chemical Corps, CHS-V Thomas J. Owen, BA, FACFEI, DABRE, DABFE, CHS-V Tony Piscitelli, MA, CHS-V James S. Potts, BS, MS, CHS-V Don L. Rondeau, MS, CJ, MBA Cert., CHS-V Lt. Col. David Rosengard (Ret.), MD, PhD, DABFE, DABFM, ABECI, CMI-V, CHS-V Robert R. Silver, Ph.D., MS, BS, CHS-V Herman C. Statum, MS, CPP, CHS-V Lt. Col. Xavier Stewart, United States Army, PhD, RRT, RCP, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, CHS-V Lt. Col. Kathleen M. Sweet (Ret.), JD, CHS-V Edward W. Wallace, Detective 1st Grade (Ret.), MA, SCSA, LPI, CFI I & II, CLEI, CTO, CDHSI, CHS-V

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The Forensic Examiner® (ISSN 1084-5569) is published quarterly by The American College of Forensic Examiners International, Inc. (ACFEI). Annual membership for a year in the American College of Forensic Examiners International is $130. Abstracts of articles published in The Forensic Examiner® appear in National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Gale Group Publishing's InfoTrac Database, e-psyche database and psycINFO database. Periodicals Postage Paid at Springfield, Missouri and additional mailing offices. ©Copyright 2004 by the American College of Forensic Examiners International. All rights reserved. No part of this work can be distributed, or otherwise used without the express permission of the American College of Forensic Examiners International. The views expressed in The Forensic Examiner® are those of the authors and may not reflect the official policies of the American College of Forensic Examiners International.

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4 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

THE

FORENSIC

EXA MINER

VOLUME 13 • NUMBER 4

®

Winter 2004

The

FORENSICEXAMINER

®

06

By Michael Slavkin, PhD, NCC

2004 Editorial Advisory Board Jack S. Annon, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS, DABLEE E. Robert Bertolli, OD, CHS-III, CMI-V David T. Boyd, DBA, CPA, Cr.FA, CMA, CFM John Brick, PhD, DABFE, DABFM Steve Cain, MFS, DABRE, DABFE James H. Carter, MD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Leanne D. Courtney, BSN, DABFN, DABFE D. Larry Crumbley, PhD, CPA, DABFA Edmund D. Fenton, Jr., DBA, CPA, CMA, Cr.FA Nicholas J. Giardino, ScD, DABFE Daniel P. Greenfield, MD, MPH, DABFE, DABFM James Greenstone, EdD, JD, FACFEI, DABECI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS, DABLEE Raymond F. Hanbury, Jr., PhD, ABPP, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE James R. Hanley, III, MD, DABFM Nelson H. Hendler, MD, DABFM James A. Horty, MBA, CPA, CVA, Cr.FA, DABFA, DABFE, CHS-V Zafar M. Iqbal, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Paul Jerry, PhD, MA, CPsych, DABFC, DAPA Philip I. Kaushall, PhD, DABFE, DABPS Richard L. Levenson, Jr., PsyD, DABFE, DABPS Jonathan J. Lipman, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM Judith F. Logue, PhD, FACFEI, DABFSW, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM David B. Miller, DDS, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABFD Sandralee N. Miller, RN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE Terrence W. C. O’Shaughnessy, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD, DABFE, DABFM George B. Palermo, MD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Marc A. Rabinoff, EdD, FACFEI, DABFE Don L. Rondeau, MS, CJ, MBA Cert, CHS-V Douglas H. Ruben, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS William R. Sawyer, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Victoria Schiffler, RN, DABFN Stanley Seidner, PhD, DABFE, DABFET, CHS-III Kandiah Sivakumaran, MS, PE, DABFET Marilyn Stagno, PsyD, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Xavier Stewart, PhD, RRT, RCP, CHS-V James R. Stone, MD, MBA, CHS-III Gere N. Unger, MD, JD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Ralph Van Atta, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS Raymond E. Webster, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Paul Zikmund, MBA, Cr.FA Publisher: Robert L. O’Block, MDiv, PhD, PsyD, DMin (rloblock@aol.com) Editor: Heather Barbre Blades, MA (editor@acfei.com) Assistant Editor, Senior Writer: Erica B. Simons, BS Designed by: Brandon Alms, BFA

Characteristics of Juvenile Firesetting Across Childhood and Adolescence

19

Coping with Stress in Terrorism Prevention Work: Combat Veterans Fair Better

By Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, PhD, DABPS, CHS-III

28

Investigation of a Psychopathic Criminal’s Behavior as the Wheels of Justice Slowly Turn

By Eric A. Kreuter, MA, CPA, CMA, CFM, DABFA, SPHR, FACFEI

36

Cognitive Impairment Associated with Habitual Nitrous Oxide Abuse in a 63-Year-Old Health Professional

CME

By Ralph Van Atta, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI, FACAPP

41

Nigerian 419 Fraud Scams Worth Pursuing

By Joseph Wheeler, CPA, Cr.FA, CHS-III

44

Announcing ACFEI’s Regional Conference in Atlanta, Jan. 21-22, 2005

54

FORENSIC CASE PROFILE: A 1957 DoubleMurder Cold Case Solved by Forensics

46

ACFEI’s Regional Conference: CMI, CFN, and CFC Registration Form

58

Recent Publications By ACFEI Members

60

Welcome New ACFEI Members

47

ACFEI’s Regional Conference: CHS-IV and CHS-V Registration Form

62

CURRENT ISSUES IN THE FIELD OF FORENSICS: An Introduction to Forensic Physiatry

48

ACFEI News

49

CHS News

64

Continuing Education (CE) Questions

50

FORENSIC CASE PROFILE: Dangerous Predictions: The Case of Randall Dale Adams

67

Falsely Accused

The American College of Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI) does not endorse, guarantee or warrant the credentials, work or opinions of any individual member. Membership in ACFEI does not constitute the grant of a license or other licensing authority by or on behalf of the organization as to a member’s qualifications, abilities or expertise. The publications and activities of ACFEI are solely for informative and educational purposes with respect to its members. The opinions and views expressed by the authors, publishers or presenters are their sole and separate views and opinions, and do not necessarily reflect those of ACFEI, nor does ACFEI adopt such opinions or views as its own. The American College of Forensic Examiners International disclaims, and does not assume any responsibility or liability with respect to the opinions, views and factual statements of such authors, publishers or presenters, nor with respect to any actions, qualifications or representations of its members or subscriber efforts in connection with the application or utilization of any information, suggestions or recommendations made by ACFEI, or any of its boards or committees, or publications, resources or activities thereof.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 5

By Michael Lawrence Slavkin, PhD, NCC Abstract The purpose of this study was to initiate preliminary analyses that would contribute to the identification of a typology of firesetters, would account for variance in the severity of fires set by juveniles, and would predict the likelihood of recidivistic behaviors in juvenile firesetters. Predictors were restricted to a limited set of exploratory variables, including age, sex, delinquency, limited sociability, and psychopathology. The breadth of the sample under study provided some interesting insight into how different types of firesetters vary in their firesetting based on levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency. Because of the skewed nature of the magnitude of fire damage (most fireplay by juveniles does not result in any financial damage), forensic psychologists and other professionals may find it helpful to investigate recidivism or the type of firesetter.

6 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

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Key Words: juvenile firesetting, category system, developmental characteristics The Scope of the Problem Each year, fires set by juveniles account for a large portion of fire-related public property damage and deaths. Fires set by children and adolescents are more likely than any other household disaster to result in death. In the United States in 1998, it was estimated that fires set by children and juveniles resulted in 600 deaths, 30,800 injuries, and $2 billion in property damage (National Fire Protection Association, 1999).

Despite the costs and impact of juvenile firesetting, it remains a little-studied area of research. Research on juvenile firesetting has also been subject to methodological and statistical limitations. Examinations of juvenile firesetting have been based on data from case studies or from research using projective instruments, which are of limited generalizability. These studies project an image of juvenile firesetters as a uniform group, not acknowledging wide intragroup differences among the forms of firesetting and the magnitude of fire damage. Also, most studies of juvenile firesetting typically depend upon data drawn from hospitalized or institutionalized samples. The reliance on samples of hospitalized or institutionalized firesetting youths reinforces the stereotyped perception that most juvenile firesetters are psychologically disturbed. These methodological constraints affect the ways in which professionals in the fire service, mental health, and education fields view young firesetters. Further, researchers have questioned what dependent variable should be investigated in reviewing the behaviors of firesetters. Based on a review of the most current literature on juvenile firesetters, I used the following as dependent variables: the magnitude of fire damage (based in dollar amount lost due to fire), the presence of recidivism, and the typology of firesetters.

The Purpose of the Study The purpose of this study was to investigate factors that contribute to the form and risk of continuation of firesetting in juveniles, examining data taken from a county-based dataset on child and adolescent firesetters. The Marion County Arson Investigation Network (MCAIN) is a county-wide database compiled by fire pro-

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 7

fessionals who investigate incidents of firesetting within Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana. The database is a subset of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) database on juvenile firesetters. By acquiring information on firesetters from MCAIN, I sought to acquire a more representative sample of firesetting juveniles. MCAIN’s use of a series of standardized measures to collect information from both the firesetter and family members (Fineman, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) is an improvement over previous research, which focused solely on case studies or interview data.

Conceptual Framework of the Study Juvenile firesetting remains an understudied area. Most attention to firesetting has been subsumed within broader categories of delinquency and aggression in children (Kazdin, 1990). However, no separate review of firesetting from a developmental framework has been performed. It is believed that juvenile firesetting, much like other forms of delinquency and aggression in juveniles, can be explained as an example of problem behavior.

Firesetting can be classified as one of many examples of problem behavior that have been identified in juveniles. In proposing his problem-behavior theory (Jessor, 1987; Jessor & Jessor, 1984), Richard Jessor asserts that most juvenile problem behaviors can be explained by an examination of the particular characteristics and experiences of juveniles (individual characteristics) within the contexts defined by a larger society or culture (environmental characteristics).

For social scientists to understand a problem behavior, individual and environmental factors must be examined in addition to the attributes of the situation in which the problem behavior takes place (Jessor, 1981; Jessor & Jessor, 1973).

This study’s emphasis on develop-

mental factors that contribute to the initiation or continuation of juvenile firesetting has implications for the ways in which parents, educators, and counselors work with these youth. By acquiring information on firesetters from the MCAIN datafile, I sought to acquire a more representative perspective of juvenile firesetters. My hope is that this dataset will improve the community’s understanding of this problem, and that programs designed to intervene on behalf of these youth will benefit as well.

Juvenile Firesetting Juvenile firesetters are typically defined as children or adolescents who engage in firesetting. Beyond its tautological character, such a definition implies a singularity about firesetting in children and adolescents. It is more appropriate to distinguish among different types of juvenile firesetters. Previous classifications of juvenile firesetters have been based on individual characteristics (e.g., personal motives, physical problems, interpersonal ineffectiveness/skills deficits, and covert antisocial behavior excesses) as well as environmental characteristics (e.g., limited supervision and monitoring, parental distance and uninvolvement, parental pathology and limitations, and presence of crisis or trauma) (Kolko & Kazdin, 1992).

This study is based on the premise that aberrant behavior, such as firesetting, occurs because some children and adolescents suffer from weak or nonexistent bonds to society, which causes them to behave in socially unacceptable ways. Juvenile firesetting may be one example of larger problems with aggression, deviance, or difficulty externalizing behaviors.

Typology of Juvenile Firesetters Patterson (1982) asserts that firesetters of different types and ages require different explanations for their firesetting behaviors. Professionals may also find it

8 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

helpful to identify the type of firesetter with which they are working. Though some in the field have differentiated between firesetters based on severe versus non-severe groupings (Sakheim & Osborn, 1999), other classification systems have been suggested as being more helpful to fire service and mental health workers. Jones, Ribbe, & Cunningham (1994) suggest that systems of classification should parallel the motivations that spur juvenile firesetters to play with fire.

Fineman (1995) offers seven commonly identified types of juvenile firesetters; an overview of these types follows.

Type 1: The Curiosity Firesetter Curiosity firesetters are typically young children (juveniles ages 3 to 6 years) who engage in firesetting as experimentation.

In some instances, hyperactivity or attention deficit disorder may be present. When asked why they started a fire, curiosity firesetters tend to respond that they did so because they desired to watch a flame. Curiosity firesetters hold no intent to cause harm. Curiosity firesetting is the traditional childhood diagnosis for most firesetting children ages 7 years and younger.

Curiosity firesetters often show remorse for their behaviors following the incident (Kolko & Kazdin, 1991), and tend not to understand the consequences of their behaviors. It is thought that most children are inherently curious about fire. However, curiosity firesetters are likely to have early involvement with firesetting and are generally more interested in fire than other types of juvenile firesetters (Kolko & Kazdin, 1991).

Type 2: The Accidental Firesetter Accidental firesetters are usually children under the age of 11 years. However, this category of firesetters may also include teenagers engaging in experimental firesetting, or those that are “playing scientist.” Accidents caused by adolescent or adult carelessness may also fall into this group. Accidental firesetters do not

Table 1: Typology of Firesetters Type of Firesetter Curiosity

Characteristics

Accidental

Usually involves children under 11 years of age; teenagers playing scientist. The firesetting does not result from a destructive motive to create fire.

Cry for Help

Offenders who consciously or subconsciously wish to bring attention to an intrapersonal dysfunction (depression) or to an interpersonal dysfunction (abuse at home, vicarious observation of parental conflict). The fires are not meant to harm people. Acceptable prognosis for treatment. This is a traditional childhood diagnosis for abused children.

Delinquent

Includes the fire-for-profit type and the cover-another-crime type of firesetter. Interest in vandalism and hate crimes is noteworthy. As juveniles, this type shows little empathy for others. Shows little conscience. Juvenile types rarely harm others with fire. Significant property damage is common. As adults, a significant percentage of delinquent firesetters do harm others.

Severely Disturbed Type

Includes those juveniles who seek to harm themselves, those who are paranoid, and psychotic types, for which the fixation on fire may be a major factor in the development of a mental disorder. Sensory aspects of the fire are sufficiently reinforcing to cause fires to be set frequently. Pyromaniac is a sub-type; sensory reinforcement is often powerful enough for significant harm to occur. Prognosis is guarded with this group.

Cognitively Impaired

Includes retarded and organically impaired firesetters. These types tend to avoid intentional harm and lack acceptable judgment. Significant property damage is common. Prognostically, they are acceptable therapy candidates.

Also included in this group are persons with severe learning disabilities or those affected by fetal alcohol syndrome or by drugs taken by their mothers during pregnancy.

Sociocultural

Includes the uncontrolled mass-hysteria type, the attention-to-cause type, the religious type, and the satanic type.

These arsonists set fires primarily for the support they get for doing so from groups within their communities.

These firesetters set fires in the midst of civil unrest, and are either enraged or enticed by the activity of others and follow suit. Most are amenable to treatment.

Younger children who do not understand the consequences of their behavior; desire is to watch the flame. Hyperactivity or attention deficit may be present. No intent to cause harm. Traditional childhood diagnosis.

* A note about this table: From Fineman, K. (1995). A model for the qualitative analysis of child and adult fire deviant behavior. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 13, 34. Adapted with permission of the author.

intend to cause harm. For the most part, accidental firesetting is not the result of neglectful or abusive home environments (Canter & Frizon, 1998; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996).

Type 3: The Cry-for-Help Firesetter The cry-for-help firesetter often cooccurs in adolescents diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression not otherwise specified, major depression, oppositional defiant disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder. These children and adolescents may engage in maladaptive firesetting behaviors in an attempt to bring attention to their parental or familial dysfunction

(Fineman, 1995). This group traditionally is defined by offenders who consciously or subconsciously wish to bring attention to intrapersonal dysfunction (depression), or to interpersonal dysfunction (abuse at home, presence during parental conflict). Although these firesetters are generally not thought to cause harm or damage (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996), their inability to appropriately express themselves can cause serious personal or property injury. These cry-for-help firesetters generally have an acceptable prognosis for treatment (Fineman, 1995).

A subgroup of cry-for-help firesetters are those individuals who set fires in order to be seen as would-be hero types,

seeking the attention of peers or the community in order to discover or help put out the fires they start. The cry-forhelp firesetter is frequently diagnosed in abused children.

Type 4: The Delinquent Firesetter Delinquent firesetting is theorized to have a developmental trend. Delinquent tendencies are thought to begin during preadolescence and increase throughout adolescence. The delinquent type includes those who set fires for profit and those who set fires to cover up another crime. This group also tends to engage in vandalism and hate crimes.

During preadolescence, delinquent firesetters show some empathy for others

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 9

Table 2: Reliability Estimates for Individual Scales and Environmental Scales

Individual scales Affinity toward aggression Delinquency Externalization of emotions

Cronbach’s Alpha .59 .90 .79

Number of items on scale 14 16 27

.57 .71 .67

14 6 12

Environmental scales Family problems School problems Peer problems

(Harris & Rice, 1996). However, adolescent delinquent firesetters show little empathy for others, and also show little conscience for their behaviors. Though they have limited empathy for the members of their families or communities, adolescent delinquent firesetters rarely harm others with the fires they set. Significant property damage is common at this age. As young adults, delinquent firesetters may attempt to harm others.

Kolko & Kazdin (1991) found that higher rates of other deviant behaviors immediately preceded firesetting recidivism when compared with other juveniles that had been psychiatric inpatients. As a group they show the greatest amount of deviancy and behavioral dysfunction. Firesetting behavior in this group is extinguished more easily than the other personality and behavior problems that accompany the firesetting (Showers & Pickrell, 1987).

Type 5: The Severely Disturbed Firesetter Those few youths identified as severely disturbed firesetters are diagnosed with a wide variety of individual pathologies, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, general anxiety disorder, conduct disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder (Jones, Ribbe, & Cunningham, 1994; Lowenstein, 1989). Moore, ThompsonPope, and Whited (1996) found that firesetters, when compared with other inpatient adolescent boys without a his-

tory of firesetting, scored significantly higher on three clinical scales: mania, schizophrenia, and psychasthenia.

Unlike the cry-for-help firesetters who tend to show similar symptomatology as a result of environmental circumstances, severely disturbed firesetters are likely to show early signs as a result of their individual psychopathology. Severely disturbed children are more likely than other types of firesetters to be found in an inpatient population, and also show higher incidents of recidivism than outpatient populations (Kolko & Kazdin, 1988). However, such diagnoses have not been found to adequately characterize the conditions that surround these children and adolescents (Jones et al., 1994; Rice & Harris, 1996; Showers & Pickrell, 1987).

Also included in this category are paranoid and psychotic firesetters, for whom the fixation on fire may be a major factor in the development of a mental disorder. The pyromaniac is a subtype of the severely disturbed firesetting category. Prognosis is guarded with this group.

Type 6: The Cognitively Impaired Firesetter Cognitively impaired firesetters typically include those children or adolescents who hold diagnoses such as attention deficit disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, or learning disabilities; those who are mildly mentally retarded;

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those who are retarded or have some type of organic brain dysfunction; those with severe learning disabilities; and those affected by fetal alcohol syndrome or by drugs taken by their mothers during pregnancy.

The view that most young firesetters are of low intelligence has been largely discounted in recent years by Showers and Pickrell (1987), who reported that disobedience and aggression, as well as emotional and physical abuse, are better predictors of firesetting behaviors.

Lower intelligence in juvenile firesetters may be better explained as a result of growing up under economic disadvantage and with limited educational opportunities. Those firesetters who are cognitively impaired tend to avoid intentional harm but lack acceptable judgment about matchplay and control of fire. Significant property damage is common with this group. Prognostically, they are acceptable candidates for therapy and educational interventions.

Type 7: The Sociocultural Firesetter More often than not, sociocultural firesetters are young-adult or adult arsonists who set fires primarily for the support they get for doing so from groups within their communities. Those sociocultural types typically set fires in the midst of civil unrest, or when they are either enraged or enticed by the activity of others and follow suit. They may also deliberately set fires to call attention to the righteousness of their cause. These firesetters frequently lose control and harm others.

Levin (1976) suggests that an analysis of firesetting behaviors needs to include whether the firesetter acted as an individual or within a group. He also suggests that the sociocultural type of firesetter is most likely to use fire to embarrass or intimidate an opponent when involving a group of firesetters, but that individual firesetting is more likely to be driven by profit.

Methods Data Collection: Data collection took place during scheduled 3-hour interviews between a fire service professional, a firesetter, and the firesetter’s parent/guardian following the firesetter’s referral to the MCAIN Fire Stop program. The interview protocol used in this study followed the recommended interview format designed by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1988). Parents and participants were told that they were to engage in a brief discussion regarding their firesetting behaviors. Participants and their parents then completed questionnaires and interview questions to fulfill mandatory program requirements.

Each data record in the MCAIN database includes demographic information, the nature of the firesetter’s behaviors, the firesetting incident, and whether or not the individual followed up with any counseling after the fire. Four primary pieces of information were included in each data record: narrative information taken from the fire-site interview, the Family Fire Risk Interview Form (Fineman, 1997a), the Juvenile Fire Risk Interview Form (Fineman, 1997b), and the Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire (Fineman, 1997c).

Measures Demographic factors: Demographic information was obtained from the Family Fire Risk Interview Form (Fineman, 1997a), which was completed by the parent/guardian at the time of the Fire Stop Program interview. Information obtained included the child’s age, race, sex, education level, school enrollment, number of siblings, parent’s education level, and parent’s present job.

Age groups: Four groups of firesetters were identified. Childhood firesetters were defined as ranging from 3 to 6 years of age. Preadolescent firesetters were defined as ranging from 7 to 10 years of age. Early adolescent firesetters were defined as ranging from 11 to 14 years of

age. Late adolescent firesetters were defined as ranging from 15 to 18 years of age.

Gender: The firesetters were classified as either male or female.

Family configuration: Family configuration and caregiver status were identified from information taken from the Family Fire Risk Interview Form (Fineman, 1997a). The caregiver’s status was divided between adoptive caregivers or biological caregivers. Caregivers were classified as either male or female. Parents were similarly classified as either fathers or mothers. Family configuration for both parents was defined as being one of 6 classifications: single, married, divorced, widowed, separated, or remarried. When referring to their marital status, the caregivers/parents were asked to refer to their present status. Separate information was also taken on all individuals living in the home, including their ages and relationships to the firesetter. Information on the living arrangements of the firesetter was also obtained (such as a child living with grandparents, but away from mother and father, etc.).

Race: The race of the participants and their parents was identified from information taken from the Family Fire Risk Interview Form (Fineman, 1997a). Race was characterized by the caregiver/parent’s response, and included such categories as Caucasian, African American, Hispanic American, Asian American, Black Hispanic, Native American, or biracial.

Participants Records from 78 child firesetters (ages 3 to 6 years), 240 preadolescent firesetters (ages 7 to 10 years), 157 early adolescent firesetters (ages 11 to 14 years), and 413 late-adolescent firesetters (ages 15 to 18 years) who were referred to the Marian County Arson Investigation Network (MCAIN) for firesetting behaviors were analyzed. Many firesetters over the age of 12 are referred for incarceration rather

than psychoeducation; as a result, the sampling of juveniles at or above this age is believed to be limited. For the purposes of this study, the entire MCAIN database was used. Firesetters in the MCAIN data file range in age from 3 to 19 years old. It was expected that there was a greater preponderance of late-adolescent firesetters than the other considered groups (see Kolko, 1985 for a review). It also was expected that a higher number of male firesetters were identified than female firesetters.

Examination of Scales Initially, it was believed that both individual and environmental variables would need to be examined in order to predict certain characteristics of juvenile firesetting; these characteristics included the magnitude of fire damage, recidivistic behaviors, and the type of firesetter.

With this individual-environmental dichotomy in mind, three individual scales (aggression, delinquency, and externalization of emotions) and three environmental scales (family problems, school problems, and peer problems) were established. Questions were organized from FEMA Juvenile Firesetter Forms (Fineman, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). Individual items were matched to the defined concepts organized by both the individual and environmental principles to create six different scales.

When examining these six scales, the externalization of emotions and delinquency scales appeared to show satisfactory reliability. However, examination of bivariate relationships revealed all scales to be colinear; all of the scales correlated with one another at the 0.001 level.

Given that the FEMA scales did not possess sufficient psychometric integrity as configured, I elected to use an exploratory data analysis to identify a set of stable variables that could assist in further understanding the hypotheses under study.

For the purposes of this study, analyses were limited to the Parent Fire Risk

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 11

Questionnaire (Fineman, 1997c). The FEMA Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire holds the advantage of a single format for all items; this is not the case with other FEMA instruments. It is perhaps because of this attribute that the Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire was found to have the strongest reliability estimates; item transparency also appeared to be less of an issue. Items on this scale were subject to exploratory data analysis using SPSS Version 9.0.

showed that a convergence criterion was satisfied within three iterations. A principal component analysis was performed based on three factors. Squared multiple correlations were used to estimate initial communalities. Shared variance was estimated by communalities, which indicated that there was some relationship found within the matrix. Components for each of the three factors only loaded on one factor, an indication of the stability of the factors.

Exploratory Factor Analysis Prior to the exploratory factor analysis, I examined the descriptive attributes of each item. Any item that showed 80% or more responses on the same choice were eliminated. As a result, 15 items were eliminated.

Principal component analysis was performed on 101 of the 116 items on the FEMA Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire (Fineman, 1997c). Principal component analysis was performed with no limit on the number of factors to be elicited or the number of iterations necessary to yield the factors. Determination of the final factor structure was also guided by an examination of the Scree plot of eigenvalues that revealed a break between the second and third eigenvalues (an indication to limit the number of factors to three). Using a critical eigenvalue greater than 1.0 also suggested a three-factor solution. A maximum likelihood chi-square test of fit was also performed, which indicated that a threefactor model would maximize the determinant of the residual correlation matrix.

Preliminary eigenvalues were observed to examine whether unidimensionality of the model was a concern. Unidimensionality was not found to be a problem, in that the second eigenvalue was not found to be five times smaller than the first factor. With three factors, I was able to explain 40% of the instrument’s variance.

The iterated principal factor analysis

Jessor’s Theory Revisited: Pathology, Delinquency, and Limited Sociability It would appear that the resulting factor structure is consonant with Jessor’s theory of problem behavior. Jessor outlines three principal individual components that have been identified throughout the literature in examining problem behaviors: the presence of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquent tendencies (Rachal et al., 1980).

Factor 1: Pathology. As a factor under consideration, pathology was identified using six items. Pathology was meant to assess concerns regarding individual psychopathology, and included items such as [the juvenile has] “unusual fantasies,” “strange thought patterns,” and “bizarre and irrational speech.” Each statement related to pathology, with responses ranging from 1 (low pathology) to 3 (high pathology) (see Table 3). Internal consistency for the pathology scale was acceptable and high, with an estimated Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87.

Factor 2: Delinquency. Delinquency was identified as any behavior that was bothersome to caregivers (e.g., highly stubborn behavior, lying, truancy, running away from home) or that inflicted harm or property loss on others (vandalism, theft, violent acts). Delinquency included items such as “the child expresses anger by hurting self or something he likes,” “child is cruel to animals,” and “child steals.” Each statement related to delinquency, with responses

12 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

ranging from 1 (low levels of delinquency) to 3 (high levels of delinquency) (see Table 3). Internal consistency for the delinquency scale was acceptable and high, with an estimated Cronbach’s alpha of 0.92.

