ADBR March-April 2020 by adbr5

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AIR MARCH-APRIL 2020 · Volume 39 | No. 02

ADBR.COM.AU

CONTENTS

.COM.AU

Volume 39 No. 2 MARCH-APRIL 2020

FEATURES & ANALYSIS

14 GERMAN SUPER HORNETS Germany to buy Super Hornets & Growlers 16 EDHFCS Babcock & Lockheed Martin team for JP9101 16

BUDGET BLUES The post-Covid-19 Defence Budget

20 CURRAWONG Army accepts Currawong Release 2

22 A SUPER DECADE 10 years of RAAF F/A-18F service 36 FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT Opportunities for Australia? 42 OSINT - CHINA’S A2AD China’s A2AD capabilities explained 48 OSINT - EYES & EARS The case for a regional ISR network 50 OSINT - SAVAGE SKIES Pt 2 The next generation of AAMs 54 COUNTER COMMAND Joint All-Domain Operations

REGULARS

ADBR

COVER The RAAF recently celebrated a decade in service of the Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet. ADF

4 EDITORIAL 6 BATTLESPACE 76

ON TARGET

MARCH-APRIL 2020

Felix Defence 7 Finlay Rd Eumundi QLD 4562 Australia adbr.com.au adbr@felix.net.au +61 (07) 5442 8377 Twitter: @DefenceBusiness

66 DOING HARM The evolution of the anti-radar missile 72 IN SYNC Link-16 synchronisation

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ADBR is published by:

60 ANZAC AMCAP ANZAC class sensor upgrade

AIR MARCH-APRIL 2020 · Volume 39 | No. 02

Managing Editor Andrew McLaughlin andrew@adbr.com.au Publisher John Conway john.conway@felixdefence.com

Assistant Editor Steve Gibbons

Art Director Daniel Frawley

Senior Contributor Max Blenkin

Sub Editor Bruce McLaughlin

Contributors this issue Dougal Robertson, John Conway, Dr Thomas Whittington, Peter Knott

Felix Advantage 2020. All material published in ADBR is copyright and may not be used without the express permission of the publisher. ISSN 1033-2898

INITIAL POINT

Initial Point

PANDEMONIUM! By Andrew McLaughlin

he world has certainly changed in the eight weeks since the last issue of ADBR went to press. The Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically affected most of our lives, the economy, travel, and sadly, the health and lives of far too many people. Fortunately for us, the business of Defence goes on, albeit in a much modified and isolated environment. Our ADBR team is working from home and, despite the recent relaxation of some travel and socialising rules, I don’t anticipate we’ll be attending any events or in-person meetings or interviews for some weeks or months yet. To this end, I’m extremely grateful to all of our team for their flexibility, and to all of those in Defence and in Industry who have made themselves available to conduct briefs or to be interviewed over the phone instead of in person, and for being available to quickly fact-check stories or transcripts. Meanwhile, while it’s still early days, it appears the Government hasn’t taken its foot off the gas pedal in its goal to hit that magical two per cent of GDP figure for Defence spending. Although, as Max Blenkin points out in his article on page 16 of this issue, just what the actual GDP number will be when it comes to budget time remains to be seen. But spending might actually increase in the short term by bringing some projects forward, as the Government looks to inject ‘stimulus’ money into projects with high Australian Industry Content (AIC). For example, industry insiders suggest a decision and contract signature for Army’s Project LAND 129 Phase 3 effort to replace its Shadow 200 UAS (the four contenders for which all have strong AIC cases – see our story on page 10) might be brought forward six or more months to October this year instead of the originally planned early to mid-2021. But one part of Defence’s business the pandemic has had an adverse effect on is the conferences and expositions that those in Industry and in Defence attend and look forward to. The RAAF’s Air Power Development Centre has recorded and will place the planned Airpower Conference presentations online from May 5. But while the presentations’ content will more or less be the same, there are no Q&As or panel

discussions, and there are no sideline events such as networking drinks, display booths, or opportunities to catch up socially. Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld was likely also relying on the Airpower Conference to build interest and momentum in his Commander’s Intent, the release of which has now been delayed. Over at Army, while its biennial Land Forces conference is still in the diary for September, it must surely be at risk unless international travel opens up, and solutions for ensuring social distancing and surface cleaning can be found. Each of the services depends on these events, as it brings most of industry’s key players, CASG and service project leads, capability managers, politicians, and trade media under one roof. Networking benefits aside, these events also provide revenue to the organisers, facilities, hotels, restaurants, taxis and ride share operators (ie GDP), not to mention a year or more worth of stories and leads for the media! There’s little doubt the world will emerge from this pandemic a very different place, geo-politically and economically. While our focus during this time has rightly been inward facing, our adversaries have and will continue to posture and test our resolve and that of our allies. Therefore, the balance between maintaining a strong and capable ADF will continue to be offset against the need to rebuild the economy will be a fine one. So, whatever your situation is during the pandemic, continue to adapt for life and business during it, and plan for a staged and protracted return to normal life and business after it’s all over. In the meantime, our team wishes you and those dear to you the very best of health.

FRESH LOOK Regular readers will notice we’ve freshened the magazine’s look a little, with cleaner fonts and layouts, and a modified logo/header. It’s our goal to continue to freshen the style as the magazine evolves and, as always, I value your constructive feedback.

GOOGLE EARTH/ADBR

HIGHER LONGER AMRAAM Extended Range (AMRAAM ER) – a low risk and affordable addition to the proven NASAMS system. AMRAAM ER expands current NASAMS System capabilities and intercepts targets at significantly higher altitudes and longer ranges

kongsberg.com

A powerful missile mix with current AMRAAM – one system – one launcher – same logistics

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

DEF ENCE NE WS ROUNDUP

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BATTLESPACE Australian Defence Vessel Cape Fourcroy. Fourcroy.

Navy to get six more Cape class patrol boats

The Commonwealth has announced it will acquire six more Cape class patrol boats from Austal for the RAN as it seeks to support Australian industry during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. The six vessels will be built at Austal’s Henderson yard in Western Australia. They will add to the two Cape class vessels the RAN currently leases from Australian Border Force, and eight Armidale class patrol boats. They will be joined in service by 10 larger Arafura class offshore patrol vessels from 2023. “These vessels will not only enhance national security but will provide important economic stimulus and employment continuity during the COVID-19 pandemic,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a May 1 statement.” The ability to build more of these vessels in Australia will deliver Australian Industry Content of more than 65 per cent, providing significant opportunities for Australian industry and Defence, as well as more than 1,200 workers in the broader Australian supply chain.” Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price MP added: “This will help to ensure continued employment opportunities for 400 of Austal’s commercial shipbuilders in WA, with flow down benefits to Austal’s supply chain. Austal is an Australian industry success story with the company already building variants of the Cape Class Patrol Boat for international customers including the government of Trinidad and Tobago, … (and the) Guardian Class patrol boats in support of the … Pacific Patrol Boat program.” The Armidale class has suffered in recent years with poor availability and greater maintenance requirements, reportedly due to overuse in the border security mission. While no timeframe for the Cape class to enter service was announced, it is likely some of the Armidales will be decommissioned early as the Cape class vessels enter service.

ADF

Chile takes on former RAN FFGs

The RAN’s final two Perry/Adelaide class FFGs – the former HMA Ships Melbourne (below) and Newcastle – have been officially handed over to the Chilean Navy. In a low-key ceremony on April 15 at HMAS Kuttabul in Sydney that wasn’t publicised by the ADF, the two vessels were commissioned into Chilean Navy service and renamed Almirante Latorre and Capitan Prat. They will be home-ported at Valparaiso, and join three Type 23 Duke class frigates, one Type 22 Batch 2 Boxer class frigate, and two Karel Doorman M class frigates in Chilean service. HMAS Newcastle was built in 1993 and was decommissioned in June 2019, while HMAS Melbourne was built in 1992 and decommissioned in October 2019. Defence strategists and observers had advocated

to retain the two ships in a ready reserve condition as they are still considered to be quite capable following an extensive refit in the late 2000s. “It remains a very good platform,” John Blaxland from the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre told The Australian newspaper last December. “This is a wake-up call,” Blaxland added. “While we have embarked on a regeneration of the naval fleet, we are basically talking about one-for-one rather than growing. We need to keep these, and when the ANZAC frigates come up to be replaced, we need to keep them too.” Both ships had returned from deployments shortly before being decommissioned, and had ably demonstrated their reliability, utility and capabilities on those deployments. The RAN’s other four FFGs were scuttled as dive wrecks or artificial reefs following their decommissioning.

ADF

ADBR

RAAF Tindal. GOOGLE EARTH

RAAF Tindal upgrade works detailed

Defence has outlined how it plans to upgrade RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory. The $1bn upgrade will see the base ready for use by RAAF F-35A fighters and KC-30A tankers, E-7A Wedgetail, forward basing facilities for MQ-4C Triton and MQ9B unmanned aircraft, as well as increasing numbers of visiting aircraft under the US Force Posture Initiative (USFPI). This is a significant enhancement to a facility which dates back to WW2, but which has been operating in its current form from the late 1980s when fast-jet operations were relocated there from Darwin for the F/A-18A Hornet. Prime Minister Scott Morrison officially launched the upgrade program in February, though major works, including lengthening the runway and improving fuel services, were foreshadowed in the 2016 Defence Integrated Investment Plan (IIP). Sitting on April 21, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works – which reviews major government infrastructure projects to ensure the taxpayer is receiving value for money – heard the project will comprise basics to update and improve three-decade old services including accommodation, power, water, drainage, firefighting, and sewage. Then there are more ambitious works to increase base capacity, including extending the runway by 2,000 feet to 11,000 feet (3,353 metres), widening runway shoulders from three metres to 10.5 metres, and improving the parallel taxiway for heavy aircraft movements. There will also be a new

air movements terminal and parking ramp which will cover 52,000 square metres and have capacity for heavy aircraft. Where once base fuel infrastructure had to meet the needs of 75SQN’s F/A-18 aircraft and occasional visiting fighters, an all-new facility will provide vastly greater capacity with total storage of six megalitres in two steel tanks encased in a concrete and an earth mound for protection. The US will construct its own separate fuel farm, aircraft parking apron and associated facilities. Construction is expected to run through to late-2027 at an estimated total cost of $1.174 billion, including Defence contingency.

US Arms sales to India offer greater regional options

Three recent major arms sales approvals by the US State Department for India have raised the possibility of that country being able to better integrate with other national forces in the Indo-Pacific region.

Previously a large buyer of Soviet/ Russian and French equipment, in recent years India has acquired Boeing C-17 and Lockheed Martin C-130J airlifters, the Boeing P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, and continues to examine the possibility of buying Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets or Lockheed Martin F-16V/ F-21s to replace its large fleet of obsolete Soviet-era MiG-21s and MiG-23s. In February the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) confirmed the State Department had approved the foreign military sale (FMS) of an Integrated air defense weapon system (IADWS) to India. Based on the KONGSBERG/ Raytheon NASAMS system similar to that being acquired by the Australian Army under LAND 19 Phase 7B, the approval includes the AN/MPQ-64Fl Sentinel radar system, AIM-120C-7/C-8 AMRAAM missiles, FIM-92L Stinger missiles, canister and vehicle-mounted launch systems, training systems, and various command and control elements. Raytheon’s Sentinel radar is the same as that used by US and other countries’ NASAMS systems, whereas Australia will integrate advanced radars designed and manufactured locally by CEA Technologies. Australia will use the same AMRAAM medium-range missiles and is considering adding the longer-range AMRAAM-ER, but will also integrate the AIM-9X Block II missile instead of the shorter-range Stinger. NASAMS is designed to be linked in with larger integrated air defence systems such as that planned for the ADF through Project AIR 6500. The adoption of NASAMS by India raises the possibility of closer defence ties through the conduct of joint air defence operations in major exercises such as Pitch Black, or in real-world operations.

KONGSBERG

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

Raytheon Technologies CEO Greg Hayes said in a statement. The new company will have four major businesses: Collins Aerospace, Pratt & Whitney, Raytheon Intelligence & Space, and Raytheon Missiles & Defense. The company is headed by Executive Chairman Tom Kennedy, CEO Greg Hayes, and Chief Financial Officer Toby O’Brien.

First production MQ-9B SkyGuardian rolled out

The first Loyal Wingman aircraft stands on its own undercarriage for the first time. BOEING

First Loyal Wingman rolled out

Boeing and its industry partners have rolled out the first unmanned Loyal Wingman unmanned combat aircraft for the RAAF. The aircraft has been designed and manufactured in Australia. It operates using artificial intelligence or in a mannedunmanned teaming scenario, and is designed to be able to operate a high subsonic speeds and employ a variety of sensors in a detachable nose section. “This project is an excellent example of innovation through collaboration and what can be achieved working together with defence industry,” Chief of Air force AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld said in a statement. “This demonstrates the importance of the relationship Air Force has with Boeing Australia and defence industry more broadly. I look forward to exploring the capabilities this aircraft may bring to our existing fleet in the future.” The first aircraft is scheduled to fly by the end of 2020, with possible full rate production and service entry by 2025.

GENERAL ATOMICS

Raytheon and United Technologies complete merger The merger of Raytheon Company and United Technologies was completed on April 3, with the new Raytheon Technologies emerging as one of the largest aerospace and defence companies in the world. First announced in June last year, the merger saw United Technologies sell off its Carrier and Otis business units, and retain its Collins Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney businesses. The transaction has been described as a “merger of equals”, and the new entity now has 195,000 employees and 2019 sales valued at US$74bn (A$121bn). “Raytheon Technologies brings together two companies with combined strengths and capabilities that make us uniquely equipped to support our customers and partners during this unprecedented time,”

The first production-representative MQ-9B SkyGuardian has been rolled out of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc’s (GA-ASI) facility in California. The aircraft has been configured in the Protector RG Mk1 mode as ordered by the UK’s RAF, and is a company-owned aircraft designed to test, validate, and certify that aircraft’s systems. The SkyGuardian is a commercially offered derivative of the MQ-9 Reaper as operated by the USAF and other nations, and will also form the basis for the RAAF’s version of the MQ-9B, 16 of which are on order under Project AIR 7003. “With first flight of the productionrepresentative aircraft, we remain on schedule for delivering MQ-9B Protector to the RAF,” GA-ASI CEO Linden Blue said in a statement. “Protector revolutionises the long-endurance RPA market by providing true all-weather capability, and NATO-standard typecertification to enable flexible operations in civil airspace.” The SkyGuardian differs from Reaper in several key areas. Visually it features a longer wingspan giving it greater endurance, de-icing in the leading edge and engine intake, lightning protection, a four-bladed propeller, and a re-profiled nose which carries the due-regard radar which will allow it to fly in controlled airspace.

AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIRSHOW AND AEROSPACE & DEFENCE EXPOSITION

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AVALON AIRPORT, GEELONG, AUSTRALIA

Australiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own international industry event, the most comprehensive aviation, aerospace and defence exposition in the Southern Hemisphere.

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38,952 Trade Visitor Attendances

698 Participating Companies

41 International Air Chiefs and Representatives

161 Official Delegations CELEBRATING THE CENTENARY of the ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE 1921 - 2021

www.airshow.com.au

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

BOEING

Boeing awarded NZ and ROK P-8A contract

The US Navy has awarded Boeing a US$1.55bn (A$2.53bn) contract for production of 18 P-8A Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, including 10 aircraft for South Korea and New Zealand. The Lot 11 production batch covers eight P-8As for the US Navy, six for South Korea, and four for the Royal New Zealand Air Force. The US DoD contract notification says the RNZAF aircraft will comprise US$523m (A$854m), although some long-lead items have already been procured at additional cost. Deliveries of the RNZAF aircraft are scheduled to start in 2022, and for South Korea in 2023. The four P-8As will replace five Lockheed P-3K2 Orions in RNZAF service.

Four companies shortlisted for Army Shadow 200 replacement

Defence has announced four contenders for the Australian Army’s LAND 129 Phase 3 program to replace the AAI Shadow 200 tactical UAS in service, with Insitu Pacific, Leidos Australia, Raytheon Australia, and Textron Systems Australia all shortlisted. The shortlist follows an initial industry survey that was issued to industry in May 2018, and a follow-on Invitation to Respond (ITR) in September 2019. The project will now progress to a Request for Tender (RFT) with submissions due by June 30. Industry sources suggest the successful tender may be brought forward from an originally planned 2021

An RQ-21 Blackjack.

Aerosonde 4.7.

INSITU

TEXTRON

Schiebel S-100 Camcopter. ADF

Orbiter 4 . AERONAUTICS

as the government seeks spending opportunities with Australian industry during the COVID-19-driven economic downturn. Few details have yet been provided as to what platforms the shortlisted companies are offering, but ADBR understands Insitu is offering the Integrator/RQ-21 Blackjack, Raytheon has reportedly teamed with Schiebel Australia to offer the S-100 Camcopter, and Textron’s bid is believed to be based on the Aerosonde 4.7. Leidos has confirmed it has teamed with Israel’s Aeronautics Ltd to offer the Aeronautics Orbiter 4 unmanned aerial system. “Leidos conducted an exhaustive search to identify capable platforms in class that can provide optimum capabilities to the Australian Army,” acting Leidos Australia Chief Executive, Paul Chase said in an April 6 statement. “We are excited to have Aeronautics join our team. We look forward to combining the capabilities of both companies to create a highlyqualified team with a strong technology footprint in Australia.” The Integrator is a larger version of the familiar ScanEagle which has seen service with the Army and RAN. The Integrator is in service with the US Marine Corps as the RQ-21 and, like ScanEagle, it is launched by catapult and retrieved by a crane-like skyhook. The S-100 vertical takeoff and land system is now familiar in Australian skies, having been leased by the RAN under Navy Minor Program 1942 and also trialled by Army in recent years. The Aerosonde 4.7 can trace its roots back to the original Australiandeveloped Aerosonde UAS, but now has a more powerful engine and larger payload capacity. It is also catapult launched and is captured by a net-like barrier. The Orbiter 4 is based on Aeronautics’ range of Orbiter UAS which have served with the Israeli Defence Force and other operators for decades. Like the Aerosonde, it is catapultlaunched and retrieved by net. All three systems use heavy fuels common to those used by Army vehicles and naval vessels, and all are designed to carry various payloads including EO/IR sensors, electronic warfare and signals intelligence payloads, and synthetic aperture radars.

ADBR

A US Navy EA-18G with two NGJ-MB pods in the Pax River anechoic chamber. US NAVY

Next Gen Jammer – Mid Band completes E3 testing

The AN/ALQ-249(V)1 Next Generation Jammer-Mid Band has completed its first round of Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) testing at the US Navy’s Air Combat Environmental Test and Evaluation Facility anechoic chamber at NAS Patuxent (Pax) River. Designed to ensure the pod’s compatibility with the EA-18G Growler’s other systems, as well the pod’s functionality, data collection and performance, the 400 hours of E3 testing was conducted over a period of three months. “Data captured during this period not only supports our initial flight clearance, but also provided lessons learned that will benefit the entire NGJ-MB test program moving forward,” the US Navy’s Airborne Electronic Attack Systems (PMA-234) program manager, Capt Michael Orr said in a statement. The testing was conducted on NGJ-MB Engineering Development Model (EDM) pods which are designed to emulate the jamming and other capabilities of the ALQ249(V)1. Flight testing of developmental NGJ pods is scheduled to commence by the middle of 2020, and the Milestone C decision to proceed to production is due before the end of the year. Operational (V)1 pods will be carried in pairs by the EA-18G to provide significantly enhanced jamming capabilities in the mid band of the electromagnetic spectrum compared to the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS) pods currently employed by US Navy and RAAF Growlers.

US Navy goes into bat for “game-changing” Triton

The US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has re-stated the importance to the service of the Northrop Grumman MQ4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance maritime ISR system. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense subcommittee on March 11, CNO ADM Michael Gilday said the service was committed to the Triton capability. “We just accelerated the deployment of our first two out to Guam, so they are on station and on mission right now,” ADM Gilday said. “The capabilities that the MQ-4 brings are game-changing in terms of longrange ISR at altitude, with sensors that we haven’t had supporting the fleet before.” Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly added, “Unmanned is going to be a huge

part of our future. Unmanned is a critical element — not just aerial but unmanned ships as well.” The future of the Triton program has been in some doubt after planned production of the large UAS for the US Navy was paused for two years in the recent Draft President’s Budget (PB21). The pausing of US Navy production could have an adverse effect on the delivery schedule and cost of the RAAF’s planned Triton introduction due to lower volumes, unless the RAAF can be convinced to bring its production forward to fill the US Navy’s slots. To this end, ADBR understand Defence’s Investment Committee (IC) met in Canberra in early March and is preparing a recommendation of how to proceed with the program to the National Security Committee of Cabinet for consideration.

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

US DoD conducts successful hypersonic glide body test

NIOA to produce F-35A gun ammunition

Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions (RNM) has been awarded a contract by the Joint Strike Fighter program to produce 25mm ammunition as a second-source supplier for the F-35A Lightning II’s four-barrel GAU22/A cannon. The 25mm Frangible Armoured Piercing (FAP) projectiles will be manufactured at a government-owned facility at Benalla in Victoria and will be available for use by all F-35A operators. RNM is a joint-venture between the multinational Rheinmetall Waffe Munitions, and the Australian-owned NIOA.

An artist’s concept of an HGB.

“We are totally committed to this joint venture and the Australian market,” RNM chairman Werner Kraemer said in a statement. “By committing to develop this medium-calibre production capability here in Australia, we will not only create local jobs and build a supply chain, we will also be developing a proven and sustainable export market.” NIOA managing director Robert Nioa added that the Benalla project would enable development of a true sovereign capability in medium-calibre munitions in Australia. The 25mm production line is scheduled to be completed in early 2021 and be at full production by September 2021.

The US DoD has announced it conducted a successful test of its Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) on March 19 from its Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. The C-HGB was launched atop a conventional missile which boosted it to the required altitude and speeds. The air vehicle then flew at hypersonic speeds to a designated impact point according to a US DoD release. The advantage of developmental weapons such as the C-HGB is that they can fly at hypersonic speeds in the atmosphere and can manoeuvre, as opposed to ballistic missiles which have predictable flight paths once they apogee. The C-HGB is being developed by the US Navy with funding from the US Army. The vehicle is comprised of a conventional warhead, guidance system, and a thermal shield for the extreme temperatures encountered at hypersonic speeds. The development aims to integrate the vehicle with ground and sea-based launch vehicles but to retain as much commonality as possible across the two services. It is hoped an operational surfacelaunched C-HGB could be fielded by the US Army and Navy by 2023, and a submarinelaunched version in 2024.