Factor 3: Limited sociability. Limited sociability was identified as a measure of individual difficulty in interacting with others in appropriate ways, and included 18 items (see Table 3). The factor included items such as [the child has] “extreme mood swings,” “temper tantrums,” and [the child is] “cruel to other children.” Each statement related to limited sociability with responses ranging from 1 (low limited sociability) to 3 (high limited sociability). Internal consistency for the limited sociability scale was acceptable and high, with an estimated Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88.

Hypotheses Under Investigation One set of analyses was carried out to test the hypothesis under consideration.

That is to say that the typology of the juvenile firesetter would be predicted by levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency, as well as the age, race, and sex of the firesetter.

Reduction in Firesetter Types and Categories of Race Fineman (1995) offers seven commonly identified types of firesetters: curiosity, accidental, cry for help, delinquent, severely disturbed, cognitively impaired, and sociocultural firesetters. However, in examining the frequency of each type of firesetter, it became clear that cognitively impaired and sociocultural firesetters were not found in numbers proportional to the other types of firesetters (n = 12). As a result, cognitively impaired firesetters and sociocultural firesetters were not used in this analysis. Also, limited numbers of Asian Americans, biracial Americans, and Hispanic Americans were identified (n = 33). Because of the limited frequency of each of these cate-

Table 3: Related factor loadings for the FEMA Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire (loadings less than .50 excluded) Item Bizarre and irrational speech Unusual fantasies Strange thought patterns Strange quality about child Out of touch with reality Severe depression/withdrawal

Pathology Sociability .82 .80 .79 .73 .62 .50

Has been in trouble with police Sexual activity with others Uses drugs or alcohol Cruel to animals Steals Expresses anger by hurting self/something he/she likes Is a loner Expresses anger by damaging others’ property In trouble at home Destroys toys/property of others Excessive uncontrolled verbal anger Lies Behavioral difficulties (past/present) Temper tantrums Withdraws from peers/group Extreme mood swings Expresses anger by hurting others Unacceptable showing off Physically violent Cruel to other children Easily led by peers Disobeys Shows off for peers Destroys own toys (ages 3-6)

gories and the risk of sociocultural variants that may serve to distinguish these groups, they were removed from further analyses.

Predictors of the Typology of the Juvenile Firesetter The third hypothesis examined in the present study was that the typology of the juvenile firesetter would be predictable by levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency, as well as the age of the firesetter. I hypothesized that the types of firesetting could also be explained by the gender and race of the participant. It was believed that higher levels of pathology and delinquency would predict most types of firesetting.

Delinquency

Limited

.75 .72 .65 .66 .62 .54 .74 .72 .72 .72 .71 .70 .69 .68 .67 .67 .66 .61 .58 .57 .57 .55 .54 .51

For each of the five types of juvenile firesetters identified, a separate regression analysis was performed.

Curiosity Firesetter Regression Analysis: The following variables were included in the study to identify the unique contribution of each variable: age, gender, race, pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency. Predictor variables were the same as those previously used in earlier regression analyses. The type of firesetter was the outcome variable, which was identified from information taken from MCAIN files (Spurlin, 1999).

Statistical significance was established at a predetermined level of 0.01. I exam-

ined each of the variables that were used to test for assumptions of the multiple regression model. No assumptions were believed to be neglected in performing the linear regression.

Results for the Linear Regression: The multiple regression model was significant, with an R-squared value of 0.10 (F (6, 842) = 25.13, p = 0.0001).

The model was able to explain 10% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as curiosity firesetters. Curiosity firesetters can be explained as younger juveniles with low levels of delinquency and low levels of pathology. Curiosity firesetters also can be explained as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions.

Cross Validation: A cross validation was performed to estimate the stability of the model. Ideally, cross validation would be conducted using two separate samples, but for the present study the sample was split into two halved samples. The difference between R-squared for the halved samples is 0.01 (Rsquared = 0.11 - 0.10 = 0.01). The shrinkage identified (0.01) is within acceptable limits (0.10).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, age, low levels of pathology, low levels of limited sociability, and low levels of delinquency can explain 10% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are curiosity firesetters. The model identified is a stable one.

The level of limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of types of firesetting. Race and gender were not significant predictors of curiosity types of firesetting.

Accidental Firesetter Regression Analysis: The following variables were included in the model to identify the unique contribution of each variable: age, gender, race, pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency. Predictor variables were the same as those used in earlier regression analyses. The

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 13

type of firesetter was the outcome variable, which was identified from information taken from MCAIN files (Spurlin, 1999). Statistical significance was established at a predetermined level of 0.01. I examined each of the variables that were used to test for assumptions of the multiple regression model. No assumptions were believed to be neglected in performing the linear regression.

Results for the Linear Regression: The multiple regression model was significant, with an R-squared value of 0.08 (F (6, 842) = 19.27, p = 0.0001). The model was able to explain 8% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as accidental firesetters.

Accidental firesetters can be defined as juveniles with low levels of delinquency and low levels of pathology. Accidental firesetters also can be defined as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions. Race neared significance as a predictor of accidental firesetting, with African American firesetters being more likely than Caucasian Americans to be identified as accidental firesetters.

Cross Validation: A cross validation was performed to estimate the stability of the model. Ideally, cross validation would be conducted using two separate samples, but for the present study the sample was split into two halved samples. The difference between R-squared for the halved samples is 0.02 (Rsquared = 0.10 - 0.08 = 0.02). The shrinkage identified (0.02) is within acceptable limits (0.10).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, low levels of pathology, low levels of limited sociability, and low levels of delinquency can explain 10% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are accidental firesetters. The model identified is a stable one. The level of limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of accidental types of firesetting. Gender was not a significant predictor of accidental types

of firesetting, although race neared significance as a predictor.

Cry-for-Help Firesetter Regression Analysis: The following variables were included in the model to identify the unique contribution of each variable: age, gender, race, pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency. Predictor variables were the same as those used in earlier regression analyses. The type of firesetter was the outcome variable, which was identified from information taken from MCAIN files (Spurlin, 1999). Statistical significance was established at a predetermined level of 0.01.

Results for the Linear Regression: The multiple regression model was significant, with an R-squared value of 0.07 (F (6, 842) = 17.66, p = 0.0001). The model was able to explain 8% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as cry-for-help firesetters. Cry-for-help firesetters can be defined as juveniles who have problems socializing or expressing emotions. Cryfor-help firesetters can also be juveniles with low levels of pathology. Cry-forhelp firesetters also are more likely to be female than male, and are often more likely to be Caucasian American than African American (though this value nears significance).

Cross Validation: A cross validation was performed to estimate the stability of the model. Ideally, cross validation would be conducted using two separate samples, but for the present study the sample was split into two halved samples. The difference between R-squared for the halved samples is 0.01 (Rsquared = 0.08 - 0.07 = 0.01). The shrinkage identified (0.01) is within acceptable limits (0.10).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, low levels of pathology, high levels of limited sociability, race, and gender can predict 8% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are cry-for-help firesetters. The model identified is a stable one. The

14 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

level of limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of the cry-forhelp type of firesetter.

Delinquent Firesetter Regression Analysis: The following variables were included in the model to identify the unique contribution of each variable: age, gender, race, pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

Predictor variables were the same as those used in earlier regression analyses.

The type of firesetter was the outcome variable, which was identified from information taken from MCAIN files (Spurlin, 1999).

Statistical significance was established at a predetermined level of 0.01. I examined each of the variables that were used to test for assumptions of the model. No assumptions were believed to be neglected in performing the linear regression.

Results for the Linear Regression: The multiple regression model was significant, with an R-squared value of 0.22 (F (6, 842) = 55.83, p = 0.0001).

The model was able to explain 22% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as delinquent firesetters.

Delinquent firesetters can be explained as older juveniles with low levels of pathology and high levels of delinquency. Delinquent firesetters also can be explained as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions.

Cross Validation: A cross validation was performed to estimate the stability of the model. Ideally, cross validation would be conducted using two separate samples, but for the present study the sample was split into two halved samples. The difference between R-squared for the halved samples is 0.03 (Rsquared = 0.24 - 0.21 = 0.03). The shrinkage identified (0.03) is within acceptable limits (0.10).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, age, low levels of pathology, high levels of limited sociability,

and high levels of delinquency can explain 22% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are delinquent firesetters. The model identified is a stable one. Low levels of pathology were shown to be the strongest predictor of delinquent types of firesetting. Race and gender were not significant predictors of delinquent types of firesetting.

Severely Disturbed Firesetter Regression Analysis: The following variables were included in the model to identify the unique contribution of each variable: age, gender, race, pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

Predictor variables were the same as those used in earlier regression analyses.

The type of firesetter was the outcome variable, which was identified from information taken from MCAIN files (Spurlin, 1999).

Statistical significance was established at a predetermined level of 0.01. I examined each of the variables that were used to test for assumptions of the multiple regression model. No assumptions were believed to be neglected in performing the linear regression.

Results for the Linear Regression: The multiple regression model was significant, with an R-squared value of 0.37 (F (6, 842) = 162.42, p = 0.0001). The model was able to explain 37% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as severely disturbed firesetters. Severely disturbed firesetters can be defined as juveniles with low levels of delinquency and high levels of pathology. Severely disturbed firesetters are also more likely to be Caucasian American than African American.

Cross Validation: A cross validation was performed to estimate the stability of the model. Ideally, cross validation would be conducted using two separate samples, but for the present study the sample was split into two halved samples. The difference between R-squared for the halved samples is 0.02 (Rsquared = 0.38 - 0.35 = 0.03). The

shrinkage identified (0.03) is within acceptable limits (0.10).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, race, low levels of delinquency, and high levels of pathology can explain 37% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are severely disturbed firesetters. The model identified is a stable one. Low levels of delinquency were shown to be the strongest predictor of severely disturbed types of firesetting.

Discussion: Predictors of the Typology of the Juvenile Firesetter The hypothesis examined in this study was that the typology of the juvenile firesetter could be predicted by levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency, as well as the age of the firesetter. It was hypothesized that types of firesetting could also be explained by the gender and the race of the participant. It was believed that higher levels of pathology and delinquency would predict most types of firesetting.

Curiosity firesetter. The multiple regression model for curiosity firesetters was significant, and was able to explain 10% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as curiosity firesetters. Curiosity firesetters can be explained as younger juveniles with low levels of delinquency and low levels of pathology. Curiosity firesetters can also be explained as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions.

This study confirmed that most curious firesetters are young children (juveniles ages 3 to 6 years) who engage in firesetting as experimentation. It was found that in most of these cases hyperactivity or attention deficit disorder were not present (Fineman, 1995). Curiosity firesetters were likely to have early involvement with firesetting, and were generally more interested in fire than other types of juvenile firesetters, leading to greater damage and destructiveness

(Kolko & Kazdin, 1991).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, age, low levels of pathology, low levels of limited sociability, and low levels of delinquency can explain 10% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are curiosity firesetters. The level of limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of types of firesetting. Race and gender were not significant predictors of curiosity types of firesetting.

Accidental firesetter. The multiple regression model for accidental firesetters was significant, and was able to explain 8% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as accidental firesetters based on the model used. Accidental firesetters were identified in this study as juveniles with low levels of delinquency and low levels of pathology. Curiosity firesetters can also be defined as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions. Race neared significance as a predictor of accidental firesetting, with African American firesetters being more likely than Caucasian Americans to be identified as accidental firesetters.

As with earlier studies, accidental firesetters are usually children under the age of 11 years. For the most part, accidental firesetting has not been found to be the result of neglectful or abusive home environments (Canter & Frizon, 1998; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, low levels of pathology, low levels of limited sociability, and low levels of delinquency can explain 10% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are accidental firesetters. The model identified is a stable one. The level of limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of types of firesetting. Gender was not a significant predictor of accidental types of firesetting, although race neared significance as a predictor.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 15

Cry-for-help firesetter. The multiple regression model for cry-for-help firesetters was significant, and was able to explain 8% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as curiosity firesetters based on the model used. Cry-for-help firesetters can be defined as juveniles with low levels of pathology. Cry-for-help firesetters can also be explained as juveniles who have problems socializing or expressing emotions. Cry-for-help firesetters also are more likely to be female than male, and are more likely to be Caucasian American than African American.

Similar to the findings of Fineman (1995), cry-for-help firesetters, whether children or adolescents, may engage in maladaptive firesetting in an attempt to bring attention to their parental or familial dysfunction. Although these firesetters were not thought to cause harm or damage (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996), their inability to appropriately express themselves can cause serious personal injury or property damage.

It is interesting to note that the only gender difference identified in this study was identified with respect to cry-forhelp firesetters. It was surprising that females, who are socialized to externalize emotions, could be found in situations that warranted the use of covert expressions of emotions, such as with firesetting. It is also interesting to note that Caucasian Americans could be more likely than African Americans to be considered cry-forhelp firesetters. It

would appear that African American youth are more likely to be labeled deviant or delinquent firesetters than to be labeled in need of emotional support or assistance. Future studies of firesetters should examine whether gender or racial biases exist in the communities where firesetters are identified.

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, low levels of pathology and high levels of limited sociability, as well as race and gender, can predict 8% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are cry-for-help firesetters. Limited sociability was shown to be the strongest predictor of types of firesetting.

Delinquent firesetter. The multiple regression model was significant, and was able to explain 22% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as delinquent firesetters based on the model used. Delinquent firesetters can be described as older juveniles with low levels of pathology and high levels of delinquency. Delinquent firesetters can also be explained as juveniles who have few problems socializing or expressing emotions.

Delinquent firesetting was found to have a developmental trend. Delinquent tendencies were found to begin during preadolescence and increase throughout adolescence. As with the findings of Harris and Rice (1996), delinquent firesetters show some empathy for others during preadolescence. However, adolescent delinquent firesetters show little empathy f o r

16 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

others and little conscience for their behaviors. As with prior studies, the greatest amount of deviancy and behavioral dysfunction was identified with adolescent firesetters (Kolko & Kazdin, 1991). Firesetting in this group is more easily extinguished than the other personality and behavior problems that accompany the firesetting (Showers & Pickrell, 1987).

Unlike earlier studies of juvenile firesetters, this study was one of the first to identify that delinquent firesetters are less likely than other types to have low levels of pathology. It would appear that some firesetters are driven to engage in firesetting due to an inability to express anger in appropriate manners. Further research is needed to identify the reasons why these firesetters turn to fire to express their feelings rather than turning to other forms of deviance or vandalism.

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, age, low levels of pathology, high levels of limited sociability, and high levels of delinquency can explain 22% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are delinquent firesetters. Low levels of pathology were shown to be the strongest predictor of delinquent types of firesetting. Race and gender were not significant predictors of delinquent types of firesetting.

Severely disturbed firesetter. The multiple regression model for the severely disturbed firesetter was significant, and was able to explain 37% of the variance in the MCAIN coordinator’s ratings of firesetters as delinquent firesetters based on the model used. Severely disturbed firesetters can be defined as juveniles with low levels of delinquency and high levels of pathology. As found when examining the relationship between delinquent firesetters and pathology, an inverse relationship appears to exist between delinquency and severely disturbed firesetters: the lower the level of delinquency in severely disturbed firesetters, the higher the pathology and the disturbed nature of the firesetter.

Severely disturbed firesetters are also more likely to be Caucasian American than African American. It is interesting to note that African Americans were not as likely as Caucasian Americans to have been identified as severely disturbed firesetters. Perhaps African American youth are stereotyped as being more delinquent or oppositional than Caucasian American youth, as is the case with other forms of nontraditional behaviors. It is unknown whether other studies have identified similar differences with respect to race.

Summary An examination of the literature to date on firesetters shows that a variety of different characteristics can define specific types of firesetters. Furthermore, firesetting appears to differ as a result of both maturational factors and environmental factors. Future reviews of this subject should include an examination of the firesetter’s history, including the firesetter’s prior fire learning experiences, cognitive and behavioral reviews, and parent and family influences and stressors.

References Adler, R., Nunn, R., Northam, E., & Lebnan, V. (1994). Secondary prevention of childhood firesetting. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 33, 1194-1202.

Canter, D., & Frizon, K. (1998). Differentiating arsonists: A model of firesetting actions and characteristics. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 3, 73-96.

Eisler, R.M. (1972). Crisis intervention in the family of a firesetter. PsychotherapyTheory, Research, and Practice, 9, 76-79.

“An examination of the literature to date on firesetters shows that a variety of different characteristics can define specific types of firesetters.”

Unlike the cry-for-help firesetters who tend to show similar symptomatology as a result of environmental circumstances, severely disturbed firesetters are likely to exhibit early signs as a result of individual psychopathology. Unlike Kolko and Kazdin (1988), severely disturbed firesetters were not shown to have higher levels of recidivism than other types of firesetters. Though social neglect and parental dysfunction are likely to correlate with firesetters identified as severely disturbed, further research needs to be initiated to answer the question of how parental dysfunction and social neglect contribute to firesetting (Heath et al., 1976).

Based on the model used in this multiple regression, race, low levels of delinquency, and high levels of pathology can explain 37% of the variance in predicting that juvenile firesetters are severely disturbed firesetters. Low levels of delinquency were shown to be the strongest predictor of severely disturbed types of firesetting.

Implications of Findings on Future Research Firesetting can be classified as one of many examples of problem behavior that has been identified in juveniles. As with most juvenile problem behaviors, firesetting can be explained by an examination of the particular characteristics and experiences of juveniles within the contexts defined by a larger society or culture. For professionals and Federal Emergency Management Agency officials to understand this problem behavior, a clearer analysis of the home environment must exist.

Though the research on juvenile firesetting also has been subject to methodological and statistical limitations, it would appear that the results of this study largely agree with those that have preceded it. However, the breadth of the sample under study provided some interesting insights into how different types of firesetters vary in their firesetting based on levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1988). Preadolescent firesetter handbook. Washington, D.C.: United States Fire Administration.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1995). Socioeconomic factors and the incidence of fire. Washington, D.C.: United States Fire Administration and National Fire Data Center.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1996). Interviewing and counseling juvenile firesetters. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Fineman, K.R. (1980). Firesetting in childhood and adolescence. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 3, 483-500.

Fineman, K.R. (1995). A model for the qualitative analysis of child and adult fire deviant behavior. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 13, 31-60.

Fineman, K.R. (1997a). Family Fire Risk Interview Form. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Fineman, K.R. (1997b). Juvenile Fire Risk Interview Form. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management

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Agency.

Fineman, K.R. (1997c). Parent Fire Risk Questionnaire. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Harris, G.T., & Rice, M.E. (1996). A typology of mentally disordered firesetters. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11, 351-363.

Heaven, P.C.L. (1994). Family of origin, personality, and self-reported delinquency. Journal of Adolescence, 17, 445459.

Jessor, R. (1981). The perceived environment in psychological theory and research. In D. Magnusson (Ed.), Toward a psychology of situations: An interactional perspective (pp. 297-317).

New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Jessor, R. (1987). Problem-behavior theory, psychosocial development, and adolescent problem drinking. British Journal of Addiction, 82, 331-342.

Jessor, R., & Jessor, S.L. (1973). The perceived environment in behavioral science: Some conceptual issues and some illustrative data. American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 801-828.

Jessor, R., & Jessor, S.L. (1984). Adolescence to young adulthood: A 12-year prospective study of problem behavior

and psychosocial development. In S.A. Mednick, M. Harway, & K.M. Finello (Eds.), Handbook of longitudinal research, volume 2.

Jones, R.T., Ribbe, D.P., & Cunningham, P. (1994). Psychosocial correlates of fire disaster among children and adolescents. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 7, 117-122.

Kazdin, A.E. (1990). Conduct disorder in childhood. In M. Hersen & C.G. Last (Eds.), Handbook of child and adult psychopathology: A longitudinal perspective (pp. 89-121). New York: Pergamon Press.

Kolko, D.J., & Kazdin, A.E. (1988).

Parent-child correspondence in identification of firesetting among child psychiatric patients. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 29, 175-184.

Kolko, D.J., & Kazdin, A.E. (1991).

Motives of childhood firesetters: Firesetting characteristics and psychological correlates. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 535-550.

Kolko, D.J., & Kazdin, A.E. (1992).

The emergence and recurrence of child firesetting: A one-year prospective study.

Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 20, 17-37.

Levin, B. (1976). Psychological characteristics of firesetters. Fire Journal, 70, 36-41.

Lowenstein, L.F. (1989). The etiology, diagnosis, and treatment of firesetting behavior of children. Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 19, 186-194.

Moore, J.M., Thompson-Pope, S.K., & Whited, R.M. (1996). MMPI-A: Profiles of adolescent boys with a history of firesetting. Journal of Personality Assessment, 67, 116-126.

National Fire Protection Association (1999). Statistics on the national fire problem.

Citation found at http://www.fema.gov/nfpa/.

Patterson, G. (1982). A social learning approach (Vol 1). Eugene, OR: Castilia.

Rachal, J.V., Guess, L.L., Hubbard, R.L., Maistro, S.A., Cavanaugh, E.R.,

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Waddell, R., & Benrud, C.H. (1980).

Adolescent drinking behavior. The extent and nature of adolescent alcohol and drug use: The 1974 and 1978 national sample studies. Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute.

Rice, M.E., & Harris, G.T. (1996).

Predicting the recidivism of mentally disordered firesetters. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11, 364-375.

Robbins, E., & Robbins, L. (1967).

Arson: With special reference to pyromania. New York State Journal of Medicine, 67, 795-798.

Sakheim, G.A., & Osborn, E. (1999).

Severe versus nonsevere firesetters revisited. Child Welfare, 78, 411-434.

Showers, J., & Pickrell, E. (1987).

Child firesetters: A study of three populations. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 38, 495-501.

Spurlin, B. (1999, June 16). Personnel communication regarding Fire Stop Program protocol (B. Spurlin – Marion County Fire Stop Program). Indianapolis, IN: Marion County Fire Stop.

About the Author Dr. Michael Slavkin is President of the Vanderburgh County Juvenile Firesetter Task Force, and is a professor of education and human services at the University of Southern Indiana. He has served as a teacher and counselor in elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education. His research interests in juvenile firesetting stem from his background in counseling and developmental psychology. Dr. Slavkin has served on the National Association of State Fire Marshal’s consortium on juvenile firesetting, and has spoken nationally about juvenile arson.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 64 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

By Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, Ph.D., DABPS, CHS-III

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for those Certified in Homeland Security who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates after June 2001 who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

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Key Words: terrorism prevention, stress, coping, combat exposure Abstract This study examines the coping responses to work-related stress in terrorism prevention personnel as they differ between those employees with prior combat exposure and those without. This study substantiates the belief that persons exposed to stress in situations that allow development of coping strategies (such as military combat), will in fact cope more effectively with stressful situations and employ better coping strategies than persons with no combat background.

Subjects in the study were 44 Israeli security personnel employed by the Israeli government terrorism prevention agency, which provides security services for Israeli national interests in the western region of the North American continent. This agency is based in Los Angeles, California. Subjects were administered the Subjective Stress Experience Scale (SSES), which measured stress at terrorism prevention work, past experiences of stress during combat exposure, and the subject’s most stressful life events. Subjects were also administered the revised Ways of Coping Inventory, which was used to produce their coping orientation profiles.

Results modestly support the hypothesis that terrorism prevention personnel who are also combat veterans cope better with terrorism prevention work-related stress; they also prefer a more direct-action coping style and less palliative coping mode than those team members with no combat background. When the subjective experience of stress is factored in, the difference in coping orientations is magnified in favor of combat veterans. The interactive effect of coping orientations and the subjective experience of stress gives combat veterans a coping efficacy edge.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 19

Introduction The current political climate of the international scene has made terrorism common nomenclature and terrorism prevention efforts the reality of many nations around the globe. Renewed interest in the stressful effects of terrorism on personnel charged with its prevention and the increased demand for up-to-the-task prevention teams has emerged since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America (Talbot, 2001; Tenner, 2001; Garfinkel, 2001; Hogan, 2001; Clough, 2002). Additionally, many drastic proposals have been made to improve the nation’s safety and security within the Bush Administration and in Congress, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the first new Cabinet-level department to be formed in over a decade (Ratnesar, Carney, & Dickerson, 2002).

Several of these proposed changes have been carried out. The Transportation Security Administration, the largest government agency organized since the Second World War, will work to conduct research and create a plan to prevent future terrorism. In the National Academy of Sciences, on Capitol Hill, and in both the House and the Senate, there has also been a great deal of activity and discussion about terrorism and terrorism prevention (Mumford, 2002). News media and professional journals have been replete with reports on the topic of terrorism: the grief of the survivors of terrorist attacks (Ripley, 2002), the devastating impact of relief efforts on emergency crews involved in rescue efforts following the terrorist attacks (APA, 2002), the theological underpinnings of terrorism (Ryan, 2002; Marshall, 2002), renewed terrorism-prevention efforts (Levant, 2001; Zimbardo, 2001), and the ongoing debate over how to prevent future terrorism (Keller, 2002) and who should carry out prevention efforts (Calabresi & Ratnesar, 2002).

For many countries, the United States notwithstanding, the experiences of ter-

rorism-related stress are new. For other countries, such as Israel, terrorism and prevention efforts are commonplace.

This study seeks to better identify who among Israeli terrorism prevention team members operating in the United States copes better with terrorism prevention work-related stress.

operation in its current configuration for some years; the organization that recruited them and employs them has been in existence for many years. The team and the agency hold an impressive preventive efficacy record that is worthy of attention (Benditt, 2001; VaismanTzachor, 1991; 1997).

The Team Studied The subjects studied for this article were members of a team employed by the Israeli government’s Terrorism Prevention Agency to provide security services for Israeli national interests in the western region of the North American continent; this agency is based in Los Angeles, California. This team holds many important responsibilities, including ensuring the security and safety of Israeli consulates and Isreali government leaders in the region, the security and safety of all Israeli National Airline (El Al) flights into and out of the region (including the passengers and cargo aboard), and the security and safety of select high-profile Jewish-Israeli public events and holiday celebrations taking place in the region.

Despite the relatively low probable risk for individuals and institutions to be directly impacted by terrorism (Alon, 1980; Powers, 1993), this team and the agency it works for understand that the possibility of a terrorist attack being carried out is high, and the consequences of such attacks would be severe (VaismanTzachor, 1991; 1997). Consequently, at the institutional levels, organized efforts are implemented to ward off terrorist activity, often at a very high cost (Alon, 1980; Martin, 1993; Smolowe, 1993; Powers, 1993; Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 1997; Stikeman, 2001). This is especially true with regard to institutions that are traditionally targets of terrorist activity (government agencies, consulates and embassies, airline companies, etc.). The team studied for this article has been in

Previous Studies of Terrorism Prevention Teams Prior studies of terrorism prevention teams sought to identify the characteristic stressors that terrorism prevention personnel identify in their work (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991). Results suggest that all rate their terrorism prevention work as stressful to some extent, with social pressure to excel at prevention work being the leading source of stress on the job. Other elements contributing to the overall experience of stress included feelings of uncertainty about the outcomes of prevention work, objective environmental constraints limiting prevention efforts (including equipment and technology limitations), and a sense of lack of control over themselves and the situations they work in (including the fear of becoming the victims of terrorism).

Another study with this population (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1997) explored the extent to which terrorism prevention personnel rate their work as stressful and whether there is a significant difference between those team members who are combat veterans and those who have no combat experience in their military or law-enforcement backgrounds.

Results indicate a clear preference to those terrorism prevention personnel whose backgrounds include combat exposure experience over those without.

Indeed, to a significant extent, combat veterans rate their terrorism prevention work as less stressful than their noncombatant counterparts (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1997). Combat veterans seem to be inoculated to stressful situations through previous military experiences,

20 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

which makes them perceive terrorism prevention work to be less stressful than their non-combatant counterparts perceive it to be.

The Stress of Terrorism The subjective experience of stress that terrorists often succeed in instilling in their targets cannot be overstated. For example, an Internet survey conducted by the American Psychological Association practice directorate after 9/11 found that approximately 60% of psychologists surveyed said their clients had experienced generalized fear and felt hyper-vigilant. Other clients reportedly experienced anxiety, sleep disturbances, irritability, and tearfulness (APA Practice Directorate, 2002). In the same survey, many psychologists reported similar symptoms in themselves; 58% of these psychologists also felt to some extent affected by the stress their clients experienced due to the 9/11 attacks. Most people exposed to terrorism report that the experience changed them in fundamental ways (Foxhall, 2001; Daw, 2001). A 2002 Time/CNN poll of 1014 adult Americans taken by Harris Interactive found that the majority of respondents were either somewhat concerned (34%) or very concerned (45%) that U.S. military action against terrorism would lead to more acts of terrorism.

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been an increase in fears about biochemical warfare, especially about anthrax. At least 20,000 Americans began taking antibiotics at the government’s urging at the peak of the anthrax scare. With each death that resulted from the anthrax virus, the public’s faith in the government waned and fears intensified (Ripley, 2001). In addition to the anthrax threat, the public is extremely concerned about other issues, such as the safety of the nation’s food supply, the fear of airborne diseases, and the potential contamination of the water supply. The American public and Centers for Disease Control officials are also worried

about smallpox, the plague, botulism, tularemia, and hemorrhagic fever (Golden, 2002). Furthermore, a growing public concern exists over air travel and airport security, and there is an increased tendency to overreact to plane crashes, immediately assuming that they are terrorist related (Saporito, 2001; Tumulty, 2001). Additionally, a characteristic reaction of hardening positions against suspected terrorists (Friedland & Merari, 1986) and reevaluating the legal treatment of suspected terrorists was noted in the government’s establishment of military tribunals (Tyrangiel, 2001; Frank, 2002). There has also been a drastic tightening in Immigration and Naturalization Service security, which has begun diligently fingerprinting, photographing, questioning, and recording detailed demographic information about those who are now deemed an “elevated national security risk”; these include 100,000 visitors from at least two dozen countries as well as current visa holders already residing in the United States (Morse, 2002).

Zimbardo (2002) offered a definition of terrorism as “the process of inducing fear in the general population by means of acts that undercut an established sense of trust, stability, and confidence in one’s personal world.” Fear is generated in the unpredictable, dramatic, and devastating violence that is often directed at seemingly random targets. Terrorist acts evoke feelings of helplessness, partly due to the fact that they are unprovoked and directed at defenseless citizens (Fields & Margolin, 2001). Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare that is meant to intimidate and instill fear in those who feel targeted (Friedland, & Merari, 1986).

Indeed, many Americans are still feeling the effects of the 9/11 attacks, as reported by a survey of 1,900 randomly sampled persons (Bossolo, Bergantino, Lichtenstein, & Gutman, 2002). Of those surveyed, 760 (40%) said they were seriously affected by the attacks on

a personal level, 9% reported having experienced a combination of symptoms commonly associated with depression, 6% reported having experienced anxiety, and 12% reported symptoms related to post-traumatic stress. Since business and workplaces were the targets of the 9/11 attacks, many employees are feeling especially distressed, and it has been hypothesized that this is creating increased violence in the workplace (Smith, 2002). Using research from the trauma caused by Hurricane Andrew to assess how children cope with disaster, it was found that more than half of the children studied had moderate to severe post-traumatic stress symptoms 3 months after the event. Another finding was that these effects can persist over time; 10 months after the hurricane, 12% of the children still had severe or very severe post-traumatic stress syndrome symptoms (DeAngelis, 2002).

Thus, even today, many children are likely to still be recovering from the violent 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In the Israeli population, reports indicate that terrorism instills a vicarious sense of stress in persons not directly victimized by terroristic attacks. A charac-

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 21

teristic increase of risk for secondary trauma (through exposure to scenes of violence, funerals, and portraits of the dead) in bystanders was noted. Stress in Israelis is experienced in demoralization and loss of hope for a peaceful solution to the political conflict, and results in hypervigilance to potential threats and increased suspiciousness (Kutz & Kutz, 2002). A study by Friedland and Merari (1986) on the psychological impact of terrorism on Israeli citizens revealed that the amount of negative emotional impact caused by terrorist attacks far exceeded the actual damage caused by those attacks. I hypothesize that this disproportionate amount of fear is due to a sense of being unable to control one’s own personal safety and security.

Coping With Terrorism-Related Stress In an Internet survey of 407 psychologists, the American Psychological Association practice directorate found that psychologists dealing with stress related to the 9/11 attacks resorted to communicating with friends and family, consulting with colleagues, balancing professional activities with personal ones, volunteering to help others, and seeking personal therapy. In treating people who were negatively impacted by the attacks, 39% of psychologists used “specific interventions such as relaxation techniques and supportive interventions” to help their clients cope with the terrorist events and their aftermath.

Many psychologists have examined the immediate emotional reactions to terrorism and how these reactions change over time. The process can begin with feelings of shock and numbness, move into intense feelings of sorrow and grief, and then develop into fear, then guilt, followed by anger and resentment, which can shift from depression and loneliness to feelings of isolation and abandonment. It can also manifest as physical symptoms of distress, or as panic, and finally, it can result in an inability to resume normal activity (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2001). The Disaster Mental Health Institute at the University of South Dakota has reported other common reactions to traumatic stress events, including recurring dreams or nightmares about the event, difficulty concentrating or remembering things, questioning spiritual or religious beliefs, being overprotective of one’s family, having increased conflict with family members, startling easily, having problems falling asleep or staying asleep, avoiding situations that are reminders of the stressful event, and attempting to remain excessively occupied so as to avoid thinking about the event (Jacobs, 1998).

Other concerns involve feeling unable to stop crying, worrying about not being able to feel safe again, wondering if having paid closer attention and having been more aware would have helped to avoid the event, questioning core beliefs such as patriotism, justice, and reason, and not knowing how to proceed with life in general (Wirth, 2002).

In other reports, people not directly affected by the 9/11 attacks lined up for hours to donate blood, U.S. military recruitment experienced an influx, and charitable organizations flourished. People displayed the American flag to signal patriotism, sympathy for the victims of the attack, and solidarity with their neighbors and fellow citizens. The emergence of a stereotypical patriotic sentiment with its many manifestations of good citizenry gave rise to a sense of national unity rarely experienced in modern America (Prentice & Miller, 2002). People seemed to seek others for support and also to orient their coping efforts onto others in need (Martin, 2002). Most of those affected by terrorism tend to reexamine their priorities in life, placing their family higher on their lists (Bossolo, et al., 2002). Some people seek comfort in religion and in faith, as seen by an upsurge in attendance and a revival of beliefs at religious institutions such as temples and churches immediately following the 9/11 attacks (Van Biema, 2001). Others find comfort in

22 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

focusing on the positive outcomes and the successful captures in the current efforts to find and imprison suspected terrorists, instead of pessimistically focusing on those terrorists who have not yet been caught (Elliot, 2002).

Despite the benefits of remaining optimistic, many Americans’ faith is waning regarding the U.S. government’s ability to successfully carry out the war on terrorism, and the public’s confidence on this issue seems to be decreasing (Ratnesar, Carney, & Dickerson, 2002).

Israelis affected directly or indirectly by terrorism are reported to be responding with increased suspicion, vigilance, and a paradoxical anesthetized sensibility and emotional numbness to the horrors of terrorism (Kutz & Kutz, 2002).

Furthermore, many Israelis adjust to the martial atmosphere by avoiding areas that are most susceptible to suicide bombings, by being more aware of where their loved ones are at all times, and by practicing ethnic profiling to remove any suspicious people from their proximity (Beyer, 2001). A study by Ayalon and Soskis (1986) involving Israeli civilians who had been victims of a brutal terrorist attack found that the survivors of the attack, as well as their families, benefitted from participating in rituals and ceremonies that commemorated the dead, participating in religious faith and observance, using jokes and humor, sharing feelings with and spending time with other victims, keeping a diary, seeking care by physicians or other helping professionals, and remaining self-reliant while turning to family for support.

Most studies indicate that those with more direct-action approaches that model proactive behaviors to channel anger about terrorism seem more effective in their coping efficacy (McGowan, 2002). However, state-of-the-art psychological studies about coping with stress suggest that interpersonal differences tend to modulate the response to stress, as do cognitive and contextual variables (Kosslyn, Cacioppo, Davidson,

Hugdahl, Lovallo, Spiegel, & Rose, 2002). Hence, the assumption that those exposed to combat situations in prior military service will have subsequently exhibited the results of these contextual and cognitive experiences in learning of coping behaviors (and in corresponding modulation of physiological responses). Thus, combat veterans are expected to exhibit differences in their subsequent behaviors and attitudes due to their exposure to the contextual experience of combat, which sets them apart emotionally and cognitively from others who might not have had such a lifechanging contextual experience.

Study Hypotheses In concert with findings in previous studies I conducted with this population (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 1997), it was hypothesized that combat veterans working as terrorism prevention team members would employ different coping devices to deal with stress at work than their noncombatant counterparts. In particular, it was expected that combat veterans would display more directaction modes of coping, such as direct actions, problem solving, and creative elaboration. Personnel with no prior combat exposure, conversely, would display more palliative modes of coping such as sublimation, intellectualization, and denial. As a consequence, it was further hypothesized that an interaction effect would be found between the subjective experiences of stress reported by the terrorism prevention team members and their coping orientations. Specifically, it was predicted that combat veterans would report relatively lower levels of subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention work while employing more direct-action coping devices, whereas personnel with no combat background would report greater levels of subjective experiences of stress in terrorism prevention work while resorting more readily to palliative coping modes.

Method Subjects: The subjects in the study included the entire Israeli terrorism prevention team operating in the western region of the North American continent; this team was stationed in Los Angeles, California (N = 44). The team included 9 women (20%) and 35 men (80%), who ranged in age from 21 to 40 years old; the majority of the team were university students and of middle socioeconomic status. The employees were recruited on a part-time basis with a contract of 4 to 6 years with the Israeli government terrorism prevention agency following discharge from military service, typically concurrent with the agents’ studies. Hence, all team members are veterans of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) with a service record of 2 to 6. Twenty subjects (46%), 2 women and 18 men, had significant combat exposure during their prior military service, which ranged from a single combat situation, few combat missions, and up to regular combat activity over extended periods of time. Twenty four of the subjects (54%), 7 women and 17 men, did not have any prior combat exposure during their military service.

Design: A posttest non-experimental between-subjects design was used in which the dependent variables were the subjective experience of stress during terrorism prevention work (measured by the Subjective Stress Experience Scale) and the coping orientations employed by security agents in response to the stress they experienced at work (measured by the revised Ways of Coping Scale). The assignment of subjects to groups was done according to preliminary verification of their past military experience, namely 20 combat veterans in the first group and 24 with no prior combat exposure in to the second group.

Hence the independent variable was the presence or absence of exposure to combat conditions during prior military service.

Instrumentation: Two instruments were used in this study. The first was the

Subjective Stress Experience Scale, which is a self-report Likert-type 34item questionnaire administered individually and scored for total stress experience ranging from 23 (lowest stress) to 92 (highest stress), as well as other stress baselines (most stressful life event and combat exposure stress). Validity and reliability analyses of this scale yielded measures that were more than adequate (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1997). The second instrument used was the Revised Ways of Coping inventory, a standardized (hence, valid and reliable) self-report Likert-type 66-item questionnaire administered individually to address the coping orientations employed by security personnel in response to stressful situations at work (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). The latter instrument yields an overall coping orientation profile along dimensions of eight scales: confrontive coping, distancing, self-controlling, seeking social support, accepting responsibility, escapeavoidance, planful problem solving, and positive reappraisal. Adaptive or effective coping profiles in a terrorism prevention context were regarded as those displaying direct-action coping styles that correspond to elevations in scales: confrontive coping, self-controlling, planful problem solving, and positive reappraisal. Ineffective or maladaptive coping profiles were regarded as those displaying palliative coping styles that correspond to elevations in scales: distancing, seeking social support, accepting responsibility, and escape-avoidance.

Procedure: Subjects were contacted directly at their workplace after authorization was obtained through the Israeli Government Terrorism Prevention Agency. All subjects were briefed about the purpose of the study and about their rights to refuse to participate or to withdraw without adversity. All team members agreed to participate and were given questionnaires that contained both the Subjective Stress Experience Scale and the Revised Ways of Coping Scale to fill out individually. One questionnaire was

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 23

Table 1: Means of Subgroups on Revised Ways of Coping Subscales Revised Ways of Coping

Combat Veterans

No Combat Exposure

Subscales

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Confrontive Coping

Planful Problem Solving

1.36 .68 1.07 1.42 1.33 .52 1.68

.57 .53 .40 .46 .62 .43 .45

1.25 .86 1.25 1.27 1.31 .56 1.50

.55 .45 .46 .56 .74 .41 .36

Positive Reappraisal

1.06

.48

1.14

.48

Distancing Self-Controlling Seeking Social Support Accepting Responsibility Escape and Avoidance

returned unanswered.

To ensure the anonymity of the respondents, no personally identifying items were included in the questionnaire.

Free consultations and referrals were offered to those subjects requiring emotional assistance as a result of exposure to the study. Only one subject required this assistance, which was obtained through two telephone consultations.

Results Covariates: Several variables that may have been related to the predictor variable in this study (exposure to combat during prior military service) were examined. These variables, found in the background section of the questionnaire, included gender, age, socioeconomic status, years of employment in the agency, and years of past military experience. The only background element that was found to be significantly related to the predictor variable was the years of employment in the agency: increase in years of employment at the agency decreased the amount of stress experienced at work (t(42) = -2.58, p < 0.05). Other analyses in this study were conducted so as to statistically control for potential extraneous effects of this variable (as covariate).

Coping: The mean scores of the team coping profiles were derived (Table 1) and an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted with years of employment controlled for as a potentially confounding variable. The inde-

pendent variable was exposure to combat conditions prior to employment.

The dependent variables were directaction coping and palliative coping orientations, which were computed from the composite scores on the Revised Ways of Coping inventory and derived out of the eight subscales.

As predicted, employees who are also combat veterans scored higher on Confrontive Coping and Planful Problem Solving subscales, which are considered to be direct-action oriented. Contrary to my predictions, they did not score higher than employees with no combat background on Self-Controlling and Positive Reappraisal subscales. Similarly, as predicted, employees who are combat veterans scored lower on Distancing and Escape and Avoidance subscales. However, again in contrast to this studyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prediction, these combat veterans scored higher on the Seek Social Support and Accept Responsibility subscales, which are considered palliative-type coping.

Analysis of covariance revealed no statistically significant differences between the two employee subgroups in any of the eight Revised Ways of Coping inventory subscales; this may be due in part to the small number of subjects in each cell. An attempt to attenuate this result by use of a post-hoc nine-function canonical discriminant analysis (for eight subscales and a covariate) produced a marginally significant discriminant Chi-Square value of 12.29, df = 9 (p < .19).

24 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

On subsequent post-hoc three-functions canonical discriminant analysis (for two subgroups and a covariate), the two employee subgroups were found to be correctly classified by the use of the Revised Ways of Coping inventory. Of the employees with no combat background, 72.7% (n=16) could be discriminated from the entire team; of the employees who are also combat veterans, 80.0% (n=16) were also correctly classified. Overall, 76.19% of the prevention team (n=32) were correctly classified with the use of the Revised Ways of Coping inventory, which falls just short of statistical significance.

A multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed to determine if the two employee subgroups differed in their global coping orientations between direct-action and palliative coping modes. The independent (predictor) variable was exposure to military combat conditions prior to employment. The dependent (criterion) variables were direct-action and palliative coping orientations with years of employment, controlled for as a potentially confounding covariate. The dependent variables were computed from the composite scores on the Revised Ways of Coping inventory, and were derived out of the eight Revised Ways of Coping inventory subscales.

As predicted, employees who were combat veterans scored higher on directaction coping orientation, with a mean of 5.17 (standard deviation [S.D.] = 1.43), as compared to their counterpart employee subgroup who had no combat background and obtained a mean of 5.14 (S.D. = 1.41). Also, in support of the hypothesis of this study, employees who are combat veterans scored lower on palliative coping orientation, with a mean of 3.94 (S.D. = 1.59), as compared to their counterpart employee subgroup with no combat background, who scored a mean of 3.99 (S.D. = 1.55). The multiple analysis of covariance revealed a trend as predicted in this study, but failed to reach statistical significance; F value = 1.55, df

Table 2: Global Coping Orientations of Terrorism Prevention Subgroups Ways of Coping

Combat Veterans

Orientations

Mean

Direct Actions

5.17 3.94 1.23

Palliative Coping Difference

S.D.

1.43 1.59

= 2, 38, (p < .86).

It is important to note that both employee subgroups tend to employ more direct actions to cope with stress in their terrorism prevention work and tend to rely less on palliative coping modes. This effect, as well as the general trend predicted by this study, is presented in Table 2.

It was also hypothesized that there would be a significant linear correlation between prior combat exposure in terrorism-prevention personnel and the employment of coping strategies that are considered more effective/adaptive, as well as a subsequent reduction of stress experienced at work. A partial correlation/multiple regression analysis was conducted, with years of employment partialled out as a potentially confounding variable and the subjective experience of stress at work as a mediating factor. The independent (predictor) variable was the extent of exposure to combat stress prior to current employment, the mediating (factor) variable was the degree of work stress experienced, and the dependent (criterion) variable was the extent of usage of effective/adaptive coping mechanisms.

The independent variable and the mediating variable were computed from composite scores on the Subjective Stress Experience Scale, and the dependent variables were computed from composite scores on the Revised Ways of Coping inventory. The potential for an interaction effect between combat exposure and coping orientations before entering the regression function was controlled for by dummy coding, as allowed by Cohen & Cohen (1983).

Partial confirmation of this hypothesis was found in a partial correlation

No Combat Exposure

Difference

Mean

S.D.

Mean

5.14 3.99 1.15

1.41 1.55

.03 -.05

between palliative coping modes and the degree of stress experienced in terrorism prevention work. The notion that an increase in the subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention work will result in an increase in the tendency to employ palliative coping modes was supported. The positive linear relationship was statistically significant at r = .50 (p < .002), and was of high statistical importance (Squared Beta = 25.0), or 25% explained variability in this population.

Partial correlation also revealed a positive linear relationship between directaction coping orientation and the degree of stress experienced in terrorism prevention work. The notion that an increase in the subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention work will result in an increase in the tendency to employ direct coping modes was supported. The positive correlation was statistically significant at r = .40 (p < .009), and of statistical importance (Squared Beta = 16.0), or 16% explained variability in this population. This last relationship suggests that there is no full interaction between the effects of coping orientations on the degree of stress experienced in terrorism prevention work.

It was also hypothesized that there would be an interaction effect between the subjective experience of stress, prior

combat exposure, and the coping strategies employed in terrorism prevention work. In particular, it was hypothesized that prior combat exposure would be associated with lesser degrees of subjective experiences of stress and more direct-action coping strategies, whereas a lack of prior combat exposure would be associated with greater degrees of subjective experiences of stress and more palliative coping strategies.

This hypothesis was tested with a multivariate analysis of covariance, with the effect of years of employment in the agency controlled for as a potentially confounding variable. For this particular hypothesis, a single MANCOVA was used instead of separate ANCOVAs because of the presence of multiple dependent variables as well as the need to control for experiment-wise (type I) error. The independent (predictor) variables were prior exposure to combat conditions and the degree of current stress at work; the dependent (criterion) variables were the subjective experience of stress and the coping strategies employed by team members. The independent (predictor) variables were computed from composite scores on the Subjective Stress Experience Scale. The dependent (criterion) variables were computed from scores on the Revised Ways of Coping inventory (for coping strategies).

The results obtained from multiple analyses of covariance support this hypothesis. The prediction that combat exposure prior to employment within a terrorism prevention agency has an interactive effect on the subjective expe-

Table 3: Interaction Between Experience of Stress at Work, Coping Orientations, and Combat Exposure Prior to Employment

Combat Veterans No Combat Experience Difference * p < .079

Palliative Coping

Stress Scores Direct-Action Coping

3.52 8.27 4.75**

3.02 6.96 3.94**

Difference 0.50 1.31 0.81*

** p < . 017

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 25

rience of stress at work and on coping orientations was supported with marginal statistical significance, F = 2.60, df = 4 (p < .079). The prediction that the subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention work has a main effect on coping orientations utilized by the employees was supported with robust statistical significance, F = 6.19, df = 1, 38; (p < .017). The effects of coping orientations on the subjective experience of stress were not found to be of statistical significance in this analysis. The results of this analysis are represented in Table 3.

Discussion The results obtained by this study support the basic tenants that stressful life events in general—and combat situations in particular—can prepare people for future stressful conditions such as terrorism prevention work. The results also give credence to the notion that certain stressful events, such as combat situations, significantly alter the subjective experience of stress and the coping orientations of the individuals involved.

Combat veterans tend to be more direct-action oriented than their noncombatant counterparts when it comes to coping with the stress of terrorism prevention work. The failure of this effect to reach robust statistical significance is related to the relatively small number of subjects in the team; however, the results are in the direction predicted. Finally, the results obtained in this study indicate that both palliative and direct-action coping orientations are efficacious in reducing the subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention personnel, with no statistically significant differences.

Although both combat veterans and those employees with no combat background prior to employment in terrorism prevention indicated that they employ more direct-action coping and less palliative coping devices, combat veterans seem to do so to a greater

extent. This seems to indicate the superiority of combat veterans’ preparedness to deal with unique and stressful situations in terrorism prevention work. It also seems to indicate that with an increase in exposure to stressful work conditions over years of employment, team members who are not combat veterans learn—by trial and error or through imitation—to employ new coping strategies. This was supported by the finding that the only covariate impacting the subjective experience of stress and the coping orientations of this team was the length of employment in the prevention agency. These findings, which also replicate previous findings of studies I conducted (Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 1997), are of great importance to the terrorism prevention agency in the selection of employment candidates. It would seem as though part of the process of adaptation to stress and part of the learning process of coping with stress at work can be bypassed by drafting combat veterans. This would, in turn, release training resources (e.g., time, money, etc.) to invest in other aspects of work preparedness procedures, and would streamline the overall terrorism prevention effort.

Other interesting and surprising findings for the entire prevention team were the positive linear relationships between direct-action coping and the subjective experience of stress and the positive linear relationship between palliative coping and the subjective experience of stress. It seems to indicate that with an increase in the subjective experience of stress in terrorism prevention work, there is a corresponding increase in the employment of both types of coping modes (i.e., direct action and palliative).

These results are consistent with literature regarding coping with terrorism stress (Bossolo et al., 2002; APA Practice Directorate, 2002; Martin, 2002) and other similarly stressful situations (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), and with the findings of my previous studies

26 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

(Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 1997). Nevertheless, the positive linear relationship was stronger for palliative coping (r = .50) when related to the subjective experience of stress than it was for directaction coping (r = .40) when related to the subjective experience of stress.

The assumption is that direct-action coping employed by team members to counteract the subjective experience of stress at work is more effective than is palliative coping. This is because the linear relationship between stress and direct-action coping was weaker (16% explained variability) than the relationship between stress and palliative coping (25% explained variability). However, the direction of the relationship here (which is cause and which is effect) is not known, and therefore should not be surmised; it is entirely possible that palliative coping became more pronounced with an increased sense of stress at work because it was found to be more useful.

There are inherent limitations in this study stemming from the fact that the prevention team was comprised of all Israeli agents who are known to have specific cultural orientations with respect to military service and terrorism prevention. It is possible that Israelis fare better than other military personnel when it comes to being involved in combat situations. It may be that Israelis are better trained to face the stresses of war and consequently adjust better than people from other nations. It may also be possible that Israelis generally have a more positive attitude towards terrorism prevention work, which may help them in their everyday coping while working.

Conclusion The study of this terrorism prevention team suggests that there are some advantages to hiring personnel who have combat experience from prior military service. This particular population seems to adjust better to the stressful demands of terrorism prevention work and also seems to cope with it more effectively.

The other advantage seems to be that combat veterans in terrorism prevention work may serve as “mentors” to other employees with no such background, teaching them to cope with stress.

From a scientific point of view, the findings of this study, albeit limited in generalizability, support the claim that exposure to combat conditions in the Israeli military setting can assist in the development of greater resilience to other stressful environments, such as terrorism prevention work. Furthermore, an exposure to combat conditions during military service in Israel before being employed in a stressful job can alter the coping orientations of individuals and can facilitate more effective and better adapted mechanisms of survival.

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About the Author Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, PhD, DABPS, CHS-III, has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners Institute since 1998. He is a Diplomate of the American Board Psychological Specialties and is a member of the Certified in Homeland Security program, having been Certified in Homeland Security at Level-III (CHS-III).

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 64 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 27

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates after June 2001 who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

ACFEI is approved by the American Psychological Association to offer continuing professional education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for the program.

ACFEI is recognized by the National Board for Certified Counselors to offer continuing education for National Certified Counselors. We adhere to NBCC Continuing Education Guidelines. Provider #5812.

ACFEI is an approved provider of the California Board of Behavioral Sciences, approval PCE 1896.

By Eric A. Kreuter, MA, CPA, CMA, CFM, DABFA, SPHR, FACFEI Key Words: psychopath, antisocial personality disorder, fraud, identify theft his article provides new information based on an ongoing case investigation. The case was first reported in the article “The Impact of Identity Theft Through Cyberspace,” that I wrote and published in the May/June 2003 issue of The Forensic Examiner. (To read this article log on to www.acfei.com and click “Online CE.”) I have been conducting an ongoing investigation into the events depicted in this story and have been working with the victim in the case to bring the perpetrator to justice. To protect the true identities of individuals involved with this case, all names included in this article are fictitious. No resemblance to any person, living or dead, is implied or should be inferred herein.