GERMAN SUPER HORNETS

TORNADO SWITCH

SUPER SALE

Germany to buy Super Hornets for NATO nuclear mission, and Growlers to replace EW Tornados BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

he German Government has reportedly approved a mixed buy of Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, and Eurofighter EF-2000 fighters for the Luftwaffe to replace its remaining fleet of 90 Panavia Tornados. An April 22 report in Der Spiegel says, as part of a 90 aircraft requirement, Germany will acquire 30 Super Hornets to conduct the NATO tactical nuclear mission currently assigned to the Panavia Tornado, 15 EA-18Gs to replace its Tornado ECR EW aircraft, and 45 new Eurofighter EF-2000s. The Lockheed Martin F-35A had also been considered to replace the Tornados but was dropped from contention in early 2019. Germany is developing the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with France to enter service in the 2030s, and the acquisition of the F-35 would have put its participation on FCAS in jeopardy. While European NATO alliance members are not nuclear powers themselves, they are obliged to assign a limited number of aircraft and crews to be certified for the tactical nuclear mission in support of possible NATO operations against Russia. The B61 free-fall weapons are supplied by the US and are stored in secure locations in most NATO member states. The Super Hornet buy is considered controversial in Europe, with local industry advocating hard for European-built aircraft, and observers questioning the cost of operating different aircraft types with vastly different operating and sustainment philosophies. But the Eurofighter has not been adapted for the nuclear mission and is unlikely to be certified to do so by A Luftwaffe Tornado ECR- to be replaced the US. in the tactical nuclear While the US-built mission stance by the EA-18G. JERRY GUNNER/ Super Hornet would be WIKI COMMONS. certified, it has not yet conducted flight and clearance testing of the B61 free-fall weapon as the US Navy no longer has a tactical nuclear mission. Therefore, Germany may be liable for all non-recurring expenses to have the B61 cleared on the jet.

If suitable anti-ship weapons are acquired, a German Super Hornet would also be capable of performing complex maritime strike missions in the relatively crowded Baltic Sea. The German Marineflieger relinquished that role in 2005 when it transferred its remaining Tornados to the Luftwaffe. Congressional approval to acquire the Super Hornet and Growler should be a formality, as the US Navy is keen to offset development of the new Block III as much as possible, and Germany already has a close military working relationship with the US DoD. Apart from its NATO ties and a number of USAF and Army units being based in Germany, the Luftwaffe has previously had a squadron of F-4F Phantoms and then Tornados, and now has Eurofighters based at the German Air Force Tactical Training Center (TTC) at Holloman AFB in New Mexico. The Tornado ECR is operated by Germany and Italy and has undergone numerous electronic combat capability improvements since entering service in the 1980s. But the airframes which were manufactured in the 1970s and 80s are becoming increasingly costly to sustain and operate. Germany, France and the US also share use of the Multinational Aircrew Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility (MAEWTF), or ‘Polygone’ ranges in Germany’s south-west, giving it an advanced EW training range on home soil it can use with allied and against dissimilar systems. In order to provide its Growlers with complete data sets and threat libraries, Germany will likely have to establish a data centre in the US in conjunction with the US Navy, similar that operated with the RAAF at Point Mugu in California. German Super Hornets will likely be of the new US Navy Block III standard as Block II production has ended. The Super Hornet is in service with, or is being acquired by, the US Navy, Australia, and Kuwait, and is being considered by Finland and Switzerland.

EDHFCS

DEFENCE HF BID

EDHFCS

Babcock & Lockheed Martin to team for EDHFCS BY MAX BLENKIN

abcock Australasia and Lockheed Martin Australia have announced they will team up to bid for the project to upgrade Defence high frequency (HF) communications to provide a modern, secure high capacity alternative to satellites. Under Joint Project 9101 – Enhanced Defence High Frequency BABCOCK Communications System (EDHFCS) – the modernised HF network will deliver substantially greater capacity and global coverage for a range of capabilities. This includes data, video, imagery, analogue and digital voice, messaging, applications, and the Link 22 secure tactical datalink. Babcock Australasia’s Managing Director for Land Graeme Nayler said Babcock had significant recent international experience in modernising HF communications systems. Babcock was recently awarded the contract to deliver enhanced HF radio communications to the New Zealand Defence Force, along with a 20 years contract for through-life support. Babcock has also provided a high frequency communications service to the UK Ministry of Defence for 18 years. “That is our pedigree,” he told ADBR. “Babcock itself is not an OEM. We are an asset manager and prime systems integrator. What we bring is that deep experience in developing and running operational communications and working very closely with the defence customer to manage a very complex capability over life of type. “This program previously was a project of concern,” he added. “What we wanted to do was bring together a partner in the eyes of the customer to deliver the best capability at the most affordable cost at the right risk.” For its part, Lockheed Martin Australia brings complex acquisition program management and systems engineering experience, backed by substantial HF expertise from developing and operating the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network (JORN) for two decades. Lockheed Martin Australia’s Rotary and Mission Systems Business Development Director Neale Prescott said the ADF once saw HF as a stopgap, or fallback communications methodology. But the key attributes of HF, long-range worldwide communication, were as important as ever.

“HF in terms of the capacity, the areas of the globe that have to be covered, all of those things have been expanded for the ADF,” Prescott said. “That’s the rationale for the new project. There are large parts of the world where HF is one of the more reliable communications methods. In a military sense it’s a valuable asset. “There’s a large amount of fixed infrastructure in Australia and a complex connection to the rest of the ADF data and communications network and that’s a key piece that Babcock and Lockheed Martin can address.” Tenders closed in late February, with the assessment scheduled to run for about a year, while final operational capability (FOC) is scheduled for 2028-30. The Defence Integrated Investment Plan cites a cost of $1-2 billion over the period 2017-2030. The JP9101 industry brief says Defence has under-utilised its HF system over the past two decades because satellite communications had been perceived as reliable and convenient. However, Australia relies on other people’s satellites, particularly the US, and space is increasingly congested and contested. In a future conflict, the ADF might have to operate with degraded or denied satellite access. That leaves HF. The network now comprises transmitters at Darwin, North West Cape, Riverina and Townsville, with network management in Canberra and an integration and test site in Brisbane. The core of this capability is in fair shape thanks to a long running modernisation program, launched in 1996 with Boeing as prime contractor. After some delays, FOC for HF Mod was declared in 2017. While the upgrade proceeds, the existing system needs to remain in service. Nayler said what the Commonwealth wanted from EDHFCS far exceeded what was currently in place. “This really is a technology refresh and the ability to spiral develop the capability over life of type,” he said. Initially core software and some system boxes will be sourced overseas. Then the project will feature a high level of Australian industry content for the technology and long-term support. JP9101 appears set to be a two-horse race. In March, Boeing and BAE Systems Australia announced they were also teaming to bid. That team cited both companies’ HF expertise – Boeing with HF Mod and the Currawong defence communications system, and BAE Systems as the prime for upgrading JORN.

DEFENCE BUDGET

DEFENCE BUDGE T

BUDGET BLUES The Covid-19 pandemic has implications for Defence spending in this yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Budget BY MAX BLENKIN

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he Federal Budget, originally to have been handed down in May but now postponed to October, was to have been the one to take Defence funding to the promised two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). That still seems likely, but with the Covid-19 virus-induced contraction of the economy it could be two per cent of an overall much smaller pie. The 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) featured two funding streams the Coalition government said were critical to executing its plans for Defence. These are the commitment to take funding to two per cent of GDP by 2020-21, and what is referred to as the White Paper funding line – a 10-year plan to pump additional money into Defence funding out to 2025-26. On DWP figures, this would see a Defence budget of $58.742 billion in 2025-26 – around $5.6 billion more than if Defence spending was held to two per cent. The DWP says the extra money will give Defence confidence in its funding so it can implement longterm plans, and to give defence industry the funding certainty to invest in infrastructure, skills and capabilities. Thus, with that funding assured, Australia has embarked on an ambitious plan to create a new industry to build new submarines, warships and armoured vehicles.

‘Now the long-promised surplus of around $5 billion is looking more like a deficit of $100 billion or more.’

Up to now, the government has stuck to its DWP commitments, with the Defence budget steadily rising to $39.3 billion in 2019-20 which is 1.96 per cent of GDP, a mere hop away from the two per cent goal the 2020-21 budget was expected to deliver. Why two per cent? There doesn’t seem to be any reason other than it’s a nice round number, and one which better compares to other nations’ commitments to defence. Two per cent does not magically assure a higher or indeed, any level of defence capability. And Australian defence spending has actually often hit or exceeded two per cent of GDP under both Labor and Coalition governments. But not lately – the last time was in 1995. But now we have Covid-19 and its massive impact on the global economy, and on that of Australia. Up until recently our economy was in pretty good shape, with GDP tipped to reach $2 trillion – doubling in just 13 years – low government debt, and most economic fundamentals pointing in the right direction. But now the long-promised surplus of around $5 billion is looking more like a deficit of $100 billion or more, with vastly increased government debt. By comparison, Australia’s previous biggest post-war deficit of $54.5 billion – or 4.2 per cent of GDP – was achieved by the former Labor government in 2009-10 following the GFC. That was not a happy time for Defence, with then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Treasurer Wayne Swan raiding the Defence budget, particularly the capital budget, in a desperate bid to recover

Concept art of the RAN future Attack class submarine - just one project among billions in expenditure planned for Defence .

DEFENCE BUDGET

the deficit and to deliver a surplus before the 2013 federal election. Neither happened, Labor lost, and the Defence budget has been catching up ever since. So where to now? Outside of Defence, the leading authority on the Defence budget is the Canberra-based Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) which every year crunches the budget figures to produce its well-regarded Defence Budget Brief. The brief is prepared by senior analyst Dr Marcus Hellyer who, in a February presentation just before Covid-19 hit, was quite upbeat about the outlook. “The government’s promise is only to hit two per cent of GDP by 2021 and we should arrive pretty much bang on,” he said. “Beyond that, the budget actually grows beyond two per cent if we follow the White Paper 2016 funding line,” he added. “It actually gets quite a lot bigger than two per cent of GDP… up to about 2.2 per cent.” He said the government had actually delivered within a fraction of a per cent on its DWP funding commitments – quite remarkable in the history of defence funding. But the question was, what would happen beyond 2021. “The big question to me has always been: will the government deliver the White Paper funding line, or will it get to two per cent and say, ‘that’s it, we’re sticking at two per cent’,” he said. “If that’s the case, Defence would take a $5 billion funding hit every year.” By the end of this decade, the shortfall between two per cent of GDP and the DWP funding line could be as much as $10 billion per year. Hellyer said there were abundant reasons to indicate two per cent alone would not be enough. Equipment sustainment costs were rising rapidly, as were the capital costs of creating a shipbuilding industry and building, new, 30 or more ships. That would eventually plateau “at a very high level for all eternity”, he said. With operations such as Afghanistan and border protection substantially reduced, operational costs are currently down but may not stay that way in an increasingly uncertain world. Then there’s a growing community expectation, arising from the disastrous summer of bushfires, that Defence will be available to assist next time, perhaps with expanded capabilities. Defence can do this very well, but it’s not good value for money. For example, an Army or Navy MRH-90 helicopter costs about $30,000 an hour to operate, against a few thousand dollars per hour to fly a civilian helicopter. Further, using very expensive Defence assets on civil tasks means they may not be available for their primary mission or warfighting. “If it is going to be done in Defence, my view is Defence needs to establish capabilities specifically for this and not use its warfighting capabilities, because this probably will become the new normal,” Dr Hellyer said.

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Dr Hellyer said there is also strong justification for additional capital funding for Defence. “Greater Defence self-reliance will cost more,” he added. “There is an argument for enhanced strike capability and for larger war stocks of guided munitions because, on day one of the war, we are probably going to blow through everything we have now. “We have been arguing strongly that we need to hedge more in autonomous systems. Our business model for Defence is very over-leveraged in traditional manned platforms. There are many other areas of emerging technologies where we need to do more, such as space.” So far, the government insists it will stand by the DWP funding line. On April 8, The Australian newspaper reported Finance Minister Mathias Cormann as saying a Covid-19 hit to the GDP would not affect Defence spending. But five months until the budget is a long time in politics, especially in the midst of a fast-moving pandemic which arrived suddenly, may not be over and, however it pans out, will have a long-term impact on the economy. Considering its rhetoric on Defence spending over a very long period, the

The MRH-90 Taipan costs $30,000 an hour to operate compared with much lowercost civilian helicopters. DEFENCE

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Dr Marcus Hellyer: ‘This is not a time to be trading off Defence spending, but to be actually doubling down.’ ASPI

government could not step back from its Defence funding commitments without political pain, especially with an election due next year. What goes around would come around. In opposition, the coalition mercilessly bashed Labor for taking Defence spending to its lowest percentage of GDP since before World War 2, establishing an ongoing narrative that Labor is soft on Defence. “If the government does miss two per cent in the coming budget, they will hear about it,” Dr Hellyer told ADBR. “Labor will not let them forget it.” But what if the government decided Defence would have to bear its share of Covid-19 pain? Dr Hellyer said this would most likely come from the capital budget. Typically, the Defence budget comprises around a third on personnel costs, a third on operating costs, and a third on capital investment – although the capital part of the budget is set to grow dramatically as big projects such as shipbuilding ramp up. “If the government decides Defence is not a funding priority, there will be potentially quite a big hit,” he said. “The hit historically tends to come from the capital budget. One thing we know very well about Defence is (that) when they have a long-term funding plan they plan to spend every single dollar. There is no buffer in there to absorb cuts.” Why the capital budget? Governments can’t easily raid personnel funds (wages)

‘Spending up on defence infrastructure – bases and facilities – is a proven means of injecting money into the nation.’ The E-7A Wedgetail is just one project with a Budget commitment to upgrade. DEFENCE

or operating costs, but the capital budget contains multiple items which, in tough times could be deferred or reassessed as unnecessary. Dr Hellyer said government needed to acknowledge that our strategic circumstances were quite uncertain. “We have an increasingly assertive and aggressive China,” he said. “While the US is still our ally, the question is to what extent can we rely on them and what can we rely on them for. “This is a time not to be trading off Defence spending, but to be actually doubling down on Defence spending. The trick is to make sure you spend it well.” Another factor could come into play – using Defence spending to help jump start a dawdling economy. Spending up on defence infrastructure – bases and facilities – is a proven means of injecting money into the nation, especially in regional areas, and it can be ramped up quickly by bringing forward work, creating new projects, or expanding the scope of existing projects. This could also be a very good time for projects with a significant Australian industry component, and not just the big ones. Anecdotal reports indicate Australian Industrial Capability (AIC) may take a greater weighting in downselect decisions, and that the decision on at least one LAND project decision may be brought forward from mid-2021 to late 2020. As if to underline this point, on April 15 the government launched an independent review of the Centre for Defence Industry Capability (CDIC) to assess how it can better help Australian SMEs to do business with Defence.

PROJECT CURRAWONG

UPD AT E

PROJECT CURRAWONG The LAND 2072/2B communications system continues to develop BY MAX BLENKIN

efence has given the tick of approval to Release Two of the Boeing Defence Australia Currawong communications system. Release Two will deliver new options for deployed troops including secure tactical communications on the otherwise insecure public internet. Also included is a new Troposcatter Communications System, providing secure beyond-line-of-site communications out to hundreds of kilometres, a useful alternative when satellite access is denied or congested. Release Two builds on Release One which entered service in December 2017, and will be followed by the final Release Three at the end of 2020. Release Three will include a vehicle-mounted system plus a Bushmaster vehicle equipped as a ‘headquarters on the move’, and a video conferencing capability. The Currawong project is rolling out a very advanced capability for the Australian Army and RAAF. Boeing was awarded the contract for what is now LAND 2072 Phase 2B in September 2015, although the company had been working on this since 2011. The total project cost is around $1 billion, including sustainment. Boeing’s Project Currawong program director Ian Vett says this would be the best in the world, and added that other countries were interested. “At the moment, the UK is looking at a new system and may be interested in a Currawong-based system as an option,” he told ADBR. “The US is also looking to replace and upgrade components of the WIN-T (the US Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical) program, and is talking to us about some options with Currawong,” he added. “The Australian Army and RAAF will probably be at the forefront of that IBTN (Integrated Battlefield Telecommunications Network) technology.”

In Australian service, Currawong is replacing Parakeet, a communications network developed in the 1990s which was then regarded as very advanced. Parakeet delivered encrypted satellite communications, though essentially from point-topoint rather than as an integrated network. Currawong IBTN connects unit nodes with each other and to a central headquarters, providing vastly more capacity, security, versatility, and redundancy. It features multiple communications options for deployed forces – first choice would usually be satellite, specifically BOEING the US military WGS constellation which provides fast, secure high bandwidth comms. Australia only has proportional access to WGS, based on funding one of the 12 WGS satellites, but the ADF also has access to a hosted payload on the Optus C1 satellite. In future conflicts, satellite communications could be congested, degraded, or even completely denied, hence the need for alternatives. These could include microwave high-capacity line-of-sight – good out to around 80 kilometres – and the new troposcatter system. Should circumstances permit, it’s entirely possible to connect

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Currawong nodes by fibre-optic cable which is secure and delivers very high bandwidth. Finally, Currawong can allow use of existing infrastructure – ie. the internet – through the new capability for secure communications called External Network Access Point (ENAP). Troposcatter is a reborn communications capability for the ADF. This is point-to-point with each system comprising two 2.5-metre antennae at each end, and operates in microwave C-Band (4-8 GHz). Normally radio communications in the UHF and SHF bands are strictly line-of-sight but by using troposcatter systems a small part of the energy of the signal is scattered by water vapour in the upper reaches of the troposphere. That’s the region of the Earth’s atmosphere which contains most of the air and the weather. With the right equipment, that signal is detectable. This is proven technology with various civil and military systems in use around the world and, for the military, an attraction is that the signal is very difficult to intercept. Ian Vett said this allowed much more range than a normal microwave line-of-sight radio and also very good bandwidth. “It works very well in highly humid environments where satellite communications may not work so well,” he said. But he stressed this isn’t a satellite terminal and doesn’t pretend to be. BDA is delivering 35 troposcatter communications sets under Release Two. Army headquarters will decide where they go, considering the current Covid-19-releated constraints for travel and training. The publicly available internet is far from secure, and Vett says ENAP will be a bit of a game-changer for the ADF, giving soldiers the ability to use existing internet capability for secure communications. “Think of any existing infrastructure that is already available as a bearer. You basically use this ENAP to plug into it to provide a secure transmission bearer,” he said.

‘Currawong has employed Australiandesigned and built software and hardware...’

“Innovations such as the ENAP are groundbreaking,” he added. “It eliminates the traditional restriction of needing to use specific Australian bearers, giving deployed forces the ability to securely communicate in remote and hostile environments. It provides a very safe way of using the existing internet system without necessarily having to bring massive antennas and radios.” Release Two also incorporates updates to the core capabilities delivered in Release One. Vett said these core capabilities featured networking software called IPNRS, plus the Mission System Manager which manages and controls the network. “It is a very intuitive system that we have designed from the ground up,” he explained. “Both pieces of software, the networking and the Mission System Manager have been significantly upgraded, and Defence will get a new version of that in Release Two. That gives much more capability, more usability, and more flexibility. We have finished the acceptance testing, now we are moving on to delivery of those systems.” Boeing’s Release One technology was delivered just 27 months after contract signature, a notable achievement considering the extensive software and hardware development required. For Currawong, Boeing decided to develop its own $7.5 million test and assembly centre in the Brisbane outer suburb of Wacol, officially opened by Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price in October 2019. Currawong has employed Australian-designed and built software and hardware, though using off-the-shelf components where appropriate. Significantly, because Currawong is Australian tech, it comes without the complications of US technology and the requirements for compliance with the US International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regulations. Release Three will bring significant security enhancements. Vett said it would bring those nodes and capabilities now on the black (insecure) network side to the red (secure) network. “It elevates it from being a black network to enabling protected and secret networks. It provides all the security partitions and provides purpose built hardware that sits in those domains,” he said. The vehicle-mounted systems are also a key part of Release Three. “Everything we do at the moment is man-portable. It comes in transit cases that the soldiers put on the back of trucks and move around,” Vett said. Release Three will provide a terminal vehiclemounted solution for use in the back of vehicles such as Hawkei or G-wagon. “It has all the same elements in Releases One, Two and Three, but are plugged into racks in a system that has its own generator and brings everything with it,” he said. “A lot happens in Release Three. We are intensely working on it now and have been for a while in parallel with Release Two.”

10 YEARS OF SUPER HORNET

COVER STORY

A SUPER Ten years of the F/A-18F Super Hornet in RAAF service BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

he RAAF celebrated a decade of service of the Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet in Australia on March 26. The date marked the 10th anniversary of the arrival of Super Hornet Delivery 1 (SHD1), the first five of 24 Super Hornets at RAAF Amberley west of Brisbane after their eight-day trans-Pacific ferry from NAS Lemoore in California via Honolulu, Pago Pago, and Auckland.

Originally acquired for the RAAF as a 10-year bridging air combat capability (BACC), the Super Hornet has proved to be invaluable and has evolved into a capability that is 5th generation in all but name, and will now serve a full 20+ years life of type through to at least 2030. Today, the Super Hornets are operated by 1SQN at Amberley, complemented by 11 Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft which arrived in Australia in 2017 and are operated at Amberley by 6SQN.

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DECADE

SUPER HORNET DEVELOPMENT The Super Hornet was developed from the F/A-18C ‘classic’ Hornet to fulfil a US Navy requirement for a carrier-borne strike aircraft. Conceived in the late 1980s but initially rejected by the US Navy, the concept was resurrected following the 1991 cancellation of the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamic A-12 Avenger program which had become hampered by development delays and cost overruns. More than just an upgrade or enhancement of the F/A-18C, the Super Hornet was derived

from a number of ‘Hornet 2000’ concepts which proposed a scaled-up but essentially all-new airframe incorporating late model F/A-18C/D systems. The F/A-18E/F promised an aircraft with a strike reach and payload comparable with that of the A-6E Intruder and A-12, and a fleet defence fighter superior in handling and almost comparable in payload range to the F-14 Tomcat, all in a single airframe. The Super Hornet is 1.3 metres longer than the classic Hornet and features a 25 per cent greater

10 YEARS OF SUPER HORNET

wing area and a larger leading edge root extension (LEX) for better airflow characteristics and greater controllability at high angles of attack. A $US4.88b Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract for the Super Hornet was signed in July 1992. Production of the first aircraft began in May 1994, and aircraft ‘E1’ flew for the first time in November 1995. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) of the aircraft was approved by Congress that year, and E1 moved to the Navy’s test facility at NAS Patuxent River in February 1996 to start a flight test and operational test & evaluation (OT&E or OPEVAL) program. The Super Hornet was declared operationally effective and operationally suitable in February 2000. The jet’s first deployment was abroad the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2002, and Super Hornets first saw combat in November of that year over Iraq’s southern no-fly zone. Despite sharing no common structural elements, the first Block 1 configured Super Hornet was basically a growth version of the late model F/A-18C/D and had many of the same sensors and avionics installed including the AN/APG-73 mechanically scanned array radar. The aircraft were so similar looking that Boeing and the US Navy managed to get the program funded through an engineering change proposal (ECP) usually reserved for upgrades rather than a more comprehensive new aircraft development program. Super Hornet production from Lot 26 onwards switched to the much more capable Block II model. The Block II features a redesigned forward fuselage ‘firewall’, radome, and avionics bay to accommodate the AN/APG-79 Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, and other enhancements that were developed for Boeing’s X-32 JSF contender which lost out to the Lockheed Martin X-35. The integration of many of these 5th generation systems has seen the Block II F/A-18E/F commonly referred to as 4.5 generation combat aircraft. This unofficial designation is reinforced by subtle but important shaping, advanced manufacturing techniques, and the use of radar absorbent materials (RAM) that provide the Block II with a significantly lower radar cross-section than 4th generation fighters such as the classic Hornet. The most obvious physical features are the shape and alignment of the Super Hornet’s engine intakes and the much cleaner underside. But more subtle enhancements can be seen in faceted shaping around angle of attack vanes, air data sensors, and heat exchanger vents, saw-tooth edges and overlapping edges on undercarriage bay doors, and the use of conformal or embedded antennas. Advances in manufacturing techniques have provided much smaller gaps between panels and access bays. RAM is used on the leading edges, inside the intakes, on the radome, and on the aircraft’s underside, while internally mounted radar blockers cover the engine turbine faces.