Abstract This article has two focuses: the victim and the criminal. The victim, referred to in this article as “William,” was a commercial airline pilot in excellent standing prior to becoming the victim of identity theft at the age of 41. William’s injuries were exacerbated when he reported the crime, while under much duress, to federal authorities. The federal authorities reluctantly registered his complaint of criminal activity; however, they did not believe his story to be true and falsely labeled him “psychotic.” The authorities also contacted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and William’s license to fly was immediately revoked. Subsequently, inaccurate and inappropriate psychological testing and reporting further damaged William’s reputation, his career, his finances, and his emotional state.

The federal authorities, although later presented with evidence of William’s truthful reporting of the crimes, have not yet amended their initial report to the FAA. The perpetrator, referred to in this article as “Connie,” has a long criminal history. Results of direct and forensic studies deem her to be psychopathic. Recently she was ordered to serve to six months in prison, but was released mid-way through her sentence and placed under house arrest. Her release was later vacated by court order, and

28 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

she was remanded back to jail pending a further order of the court. Connie now faces extradition to another county in her state on charges that involve serious parole violations. However, Connie employs tactics that enable her to take advantage of weaknesses in the legal system so as to delay prosecution and incarceration. Typical of psychopathic behavior, she is unremorseful and smug in her lengthy record of scamming innocent citizens.

Psychopathic personality disorder The perpetrator in this case has a long and relentless history of psychopathic criminality.

Early in the 20th century, the term psychopathy was used to refer to extreme variants of normal personality and included all personality disorders.

Phillipe Pinel (1745-1826) first described this type of behavior in 1806. He used the term mania sans delire, which essentially means craziness without raging. Such a diagnosis carried with it a certain moral stigma similar to insanity. In an attempt to remove the moral stigma of the term psychopathy, the American Psychiatric Association adopted the term antisocial personality disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

People who are given the diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder exhibit the following characteristics: they are engaging, charming, and egocentric; they are incapable of love; they reveal no ability to express guilt, remorse, and shame; they have little insight; and they do not easily learn from certain types of experiences, such as causing pain in another person or being convicted of a crime (Hare, 1998).

Much is known about Connieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s behavior through various sources. These sources include criminal records, court transcriptions, printed e-mail records, correspondence, taped conversations, newspaper articles, personal interviews of the victim cohort by the author, and the reports of a private investigator.

Using forensic methods, Connieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s behavior may be easily diagnosed as psychopathic based on a study of her behavior. The author has interviewed numerous members of the victim cohort, and their stories concerning Connieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actions serve to highlight her anti-

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 29

social nature. One victim, Connie’s parish priest, referred to her in the following manner: “If ever there was evil incarnate walking on two legs, it is that woman.” Connie’s former Alcoholic’s Anonymous sponsor referred to her as “a black widow spider” or “the scorpion that goes after people,” and said that “she is highly manipulative and multi-faceted, skilled in the art of deception.” Connie usually selects victims who are unable to defend themselves. William is the only member of the victim cohort so far to fight back. Several additional victims have been identified but are unwilling to provide information; they continue to live in fear that Connie will hurt them again. Connie physically assaulted one such victim. Her former probation officer stated that he thought she had it in her to be a killer.

Connie has manipulated and scammed many individuals in the past 30 years.

She has even victimized her former husband, both her daughters, and other relatives. She has also made false statements in the past that one of her daughters and an infant son died. For example, in one attempt to gain sympathy, Connie fabricated a story that she tragically lost a daughter in a car crash. Psychopathic individuals typically lie and distort facts in their often-unsuccessful attempts to fool their therapists or interviewers (Hare, 1998; Meloy, 2002).

William’s victimization This amazing but factual case study outlines the story of William, who was victimized by Connie. It is important that the reader understand that there was no romantic relationship between William and Connie. Her scam was based on fear, subterfuge, and distortion of the identities of others.

In 1995, Connie began sending William seemingly harmless yet provocative e-mails. She followed these with enticing phone calls. As William was drawn in, Connie began using cyberidentities that she herself created to harass and threaten him and his family.

She created these cyber-identities in order

to manipulate and control her victims, thereby masking her true involvement as the mastermind.

At this point William made many attempts to sever contact with Connie; however, he felt safe in the fact that Connie lived 300 miles away from him. At first William attempted to respectfully dismiss her—at the time he had no awareness of her true intentions. But Connie used the threatening cyber-identities to make it appear that she too was a victim, ensuring that their contact continued. William was at heart a good person who was willing to place himself in danger to protect others. Because William believed that Connie was being terrorized, he tried to help her. She took advantage of his protective nature and continued the scam. Eventually Connie and William met, and she continued her reign of terror.

William eventually succumbed to the demands of one of Connie’s cyber-identities, a corrupt police officer. This identity insisted that William meet with Connie and help her. This was a tactic Connie often used, and all of the cyber-identities were somehow linked to Connie.

For example, some of the cyber-identities threatened William and his family, while others supposedly threatened Connie.

William did not know how dangerous Connie was; at the time the crimes were being committed, it was not clear to William if she was the victim or victimizer. This intentional deception was part of her devious scheme. Such behaviors are common elements of psychopathy, according to research.

Connie used her scam to steal William’s identity, withdraw large amounts of cash from his bank accounts, and fraudulently use his credit. She even established new credit card accounts using his identity. Each time William confronted her, Connie portrayed false scenarios of her victimization designed to elicit sympathy. In one incident, Connie said that the people who had been threatening them both had abducted her and burned her vagina with a lit cigarette.

William insisted on seeing the injury and

30 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

was shown a series of fresh burn marks.

This left William and his family in a state of absolute terror. Many months later, Connie admitted to William’s private detective that she had inflicted these burns herself while on Demerol in order to manipulate William.

Reporting the crime The crimes that Connie committed against William involved threats, extortion, and the use of computer technology (Internet and e-mail). Connie used the identities of a police officer and an actor, as well as the identities of several professional ballplayers, to add to her scheme of deception. William’s eventual reaction to the crimes of extortion and identity theft was to report the harassment, in person, to a federal investigative agency. He was reluctant to go to the police because one of Connie’s cyber-identities, posing as a police officer, threatened to harm William’s young nephew if he did. He finally made the decision to report the crimes because his life and the lives of his family members had been threatened.

After initial disinterest, agency representatives met with William. This meeting resulted in apparent disbelief on the part of the federal agents, and they immediately suspected that he might be psychotic. As a result, the federal agency never completed a thorough investigation of William’s original complaint (a fact William discovered when he reviewed his file under the Freedom of Information Act). Had they done so, the agents would have uncovered the true nature of the illegal acts committed by Connie against William. The agents knew William was a commercial airline pilot and therefore should have made a proper effort to investigate his claims, given that he was responsible for public safety and they thought he might be psychotic.

Instead of a thorough inquiry, their limited investigation consisted of telephone conversations with Connie, a few of which she initiated. Connie often demonstrated her cleverness by diverting the attention from herself and onto her

victims. In this instance she lied to the agents, saying that William was exaggerating and that he had been affected by the Oklahoma City bombing incident.

Using this famous case, she was able to increase suspicion about William’s behavior. One day after the announcement of the McVeigh trial verdict, Connie brazenly called the federal agents to describe how William was despondent over McVeigh being found guilty.

William did not know about the conversation until at least a year-and-a-half later when he finally had a chance to see his federal file and read the agents’ notes on their telephone conversations.

Following its “investigation,” the federal investigative agency wrote a report, which was sent to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), alleging that William had made a false criminal complaint and was suspected of suffering from psychosis. The “diagnosis” on the part of the interviewing agents was suggested even though they did not possess the psychological training or diagnostic abilities necessary to render any kind of psychological opinion. As a result of the federal agency’s report to the FAA and the strength of the agents’ recommendation, William was instantly grounded without the benefit of a hearing and was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation with “Dr. Neumann.”

William initially turned to his pilot’s union for their help, but was advised not to file an appeal to the FAA’s suspension because the union would not support his arguments. They provided no support because the union officials were influenced by the federal agency’s report. Because the union deemed William’s problem as one simply requiring therapy, they recommend that he pursue a slower approach. After a 15year exemplary flying record, this seemed unjust to the pilot, but he agreed to undergo the testing.

William’s ordeal continues William complied with the FAA’s order and submitted to a battery of psychological tests by Dr. Neumann. According to

an analysis of Dr. Neumann’s records, William’s evaluation also included interviews of himself, his parents, and Connie. Not surprisingly, Connie duped Dr. Neumann by manipulating the facts. She stated that William was exaggerating and that she would never harm him. She said that she cared about William and wanted to protect him from himself. She made Dr. Neumann believe that no one was harming or threatening William. For example, William had expressed fear of the cyber-identity of a state trooper (this cyber-identity was actually Connie in disguise); however, Connie convinced Dr. Neumann that the cyber-identity was actually her former boyfriend, and that William was just intimidated by him. At the time, William did not know whether this state trooper was a real person or a cyber-identity. However, Dr. Neumann believed that he was a real person, despite the absence of evidence. This was apparently used to support Dr. Neumann’s finding that William was delusional.

Connie also convinced Dr. Neumann that the financial crimes and the identity theft William reported were untrue.

The information Connie fed to Dr. Neumann made the doctor even more confident in his diagnosis of William. In a taped telephone call he told William, “She told me that you were making all this up. So why shouldn’t I believe her?

Why shouldn’t that influence me?”

William taped such telephone calls in an effort to prove his credibility and because of his growing distrust of the professionals involved in his case.

William offered Dr. Neumann (who was also an attorney) corroborating documents as proof of Connie’s criminal scam. However, if Dr. Neumann did review these documents, he did not interpret them accurately. For example, to prove that he was the victim of financial fraud, William showed Dr. Neumann a credit card statement with a balance of over $10,000 due. William told Dr. Neumann that he had never even heard of the issuing bank, and that he had only recently become aware of the existence of the account. Upon seeing William’s name

and address on the statement, Dr. Neumann concluded that the account was in fact William’s because it had his identifiers on it.

Dr. Neumann also had a session with each of William’s parents, who had been receiving threats as well. They corroborated William’s claim that he had not opened the credit accounts, but Dr. Neumann chose not to believe them. When William insisted that he did not open the accounts, Dr. Neumann determined that William was suffering from a delusional disorder. Dr. Neumann then decided that William needed long-term therapy and psychotropic medication.

Dr. Neumann’s written report supported the federal agency’s suspicion of psychosis, labeling William as delusional based on his reported “story” of being the victim of an extortion scheme by some individual or group. As a result of Dr. Neumann’s report, the FAA placed William on total medical disability.

Forensic evidence developed years later showed that Dr. Neumann’s testing protocols and conclusions were flawed and violated the ethical standards for his profession. This prompted William to file a complaint against Dr. Neumann with the governing state board. Ironically, Dr. Neumann chairs his state’s Board of Ethics, leading to William’s doubts that his complaint will be handled adequately.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 31

Unethical conduct In order to maintain his disability benefits, William was required to undergo psychotherapy. The therapist (Dr. Goldstein) saw William over an almost 4-year period. Dr. Goldstein brought William’s parents into the treatment sessions under the guise of family therapy, despite the fact that William is middleaged. He also insisted on conducting 23 sessions each week, though William was not displaying any critical psychological symptomatology.

During treatment sessions, Dr. Goldstein would often act in a bizarre, unprofessional manner; he held sessions in his car on the way to run errands and, on at least two occasions, he fell asleep during the sessions. Dr. Goldstein would also make inappropriate personal disclosures that made William uncomfortable. For example, on one occasion Dr. Goldstein cut an appointment short by explaining that he needed to take his car to the shop so that the mechanic could roll back the

odometer before the lease expired.

Boundary violations were also demonstrated when Dr. Goldstein revealed to William that he was under the influence of several prescription drugs. Dr. Goldstein also mentioned (during William’s therapy sessions) that he was an alcoholic and used cocaine. Therefore, when Dr. Goldstein would fall asleep during a session, William would not know whether Dr. Goldstein’s problem was related to alcohol, cocaine, prescription medications, or a combination of various factors. Dr. Goldstein would sometimes appear to be extremely drunk, slurring his words and falling into unconsciousness. When Dr. Goldstein was very wobbly William would drive him home.

After William terminated treatment with Dr. Goldstein, he learned through felony arrest records and court transcripts that Dr. Goldstein had committed Medicare fraud. Further investigation revealed that Dr. Goldstein had inappropriately billed William’s parents’

32 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Medicare account for sessions, and had done this to many other patient accounts as well, thereby stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars through fraud.

Given the history of William’s case, Dr. Goldstein’s inadequate treatment of William was particularly traumatic.

William had already been the victim of Connie, a narcotic-addicted identity thief. He then went on to be treated by Dr. Goldstein, who was a narcoticaddicted felon who took advantage of William’s vulnerability by utilizing his and his parents’ personal identifiers to commit fraud. Ironically, Dr. Goldstein was investigated by the same federal agency with which William filed his initial complaint. Dr. Goldstein was eventually convicted of a felony and sent to federal prison; his license to practice as a psychologist was also revoked.

Unfortunately, these events were not the end of William’s troubles. During William’s treatment, Dr. Goldstein had failed to keep session notes. He also failed

to submit mental status reports to the insurance carriers despite repeated requests for this information from both the insurance carriers and William. As a result of Dr. Goldstein’s unprofessional conduct, William’s disability insurance carriers decided to investigate his psychological treatment and status, questioning whether he was suffering from any debilitating illness.

In order to assess William’s mental status, the insurance carrier required him to undergo another battery of psychological testing, including the Rorschach Inkblot Test. The outcome of this testing revealed an absence of psychological dysfunction.

A large portion of William’s disability benefits, which were his only source of income, were discontinued because of Dr. Goldstein’s lack of cooperation and the carriers’ assessment that William was not as mentally disabled as they previously thought.

After realizing he was harmed by Dr. Goldstein’s prolonged negligent and harmful treatment, William engaged a law firm to pursue civil malpractice action. William and his attorneys alerted the insurance carriers that Dr. Goldstein should be held accountable for his refusal to provide timely and adequate information to them. In addition, Dr. Goldstein had falsely stated that William needed treatment three times per week. In retrospect, this seemed to be a decision based solely on financial gain for Dr. Goldstein.

Corroborating William’s claims William commissioned an independent forensic psychologist (Dr. Southington) to perform a peer-review forensic evaluation of the forensic assessment conducted

by Dr. Neumann. This peer review involved extensive interviews and the examination of documents, and revealed the nature of the scam. Dr. Southington’s peer review, “…raises serious questions regarding the validity and reliability of the evaluation. Dr. [Neumann] failed to follow specified guidelines established by the FAA by omitting the specific psychological tests, which are considered

essential and mandatory for such evaluations. In addition, Dr. [Neumann] did not follow standardized procedures for the administration, scoring and interpretation of another psychological test he did administer, the Rorschach Test. The conclusions reached by Dr. [Neumann], in significant part, are based on the use of psychological tests and can only be considered invalid. Dr. [Neumann] violated the basic ethical requirements for the use of psychological tests.”

The peer-review report amplified the revelation that William was not psychotic or delusional and that the crimes he reported did occur. By this time, William had possession of written confessions from Connie admitting to her crimes, as well as numerous letters of vindication from various banks that were involved in her scam. William assembled a package of documents that supported his claim that he was the victim of an elaborate fraud scheme and was in no way psychologically dysfunctional. These packages were sent to all parties deemed responsible for handling his case. He hoped the information would motivate the recipients to help him.

One of these packages was sent to Dr. Neumann. Additionally, the then-treating psychologist Dr. Goldstein informed Dr. Neumann by telephone that it had been proven that William had indeed been victimized and that his story was credible. However, these efforts did not change Dr. Neumann’s position or findings. In a telephone conversation between William and Dr. Neumann, Dr. Neumann agreed that the information demonstrated an accurate reporting of William’s claims but, despite these facts, he was sticking by his earlier report. It is important to emphasize that to do otherwise would require Dr. Neumann to contradict his initial psychological evaluation. As mentioned earlier, William has since filed a complaint with Dr. Neumann’s state licensing board asking them to investigate Dr. Neumann’s alleged breach of professional ethics for forensic psychologists.

Looking for help to clear his record In the airline industry, accusations of psychosis made against pilots are quite difficult to overcome, especially when made by a very powerful federal agency.

William was placed on long-term disability and has been working to clear his record ever since. However, it has become evident that it will be extremely difficult to correct William’s file given that it was a federal investigative agency that originally labeled him psychotic.

This agency does not seem interested in admitting its errors and has an infamous reputation for not doing so. A senator was asked to intervene on William’s behalf, and this senator has formally requested that the investigative agency re-examine its handling of William’s complaint. Reportedly, the agency did conduct an internal investigation, but the results have not yet been disclosed.

The fact that the agency chose to issue a report alleging psychosis was an injustice that resulted in lasting trauma to William. One analysis of the wrongdoing on the part of the federal agency points to a violation of William’s civil rights.

William’s current treating psychologist considers William to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of losing his career after being falsely labeled psychotic.

Connie’s latest scam Despite the numerous ordeals William has been through, his original goal of stopping the person who was terrorizing him (namely Connie) has not yet been achieved. In fact, Connie continues to locate and exploit new victims. Recently, it has been learned that Connie has victimized an elderly man (Horace) who is mentally incompetent due in part to Alzheimer’s disease. Connie did this through manipulation of her relationship with Horace as a co-participant in regular substance-abuse peer-meetings. With the help of a male accomplice, Connie created a ruse to gain access to Horace’s apartment. While pretending to dote over him, Connie was stealing and using

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 33

Horace’s credit cards for personal gain.

Horace’s attorney and legal guardian believe that these criminal activities may require Horace to file a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. Connie also took advantage of Horace’s illness by stealing money from him and taking his car.

Horace also suffered a debilitating stroke while Connie was with him, raising additional suspicions.

Connie used Horace’s credit accounts and his credit profile to open charge accounts with more than 30 online merchants. Over the course of 6 months she purchased, on an almost daily basis, jewelry, clothing, gifts, and household items amounting to tens of thousands of dollars. Connie also charged numerous telephone calls to Horace’s home phone.

Many of the online orders indicated that Connie used her first name with Horace’s last name and requested that the items be shipped to her address and billed to Horace’s credit accounts. In one case, Connie mistakenly entered Horace’s address for shipping; she then frantically e-mailed the merchant to request that the order be mailed to her address.

At present, Connie is under police investigation by a computer crimes expert for felonious use of Horace’s credit cards. However, she seems to be planning a defense based on verbal reports that Horace gave her permission to use his credit. This police investigation has been proceeding very slowly. Police, pursuant to a search warrant, raided Connie’s apartment. During the search Connie was questioned and her computer taken into evidence. More than a year has passed since the search. The computer crime expert handling the case has said they are monitoring the health of the elderly man and that they would arrest Connie at some point. Presumably, this suggests that if the elderly man dies they may choose to drop the case. It seems that this delay is allowing Connie to continue to dodge prosecution for crimes that could be easily proven.

Horace’s attorney spoke directly with Connie, and she told him that if he brought felony charges against her and

she was sent to prison, she might kill herself. Archival data reveals that Connie threatened suicide many times as a way to manipulate people. Connie also uses a false story about being chained up and raped by a male guard while in a detention center to elicit sympathy. Such false victimization is yet another psychopathic trait. Psychopaths often attempt to gain sympathy for problems unrelated to their criminality in order to avoid detention.

Connie’s other crimes While on probation for her crimes against William, Connie was arrested for visiting a hospital 85 miles from her hometown to obtain Demerol under a false name, reportedly for severe migraine headaches. She had to travel such a distance because the local emergency room attendants were familiar with her many previous attempts to obtain narcotics. In one attempt she impersonated a police officer; in another she said she was the twin sister of the person who previously asked for the same drug. Connie identified herself using combinations of the names of several of her victims but at no time revealed her true identity. According to the arrest report, the attending emergency room physician became suspicious, reviewed the hospital computer records, and noticed that Connie met the description of a person with a different name who had recently requested Demerol for severe headaches. The doctor confronted Connie about his concern. She immediately fled the hospital.

The police were summoned and Connie was arrested on felony charges for attempted theft of a controlled substance and use of false identification.

Scheduled hearings for this case were delayed several times due to Connie’s clever tactics. On the day of one hearing, Connie checked herself into a nearby drug rehabilitation clinic. Police inquiry revealed that the clinic doctor was of the opinion that Connie was there simply to avoid the court hearing and not to deal with her drug addiction. This evasive tactic reveals the ease with which some

34 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

psychopathic criminals delay prosecution. It also shows how they seek to garner sympathy and manipulate prosecutors and judges.

Connie was ultimately convicted of these felony charges and her probation was revoked. She was sentenced to 6 months in jail, but after serving 3 months she was released and placed on house arrest. Reportedly, Connie became an informant while in jail, advising authorities about criminal activities by her fellow inmates. At the time of her hearing, Connie accused her former parole officer of having been sexually inappropriate with her. An internal investigation refuted this claim, but the parole officer was so shaken by this allegation that he was removed from her case. In a discussion between this parole officer and William, the officer admitted that he was afraid of Connie.

At present, Connie faces charges for probation violations in a different county; her arrest and prosecution for her fraudulent behavior using Horace’s identity and his credit are pending. The current concern is that there is no effort to review Connie’s statewide criminality. Thus, a trial or sentencing judge who is unaware of the facts of the other cases may give her a lighter sentence. This potential situation points to a serious problem within the criminal justice system in its dealings with psychopathic criminals.

Weaknesses of the criminal justice system This story reveals how criminals can easily manipulate the criminal justice system itself. When criminals commit crimes in multiple jurisdictions, these crimes are rarely connected, allowing the criminals to get away with lighter punishments. In a way, each jurisdiction prefers to let other jurisdictions handle the criminal and will ignore certain probation violations if the criminal resides in a different jurisdiction or county.

Savvy criminals take maximum advantage of this weakness in the criminal justice system.

Further complicating matters, as in the case of Connie, is that when criminals have been arrested in multiple counties, they may have been assigned many different parole and probation officers who are spread out over hundreds of miles and several jurisdictions. Additionally, there is a certain turnover rate among probation officers. Research into Connie’s criminal past reveals that her new probation officers rarely contacted previous parole officers from different counties to obtain information about persons for whom they are responsible.

An additional weakness of the system is exploited by psychopaths who often manipulate their public defenders and judges. They do this by the continuation of scams in different jurisdictions, and by taking advantage of loopholes in the criminal justice system. When caught, they attempt to sway the legal system to pity them rather then isolate them from society. These psychopaths understand that the legal system will eventually hold them accountable for their crimes, and they will do anything to delay imprisonment. Such criminals want the legal system to view them not as dangers to society, but as drug users or habitual shoppers who simply need treatment for their addictions.

Historically, prisons were designed to first punish those found guilty of crime.

Secondly, they were intended to protect society from criminals. Thirdly, and dependent upon the political and philosophical climate of the era, imprisonment provides an opportunity for inmates to receive treatment geared towards rehabilitation. If done well, this third purpose will lead to a reduced rate of recidivism. However, it is this author’s opinion that the prison system is not achieving adequate results with respect to rehabilitation for psychopaths. This case example provides evidence of the flaws in the system concerning its handling of such criminals. In Connie’s case, while the system did provide opportunities for her to rehabilitate, it did not succeed in its efforts. The conditions in a few of her probation orders required her

to get drug treatment, but Connie has never completed a treatment program.

Furthermore, her only use of these programs has been to manipulate participants and target vulnerable ones for more criminal attacks.

Conclusion This case study highlights the problems that can be encountered in bringing psychopathic criminal offenders to justice. It also emphasizes the frustration often felt by victims who place their lives on hold in the hope that their true story will become known and believed. It is common for victims to become investigators of their own cases. Often, they embark on an exhaustive study of the lives and activities of their victimizers.

There is some basis for optimism in the present case. At least there is a possibility that the various criminal matters will ultimately be brought before the courts and that the judges will understand the seriousness of the cases because of the psychopathic element involved. Studies in the area of psychopathy suggest that incarceration is the optimal remedy for repeat offenders with this disorder.

Meanwhile, readers are encouraged to be mindful of their personal information and to be aware of the presence of psychopathic individuals in our midst.

References American Psychiatric Association.

(2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, fourth edition, text revision. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.

Hare, R.D. (1998). Psychopaths and their nature: Implications for the mental health and criminal justice systems. In R.D. Davis, T. Millon, E. Simonson, & M. Birket-Smith, (Eds.), Psychopathy: Antisocial, criminal, and violent behavior (pp. 95-99). New York: Guilford Press.

McCallum, D. (2001). Personality and dangerousness: Genealogies of antisocial personality disorder. Cambridge, MA: University Press.

Melloy, J.R. (2002). The psychopathic mind: Origins, dynamics, and treatment.

Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

About the Author Eric A. Kreuter is a practicing Certified Public Accountant and is a shareholder of the public accounting firm of Marden, Harrison & Kreuter, CPAs, P.C., headquartered in White Plains, New York. He also serves as an Adjunct Professor at Mercy College in Dobbs Ferry, New York, where he teaches graduate level human resource management courses. Additionally, he is a member of the faculty at Marymount Manhattan College, where he has taught at the Bedford Hills, New York Correctional Facility. He also runs a group counseling program for money addiction at Taconic Correctional Facility in Bedford Hills, New York.

Mr. Kreuter has a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from Manhattan College and a Master of Arts degree in Psychology from Long Island University. He is also a student at Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center in San Francisco, where he is pursuing his Doctorate in Clinical Psychology.

He is currently writing his doctoral dissertation on victim vulnerability, interpreted from an existential-humanistic viewpoint using a single case study.

Mr. Kreuter is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Accounting and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1999.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 65 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 35

Cognitive Impairment Associated with Habitual Nitrous Oxide Abuse in a 63-Year-Old Health Professional By Ralph E. Van Atta, Ph.D., DABPS, FACFEI, FACAPP Key Words: chronic substance abuse, nitrous oxide abuse, cognitive deficits, neuropsychological deficits Abstract MicroCog test results and supplemental neuropsychological test findings are reported concerning a male health professional who had abused nitrous oxide (N2O) on a regular basis for more than 20 years. At the time of the examination, the health professional had abstained from N2O use for 12 months. Test findings indicate that the patient had suffered a general decrement in cognitive functioning. Spatial functioning and reaction times were better preserved than attention, mental control, verbal and arithmetic reasoning, and verbal memory. His verbal memory loss was particularly severe, but abstract reasoning and practical social judgment remained intact.

Marked visual memory and construction deficits were identified with supplemental clinical tests. Since 12 months of abstinence had elapsed prior to the examination, it may be reasonably assumed that cognitive recovery was nearly complete and the findings reported are stable.

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

CME

ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates after June 2001 who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Certified Medical Investigators who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

ACFEI is accredited by the ACCME to sponsor continuing medical education for physicians. ACFEI designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1 hour in category 1 credit towards the AMA Physicians Recognition Award.

ACFEI is California Board of Registered Nursing Provider 13133.

Introduction Nitrous oxide (N2O) abuse is rarely seen in the general practice of clinical and forensic psychology. Also, little has been reported on the cognitive consequences of chronic N2O abuse. For this reason, we offer the results of a neuropsychological evaluation completed in a VA Medical Centerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Outpatient Behavioral Medicine Clinic on a chronic abuser of N2O. Background Nitrous oxide (N2O) is widely used as an anesthetic in medicine and dentistry.