The first 135 Block IIs were delivered with APG-73s while the more advanced APG-79 AESA completed its development. Deliveries of new-build jets fitted with the AESA commenced in 2007, and many of the early Block IIs have subsequently been retrofitted. The Block 1 jets without the forward fuselage enhancements capable of housing the AESA have retained their combat capability, but have largely been relegated to training or buddy tanking duties in US Navy service. Another key sensor on the Block II is the AN/ALQ-214 integrated defensive electronic countermeasures (IDECM) radio frequency countermeasures (RFCM) suite, and the BAE Systems AN/ALE-55 fibre optic towed decoy (FOTD). The IDECM RFCM system provides three layers of defence – suppression to deny, delay and degrade adversary acquisition and tracking; deception to mislead guided weapons away from the aircraft if a track solution is obtained and a launch occurs; and end-game seduction capabilities with the rear fuselage mounted FOTD being reeled out behind the aircraft to electronically seduce adversary missiles. The advanced sensors are ‘fused’ and presented on a common display for the Super Hornet pilot or weapon systems operator. While not as advanced as the ‘fusion’ engine and large screen display on the F-35, the Super Hornet’s multi-sensor integration (MSI) system still offers a greater degree of situational awareness compared to ‘federated’ systems on the classic Hornet and other 4th generation fighters. The MSI has been uploaded to US Navy and RAAF jets in three phases in conjunction with planned software configuration set drops since 2013. Each iteration has offered greater levels of sensor fusion for the air-to-ground and air-to-air missions, and also has provisions for new sensors such as the forthcoming infrared search and track (IRST).

Then Commander ACG AIRCDRE, now Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld (front centre) with then OC 82WG GPCAPT, now AVM Steve Roberton (front left), then CO 1SQN WGCDR, now AIRCDRE Glen Braz and the aircrews and maintainers of 1SQN prior to departing NAS Lemoore on the first ferry flight. ADF

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JSF DELAYS The Super Hornet was initially acquired for the RAAF as a bridging air combat capability (BACC) through Project AIR 5349. The requirement for BACC followed concerns that the RAAF’s F-111C strike fleet was becoming increasingly costly to operate and was experiencing some fatigue issues. The F-111 was an incredibly complicated aircraft and was becoming more difficult and more expensive to sustain. It was also recognised that, despite its impressive range and payload, the F-111’s limited electronic warfare self-protection capability and its lack of GPS-guided weapons and secure communications, combined with the emerging counter-air threat in the region, meant its range was effectively limited to that its escorting F/A-18A/B classic Hornets in an operational scenario. At the same time, the F-35 JSF program which was selected by Australia in 2002 to replace both the F-111 and the classic Hornet from 2012, was experiencing developmental and programmatic delays, and the RAAF determined that the F-111 wasn’t viable to be extended beyond that time. These delays came to a head in the 2004 to 2006 period when Lockheed Martin concluded a STOVL Weight Attack Team (SWAT) analysis. Although initially targeted to remove about 1,500kg from the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the jet, the study flowed on to all three variants of the jet which led to a redesign of several key structural components, and which resulted in several years being added to the EMD program. The delays continued right through JSF development and the program’s schedule didn’t really stabilise until 2012, although concurrency issues where developmental issues are found despite production being underway have continued to hamper the program.

‘...the RAAF quickly became concerned about the potential air combat capability gap.’

Then Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL, now ACM (ret) Mark Binskin , US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Skinner, then Defence Minister John Faulkner, Boeing executives Dennis Muilenburg and Bob Gower, then Ipswich Mayor Paul Pisasale, and then CO 1SQN WGCDR, now AIRCDRE Glen Braz at the SHD-1 arrival ceremony at Amberley. ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

Also in 2012, the Gillard Labor government delayed the planned AIR 6000 Phase 2B acquisition of 58 jets – the main bulk of Australia’s F-35s – by two years, ostensibly to “better align” Australia’s program with those of the US and other partner nations. This had the effect of pushing the RAAF’s planned initial operational capability (IOC) back from 2018 to late 2020, and full operational capability (FOC) to 2023.

THE ‘GANG OF SIX’ With the results of the SWAT analysis and the subsequent delays to the F-35’s development program, the RAAF quickly became concerned about the potential air combat capability gap. “There were a few concerns running with the air combat capability at that time,” former Chief of Defence Force ACM Mark Binskin told ADBR. “One of the concerns was the fragility of the F-111 because, from a strike capability point of view, the government felt it was relying on a capability that could suddenly have a problem and not be a viable capability. “The other issue was, the investment going to the F-111 just wasn’t delivering a commensurate capability as an outcome,” he added. “If you think about the achieved annual flying rate of effort back then, it just wasn’t providing the capability or a return on the investment that we were putting into it.” Then Chief of Defence Force ACM Angus Houston expressed confidence that any potential air combat gap would be covered by five capabilities that were then in development; the Project AIR 5418 JASSM stand-off strike missile; the AIR 5402 KC-30 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT); the AIR 5077 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system; the AIR 5333 Vigilare ground-based command and control system; and the comprehensive AIR 5376 Hornet Upgrade Program (HUG) to provide the classic Hornets with new sensors, avionics, communications, weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and structural enhancements. But all five of those projects were either experiencing developmental issues or were new and not yet ‘bedded down’ in service. In 2005 ACM Binskin was an Air Commodore in the role of Director General Capability Planning (DGCP) in Air Force Headquarters. He was tasked by ACM Houston to manage a group of senior experts from the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO, now CASG), Capability Development Group (CDG), the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO, now DST Group), from the RAAF’s Air Combat Group (ACG), and from the New Air Combat Capability (NACC) project team. “The group became known as the ‘gang of six’, and our job was to meet to work across Defence in the air domain to ensure that the big five projects were delivered in order to ensure there was no air

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combat gap,” ACM Binskin recalled. “We worked to minimise any loss in air combat capability during the transition period to F-35s. During that time, Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, concerned with the growing risk, asked Defence to provide some air combat capability options to government, including what ended up being called the ‘bridging capability’.” Led by ACM Binskin, the ‘gang of six’ briefly considered several contingency options for a bridging capability, including Boeing’s F-15E Strike Eagle, the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor, and the Super Hornet. “Government wanted a low-risk option,” Binskin recalls. “And realistically, the Strike Eagle and the F-22 just weren’t going to be lowrisk options. So the best option was to go down a path that we knew.” Due to an obscure 1997 US law, the F-22 was supposedly not available for sale to any other nation, although anecdotally it is felt that had Australia made a formal request to buy it, an ‘export’ version could have been developed – no doubt at significant cost. Regardless, at that time the F-22 had only just entered service with the USAF and was still very much a single-mission air superiority fighter. And due to a large reduction in the USAF’s planned acquisition from 750 to just 187 aircraft, the unit cost would have been three times that of a Block II Super Hornet. With its range and multi-role capability, the F-15E would have been an awesome capability for the RAAF. But the RAAF had no current experience operating a USAF-origin fighter, and the F-15E version built for the USAF had ceased production in 2001. Subsequent variants for South Korea (F-15K), Singapore (F-15SG), and Israel (F-15I) – and later advanced versions for Saudi Arabia and Qatar – have incorporated different engines and, in many cases, more advanced sensors, electronic warfare suites, avionics and weapons. Therefore, any potential economies of scale from commonality with the USAF F-15E could not have been realised. Conversely, the Super Hornet was essentially seen as a “big Hornet”. In 2006, the RAAF had been operating the classic Hornet for 21 years and had developed strong relationships with the US Navy and the main contractors on both Hornet types – Boeing, General Electric (engines), and Raytheon (sensors). “If we had gone to a different aircraft type like F-22 or F-15, it would have been as big a change in the support side, and would have added considerable risk and cost,” then Director Air Combat Transition Office (DACTO), GPCAPT (now AVM) Steve ‘Zed’ Roberton told ADBR. “We had to go with an aircraft and a system that we had the capacity to introduce. With the level of commonality, the maintenance philosophy, and the way of doing things – although it was all-digitised with Super Hornet compared to the classic – we already ‘spoke’ US Navy strike fighter, so that’s what made it possible.”

ACTO In late 2005, then WGCDR Roberton had just completed a tour as Commanding Officer 75SQN and was posted to Canberra for a new role. But before he was able to assume that role, he was diverted by ACM Binskin and then Chief of Air Force, AIRMSHL Geoff Shepherd, and was tasked to run what would become the Bridging Air Combat Capability (BACC) project. The ‘gang of six’ had established the new Air Combat Transition Office (ACTO), and AVM Roberton was to head that up. In order to maintain a degree of secrecy of and agility for the project, DACTO would report directly through AFHQ and CDG, with a “dotted line” link to the DMO. The plan to acquire and introduce the Super Hornet, including basing and facilities, manning, sustainment and all the other things required to transition to a new capability was mapped out by ACM Binskin and AVM Roberton with input from the rest of the ‘gang of six’. AVM Roberton then had about a month to come up with a plan that could go to government. “We had 32 working days from that day,” AVM Roberton recalls. “We put together what would normally be about four years’ worth of capability development work in time to present it to government for consideration. “We had done something similar with C-17, and so proved that it was possible,” he added. “The difference of course, was that the C-17 came with an all-in package with an established training pipeline and global support package. “But with Super Hornet we were going to have to build a workforce model and a sustainment model ourselves. There was no training pipeline, so we had to work that out. We had the option to do it with the US Navy, or we could have trained on classics.” Brendan Nelson had requested a briefing in mid-2006 on the five projects that the ‘gang of six’ were overseeing, and it was there that ACM Binskin presented a Super Hornet option to him. Despite

AIRCDRE, now AVM Steve Roberton in the Middle East during his posting as Task Group Commander. ADF

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An RAAF Super Hornet and KC-30A MRTT in the Middle East. ADF

there being no money in the capital budget for the BACC, Dr Nelson took it to cabinet and came back with supplementary funding and instructions to develop the plan. “The government decided that they weren’t willing to wear the risk that was inherent in the air combat capability at the time,” ACM Binskin said. “Brendan Nelson pushed it hard, and so the direction out of that was to pursue a Super Hornet option and come back in three months. “So we sat down and we looked at what would a Super Hornet capability look like,” he added. “We had a general idea that we had briefed government – when you do the numbers, you’re looking at 23 or 24 aircraft to have a training capability and an operational capability and allow for a level of attrition, so we went with 24. Also to be able to look at it as an F-111 replacement, you wanted to make sure you had similar numbers.” AVM Roberton recalls, “What we did was use NACC methodology that had been applied to the JSF. So I applied that to Super Hornet and the answer came up with 23 point-something aircraft, so we rounded it up to 24. We also worked out how many forward looking infrared (FLIR) pods we would need, how many training missiles we would need, that sort of thing. “We then went through the committee process, and briefed General Hurley (then Chief CDG, now Governor General), the Secretary and others. They basically said, ‘Yes, that sounds good’. I walked out jokingly saying, ‘Damn, I should have asked for more pods!’.”

ARCHANGEL When buying military equipment from the US, dealing with the Pentagon can be fraught with layers of bureaucracy, approvals processes, and political machinations. But fortunately for ACM Binskin and AVM Roberton and their teams, they were

able to build and maintain a high degree of momentum on the project partly because Boeing had quietly been working away for a number of years to get the Super Hornet in to Australia. In the late 1990s when the RAAF was considering whether to upgrade or replace the F/A-18A/B, Boeing had proposed a buy of Block I Super Hornets as an option. To this end, the company had laid some groundwork with the US Navy’s Project Management Activity (PMA 265) office – which also runs classic Hornet support and sustainment services for US Navy and foreign military sales customers – to clear some of these potential barriers. Internally dubbed ‘Archangel’, Boeing’s plan was initially shelved after the RAAF elected to upgrade its classic Hornets under the multi-phased HUG program, and the company’s focus shifted to supporting HUG. But Archangel was revived and updated when Australia committed to the JSF program in 2002, the company’s thinking being – rather presciently as it turned out – that the Super Hornet would be an ideal ‘Plan B’ alternative to the JSF should that program fall over or suffer delays. To this end, Boeing kept a watching brief with the RAAF and DMO on the Super Hornet program, including the development of the Block II. Once Defence got the approval from Government, ACM Binskin contacted Boeing. “I told them, ‘this is not a done deal, but we want to explore procuring Super Hornets’,” he said. “I gave them the basics of what we were after. (As part of the watching brief,) they had already looked at what it would take to transition out of F-111 and into Super Hornet on their own project (Archangel). They had already basically worked on it and they used the USN plan of going from Tomcat to Super Hornet as a model for going from F-111 to Super Hornet.” At that point Boeing brought the US Navy in on the BACC proposal. “The cooperation from

F/A-18F SUPER HORNET

the US Navy and from Boeing was absolutely brilliant,” ACM Binskin said. “Super Hornet has some capabilities the classic doesn’t have with accompanying sensitivities, and we were to be the first foreign force to operate Super Hornets. “We wanted to go US Navy-common, which itself from a clearance point of view was going to provide some issues,” he added. “But the US Navy and Boeing really pulled together to clear any roadblocks to do it – they were conscious of the short timeframe that we had to do it, and we were only going to lose this opportunity through forcing delayed decisions and not being proactive.” PMA 265 advocated to Congress on behalf of the RAAF – including the need for Australia’s jets to come from US Navy production lots which had already been funded. At the end of the three-month planning process, Brendan Nelson took it back to Cabinet in August 2006. “The Minister pushed it hard, we got approval, and we got supplemental funding,” ACM Binskin said. “Then he and the Prime Minister stepped out the next day or the day after at Fairbairn and announced it! It was literally within two days of the Government decision, and the rest is history.” Around this time the ‘gang of six’ began to focus their attention on other projects including some of the more sensitive and troublesome elements of HUG, while AVM Roberton and the forming ACTO team began to work the details of the Super Hornet acquisition and the operational model.

OPTIONS There were several options ACTO had to consider in defining the RAAF’s Super Hornet capability. These included what electro optical/infrared pod would the aircraft carry, what weapons would we buy, how would an instrument landing system – as opposed the US Navy carrier landing system – be incorporated, how the RAAF training model would differ to that of the carrier-centric US Navy and, perhaps most importantly, would the RAAF buy single-seat F/A18Es, or two-seat F/A-18Fs? Early in the project, AVM Roberton put forward the case for the two-seat F/A-18F, especially as flight controls can be installed or de-installed in the back seat of the jet. “I said ‘we have got to get all F models’,” he said. “The RAAF was just starting to close the fast-jet Navigator/Air Combat Officer training pipeline down, so I had to act quick. “We needed two seats for three reasons. The first was so we could get the most out of this platform. Even though I was a single-seat guy, I’d done some two-seat operations with the US Marine Corps on their D model Hornets. I knew the Super Hornet would be like going from dial-up to broadband in the amount of information it brings. “The second reason was, if we get two-seaters we’ve only got to get one aircraft type. We won’t need to have some trainers and separate operational aircraft. We could move the sticks around between the back seats for the number of trainers we’d want. The third reason was we had to retain and use all of

A ‘bombed up’ F/A-18F breaks away from a KC-30A during operations in the Middle East. ADF

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the smart operators we had from the F-111 navigator workforce to help us get through the transition – not just for Super Hornet, but for F-35 as well. “It was funny because ‘Binny’ and I – two singleseat fighter guys – were arguing for a two-seater F/A-18F... what strange world have we landed in?! But it ended up being, I believe, the right decision for all of those practical measures. We would not be anywhere near as well positioned for F-35 transition without the capacity of the smart humans with F-111 experience if we hadn’t done that.” Another option was whether to operate the Super Hornet’s AN/ASQ-228 ATFLIR targeting pod as used by the US Navy, or to integrate the newer and more advanced AN/AAQ-28(v) Litening AT pod being acquired for the RAAF’s upgraded classic Hornets. In the end, with the goal being to remain US Navy-common, the ATFLIR was acquired. The other major option proposed by the RAAF was the pre-configuration of the last 12 of the RAAF’s F/A-18Fs with structural and wiring enhancements. This would allow them to be upgraded to EA-18G Growler airborne electronic warfare aircraft if that then nascent idea to acquire such a capability could evolve into a firm requirement at a later date. The changes included a higher capacity wiring harness, modifications to the wing fold mechanism, the addition of at least six extra antenna apertures, and the incorporation of additional avionics racks in the nose and LEXs. The weight penalty and cost of these changes added about 100kg, and about A$3.5 million per aircraft. “In late 2007 it became apparent that it was feasible to look at pre-wiring our second batch of jets,” AVM Roberton recalled. “The way we positioned it was, we had a new government with a new Defence Minister coming in, and we made the argument that rather than being heavily reliant on the US, when we bought the Super Hornet we suddenly had a real opportunity. “I described Growler as the ‘SAS of airpower’,” he added. “It doesn’t matter whether you’re talking World War 3 or whether you’re talking about counter terrorism and counter IED, the Growler has got capabilities that are applicable across the conflict spectrum. That would be a massive force-enhancement and we might never have had another chance to get it. “What’s more, the capabilities of Growler are wound into the DNA of the Super Hornet. If we are entrusted by the US Navy to have Super Hornet, this would open up our own awareness and establish relationships which the ADF can leverage as a whole joint force for many years to come.”

‘“I described Growler as the ‘SAS of airpower”.’

AVM Roberton’s next priority was to build and maintain a high degree of speed and agility in the program. “Boeing, the US Navy, and Australia’s Defence Department are large organisations that have a level of bureaucratic inertia, and there are good reasons for that,” he said. “So, I had a ‘300 knot’ philosophy – 300 knots is about the corner speed of a Hornet or a Super Hornet, that being the speed where you can pull maximum G in an aircraft for the minimum radius of turn. “So, we had to stay above corner speed for our three bureaucracies, because if any of us ever slow down we will get buried in the process,” he added. “So, everything was about pace. We weren’t doing anything unsafe and were doing everything transparently, but ‘speed is life’.”

NOT A BRIDGING CAPABILITY The foreign military sale contract with the US Navy for 24 Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornets was signed in 2007 and included a large pool of spares and ground support equipment, weapons, and an initial training package with the US Navy. Because the Super Hornet BACC was supposed to only last 10 years until the then-planned F-35A FOC, the government openly quoted the entire cost of the capability including manning, base facilities, training, sustainment, and even some consumables would be A$6.3 billion for the 10 years. But further slips in the JSF program – both developmental and political – soon meant that, even before the first jets arrived in Australia, it was clear the Super Hornet was going to be in service beyond 2020. Even back in 2006/07, the ‘gang of six’ and the ACTO teams were planning to set up the Super Hornet for success beyond the initial 10-year plan. “Although this was all about a bridging air combat capability, I don’t think many of us really believed that we were really going to be withdrawing the Super Hornet after 10 years,” said AVM Roberton. ACM Binskin added, “We called it bridging, but we were fully expecting that it wasn’t just going to be a 10-year project. “Because a lot of decisions can change in 10 years, we fully knew that we were getting an ‘all-up round’ as a capability because it needed to be set up with logistics, weapons, and everything to see it through as a mature capability. So that gave government the best flexibility for decisionmaking in the future – we didn’t want to get 10 years down the road and have it all fade out because we hadn’t thought about it.” With the JSF concurrency issues continuing to drag on, it was quietly decided in 2015 that the RAAF Super Hornet would likely serve a full life of type in service of at least 20 years to 2030, and that it would remain in lockstep with the US Navy’s spiral upgrade path, formerly called its ‘Flightplan’.

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DELIVERY In early 2009, the initial cadre of RAAF arrived at various locations in the US including NAS Lemoore in California to prepare to take delivery of the first Super Hornets, and to establish an initial training system with the US Navy. Leading that cadre was then Commanding Officer designate of 1SQN and former F-111 pilot, WGCDR (now AIRCDRE) Glen Braz, and then SQNLDR John Haly (now GPCAPT Officer Commanding 81WG), who had extended his exchange posting with the US Navy at Lemoore on the classic Hornet to the Super Hornet. The rest of the cadre was built from a handpicked mix of F-111 and classic Hornet pilots and navigators. “Philosophically, I thought at the time if we ended up flying the Super Hornet like the classic Hornet, we can do that safely and efficiently, but we won’t be leveraging all the great capabilities of this jet,” AVM Roberton said. “But if we flew it like an F-111, it would be a tragedy! “This was not just going to be a bomb truck,” he added. “This is a modern strike fighter, so we had to look at it as a cultural change process. We chose a bunch of folks from both 81 Wing (Hornet) and 82 Wing (F-111) with the right kinds of attitudes, background, and experience, and a couple of guys who had done Strike Eagle exchanges with the USAF. “We got folks like Glen Braz who had instructed at 76 Squadron and spent a fair bit of time down with 81 Wing and 78 Wing, and we had a really good mix of people who could add the right balance of experience and temperament to get the most out of the platform and to keep learning.” With the similarities in systems and philosophy between the classic and Super Hornets and the massive support from the US Navy, the RAAF had a real capability almost from day one. The first RAAF Super Hornet, A44-201 – with by then Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Mark Binskin’s name painted on the cockpit rail – was handed over to the RAAF at Boeing’s St Louis facility in 2009. The first jet was the designated test jet which was tasked to test the ILS and other minor RAAFspecific systems at the US Navy’s NAS China Lake test facility prior to release, so it didn’t make the first delivery flight in 2010. Another of the initial cadre of pilots was F-111 pilot, then SQNLDR (now CO 1SQN, WGCDR) Ric Peapell. “I started on the Super at the beginning of 2009,” WGCDR Peapell told ADBR. “I went across to the US and flew with VFA-122, I did my training and then stayed there on the staff teaching the US Navy guys and some of the Aussie guys that were coming through.” As the US Navy’s west coast fleet replenishment squadron (FRS), VFA-122 is responsible for operational conversion training, refreshes, or upgrade training on the Super Hornet, and all of the RAAF’s Super Hornet crews trained with the squadron for a few years until the RAAF achieved FOC and training switched to Amberley.

PATH TO FOC After the initial delivery to Amberley, the RAAF’s Super Hornet capability was built up fairly rapidly, and all 24 jets were in-country by the end of 2011. WGCDR Peapell recalls it was a reasonable change for former F-111 crews adapting to the new jet. “All of a sudden I went into an airplane that now I could do everything myself,” he said. “And then I had a guy in back who could also do everything short of flying the airplane. So I found myself stepping on their toes a bit because I didn’t have to ask or wait for the WSO to do things, I would often find myself thinking, ‘Hey, I can do all this now, so I’m just going to do it myself’. Whereas the classic Hornet guys were likely more inclined to think, ‘I’ve now got a guy to share some of the workload with, that’s going to increase my capacity really quickly’. “So we came at it from different angles initially, and we went through a few crew model changes in the first couple of years,” he added. “That was a combination of, we had guys coming off Strike Eagle and RAF Tornado exchanges, we obviously had the classic Hornet single-seat community, and the F-111 community all coming together to work out what is

SHD-1 arrives at Amberley, escorted by four F-111s. ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN

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‘“All of a sudden I went into an airplane that now I could do everything myself”.’

The crew members of SHD-1 walk towards officials, families and friends at Amberley after shut down. Then SQNLDR, now WGCDR Peapell is second from right ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN

going to be the best way to fly this airplane.” Anecdotal comments indicate the tactics started to gel and the Super Hornet really started to show its incredible capabilities at Exercise Aces North in 2013, the culmination exercise of the RAAF’s biennial Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI) Course. This coincided with the return of an RAAF pilot from the first F-22 exchange who brought back ideas on how to operate the AESA radar, Link-16 datalink, low observability, and other advanced capabilities. The confidence gleaned from this meant the Super Hornet was the first to be deployed as part of an RAAF Air Task Group (ATG) to Al Minhad AB in the UAE for Operation OKRA, the coalition operation to remove ISIS/Daesh from Iraq and Syria in September 2014. The Super Hornet’s first six-month deployment for Operation OKRA saw the eight jets fly 418 sorties over 3,361 hours – an average of eight hours per mission – and employ 278 precision weapons on target. “OKRA required us to deploy 12,000 kilometres, rapidly commence combat operations, and actually start utilising the full capabilities of the jet,” AVM Roberton said. “It proved amazingly capable in theatre. Even though we faced a fairly benign threat,

it wasn’t in very benign environmental circumstances nor simple in terms of the length of missions and the complex roles that we were performing. I think from day three we were already leading the international coalition partners, and we maintained that role throughout. It was a real privilege to be part of that.” After the first OKRA deployment, 1SQN had a recovery period which coincided with a rotation period of some of the more experienced staff posting out to other jobs. Around the same time the jet received a software upgrade which opened up new capabilities, and some of the lessons from OKRA saw some changes in tactics and operational procedures applied.

GROWLER With the acquisition of the F/A-18F, the RAAF had opened the door to a possible future acquisition of the EA-18G Growler airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft. The Growler shares a common airframe, engines, avionics, and primary systems with the Super Hornet. The primary differences are the F/A-18F’s nose-mounted gun is deleted and replaced with electronic warfare system racks, the wingtip missile rails are deleted in favour of AN/ALQ-218 radar warning receivers, and there are additional rear fuselage, dorsal and nose antennae apertures. The Growler retains its AMRAAM air-to-air missile capability primarily for self-defence and adds the AGM-88 HARM and AARGM anti-radar

10 YEARS OF SUPER HORNET

missiles. The Growler also carries up to five AN/ ALQ-99 jammer pods on wing and centreline stations capable of disrupting a broad range of the electronic spectrum, and these are expected to be replaced in service by the all-digital AN/ALQ-249 next gen jammer (NGJ) in the coming decade. Instead of converting the 12 pre-configured Super Hornets, the decision to acquire 12 new-build Growlers under Project AIR5439 Phase 3 was announced in May 2013. The EA-18Gs were assigned to 6SQN, while 1SQN took on all 24 F/A-18Fs. “When we bought the Super Hornets, it was a relatively small investment to add the wiring into the last 12 aircraft,” AVM Roberton recalled. “But the last thing we wanted to do was crack open those airplanes and convert them into a uniquely configured Growler. What it did was kick off the ‘releaseability’ process with the US which gave the Australian Government the option to look at acquiring this capability, which had massive ramifications and real benefits for us later on.” Like the Super Hornets, the RAAF’s Growlers came out of US Navy production lots, so some of the aircraft spent a brief period in storage while the RAAF caught up with its training, sustainment, and facilities. The first two aircraft arrived in Australia just in time for the Avalon Airshow in 2017 – along with the first two F-35As – and the 12th jet was delivered just three months later in June.

TRAINING & SUSTAINMENT Currently, all operational conversion training for RAAF Super Hornet and Growler crews is conducted at NAS Oceania in Virginia and NAS Whidbey Island in Washington respectively by the US Navy. While 6SQN was the designated Super Hornet training squadron for a few years, rather than stand up a third squadron and its associated overheads to operate Growler, it was decided to resume training for both types with the US Navy while 6SQN took on the Growler. But with Growler now past IOC and approaching FOC, 82WG is looking to return some training to Amberley. 1SQN briefly had three Flights, one of which was a training flight which conducted upgrades and refreshers. But this was recently transferred to 82WG which will soon resume some operational conversion for both Super Hornet and Growler as part of a two-year trial, while continuing to send crews to the US as well. “We’re in a two-year trial period with the training flight, so whether we continue to share the training with the Navy or bring it all back here is a decision that will be made as one of the outcomes of the trial,” WGCDR Peapell explained. “I’m not sure what the ultimate answer is, but keeping our tie into the US Navy, whether it’s just through the exchanges or through the training piece is definitely something we will benefit from.”

Boeing’s ACEASP manager Chris Gray (front left) and elements of the ACEASP team. ADF

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In the meantime, Boeing Defence Australia was recently contracted to continue its role as platform steward for the Super Hornet and Growler through the Air Combat Electronic Attack Sustainment Program (ACEASP), enabled by a strong industry team including Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and an increasing number of Australian companies. “Any conversation around being a platform steward, in my mind, is about the mindset and the behaviours for how an organisation approaches it,” Boeing Defence Australia’s ACEASP Manager, Chris Gray told ADBR. “For Boeing, platform stewardship is about – and I looked up the word ‘steward’ in the dictionary – looking out for the long-term interests of something you do not own. “When I see our role as a platform steward, we are looking after what is a best capability for life of type,” he added. “Many of our behaviours transcend the words that are in our contract to deliver platform steward outcomes for the capability.” Previously managed by ‘big Boeing’, the ACEASP contract is now managed through Boeing Defence Australia. “The ACEASP contract means we are the prime to the government of Australia, and The Boeing Company is a sub-contractor to us,” explained Gray. “As a sub-contractor to us, The Boeing Company were able to leverage economies

‘“When I see our role as a platform steward, we are looking after what is a best capability for life of type”.’

The first RAAF Super Hornet to touch down at Amberley, A44-202 taxis in after the ferry. ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN

of scale, to get access to information, and to get access to people skills and technologies, so that we can deliver for Australia. “The Commonwealth has strong arrangements with the US Navy, and in that regard our role is to advise and assist the Commonwealth in the needs that they have for those existing arrangements.” Boeing and RAAF personnel both work together on the jets on the flightline and in deep maintenance. “We are all here for the capability,” he added. “Where it makes sense for Boeing to do the role, we do it, and where it makes sense for Commonwealth to do the role, they do it – it’s an integrated workforce. It is probably one of the fundamental reasons why I believe our program has been so successful. We’ve moved away from the transactional relationship and we have moved into a true relational state arrangement with the Commonwealth.”

THE FUTURE So what’s next for the RAAF Super Hornet? In 2019 the US Navy commenced a major upgrade program on the majority of its Block II jets to the latest Block III standard, with 78 funded to date. This will include a structural service life extension program (SLEP) designed to get the jets from the originally planned life of 7,000 hours to more than 10,000 hours, the installation of plumbing and mounts for upper fuselage conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) – development of which was funded in February 2018 – optical fibre wiring to support new generation sensors and weapons, a new Tactical Targeting Networking Technology (TTNT)

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datalink, and a new Distributed Targeting Processor-Networked (DTP-N) computer. Also included in Block III is the integration of the AN/ALQ-214 Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Block IV EW suite, new 10 x 19in large screen cockpit displays, enhancements to the APG-79 AESA radar, and further detail improvements to the aircraft’s radar cross-section. With Australia wanting to remain in ‘lock step’ with the US Navy program, it will need to decide in the next couple of years whether it will also embark on a Block III upgrade, or to take on a few elements of it, or to keep them as Block IIs and diverge from the US Navy. With the US Navy’s EA-18Gs likely to undergo a similar upgrade, any Super Hornet upgrade decision by the RAAF may be influenced by retaining commonality with its own Growlers. Regardless, if the upgrade is performed the life of type would likely be extended well beyond 2030 in order to get a return on investment on that upgrade. Another influencing factor may lie in the success of the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman development program

currently being conducted with Boeing, and how the new unmanned capability being employed in the future. “As recent operations have shown, the Block II jet will remain viable and relevant, although there will be different scenarios where you will only want to have the F-35 out in front,” said AVM Roberton. “But at the moment that high level of connectivity and its synergy with the Growler is really important. “If Loyal Wingman, or a similar unmanned capability is successful – which I suspect it probably will be – I think the back-seater in a Super Hornet will have a whole new role to play,” he added. “Loyal Wingman is a great capability where the transition will potentially be far better facilitated through a two-seat cockpit. “Why would you do it from a fighter aircraft rather than from a command and control aircraft like a Wedgetail? Well, that could be because of the need to penetrate contested airspace or for survivability in a higher threat area. But we are yet to transition to that, and of course the rate of development of those sorts of systems is still unknown, but we’re well along the path.”

An RAAF Super Hornet overflies the Iraqi city of Mosul during operations in the Middle East. ADF

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LEGACY Everyone we spoke to for this article agreed that the Super Hornet has done far more for the RAAF than just provide air combat capacity during a time of a capability gap. “As we stepped into it, we started to understand all the security issues and that has positioned us better to get into F-35s,” said ACM Binskin. “That means understanding facilities requirements, understanding how you protect information, and how you design the workforce. “We had to do all of that before, but not to the level that we were going to do it with the F-35, and the Super Hornet brought us into that world earlier than we would’ve otherwise had, and then it helped shape our thinking in how we would look to introduce and employ the F-35. WGCDR Peapell added, “We happened to hit the factory timeline for the Block II version of the Super Hornet with the AESA and all the other really nicely integrated software incentives, and that ended up being an amazing bonus for us. It meant that when we got it back here and we started fighting it, we went, ‘Hold on, this is actually better than we first thought we needed, but it’s definitely what we want’.

‘“...this is actually better than we first thought we needed”.’ A great comparison photo of an F/A-18A classic and F/A-18F Super Hornet shows the latter’s longer fuselage, wider LEX, and greater wing area. ADF

“It has made that transition into the 5th gen world a whole bunch smoother,” he added. “This is because we have been able to make the leap into a jet that can handle a lot of information in a well-integrated multi-data environment, as well as having the AESA radar coupled to our current suite of weapons. So it was a bit of a win and we are certainly capitalising on that now. “We’ve really hit the sweet spot. We’re the go-to squadron if something was to happen. As the classic Hornets start to taper off and the F-35 is still on its way up, we are actually pretty stable, and we’ve got an absolutely amazing capability in this airplane. That whole plan that was put together at the outset has worked absolutely perfectly, and we are right where we need to be during this transition to F-35.” For AVM Roberton – as DACTO, OC 82WG, the inaugural Commander of the OKRA ATG, Commander Air Combat Group, and Air Commander Australia – he has been directly involved with the Super Hornet capability for all but the last 10 months. “That’s the biggest thing for me from a personal perspective,” he said. “I am incredibly grateful and feel very privileged to have been part of something from the beginning, to then see it stood up, and to command it at different levels. And to command it as part of two other advanced air force capabilities – Wedgetail and KC-30 – on their very first combat ops, that was a rare privilege.”

FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT

FUTURE VERTICAL LIF T

READY FOR LIFT OFF The US Army’s vertical takeoff revolution takes shape BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

T Concept art of an operational Sikorsky Raider X. SIKORSKY

he US Army’s comprehensive and acronym-rich Future Vertical Lift (FVL) helicopter recapitalisation program took a big step forward in March when the shortlisted contenders for two of the key elements of the program were announced. FVL is a family of systems designed to replace the US Army’s current vertical takeoff capabilities with a new generation of revolutionary aircraft that can leverage common hardware components, software, production, and operational elements. The FVL program resulted from the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in which Congress directed the Pentagon to ‘outline a joint approach of the development of vertical lift aircraft for all the military services’. The US Defense Secretary subsequently authorised the establishment of the DoD FVL initiative to address vertical lift capability requirements, focus technology development, and determine feasible and affordable solutions beyond

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FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT

2030. Four integrated product teams were formed to focus on coordinating and synchronising service activities for requirements, science and technology, acquisition, and common systems. Leading the way for FVL is the medium-lift Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) – also known as Capability Set 3 – which will initially complement and eventually replace the Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk transport helicopter. In parallel with FLRAA, the US Army is also developing the light-scout Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) – or Capability Set 1 – which will fill the armed reconnaissance helicopter (ARH) requirement left vacant by the failed BoeingSikorsky RAH-66 Comanche and the Bell ARH-70 Arapaho, both of which were cancelled in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Following the retirement of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in 2017, the ARH/light attack role has been performed in service by the heavier Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopter. There are currently no plans to replace the AH-64E or the heavy-lift CH-47F/MH-47G Chinook as part of the FVL effort, although the US Army has indicated that these could be follow-on programs once FARA and FLRAA are more advanced. In addition to FARA and FLRAA, the FVL program is also working on two other capabilities – the Future Unmanned Aircraft System (FUAS), and the FVL Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) – both of which are designed to be “critical enablers” across the FVL family of systems. FUAS will work with FARA, FLRAA and current aircraft to enable long-range precision fires by combining ground-launched unmanned systems with airlaunched effects (ALE) through manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). MOSA, meanwhile, is a set of common design standards that will be applied across the entire FVL fleet to enable faster technological insertion, greater competition, and interoperability. In the meantime, the US Army is accelerating FARA and FLRAA by deviating from the US DoD’s traditional acquisition model and applying instead the ‘Middle Tier of Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding’ model as outlined in the 2009 NDAA. This model will see companies develop technology demonstrators and prototypes much faster, while the Army utilises its Futures Command, Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID), and cross-functional teams (CFTs) to coordinate the FVL requirements and to develop future modernisation plans.

FLRAA Furthest along in terms of maturity is FLRAA, even though FARA is scheduled to enter service some two years before it. Much of the development risk for FLRAA was identified during that program’s Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD) program which saw both contenders build and fly prototype

designs – Bell with its V-280 Valor tiltrotor design, and Sikorsky-Boeing with their SB>1 Defiant coaxial rotor and pusher prop concept. JMR-TD also provided funding for several companies to prototype and test mission systems architecture, and all the results gleaned from JMR-TD have allowed the US Army to develop its requirements for FLRAA. And while FLRAA is currently a US Army program, the US Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have also issued RFIs to industry for a similar capability. Following a successful JMR-TD program, both Bell and Sikorsky-Boeing were awarded contracts in March 2020 to proceed to a competitive demonstration and risk reduction effort (CD&RR) to further develop their aircraft. Both teams had already built full-scale technology demonstrators and successfully explored their low and intermediate-speed flight envelopes over more than a hundred hours of flight testing since 2018 and 2019, respectively. “These agreements are an important milestone for FLRAA,” US Army aviation program executive officer Patrick Mason the said in a March 16 statement. “The CD&RR continues to transition technologies from the JMR-TD effort to the

TOP: The Sikorsky-Boeing SB>1 Defiant shares the coaxial rotor and pusher prop design of the smaller Raider X. SIKORSKY ABOVE: Bell’s V-280 Valor uses an evolution of the tiltrotor technology developed for the V-22 Osprey. BELL

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‘Bell is yet to fly its 360 which is a more conventional single rotor and shrouded tail rotor design...’

FLRAA weapons system design. We will be conducting analysis to refine the requirements, conceptual designs, and acquisition approach. Ultimately, this information and industry feedback are vital to understanding the performance, cost, affordability, schedule risks and trades needed to successfully execute the FLRAA program.” The current FLRAA program schedule has the US Army awarding a preliminary design contract in the fourth quarter of 2021. The successful system will proceed to a preliminary design review (PDR) in the second quarter of 2023, with first flight of the production representative prototype in the third quarter of 2024 followed by critical design review (CDR) in the fourth quarter of 2024 and service entry scheduled for 2030.

FARA

The Bell 360 Invictus is a clean-sheet design but uses elements of Bell’s 525 commercial program. BELL

Much more ambitiously, the US Army’s light-scout requirement is considered more urgent. As such, it is expected to start fielding its successful FARA design in 2028, despite currently being less advanced than FLRAA. In order to accommodate the accelerated development, the US Army will conduct rapid prototyping, fly-off and follow-on production awards. After an RFP was issued in September 2018,

concept development awards were issued to five companies in April 2019, including a teaming of AVX and L3Harris, Bell Helicopter, Boeing, a teaming of Karem Aircraft and Northrop Grumman, and Sikorsky. In March. the US Army announced it had shortlisted two companies – Sikorsky with its Raider X coaxial rotor and pusher prop design, and Bell with its 360 Invictus – to proceed to competitive prototype (CP) development. The FARA announcement came less than two weeks after the FLRAA shortlist announcement, with the same two companies tasked to compete on both programs. The Raider X is based on Sikorsky’s S-97 Raider which has been flying for several years, and the technology and configuration developed for it has also been applied to its larger SB>1 Defiant FLRAA contender. “Through our mature S-97 Raider technology demonstrator, we continue to optimize our FARA solution, which will provide the Army with an integrated weapon system that combines speed, range, manoeuvrability, survivability and operational flexibility,” Sikorsky’s vice president of future vertical lift, Andy Adams said in a March 25 statement. “This approach is driving down risk and will result in an aircraft solution that is capable of executing the Army’s joint all-domain operations.” Bell is yet to fly its 360 which is a more conventional single rotor and shrouded tail rotor design, although it says many of its systems and dynamic components will be leveraged from its larger commercial 525 program which was recently certified.

FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT

“Bell is proud to continue work on the Bell 360 Invictus as part of the Army’s FARA Competitive Prototype competition,” Bell’s vice president of advanced vertical lift systems, Keith Flail told Defense News. “We have made significant investment and begun manufacturing in order to preserve the Army’s schedule for FARA CP and we are thrilled to continue our work on the Invictus.” Both aircraft feature long and low-slung fuselages, a chin-mounted cannon, tandem cockpits, faceted fuselages and detailed shaping, shrouded rotor heads, and internal weapons bays. Many of these elements appear to be aimed at providing a reduced radar cross-section compared to the current AH-64E Apache and other attack/armed reconnaissance helicopters. The FARA program schedule plans for the two shortlisted prototypes to be flying by November 2022, the fly-off to be conducted in 2023, a production contract to be awarded to the winning design in 2024, and service entry is scheduled for 2028.

FLRAA into special mission variants as has been done with the Black Hawk family over the years, provision will be made in the airframe and in the aircraft’s combat system to accommodate sensors, weapons and other future-growth payloads as new roles emerge.

CAPABILITY

FVL & AUSTRALIA

Both FARA and FLRAA are hoping to achieve higher speeds, greater range/endurance, and higher levels of survivability than the aircraft they are designed to replace, while also incorporating superior levels of integrated systems, sensors, electronic warfare systems, and weapons. Sikorsky’s X2 and follow-on S-97 Raider prototypes have both demonstrated their ability to fly at more than 200kts, with the X2 holding the world helicopter speed record of 280kts. By comparison, an AH-64E has a top speed of about 190kts without external weapons. The larger FLRAA is aiming to be able to fly at speeds up to 300kts and have a combat range of more than 500nm (940km), well in excess of a Black Hawk’s 170kts and 300nm (550km). The successful FARA aircraft will be a weapon system equivalent to a 5th generation fighter, incorporating F-35-like data-fusion and robust datalinks to provide the crew with enhanced battlespace awareness from numerous onboard and off-board sensors. Most onboard sensors will likely be conformal or embedded within the airframe to preserve the aircraft’s low radar cross-section. Off-board sensors will include those carried by tactical and strategic unmanned aerial systems (UAS), AEW&C, satellites, ground-based joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), and fixed or mobile ground-based sensors such as those in ground-based integrated air defence systems (IADS). All will feed data into the aircraft’s weapon system to provide unprecedented situational awareness. Like FARA, the FLRAA will also have a much higher level of sensor integration compared to the federated ‘add-on’ systems of its predecessors. With a view to developing

The timing of the FVL program is potentially useful for the ADF. The Australian Army is currently looking to replace its Airbus Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) under Project LAND 4503, while it will be seeking a replacement of the Airbus MRH-90 Taipan medium-lift helicopter and the Tiger’s subsequent replacement from 2040. The LAND 4503 tender process is in its final stages, with the three contenders – Boeing with the AH-64E Apache, Bell with its AH-1Z Viper, and Airbus with an upgraded Tiger complemented with a number of H145Ms – having submitted their proposals. Selection is due to be made in the next few months. If the Apache or Viper are selected, these aircraft will start to enter service in 2024/25, and will achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2027/28. Both aircraft are capable, offer US-common off-the-shelf solutions through an FMS sales process, have mature parent-service sustainment systems in place, and all their capabilities are well understood. With a projected 15-20 year life of type, Apache or Viper should be in service until at least the mid2040s in order to realise a return on investment. Both aircraft have been developed from vastly lesscapable systems over decades – the early 1980s AH-64A Apache, and the Vietnam-era AH-1J Cobra – and there is no reason to assume their sensors, avionics and weapons capabilities won’t continue to be enhanced over the next two to three decades. But Apache and Viper – and Tiger – are at the outer edge of their performance envelope. They will never be able to fly faster or further or carry more than they can now. In the January-February 2020 issue of ADBR, we took a closer look at Airbus’s upgraded Tiger

FARA will fulfil the requirement which has laid vacant since the cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche. US ARMY

ADBR

If Tiger is retained and upgraded, the Australian Army could be at the leading edge of both the FARA and FLRAA programs in the early 2030s. ADF

option. The Australian Army currently operates 22 Tigers but has a requirement for 29 new aircraft to replace them. And because it is unlikely newbuild Tigers would be available to make up the required numbers, Airbus has offered seven H145M helicopters to augment the 22 upgraded Tigers. The chance that Army would choose to retain and upgrade the Tigers was once considered by most observers to be relatively low, especially after an adverse Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report which outlined its protracted development, sustainment and capability issues. But its chances have been bolstered in recent years by improved availability and reduced sustainment costs, as well as a quite compelling financial case to retain it. Airbus claims it could upgrade the Tigers and acquire the H145Ms for less than $1 billion, whereas the acquisition of 29 Apaches or Vipers along with associated training, spares, ground support equipment, FMS fees, and other systems has been estimated to cost at least $3 billion. That $2 billion saving could be redirected by Army towards other projects such as its goal to move Tiger or its replacement to Townsville, or it could be returned to Government to be put towards other parts of the budget. Another possibility is that part of those savings could be invested in joining the FVL program as a possible cooperative development partner. It’s not just the Army which could benefit from acquiring FVL earlier from a capability point of view. If successful, it promises to deliver thousands of aircraft to the US military and allied forces, and there could be big opportunities for Australian industry to participate in the development, production, and sustainment of these aircraft over the next half century. That option is possibly the most compelling, as it would not only give Australia a seat at the

table for defining the FVL initial and future requirements but would also provide opportunities to Australian industry to manufacture components and support systems for FVL. This would meet one of the key goals of the Morrison LNP Government which is to give Australia’s defence industry greater export opportunities as well as cementing its place as a fundamental input to capability (FIC). If Tiger is retained and upgraded, with a large proportion of the upgrade work being done in Australia, it could be phased out in the early 2030s in favour of FARA. But if Tiger is replaced by Apache or Viper, any opportunity to cooperate on FARA’s development would likely be lost due to the planned post-2040 timing to replacing them. ADBR understands the effort to replace Tiger is causing some friction between Army Aviation and CASG. Army naturally wants a new aircraft and the off-the-shelf capabilities it will come with – with Apache reportedly the favourite – while CASG is reportedly more interested in the actual short-term and potential longer-term benefits for industry on upgrading Tiger and then going to FVL. There is no doubt there is some risk in upgrading Tiger, especially as the alternatives will meet the requirements ‘out-of-the-box’, although Airbus and Army have learned much about the aircraft in recent years. Conversely, it would be much easier to integrate an upgraded Tiger as the training systems, ground support equipment, and spares and sustainment pipelines are already in place. Additionally – while not yet announced – ADBR also understands Airbus’s H145M is the preferred solution for Army’s Project LAND 2097 Phase 4 special forces support helicopter requirement, so there will be obvious operational and training benefits in augmenting the Tigers with the same type.