Perhaps because of its industrial applications (as a propellant in whipped cream, in automobile racing engines for boosting horsepower, as an inflator in automobile airbags), N2O has not been designated as a controlled substance. When inhaled in a 100% concentration, it produces an intoxicated state that is experienced as pleasant by some; because of this, it is subject to abuse (Center for Substance Abuse Research, 2002). N2O abuse is common among urban homosexuals because of the sexual enhancement that is associated with vasodilation (The Merck Manual, 1999).

N2O is subject to rapid absorption via the lungs with associated hypotension, dizziness and flushing. Recreational use of N2O places the individual at risk for

36 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

central nervous system depression and unconsciousness. Central nervous system depression may be sufficient to cause death (Center for Substance Abuse Research, 2002). Survival often depends upon cardiac, respiratory, and circulatory support.

Physiologically, N2O interacts in the body with B12, described as having monovalent cobalt at its center, converting the monovalent form into bivalent form (Nunn, 1987). This process blocks the transmethylation reaction, a reaction that is fundamental to mylenation. According to Nunn (1987), when transmethylation is blocked, other pathways for generating methionine, an end product of transmethylation, may be opened and plasma concentrations of methionine may remain stable, at least temporarily. If exposure to N2O continues, interference with DNA synthesis will follow, which will result in megoblastic changes and agranulocytosis. The latter consequences are associated with pernicious anemia (Nunn, 1987).

When exposure to N2O is prolonged, metabolism and chronic use may result in vitamin B12 deficiency. Red blood count may be lowered to the point of anemia with consequent nerve degeneration (Pema, Horace, & Wyatt, 1998). Occupational exposure to N2O has been implicated by Peric, Vranes, and Marusic (1991) in changes in red cell count, hematocrit, and hemoglobin concentration.

Layzer (1978) found neurological disorder in 15 patients who had chron-

ic exposure to N2O. Thirteen of these patients were chronic abusers of N2O; two were surgeons with substantial intheater exposure. Of these patients, a preponderance experienced Lehrmitteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sign (shooting, electric shock-like sensations when the neck is flexed) along with other neurological symptoms, such as numbing/paresthesias of the hands and/or feet, numbness of trunk, disequilibrium, impotency, and loss of sphincter control. Also pertinent to the present report, 7 patients reported altered mood, impaired memory, or difficulty in thinking clearly (Layzer, 1978).

Finally, it should be emphasized that nerve damage may be central, as confirmed in the findings of myelopathy as reported by Pema, Horak, and Wyatt (1998) and Waclawick et al., 2003.

According to Jevtovic-Todorovic et al.

(2003), exposing rats to 6 hours of nitrous oxide induced anesthesia with resulting neurodegeneration and subsequent learning deficits. Somewhat peripheral to our purposes but worth noting is the study of Hoerauf et al.

(1999), which showed that exposure to even trace amounts of N2O may result in dose-dependent genetic damage.

Diagnostic Procedures The patient examined for this study appeared voluntarily for evaluation as directed by his professional licensing board, after the board determined that he had been chronically abusing N2O. This board directed the patient to participate in a substance abuse rehabilita-

tion program; he had completed this program 10 months prior to the evaluation used for this study. For the purposes of this study, the patient was interviewed, his medical records were reviewed, and neuropychological tests were assigned. The latter included MicroCog (Powell et al., 1993), a computerized neuropsychological test. The assessment plan included our usual practice of confirming and supplementing MicroCog results with selected neuropsychological clinical tests.

Identifying Information The examinee was a 63-year-old white male health professional (separated from his wife); he was well dressed and seemed alert. He wore corrective lenses but had no other apparent sensory deficits. His gait was normal and his facies were symmetrical; he proved to have mixed lateral dominance.

Behavioral Observations Although the patient acted socially appropriate throughout the 3-hour examination, he was obviously quite anxious and tense. He attributed his discomfort to the fact that his professional license was at risk, as was his ability to earn a living. He was also quite embarrassed by his predicament, and was very concerned that his standing in his family and community was in jeopardy. The patientâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s anxiety was severe enough to impair his ability to comprehend test instructions; he was observed to have read and reread the test and subtest instructions, but hav-

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 37

ing done so, had discernible difficulty in responding to the test requirements. It should be noted that MicroCog does not penalize examinees for reading and rereading test directions.

The patient stated that he had been using N2O regularly since the early 1970s, though not on a daily basis. He at first attributed his problem to bronchial asthma and later to his inability to relax. He also stated that he was reported to his board by a disgruntled employee who had happened to witness his N2O use on one occasion. He professed to have no idea why his board might have recommended neuropsychological evaluation.

Patient History The patient’s family of origin was described as being loving and supportive though impoverished. He reported no history of physical or psychological trauma and no history of seizure or convulsion during his developmental years. He was hospitalized for observation after suffering a head injury from high school athletics; subsequent to his discharge from the hospital, he had no change in personality or cognition. The patient graduated from high school, served for 4 years in the military without incident, and graduated with honors from both college and post-graduate professional school. He viewed himself being driven and ambitious, and stated that he had served in various elected public offices and had been a pilot in the Air National Guard while maintaining a flourishing professional practice.

Ten months prior to the required neuropsychological evaluation, the patient completed a 3-week substance abuse program, where he received treatment for both nicotine and N2O dependence.

He reported that he had been abstinent from N20 for 1 month before entering the substance abuse program. Prior to his admission, he had been given Diazepam 5mg, PRN (as needed) for anxiety. His physical examination, which included neurological screening,

was normal with the exception of low blood pressure and bronchial asthma.

Lab work showed a rather mild hyperlipidemia, elevated triglycerides, and marginally elevated blood glucose (fasting 102). He scored 28/30 when screened with the MiniMental Status Examination. In the course of his participation in the substance abuse rehabilitation program, he had trouble sleeping and was treated with Trazodone 50mg, qhs for a period of 1 week. Progress through the program was otherwise unremarkable.

Findings/Results MicroCog provides a three-level profile (Powell et al., 1993) based on a pyramidal model of the interdependency of higher order functions and lower order functions. At the base of the pyramid (Level I) are five factors: attention/mental control, reasoning/calculations, memory (verbal), spatial processing, and reaction time. Level-II factors include Information Processing Speed and Information Processing Accuracy. Toward the apex, at Level III, are estimates of general cognitive functioning and general cognitive proficiency. Level-III scores are composite, general assessments of cognitive functioning that are derived from and theoretically dependent upon lower order functions.

Presented in Table 1 are the examinee’s standard scores along with corresponding percentiles. Standard scores on this test have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15, parallel to many tests of scholastic aptitude (IQ tests). In recognition of the variable nature of psychological test performance, score bands are provided that represent the range of standard scores with which his scores might be expected to fall within a 95% probability. In a sense, one might read the table as providing data concerning the actual test performance in contrast to best and worst case “scenarios.” Probabilistic estimates are of much importance, of course, in forensic science.

As the patient’s performance is

38 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

reviewed, it should be noted that our interest is in estimating losses. Therefore, it should be emphasized that we are using norms for individuals who are similar in age and have more than a high school education. Using these norms, it will be observed that the patient’s standard score on the memory scale was 66, corresponding to percentile 1. Table 1 suggests that there is a 95% chance that his memory score falls with the standard score range of 56-76. The standard scores for the other Level-I factors are within a range considered to be average or within normal limits (within 1 standard deviation of the mean standard score), but all of these scores would seem to be below those expected of a professional school graduate. The patient’s results show a general decline in cognitive functioning. The range of variation for the patient’s memory score was below the range for any of the other Level-I scores, which demonstrated that verbal memory was an area of severe decrement.

In the case of individuals who have cognitive difficulties, it is expected that those who are more intact will commit relatively more time to problem solving in the interest of improving accuracy.

This compensatory process may be theoretically guided by conscious or unconscious executive functions. With both information processing speed and information processing accuracy scores at low levels, and, as shown in Table 1, with no significant difference between the two scores, we can say that the compensatory processes that we would hope to see are not evident. This patient’s general cognitive functioning and general cognitive proficiency scores fall more than 1 standard deviation below the average, comparable to the percentiles 8 and 5, respectively.

With respect to supplemental clinical evaluation, we found that the examinee was unable to successfully complete a very simple construction task, drawing a cube. He responded to this requirement by drawing a square. When we indicated

to the patient that he had produced a square rather than a cube, he made an unsatisfactory attempt to introduce perspective into his drawing. Failure at such constructional tasks suggests the presence of parieto-occipital lesions (Luria, 1973; Vocate, 1987).

The patient also had difficulty drawing the face of a clock, but with erasure he was successful in the task (Stowe, 1996). We gave rather more convoluted verbal instructions for this task than Stowe by requesting that the examinee set the hands at “10 minutes to 11 o’clock.” Remarkably, the subject of this examination responded to our request with confusion by drawing three hands on the face of the clock, one of them pointing to each of the numbers 10, 2, and 11. He succeeded in a nonverbal reasoning task (Plan-of-Search) included at the 14-year-old level on the StanfordBinet (Terman and Merrill, 1973). He achieved only 8 out of 20 possible points on Lezak’s Bicycle Drawing Task (Lezak, 1983). He showed no language dysfunctions (normal productivity, no dysrhythmias, no dysphasic findings), and was quite successful on verbal reasoning tasks (e.g., proverbs), serial sevens, and simple arithmetic tasks.

Summary/Conclusions Reported in this article are the results of a neuropsychological evaluation of a 63year-old male health professional with a history of N2O abuse dating to the early 1970s. He sought help and was neuropsychologically evaluated after being pressured by his professional licensing board to do so. He had previously gone through a substance abuse medical examination that revealed a normal neurological profile, mild hyperlipidemia, and DJD (a form of arthritis) involving the lumbar spine.

Premorbid history revealed that the patient had graduated from college and his professional program with honors.

His personality was overdriven, and he may have been an overachiever. These facts might suggest a lower estimate of

premorbid intellect as toward the lower end of the superior range; such an estimate is of course crude but necessary for purposes of estimating the extent of impairment (Snyder and Nussbaum, 1998). He had suffered no significant neuropsychological events (closed head injuries, seizures or convulsions, sustained high fevers, or neurological disease) subsequent to completing his graduate education.

Complicating the assessment were possibilities of age-related cognitive decline and the patient’s hyperlipidemia.

With respect to the patient’s age-related decline, there was no family history of Alzheimer’s disease or dementia. Powell et al. (1993) reported data that bears upon questions of normal aging, agerelated decline, Alzheimer’s disorder, and N2O abuse as possible causes of the patient’s decline. This report compared the MicroCog profiles of two groups of older patients with mild cognitive impairments who were matched for age (average 72 years) and educational level (average 14.2 years). One group suffered mild cognitive impairment; the other had no impairment. Our patient’s standard scores compare quite favorably to the normal controls and are well above the impaired group with one exception, verbal memory. The patient’s score on verbal memory was, in fact, below that

of a small reference group (n = 18) of older patients with mild Alzheimer’s (Powell et al., 1993). With respect to hyperlipidemia, there were no suggestions of vascular impairment in the physical exam as reported in medical records. Studies such as an EEG, CT Scan, or an MRI, which might have enabled us to further narrow the range of explanatory hypotheses, were unfortunately unavailable.

Considering the patient’s own baseline of estimated premorbid functioning, his performance was quite generally below the level that would be expected based on his estimated bright-normal to superior level. In the case of spatial processing (nonverbal reasoning) and reaction times, the degree of loss may be described as mild. Attention/mental control measures were areas of moderately severe losses. Memory (verbal) was quite severely affected, with the examinee performing in a manner comparable to the lower 1% of his age and education cohorts.

Compared to this same reference group, the patient’s information processing speed was also an area of severe loss.

Powell et al. (1993) assembled evidence that suggests that processing speed is a function of one’s knowledge base, the implication being that processing speed is an index to central nervous system

Table 1: MicroCog Test Results on a 63-Year-Old Nitrous Oxide Abuser MicroCog Scales Level I Attention/Mental Control Reasoning/Calculations Memory Spatial Processing Reaction Time Level II Information Processing Speed Information Processing Accuracy Level III General Cognitive Functioning General Cognitive Proficiency

Standard Score 91 90 66 103 104

Percentile

Interval *

27 25 1 58 61

81–102 78–102 56–76 93–113 97–111

82 82

12 12

75–89 75–89

79 75

8 5

73- 85 69- 81

*Note: Interval refers to the band of standard scores within which the patient’s score is expected to fall upon reexamination, with a 95% confidence rate.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 39

integrity, a point also made by Powell et al. (1993). IPS has also been implicated in working memory (Powell et al., 1993) and there is a distinct possibility that his memory impairment and his poor showing with respect to IPS are related. IPS is also subject to UCS and CS control as a reflection of executive functioning.

When patients have cognitive difficulties, one would hope that the speed of information processing would slow so as to compensate for these difficulties.

Unfortunately, such an accommodation was not seen in this patient, and IPS and information processing accuracy were at very similar levels.

Finally, when aggregate estimates of his abilities were made (general cognitive functioning and general cognitive proficiency), the patient appeared to be functioning below the 10th percentile and would seem to have suffered a rather devastating loss. Correspondingly, he had difficulty on tasks that assessed planning and reasoning ability, such as Lezak’s Draw-A-Bicycle task and Stowe’s Draw-A-Clock measure.

After more than 20 years abusing N2O, under pressure from his licensing board, the 63-year-old subject of our study had been abstinent from N20 for a period of 12 months. It seems reasonable to expect that his cognitive recovery was complete at the time of his neuropsychological examination. While we are unable to unequivocally attribute his deficits to N2O abuse, it is quite clear from our literature review that inhalation of this gas on a regular basis, whether accidentally or intentionally, will produce peripheral neuropathy in nearly all patients, with roughly 50% reporting cognitive impairments.

Patients suffering from repeated, short-term N2O abuse may be expected to show recovery from its cognitive and physiological residuals. In this particular case, there would seem to be good reason to suspect that our patient’s unfortunate cognitive circumstances are related to his chronic abuse of nitrous oxide.

References Center for Substance Abuse Research. (2002).

Nitrous oxide—Signs and symptoms. University of Maryland.

Retrieved from: www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/bydrug/nitrous.asp.

Hoerauf, K., Lierz, M., Wiesner, G., Schroegendorfer, K., Lierz, P., Spacek, A., Brunnberg, L., & Nusse, M. (1999). Genetic damage in operating room personnel exposed to isoflurane and nitrous oxide. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 56(7), 433-437.

Iwata, K., O’Keefe, G.B., & Karakas, A. (2001). Neurologic problems associated with chronic nitrous oxide abuse in a non-healthcare worker. American Journal of Medical Science, 322, 173-174.

Jevtovic-Todorovic, V., Hartman, R., Izumi, Y., Benshoff, N., Dikranian, I., Zorumski, C., Olney, J., & Wozniak, D. (2003). Early exposure to common anesthetic agents causes widespread neurodegeneration in the developing rat brain and persistent learning deficits. Journal of Neuroscience, 23(3), 876-882.

Layzer, R. (1978). Myeloneuopathy after prolonged exposure to nitrous oxide. The Lancet, 2(8102), 1227-1230.

Lezak, M. (1983). Neuropsychological assessment, Second Edition. New York: Oxford.

Luria, A.R. (1973). The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology. New York: Basic Books.

Nunn, J. (1987). Clinical aspects of the interaction between nitrous oxide and vitamin B12.

British Journal of Anaesthesia, 59, 3-13.

Pema, P., Horak, H., & Wyatt, R. (1998).

Myelopathy caused by nitrous oxide toxicity.

American Journal of Neuroradiology, 5, 994-995.

Peric, M., Vranes, Z., & Marusic, M. (1991).

Immunological disturbances in anaesthetic personnel chronically exposed to high occupational concentrations of nitrous oxide and halothane.

Anaesthesia, 46, 531-537.

Powell, D., Kaplan, E., Whitla, D., Weintraub, S., Catlin, R., & Funkenstein, H. (1993).

MicroCog: Assessment of cognitive functioning. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation.

Snyder, P., & Nussbaum, P. (Eds.) (1998).

Clinical neuropsychology: A pocket handbook for assessment. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Stowe, R. (undated). The neurobehaviorallyoriented mental status examination. Pittsburgh, PA: Highland Drive VA Medical Center.

The Merck manual of diagnosis and therapy (17th ed.) (1999). Whitehouse Station, NJ: Merck Research Laboratories.

Terman, L., & Merrill, M. (1973). Stanford intelligence scale: Manual for the third revision, form L-M. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Vocate, D. (1987). The theory of A.R. Luria: Functions of spoken language in the development of higher mental processes. Hillsdale, NJ: Erblaum.

40 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

About the Author Ralph E. Van Atta, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI, FACAPP, completed his bachelor’s degree in biological- and physicalsciences education at Ohio State University. After graduating ninth in his college class and being recognized as a Distinguished Military Student, Dr. Van Atta went on to serve in the U.S. Army as a Field Artillery Officer; his service included 16 months in Korea.

Dr. Van Atta completed his doctoral studies at the Ohio State University Graduate School. Over the course of his career, he served as clinician and academician at the University of Texas, Southern Illinois University, and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, where he founded the Department of Psychological Services. In 1978, Dr. Van Atta left academia to establish a private practice in forensic and clinical psychology; his work on psychophysiological monitoring in psychotherapy was recognized with a Clinical Research Award from the American Society of Clinical Hypnosis.

Dr. Van Atta is currently the Lead Psychologist/Clinical Psychologist with the Louis A. Johnson VA Medical Center.

He serves on the Editorial Advisory Board for The Forensic Examiner, and is a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Disabled American Veterans organizations. In addition, he serves on the Institutional Review Board of West Virginia University. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1997.

Required CME Disclosure Statement The following author has indicated that he has no relationship with industry to disclose relative to the content of this CME activity: Ralph E. Van Atta, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI, FACAPP. Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 65 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates after June 2001 who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

ACFEI provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Accountants who are required to obtain 15 credits per year to maintain their status.

By Joseph Wheeler, CPA, Cr.FA, C AMS, CHS-III Key Words: fraud, Nigerian 419, scams, forensic accounting Dear Sir, We want to transfer to overseas ($152,000,000 USD) from a Bank in Africa.

I want to ask you quietly for a reliable and honest person who will be capable and fit to provide either an existing bank account or to set up a new bank account immediately to receive this moneyâ&#x20AC;Ś I am (name withheld), the Auditor General of a bank in Africaâ&#x20AC;Śat the beginning of this business, you will be given 35% of the total amount, 60% will be for me, while 5% will be for expenses both parties might have incurred during the process of transferring.

I look forward to your earliest reply.

Yours, (name withheld) Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 41

Abstract When Mr. Wheeler, the author of this article, was approached by a client whose boss had been transferring millions of dollars out of their multinational charity, he quickly surmised that they had been victims of a Nigerian 419 fraud scheme.

By forming a powerful coalition of experts, Mr. Wheeler was able to trace the funds. In this article, he outlines his story and the steps required to recover lost funds in similar cases. *Note: Fictitious names are used to protect the identities of those involved.

In 2002, I received a call from a new client. Kathryn Jameson*, an accountant for a large multinational charity, was puzzled. For the past several years, her boss had been transferring millions of dollars out of the charity for an “investment.”

Ms. Jameson did not know how to reflect this investment on the books. After uncovering the facts, I realized that the charity had been the victim of a Nigerian 419 fraud scam. Many people believe the 419-scam trend is over, but it’s still very much alive and thriving off of the getrich-quick dreams of many.

E-mail scams originating from Nigeria, termed “4-1-9” after the section of the Nigerian penal code that addresses fraudulent schemes, account for $100 million in losses every year in the United States. The Nigerian schemes, which can also arrive via letters and faxes, “…are the fastest growing Internet fraud reported to the IFW [Internet Fraud Watch], increasing 900 percent from 2000 to 2001” (Internet Fraud Watch [IFW], 2002, p.1). The IFW, a service of the National Consumer’s League, reported that in 2003, Nigerian money order scams ranked third among the top ten Internet scams (2003, p.1). The official website of the United States Secret Service (2002) put 419 schemes into seven main categories: • Disbursement of money from wills and estates, • Contract fraud (COD of goods and services),

• Purchase of real estate, • Conversion of hard currency, • Transfer of funds from over-invoiced contracts, and • Sale of crude oil at below market prices.

Typically, these scams involve e-mails or letters requesting assistance in the transfer of millions of dollars out of the country. By simply providing bank information, victims are assured that they will get a generous cut of the millions. Instead, the victims usually discover that unauthorized withdrawals have been made from their own accounts.

In this particular case, an “access agent” was recruited to contact and become a trusted friend of the potential fraud target, the president of the charity, George Christopher*. Once a relationship was forged, the agent took his target to Senegal, a country west of Nigeria. There, the agent showed Christopher the precious stones, metals, and U.S. dollars that would be his if he could just provide the $10 million up-front investment needed to cut through the government red tape and get the goods out of the country.

Christopher did provide the funds, gradually transferring money out of the charity over a period of 2 years, planning to eventually return the funds when the deal went through. Of course, he never saw any of the precious stones, metals, or currency. That’s when Ms. Jameson discovered the discrepancy, and contacted me.

The first step I took was to follow the money trail across the United States and into Nigeria. I began by attempting to find the organizations that were supposedly receiving the funds. I accomplished this through use of the Internet, and through inquiries with intelligence agents, law enforcement, and Interpol.

My goal with this effort was to determine if these companies existed, and to determine whether they were actual brickand-mortar companies (organizations with actual physical addresses) or just shells. When I could not find such locations, I searched the Internet for incorporation documents, company registra-

42 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

tions, advertisements, and phone numbers—practically any attribute that a company doing business would have.

Again, I found that there were no histories or records of these companies.

After reviewing copies of the bank wires, it was clear that most of the money transferred out of the United States was being transferred to banks in the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent, African banks. It appeared that some money might still be in accounts held at several U.K. banks. At this point I knew I needed to team up with experts in the United Kingdom. The U.K. experts could access data and reports I couldn’t and could act quickly if accounts needed to be frozen or law enforcement brought in.

Most of the money in these scams ends up outside the United States. It’s difficult to determine how to trace those funds unless you have specific experience.

However, tracking funds outside the United States should not kill the case, because some countries can provide assistance. In fact, discovering that the money is outside the United States is just the beginning. For example, laws in the United Kingdom are much more stringent than those in the United States. If you can tie the funds to a U.K. bank, that bank is ultimately liable.

In addition to notifying the Financial Crimes Division of the Secret Service, which has taken a lead role in combating 419 scams, I engaged Bayhall Global Inquiries, a private investigation firm, and Philippsohn Crawfords Berwalds, a leading U.K. fraud litigation practice.

Together we pursued this as a global scam, which involved at least 10 individuals and spanned several continents.

Some of the funds went to Lloyds Bank of London. Others were linked to the Union Finance House on the Isle of Man. To mitigate the expense of the investigation, I originally planned to contact individuals with accounts at the Isle of Man, hoping to have them support the investigation. Then I became concerned.

There were many, many accounts in that bank with millions of dollars in them, but what if these individuals were not

“Most of the money in these scams ends up outside the United States. ... However ... discovering that the money is outside the United States is just the beginning.” scammed themselves but were instead members of an organized crime ring?

However, when Bayhall contacted the bank, the bank confirmed that some of its account holders had indeed been scammed themselves.

My coalition and I had come very close to cracking the case, but then a major hitch arose. The president of the charity, concerned about his own reputation and the possibility of prosecution for his part in the plot, did not wish to be identified or to cooperate further. Without his testimony as the plaintiff, the case could not be resolved.

Although my own case did not end in a prosecution, I do not believe that this turn of events should discourage others from taking similar cases. However, if you do pursue such cases, you must realize that they will require thousands of dollars to prosecute. You will need a coalition to get it done, and you must hire the very best. Based on my own experiences, I offer the following advice for those who wish to investigate and prosecute 419 scammers.

Inform the Secret Service. The Secret Service provides the e-mail address 419.fcd@usss.treas.gov to allow individuals to report 419 fraud scams. According to Marc Connolly, spokesman for the Secret Service, the basic scam has been expanded upon. He noted, “The vast

majority (of scams) still originate from Nigeria, but we’ve seen a large number originate in neighboring African countries, South Africa, European countries, and the former Soviet Union. And we’ve seen participants further the scam here in the United States” (Oldenburg, November 9, 2002, p. 9). In addition, scammers have tried connecting the scam to current events, such as September 11, or the war in Afghanistan.

Engage experts with overseas experience. It’s difficult to bring yourself up to speed on the intricacies of money tracing at a moment’s notice. If necessary, subcontract to a forensic accounting firm or investigative firm with experience in tracking people down.

Form a coalition. Most clients can’t afford the forensic expertise required to solve such scams. My client spent $50,000 before pulling out at the last minute. By forming a coalition with investigators and law enforcement officials you can spread out the expense.

Be flexible, but wary. Don’t lower your rate, expecting that you’ll receive a portion of the frozen assets. It’s possible that may not happen, and you’ll be shortchanged. Nevertheless, you may choose to offer flexible payment options to accommodate clients.

Have an attorney available at a moment’s notice. If we had convinced our client to move just a little faster, we could have obtained the funds from an account in Lloyd’s of London. But just shortly before the decision was made to move forward, the money was pulled out of the bank. We could have frozen those assets—and what we recovered would have been significant.

By taking action against these scams, we can hope to discourage the perpetrators and effect some change.

If you have experienced such scams, please inform the Secret Service (USSS) via e-mail at 419.fcd@usss.treas.gov, or fax (202) 4065031. Or you may mail the information to: United States Secret Service, Financial Crimes Division ATT: 419, 950 H Street, NY Suite 5300, Washington, DC 20223.

References Internet Fraud Watch. (2003). Fraud trends January-December 2003. Internet Scams [Online]. Available: www.fraud.org/2003internetscams.pdf.

Internet Fraud Watch. (May 22, 2002). Internet fraud lurks in your inbox. Internet Fraud Watch Press Release [On-line]. Available: www.nclnet.org/emailscamspr02.htm.

Norr, H. (2002, September 8). Fast-growing fraud from Nigeria uses Internet to search for suckers. San Francisco Chronicle. p. A.6.

Oldenburg, D. (2002, November 20).

Scammed/e-mail swindles from abroad becoming more sophisticated. Houston Chronicle, p. 9.

Oldenburg, D. (2002, November 12). The scam of the Earth, back for more. The Washington Post. p.C10.

Singletary, M. (2002, October 31). Nigerian scams blur the line between victim and accomplice. The Washington Post, p. E03.

United States Secret Service. (2002). Public awareness advisory regarding “4-1-9” or “advance fraud” schemes. United States Secret Service [Online]. Available: www.secretservive.gov/alert419.shtml.