OSINT - CHINA’S A2AD

OSINT

STRATEGY A2AD There is growing concern over China’s ability to further exploit the First Island Chain BY PETER KNOTT

ADBR

nyone who has a passing interest in China’s military development would have heard of the term, ‘Anti-Access Area Denial’, or A2AD for short. A2AD is an increasingly popular term for layered defence strategies. In China’s case, it is the overarching strategy in its defence posture, and what it is seeking to achieve from the massive military modernisation program it has undertaken in the past 15 to 20 years. Simply described, A2AD is what the Pentagon’s annual report into China’s military power calls the ability for China to “dissuade, deter, or, if required, defeat third-party intervention against a large-scale, theater-wide campaign” mounted by China’s People’s Liberation Army, such as a Taiwan contingency. Key to Chinese A2AD efforts would be the so called First Island Chain, a string of islands stretching from Russia’s Sakhalin in the north, down through Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo, encompassing everything in between, that provides a series of natural maritime chokepoints surrounding China. This has always been seen by China as a natural means for adversaries to contain its wider ambitions to be a Pacific and global player in a geopolitical sense, with a series of carefully placed American and allied military bases designed to hem China in. But the barrier effect of the First Island Chain can work both ways. In recent years China’s massive military modernisation effort and investment in A2AD has turned the waters inside the chain into an area where China’s adversaries will find it more and more difficult to operate freely. Indeed, there is now a growing worry that China – should it see an open conflict as inevitable or necessary – has acquired enough capability to conduct a massive pre-emptive strike against key

The Type 055 (left) is the PLA Navy’s largest surface warfare combatant, China has eight such ships in service and under construction, with possibly more to follow. Each ship has 112 vertical launch missile cells for anti-ship, antiaircraft or land-attack cruise missiles.

military facilities and targets throughout the First Island Chain, and even beyond into the Second Island Chain comprised of a line stretching from Japan’s Bonin Islands, down through the Mariana Islands including Guam, and on to West Papua. Such a strike could potentially cripple a US military response to any regional crisis, and the A2AD capabilities could prevent follow-on forces from Hawaii and the US mainland from intervening. The Pentagon report mentioned above echoes this, noting in its 2019 iteration that the PLA’s “A2AD capabilities are currently most robust within the First Island Chain, though China aims to strengthen its capabilities to extend farther into the Pacific Ocean”. In a similar vein, an article by former US Navy submariner Thomas Shugart in the War on the Rocks website notes that satellite photos of missile test ranges in China suggests that it has conducted trial missile attacks – believed to be made using short or medium-range ballistic missiles – on mockups shaped to look like US air and naval bases in Japan. This would indicate that China has seen such an action as possible enough to test the viability of its missiles for such an eventuality.

AN A2AD SENSOR NET The DoD report also said that China has robust Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) architecture over land areas, and out to 550km from its coast, that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. China is also placing radars and air defence weapons on its man-made island outposts in the South China Sea, further extending its IADS. The IADS includes early warning radars that are designed to spot inbound targets, ranging from

SAKHALIN

USA

CHINA

The First Island Chain (right), a series of natural maritime chokepoints relative to the position of mainland China.

FIRST ISLAND CHAIN BORNEO

INDIAN OCEAN

AUSTRALIA

PACIFIC OCEAN

OSINT - CHINA’S A2AD

bomber aircraft to cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles. These include four large phased array radars for possible ballistic missile tracking similar to the American Pave PAWS system, although there is also a possibility these could be associated with anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) targeting. China has also developed and put into service highfrequency (HF) over the horizon radars at several locations throughout China that claim to be able to detect stealthy aircraft. These include both OTH Backscatter (OTH-B), similar to Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) and the less complex OTH Surface Wave (OTH-SW) radars, and include one set of the latter at some of the islands in the South China Sea. Chinese analysts claim that these have a range of up to 400km, although the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS-AMTI) estimates that the smaller sets in the South China Sea islands are not able to extend their coverage that far. These ground-based sensors are backed by an increasing number of space-based sensors. The US-based Union of Concerned Scientists says that, as of 2016, China had 192 satellites in orbit (second only to the US which has 593). That number has since increased, with nearly all of these belonging to organisations or companies with close ties to the government and many with dual civilian and military utility. These satellites include the Yaogan Weixing (remote sensing) family of approximately 40 satellites whose functions are officially civilian in nature, such as crop yield studies or scientific research. However, several of these are almost

The HQ-9 is China’s development of the Russian S-300 (SA-20) long-range surface-to-air system, A naval version equipping PLAN ships is called the HHQ-9..

certainly used for military purposes with payloads such as electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence (ELINT). There are also constellations of Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) satellites providing persistent coverage of the waters surrounding China. All of the above could, and almost certainly are used to support ASBM targeting and other naval purposes. With sufficient numbers and integration, they can potentially provide real time target triangulation data to build up a robust picture of the location of a target to generate a targeting solution (see below). China is also said to be developing and trialling an underwater sensor network – similar to the US’s SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) in the North Atlantic – as part of its anti-submarine warfare efforts. Like many things about PLA developments, there is little solid information about such efforts. While the Pentagon report acknowledges the development of such a network, it adds that the PLA continues to lack a robust deep-water antisubmarine warfare capability. It also adds that it is unclear whether the PLA can “collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes in sea areas beyond the First Island Chain”. It is this writer’s opinion that this capability is not so pressing, and the priority for the PLA is to be able to do so effectively within, but not yet beyond, the First Island Chain.

‘As of 2016, China had 192 satellites in orbit ... that number has since increased’

The Shenyang J-16 is China’s latest indigenous development of the Russian Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker family of combat aircraft. It has been seen carrying the little known ultra long-range air-to-air missile (inset) believed to be designated PL-20 and said to possess a range of 300km for use against an adversary’s high value assets.

THE SHOOTERS The PLA’s fighters typically employ short and medium-range air-to-air missiles of indigenous design in addition to Russian types such as the Vympel NPO R-77 (AA-12 Adder) for its Russian-built Sukhoi Su-30/35 Flankers, but is also developing an ultra-long range air-to-air missile. Expected to be used to target an adversary’s high value airborne assets such as AEW&C or tanker aircraft, the missile has been given the temporary designation the PL-XX, although observers believe that the eventual in-service designation will be PL-20 (see ‘Savage Skies’ in ADBR Jan-Feb 2020). The new missile has been observed being carried on the Shenyang J-16 multi-role fighter and Xi’an JH-7 fighter-bomber. Comparing the known sizes of the parent aircraft and its hardpoints, has been estimated to measure roughly 5.8 metres in length and about 300mm in diameter. Four rear-mounted fins provide manoeuvrability and control for the missile. By comparison, the RAAF’s longest ranged airto-air missile, the AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM, measures 3.7 metres long and has a diameter of 180mm. There is little verifiable information about the PL-20’s performance, however a schematic of how it would be used has been leaked to the internet, showing the ramjet or solid-fuel powered missile with a range of 300km. After launch, the missile will fly a parabolic trajectory to its target, attaining an altitude of about 100,000ft from a launch altitude of 50,000ft, before diving down onto its target. Missile guidance is expected be achieved by a mixture of GPS, INS, and space-based sensors providing launch and mid-course guidance, before an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar takes over in the terminal phase.

That the launch platform can be a relatively limited aircraft like the JH-7 lends further credence that the missile does not rely on its launch aircraft for early targeting data, with an AEW&C platform also likely to be a source of launch parameters. It is not known if China’s stealthy Chengdu J-20 interceptor can carry the missile, but it would need to be carried externally as the J-20’s internal weapons bays are not long enough to carry the missile internally. The airborne shooters are backed up by a network of ground-based long-range air defence systems. Similarly to what it has done across its other defence domains, China has put a lot of effort in improving and modifying Russian systems for its own needs, and in recent years has developed its own line of indigenous ground-based air defence systems. The longest ranged system is the HQ-9, a development of the Russian S-300PMU (SA-20) system that China acquired from Russia. Starting with the original HQ-9, China has since improved the system with the HQ-9A and HQ-9B introduced at the turn of the century and in the mid-2000s respectively, leveraging on improvements in technology in microelectronics and signal processing to introduce dual seekers in the latter. The range of the HQ-9B is said to be in excess of 300km with an altitude ceiling of 134,000ft. To maximize the flexibility of the system, the HQ-9 can employ a wide range of radars, both the search/ surveillance/acquisition radar and the tracking/ engagement/fire control radar (FCR), however the primary FCR is the dedicated HT-233 that can also double as a search and acquisition radar if required. Like the HQ-9 the FCR is also mobile, being mounted on a 10x10 wheeled transporter and is said to operate on the C-band at 300MHz.

OSINT - CHINA’S A2AD

Performance-wise the HQ-9/HT-233 is said to be closer to the AN/MPQ-53 of the American Patriot missile system than the Russian 30N6 (Flap Lid) that supports the S-300 which is limited by its narrow beam coverage, even in search mode. The HQ-9 has also made its way into the PLA Navy’s ships, with the navalised HHQ-9 being standard fit on board China’s Type 052C, 052D and 055 destroyers. China has also acquired the Russian S-400 Truimf (SA-21) long-range SAM system, although given past history it is likely to be seeking to reverse-engineer it for its own purposes rather than having any intentions of integrating it into its own IADS. Given that the objectives of China’s A2AD strategy is to keep not only aircraft but an adversary’s ships away from its shores, it is also of no surprise that China has also pursued its anti-shipping options in the form of a variety of anti-ship missiles. The most talked about of these weapons is the ASBM. As the name suggests, these are long-range, conventionally armed ballistic missiles used for attacking moving ships at sea, most notably the US Navy’s showpiece nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The theory being that a missile speeding down to sea level on a ballistic trajectory at speeds of Mach 5 or higher would prove to be an extremely difficult capability to counter. The DF-21D is a road-mobile ASBM system that is mounted on a wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL) to improve survivability against possible enemy counter-strikes. Said to have a range of about 1,450km, the DF-21D is derived from the DF-21 family of two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, single-warhead conventional or nuclear-warhead medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in use by the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF). The US DoD suggests the DF-21D reached IOC with the PLARF in 2010. The system is thought to employ manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) with terminal guidance systems assisted by China’s network of satellites such as the Jianbing-5/ YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 that provide targeting data in the form of radar and visual imaging respectively. There are however still questions remaining about the utility of the ASBMs. China has reportedly tested the DF-21D against fixed land targets, but it is not known to have conducted similar tests against a moving target. This makes it difficult to accurately judge the capability – particularly from the maturity and efficacy of China’s sensor net for its kill chain in generating the kind of real time, highly precise data required to enable the DF-21D, and the newer 4,000km-range DF-26 – to accurately target an aircraft carrier making 30 knots in the expanses of the western Pacific. There is however the possibility of using ASBMs and their sensor net to keep watch and/or provide deterrence on the maritime chokepoints presented by the First Island Chain, including the Miyako

Straits between Okinawa and Taiwan, and Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. This would theoretically reduce the demand on a lessthan-mature sensor net and kill chain to limited geographic areas where potential targets will have to navigate. Considering the limited combat radius of carrierborne aircraft without large scale tanker support, the ability to keep an American carrier battle group at arm’s length may be all that China’s A2AD capability needs. But if required, an attack with ASBMs can be used in conjunction with air and surface-launched anti-ship missiles (ASMs), timed to arrive at the target at the same time to saturate its defences. These attacks could be mounted from longerranged ASMs such as the YJ-12 and YJ-18. Both are Chinese improvements of Russian designs, derived from the Kh-31 air-to-surface missile and the 3M54 Klub cruise missile. Both are capable of supersonic speeds, with the anti-ship YJ-18A variant attaining its maximum speed of around Mach 2 in its terminal phase following a subsonic cruise, while the YJ-12 can fly at speeds of between Mach 2 and 4 depending on its launch and cruise altitudes. Both are also very long ranged, with the YJ-12 believed to be between 200 and 400km, while the YJ-18 is believed to possess a range of 540km. The YJ-12 can be launched from wheeled TELs, from vertical launch cells on ships such as the Type 052D or 055 destroyers, or aircraft such as the Xi’an H-6 bomber, JH-7 fighter bomber and possibly the Shenyang J-11/15/16. Meanwhile, the anti-ship variants of the YJ-18 can be launched from ships, submarines or landbased mobile TELs, offering flexibility in targeting adversary ships. There are also land attack versions of the YJ-18, which would theoretically mean that US bases such as Guam and even Hawaii could be threatened in times of conflict. The former is also within range of the DF-26 – colloquially known as the ‘Guam killer’ on account of its range.

The YJ-18 cruise missile is also a development of a Russian design, this time the 3M54 Klub missile. It can be ship, submarine or groundlaunched, the latter from wheeled mobile launchers or (reportedly) shipping containers.

ADBR

The Xian H-6K bomber is a heavily modified version of the Russian Cold Warera Tupolev Tu-16, and is equipped with improved (Russian) engines and indigenous avionics. It is now used primarily as a cruisemissile and anti-ship missile carrier. CHINA MIL

China also has other conventional attack weapons for targeting an adversary’s land targets. These include the CJ-10 and the CJ-20 cruise missiles which can be launched from H-6 bombers and the PLAN’s newer destroyer classes, and can carry a 1,000lb conventional or nuclear warhead over 1,500 km. One area of weapons development China is reportedly more advanced than the West is in the field of hypersonics. China became the first country in the world to officially field an operational hypersonic weapon when it unveiled the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) during its 2019 National Day parade. The DF-17 has its HGV mounted on the rocket booster of the DF-16 short-range ballistic missile and its TEL, simplifying the development cycle. Testing of DF-17 prototypes was underway by 2014 with at least nine test flights reportedly occurring between January 2014 and November 2017. The HGV is known as the DF-ZF and adopts a very different flight profile from normal ballistic missiles by suppressing its trajectory and accelerating to reach speeds of around Mach 5 in its terminal phase. Due to its extreme speed and suppressed/lower altitude trajectory, intercepting the glide vehicle becomes more complex than that of a conventional re-entry vehicle – already a difficult undertaking. The high-speed glide profile means the DF-ZF is more manoeuvrable with the bonus of extending its range. In a November 2017 test the HGV reportedly managed to glide at a depressed altitude of around 60km following the DF-17 booster’s ballistic and reentry phase 1,400km downrange.

INTEGRATION UNKNOWN Writing in the in-house blog of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace Douglas Barrie pointed out that there is always a risk of using shorthand phrases such as A2AD, and conflating the term with drawing weapons range circles on a map and declaring anywhere within those circles as a ‘no-go area’. This is a valid point in assessing the efficacy of an A2AD ‘bubble’. For all of China’s military advancements, the waters of the East and South China Seas and the airspace above will certainly not become no go areas for the US and allied navies, even in a ‘hot’ conflict. But, where it once was a permissive environment, it will undeniably become contested space and become increasingly more so the deeper one ventures into the ‘bubble’. While the sensors and shooters inside that bubble look impressive on paper, questions remain about their level of integration. Integration of the PLA’s various services has been acknowledged to be China’s weak spot in the past. But recent military reforms such as the consolidation of military regions from seven to five, and the formation of the PLA’s Strategic Support Forces seems to be a step in the direction of creating a truly joint force. At the end of the day, the dearth of verifiable information coming out of China is a stumbling block to assessing how effective or how far-reaching such integration efforts are. But given that these reforms only started in 2016, these are still early days, and a true picture of how effective these efforts will be is still years away.

OSINT

EYES & EARS Focus on the need for a regional ISR network BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON

he NATO alliance marked a quiet milestone in March with the transfer of a mobile general ground station (MGGS) to the Alliance Ground Station (AGS) Force in Sigonella, Italy. The MGGS is the exploitation segment of the AGS Program, a 15-nation intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system to exploit and disseminate intelligence from five RQ-4B Global Hawk ‘Phoenix’ remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and associated ground stations. The RQ-4Bs are NATO-owned and operated, in much the same way as the 14 upgraded E-3A Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft of the NATO E-3A Component. With a resurgent Russia, the E-3A Component is a pillar of the NATO Assurance Measures missions supporting smaller alliance members against Russian intimidation. The AGS and E-3A Components provide intelligence for the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS), the element of the NATO joint air power strategy that both supports air policing in peacetime and is postured for intelligence and targeting support during operations. NATO has more than 70 years’ experience working through complex multinational integration problems. In Australia there is no joint concept linking the military services’ capabilities into a cohesive whole, and there’s even less of a framework for regional collective security. Recently, academic and defence media commentators have focused on an independent Australian ‘strike’ capability – with differing opinions

on potential requirements for range and lethality. The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper (DWP) is vague on specifics, noting only that strike capabilities will “provide flexibility for the ADF” to respond to threats and participate in regional and global coalitions. Before the ADF can conduct strike missions, it must know what targets exist and where they are located. To do this, the ADF has to ‘sense’ and understand the battlespace. To this end, the Government’s Defence Integrated Investment Program (IIP) plans to spend close to 10 per cent of the allocated A$195 billion over the next decade on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare (EW), space and cyber.

AN ASSERTIVE AND EXPANSIVE PLA Heritage Foundation policy analyst Frederico Bartels recently concluded that, properly measured, China’s defence budget at US$467.4bn is 87 per cent the size of the US ($US534.5bn). A huge sum has been spent in the South China Sea where the PLA has militarised coral islands and reefs inside China’s claimed ‘nine-dash line’. With the completion of island outposts in the Spratly Islands at Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi Reefs, regional governments have accused the PLA, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia of harassing Vietnamese, Malaysian, Philippine and Thai shipping and commercial activity. The ‘People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia’ (PAFMM) is probably used by the PLA to provide a level of unofficial or deniable aggression against other claimant states.

ADBR

The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail (left) could prove a critical factor in a more cohesive regional security response. DEFENCE

The physical Spratly outposts also provide the PLA with a permanent intelligence collection capability. The collection apparatus probably feeds information to senior PLA decision-makers in Beijing and the Southern Theatre Command in Guangzhou, and almost certainly provides situational understanding of the environment to enable the targeting of PLA offensive weapon systems. The PLA has built a system to sense and understand the battlespace so it can position PLA, Coast Guard and PAFMM vessels and units where they can have the most influence. The Economist noted that Xi Jinping “has done more in the last three years to reform the PLA than any leader since Deng Xiaoping”. Part of that reform restructured the PLA to fight “local wars under high-technology conditions” where the intensity and conclusion of conflict is controlled. The concept of war control avoids escalation and seeks to shape the international environment in China’s favour. NATO faces a similar problem with Russian aggression in Europe. Russia seeks to avoid direct confrontation with NATO, and instead the recent targets of Russian military activity have been the Ukraine and Georgia – neither of which are NATO members. The NATO E-3A Component and the nascent NATO AGS is designed to monitor and understand the battlespace to place Russian activity out in the open, and to reassure Poland and the Baltic States.

REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING

Dougal Robertson is an Executive Analyst at Felix Defence.

The question is whether a cooperative security approach such as NATINAMDS could be applied to maritime South-East Asia and the South Pacific. One answer may be to build the foundation of a regional maritime information sharing network based on the RAAF E-7A Wedgetail, like the NATO E-3A Component. The RAAF E-7A is the most technologically advanced airborne command, control and battle management (C2BM) platform in operational service. Its networked capabilities allow the E-7A to share information from other aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and F-35 to build a complex surveillance picture. Boeing claims the E-7A Multirole Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) L-band radar can track airborne targets out to 350nm in look-up mode and surface targets at 150nm, while the MESA also has a passive electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection capability. The information and data fusion capabilities inherent in the E-7A make it central to situational understanding in any operating environment. The E-7A also has the capability to control and receive sensor data from unmanned aircraft – a concept Boeing demonstrated in 2009 using three of the company’s ScanEagle UAVs. The E-7A is also operated by South Korea and Turkey and, as reported in ADBR in March 2019, the UK has ordered five E-7As based on the same 737700IGW airframe as the RAAF aircraft.

While NATO must maintain awareness of a complex ground environment, the ADF has to build understanding of a complex maritime environment. That relies on persistence of sensors and constant presence. Even with the expected boost in spending from the IIP, Australia does not have the size and resources to maintain a constant watch on PLA maritime activity. The US conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the Spratly Islands but does not maintain an ongoing presence. Using a highly networked aircraft such as the E-7A in cooperation with multiple P-8As, MQ-4C Tritons, and F-35As could allow the ADF to combine an effective ‘sensing layer’ with a robust ‘decision layer’ to inform government and senior defence leaders.