About the Author Joseph F. Wheeler, CPA, Cr.FA, CHSIII, CAMS, has almost 20 years experience in such diverse areas as auditing and financial investigations, tax planning and preparation, and small business consulting. Mr. Wheeler worked as a forensic accountant at the CIA from 1995-1998. In his role as a forensic accountant, Mr. Wheeler traced illicit money flows and identified hidden assets of major international organized crime groups and narcotics traffickers, prepared intelligence reports and target studies, worked with liaison services in foreign countries, and conducted briefings on money laundering and other financial crime topics to high-level government officials. He received exceptional performance awards in 1993, 1995, and 1997. Mr. Wheeler currently works as a business advisor for Fiducial Business Centers, Inc. He has also been a member of ACFEI since 2002.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 66 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 43

Make Plans Now to Attend ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference will be held at the Wyndham Peachtree Conference Center (and hotel) in Atlanta (Peachtree City), Georgia, on Jan. 21-22, 2005. This regional conference will feature several of ACFEI’s most popular certification programs, including the Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC, course, the Certified Forensic Nurse, CFN, course, and the Certified Medical Investigator, CMI, course. Courses and examinations for the Certified in Homeland Security (CHS) Program’s new advanced levels of Certification in Homeland Security, CHS Level-IV (CHS-IV) and CHS Level-V (CHS-V), will also be offered.

These courses are expected to have a great turn out, so reserve your spot today before the classes are filled. To register for the 2005 Regional Conference in Atlanta, call toll free (800) 423-9737 or fax the registration form on page 46 or 47 to (417) 881-4702. You may also register online quickly and easily by logging on to www.acfei.com (click the Conferences link).

Travel and Accommodation Information The Wyndham Peachtree Conference Center (and hotel) in Atlanta is holding a block of rooms specially priced for ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference. For reservations, call (770) 487-2000 or toll free (800) WYNDHAM and mention the group code: ACFEI 2005 Regional Conference. Don’t delay! Reserve your room early to receive the best rate. The cutoff for the guaranteed group rate is December 20, 2004.

44 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Certification Courses Offered at ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference Certified Medical Investigator®, CMI, Training Program January 21-22, 2005 The Certified Medical Investigator, CMI, designation is an advanced credential that helps confirm to legal authorities that you have experience, education, training, and expertise in conducting medical investigations. It attests that you have completed the necessary coursework and acquired the advanced specialized knowledge and skills to pass the required examinations on medical investigation, setting you apart as a nationally recognized medical investigator.

The CMI training course covers the critical areas of forensic investigation, including the importance of recognizing evidence, securing evidence, protecting a forensic scene from contamination, and the legal issues involved in managing evidence and testifying about it. All forensic professionals will benefit from the CMI course, including those outside the traditional medical professions.

Earning Certification in Homeland Security at Level-IV (CHSIV) and Level-V (CHS-V) These advanced levels of certification (CHS-IV and CHS-V) are designed for senior-level Homeland Security professionals and are restricted to those who have already been certified at CHS LevelIII (you must be certified at CHS LevelIII to be eligible for CHS Level-IV, and you must be certified at CHS Level-IV to be eligible for CHS Level-V).

Certified Forensic Nurse, CFNSM, Program January 21-22, 2005 The CFN program was created to provide a credential to enhance the credibility, competency, knowledge, and advanced skill levels of nurses working in various roles within the exciting and rapidly growing field of forensic nursing. The CFN designation will help demonstrate to nursing professionals’ colleagues, patients, clients, employers, and the health care community that they have an extensive base of knowledge, skills, and education; direct professional experience; and a total commitment to continuing education and excellence within the forensic nursing profession. The CFN designation can also contribute to the weight and relevance of the Certified Forensic Nurse’s testimony and the applicability of the evidence that he or she presents in a court of law.

The CFN program is unique from other forensic nurse training programs, because rather than teaching only one specific area of nursing or forensics, it teaches and tests the overall capabilities required of a competent forensic nurse. As a result, the CFN designation helps verify that the Certified Forensic Nurse can conduct a sound forensic engagement, examination, or case that will stand up under the rigorous standards of the U.S. judicial system.

CHS-IV Course: Incident Command Management and Terrorism January 21, 2005 This in-depth one-day course and exam covers Incident Command Management and Terrorism. The Incident Command Management portion of the course will provide an understanding of the differences between a HAZMAT (HMI) incident and an NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) incident. It will define and provide an understanding of the importance of incident management and its challenges. The Terrorism portion of the course will review domestic and international terrorist groups that may engage the United States in WMD-related incidents.

Certified Forensic Consultant, CFCSM, Program January 21-22, 2005 The CFC Course is a Requirement to Earn Diplomate Status.

The Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC, program is intended to train forensic professionals in the law, both generally and specifically. It educates individuals in the fine points of being competent and knowledgeable forensic consultants in the unique environment of the American judicial system.

The CFC course begins with classroom instruction, followed by interactive roleplaying scenarios, including a mock trial, and adversarial confrontations related to issues such as giving deposition testimony, testifying at trial, and assisting counsel and clients during the opposing expert’s testimony. Participants are challenged so that when confronted with litigation they will be comfortable and competent in their role as forensic consultants.

CHS-V Course: CBRNE Preparedness January 22, 2005 This in-depth one-day course covers Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Preparedness. This course will review CBRNE in detail and will also discuss catastrophic events involving CBRNE. In addition, a general overview of CBRNE cases will be provided, including event analysis and medical, physiological, and personnel management considerations.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 45

ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference January 21-22, 2005, in Atlanta (Peachtree City) Earn your C e rtified Medical Investigator¤ , CMI, C e rtified Forensic Nurse, CFNs m or Certified Forensic Consultant, CFCs m credential Registration Information: (Please type or print) Name______________________________________ Designation____________________ Member ID#___________

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Certification Examinations (select one)

Note: Each of the following courses will consist of two days of instruction (8 a.m.–5 p.m. on January 21st and 8 a.m.–4 p.m. on January 22nd). Participants will then have the choice of taking their examinations on the evening of January 22nd from 4:30 p.m.–8:30 p.m OR on the morning of January 23rd from 7 a.m.–11 a.m. Participants will need to select their testing date when they sign in at the registration desk on January 21st. ❏ Certified Medical Investigator, CMI CMI Exam Levels: (Please check anticipated level) Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level V ❏ Please send me the CMI Study Guide.

Before 11/22/04 After 11/22/04 (Save $50) $495 $445

Total $_________

❏ Certified Forensic Nurse, CFN

$300

$350

$_________

❏ Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC

$445

$495

$_________

Payment Processing ❏ Check enclosed ❏ American Express

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Total $_________

Card Number:____________________________________ Exp.: Name (as it appears on card): Signature:__________________________________________________________ All requests for cancellation must be made to ACFEI headquarters in writing by fax or mail. Phone cancellations will not be accepted. All cancelled/refunded registrations will be assessed a $50 administrative fee. Refunds are pro-rated as follows: Prior January 1, 2005, 50% refund; NO cash refunds after January 1, 2005. The performance of this conference is subject to the acts of God, war, government regulation, disaster, strikes, civil disorder, curtailment of transportation facilities or any other emergency making it impossible to hold the conference. In the event of such occurrences, credit vouchers will be issued in lieu of cash. Conference schedule is subject to change.

Special Services: ❑ Please check here if you require special accommodations to participate in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Attach a written description of your needs.

Please be prepared to show photo identification upon arrival at the conference.

REGISTER TODAY! Fax: (417) 881-4702 Online: www.acfei.com Mail to: 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804 Phone: (800) 423-9737

This conference will be held at Peachtree City’s exclusive Wyndham Peachtree Conference Center (and hotel), which is surrounded by 19 scenic wooded acres. To make your hotel reservations call (800)-Wyndham and mention the group code “ACFEI” to receive the best rates.

ACFEI’s 2005 Regional Conference January 21-22, 2005, in Atlanta (Peachtree City) Earn your

Advanced Certification in Homeland Security by completing the courses and examinations for

CHS—Level IV and CHS—Level V Registration Information: (Please type or print) Name______________________________________ Designation____________________ Member ID#__________

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Note: You must be CHS-III to take the course and exam for CHS-IV. You may enroll in both the CHS-IV and CHS-V courses. However, you cannot earn CHS-V status unless you successfully complete BOTH courses. If you are not already Certified in Homeland Security, please call (800) 423-9737, ext. 220 for more information.

Certified in Homeland Security courses offered at the Atlanta Regional Conference ❏ CHS-IV course: Incident Command Management and Terrorism Course and Testing: January 21, 2005 Note: You must be Certified in Homeland Security at Level III to take the CHS-IV Course and Exam

After 11/22/04

Total

$425

$_________

$495

$_________

❏ CHS-V course: CBRNE Preparedness Course and Testing: January 22, 2005

Note: You must be CHS-III to take the course and exam for CHS-IV. You may enroll in both the CHS-IV and CHS-V courses. However, you cannot earn CHS-V status unless you successfully complete BOTH courses.

Payment Processing ❏ Check enclosed ❏ American Express

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Card Number:____________________________________ Exp.: Name (as it appears on card): Signature:___________________________________________________________ All requests for cancellation must be made to ACFEI headquarters in writing by fax or mail. Phone cancellations will not be accepted. All cancelled/refunded registrations will be assessed a $50 administrative fee. Refunds are pro-rated as follows: Prior January 1, 2005, 50% refund; NO cash refunds after January 1, 2005. The performance of this conference is subject to the acts of God, war, government regulation, disaster, strikes, civil disorder, curtailment of transportation facilities or any other emergency making it impossible to hold the conference. In the event of such occurrences, credit vouchers will be issued in lieu of cash. Conference schedule is subject to change.

Special Services: ❑ Please check here if you require special accommodations to participate in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Attach a written description of your needs.

Please be prepared to show photo identification upon arrival at the conference.

REGISTER TODAY! Fax: (417) 881-4702 Online: www.acfei.com Mail to: 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804 Phone: (800) 423-9737

This conference will be held at Peachtree City’s exclusive Wyndham Peachtree Conference Center (and hotel), which is surrounded by 19 scenic wooded acres. To make your hotel reservations call (800)-Wyndham and mention the group code “ACFEI” to receive the best rates.

ACFEI Announces the All-New CMI, Cr.FA, CFC, and CFN Membership Directory ACFEI is excited to announce the newest benefit offered to our members: the allnew CMI, Cr.FA, CFC, and CFN Membership Directory! This easy-to-navigate online directory allows ACFEI members to locate fellow members who are certified through one of ACFEI’s Certification Programs, including the following:

ACFEI NEWS Forensic Case Profile Tell The Forensic Examiner about your most fascinating case!

The Forensic Examiner and ACFEI want to know about your most fascinating forensic case. The most informative, intriguing, and unusual cases will be published in upcoming issues of The Forensic Examiner and on ACFEI’s website, so submit your forensic case profile now!

Submissions should explain the nature of the case (protecting confidentiality as necessary) and how the author and others used forensic knowledge and techniques to solve it. Please also include a short biography about yourself, along with any supporting materials such a photographs.

Cases from all forensic specialties are invited, including: • Forensic medicine • Document examination • Forensic psychology • Recorded and digital evidence • Forensic nursing • Computers and forensics • Forensic accounting • Law enforcement • Forensic counseling and social work • Forensic examination • Crime scene investigation • Forensic anthropology • Forensic etymology • Forensic dentistry Submit your case via e-mail to editor@acfei.com (please include the subject line: most fascinating case).

• Certified Medical Investigator®, CMI • Certified Forensic Accountant, Cr.FA • Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC • Certified Forensic Nurse, CFN This directory was designed to facilitate exclusive networking opportunities between our members from specific disciplines and areas of professional expertise.

ACFEI members who hold CMI, Cr.FA, CFC, or CFN certification will be listed in the Membership Directory free of charge. To use the Directory, log on to the Members Only section at www.acfei.com.

Take Advantage of Networking Opportunities Through ACFEI’s Online Forums Have you taken part in ACFEI’s Online Forums yet? The Online Forums, accessible from the Members Only section of ACFEI’s website, allows you to network with fellow ACFEI members from all across the nation. ACFEI Board members

are also encouraged to use these forums to collaborate with fellow Board members.

Log on today to www.acfei.com (enter the ‘Members Only’ section, then click ‘Online Forums’) to take part in this great member benefit, then share your ideas, questions, or opinions with your fellow ACFEI members!

Outstanding ACFEI Members Honored at 2005 National Conference Several individuals were honored for their contributions to ACFEI and the field of forensics at the 2005 National Conference in Chicago. Dr. Michael Karagiozis and Richard Sgaglio were recognized with ACFEI’s Distinguished Member Award in honor of their dedication to excellence within their fields and for serving as outstanding representatives of our organization. John Bridges, III, Rusty Rooms, and Jamie Ferrell were honored with the Distinguished Board Service Award in recognition of the numerous contributions they have made to ACFEI through their guidance, leadership, and vision. Finally, the CHS Preparation & Response Team Achievement Award was given to John Huffman for coordinating proactive participation in CHS P&R Teams and for building connections between the CHS program and Homeland Security leaders and government representatives.

For more information and to view pictures from the conference awards banquet, log on to www.acfei.com.

Left to right: Dr. Mike Baer and Chief Association Officer Brent McCoy join the following ACFEI award-winners at conference banquet: John Huffman, John Bridges, III, Dr. Mike Karagiozis, Richard Sgaglio, Jamie Ferrell, and Rusty Rooms.

48 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Four Prominent Homeland Security Professionals Added to the American Board for Certification in Homeland Security The American Board for Certification in Homeland Security (ABCHS) and the Certified in Homeland Security (CHS) program are proud to introduce four new ABCHS Executive Advisory Board members.

land Security and Defense responsibilities. Prior to joining the SAIC, Col. Johnson served as Director of the Center for Domestic Preparedness within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and served as the Senior Executive Advisor to the Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness on all matters pertaining to the domestic preparedness national training program.

Herman C. Statum, M.S., CPP, CHS-V

Edward W. Wallace, Counter Terrorism Bureau/Crime Scene Unit, NYPD, BA, MA, SCSA, LPI, CFI I & II, CLEI, CTO, CDHSI, HAZMAT Specialist, CHS-V

Herman C. Statum is the Security Account Manager for Deloitte and Touche. Statum has extensive military experience, having served as the Operations Officer for the International Police at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, and as a Branch Chief at the Headquarters of the Department of the Army Law Enforcement Division in the Pentagon. Statum also served as the Executive Director of the Pentagon Headquarters’ Department of the Army’s Physical Security Review Board, the Army Secretary’s leading group for managing the continuous protection of personnel, facilities, data systems, and WMD worldwide. Statum also served as a senior consultant with the Booz-Allen and Hamilton Consulting Firm in the development of a comprehensive security system for the U.S. Navy’s newest TRIDENT nuclear submarine base.

Colonel LZ Johnson, Special Forces, U.S. Army (Ret.), CHS-V

Colonel LZ Johnson is the Corporate Vice President of Homeland Security Programs for the Applied Technology Business Unit of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where he is responsible for identifying and qualifying new opportunities for Applied Technology Business Unit services within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies with Home-

Edward W. Wallace is President of Finest Forensic Consultants, L.L.C., and has served with the Counter Terrorism Bureau/Crime Scene Unit of the New York City Police Department. Wallace also serves as Adjunct Instructor and Consultant for the Center for Domestic Preparedness (EAI Corporation), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Adjunct Instructor/Training Course Developer for the Louisiana State University National Center for Biomedical Research Training Academy of CounterTerrorist Education, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The American Board for Certification in Homeland Security Announces Advanced Levels of Certification in Homeland Security, CHS-IV and CHS-V

The American Board for Certification in Homeland Security (ABCHS) and the Certified in Homeland Security (CHS) program are proud to announce the development of two new levels of advanced Certification in Homeland Security, CHS Level-IV (CHS-IV) and CHS Level-V (CHS-V)! CHS-IV and CHS-V are designed for senior-level Homeland Security professionals, and are attainable only through the successful completion of in-depth Homeland Security courses and examinations provided by elite CHS instructors.

For more information on this exciting development in the CHS program call Member Services at (800) 423-9737.

Robert B. Silver, Ph.D., B.S., CHS-V

Dr. Robert Silver is a renowned scientist with an extensive career in the scientific arena. He is a Professor in the Biomedical Engineering Department at the Wayne State University College of Engineering, and is a Professor in the Radiology, Pharmacology, and Physiology Departments in the Wayne State University School of Medicine. He is also CoChair of the Integrative Cancer Biology Program and is a member of the Chicago Preparedness for Biological Incidents and Unusual Disease Outbreaks Detection Technologies Working Group.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 49

By Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, DABFM, DAPA On November 28, 1976, shortly after midnight, Dallas Police Officer Robert Wood and his partner, Officer Turko, made a routine traffic stop of a car driving without headlights. Officer Wood approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and was shot five times, dying on the spot. Officer Turko fired several shots as the car sped off, but she was not able to get the car’s license plate number. She saw only the driver in the car.

Over the next few days, 300 miles away, 16-year-old David Ray Harris bragged to friends that he “off ’d a pig,” showing them a gun he claimed was the murder weapon. Within days of the murder, Harris was pulled over and arrested for driving a stolen vehicle. During the investigation, officers heard of Harris’ boasting but, when questioned, he claimed he was just trying to impress his friends. Investigators soon learned that the stolen car matched the vehicle used in the Dallas murder and that the gun Harris was showing around (which he had stolen from his father) was the exact gun that killed Officer Wood.

When confronted with the ballistics report, Harris changed his story, claiming he was present for the murder but did not commit it. According to Harris, Officer Wood was killed by Randall

Dale Adams, a hitchhiker Harris had picked up on the afternoon of the offense. Having passed a polygraph, Harris was not charged and received immunity in exchange for his testimony against Adams.

On the afternoon of November 27th, Adams (a 27-year-old veteran with no prior record) was walking down a major Dallas street, having just run out of gas.

He was offered a ride by Harris (who was driving the stolen vehicle) and the two ended up spending the afternoon together smoking marijuana, drinking beer, and pawning stolen items Harris had with him. That evening they went to an adult drive-in theater, and then Harris dropped Adams off at the motel where he had been staying.

When Adams was brought in for questioning, he denied any knowledge of the crime. He took a polygraph and remained resolute in proclaiming his innocence even when told he had failed the test and Harris had passed. Adams did, however, sign a statement outlining his activities during the hours before the murder, which included a sentence indicating he had been near the intersection of the shooting. While Adams later claimed that sentence was an error, police presented it as an admission of guilt.

50 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Due Process With no physical evidence against Adams, at trial the prosecution presented Adams’ signed statement, Harris (the crux of their case), Officer Turko, and three additional eyewitnesses. Officer Turko testified that the person she saw in the car had hair the same color as Adams’ and was wearing a coat with a fur collar.

(Adams did not own such a coat, but Harris acknowledged that he did and that he was wearing the coat at the time of the offense.) One of the three remaining witnesses, Michael Randall, stated he drove by the scene as the officers stopped the car, which he claimed held two people whom he identified as Harris and Adams. The last two eyewitnesses, Robert and Emily Miller, claimed only Adams was in the car.

Neither the Millers nor Randall were disclosed to the defense prior to their in-court testimony. Adams had taken the stand in his own defense, and the prosecution claimed these witnesses were called to rebut his testimony and as such, under Texas law, the prosecution was not required to reveal the witnesses in advance. During the weekend following the Miller’s testimony, the defense learned Emily Miller had originally told police that the man she saw in the car was either a light-skinned African American man or Mexican man. The next Monday when the defense asked to recall her, they were informed by the prosecution the Millers’ had moved to Illinois (they had actually moved within Dallas) and the judge refused to admit Emily Miller’s initial statement into evidence on grounds that an attempt to impeach her when she was unavailable would be “unfair.”

In April 1977, after brief deliberation, the jury convicted Randall Dale Adams

of capital murder for the shooting death of Officer Wood.

The Dangers of Sentencing In order to impose the death penalty, the Texas jury had to be convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt” there was a “probability” Adams would commit future acts of violence. As such, during the sentencing hearing, the prosecution called Dr. James Grigson, a Dallas psychiatrist who testified that Adams had a “sociopathic personality disorder” and was “at the very extreme, worse or severe end of the scale.” Grigson opined Adams would “continue his previous behavior,” that his behavior would “ascent,” and that he may kill again. According to Grigson, “nothing known in the world today” could change Adams.

In addition to Grigson, the prosecution called Dr. John Holbrook (the former chief of psychiatry for the Texas Department of Corrections) who also concluded that Adams would be a danger to society unless executed. Again with brief deliberation, the jury found Adams qualified for capital punishment, and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty. In January 1979 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence, setting May 8, 1979 as Adams’ execution date.

Three days before his execution, Adams was granted a stay by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who formed the opinion that prospective jurors with ethical qualms regarding the death penalty had been excluded from service. These potential jurors were excluded despite their stated commitment to follow Texas law, therefore in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). On June 25, 1980, in an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that Adams was entitled to a new trial. The Dallas District Attorney, Henry Wade (of Roe v. Wade),

announced the state’s intention to retry the case. However, three days later, on the basis that a new trial would be a waste of money, Wade successfully petitioned then-Governor Bill Clements to commute Adams’ sentence to life without parole. With the death penalty no longer an issue, Wade concluded the error in jury selection was no longer relevant and therefore, there was no basis for a new trial. The Appellate Court concurred with Wade, leaving Adams to serve a life sentence.

The Big Picture In April 1985, filmmaker Errol Morris arrived in Dallas with the intention of making a documentary on Dr. James Grigson, who had become known as “Dr. Death” for having testified regarding future dangerousness in over 160 cases,

including over 100 in which the defendant was sentenced to death based on his predictive conclusions. Morris had planned to raise issues surrounding psychiatric conclusions that execution was required to prevent future violence by defendants, not to question the guilt of individual defendants about whom Grigson testified. As part of his research, Morris interviewed Randy Schaffer, a Houston attorney who had volunteered his services on Adams’ behalf since 1982, and the focus of his documentary shifted.

In 1988 the documentary The Thin Blue

Line, based on Adams’ story, was released.

Through research and interviews, Morris learned the prosecution had suppressed evidence that was favorable to Adams (in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), had knowingly used perjured testimony to gain a conviction, and had deceived the court.

Also uncovered was the fact Officer Turko had been hypnotized during the initial investigation and had originally been unable to identify the killer. In addition, it was discovered that Emily Miller had been promised that the robbery charges her daughter was facing in an unrelated matter would be dropped if Miller identified Adams as the killer (she did, and they were).

Morris also acquired compelling information regarding Harris and his behavior subsequent to Adams’ trial. Specifically, Harris had joined the Army and, while stationed in Germany, was convicted in military court of a series of burglaries and sentenced to time in Leavenworth. A few months after his release and dishonorable discharge, Harris was convicted in California of kidnapping, armed robbery, and several other crimes for which he was sentenced to 6 1/2 years in the California Department of Corrections. His sentence was extended by 2 years when, while incarcerated, he was convicted of “possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner.”

After his release, Harris (then age 24) returned to Texas. Just before dawn on September 1, 1985, he broke into Mark Mays’ apartment. Armed, he woke Mays and his girlfriend, Rosanne Lockard, ordered Mays to lock himself into a hallway bathroom, and led Lockard out to his truck in the apartment complex parking lot. In order to prevent the kidnapping, Mays grabbed his own gun, ran to the lot, and began shooting. Lockard escaped in the crossfire, Harris was wounded, and Mays was killed by multi-

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 51

ple rounds from Harris’ gun, one of which was shot from very close range while Mays was already down. Four days later, Harris was arrested for the murder. In April 1986, he was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death.

Final Judgment This new evidence became the basis for Adams’ motion for a new trial. A 3-day hearing on the motion was held before District Court Judge Larry Baraka who, on December 2, 1988, recommended the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals grant Adams a new trial. Going one step further, on January 30, 1989, Baraka wrote to the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole recommending Adams be immediately paroled, a recommendation the Board refused. However, on March 1, 1989, in Ex parte Adams v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 768 S.W.2d 281 (1989), the Court concurred unanimously with Baraka and essentially demanded Adams be retried. This, only after Harris (who was already on death row for the Mays murder) had attested to Adams’ innocence and his own guilt in the 1976 slaying of Officer Wood during the hearing on Adams’ writ of habeas corpus.

On March 20, 1989, three weeks after the Appeals Court’s decision was made public, Randall Dale Adams was released on his own recognizance. Three days after that, John Vance, who had succeeded Henry Wade as Dallas’ District Attorney, dropped all charges against Adams.

Adams had come within 3 days of execution and served over 12 years on the basis of his predicted dangerous. Subsequent to his exoneration, Adams wrote a book about his experience, Adams v. Texas, and became a passionate advocate for a moratorium on the death penalty.

In September 1989, David Ray Harris’ conviction and death sentence were upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and, with all available appeals subsequently denied, on June 30, 2004, at the age of 43, Harris was executed by

lethal injection for the 1985 murder of Mark Mays.

Dangerous Decisions Legal error and prosecutorial misconduct aside, Adams faced lethal injection only because he was found to be potentially dangerous. Texas—which leads the nation in executions—is one of two states (Oregon being the other) that legislatively allows “future dangerousness” to play a deciding role in whether individuals convicted of capital offenses receive the death penalty. Of the 38 death penalty states, on paper 29 do not allow testimony regarding future violence. However, in many states with such a ban, testimony regarding a defendant’s potential for further crimes of violence is regularly addressed at sentencing and is a key factor in jury deliberation.

Guarded with protecting society, with good reason the legal and penal systems have long been concerned with identifying those defendants and inmates who represent a continuing threat to society.

Future dangerousness is taken into consideration not only when sentencing violent offenders, but also when classifying inmates, when considering suitability for release, and at parole. Under involuntary commitment statutes, determining dangerousness is a vital component of evaluations for civil commitment. Psychiatrists and psychologists (particularly those with a forensic practice) must identify interventions and social situations most likely to lower (and conversely increase) the likelihood of future violence by a client.

Approaching Danger The most common means of determining dangerousness are clinical analysis and actuarial or statistical prediction.1 Clinical analysis depends on the subjective judgment of the clinician, the accuracy of which is influenced by bias, training, and experience (or lack thereof ) with particular types of crime, and theoretical orientation. Theories abound regarding

52 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

what underlies violent behavior and what leads to change. Different professional orientations can result in two clinicians making different predictions regarding the same offender’s future dangerousness; in fact, there are high rates of disagreement even within shared orientations. Research has shown that neither the amount of training nor the amount of available client information is related to judgment accuracy, although the latter is correlated with prediction confidence.2 Actuarial or statistical predictions, made by comparing factors in the case at hand with averaged data from prior “matched” offenders, includes both static factors (e.g., age, offense history, abuse history, etc.) and dynamic factors (e.g., attitude, interpersonal relationships, treatment progress, etc.). For example, if data suggest X% of released offenders with no employment and a history of childhood physical abuse will be detained for future crimes, the person in question (with the same characteristics) has the same X% chance of re-offending.

The vulnerability in this approach is that the factors are not weighted, thereby not allowing for the fact that a single dynamic factor can often outweigh a multitude of static factors.

While research has shown actuarial predictions using only the client’s history of violence are more reliable than clinical predictions, most courts seem to prefer clinical predictions of future dangerousness.3 In fact, neither approach—clinical or statistical—has proven accurate.

Associated Dangers The only consistently proven factor for predicting future dangerousness is prior acts of violence.4 Using that “soft indicator,” the Canadian parole system found those rape, homicide, and assault offenders with three same or similar prior convictions had re-offend-rates of 17.6%; those with a history of five such offenses had repeat rates of 27.6%. In other words, even the most repetitive offenders

only re-offended on release approximately one quarter of the time, with predictions being wrong 75% of the time.5 Some of the many traits and factors associated with violence (but unreliable predictors) include the nature and gravity of the instant offense, callousness, conceit and feelings of superiority, finding enjoyment in teasing others, and lack of empathy.6 Diagnosed alcoholics have a violence-prevalence rate 12-times higher than non-alcoholics, while diagnosed drug abusers have a 16-times higher rate than non-abusers.7 Persons diagnosed with serious mental illness have a prevalence rate of general violence over 5times higher than that of non-mentally ill persons.7 As pertains to homicide, though over-represented in the media, severe mental illness is under-represented and, when present, no single diagnosis is predominant. While the presence of a mental disorder can be an accurate predictor of present dangerousness, it does not accurately predict future violence because of symptom fluctuation and treatment effects.

Violence is generally considered to be the result of the interplay between numerous situational, psychological, and social factors. Those factors that combine to produce violent behavior in one person might not have the same effect on another. It follows that instruments designed for the express purpose of predicting dangerousness yield anywhere from a 60-70% rate of false positives.8 Some suggest that future assessment devices, regardless how sophisticated, will be no better than chance at predicting dangerousness.

Risky Predictions As early as the 1970s, mental health practitioners have asserted that the profession lacks the capacity to predict the likelihood of future violence. It was thought that continued attempts to do so would ultimately result in the abolishment of civil commitment laws. To the contrary, from a 1983 Texas case, the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled that testimony regarding future dangerousness was constitutional.9 That same year, after the attempted assassination of President Reagan, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) formally declared, “psychiatrists have no special knowledge or ability with which to predict dangerousness.”10 So, while constitutional, future violence testimony is unethical.

The APA went so far as to take the position that when psychiatrists are asked or required by law to predict dangerousness, there should be no attached liability in the event the client subsequently behaves violently. While expert witnesses might not be held civilly liable for their testimony regarding dangerousness, perjury charges could technically be brought against professionals for offering opinions with no credible scientific foundation.11 Practitioners can be (and have been) sued for malpractice and held to negligence standards when predictions of dangerousness were proved to be erroneous. For example, if during the process of civil commitment a mental health practitioner discharges the patient prior to the probable cause hearing and that patient goes on to commit a violent act, the practitioner would undoubtedly be judged negligent.

Significant moral, social, legal, and professional stakes are routinely placed on a “method” that has exceptionally poor reliability and validity. Despite the fact that many consider predicting violence nothing more than “junk science,” there exists a tendency on the part of professionals to over-predict dangerousness.

Failing to identify a dangerous individual will have stark social consequences and probable professional implications. A false positive prediction may have no consequences for the professional, but can result in confinement or detention (and perhaps execution) of the individual, a multitude of losses for significant others, and diffuse but definite social and economic costs for society at large.

References 1. Adair, D.N. (1993).

The determination of dangerousness. Federal Probation, 57(1), 74-79.

2. Quinsey, V. L., & Maguire, A. (1986). Maximum security psychiatric patients: Actuarial and clinical predictions of dangerousness. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1(2), 143-171.

3. Bartol, C. R., & Bartol, A. M. (1994). Psychology and law (2nd ed.). Pacific Grove: Brooks Cole Publishing.

4. Monahan, J. (1988). Risk assessment of violence amount the mentally disordered generating useful knowledge. Int J Law Psychiatry, 11, 249257.

5. Montgomery, B., & Wilson, P. R. (1998).

Predicting dangerousness. Discussion paper, Bond University, Australia.

6. Salekin, R.T., et al. (2003). Predicting dangerousness with two million adolescent clinical inventory psychopathy scales: The importance of egocentric and callous traits. J Personality Assessment, 80 (2), 154-163.

7. Ward, A., & Dockerill, J. (1999). The predictive accuracy of the violent offender treatment program risk assessment scale. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 26 (1), 125-140.

8. Petherick, W. (2004). Predicting the dangerousness of criminals. http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminal_mind/pro filing/danger/1.html?sect=20.

9. Barefoot v Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).

10. American Psychiatric Association. (1988).

APA to update position on predicting dangerousness. Psychiatric News. Washington DC. 11. Dyer v Dyer. 156 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn.

1941).

About the Author Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM, DAPA, is a Fellow in the American College of Forensic Examiners and is a member of the Executive Board of Forensic Examiners for the American Board of Forensic Examiners. Dr. Gross is also a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners, the American Board of Forensic Medicine, and the American Board Psychological Specialties. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1996. Additionally, Dr. Gross is a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 53

By Paul R. Edholm, Jr., FACFEI, Forensic Document Examiner As a forensic document examiner, I examine questioned documents and compare them to known exemplars. The following is an example of a cold case that I was asked to solve by the use of handwriting examination.

The Crimes Occur It was 11:45 p.m. on July 21, 1957, and a 1949 metallic blue Ford 4-door sedan owned by Roy Jones was parked in “lover’s lane” in the oil field on Van Ness in Hawthorne, California. The car was occupied by four teenagers, two young men, aged 16 and 17, and two young women, both 15.

The vehicle was approached on the driver’s side by a lone gunman (described later as a white male in his early 20s with blonde hair and a slight Southern accent) carrying a nine shot .22 caliber H&R revolver. He told the four teenagers to pay attention, and that they were being robbed. He further stated, “All I want is your money, I won’t hurt you.”

He entered the driver’s door and had the driver and the female passenger in the front seat move over. He proceeded to drive the car to a more secluded area in the Hawthorne oil fields (property owned by Northrop Corporation) and then, using the shirts taken off the two boys, he bound the teenagers’ hands behind their backs and began taping (with adhesive tape) the eyes and mouths of three of the minors (both of the young

men and one of the young women, who made the sign of the cross). The boys were forced to lie on the rear floorboards of the car, and the girl in the backseat was ordered to lie back. The suspect then proceeded to rape the second 15-year-old girl who was sitting in the front seat. He did not rape the girl in the rear seat who had made the sign of the cross.

At approximately 12:50 a.m. he told all of the victims to undress. He then collected the adhesive tape and their bindings and fled the location in the vehicle, leaving the teenagers stranded.

He took two watches and billfolds containing between $15 and $20 each in the robbery.

At approximately 1:28 a.m. on July 22, 1957, the suspect, in the unreported stolen vehicle, ran a red light at the intersection of Rosecrans Avenue and Sepulveda Boulevard (approximately 5.5 miles from the Hawthorne crime scene). Officers Richard Phillips, age 28, and Milton Curtis, age 25, of the El Segundo Police Department (ESPD) pursued the vehicle until it pulled over at Rosecrans and Pacific, a semi-rural road fringed with trees, fields, and a vast Standard Oil refinery. The suspect exited the stolen vehicle as a second ESPD unit arrived.

Officers Porter and Gilbert, in the second police car, observed the lone suspect standing in front of Phillips and Curtis, speaking to them. Officers Porter and Gilbert waited to determine if the first officers on the scene were “Code 4”

54 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

(everything was O.K.). Officers Phillips and Curtis waived the second ESPD unit off, indicating that they were “Code 4.”

Phillips and Curtis were unaware that just prior to their contact, the armed suspect had committed robbery, sexual assault, kidnapping, and vehicle theft in the City of Hawthorne. Within a minute-and-a-half, Officer Phillips had been shot three times. He managed to return fire three times at the suspect and stolen vehicle—one bullet struck the suspect and one left a bullet strike-mark on the vehicle. Officer Curtis, who had also been shot three times, made it back to the radio and put out a call, “Officers shot!” and “Send… ambulance.”

The suspect got back into the stolen vehicle and drove away, abandoning it approximately four blocks (.21 miles) from the site of the traffic stop/shooting.

He fled on foot into the darkness, escaping through Manhattan Beach by hopping fences and crossing yards.

Officers Porter and Gilbert rushed back to the scene they had left moments earlier. There they found Curtis dead and Phillips mortally wounded and groping for the car radio. Phillips later died while en route to the hospital.

Both officers left behind widows and young children.

A Dead End Thousands of “tips” were investigated and numerous individuals were checked and cleared during the exhaustive investigation that followed, which investigators worked day and night for two years.

The clothing used to tie up the victims was recovered at the first crime scene, and all of the victims assisted in the creation of composite drawings of the suspect. Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Deputy Howard Speaks dusted the stolen vehicle for fingerprints and obtained two partial prints from the steering wheel and dusty door and one from a chrome strip inside the vehicle. The victims’ fingerprints were eliminated, and the prints recovered were not identifiable. At this point the investigation stalled.

Evidence Appears In August of 1957, Mr. Tuley, a resident of the 500 block of 33rd Street in Manhattan Beach found two watches in his back yard. Unsure of where they had come from, he stuck them in his garage and forgot about them.

In April of 1959, he found the frame of a .22 caliber H&R revolver. He threw this in his garage with the watches. In March of 1960, his son, while rototilling Tuley’s yard, found the cylinder of the revolver, which contained six shell casings, one live cartridge, and two empty chambers. Mr. Tuley now believed it was time to call the El Segundo Police Department.

The robbery victims identified the two watches, and the one live cartridge was consistent with the ammunition used to kill the two police officers. Ballistics was completed, and the forensic testing revealed that this revolver was the murder weapon used in the slayings of Officers Phillips and Curtis. El Segundo detectives traced the revolver (serial

number 817459) to a Sears store in Shreveport, Louisiana. It had been purchased on July 18, 1957, (4 days before the murder) by an individual using the false name of G.D. Wilson (using the address of a gravel pit for the purchase).

Detectives checked the area surrounding the Sears store and found that a George D. Wilson had checked into the YMCA next to the Sears store the day before the gun was purchased and had signed the

guest registry using a fictitious address of 2306 NW 34th Street, Miami, Florida.

A photostatic copy of the registration card was obtained as evidence under that name.

So it was believed that the individual using the name of George D. Wilson was responsible for the murders. Over a hundred individuals bearing that name were checked out and eliminated as suspects, and the investigation stalled again.

The last time ESPD reviewed the case was in 1997, with no additional information or leads.

A Break in the Case Then, in September of 2002, ESPD was contacted regarding new information on the case: a deathbed admission from an individual who stated he knew who had committed the murders. The lead sounded hot, but it ended in disappointment when the individual named in the deathbed admission was quickly eliminated. However, this tip caused the detectives to review the entire case file again. They asked the LA County Sheriff ’s Criminalistics Laboratory to reexamine the fingerprints lifted from the vehicle back in 1957.

A relatively new fingerprint database was now available; known by the FBI as AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System), it contained over 44 million fingerprints.

New advances in fingerprint technology (as of February 2002) allowed investigators to stitch together the two partial thumbprints (which in and of themselves were not identifiable) into a digital composite, which became one identifiable thumbprint. This thumbprint was run through AFIS, which produced a hit: Gerald Fatten Mason. Once the match was made to the partial prints, not just the composite, three fingerprint experts compared the prints to Mason’s.

They all agreed the prints were his by matching them to the fingerprints taken from Mason when he was sent to prison in 1956 for commercial burglary and forgery.

Armed with this information, detectives began checking out Mason, a 68year-old white man living in Columbia, South Carolina. He was a retired gas station owner, and it was believed that he could have an affirmative defense in court; by stating that as a mechanic he worked on the car, he could explain why his prints were found there. Thus,

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 55

investigators knew they would need more evidence.

Mason’s 1956 booking photo was obtained and compared to the composite drawings, and ultimately this photo was placed in a six-pack lineup and shown to the surviving victims from the first crime scene (one of the victims had died). None of the victims could identify him from the photo lineup. However, Officer Porter stated that he believed Mason was the man he saw standing alone with Phillips and Curtis at the location of the murder.

The detectives and the District Attorney wanted more evidence before the case would be filed and an arrest made.

Detectives obtained the documents regarding the purchase of the gun from Shreveport, Louisiana, and the YMCA documents, and began to amass a collection of Mason’s handwriting and hand printing obtained from a South Carolina DMV from 1999.

Deputy District Attorney Darren Levine (who specializes in crimes against police officers) had used my services as a forensic document examiner previously in the investigation of a murder of a Los Angeles Police Officer and had obtained a conviction in that case. Edholm met with the DA, El Segundo Detectives, and LASO Detectives at the El Segundo Police Department on October 24, 2002.

Due to the fact that the YMCA document was a photostatic copy (essentially a paper negative with a black background and white letters—there were no photocopy machines in 1957), I used the computer program Adobe Photoshop to reverse the image so that the background became white and the letters black. Now a more conclusive examination could be made. I compared a Report of Eye Examination from the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (dated in 1999) to the 1957 YMCA document. Due to the fact that only photocopies were available, I could give only a qualified highly probable

opinion (99.9%) that the hand printing on both documents was written by the same person (Gerald Mason).

Now, with the fingerprint evidence, photo lineup, and handwriting evidence, the case was presented to the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Crimes Against Peace Officers Unit, for the filing of criminal charges against Mason. On January 24, 2003, a complaint was filed charging Mason with two counts of murder, one count of rape, five counts of kidnapping, and four counts of robbery.

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David Wesley issued a no-bail warrant for Mason’s arrest.

LASO Homicide Detectives Dan McElderry and Kevin Lowe responded to Columbia, South Carolina, and placed Mason under arrest just days before his 69th birthday. It was noted at the time of his arrest at his home that Mason had sustained a gunshot wound, and a DNA swab was taken from his mouth. He was booked at the Richland County Jail pending extradition.

DNA was not expected to play a role in the case due to the fact that the rape kit had been lost. However, DNA had been recovered from the clothing used to bind the robbery victims, and DNA testing was pending since investigators did not know whether the DNA belonged to the suspect or to one of the victims. Mason’s attorney argued that the DNA swab taken from Mason at his home was an illegal search, thereby obtaining a temporary restraining order to halt testing of the sample.

When Mason was brought to court again, his attorney announced that he would fight extradition, so LASO detectives began the process of obtaining a Governor’s Warrant so they could bring

him back to California without his permission. Mason now faced a possible life sentence without the possibility of parole. He would not face the death penalty; prosecutors could not seek it because the death penalty statute in effect in California in 1957 was overturned and later replaced.

A search of Mason’s home revealed that Mason had applied for Belgian citizenship during the last two years, and additional handwriting evidence was obtained as well and was submitted to me for examination.

On Friday, March 21, 2003, Mason decided to confess to all of the charges and waive extradition. He was flown back to Los Angeles on that same day.

All evidence was presented to Mason’s lawyer as part of the discovery process before Mason entered a plea. On Monday, March 24, 2003, in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Mason admitted to purchasing the gun under the false name and address; to filling out the YMCA registration under the false name and address; to committing the robbery, rape, kidnapping, and grand theft auto; and to murdering the two El Segundo Police Officers.

Mason was sentenced to two life terms in prison, and after 46 years, justice was served.

Note: The information listed here was obtained from the police ‘Murder Book’, various newspaper and magazine articles, interviews, and personal notes pursuant to my own investigation as one of the members of the investigative team.

About the Author Paul R. Edholm, Jr., FACFEI, FDE, is a Fellow in the American College of Forensic Examiners and has been a member since 1993. Edholm is a forensic document examiner and a retired detective with the Beverly Hills Police Department.

Have you worked on a fascinating case? Share your story with your fellow ACFEI members! For more information or to submit your Forensic Case Profile send an e-mail to editor@acfei.com

56 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION 1. Publication Title: The Forensic Examiner 2. Publication Number: 1084-5569 3. Filing Date: August 27, 2004 4. Issue Frequency: Quarterly 5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 4 6. Annual Subscription Price: $130.00 7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804 8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters of General Business Office of Publisher: 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804 9. Full Names & Complete Mailing Addresses of Publisher, Editor, & Managing Editor: Publisher: Robert L. O’Block, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804; Editor: Heather Blades, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804; Managing Editor: None 10. Owner: The American College of Forensic Examiners International, 2750 E.Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804 11. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, & Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities: None 12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at nonprofit rates) The purpose, function, & nonprofit status of this organization & the exempt status for federal income tax purposes: Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months 13. Publication Title: The Forensic Examiner 14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: September 2004 15. Extent & Nature of Circulation: Average No. No. Copies of Copies Each Single Issue Issue During Published Preceding 12 Nearest to Months Filing Date 11,910 a. Total # of Copies (Net Press Run) 12,000 b. Paid &/or Requested Circulation (1) Paid/Requested Outside-County Mail Subscriptions Stated on Form 3541 (Include advertiser’s proof & 9,215 exchange copies 9,484 (2) Paid In-County Subscriptions Stated on Form 3541 (Include advertiser’s 19 proof & exchange copies) 19 (3) Sales Through Dealers & Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, & 213 Other Non-USPS Paid Distribution 400 (4) Other Classes Mailed Through the 0 USPS 0 c. Total Paid &/or Requested Circulation 9,447 [Sum of 15b. (1), (2), (3), & (4)] 9,884 d. Free Distribution by Mail (Samples, complimentary, & other free) 1) Outside-County as Stated on Form 0 3541 0 0 (2) In County as Stated on Form 3541 0 (3) Other Classes Mailed Through the 1,800 USPS 1,800 0 e. Free Distribution Outside the Mail 0 f. Total Free Distribution (Sum of 15d. & 1,800 15e.)

1,800 11,247 g. Total Distribution (Sum of 15c. & 15f.)

11,684 663 h. Copies Not Distributed 316 11,910 i. Total (Sum of 15g. & 15h.)

12,000 j. Percent Paid &/or Requested Circula84% tion (15c./ 15g. x 100) 85% 16. Publication of Statement of Ownership: Publication required. Will be printed in the Winter 2004 issue of this publication.

17. Signature & Title of Editor: (Signed) Heather Blades, Editor (Date) 9/27/04. I Certify that all information furnished on this form is true & complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (including fines & imprisonment) &/or civil sanctions (including civil penalties).

People want a true, straight-talking, plain-speaking, “Don’t tell me what you think I want to hear, tell me what I need to hear,” biblically accurate interpretation and exposition of God’s Word.

The 150 topics covered by Word Pictures meet this desire with high-end visuals and contemporary illustrations that bring the Bible to life before the viewer’s eyes.

May God bless the truth to your soul through this amazing one-of-a-kind Bible teaching series.

Phone: 1-877-CROSSTV Email: production@crosstv.com

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 57

Recent Publications By ACFEI Members A Handbook for Psychological Fitness-for-Duty Evaluations in Law Enforcement Cary D. Rostow, PhD, DABPS, and Robert D. Davis, PhD, DABPS, present a comprehensive overview of the foremost issues in law enforcement today in their wellresearched text, A Handbook for Psychological Fitness-for-Duty Evaluations in Law Enforcement. An examination of police culture and police psychology guides the reader to understand assessment issues in law enforcement, such as police-specific psychological assessment, treatment, and special psychotherapy issues in police settings. The mechanics, processes, and necessity of fitness-forduty evaluations (FFDE) are outlined, and forensic issues inherent in FFDE, including liability, expert witness laws, and related federal laws, are examined.

FFDE guidelines, an FFDE regulations model, and a template FFDE report will be especially useful to law enforcement agencies, as will the glossary, which provides a quick reference on the terms, laws, and topics encountered in the field of police psychology.

Dr. Cary Rostow is a licensed clinical psychologist in Baton Rouge, La., and has performed hundreds of fitness-forduty evaluations. Dr. Robert D. Davis is a police and criminal psychologist in Baton Rouge, La. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1999.

A Handbook for Psychological Fitness-for-Duty Evaluations in Law Enforcement by Dr. Cary D. Rostow and Dr. Robert D. Davis is available through The Haworth Press, Inc., 10 Alice Street, Binghamton, NY 13904-1580; www.HaworthPress.com.; hardbound ISBN 0-7890-2397-0; softbound ISBN 0-78902396-2.

The Internet Project Manager: Practitioner’s Desk Reference The Internet Project Manager: Practitioner’s Desk Reference by Edward B. Farkas, B.Sc. CHS-I, MIEE, PMP, is a step-bystep guide to managing complex web-based projects. Web developers, programmers, and project managers will benefit greatly from this resource. The first section of the book examines the project life cycle, with project management strategies for time management and work scheduling, quality assurance, risk management, and more. The second half of the text provides tools and templates that the reader can reproduce and tailor to the specific projects they manage, including Project Scope Review, Risk Management, and Project Team Meeting checklists; a Project/System Feedback form; and a Customer Satisfaction Survey.

Edward Farkas is a project manager who has managed over $5 billion worth of aviation, construction, engineering, ecommerce, informational technology, public safety, and telecommunication projects worldwide. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1998 The Internet Project Manager: Practitioner’s Desk Reference by Edward B. Farkas is available through AuthorHouse, 1663 Liberty Drive, Suite 200, Bloomington, IN 47403; (800) 839-8640; www.authorhouse.com; hardbound ISBN 1-4184-0135-8; softbound ISBN 1-4184-0136-6.

Forensic Psychology: From Classroom to Courtroom Forensic Psychology: From Classroom to Courtroom, edited by Brent Van Dorsten, PhD, DABPS, DABFM, FACFEI, is an outstanding resource for forensic psychologists—including veterans and those new to the field. The book guides the reader through a wide range of topics presented by prominent contributing authors, beginning with an examination of the history and future of forensic psychology. The role and duty of the forensic psychologist are defined, and ethical and legal issues, such as the Daubert test on the admissibility of expert testimony in court, are examined. Several types of forensic assessments are outlined, including those addressing Malingering, competency, child custody evaluations, child abuse, and sexual offenders.

The application of forensic neuropsychology and medical psychology in personal injury litigation is also addressed.

The extensive information presented in the text is further clarified through select examples illustrating real-world situations that forensic psychologists will likely encounter in their career.

Anyone wanting to be a more effective expert witness will benefit from this thorough resource.

Dr. Brent Van Dorsten is a clinical forensic psychologist with the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center in Denver, Colorado. He has been a member of ACFEI since 1996.

Forensic Psychology: From Classroom to Courtroom Edited by Dr. Brent Van Dorsten is available through Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013; www.wkap.nl/.

Members can have their books reviewed in The Forensic Examiner by sending a review copy to: Editor, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield MO, 65804

58 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Due to space limitations, members' academic degr Nanette Adkins Danette Alford Henry A. Alfred Carolyn F. Allen Gregory M. Allman Scott R. Altemose Bruce R. Altschuler Robert A. Andrews, II Lynne Arrasmith Susan L. Arwood Joanne Ashland O. Anthony Avens Ali G. Awadi Tom Banta Garrett Baring Michael J. Bascom Sharon Baugh Todd Baumann Douglas Beaver Stephen Wesley Becker Frank R. Bedoe William Belanger Marco Antonio Belardo Richard M. Beldyk Donald Wesley Bendure Sherrie E. Berg Robert D. Bergida Kara Bettis David C. Billau Ralph Biltz William J. Birks, Jr. Bryan Bishop Larry Dean Boettger Lysander B. Bone Marvin H. Bonta Sharon Booth William K. Bowman George F. Breed, Jr. Tim Bridges Robert W. Briley, Jr. Tripp C. Brinkley Jule G. Brownfield

Freeman Costello Bryant Roxanna R. Bryant Robert G. Buckingham Amy L. Burgess Doyle J. Burke Kevin R. Burke Brian W. Burks Mary A. Butler Richard D. Caldwell Joseph C. Camarota Sandra A. CaramelaMiller John J. Cardarelli, II Robert Hunt Carpenter Cari Caruso Cecilia N.H. Causey Mark Cavey Kellen Ace C. Cenek Richard Chandler Jeff Charlton Frank A. Chavez Ron Ciampolillo Frank A. Cirillo Dakota H. Clark William D. Clark Louise Cleary James Cole Thomas E. Collins Gregory M. Cooper Katherine Corten Fil J. Cosentino Juan Antonio Cosme Santiago Thomas C. Creelman Jerrod L. Crockett Christopher Henry Cruzado Jose A. Cruz-Jimenez Dian C. Cucchisi William H. Cummins Philip John Curlewis Lisa A. Dahl

60 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Chad A. Dailey Thomas J. Daly Leonard D. Daniell Richard Stephen Davis Humberto Y. De Gyves, Sr. Paula D. Deal Kenneth L. Dennis Michael D. Dennis Robert P. DePalo Dennis D. Dodt Suzi Dodt Larence D. Dublin Ken DuBoise Beata Dumala Mona M. Durban Robert Allan Durham Gilliam E. Duvall David G. Dwyer Mark T. Edmead Chad M. Edwards George W. Elberti, III Stephen A. Elmore, Sr. Alex A. Escobar.

Michael Fanning Philip Farina Mary Feagins Stephen L. Ferraro Julie A. Fetcho Michael C. Finnegan Carl E. Finto, III Charlotte Franklin Jerry Keola Freitas W. Thomas Frogge Wendy J. Frost John R. Gambill Robert C. Garcia John E. Garnett Susan H. Garritson Harry J. Gartlan, Esq. Chad Alan Gatlin James D. Geiger, Jr. Michael D. Geyer

Mark E. Gibson Harold C. Gillens Rodd Goldman Debra L. Granger Larry V. Gray Brian J. Grayek Henry C. Grayson Billy G. Green Dennis M. Greene Ronald L. Gregory Joseph P. Gribben W. Joel Gridley Hal Gross Nilsa M. Hairston Proctor Clifford H. Hall Geraldine M. Hanspard Nancy J. Hatfield Steven C. Hausotter Robert E. Hayhurst John Bruce Hayman Joseph P. Henderson Toni C. Hering Stephen Lamar Hermann James A. Hibbard Ciro G. Hidalgo Zane M. Hill Kory A. Hinton Diab Hitti Kenneth W. Hofbauer Connie A. Holland Linda Carol Hopkins Richard L. Horn Adam David Howe Twila M. Hudry Christian M. Huenke John R. Hummel Kelly Humphrey Brent Huston George T. Hutchinson Tim R. Hutchison

Debra S. Isaac D. Ian Jackson Jerry L. Jackson Karen R. Jenkins Gwen C. Jennier Cyndi R. Jensen Charles L. Johnson James V. Johnson Leighton R. Johnson, III Robert M. Johnson James M. Jones Kim L. Jones Michael W. Jorgenson John E. Justice Timothy M. Kachmarik Stephen Richard Kalb Russ Karr Mark F. Kasehagen Gregory Charles Kern Robert Scott Kern Boo Huat Khoo Morton F. King John Scott King Paul S. Kitchen Robert John Klancko Thomas E. Knight, Jr. Arthur B. Kordus Denise M. Krantz Richard George Kuiters Jeremiah Kung Joseph M. Kurfehs Richard Lagg Maragret M. Lane William Stanley Langston Dominador F. Laudencia, Jr. Kevin M. Lewis Paul G. Lewis Kenneth C. Lincoln Gail Lippert

rees and professional designations are not listed.