POLITICAL COMPLEXITY The regional security framework in South-East Asia means it is unrealistic to expect the sharing of information that could be used for targeting or operations. But a capability that offers understanding and awareness of malign activity – particularly by sharing information from key regional militaries and fusing this information in a collaborative hub – might be a small step in the right direction. The ADF already conducts maritime surveillance patrols in the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea as part of Operation Gateway, and there are several security arrangements in place that could facilitate a regional surveillance hub. The existing Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) are a cooperative mechanism for the militaries of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the UK to train together. The RNZAF will take delivery of its first of four P-8As in 2022 while, in January, the US State Department approved Singapore’s request for 12 F-35Bs to replace some of the RSAF’s 60 F-16C/D fighters. As the UK re-thinks its global position post-Brexit, a closer engagement with the FPDA is possible. Australia, Japan and the US also signed a trilateral information-sharing arrangement (TISA) in 2016. The US Department of Defense says the TISA expedites information sharing “to enable higher capability defence exercises and operations among the three nations”. In the Jan-Feb 2020 edition of ADBR, Peter Hunter noted that Australia and Japan already have similar platforms and equipment and shared interests in achieving interoperability and integration. It took an aggressive, expansionist Russia to revitalise a NATO joint ISR system based on historical cooperation using a single aircraft type, and Australia and the region face similar disruptive behaviour and intimidation from the PLA. Cooperation through military technology and information-sharing may be the first step towards a more cohesive regional security response. And that engine of collaboration could be the E-7A.

OSINT

SAVAGE SKIES The next-generation missile programs PART 2 BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN & DOUGAL ROBERTSON

he first part of this article in the ADBR January-February 2020 issue reviewed the current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air-to-air missile (AAM) programs. Since the entry to service of the AIM-4 Falcon guided air-to-air missile in 1956, the US has expected to hold an AAM range advantage over any adversary. This is now being challenged by the scope and scale of the PLA’s AAM programs. The Chinese PL-15 and ‘PL-X’/PL-17 missiles both claim ranges in excess of the AIM-120D AMRAAM. The PLA is building missiles and launch platforms to target and negate US and Allied advantages in air power: AEW&C, tanker, surveillance and intelligence aircraft, all-aspect stealth, and information-sharing. If the Soviet Union was ‘pacing’ the West during the Cold War, the PLA and a resurgent Russian military are now outpacing the US and Allied nations in some areas.

In 2019, USAF Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Will Roper spoke about replacing the Pentagon major defence acquisition program with “something that looks more like the Century Series development of the early Air Force”. The so-called ‘Century Series’ were the six aircraft designated F-100 to F-106. These fighters all came into service in the 1950s and progressed from first flight to operational acceptance in under three years. Some industry pundits took Roper’s comments as heralding a new golden age of fighter aircraft development. But Roper was talking about air combat systems sharing design principles and functioning on a common modular open architecture, like an air power ‘App Store’ with plug-and-play components. The first step towards realising these fast-to-build, lower-cost programs might be in air-to-air missiles.

An AIM-120 AMRAAM takes flight from an F-35 Lightning II in a practice firing over Edwards AFB. The AMRAAM will eventually be superceded by the AIM-260. LOCKHEED MARTIN

ADBR

LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT WEAPON

JOINT AIR TACTICAL MISSILE (JATM)

The Long-Range Engagement Weapon (LREW) concept surfaced in 2017 when Deputy US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Chuck Perkins distributed a picture showing an F-22 launching an unusual missile from the internal weapons bay. It was clearly an artist’s impression of the LREW concept and looked like a two-stage (boost and sustain) rocket motor body. The US Department of Defense’s 2019 budget proposal stated LREW had completed engineering and design work, and combined components from existing missile systems with new technologies to provide ‘a leap-ahead increase in overall performance’. Based on the limited information available, it’s possible LREW is the first in a modular series of missiles, combining different seeker and guidance kits in dual-mode configuration or with swappable front-ends. Whether LREW uses a two-stage motor configuration to provide range advantage is unknown. It is also unclear if LREW will branch into production, or if it was a testbed for advanced technology. What we do know is that LREW is meant to give the range advantage firmly back to the US military, and make it happen fast.

More is known about the Lockheed Martin Joint Air Tactical Missile (JATM), designated the AIM-260. Last year, USAF program executive officer for weapons Brig Gen Anthony Genatempo said AIM-260 would reach initial operational capacity (IOC) by 2022. The JATM will be flown first on the F-22 and F/A-18E/F before integration onto F-35. It will replace the AMRAAM, and Genatempo stated that, as JATM production increases, AMRAAM production will “start tailing off”. The last AMRAAM buy is expected in 2026. The AIM-260 could use some form of dualpulse motor and have a combined or dual-mode seeker. Lockheed Martin claims the AIM-260 has ‘significantly more range” than the AIM-120D. How it achieves this range is unknown but could be from a more efficient high-impulse fuel motor, a smaller warhead, or a combination of both. Either way, the AIM-260 is the same size as the AIM-120D and is clearly designed to beat the Chinese PL-15. The missile’s rapid development suggests it uses components from existing weapons rather than being a brand-new design, with this ‘spiral upgrade’ approach being in the spirit of Roper’s desire for modular plug-and-play weapon systems.

A Luftwaffe Mig-29 unleashes a Russianmade R-27 during a jointUSAF live fire exercise. This type of missile is more susceptible to ‘layered defence’. USAF

OSINT - SAVAGE SKIES

SMALL ADVANCED CAPABILITIES MISSILE (SACM) The Small Advanced Capabilities Missile (SACM) is another program that apparently started life as a concept demonstrator when, in 2013 Lockheed Martin displayed a small ‘hit to kill’ missile. The ‘Cuda’ was around half the length of the AIM-120 and could allow 5th generation aircraft to double or triple their internal AAM loadouts. At the time it might have been a pitch to address criticisms the F-35 could only carry a small number of AAMs internally. In 2017 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Science, Technology and Engineering Dr David Walker testified on the Air Force Science and Technology Program before the US House Armed Services Committee. One of the weapon programs he outlined was SACM, stating it “will be affordable and provide high loadouts compared to current airto-air missiles.” The same year, the USAF Research Laboratory (AFRL) listed SACM as a technology demonstrator with advanced airframe design, an improved solid rocket motor, ‘synergistic control’ (combined aero, attitude control and thrust vectoring) and ‘hyper-agility’. Then late last year Raytheon Advanced Missile Systems released details of its Peregrine missile. Raytheon said the Peregrine had “advanced sensor, guidance and propulsion systems packed into a much smaller airframe” and was faster and more manoeuvrable than AMRAAM. Peregrine combines the manoeuvrability of the AIM-9X Sidewinder with the range of the AIM-120. While there were no details on the seeker, Raytheon described it as a ‘tri-mode’ design. Raytheon already builds the AIM-9X and AIM-120 so it is likely that technology from both missiles is used in the Peregrine. Raytheon says the Peregrine was developed inhouse and isn’t a response to any program request.

CUDA SIZE COMPARED TO AIM-120 ROCKET MOTOR ~39in

~12in

~6.5in RADOME

~6.25in ~7.25in

CONTROL

~6in Dia.

GUIDANCE

AIM-120 AMRA AM C7

The SACM and Peregrine are both touted as ‘complements’ to the AMRAAM, not as replacements, and it’s possible some of the concepts from SACM have made their way into the Peregrine. Again, if Peregrine goes into flight test soon it’s another example of rapid development and testing of an air-to-air missile using existing technology to fill an operational requirement – in this case cramming more missiles into fifth-generation fighters to win the numbers game.

SELF DEFENCE The traditional approach to protecting aircraft is ‘layered defence’, using stealth, electronic attack, and countermeasure dispensing systems (CMDS) to defeat the individual sensors on a threat aircraft or missile. This approach worked when there were two or three ‘factor’ missiles to defeat, like the Russian R-27 and R-77 (AA10 and AA-12) missiles and the Chinese PL-12. But defeating missiles requires good intelligence on how they work and their vulnerabilities. When there are almost a dozen threat systems to defeat, the Allied intelligence collection network will probably

A digital rendering of the Peregrine which Raytheon says combines attributes of the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120. It is pitched at 5th generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35. RAYTHEON

ADBR

A Chengdu J-10 from China’s PLAAF fires a PL-12 air-to-air missile. The PLA is building missiles and launch platforms to target and negate US and Allied advantages in air power. CHINA MIL

never develop enough technical intelligence for effective countermeasures. Enter the concept of kinetic defeat, ie destroying the incoming missile, surface and air. There are two known kinetic defeat programs – the Miniature Self-Defence Munition (MSDM), and the Small High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD). The MSDM came up in the same testimony as SACM. At the time, Dr Walker said MSDM would “enhance future platforms’ self-defence capability without impacting the primary weapon payload”. AFRL says the MSDM is an all-aspect self-defence weapon designed to defeat surface-to-air missiles. It is, apparently, a hit-to-kill interceptor with a passive seeker and a planned unit cost around US$40,000, a relative bargain when compared to the estimated sale price of an S-300PMU-1 (SA20) missile of between US$800,000 and US$1m. The MSDM is reportedly in design review and the subject of competition between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Flight test is expected next year. While MSDM provides much better self-defence options for a range of penetrating capabilities like low-observable fighters, it could also allow high value airborne assets such as AEW&C, tankers, and intelligence aircraft to fly much closer to SAM engagement zones and potentially over contested areas where unlocated mobile SAM systems might be operating. The idea behind SHiELD is to integrate a laser weapon system into a fighter fuel tank pod and provide self-protection against electro-optical and infrared air and surface missile threats. The US has been pursuing directed-energy weapons (DEW) for decades, but SHiELD

‘Applying (the) air power App Store concept might have advantages for the ADF’

is probably the first attempt to get an effective DEW onto a fighter aircraft. And while SHiELD will help fighters such as the F/A-18F and F-15E to survive over the battlefield, it is also a natural fit for the same high-value assets that might carry MSDM.

AUSTRALIAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM There is no indication Australia is involved in any of these AAM projects. In a statement in response to questions from ADBR, an ADF spokesman told us, “Air Force will field a mix of AIM-120C-5 and -120D AMRAAM, and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles across F/A-18F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. “The potential acquisition of additional air-to-air weapons is a matter for future consideration by the Government. Air Force is not currently participating in any air-to-air weapons cooperative programs. Current need is being met via the procurement of proven US-common weapons via foreign military sales arrangements.” But with most RAAF combat aircraft less than a decade old and operating as a highly networked force, applying Roper’s air power ‘App Store’ concept might have advantages for the ADF. An Australian combat aircraft system of strike and electronic attack aircraft teamed with the E-7A Wedgetail command, control and battle management (C2BM) aircraft, sustained by networked KC-30 Multirole Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft and linked to a sensing grid built on persistent systems such as the Jindalee Over the horizon Radar Network (JORN) and dynamic sensors like Boeing’s ‘Loyal Wingman’, would be extremely effective. Combining this 5th generation force with next-generation weapons would make it even more lethal and survivable. Dougal Robertson is an Executive Analyst at Felix Defence.

COUNTER COMMAND

ADBR

A N A LY S I S

COUNTER COMMAND An Australian Perspective on the Exemplar JADO Mission BY JOHN CONWAY

This in-depth feature outlines the need for a unifying mission to replace the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency narrative of the past two decades because it’s crucial to define the ends before choosing the ways – and current military thinking is too focused on ‘how’ as the answer.

n 2 May 1999 while conducting a suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) mission over Serbia, USAF F-16CG aircraft callsign Hammer 34 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery. It was the opening phase of the NATO-led mission, Operation ALLIED FORCE, the airpower-led use of force to change the situation on the ground and prevent the killing of civilians in Bosnia by irregular Serbian forces. Unfortunately, the use of airpower in ALLIED FORCE was beset by problems of authority and rules of engagement. The ‘dual-key’ strike approvals slowed down the targeting process, dynamic targeting was slow, and the European winter forced the US and NATO allies to rely on GPS-guided allweather weapons which quickly ran out. Compounding the problems for NATO was an aggressive and clever adversary fighting on their own terrain. The Serbs knew NATO would not commit to an all-out ground offensive and found novel ways to degrade air power’s effectiveness. After 1999, ALLIED FORCE became a catalyst for improvements to US airpower – improvements in targeting, to all-weather weapons, in service-level

integration, and in the structure of C2 in a coalition. The improvement of targeting databases to ensure information was accurate and constantly updated, and the use of ISR to gain the required intelligence for rapid dynamic strikes against fleeting targets. In Iraq in 2003, the overwhelming success of airpower combined with ground manoeuvre was partly an outcome of the detailed operational evaluation following ALLIED FORCE.

FAST FORWARD The pilot of Hammer 34 that day in 1999 was USAF Lt Col David Goldfein. Today, General Goldfein is the USAF Chief of Staff. Gen Goldfein’s rapid recovery by the USAF Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is a compelling story on its own, and the experience shaped his career and has developed his thinking so extensively it now forms his legacy. Gen Goldfein sits atop the USAF decisionmaking tree and knows the type of future conflicts the US and its allies are facing. While the technology and speed has increased, many of the underlying problems that come from facing an adaptive, thinking adversary remain.

COUNTER COMMAND

-The operations in Bosnia had similar complexity to those likely to be encountered in South-East Asia, the Pacific Rim and Eastern Europe today. These include the use of proxy forces to complicate decision-making, the requirement to fight in a coalition with non-traditional partners, high levels of political engagement to retain public support, and adversaries who have studied our traditional advantages and how to negate them. Gen Goldfein understands future operations require enhanced levels of synchronisation between offensive and defensive counter air (OCA & DCA) systems. Air superiority is no longer assured due to “anti-access and area denial (A2AD) threats, reduced freedom of manoeuvre, and rapid proliferation of advanced technologies,” he has said. In response, the US military has developed the Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concept, and the glue inside JADO is Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The US Army describes JADC2 as ‘not a single physical thing’, but ‘a combination of technology, new processes, and new organizations to enhance situational awareness, decrease reaction time, and enable continuous integration across all domains’. JADC2 is meant to ‘enable any shooter, with any sensor, through any command and control node in near-real time, with the appropriate authorities to employ joint and mission-partner effects.’ It says the time gained through increased interoperability will give friendly forces ‘decision advantage’ over any adversary. In plain English, JADC2 is the rapid targeting of an adversary by linking sensors and weapons systems in air, space, land, sea, and cyberspace.

CREATING POWER IS DIFFERENT TO FORCE There appears to be little Australia could replicate or buy into when it comes to JADC2, as the concept is designed to deliver an updated version of American scientific management principles applied to the US art of warfighting and power projection. But upon closer analysis, there are implications for Australia. Any significant change in the way the US military conceives, equips, organises, or prepares for operations can quickly leave the ADF out of sync, and unable to participate in a meaningful way in the type of coalition operations expected by the Australian Government. In Bosnia the junior NATO partners became a limitation on the effectiveness of US airpower, and a decade later they were sidelined and given minor roles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia needs to understand JADC2 and its implications for our force. Whether we become an active participant in JADC2 is a different question. Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, Sir Laurence Freedman, describes strategy as “the creation of power”.

Creating power is different to creating a force, in the same subtle way that integration is different to synchronisation. Power and synchronisation are higher order functions, each with a direct rather than derived relationship with time. You need to create a force to create power. The force design contributes to strategy, it is not a strategy. Spending vast sums of Australian taxpayers’ money on a force design that attempts to replicate a US system – which is designed to create US military power through the sustainment of a permanent domestic manufacturing and employment base – is never going to work in Australia. But while joint-force integration is an essential activity, the creation and synchronisation of military sea, land, air, space, and information power with the other elements of national power is the goal. Achieving this goal, which delivers an advantage in time and space regardless of the prevailing operational circumstances, now requires a new question and new thinking. Since 1945 the US military has focused on science and technology as the answer, applying a scientific management approach to warfare that separates it into domains and areas of specific technological expertise. This is partly cultural and partly a way of organising an extremely complex human endeavour on an industrial scale. For the US, warfare and its associated means of production is probably the most complex closed system imaginable, comparable to a society but still subject to rules and defined outcomes. Those rules and outcomes play out in the US budget approvals process and involve the regular introduction of new ‘bumper-sticker’ definitions describing war. These slogans are often designed in the Pentagon to signal unity against a common adversary, yet mask the fierce underlying battle for resources between the services.

General David Goldfein. USAF

ADBR

The Pentagon’s latest search for a unifying principle to solve the problem of a perceived decline in its relative power has, this time, been framed within the context of JADO. The prominence of JADC2 is largely because there are six US services – Space and Cyber now being on the same level as the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines. With the additional services comes increased organisational complexity, as traditional decision-making hierarchies clash with new ideas about the ways and means of achieving control of a domain – the core business of each military service.

‘Australia...must be aware of unnecessary distractions and issues unique to the US militaryindustrial complex.’ WILL JADO WORK?

Australia and regional nations must be aware of unnecessary distractions and issues unique to the US military-industrial complex. These domestic debates can waste time and effort by diverting attention away from details that are relevant to the scale and context of US-Australian interoperability. Compared to the US, Australia’s acquisition and sustainment processes are streamlined and integrated. Dr Morgan Dwyer, a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) describes the US criteria for success as providing top-down direction to guide the bottom-up technical development and demonstration of JADC2, as well as the need to simultaneously address ‘one of the toughest problems in the Pentagon: who is in charge?’ In a recent paper Dr Dwyer reviewed the emergence of the USAF Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) as the leading technical solution for JADC2. She notes the difficult

ADF

resourcing choices ahead regarding priorities, especially in relation to command and control and identifying core missions that drive high-end requirements for JADO. Dr Dwyer observed that “the Air Force’s work will undoubtedly raise questions of operational and acquisition authorities that the Air Force cannot address alone … it will encounter organisational constraints that impede its ability to operate and acquire new technology jointly”. She believes that, making the most of the Air Force’s investment “requires a commitment from Department of Defense leadership to not only build technical links between sensors and shooters but organisational links as well”. Until now, that top-down direction has been lacking. Questions remain about the purpose of JADO/JADC2 – Will it work? What is its relevance and application for Australia and other US Allies?

TOP-DOWN In the absence of US Joint doctrine for JADO and JADC2, in March 2020 General Goldfein released Air Force Doctrine Note 1-20. He stated, “recent studies, wargames, and collected observations show a need to provide a clear and comprehensive doctrinal framework for conducting JADO.” The doctrine note, USAF Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, concedes the US’ comparative military advantage has been eroded to the point where new thinking is needed to deter and defeat adversaries that are technologically advanced and have evolved their operational approach. It also provides an insight into the gaps and risks associated with the integration and synchronisation of future operations involving the US military services. It acknowledges the USAF already participates in JADO but that “such operations are primarily conducted in permissive environments and are not subject to the stresses likely to exist in a contested operating environment across the competition continuum”. These stresses include denied communications and decentralised operations from forward bases at risk from air and missile attack. In many scenarios the US can still rely upon overwhelming firepower underwritten by a nuclear deterrent to meet its objectives. But there are some objectives that will need each of the Services to operate together in a distributed way at high tempo to counter sophisticated adversary systemsapproaches to warfighting. This requires an emphasis on speed, rapid decision-making, and acting faster than an opponent. Gen Goldfein believes “the proper application of a coordinated force across multiple domains can produce effects that exceed the contributions of forces employed individually”. His top-down guidance provides a common framework upon which each of the services can focus their attention on the most demanding

COUNTER COMMAND

missions. These missions will need the synchronised, multi-domain approach envisioned within JADO “to rapidly sense, command and control, target, and support actions across all warfighting domains”. But to do so it must address integration shortfalls in the command of joint operations and stovepiping. These shortfalls limit “synergies between activities in separate domains, create vulnerabilities and reduce the capacity for dynamic exploitation of opportunities”.

JOINING FORCES Although these JADO/JADC2 integration shortfalls reflect the scale of US power projection and globallyintegrated operations, there are factors applicable for Australia and the region. As well as deficiencies in C2 and sensing, the doctrine note outlines the need for ‘Agile Support’ including ‘All-Domain Protection’ and ‘Resilient Sustainment and Logistics’. Integration shortfalls extend beyond technological interoperability. They include operational challenges due to the USAF no longer being able to assume that control of the air will be achieved through a superior air combat capability operating from sanctuary air bases with uncontested supply chains. Perhaps the most significant shortfall is in component planning and the need for operations with space and cyberspace. These two domains must be promoted from historical supporting roles to provide ‘synergistic effects in air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum’.

FULL SPECTRUM TARGETING The key integrating function in this activity is targeting. As described in Accelerating Warfare in the Nov-Dec 2018 issue of ADBR, targeting is the sum of the effort to combine intelligence, political, legal, environmental, technological, conceptual, and moral factors into the way Western states plan and execute military campaigns and operations. It is a critical, data-intensive process that generates power by linking strategy to individual tasks and activities in each of the domains. In the USAF doctrine note targeting is mentioned on many occasions, not just in terms of its criticality to successful JADO, but also in the context of creating an information advantage. This information advantage becomes a core element of the US definition of JADC2, defined as ‘the art and science of decision-making to rapidly translate decisions into action, leveraging capabilities across all domains and with mission partners to achieve operational and information advantage in both competition and conflict’. In turn, information advantage is described as ‘the application of information capabilities including space, cyberspace, EMS, and influence, resulting

in comparative advantage to support all-domain operations. It includes intense targeting of adversary command and control and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.’ Specifically, ‘JADO should enable the engagement of thousands of targets in hundreds of hours’. Yet targeting at the scale and speed described here requires an enterprise approach to the management, access, and distribution of data, without which all the talk about information advantage, JADC2, and JADO will amount to nought. ‘A central challenge of JADO is turning large amounts of multi-source data into actionable intelligence, enabling leaders to drive operations by observing, orienting, deciding, and acting correctly based on the that information’. Dr Dwyer’s analysis describes the data problem in the following terms, “Technical solutions to the problem of JADC2 enable operators to detect and effect targets. Therefore, in developing ABMS, the Air Force first needs to decide what data to collect and connect. Next, it needs to identify who tasks sensors to collect that data and who adjudicates competing priorities when sensors are assigned more than one task. The Air Force also needs to determine who will store and analyse data and who will decide to initiate an effect, task relevant shooters, and adjudicate competing priorities.” Getting the technical aspects of data and targeting right solves a significant part of the any sensor, any shooter problem but ‘operationalising’ the JADC2 solution to the point where it can be used in anger will generate extraordinary challenges in preparedness. The ability to test, evaluate and train the six US services in a contested and denied JADO context will be covered in a later edition of ADBR. At some point though, it will require the prioritisation of the likely missions where JADC2 is essential. The past two decades were dominated by a military focus on counterinsurgency and

. ADF

ADBR

counterterrorism that involved operations in all domains. The emerging multi-domain narrative has yet to mature to the point where its core mission is clear to the DOD, lawmakers, and industry alike. Given Gen Goldfein’s eagerness to take the lead, it is likely the USAF intends JADC2 to be established for the counter air mission.

A synchronised counter command system, enabled by the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangements, and regional security frameworks, could be the answer. The question is how to build a counter command system to protect Australia and its interests. Targeting and a joint data platform is a good start point.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

MISSION FIRST

A significant amount of the ADF force structure – the ways and means to achieve power – is provided by the US. To realise the full capability of the force ‘bottom-up’ design thinking is needed to generate an integrated joint force that can operate across all domains in our area of strategic interest and still integrate with the US. Top-down thinking requires a different approach with an emphasis on systems thinking. The combination of systems thinking with design thinking links strategy and task. Both are needed because bottom-up thinking generates the force, while topdown thinking generates power. For example, in the US approach to counter air there is a requirement for a higher-order mission that unifies the services with a common goal, linking strategy to task. This mission is best characterised as counter command. Counter command would be the exemplar mission executed within the JADO concept of operations, and enabled by JADC2. The purpose would be the synchronisation of domain contributions and the whole of government apparatus. A counter command narrative signals intent, and JADO describes to an adversary the conceptual sophistication of a military force. But counter command explains what that force is going to achieve. Instead of targeting objects, counter command first and foremost removes the levers of power and control from military and political leadership. It isolates them as a group. The unstated intent is to target the individual, and the outcome is to provide a choice to an adversary that does not rely on a strategy of annihilation. The counter command mission is the off-ramp to negotiation and settlement. While the US approach to JADO and its enabling JADC2 takes shape, we should be assured by the associated level of scrutiny. Gen Goldfein’s doctrine note is compelling and is sure to be adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the basis for future US joint doctrine. If successful, multi-domain operations should be able to bridge the divide between tactical excellence and strategic failure which continues to characterise modern conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia involving the US and its allies.

In the US military this requires JADC2 – specifically the ABMS – to deliver an integrated counter air system with unified command arrangements and multi-domain expertise. Counter air is a joint mission and is approached by the services in different ways through different organisations and mission systems, with different cultures and views from and within their domains. For example, the US Army has its own Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) for the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) mission, and the US Navy conducts counter air using the Naval Integrated Fires-Counter Air (NIF-CA) concept. These are the bottom-up systems that provide the ways and means of warfighting. However, the question remains. ‘in order to do what?’ Despite the services’ willingness to co-operate within the framework of JADO/JADC2, it remains to be seen whether it is too vague a concept to be of any operational use. It would be wrong to simply view the JADC2 challenges though the counter air lens. There are non-operational challenges, with projects, programs and the allocation of resources also an important part of the mix. The number and complexity of interfaces and requirements across the services is too difficult to contain within a single integration project. At some point, the mission must be better defined to enable top-down to synchronise with bottom-up. When Professor Freedman wrote about the creation of power he was referring to the art of strategy. Force design and technical concepts are a science. The development of the force contributes to the creation of power. Concepts linking a force together like JADC2 are just as important as systems when building a force, but systems and operational concepts need to have an underlying mission and intent that is more sophisticated than ‘better, faster’. It wasn’t until the US started targeting the command and decision-making apparatus in Belgrade and key Serb leadership that negotiations started. Not leadership targeting, but denying the ability to command. Twenty years of counterinsurgency has taught us that tactical targeting is not the answer to winning a campaign, despite its crushing success on the battlefield. The counter command mission with an enabling system linked to clear strategic goals is how we avoid losing the next conflict.

‘A significant amount of the ADF force structure is provided by the US. ’

ANZAC FRIGATE

FIGHTING FIT Navy’s eight Anzac frigates have come a long way over the past two decades BY MAX BLENKIN

loating targets – that’s how former Defence Industry Minister Bronwyn Bishop described our eight ANZAC frigates, a comment unlikely to inspire confidence in their crews or the rest of the nation. Subtracting the politics – the minister was really having a shot at the Labor opposition – she was pretty much spot on. The ANZACs were delivered with only basic defensive and offensive systems, with a vision that more could be added later when the money became available. In the language of the time, they were fitted “for but not with” the additional weapons. From that uninspiring beginning, the Anzacs have been steadily upgraded, adding advanced systems which now make them among the best small warships in the world. “We have gone well and truly above what people would have thought we were going to do. It would have to be one of the most capable frigates in the southern hemisphere,” said CDRE Rob Elliott, Director General for Major Surface Ships, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). So why not the best small warships in the world? After all, few others, maybe none, feature the advanced capabilities delivered by the Australian CEA air defence and long-range search radars,

coupled with the Saab Australia 9LV combat system and ESSM missiles. Elliott notes that it’s not the Aussie way to get too carried away with telling the world of our cleverness. He also says this is sovereign Australian capability, developed in Australia for Australia. Saab Australia is a subsidiary of the well-known Swedish parent but its 9LV combat system has software capability modules developed solely for Australia and not shared with anyone else. A little bit about the description of ANZACs as small warships: these started at 3,600 tonnes, now 3,900 tonnes with all their upgrades. However, their successors, the new Hunter class frigates will max out close to 9,000 tonnes. The ANZACs are now past mid-life and will be replaced by the Hunters starting around end of this decade. The Hunters will feature the CEA Technologies CEAFAR2 radar system, US Aegis combat system and the Saab Australia-developed 9LV Australian interface. So the substantial development work on integrating the CEA radar and Saab combat system into the ANZACs will go a very long ways towards removing the risk of integrating sensors and combat systems on the Hunters.

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HMAS Toowoomba, one of the eight ANZAC-class frigates to have undergone the Anti-Ship Missile Defence Program and now destined for radar system replacement as part of further upgrades. ADF

ANZAC FRIGATE

The Hunters are a variant of the UK Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS), the first of which is now under construction for the Royal Navy using a different radar and combat system to Australia. The same goes for Canada which chose GCS as its new surface combatant. Stepping back more than two decades, here’s what Bronwyn Bishop had to say in June 1998 when she rose to answer a question from then Queensland Nationals MP Bob Katter in the House of Representatives. “The policy that the previous government followed, of fitting platforms for but not with, has left us with a situation where we have built splendid new frigates – for but not with – which in fact are floating targets. It is up to this government to give them the wherewithal to be able to truly defend this nation.” Bishop added that if Opposition Leader Kim Beazley thought a five-inch gun and Sea Sparrow missile were enough armament, he’d better think again. “What is clearly required is an upgrade of both missiles and radar, which are clearly in the area of defence industry. This is the government which will enable our defence force to adequately defend this country.”. Beazley was Defence Minister in the Hawke Labor government which conducted the selection process and announced the winning Anzac design in August 1989, then oversaw the start of construction. By the time Labor was defeated and John Howard came to power at the 1996 election, two of the 10 ANZACs had been launched, one for Australia and one for New Zealand. Eight more were to follow with the last, HMAS Perth, commissioned in August 2006. This was an exemplary construction program, with the contractor, initially Amecon which became Tenix, now BAE Systems Australia, delivering on time and within budget, with negligible dramas along the way. But in their original form, the ANZACs – based on the German Blohm and Voss Meko 200 design – had limited capability. They were fitted for but not with Harpoon antiship missiles, Phalanx close-in weapons system, torpedo tubes, a second eight-cell Mark 41 Vertical Launch System and a towed array sonar. However, a project was under way to acquire a new anti-ship missile-equipped medium helicopter as a key component of ANZAC capability. That was Seasprite, and we all know how that turned out. As Bishop correctly noted in 1998, the ANZACs’ main offensive weapon was their five-inch gun – a very good gun system but in principle not much different to the principle weapon of warships a century earlier. On the plus side, the Anzacs were a great improvement on their predecessors, the six River class Destroyer Escorts, based on the 1950s Royal Navy Leander class.

The ANZACs were significantly larger with significantly greater range and endurance, while requiring a smaller crew. CDRE Elliott said the government at the time was focused on replacing the Destroyer Escort which didn’t have much capability. The government was also focused on doing a deal with New Zealand which needed to replace its two 1970s Leander class vessels. This was a matter of protracted and rancorous debate over what New Zealand really needed of its Navy. The end result was that New Zealand acquired two vessels, ships two and four, but never exercised an option for an additional two. New Zealand’s involvement gave rise to the enduring class description ANZAC frigates. Australian and New Zealand vessels may have been substantially identical on delivery but have followed quite different upgrade paths. ANZAC shortcomings were well recognised and, in 1996, the Australian government approved the ANZAC Warfighting Improvement Program (WIP) which, in 1999, morphed into the Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) program, a highly developmental upgrade which proved deeply troublesome but ultimately spectacularly successful. This involved installing the Australian CEA Technologies CEAFAR phased array radar and CEAMOUNT continuous wave illuminator, integrating with the Saab combat system and adding Vampir NG Infrared Search and Track and Sharpeye navigation radar. ASMD was first installed on HMAS Perth, a modification process started in January 2010 and completed that October. Sea trials were completed in July 2011 and showed this was an absolute winner. Where the original system featured a single fire control channel which would have worked against one or maybe two slow missiles, ASMD-equipped warships can detect, track and engage multiple fast-moving air and surface threats with ESSM missiles.

The ASMD program may have been troublesome at times, but it has proved to be hugely successful on the ANZAC frigates, including HMAS Stuart (above). DEFENCE

‘ANZAC shortcomings were well recognised.’

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In November 2011, the then Labor government approved upgrading of the other seven ANZACs at a cost of $650 million, including what had already been spent on Perth. Upgrade of the entire ANZAC fleet, minus New Zealand’s two vessels, was completed in 2017. CEAFAR is a solid state active phased array radar, visible on the upgraded ANZACs as the curious sceptre-shaped structure with radar facets in place of the original mast. Unlike traditional rotating radar antennae, phased array radar uses fixed emitter and receiver elements, with the beam directed by adjusting signal phase. This has many advantages, including the ability to maintain constant 360 degrees surveillance, to track multiple targets simultaneously and to stare at a specific item of interest. Solid state radar – technically, actively electronically scanned arrays (AESA) – are a step up on passive electronically scanned systems, such as the SPY-1D on US and Australian DDGs and other warships. These offer far greater sensitivity and much improved capability to detect and track stealth aircraft and drones, swarming drones and the hypersonic weapons increasingly likely to feature in future conflicts. Putting Australia’s achievements into perspective, future production US Navy

AMCAP upgrades to all eight ANZAC frigates will be complete by the end of first quarter 2024. DEFENCE

DDGs, the Arleigh Burke Flight III, will be equipped with the Raytheon AN/SPY-6 AESA radar, with the first, USS Jack Lucas, set to be commissioned in 2023. The US Navy is still deciding which of its large fleet of in-service DDGs and other vessels will be retrofitted with this radar. Australia’s three near-new SPY-1D-equipped Hobart class DDGs are also due for an upgrade, though the full scope hasn’t yet been outlined. ASMD left the original Raytheon SPS-49(V)8 ANZ aerial search and long-range surveillance radar, with its rotating antenna, in place. But that is now being replaced under the next major ANZAC frigate upgrade program, AMCAP, which will be conducted at Henderson in Western Australia. AMCAP is being delivered under the umbrella of the Warship Asset Management Agreement (WAMA), an alliance of CASG, Saab Australia, BAE Systems Australia and Naval Ship Management Australia to sustain and upgrade the ANZACs. AMCAP is the ANZAC Mid-life Capability Assurance Program. As part of AMCAP, the AN/SPS-49(V)8 radar is being replaced by the CEAFAR2 L-Band phased array radar system under Project SEA 1448 Phase 4B. Lead ship HMAS Arunta completed her 20-month upgrade in mid-2018 and then proceeded on extensive sea trials. She officially graduated from this upgrade program with the firing of a live ESSM missile off the Western Australian coast in March. HMAS ANZAC is soon to start sea trials while HMAS Warramunga and HMAS Perth are now part way through. All eight vessels will be upgraded by end of first quarter 2024.

ANZAC FRIGATE

The headline AMCAP item is replacement of the legacy Raytheon radar with the CEAFAR2-L long-range search radar. Whereas the CEAFAR1, around which ASMD operates, is classed a medium-power radar, CEAFAR2-L is a high-powered radar with capability well beyond 100 nautical miles. CEAFAR2-L is fully integrated into the ASMD fire control system with the ability to perform long-range air and surface search plus the ability to deliver missile firing solutions. Elliott said the ANZACs formed the backbone to our major surface combatant fleet. “But they act in the bigger integrated picture through Link, whether that is Link 16 or Link 22 which is where we are heading to across the fleet,” he said. “We want to put a picture out there which is able to be shared with destroyers and so that we can actually use it for targeting.” CDRE Elliott said one of the great capabilities of the CEAFAR radar is its ability to identify targets with extreme accuracy and provide that information to other warships, such as the DDGs, for targeting at extended ranges using SM-2 and maybe, further down the track, SM-6 missiles. But does that amount to a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), a much vaunted and very high-end ability of Aegis-equipped warships to share sensor information, with one providing target data and another firing the missiles? “We would like to refer to it as that one day, but of course that’s the American terminology. We would like to consider that this capability is like that,” CDRE Elliot said. Moving to solid state radar provided other benefits. It removed a substantial amount of weight

from high above the waterline and is much more maintainable and reliable. “The CEAFAR2-L system in Arunta has been out there for over six months and we haven’t had one significant defect. Of note though, CEA designed into the CEAFAR system the ability to move power amplifiers and other things around. There are multiple levels of redundancy,” CDRE Elliott said. AMCAP also featured other warfare system improvements. The stand-alone IFF system was replaced with an IFF system designed by CEA and integrated into the CEAFAR2-L system – another world first for the company. ANZAC communications were significantly upgraded through Project SEA 1442 Phase 4. Original ANZAC comms were quite capable – the wags even referred to the class as very well-informed targets. But a decade on, the communications fitout was showing its age. The government gave first pass approval for an upgrade in December 2010 and second pass in July 2013, with the work awarded to Leonardo Australia subsidiary Selex ES, now Leonardo MW. Total budget was $440 million. This was a complex project designed to address ANZAC communications system obsolescence through

HMAS Arunta (below) graduated from the AMCAP program with the firing of an Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. DEFENCE

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A digital render of one of the Hunter-class frigates that will begin to replace the ANZACs around the end of the decade. BAE SYSTEMS

improved system management, secure voice and tactical intercom, tactical radios and a high data rate line-of-sight capability. It also delivered support systems, a secondary Maritime Tactical Wide Area Network Shore Gateway and training system at HMAS Stirling. What was called the NewGen MCS (modernised communications system) involved a mix of MOTS and COTS equipment, including ARC-210 Gen5 V/ UHF multi-band multi-mode software defined radios, acquired through a Foreign Military Sales deal with the US. All this required substantial integration, facilitated by Leonardo’s new integration and test facility opened in Melbourne in October 2017. SEA 1442 Phase 4 was a very big deal for Leonardo. In 2017, the company declared Australia was now its fifth domestic market after Italy, the UK, US and Poland. CDRE Elliott said for this project the original communications suite was completely gutted and replaced with the state-of-the-art Leonardo system. “It’s been proven in Arunta. All the testing is complete, and we are very impressed,” he said. He also noted that the Navy doesn’t hand its ships to CASG for extended upgrades all that often. “So when we get them, we do a lot,” he said. In addition to the AMCAP enhancements to the radar and communications system, the modification program also included what was called the Platform System Remediation Project to enhance ship-enabling capabilities of power, air conditioning and chilled water. CDRE Elliott said the ASMD project was directed to work within margins for power and cooling. “Operating in areas of the Middle East for many years we have determined that our chilled water and our air conditioning capability needed to be upgraded. It was never designed

‘This is about keeping the ship seaworthy until life of type.’

for those sort of waters,” he said. “We are now well within that and have extra margin.” Chilled water is nice for the crew but it’s really required to cool electronic equipment, with the more electronics, the more cooling required, especially at action stations. There were also some engine mods to improve power and efficiency. Crew members weren’t neglected either - as well as enhanced cooling, they get an upgraded galley and an improved sewage system. “We basically invaded about 85 per cent of our compartments. These are areas which in ASMD we didn’t touch,” he said. “This is building resilience into the hull and mechanical electrical components to provide the warfare system continued operation over a significant period of time.” Ships undergoing AMCAP also emerge with one noticeable and distinctly low-tech change. They’re a slightly different colour, with the Navy moving from Shipside Grey to Haze Grey, the same as US warships, that features a slightly greenish tinge. Research by the Defence Science and Technology (DST) group had examined what colour made ships least visible on the horizon. In our waters, Shipside Grey was most effective, but Haze Grey worked in the widest range of conditions everywhere. Eventually all Australian warships will be painted this colour, with the Canberra class landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessels next in line for what will be a very big paint job indeed. Upgrades to the ANZACs aren’t over yet. ASMD served as the baseline for AMCAP which in turn is the baseline for the ANZAC Capability Assurance Program (CAP) to be conducted under SEA 5014 Phase 1. This is a life of type extension to take the ANZACs out to the arrival of the Hunters. This doesn’t feature further capability enhancements, but it does mean ensuring onboard systems remain in good order, corrosion is kept in check, and margins remain adequate. “This is about keeping the ship seaworthy until life of type,” CDRE Elliott said. That will ultimately depend on the drumbeat of Hunter production, with a new vessel expected around every two years and an ANZAC departing service at the same rate. This could mean more than a decade more service for the oldest of the class, HMAS ANZAC, launched in September 1994 and commissioned in May 1996, making an in-service life of more than three decades. CDRE Elliott said the successful upgrade of the ANZACs was a good news story. “What we are doing with the ANZACs is all Australian. We are over 90 per cent in this sustainment,” he said. “Sustainment is very underrated but it is the backbone of ongoing funding expense within defence, certainly in maritime.”

ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES

An AGM-88 HARM takes flight from a US F-16CJ. It is more than 30 years since the AGM-88 made its combat debut, and it is showing no signs of retirement with the recent development of two new variants. US MIL

A N T I - R A DI AT ION MISSIL E S

DOING HARM The anti-radiation missile sector has seldom been so vibrant. New and upgraded weapons are entering the marketplace as a riposte to enhancements of ground-based air defences. BY DR THOMAS WITHINGTON

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he Spencer Davis Group and The Righteous Brothers were celebrating on 18 April 1966. Both bands had scored number one hits with their singles Somebody Help Me and (You’re My) Soul and Inspiration in the Britain and the United States. Thousands of miles away in South-East Asia, the US was deeply embroiled in the Vietnam War. That day the USAF ushered in a new era in its history by employing the Texas Instruments AGM-45A Shrike Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) for the first time. The AGM-45 was used extensively during the Vietnam War by the USAF and US Navy. Eleven variants were produced, each of which used a different Radio Frequency (RF) seeker tuned to the waveband of the radar the missile was to attack. For example, the AGM-45A/B6 detected X-band (8.5GHz to 10.68GHz) radar emissions, principally those from the SNR-125 (NATO reporting name Low Blow) fire control radar forming part of the Almaz S-125 Neva/Pechora (SA-3 Goa) medium-range/medium-altitude surface-to-air missile ensemble. Nor were the capabilities of the AGM-45 restricted to Soviet and Warsaw Pact radars. During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the RAF famously used AGM-45A missiles launched from Avro Vulcan-B2 strategic bombers against an Argentine Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F groundbased air surveillance radar and Oerlikon Contraves Skyguard fire control radars accompanying Oerlikon GDF anti-aircraft artillery systems. These radars were located on the island of East Falkland and were attacked on 31 May 1982 and again on 2 June 1982. Aside from being the world’s first operational ARM, the AGM-45 had one of the longest careers of such a weapon, eventually leaving US service in 1992. It made way for the legendary Texas Instruments/Raytheon AGM-88 HARM (High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile).

Early days - the Texas Instruments AGM-45 Shrike. First used in the Vietnam war, the missile was retired from US service in 1992. US NAVY

HARM IN ACTION Just under one year after RAF use of the AGM-45, the US DoD approved the full rate production of the AGM-88. The missile subsequently made its combat debut during the Operation Eldorado Canyon airstrikes mounted by the USAF and US Navy on 15 April 1986 against targets in Libya in retaliation for the sponsorship of violent insurgent movements in the Middle East and beyond by the country’s then leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Some 34 years later, the AGM-88 shows no signs of heading for retirement. In fact, the weapon has evolved into two new variants – the Northrop Grumman AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), and Raytheon’s AGM-88F HCSM (HARM Control System Modification), both of which augment the existing AGM-88B/C variants which entered service in 1987 and 1993 respectively. The AGM-88E adds a global positioning system/inertial navigation system (GPS/INS) and a Millimetric Wave Radar (MMW) to the AGM-88B/C. The former helps a missile avoid the so-called ‘switch off’ tactic where radar operators deactivate their equipment to break the RF lock an ARM relies upon to guide towards its target. The GPS/INS allows the missile to be loaded with the precise coordinates of the radar so that, even if it is deactivated, the missile can use these coordinates to find its target. Secondly, the GPS/INS can be programmed with a defined area beyond which the missile is not permitted to fly. It is noteworthy that during Operation Allied Force in 1999 – the NATO-led effort to end ethnic cleansing in the Balkans territory of Kosovo – an AGM-88B ended up hitting a street in a suburb of the Bulgarian capital Sofia after having lost its RF lock. MMW radars, which transmit on frequencies of 30GHz and above, produce highly detailed imagery thanks to their very short wavelengths. This helps in the gathering of battle damage assessment as the

ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES

MMW radar can transmit detailed imagery of the missile’s end game to verify the accuracy of the attack. Customers for the AGM-88E include the German government procuring 91 examples for the Luftwaffe’s Panavia Tornado-ECR air defence suppression jets under a US$122m (A$192m) foreign military sale announced in 2019. These will replace the current AGM-88B/C missiles used on Tornado. AGM-88Es are also furnishing the Tornado-ECRs flown by Italy’s Aeronautica Militaire. Closer to home, the RAAF is also acquiring the weapon, placing an initial order for 16 AGM-88Es in 2015 and an additional 10 in 2018, with plans afoot for a further 14. On 8 March 2020 Northrop Grumman announced that it had secured a US$322.5m (A$508m) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract for an extended range variant of the AARGM, called somewhat predictably the AGM-88G AARGM-ER. The contract covers the design, test, and integration of a new rocket motor for the baseline AGM-88E to enhance its range. Development of the AARGM-ER is being financed by the US Navy which could become a customer in the future. The AGM-88F is also a reworking of the AGM-88B/C adding a GPS/INS to the baseline version of the missile. Customers for the AGM-88F include Bahrain, Qatar and Taiwan, with a US foreign military sale being concluded in May 2019 worth US$355m (A$560m). The contract also covers the upgrade of an unspecified number of USAF

AGM-88C weapons to AGM-88F status. This work, and delivery of the AGM-88Fs to foreign customers, is expected to be completed by 2027. These contracts build on the 650 AGM-88F missiles delivered to the USAF from a contract won by Raytheon in 2012. They are deployed on Lockheed Martin F-16CJ Viper Weasel air defence suppression aircraft. Like the AGM-88E, the AGM-88F can be deployed both with and without the Raytheon AN/ ASQ-213(V) HARM targeting system. This is used with dedicated air defence suppression aircraft to provide highly accurate emitter fire control information, uploaded into the missile before launch or during its flight via datalink. USAF sources said the AN/ASQ-213(V) is used by aircraft such as the F-16CJ Viper Weasel to provide precise emitter location information during SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence) efforts. Use of the AGM-88 series without an ASQ-213(V) is more conducive to attacking hostile emitters in self-defence if an aircraft is illuminated.