Maureen Elizabeth Logue Vance Vincent Lommen Bill L. Lopez Austin P. Lossett Dannie R. Lowe William C. Lowe Ana Machuca David MacLeod Ben E. Magee Kevin T. Maher Abigail S. Malcolm David C. Maloney Douglas W. Maranto James A. Martin Robert A. Martin Christopher J. Martinson Gregory Masterson Harry H. Matsuno Lawrence E. Maxwell Scott F. McBride James F. McTamney Neftali Negron Medina Claude M. Melton, Jr. Steven M. Mensing James R. Metts Martin K. Michelman James G. Michitson Steven W. Miller Jeremy Mitoraj Angela M. Mobbs Thor A. Mollung David J. Monteith William S. Montgomery Dean Moore Joe B. Moore, Jr. Michael D. Moore Donald E. Moreno William H. Morris Martha M. Moses

Walter J. Mulhall Patricia M. Murphy Minessa Avril Mustaq Judith Myerson Andrew E. Neal Nick Neforos Thomas O. Nelson Bonnie S. Noll George M. Northrup John T. Oberle Daniel P. Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Brien Ralph A. Odom, Jr. James E. Olsen Igbelokotor Onoabhagbe Eric V. Orr Teresa Raye Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Shea Michael D. Pakter Douglas B. Palmer David L. Patton Darlena D. Patty Michael A. Paulauskas Kenneth W. Payne Andrei L. Peck Roberto Hector Pena Enrique Perez Kathirae S. Perkins John L. Phillips Egbert G. Phipps Ricky A. Plummer Cary Polk Marie Jessie Polycarpe Angela A. Pons-Sepsis Victor R. Poole Don C. Porter Louis R. Pryor Stefan Pryor David E. Puckett Lois E. Purnell Thomas J. Raburn Ralph L. Raimond Felix M. Raldirez Jim Raley

Swaroopa Ramdas Thomas E. Rams Bryan Wayne Randolph Karyn Rasile Jerry A. Reick Christopher W. Reid Carol H. Rice Morissa Richman Daniel J. Richmond Evo Riguzzi Darrel L. Riley Gerald M. Roach Shane Roberson Lovette Robinson Carlotta Rodas Steven L. Rogers Leon E. Rominiecki Daniel L. Ross James J. Rowan Patrick W. Rowley John A. Rutley Ramon A. SantiagoBayon Donnie R. Savage Clarence Rags Scanlan David R. Schaller Jerrold John Scharninghausen Ellen Michol Schimmels LeAnn Schlamb Greg L. Schumann Frank S. Scott David J. Seidel T. Michael Self Wayne R. Serin Larry Scott Shaffer Lyle R. Sharman Robert L. Shaw Robert Sherard Robert Silver Clyde A. Simpson

James Smith Kenneth C. Smith Thomas H. Smith Rise Smythe-Freed Gary D. Snyder Amanda R. Snyder William Souza Mark R. Sparks William T. Sparks Jeff S. Spivack Robert O. Steers Bill L. Stephens James C. Stevens Larry D. Stewart Robert N. Stout Bret H. Swanson Alicia A. Tate-Nadeau Kerry M. Thomas Kevin D. Thomas Wayne E. Thomason William J. Tinney, Jr. Scott H. Tobey Frank T. Tobin Richard D. Toliver Wayne E. Toms Melissa D. Tonn Francisco J. Torres Jorge Torres-Caratini Jim Tudor Dwight Van de Vate Michael F. Ventimiglia, Sr. Collin Vesley Thomas D. Villani Joseph A. Vodola Michael Von Wupperfeld Vicki Voyles Raymond Walker Edward W. Wallace Victor D. Waller Mark J. Ward Dan Watkins

Arnold H. Webster Barry R. Weissman Johnnie M. Welch Eric Westfall William Earl Whaley Barbara J. Whitehead Michael Ray Whittaker Mickey C. Wilhoite Randall H. Wilson Roby C. Wilson John P. Winslow Roy J. Wood Dennis Workman Paul A. Wright Ray J. Yepes Dale A. Yorgovan Rocco J. Youmans Glenn E. Young James A. Yow William J. Zeilenga David R. Zimmerman Daniel A. Zinn William A. Zwiebel

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 61

By E. Franklin Livingstone, MD, FAAPM&R, DABFE, DABFM, FACFEI, DAAPM I am a physiatrist practicing in Arizona, and have been appointed to the Board of Medical Advisors within ACFEIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s American Board of Forensic Medicine. You may not be familiar with my medical specialty, and that, in part, is the purpose of this article. My goal in publishing this article is to promote awareness and understanding of my chosen area of professional expertise with forensic professionals, physicians, attorneys, and the public in general. To this end, I present the following article, which provides an overview of forensic physiatry. he term forensic rehabilitation may sound suspiciously like an oxymoron.

However, in personal injury litigation, a physiatrist (fizz-EE-A-trist), a medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation, can often be helpful in case preparation as well as trial testimony.

This medical specialty, physical medicine and rehabilitation (physiatry), encompasses the diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of problems varying from sore shoulders to spinal cord injuries.

The focus of the specialty is on restoring function and quality of life to patients with disabling illnesses or injuries. Physiatrists treat acute and chronic musculoskeletal and pain disorders, and also diagnose and treat serious disorders of the nervous, muscular, and skeletal systems. They study the appropriate use of physical medicine modalities, such as various heat and cold modalities, exercise in its many forms, traction, and electrical stimulation, to name a few. They are also trained to lead a multidisciplinary team of medical professionals in the comprehensive and holistic treatment of illness and injury-related disability. Many physiatrists are also trained in the subspecialty of Electrodiagnosis (the elec-

T

tromyagraphy of nerves and muscles and nerve conductivity testing).

A physiatrist is a rehabilitation expert who is able to diagnose and evaluate disabling conditions. Physiatrists provide assessment of the impact of a disability on the life of the injured patient and on

those who are close to the injured individual, such as family members. This assessment also addresses the impact of injury on many facets of the patientâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life, including the medical, physical, psychological, educational, vocational, avocational, social, economic, and spiritual aspects.

62 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER W inter 2004

The early development and implementation of a comprehensive rehabilitation treatment program is imperative if optimal outcomes are to be expected in a patient with a disabling illness or injury. In this capacity, a physiatrist leads the rehabilitation team in developing appropriate short- and long-term goals of comprehensive rehabilitation, and also directs the implementation of progressive treatment protocols. Indeed, the specialty of physical medicine and rehabilitation was the first to promote and develop a holistic, medical teambased, interdisciplinary treatment of often-complex medical, physical, and psychological problems.

The physiatrist is one of the most qualified specialists to determine the extent to which a disability exists and its relationship to injury or illness. They are also highly qualified to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation plan to optimize outcomes, to minimize overall negative impact, and to bring about maximum recovery of function and quality of life. The overall analysis provided by a physiatrist might include a study of potential and actual economic loss, a prognostication of future employability or under-employability, and a cost analysis of the rehabilitation program and its implementation.

Some of the more difficult cases encountered by personal injury attorneys involve clients who have an apparently minor injuryrelated physical dysfunction, but seem to face greater problems in view of certain psychological sequelae and, all too often, chronic pain residuals. Not only will a qualified rehabilitation expert be instrumental in assisting the client in the recovery from and/or adaptation to a potentially disabling injury, he or she will also able to document the nature of that individual’s psychological trauma and pain.

Often an attorney may begin to work on a significant personal injury case while his or her client is still in a healthcare facility that may not be able to provide necessary and appropriate rehabilitation services. In addition, a review of medical records may not identify anyone coordinating the patient’s health and rehabilitation services as required. These situations compel immediate action, review, and analysis so that the appropriate recommendations may be brought to the patient and his or her family. The implementation of comprehensive rehabilitation must be expedient, comprehensive, and timely. A knowledgeable and reputable rehabilitation consultant can persuade healthcare providers to participate in a coordinated long-term rehabilitation treatment program. The rehabilitation consultant can also make appropriate recommendations, can redirect therapy efforts, or can suggest alternative placements using a more longterm perspective.

These points emphasize the importance of early engagement of the physiatrist consultant. Current concepts of rehabilitation recognize the importance of starting the rehabilitation process as early as possible. In minor injuries,

however, there is less urgency to consult with a rehabilitation expert until the extent of any residual disability can be assessed.

It should be understood that in any case involving potentially disabling conditions, factors can arise indicating the need for rehabilitation expertise early in the recovery process.

The physiatrist is also one of the most qualified professionals to participate in the development of life care planning and to provide critiques to assure the thoroughness and appropriateness of every aspect of the life care plan. This would include medical care needs, rehabilitation therapy programming, transportation needs, specialized equipment or home modifications, and educational and vocational considerations. Furthermore, the rehabilitation expert is the most qualified to explain and justify the life care plan in deposition or trial testimony.

The consulting physiatrist should be able to work with the attorney on an ongoing basis, providing periodic reports and updates (written or verbal), and when needed, assisting in obtaining insurance coverage benefits. In addition, the rehabilitation expert can assist in trial preparation, providing the attorney with insight into the presentation of evidence at trial and ensuring that testimony preceding the expert’s testimony establishes the proper foundation and support for the opinions of the experts involved.

During a trial, the physiatrist will be one of the most qualified witnesses to present objective testimony with respect to non-economic damages in the case.

These would include but are not limited to psychological trauma and its consequences, difficulty adapting to specific disabling conditions, and chronic pain residuals. The many seemingly insurmountable problems encountered by the catastrophically injured or disabled client in the acute recovery phase and the long-term rehabilitation process can

be explained with compelling language and detail through the physiatrists’ testimony.

The physiatrist will usually have many ideas to offer the attorney in the presentation of trial evidence and testimony.

He or she can review with the attorney the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and can help the attorney decide how to best present evidence and testimony to emphasize the strengths of the case based on historical information, injuries, and progression of recovery and/or disability.

Finally, the physiatrist is one of the most qualified specialists available to diagnose disability, to differentiate causation in disability, to rate disability at maximum medical improvement, to prognosticate potential secondary medical and physical complications in the future, to define appropriate treatment, and to determine when treatment will no longer be of benefit. Overall, a physiatrist can be of immeasurable help and support in personal injury rehabilitation and litigation.

References Burke, W.H. (1995). Forensic rehabilitation. Houston, TX: H.D.I. Publishers.

Deutsch, P.M. (1990). A guide to rehabilitation testimony: The experts’ role as educator.

Orlando, FL: P.M.D. Press.

Weed, R.O. (1999). Life care planning and case management handbook. Boca Raton, FL: C.R.C. Press.

About the Author Dr. E. Franklin Livingstone is the Director of Rehabilitation Medicine for the Havasu Regional Medical Center in Lake Havasu City, Arizona. He is a member of the Executive Board of Medical Advisors within ACFEI’s American Board of Forensic Medicine, and is also a Fellow of the American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. For more information on the topics presented in this article, please contact Dr. Livingstone through his website at www.doctor-livingstone.com. Dr. Livingstone is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Medicine and the American Board of Forensic Examiners. He is also a Fellow with ACFEI and has been a member since 1996.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 63

CE TEST PAGE: FIVE TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 5 CE TESTS) In order to receive CE credit, you must do the following: 1.) Read the continuing education article. 2.) Complete the exam by circling the chosen answer for each question. 3.) Complete the evaluation form. 4.) Mail or fax the completed form, along with the $15 payment for each CE exam that you take.

If the exam is passed with a grade of 70 percent or above, a certificate of completion for one continuing education credit will be mailed to you. The participants who do not pass the exam are notified as such and will have a second opportunity to complete the exam. Any questions, grievances, or comments can be directed to the ACFEI CE Department by phone at: (800) 423-9737, faxed to: (417) 881-4702, or e-mailed to: cedept@acfei.com.

Learning Objectives for “Characteristics of Juvenile Firesetting...”

After reading this article, participants should understand the following: 1.) That the magnitude of damage caused by firesetting can be predicted by the firesetter’s age and levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

2.) That the likelihood of juvenile firesetting recidivism can be predicted by the firesetter’s age and levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

3.) That the typology of the juvenile firesetter can be predicted by the firesetter’s age, race, sex, and levels of pathology, limited sociability, and delinquency.

4.) The implications of developmental/individual and environmental factors as they relate to the problem of juvenile firesetting.

Learning Objectives for “Coping with Stress in Terrorism Prevention Work: Combat Veterans Fair Better” After studying this article, participants should be able to do the following: 1. Understand the impact that prior combat exposure through military experience has on terrorism prevention personnel.

2. Recognize the different coping orientations typically employed by personnel on a terrorism prevention team.

3. Understand the type of stress exposure involved in terrorism prevention efforts.

4. Understand that military combat exposure can act as a beneficial learning experience when it comes to terrorism prevention work.

Article 1: CE Test for “Characteristics of Juvenile Firesetting…”

(See page 6 for article.)

Article 2: CE Test for “Coping with Stress in Terrorism Prevention Work...” (See page 19 for article.)

1.) Juvenile firesetters are best categorized by: A. The likelihood of recidivism (whether they will continue to set fires).

B. Characteristics related to their intentions (curiosity, cry for help, etc.).

C. The extent of the damage caused by the fires they set.

D. Their age at the onset of firesetting behaviors.

1.) Terrorism prevention personnel who are not combat veterans: A. Prefer more palliative coping strategies over direct-action coping styles.

B. Prefer more direct-action coping strategies over palliative coping styles.

C. Prefer palliative coping devices and direct-action coping devices equally.

2.) Limitations in previous research on juvenile firesetting largely stem from the fact that: A. Examinations have been based on data from case studies.

B. Examinations have been based on research using projective instruments.

C. Most studies depend upon data from hospitalized/institutionalized samples.

D. All of the above.

2.) The findings from this study may be utilized to improve efforts to prevent terrorism because: A. They indicate how best to reduce the subjective experience of stress in the jobs of terrorism prevention agents.

B. They provide a model for how terrorism prevention personnel may be trained to internalize the subjective experience of work-related stress.

C. None of the above.

3.) The reliance on samples of hospitalized or institutionalized firesetting youths reinforces the stereotyped perception that: A. Most juvenile firesetters are youths.

B. Most juvenile firesetters are delinquents.

C. Most juvenile firesetters are psychologically disturbed.

D. Most juvenile firesetters have a family history of mental illness.

3.) The relationships between the subjective experience of stress and direct-action coping and between the subjective experience of stress and palliative coping were: A. Predictably non-linear but in the same general directions.

B. Surprisingly linear and in the same general directions.

C. Diametrically opposed non-linear relationships.

4.) Curiosity firesetting is the traditional childhood diagnosis for most firesetting children ages: A. 3 years and younger.

B. 7 years and younger.

C. Between 7 and 12 years.

D. 13 years and older.

4.) The relationships between the subjective experience of stress, combat exposure prior to employment, and coping orientations were such that: A. Combat exposure prior to employment led to a decreased sense of stress and to an increase in palliative coping orientations.

B. An interactive effect was observed between the subjective experience of stress, combat exposure prior to employment, and coping orientations.

C. None of the above.

5.) Which of the following diagnoses are NOT often connected with the cry for help firesetter?

A. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

B. Depression not otherwise specified, or major depression.

C. Oppositional defiant disorder.

D. Childhood schizophrenia.

5.) Most studies indicate that terrorism prevention personnel with more direct-action approaches to dealing with stress tend to cope less effectively than personnel who use more palliative approaches.

A. True B. False

Payment Information Evaluation for Article 1: (1-3 rating section) Please circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. The stated learning objectives were met. 1 2 3 3. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 4. Additional comments:

Evaluation for Article 2: (1-3 rating section) Please circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. The stated learning objectives were met. 1 2 3 3. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 4. Additional comments:

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State:

Zip:

E-mail:

Statement of completion: I attest to having completed the CE activity.

Credit Card # Signature

Date

Please send the completed form, along with your payment of $15 for each test taken. Fax: (417) 881-4702, or mail the forms to ACFEI Continuing Education, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. If you have questions, please call (417) 881-3818 or toll free at (800) 423-9737.

64 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004 Take CE Tests online: www.acfei.com (select ”Online CE“)

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CE TEST PAGE: FIVE TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 5 CE TESTS) Learning Objectives for “Investigation of a Psychopathic Criminal’s Behavior as the Wheels of Justice Slowly Turn”

Learning Objectives for “Cognitive Impairment Associated with Habitual Nitrous Oxide Use...”

After studying this article, participants should be able to do the following: 1.) Identify the characteristics of a psychopathic individual.

2.) Understand the weaknesses of the criminal justice system in dealing with psychopathic criminals.

Article 3: CE Test for “Investigation of a Psychopathic Criminal’s Behavior...” (See page 28 for article.)

1.) Psychopathic individuals, or those with antisocial personality disorders, often: A. Experience intense regret when confronted with the consequences of their actions.

B. Respond favorably to rehabilitation efforts during incarceration.

C. Appear to be charming, engaging, and egocentric.

D. Feel and exhibit love for their close family and friends.

2.) Psychopathic individuals will often lie: A. In order to fool therapists and interviewers.

B. In efforts to elicit sympathy from prosecutors and judges.

C. To manipulate and take advantage of their victims.

D. All of the above are true.

3.) Individuals who commit crimes in multiple jurisdictions: A. Typically receive harsher punishments than those who commit crimes in a single jurisdiction.

B. May take advantage of the fact that judges and prosecutors do not connect their crimes.

C. Are more likely to receive treatment and rehabilitation than those who commit crimes in a single jurisdiction.

4.) Individuals who are convicted of crimes in multiple jurisdictions: A. Will be monitored by a single probation or parole officer.

B. May take advantage of having multiple probation and parole officers who do not communicate with each other.

C. Will receive punishment only in the jurisdictions where the most serious crimes were committed.

D. Will have parole and probation officers that receive a complete file outlining all of their crimes from each jurisdiction.

5.) The author identified which of the following weaknesses of the criminal justice system in its dealings with psychopathic criminals?

A. Psychopathic criminals use lies, deceit, and stories of false victimization to manipulate the criminal justice system.

B. The criminal justice system may require psychopathic criminals to get treatment, but it does not ensure they complete the treatment.

C. When psychopathic criminals commit crimes in multiple jurisdictions, those crimes are rarely connected by the courts, enabling the criminals to get away with lighter punishments.

D. All of the above are true.

CME

After studying this article, participants should be able to the following: 1.) Understand the physiological effects of nitrous oxide.

2.) Describe the symptoms associated with chronic exposure to nitrous oxide.

3.) Outline the possible neuropsychological consequences of chronic nitrous oxide abuse.

4.) State the differences between the neuropsychological profiles of mild Alzheimer’s reference groups as compared to a chronic nitrous oxide abuser.

5.) State the differences between the neuropsychological profiles of mild agerelated dementias and that of a chronic nitrous oxide abuser.

Article 4: CE Test for “Cognitive Impairment Associated with Habitual Nitrous Oxide Abuse in a 63-Year-Old Health Professional” (See page 36 for article.)

1.) True or false: Physiologically, nitrous oxide initiates a process that may interfere with mylenation and result in central nervous system impairment.

A. True B. False 2.) Which of the following effects will NOT be associated with chronic exposure to nitrous oxide?

A. Numbing of extremities.

B. Paresthesias of the extremities C. Priapism D. Loss of sphincter control E. Lehrmitte’s sign 3. Which of the following deficits did the patient NOT show in the neuropsychological evaluation reported in this article?

A. A general decline in cognitive functioning.

B. A marked decline in verbal memory.

C. Construction deficits.

D. Dysphasia and dysfluency.

E. Decline in reasoning/calculations.

4.) True or false: Nitrous oxide, when taken as a recreational drug, is not likely to have harmful effects if it is only used infrequently.

A. True B. False

Payment Information Evaluation for Article 3: (1-3 rating section) Please circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. The stated learning objectives were met. 1 2 3 3. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 4. Additional comments:

Evaluation for Article 4: (1-3 rating section) Please circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. The stated learning objectives were met. 1 2 3 3. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 4. Additional comments:

Amt: $15 per test

Identifying information: Please print legibly or type the following: Name: Fax Number: Phone Number: Address: City:

State:

Zip:

E-mail:

Statement of completion: I attest to having completed the CE activity.

Credit Card # Signature

Date

Circle one: check enclosed

Please send the completed form, along with your payment of $15 for each test taken. Fax: (417) 881-4702, or mail the forms to ACFEI Continuing Education, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. If you have questions, please call (417) 881-3818 or toll free at (800) 423-9737.

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Name on card: Exp. Date:

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 65 Take CE Tests online: www.acfei.com (select ”Online CE“)

CE TEST PAGE: FIVE TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 5 CE TESTS) Learning Objectives for“Nigerian 419 Fraud Scams Worth Pursuing” After reading this article, participants should be able to do the following: 1. Understand that Nigerian fraud schemes are still prevalent.

2. Identify the types of schemes that are occurring.

3. Understand the importance of forming a coalition of experts when pursuing 419 fraud schemes.

4. Identify the types of experts required to resolve such scams.

Article 5: CE Test for “Nigerian 419 Fraud Scams Worth Pursuing” (See page 41 for article.)

1. What does 419 stand for?

A. The new alternative number to call for emergencies.

B. The organization addressing international crime.

C. The section of the Nigerian penal code that addresses fraudulent schemes.

2. What U.S. agency is taking the lead against Nigerian fraud cases?

A. The Federal Trade Commission (FCC).

B. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS).

C. The Federal Communications Commission (FTC).

3. How can you mitigate expenses in pursuing fraud cases?

A. Do the work yourself.

B. Form a coalition of experts.

C. Accept payment upon completion of the project.

Evaluation for Article 5: (1-3 rating section) Please circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. The stated learning objectives were met. 1 2 3 3. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 4. Additional comments:

4. What are some of the categories that 419 scams fall into?

A. Identity fraud, Internet auctions, and shop-at-home.

B. Disbursement of money from wills, contract fraud (COD of goods and services), purchase of real estate, conversion of hard currency, transfer of funds from over-invoiced contracts, and sale of crude oil at below market prices.

C. Work-at-home plans, telephone pay-per-call, and credit protection/repair.

5. In what country are funds being traced to banks, with the bank possibly liable for the losses?

A. The United Kingdom.

B. The United States.

C. Nigeria.

Payment Information Amt: $15 per test

Identifying information: Please printlegibly or type the following: Name:

Credit Card #

Fax Number:

Circle one: check enclosed

Phone Number: Address: City:

MasterCard

Visa

American Express

Name on card: State:

Zip:

Exp. Date:

E-mail: Statement of completion: I attest to having completed the CE activity.

Signature Date Please send the completed form, along with your payment of $15 for each test taken. Fax: (417) 881-4702, or mail the forms to ACFEI Continuing Education, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804.

If you have questions, please call (417) 881-3818 or toll free at (800) 423-9737.

Offer Continuing Medical Education (CME) through your organization by jointly sponsoring an activity with the American College of Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI). By jointly sponsoring activities with ACFEI, a nationally accredited provider of Continuing Medical Education, you can offer Continuing Medical Education to physicians in practice anywhere in the United States.

For more information about how your organization can offer CME by jointly sponsoring an activity with ACFEI, call toll free (800) 423-9737 or send an e-mail to cedept@acfei.com.

www.acfei.com 66 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Winter 2004

Falsely Accused DNA Testing Sets Wrongfully Convicted Man Free After 17 Years In Prison

In August, 44-year-old Clarence Harrison of Decatur, Georgia was declared a free man and was released from prison, having served 17 years of a life sentence for a crime he did not commit. This is his story.

In the rainy early morning of October 25, 1986, a 25-year-old female hospital worker standing at a bus stop was seized and told she would be killed on the spot if she screamed. The woman was dragged to a nearby wooded area, where she was raped, sodomized, and beaten. The perpetrator went on to force the woman to two other nearby locations, where he continued his vicious assault. Finally, after stealing the victim’s money and wristwatch, the perpetrator knocked out her two front teeth and walked away.

The victim, badly injured, was able to walk to the nearby home of an acquaintance. She was taken to a local hospital, where a sexual assault examination was conducted and a rape kit used to collect DNA evidence. This DNA evidence would soon be used to wrongfully convict Clarence Harrison, but it would also provide the key that would set him free many years later.

Police were led to suspect Clarence Harrison, who lived near the site of the attack, when his neighbors reported hearing that someone at his house had a watch for sale.

Harrison’s residence was searched, but the victim’s watch was not found. Still, he became the main suspect in the case.

The victim picked Harrison’s picture out of a photo lineup of possible suspects, identifying him as the man who attacked her. Another witness also identified Harrison’s photo, and told police she had seen him and another man in the area after the attack occurred. This provided sufficient evidence to charge Harrison, and the court case ensued.

The prosecution’s case centered around two key pieces of evidence: the victim’s testimony and DNA testing of seminal fluids taken from the rape kit. In 1987, crime labs could only narrow the field of individuals that could match the DNA to 88% of the total male population. Unfortunately, Harrison was included in this 88% segment. With these findings and the victim’s identification of Harrison, both in photo lineups and in the courtroom, the jury was convinced. Harrison was sentenced to life in prison.

Harrison steadfastly claimed he was innocent and continued to request that additional testing be conducted on the evidence. In 1998, in response to Harrison’s repeated requests, the DeKalb County Public Defender’s office agreed to have the evidence from the rape kit submitted for further DNA analysis. However, the lab that analyzed the evidence was unable to work with the small sample that remained, and declared that new testing would be impossible. It seemed the case was closed.

Still, Harrison continued to seek assistance to uncover the truth about his conviction. In a stroke of good fortune, he sent a letter to the Georgia Innocence Project (GIP), and the group agreed to look into his case. After many long years spent behind bars, Harrison finally had hope.

The GIP was formed in 2002, its mission to free wrongly convicted inmates through the use of DNA testing and to

promote modern forensic practices to minimize wrongful convictions. Like other Innocence Projects that have cropped up across the country in recent years, volunteer law students handle most of the GIP’s investigative and judicial work. At the time, the GIP had not yet successfully overturned a conviction, but that statistic was about to change.

When GIP volunteers began investigating Harrison’s conviction, they were told that all evidence from the case had been destroyed. Still, they refused to stop investigating, and after an exhaustive search, they tracked down one last remaining sample from the victim’s rape kit. That sample—a slide containing trace amounts of the rapist’s seminal fluid— was sent to a forensic science agency with new DNA samples taken from Harrison for comparison. Using advanced techniques and technology unavailable when Harrison was on trial, the agency was able to analyze the DNA evidence. The results of that test were conclusive: the DNA samples taken from Harrison did not match those from the rape kit, meaning Harrison couldn’t possibly have committed the crime.

Within a week of the test results being returned, a judge overturned Harrison’s conviction and ordered that he be released from prison immediately. After 17 years, he was finally free, redeemed through the hard work of dedicated GIP volunteers and the advancements of forensic science.

For more information, please see the following websites: Georgia Innocence Project. <http://www.ga-innocenceproject.org/>.

Law.com newswire. <http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire_article.jsp?id=1096473927263>.

WSB-TV Atlanta. <http://www.wsbtv.com/news/3694637/ detail.html>.

WXIA-TV Atlanta. <http://www.11alive.com/help/search/sea rch_article.aspx?storyid=51720>.

Winter 2004 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 67

American College of Forensic Examiners International 2750 E. Sunshine Springfield, MO 65804