NEW SYSTEMS Beyond the AGM-88, other countries are entering the ARM club. These include India where that country’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is realising the New-Generation Anti-Radiation Missile (NGARM). Work started on this missile in 2012 and reports claim ranges of between 54nm (100km) to 65nm (120km), with the weapon expected to be deployed

An Italian Air Force Panavia Tornado ECR furnished with an AGM-88E. Other European customers for the missile include the Luftwaffe and the RAF. ITALY A.M.

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‘The SPEAR-EW is able to loiter and perform electronic attack while the aircraft completes its mission.’

India is developing its own New Generation ARM, seen here modelled on a Sukhoi Su-30MKI. It will include an MMW radar seeker like the AGM-88. INDIA DEFENCE

on Indian Air Force Sukhoi Su-30MKI and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Tejas combat aircraft. Like the AGM-88E, it will include an MMW radar seeker, with the missile’s RF seeker expected to cover a waveband of 2GHz to 20GHz. Once development of the NGARM is complete, the missile may augment or replace the IAF’s Soviet-era Zvezda-Strela Kh-25MP (NATO reporting name AS-12 Kegler) ARMs. While the IAF has been in the ARM club since the 1970s, the UK’s RAF bowed out in 2013 with the retirement of its British Aerospace/MBDA ALARM (Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile), a system which was last used in anger by the force during the 2011 NATO and US-led interventions in the Libyan civil war. More recently, MBDA sources said the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), which also acquired the ALARM for employment from its Tornado IDSs, may have used the weapon during its intervention in Yemen’s civil war, although against general land targets rather than radars. The RAF is considering acquisition of MBDA’s SPEAR-EW (Select Precision Effects at RangeElectronic Warfare) variant of the SPEAR-3 air-to-

ground missile. The SPEAR-EW design dispenses with the warhead and seeker of the SPEAR-3, replacing this with an electronic warfare payload. The EW payload comprises Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to detect, locate and identify hostile emitters, and an electronic attack system to blast these with jamming waveforms. MBDA sources said that the SPEAR-EW could be used as a stand-in capability, jamming hostile radars while an aircraft such as the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon-F/GR4 combat aircraft are operating in contested airspace. The SPEAR-EW is able to loiter and perform electronic attack while the aircraft completes its mission, or can be used to identify and jam hostile emitters which could then be engaged by kinetic air-to-ground weapons such as the SPEAR-3. Although not formally revealed, it is possible that the SPEAR-EW will jam emitters transmitting in wavebands of 8.5GHz to 40GHz, enabling it to jam X-band, Ku-band (13.4-14/15.7-17.7GHz), K-band (24.05GHz to 24.25GHz) and Ka-band (33.4GHz to 36GHz) ground-based and naval surveillance and fire control/ground controlled interception radars and missile radar seekers. The range of the SPEAR-EW is thought to be in excess of the 75nm (140km) of the SPEAR-3. MBDA sources have told the author that production and delivery of the SPEAR-EW could occur over the next five years should the RAF place a formal order.

ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES

UAVS

CHINA AND RUSSIA

Air-to-surface missiles have been the weapon of choice for attacking hostile radars, but Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) has bucked this trend with the development of the Harpy anti-radar unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which is believed to have entered service with the Israeli Air Force around 1973. Open sources state that the weapon has an endurance of about six hours and carries a blast fragmentation warhead. After launch, it will loiter at an altitude of 6,500 feet and use an ESM to detect emissions from hostile radars. Once an emitter is detected, the Harpy will dive towards the radar and detonate. Taiwan has taken a similar approach with the realisation of its Anti-Radiation UAV (ARUAV). Few design details have been released, although in 2017 it was reported that the weapon can loiter for 100 hours. Although not publicly revealed, sources claim the ESM equipping the ARUAV covers a waveband of at least 2GHz to 18GHz. This may have been extended further downwards to frequencies of 500MHz allowing the ARUAV to detect emissions from ultra-high frequency (UHF) radars transmitting on L-band wavelengths of 1.215GHz to 1.4GHz. These frequencies are used by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering’s JY-14 ground-based air surveillance radar, alleged in some reports to be capable of detecting and tracking combat aircraft with low radar cross-sections. The JY-14 is reportedly the most numerous such radar in service in the PRC.

Like its rival across the Taiwan Strait, the PRC is pouring investment into ARM technology. Details are sparse regarding the performance of the Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation YJ-91 ARM, but it is thought to have been developed from Russia’s Tactical Missiles Corporation’s Kh-31 (NATO reporting name AS-17 Krypton) air-to-surface weapon. The Kh-31P ARM variant can be outfitted with a number of distinct RF seekers depending on the radar the missile is to attack. The PRC has developed an indigenous variant of the weapon – known as the KR-1 and thought to have been equipped with a single RF seeker optimised for detecting and homing in on S-band (2.3GHz to 2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) ground-based air surveillance radars. One of the principle differences between the baseline KR-1 received by the PRC in 1997 and the YJ-91 is the latter’s single RF seeker covering a wide waveband of emitters, in contrast to the KR-1’s restriction to S-band. This will allow the missile to cover, roughly, the 2GHz to 18GHz waveband used by most ground-based air surveillance, naval surveillance, and fire control/ ground-controlled interception radars – the priority targets during SEAD missions. Alongside the expanded frequency range of the YJ-91, the missile may have a slightly extended range of 65nm (120km) versus the 59nm (110km) of the Kh-31P. Since its service entry in 1991, the Kh-31P has been developed into several subvariants. Three distinct models have been identified, the Kh-31P,

MBDA’s SPEAR-EW has been designed as a stand-off/stand-in electronic attack decoy. The weapon is currently under development and could equip the RAF in the near future, putting the air force back in the air defence suppression business. MBDA

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The Kh-58 (above and below) is one of the standard ARMs in service with the Russian Air Force. The weapon is produced in two variants with the Kh58UShKE being the export version of the missile. VITALY V. KUZMIN

Kh-61PK and Kh-31PD. The Kh-31PK offers improved lethality over the Kh-31P with a proximityfused warhead. Meanwhile, the Kh-31PD extends the missile’s range to 135nm (250km). Each of these missiles is still thought to use multiple RF seekers – reportedly designated L-111, L-112 and L113 collectively – covering a 1GHz to 11GHz waveband. All Kh-31P variants are used with the L-080/L-081 Phantasmagoria-A/B emitter locator system which works in a similar fashion to the HARM’s AN/ASQ-213(V) In Russian service the Kh-31P series has been augmented by the Kh-58E/UShKE (NATO reporting name AS-11 Kilter) missile which has a reported

range of up to 132nm (245km) and is capable of targeting radars emitting on frequencies of 1GHz to 12.5GHz. Alongside the Kh-58E/UShKE, the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ 2020 Military Balance noted that the Zvezda-Strela Kh-25M/MP (NATO reporting name AS-10 Karen) continues in service with the Russian Air Force, having been introduced in 1975. No details appear to have been released regarding the wavebands covered by the missile although, like the Kh-31P, it is thought to use an array of RF seekers which must be fitted to the missile prior to a sortie according to the radar being targeted.

ARM INVESTMENT The prevailing paradigm of near-peer rivalry is spurring investment into ARM technology. The US and its allies, and the PRC and Russia, all field sophisticated ground-based air defences, particularly radar. As a result, defeating such threats becomes an imperative for success in the wider offensive counter air (OCA) battle. Success will belong to those who can outclass the technological sophistication of an adversary’s radar, particularly in terms of the electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques these can bring to bear through the technological sophistication of their ARMs. Similarly, countries such as India and Taiwan are more than aware of the importance of these weapons and are making investments accordingly. Not only will this help them develop capabilities independent of their traditional suppliers, but also help them to emerge as exporters of such materiel in their own right.

IN SYNC

INF OR M AT ION A D VA N TA GE

STAYING IN SYNC

This feature continues the technical description of tactical data links from previous editions of ADBR, and addresses the fundamentals of LINK 16 synchronisation BY FELIX DEFENCE

he need to synchronise intelligence and tactics is key to achieving information advantage and battlefield success in multi-domain operations. While this is driven by doctrine at the strategic level, it is the technologies that we employ at the tactical level that ultimately underpin this success. Tactical Data Link (TDL) 16 is one of the technologies utilised to provide military intelligence. Link 16 is both the ADF’s and US Department of Defense’s primary TDL, and is essential in enabling secure situational awareness, integrated fire control, and command and control capabilities Describing the value of Link 16 in Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, Barry D Watts, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), draws upon data collected from operational experience during Operation Desert Storm where F-15Cs, aided in most cases by E-3A Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, downed 28 Iraqi fighters without a single loss. When Link 16-equipped F-15s flew against the same fighter/AWACS combination that had done so well in the Gulf War, the Link 16 ‘information advantage’ enabled them to “dominate opponents by exchange ratios of four-to-one or better”. Yet in order to achieve the necessary levels of situational awareness, Link 16 platforms first need to achieve synchronisation. So, how is that done?

COMMON TIME REFERENCE In the January-February 2020 issue of ADBR our Link 16 series of articles began to explore synchronisation and network synchronisation, and the need to know where the 12-second frame

begins and ultimately where it ends. Synchronisation is a function of platforms being aligned to a specific Frequency-Hopping Pattern (FHP) and the requirement to utilise a common Network Time Reference (NTR). This common time reference is provided either by a single platform’s Link 16 terminal, or via an external source, most commonly Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), via satellite. This results in the establishment of either a System Time Reference Network (STRN) or an External Time Reference Network (ETRN). The weakness of an STRN is that only one platform can be the NTR, whereas in an ETRN multiple platforms could be the NTR, as they all derive time from the same source. At this point it is important to recognise that the role of NTR is a defined Link 16 duty and is allocated as part of the planning process. Secondly, not all platforms are External Time Reference (ETR) capable, but all Link 16 platforms can operate in either an STRN or an ETRN. It is the allocation of the NTR duty that is important, and this allocation must be carefully managed based upon the type of network in use.

TIME QUALITY In order to maintain an aligned FHP we need to ensure that all Link 16 platforms have and maintain system time; synchronisation after all is the adjustment of a clock to show the same time as another. Within Link 16 a feature known as Time Quality (Qt) is maintained by every platform to support its own accuracy of time with respect to the common time reference so that, in essence, each platform’s terminal estimates how well it knows system time. It achieves this by building a clock

ADBR

SYSTEM TIME REFERENCE NETWORK

EXTERNAL TIME REFERENCE NETWORK External Time Reference

I need the time

Not ETR capable. We need the time

ETR Capable Network Time Reference Qt15

Network Time Reference

I need the time

Figure 1: STRN v ETRN

ETR Capable Network Time Reference Qt13

Not ETR capable. I need the time

I need the time

drift model – an assessment of the rate at which their own internal clock drifts by comparison to that of system time. Qt is expressed as value from 0 to 15, with each value representing the number of nanoseconds’ deviation. A Qt value of 15 is the best and represents a deviation of less than, or equal to, 50 nanoseconds. In an STRN, only the NTR has a Qt of 15 but in an ETRN there could be multiple NTR’s and the Qt of each NTR could actually be lower than 15. This is because its Qt is based upon its own connectivity with the ETR. A terminal that is ETR capable is provided the time through a continuous stream of precise timing pulses. When an ETRcapable terminal sets NTR it uses those timing pulses to achieve fine synchronisation. The Qt it then transmits is directly related to the accuracy of those timing pulses and, as such, the platforms’ relationship to satellite coverage. Figure 1 illustrates in simple terms both STRN and ETRN, setting of NTR and the requirement for network time to achieve synchronisation.

Not ETR capable. I need the time

INITIAL NET ENTRY The single most important role of the NTR is to define network time to enable platforms that wish to join the network (need the time) to achieve Initial Net Entry. To do this the NTR transmits a J0.0 Initial Entry Message (IEM) within the very first time slot every 12-second frame. The J0.0 IEM provides all other platforms what the sender’s Qt is and is the beginning of understanding the actual system time. When a terminal is set as NTR, the transmission of the IEM is an automatic function. All terminals, except the NTR, are initialised to receive in the very first time slot on the default net, usually Net 0. So, any platform wishing to join a network automatically listens for the IEM. Once a joining platform receives an error-free IEM, its terminal adjusts its time to match that of the NTR and achieves coarse synchronisation. But what happens when a joining platform is outside of line-of-sight (LoS) of the NTR and cannot receive the IEM?

INITIAL ENTRY JTIDS UNIT JOINING A LINK 16 NETWORK The process of synchronisation can be considered as having 4 separate phases.

Initial Net Entry

Coarse Synchronisation

Fine Synchronisation

Maintenance

Any platform can support the NTR by setting the terminal to perform the Link 16 duty of Initial Entry JTIDS Unit (IEJU), sometimes called Network Entry Transmit Enable (NETE). Once these platforms have themselves synchronised, they transmit the IEM in exactly the same time slot (TS) but every other 12-second frame. Since an IEJU uses the same TS as the NTR, there is no increase in TS use by having as many such platforms as the network may require.

IN SYNC

ROUND TRIP TIMING-ADDRESSED SYNCHRONISATION MODE 1. Fighters joining the network are in coarse synchronisation and receiving PPLI and Qt data. 2. Each Fighters Link 16 terminal stores and assesses this data and identifies the platform with the highest Qt (JU00002).

JU00002 Qt15

3. Each Fighter transmits an RTT-I message in their own allocated RTT-A time slot to JU00002.

Network Time Reference

4. JU00002 responds with an RTT-R message in the same time slot. 5. The fighters use the information held in the RTT-I and RTT-R to adjust their system time, thereby removing any error. 6. Both fighters acheive fine synchronisation.

In today’s Link 16 networks – which may span over a wide geographical area – it is critical for network connectivity, and therefore data exchange, that as many platforms as possible set IEJU to provide system time to those platforms that are beyond LoS of the NTR.

COARSE SYNCHRONISATION The terminal is now able to receive data from other platforms which are already in the network but cannot transmit data. Although it adjusted its clock to match that of the NTR, it did not allow for the time taken (propagation) for the IEM to travel between its own terminal and that of the NTR; as such, it only knows system time to within one time slot. Once this inaccuracy/error in system time has been removed, the terminal will progress to fine synchronisation. Fine synchronisation can be achieved in two ways, either actively or passively, with the latter being far easier to explain!

ACHIEVING FINE SYNCHRONISATION – BY PASSIVE MEANS Passive synchronisation is only used by platforms operating in radio silence. Once a joining platform achieves coarse synchronisation it is able to receive data, specifically the reception of other platforms’ Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) data pivotal to the synchronisation process. This PPLI data provides the geographical position and quality of the sender, but importantly it also provides Qt. Using the PPLI data being received along with its own position, the joining platform’s terminal can estimate the range between itself and other active platforms and thus the time taken (propagation). Simply put, it compares the expected time of arrival with the actual time of arrival.

We have received an IEM

JU00001 Qt14

JU00003 Qt14

Finally, by combining all the information, notably the Qt being received, the joining platform’s terminal can adjust its estimate of system time by removing any propagation error, subsequently achieving fine synchronisation.

ACHIEVING FINE SYNCHRONISATION – BY ACTIVE MEANS As described earlier, once a joining platform’s terminal achieves coarse synchronisation it is able to receive data, notably PPLI data which includes Qt. The joining platform’s terminal stores and monitors this data in its internal table and is able to evaluate which platforms have the highest Qt. Active synchronisation involves a joining platform terminal transmitting a Round Trip TimingInterrogation (RTT-I) message and hoping that an already active terminal replies, otherwise known as RTT-R. This reply uses the same TS. RTT messages can be exchanged in one of two modes, RTTAddressed (RTT-A) or RTT-Broadcast (RTT-B). ROUND TRIP TIMING-ADDRESSED Although RTT-A is an active synchronisation mode, it is arguably no longer employed. RTT-A requires that every platform in the network is allocated its own Time Slot (TS) through the network design process to transmit an RTT-I message. In today’s oversubscribed and congested Link 16 networks, this is simply an inefficient use of TS. During RTT-A, a joining platform terminal transmits an RTT-I to the platform with the highest Qt it holds in its internal table, ie it is addressed to a specific Link 16 unit (JU). To achieve fine synchronistion, the joining platform needs the platform being addressed to provide an RTT-Reply. If no reply is received, the joining platform simply transmits an RTT-I to the next JU with the highest

JU00004 Qt12

Figure 2: RTT-A Synchronisation Mode.

ADBR

ROUND TRIP TIMING-BROADCAST SYNCHRONISATION MODE 1. Fighters joining the network are in coarse synchronisation and receiving PPLI and Qt data.

We have received an IEM

JU00001 Qt14

2. Each Fighters Link 16 terminal stores and assesses this data and identifies the platform with the highest Qt (JU00002).

JU00002 Qt15

3. All active platforms listen in the shared RTT-B time slots on the net number which equals their Qt. (For example JU’s 00001 & 00004 listen on Net number 14). 4. Each fighter transmits an RTT-I message in the RTT-B shared time slots to Net Number 15 (highest Qt received).

Network Time Reference

5. JU0002 responds with an RTT-R message in the same time slot. 6. The fighters use the information held in the RTT-I and RTT-R to adjust their system time, thereby removing any error.

JU00003 Qt14

JU00004 Qt12

7. Both fighters achieve fine synchronisation.

Figure 3: RTT-B Synchronisation Mode.

Qt. The detailed information in both the RTT-I and RTT-R is used by the joining platform to adjust its system time by removing any error to achieve fine synchronisation. Figure 2 explains the RTT-A synchronisation mode.

ROUND TRIP TIMING-BROADCAST RTT-B usually requires no more than eight time slots which all platforms in the network share – hence it is far more efficient. When using RTT-B, the RTT process and calculations are the same as described above. The difference is that, having determined which JU has the highest Qt, the joining platform transmits its RTT-I on the net whose number is equal to the highest observed Qt using the broadcast address. Platforms which have achieved fine synchronisation, when not transmitting their own RTT-I messages used to maintain their Qt, listen for RTT-Interrogations on the net number equal to their own Qt, and reply to them on that net number. A joining platform does not care which platform replies as long as one does. RTT-B operates in a form of stacked net system using net numbers 1 to 15. Figure 3 explains the RTT-B synchronisation mode.

MAINTENANCE Once in fine synchronisation all platforms terminals then maintain how accurate they know system time by transmitting RTT messages every minute, and also measure the time of arrival of all other messages they receive to build what we now know as the clock drift model. Using the accuracy with which platform terminals reply to RTT-I messages and their estimate of system time, plus the time since the last RTT-R was received, enables a platform to set its own Qt. If a platform later loses LoS with all other platforms in the network, it uses this clock drift

model to adjust its own clock. By so doing a terminal can maintain synchronisation with the network for many hours, but its Qt will slowly degrade once RTT responses are no longer received. The great advantage of ETR-capable platforms operating in an ETRN, is that they can maintain fine synchronisation by directly observing the ETR precise timing pulses. Of course, some platforms may experience poor satellite coverage and, consequently, their Qt could decrease. But as all platforms perform the RTT process they can use this source, ensuring the best of both worlds. Ultimately, it does not matter if it is an STRN or ETRN, as all Link 16 platforms need the time to synchronise. Figure 4 summarises the full Link 16 synchronisation process.

INFORMATION ADVANTAGE Emerging US doctrine describes Information Advantage as “The application of information capabilities, including space, cyberspace, EMS, and influence, resulting in comparative advantage to support all-domain operations. It includes intense targeting of adversary command and control and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.” The need to synchronise intelligence and tactics is key to achieving information advantage and battlefield success in multi-domain operations. At the technical level this involves fine synchronisation of the Link 16 TDL. In our next article, we will continue to explore how Link 16 will change over the next five to 10 years, the challenges that Link 16 modernisation will bring, and the introduction and operational use of more Link 16 software-defined radios. It will certainly add another level of complexity which, if not correctly managed, will undermine battlefield success.

ON TARGET - SIR RICHARD WILLIAMS FOUNDATION

On Target

Australia’s ‘First Island Chain’ Part 2 By Brian Weston

n the January-February 2020 issue, On Target identified the growing importance of Australia’s First Island Chain to Australia’s national security. It outlined that, while Australia’s security strategy has many elements, military operations in the theatre extending south from Australia’s First Island Chain to continental Australia need much closer attention in national security planning. The column also noted that military operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain could credibly be sustained and conducted from Australia and executed under Australian national command – unlike operations beyond Australia’s First Island Chain which would involve access to forward basing, the concurrence and support of allies and neighbours, and difficult operational scenarios, This theatre also would assume elevated national security importance to Australia should global issues cause levels of political, strategic, military and logistic support from the US to fall short of Australian expectations. This is not an unreasonable assumption given US commitments in the IndoPacific, especially to Japan and South Korea. The US also might find itself pressured on other fronts, particularly by Russia which is seeking to advance its territorial ambitions. All this, without even factoring in the complications of US commitments to the Middle East.. So, although not by desire but necessity, Australia might find itself almost wholly responsible for the defence of its island continent, its approaches, its national interests, and of Australian (and US) logistics and enabling bases. But there are some positives in facing this security challenge. First, operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain play more to Australia’s advantage than to an enemy which would be required to sustain challenging military operations at long distance from home bases. Second, Australian military operations, especially maritime, play to Australia’s high levels of professional military mastery and the nation’s aptitude for the exploitation of technologically advanced capabilities. This is particularly the case with ISR and with information and intelligence, which will hopefully be assisted by continued support from off-board coalition capabilities.

The ability to operate with situational awareness and to target accurately at long ranges while denying an enemy that capability will be key to favourable operational and tactical outcomes in the maritime domains. These factors, together with the ability to conduct credible, long-range operations from Australian bases in a familiar environment, add to what should be a significant ‘home ground advantage’. So how does Australia’s force structure shape up to the challenge of operating against an adversary seeking to venture into Australia’s vast front yard? The answer is not immediately obvious from Australia’s Defence White Papers which are expressed in abstract terms such as: decision-making superiority; enabled, mobile and sustainable forces; and capability streams, etc. For example, the 2016 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) recommends the acquisition of both seven Triton maritime UAS and 15 Poseidon manned aircraft, with no reference that these two systems are essentially complementary with a combined effectiveness considerably greater than the sum of the two individual systems. More critically, the IIP makes no mention of whether these two capabilities provide an operational capability in only one area of operations, or are sufficient to conduct operations simultaneously in two areas. This is fundamental to any assessment of the strength and preparedness of the ADF’s capability. This should not be taken as criticism of past Australian force structure policy when it was – in more benign times – probably the best basis on which to plan a national defence capability. But the world has changed. Long-standing rules-based international processes have been disregarded, propaganda and proxies are being used as vehicles to advance nation states’ interests, and nation state militarisation is escalating. In this environment, Australia now needs to assess more critically just how well its planned defence capabilities can cope with emerging threats. A good start would be to assess how well Australia’s IIP military capabilities can deter, neutralise and, if necessary, defeat assertive foreign military action in the expansive theatre south of Australia’s First Island Chain.

Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Development Planning Branch.

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